Political Realignments in Post-NTR Andhra Pradesh

Author(s): K. Srinivasulu and Prakash Sarangi

Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 34, No. 34/35 (Aug. 21 - Sep. 3, 1999), pp. 2449-
2458
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 Political Realignments
in Post-NTR
Andhra Pradesh
K Srinivasulu
Prakash Sarangi

The volatility of the electoral performances of Telugu Desam Party and Congress in the post-N T Rama
Rao Andhra Pradesh could be symptomatic of deeper changes in their social bases. The voters have accepted
Chandrababu Naidu as NTR's successor, and have continued to accept him as such even after he moved
away from some of NTR 's policies. But the OBC, ST and Muslim supporters of TDP have shown some unease
recently. Both the TDP and the Congress experienced seat changes and swings in their vote margins in
1998 elections with the BJP deriving some benefit from this.

THE political scenario in the post-N T
RamaRao phaseof AP politicshas been
characterised by both continuity and
change.While the continuityis transpar-
entin thedominantpresenceof theTelugu
Desam Party (Naidu) (TDPN) and
Congress(I)inthestatepolitics,thechange
is somethingthatdefiesprecisecharacteri-
sation. Electoralterrainis not merely a
fieldof contestamongpoliticalpartiesfor
powerbutsignificantlyalso a siteof parti-
cipationandarticulation bypopularclasses
of theirinterestsandaspirations(andtheir
co-optationby competingparties).
The orchestratedview is thatthe 1996
and 1998 Lok Sabha elections, keenly
contestedbytherivalTeluguDesamgroups
- TDPN and TDP Lakshmi Parvati
(TDPLP)- for the politicallegacy of N T
RamaRao (NTR),andbetweenthemand
the Congress(I),have settled the social
forces between the TDPN and the
Congress(I)as two majorplayersin the
politicalarena.This view couldbe a very
limitedreadingof thesignificanceof these
elections.Theseatchangesandincreased
vote marginswitnessedin theseelections
betweenthe TDPN and the Congress(I)
on the one hand and between them and
the BJPon the otherhavebeen attributed
in the popularpressto the local specifici-
ties. What is lost sight of in this crass
empiricism is the possibility that the
volatilityevidentin the electoralperfor-
mance of dominantpartiesin the post-
NTR period could be symptomaticof
deeperchangesin theirsocial bases.Here
an attemptis made,by locatingthesetwo
elections in a historical perspective,at
readingthe electoralfluidityas indicative
of a realignmentof social forces carving
out politicalspace for an alternativearti-
culation,the precise form and character
of which is yet to crystallise.
ThestateofAndhraPradeshwasformed
inNovember1956,by mergingTelangana
- a regionof nineTelugu-speaking districts
of the erstwhileHyderabadstatewith the dominance is noticeable especially in
11 districts of the Andhra state. The the TelanganaandRayalaseemaregions.
Hyderabadstatewhichwas undertherule The kammas, on the other hand, are
of the Nizambecamea partof the Indian dominantprimarilyin thecoastaldistricts
union as a resultof the police action in and their influence in other regions is
September1948.Thepeopleof Hyderabad, negligible.
underthe leadershipof the Communist The brahmins are numerically very
Partyof India (CPI), had waged a pro- small,comprisingas theydo, a mere3 per
longed struggleagainstthe Nizam's op- cent. They were politicallyactive during
pressiverule.TheCongressPartyhadalso nationalistmovement.They are not an
been in the forefront of the people's economicallypowerfulgroup,andhence,
strugglein this area.The Andhrastateon theirinfluencehasdeclinedduringthelast
the other hand, was formedin October few decades. Among the other forward
1953 by separatingthe Telugu-speaking class peasantcastes, the kapus,velamas
districtsof the Madraspresidency,con- andrajusareimportantcastesthatmatter
sequentuponan agitationby the Telugu- to a significant extent in state politics
speakingpeople for a separatestate of thoughthey are confinedonly to smaller
their own. The Andhrastate itself con- pocketsin termsof theirnumericalpres-
sisted of two regions:the rich and fertile ence and influence.The otherbackward
coastalAndhradistrictsandthe poorand castes (OBCs) comprising46.1 per cent
backwarddistrictsof Rayalaseemaregion. constitutea very large proportionof the
ThusthepresentAndhraPradeshcomprises state's population[Reddy 1989]. There
of threegeographical regionsofTelangana, has been processof gradualrealisationof
coastal Andhraand Rayalaseema,leach their numericalstrengthand collective
with its distinct regional profile. Each interestsinpoliticalandeconomicspheres,
region'shistory,socio-economicdevelop- amongthesecasteswhichbecameincreas-
ment and politicalcultureare invariably ingly visible in the post-emergencype-
reflected in the electoral processes and riod.This is a consequenceof the process
outcomes. of economic development,state policies
Caste has been the basis of political and expansionof educationalopportuni-
grouping and mobilisationof electoral ties andthe politicsof patronagepursued
supportin the staterightfromthe begin- bytheCongressunderIndiraGandhi.Thus
ning.Reddysandkammas,whoconstitute they are in a positiontoday to challenge
only 6.5 and 4.8 per cent of the state's the traditionallandowningcastes in the
populationrespectively,are the two po- ruralareas.The scheduledcastes (SCs),
liticallydominantcommunities.Themost constituting15.5 per cent of the popula-
importantsourceof theirpowerhas been tion, are graduallyemergingas a politi-
theircontrolover land [Elliot 1970]. As cally salientgroup.The two mostnumer-
the majorlandholdersand occupantsof ous castes among them, the malas and
importantpositionsin the villages, they madigas,comprisingthe bulkof agricul-
have traditionallycontrolledvillage po- turallabourare presentall over the state.
liticallife. In the courseof timetheyhave Andhra Pradesh has 6 per cent tribal
expandedtheiractivitiesintootherspheres populationwhich is largelyconcentrated
of the economy, i e, business,transport, in the forest areas of the Andhraand
contractsand industry[Upadhya 1988; Telanganaregions.Similarly,theMuslims
1997]. The reddys are distributedin all who constituteabout 8 per cent of the
the three regions of the state. but their state's populationhave their distinctive

