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David Laibson
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 116, No. 1. (Feb., 2001), pp. 81-119.
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Wed Nov 21 11:19:31 2007
A CUE-THEORY OF CONSUMPTION*
* This work has been supported by the National Science Foundation (SBR-
9510985) and the MacArthur Foundation. I am particularly grateful to anony-
mous referees whose careful comments dramatically improved this pa er, to QJE
editors Edward Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer, and to Jeroen Swinkels w i o drew my
attention to the association between cues and motivational states. I have also
benefited from the insights of Colin Camerer, Peter Diamond, George Loewen-
stein, Gregory Mankiw, Drazen Prelec, Paul Romer, Richard Zeckhauser, and
seminar participants a t Brown University, Columbia University, Cornell Univer-
sity, Harvard University, MacArthur Foundation Preferences Group, National
Bureau of Economic Research, and Norwegian Research Council Addiction Group.
Meghana Bhatt, Xiaomeng Tong, and Stephen Weinberg provided excellent re-
search assistance.
0 2001 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 2001
82 QUARTERLY J O U R N f i OF ECONOMICS
[1980], Stewart and Eikelboom [1987],Siegel, Krank, and Hinson t19881, Turkkan
Woods 119911.
10. The assumption that the compensatory process does not evolve if the cue
is not present is consistent with the available evidence on "extinction" (see
Institute of Medicine [1996, pp. 421 and Hoffman, Fleshler, and Jensen [19631).
Recall the example of the ex-smoker who had not extinguished his association
between beach cues and smoking. Cue-based drives do not decay on their own. The
cue-conditioned addict must be desensitized by repeatedly ex osing the individual
to the cue while abstaining from consumption of the addfetive good. Finally,
assuming that the cue-based drive decays in the absence of the cue, would not
change most of the qualitative analysis.
88 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
u ( a - Ax) + (1 - a)E.
A high value of the compensatory process, x, raises the marginal
utility associated with consumption of the primary good (i.e.,
a2ulacax 2 0). This effect is mitigated, but not completely offset,
by dynamic considerations.12 When the compensatory process is
strong, consumption of the primary good is optimal, which is the
result in Proposition 1. Hence, the model is said to be character-
12. Specifically, higher current values of the compensatory process raise the
future disutility associated with current consumption of the primary good.
92 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
13. The analysis in Becker and Murphy [I9881 focuses on parameter values
that imply adjacent complementaiity, but their model admits cases in which
adjacent complementarity does not arise.
14. Comparative statics with respect to X cannot be signed unless more
structure is imposed on the function u. When u is linear, rl2IrlX > 0, but this
inequality reverses when u is sufficiently bowed.
A CUE-THEORY OF CONSUMPTION
COROLLARY
4. The optimal policy correspondence of the Cues Bell-
man equation is a threshold rule. I.e., there exist threshold
values f R and f Gsuch that
xC
*steady state t
:
Steady Stat0
0.9
0.8 -'--I
0.7 -
0.6
0.5
xc
0.4 - -
0.3 --
0.2
0.1 --
Staacly Stalr
1 r Strady Statr
0 i *
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
iR
FIGUREI
Steady States and Basins of Attraction
15. A steady state exists a t time period T if the state variables are constant
from T forward:
Axjl=A$=O VtZT.
A CUE-THEORY OF CONSUMPTION 97
16. For scenarios in which the consumer gives up K > 1proportion of income,
I assume zero consumption of the primary good and negative consumption of the
alternative good. E.g., if income is 1- K < 0,then consumption of the alternative
good is 1 - K units generating E(1 - K) utils.
A CUE-THEORY OF CONSUMPTION 99
J a r of candy on the desk. . . sure I'll have some. Strolling past a bak-
ery . . . the donuts sure smell good. Popcorn a t the movies . . . I can't resist.