Economic and Political Weekly August 21-28, 1999 2449

impacton the politics of the Telangana
and Rayalaseemaregions.
I
Era of Congress Dominance
The dominanceof the CongressParty
in the politicalhistoryof AndhraPradesh
continueduninterrupted forthreedecades
till it was upsetby the TDP in the 1983
assemblyelections. In the early yearsof
independence,this region had witnessed
a credibleanti-Congressideological ar-
ticulation and popular vote. The left,
comprisingof thecommunistsanddiffer-
ent shadesof socialists,was the mainstay
of this oppositionboth in the Telangana
region of Hyderabadstate and Andhra
state.Theirfailureto evolve into an alter-
nativestrongenoughto displacetheCong-
ressis aninstanceof a lostpossibility.After
theformationof AndhraPradeshstate,the
lefthasregisteda gradualdeclinebothor-
ganisationallyandideologically.Organis-
ationally,it hadbeenweakenedandideo-
logicallyit got diffusedas a resultof suc-
cessive splits following serious disputes
on crucialpolitico-ideologicalquestions.
In contrastto the left, the Congress
duringthis period,displayedtremendous
dynamismandpoliticaltactin tacklingthe
challengesfacing it. By conceding the
demand for the 'Vishalandhra' state,
organisedon a linguisticbasis, the Con-
gressvirtuallyhijackedanimportantissue
of the left agenda.Further,throughdif-
ferentagrarianreformmeasures,like the
zamindariandjagirdari abolition,tenancy
andlandreformlegislations,theCongress
regimesoughtto addressthecrucialagrar-
ianandlandquestionsbroughtto thecentre
of Indianpoliticsby theagrarianstruggles
of the 1940s.Theoverallchanges,induced
by the earlier agrarianradicalism and
subsequentstatereformhavesubstantially
alteredthe agrarianstructurethusleading
to the decline of the supportbase of the
left. Added to these factors, there was
ideologicalconfusionand uncertaintyin
the communistcampas a resultof Soviet
Union'ssupportfor the CongressParty's
formalcommitmentto createa 'socialist
patternof society'.In part,thisconfusion
and uncertaintywas both a cause and an
effectof the splitin the partybetweenthe
CPI and CPI(M).In the meanwhile,the
Congress Party was consolidating its
position by accommodatingin its fold,
splintergroupswhichhadearlierdefected
from the party,especially the Krishikar
Lok Party of N G Ranga and Kisan
MazdoorPartyof T Prakasam.It was also
trying very hard to win over sizeable
support from the Muslim community
which was disenchantedafterthe police
2450
action and the merger of Hyderabadin the portof marginalisedgroupslikebackward
Indian union. castes, dalits, tribalsand women.
The Congress Party maintained its IndiraGandhi'spopulistradicalismand
absolute supremacy for almost two and a political strategy of mobilisation and
half decades, startingfrom the state's first accommodationof marginalisedgroups
election in 1957 (Tables 1 and 2). In the was instrumentalin increasingthe social
five elections to the legislative assembly polarisationalong both caste and class
during this period, it won between 57.5 lines. This not only led to the breakdown
percent and76.3 percent seats andbetween of the traditionalpatron-clientrelation-
39.3 per cent and 52.3 per cent votes. In ships at the local level but also pavedthe
the six Lok Sabha elections during this way forthedeclineof thepoliticalcontrol
period, its share of seats in the state varied of dominantlandedcastes.IndiraGandhi's
from 68.3 per cent to 97.6 per cent and populismand radicalrhetoric,by raising
its vote share varied from 46.8 per cent the aspirationsand expectationsof the
to 57.4 percent. It is interesting to note that marginalisedsocial groupsand commu-
the Congress Party did not lose its domi- nities,openedup a new phaseof political
nance in any of the elections, not even in contradictions.Thus caught up in the
the 1967 election when it lost power in contradictionsandintensefactionalism-
as many as eight states nor in the 1977 a reflection of the contradictions- the
election, when it was completely routed Congress under IndiraGandhiincreas-
in almost every corer of the country. On ingly resortedto centralisationof power:
the contrary, it sent a record number of at the politicalorganisationallevel in the
41 members to the Lok Sabha in 1977. high commandof the party and at the
Thus, the Congress Party's performance governmentallevel in thecentre.Thecon-
during this period was significantly better sequenceof this processwas the erosion
than thatof any other political party.Apart of regionalleadershipandinitiative.The
from the communist parties, the other failureof the CongressPartyto accom-
parties which contested elections at dif- modatecontendinginterests,its inability
ferent phases but had only a marginal to channelise the politicisation of
influence on the state's politics were the marginalisedcommunitiesopenedupnew
Swatantra Party, the Jan Sangh, Socialist political possibilities. It is against this
Party, Praja Socialist Party, Republican backgroundthattheemergenceof theTDP
Party of India, Majlis-e-Ittehadul- in AP has to be appreciated.
Muslimeen, Congress (0) andJanataParty.
II
The Congress Party's sterling electoral
performance during this period however, Emergence of Telugu Desam Party
conceals a major weakness, its internal The 1980s broughtaboutan important
factionalism. It was the clash of person- changein the politicalhistoryof the state.
alities among Congress leaders which was The CongressPartytasteddefeatfor the
reflected in several powerful agitations in first time in the electoralhistoryof the
the state: for a steel plant during the mid- state. It was a sequel to the intra-party
1960s, for a separateTelangana in the late factionalconflictandrepeated'diktat'from
1960s and the Jai Andhra movement in the 'high command'leadingto frequent
the early 1970s. These agitationsalso partly changes of chief ministers,as witnessed
symbolised a struggle for power among by four changes in a five-year period
different strataof society. Several of Indira precedingthe 1983 assembly elections.
Gandhi's initiatives in introducing socio- As a reactionto thesecentralisingtenden-
economic programmes aimed at address- cies in the Congress, a regional party
ing the interests of, and rallying the sup- emergedwith a proclaimedobjectiveto
TABLE
1: LOKSABHA
ELECTION
Year Total Turnout INC JNP CPI+CPM Others
Seats (Per Cent) BLD (1977)
SWA (1962-71) _
Seats Vote Seats Vote Seats Vote Party Seats Vote
1952 25 44.7 14 40.1 - - PDF 7 28.2
1957 43 - -
43.9 37 51.5 2 12.0 PDF 2 11.0
1962 43 64.7 34 48.0 1 14.9 7 21.0 BJS - 1.2
1967 41 68.7 35 46.8 3 13.8 1 11.4 CPM - 7.4
1971 41 59.1 28 55.7 - - 1 5.9 TPS 10 14.3
1977 42 62.5 41 57.4 1 32.3 - 2.7 CPM - 4.7
1980 42 56.9 41 56.2 - 6.4 - 3.7 INCU 1 7.2
1984 42 69.0 6 41.8 1 1.2 1 1.9 TDP 30 44.8
Notes: Remaining seats and vote have gone to either other minor parties or independents.
'Vote' is per cent to total votes cast.