Snacks while watching TV . . . the whole family does it. It's just about im-
possible to isolate yourself from food and the various signals that remind you
of food. In our society, we're bombarded with tempting treats that lure us into
unplanned eating episodes. So what can you do? [. . .I You can eliminate some
triggers, such as bowls of candy sitting on your desk. You can stop buying
foods where "you can't eat just one" [Wellbridge Weight Management Ap-
proach 1998, Section 5, p. 81.
In addition, i?R
5 2 , where 2 is the threshold value from the
optimal policy generated by the No-Cues Bellman equation
with 8 = 6.
COROLLARY 10. For any K < 1, there exist preferences and cue
probabilities of the Restricted Cues Model that support a
steady state at which the consumer is willing to give up at
least K proportion of her permanent income to permanently
deny herself access to the primary activity. No such param-
eterization exists if K 2 1.
22. The ideas in this subsection developed from a conversation with Jeroen
Swinkels.
23. Alternatively, one could assume that the cigarette will be present until
the decision-maker smokes it. This would not change the qualitative results. An
earlier version of the paper analyzes this case.
104 QUARTERLY JOUItNAL OF ECONOMICS
dictably and are "elicited by cues that were associated with drug
availability and drug use in the ex-addict's previous experience"
[Goldstein 1994, pp. 220-2211. In addition, if an addict experi-
ences a small taste, or "priming" dose of the addictive substance,
he will experience extremely strong cravings [Gardner and Low-
inson 19931. Such tastes are themselves an important consump-
tion cue.24The Cues Model predicts that seemingly trivial varia-
tion in situational cues can elicit temporary but powerful changes
in marginal utility. These effects arise in the consumption of a
wide range of goods. "Impulse buying" and unplanned consump-
tion are subjects of active study by retail firms and marketing
experts. For example, surveys find that between 20 percent and
50 percent of supermarket purchases are unplanned, and that
most of these unplanned sales are catalyzed by in-store stimuli.25
The Cues Model explains much of this behavior, predicting which
familiar stimuli-e.g., drug cues, food cues, sexual ~timuli,~%o-
cia1 stimuli27-will cause preferences to vary from moment to
moment.28
Second, the Cues Model explains why and how consumers
work to overcome/regulate their habituated appetites. In the
Becker and Murphy model, staying in the addicted state is an
optimal policy. Addicted consumers would like, in principle, to
have less consumption capital, but there is no way for them to
optimally achieve this. In the Cues Model, addictivehabitual
consumption will be resisted by addicts who can control their
environmental cues. The Cues Model predicts many of the specific
cue-management and quasi-commitment strategies that habitual
consumers commonly use to regulate their own appetites (e.g.,
hide cigarettes, avoid parties where alcohol will be served, use the
candy-free checkout lane, "store tempting treats in 'see proof
~ontainers,"~%tc.). The model also predicts the successful strat-
egies that people use to delay gratification (e.g., distract oneself
30. See Mischel, Shoda, and Rodriguez [I9921 and Jansen [19981.
31. See Wellman [19991.
A CUE-THEORY OF CONSUMPTION 109
32. For example, since 1934, Federal law and FCC regulations have prohib-
ited broadcasts of gambling advertising. Recently these restrictions have been
legally challenged with mixed success. See United States District Court, D. New
Jersey 119971 and United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit [19981.
33. The aversiveness of cue-exposure depends on the form of preferences. If
preferences take the form U ( O ~ X $- Xxu t (1 - a;)<, then activation of a
cue-conditioned compensatory process may be desirable.
110 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
LEMMA
11. Let
m
f(x) = x
t=O
Gt[u(-Xatx)+ <]
f ( x )= x St(-hat)u'(-hatx)
t=O
LEMMA
12. Let
m
Then,
c$~(x)
$;(XI-- u(1 - h[aix+ 1 - ail)
- u(-hlaix + ai-'(1 - a)])- 5 (i 2 I),
where x represents xt. Note that +i represents the difference
+
between the (t i)th period instantaneous utility flow generated
+
by f(x) and the ( t i)th period instantaneous utility flow gen-
erated by f(x). Likewise, +irepresents the difference between the
(t + i)th period instantaneous utility flow generated by g (x) and
the ( t + i)th period instantaneous utility flow generated by f^( x).