Economic and Political Weekly August 21-28, 1999
representthe interestsof Telugupeople.
N T Rama Rao, a popular film star,
launchedthe TDP on March 29, 1982
whichwithinninemonthsof its formation
emergedvictoriousin the 1983 assembly
electionsby successfullyrallyingthenon-
Congressvote. The TDP won 202 seats
outof a totalof 294, whereastheCongress
Partycouldsecureonly 60 seats.The CPI
and CPMgot fourand five seats respec-
tively. Only one seat went to the Janata
Dal andthreeto theBharatiyaJanataParty
(BJP)(Table2). For the firsttime a non-
Congressgovernmentwas established.A
similarpatternwasdiscerniblein the 1984
Lok Sabha elections which followed
shortly,after dramaticdevelopmentsat
the state and nationallevels.2 The Con-
gress Partysecuredonly six seats out of
a total of the 42 it contested,with 41.8
per cent votes, whereasthe TDP got 30
out of the 34 seats it contestedwith 44.8
percentvotes (Table1). This was in spite
of a sympathy wave in favour of the
Congress(I)followingtheassassinationof
IndiraGandhi.
The emergenceof NTR as a political
force not only changed the course of
politicaldevelopmentsbut also the very
styleofpoliticsitself."WhileIndiraGandhi
brokepatron-clientties at the local level,
she herself emerged as the key patron.
This trend initiated the process of
'depoliticisation'of partyworkerswhich
ended in loss of credibilityof Congress
politicians.Thus,NTR, who was a new-
comer to politics, enjoyed greatercred-
ibilitythanmostmenlongassociatedwith
publiclife" [Reddy 1989]. Startingwith
the sloganof protectingthe 'self-respect'
of the Telugu people, which he claimed
had been lost duringCongress rule, he
wentonto unfoldhisspecificprogrammes
to promotethe welfareof the Telugus.A
mythologicalheroon the celluloidscreen
was transformedinto a real life hero of
themasses.He usedtheTelugusentiment
very well duringelectioncampaigns.He
reachedout to the masses by personally
touringthe state aboardhis 'Chaitanya
Ratham'- a campaignvehiclefittedwith
gadgetslike a publicaddresssystem.His
use of cassettes, posters and cut-outs decentralisationby dismantlingrevenue
symbolisednewmodesof effectivepoliti- talukaand panchayatsamitis.3
cal communication. The next assembly and Lok Sabh:
NTR's entry into politics also altered elections wereheld in 1989, in whichthe
thetraditionalcastecalculusin the state's TDP lost its dominantposition to the
electoralpolitics.Thekammacaste,which Congress(I).The latterbagged 181 seats
has come to play a dynamicrole in the in the assemblyand came backto power
stateeconomy,couldneversecurea chief aftera gap of seven years.The TDP won
ministershipduringthe Congressregime, only 74 seats.Similarly,in theLokSab-ha
though there were six chief ministers elections, the CongressPartysecured39
belongingto the rivalreddycaste. NTR, out of 42 seats and 51 per cent votes
being a kamma,could becomea rallying whereasTDPsecuredameretwoseatsand
pointforthe kammagroupsby providing 34.5 per cent votes. This positionof the
them with an opportunityto realisetheir CongressPartysuffereda setbackin the
politicalambitionsanddemonstratetheir 1991Lok Sabhaelection whenit won 25
potentialities.He triedto createa support seats and 45.6 per cent votes. While the
base among the backwardcastes, rural TDP increasedits share to 13 seats and
poor and women by means of several 32.3 percentvotes(Table3). Thiselection
populistpolicies andby facilitatingtheir markedalsotheentryof theBahujanSamaj