Note that
LEMMA
14. The solution to the No-Cues Bellman equation
( 1 4 ) W ( x )= max [u(a - Ax) + ( 1 - a ) t + GW(m + ( 1 - a)a)I1
a
is given by
W(X>
=f(x) by assumption
= max ( f ( x > , f ( x > ) by Lemma 13
= max [ u ( a - Xx) + ( 1 - a ) t + Gf(ax + ( 1 - a ) a ) ]
a
by definition o f f and f^
= max [u(a - X x ) + (1 - a)( + GW(m + ( 1 - a)a)]
a
by definition of W .
W(X>
= f(x> by assumption
= max ( f ( x >g, ( x > > by Lemma 13
= max [u(a- kc)+ (1 - a)(c+ 6 f ( m ) ) + aSg(ax + 1 - a)]
a
by definition o f f and g
= max [ u ( a - Ax) + ( 1 - a ) <+ 6 W ( a x + ( 1 - a ) a ) ]
a
by definition of W .
Parallel arguments apply for the cases in which x > 2, confirming
that the Bellman equation is satisfied for the candidate function
W(.>.
Lemma 14 implies that the optimal policy generates payoff
function f(x) when x I 2, and the optimal policy generates payoff
function g(x) when x e 2. Payoff f(x) implies permanent absti-
nence from the primary good. Payoff g(x) implies permanent
consumption of the primary good. Hence, the optimal policy is a
threshold rule, completing the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. By Lemma 14,the threshold value 32 is
the unique crossing point of the functions f(x) and g(x), defined
in the statement of Lemma 11. Let O represent a parameter of
interest in the model. Then by the implicit function theorem,
So the difference, f,(f , a ) - g,(f ,a), can be broken down into two
components:
then
(I- " 1
Tit'(. ) = 1- 8(1 - F) w . &=---1- 8(1 - F) .
"
Proof of Lemma 15. Confirm that the Bellman equation is
satisfied for the candidate function w(.):
A CUE-THEORY OF CONSUMPTION
.
The first equality follows from the definition of the candidate
function. The second equality follows from the definition of W.
The third equality follows from the definition of W . The fourth
equality is derived by rearranging the equation.
Continuing with the proof of Proposition 3, let
and confirm that the candidate function satisfies the Cues Bell-
man equation:
= + W ( X G I =~ pG)
ii7(xRly = yR)
= max yR[u(aR- X X ~ +
) (1 aR)( -
aH
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
+ (1 - uG)<+ 6 W ( X R ~ , L R
+)6 W ( a x G+ ( 1
a > a IP
G G
- 11
= max ELR[u(aR- hxR) + ( 1 - a")<
an
+ 8 V ( a x R + ( 1 - ol)aR,xG)]. . .
+ max p G [ u ( a G hxG)+ ( 1 - aG)[
-
a0
+ S V ( x R , a x G+ ( 1 - ol)aG)].
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[Footnotes]
5
Heroin ``Overdose'' Death: Contribution of Drug-Associated Environmental Cues
Shepard Siegel; Riley E. Hinson; Marvin D. Krank; Jane McCully
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A Theory of Rational Addiction
Gary S. Becker; Kevin M. Murphy
The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 96, No. 4. (Aug., 1988), pp. 675-700.
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Unplanned Buying and In-Store Stimuli in Supermarkets
Russell Abratt; Stephen Donald Goodey
Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 11, No. 2. (May, 1990), pp. 111-121.
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Credit Cards as Spending Facilitating Stimuli: A Conditioning Interpretation
Richard A. Feinberg
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