accommodationin the power structure. Party(BSP)intotheelectionfrayinAndhra
An event of criticalsignificanceto the Pradesh.It contested77 seats, but could
consolidationof NTRin statepoliticswas not secureeven a single seat.Thoughthe
the revoltof a sectionwithinthe TDP in CongressPartycame backto powerit did
1984. Nadendla Bhaskar Rao, NTR's not seem to have learntanythingfromits
finance minister,revolted against NTR past mistakes.It continuedwith the old
and became the chief ministerwith the cultureof internalbickeringsandfactional
supportof the Congressafterhavinggot conflicts resultingin frequentchangeof
NTRdismissedfromthechiefministership. chief ministers.These factorsin a signi-
NTR went back to the masses with an ficantsensecontributed totheTDP's come-
appeal to 'save democracy'. He was re- back to power in the 1994 elections.
instatedin powerwithina monthbecause In the assemblyelectionsof December
of massivepublicprotest.But he recom- 1994, the TDP swept the polls capturing
mendedthe dissolutionof the assembly a massive 217 seats (251, if the shareof
and fresh elections were conducted in its allies. CPI andCPM,is added)out of
March1985.This time NTR enteredinto a total of 292 seats for which elections
seat adjustmentswith non-Congress(I) were held. The CongressPartywon only
partieslike CPI, CPM, Janataand BJP. 25 seats. The vote shareof TDP and its
NTR's TDP corneredas many as 202 allies was 49.5 percentcomparedto 33.2
seats, more than what it had bagged in per cent of the Congress.In the coastal
1983;the Congresscould secureonly 50 region, the TDP won 105 seats out of a
seats. With this massive mandate,NTR total of 133 seats, comparedto the Con-
wentaheadwitha vengeanceto introduce gress Party'spoorperformancein secur-
his welfare schemes and administrative ing only 10seats.InTelanganaregion,the
reforms.He becameverypopularwithhis TDP won 69 seats out of a total of 107
subsidisedrice scheme, which provided seats.The Congresscouldsecureonly six
rice at Rs 2 a kilo for the pooranda slab seats, the lowest ever. Out of a total of
rateof electricityforthefarmers.To strike 52 seats in the Rayalaseemaregion, the
at an importantinstitutionalsupportbase TDP secured40 seats comparedto 10 of
of the Congress,NTR abolishedthe vil- the Congress.The TDP also established
lageofficerssystem,'patel-patwaris', and its strong presence in the SC and ST
to makethebureaucracy responsiveto the constituencies.Out of a total of 39 SC
people NTR initiated administrative seats,it won 28, while the Congresswon
TABLE2: VIDHANSABHAELECTION

Year Total Turn- INC CPI JNP SWA (1962-72) Others

Seats out Seats Vote Seats Vote Seats Vote Party Seats Vote Party Seats Vote
1957 301 73.1 187 41.7 15 22.2 - - PDF 22 7.6 PSP 14 5.6
1962 300 65.1 177 47.3 51 19.5 19 10.4 SOC 2 0.6 - - -
1967 287 69.6 165 45.4 i 7.8 29 9.8 CPM 9 7.6 BJS 3 2.1
1972 287 63.5 219 52.3 7 6.0 2 2.0 CPM 1 3.4 STPS 1 1.7
1978 294 72.9 175 39.3 6 2.5 60 28.9 INCU 30 17.0 CPM 8 2.7
1983 294 68.7 60 33.6 4 2.8 1 1.0 TDP 202 46.3 CPM 5 2.0
1985 294 67.6 50 37.5 11 2.7 3 0.8 TDP 202 46.2 CPM 11 2.3
Notes: Remaining seats and vote have gone to either other minor parties or independents.
'Vote' is per cent to total votes cast.

Economic and Political Weekly August 21-28, 1999 2451

onlytwo.CPIandCPM,theTDP's allies, III trary,wantedto prove that the mandate
got four and five seats respectively.All NTR's Legacy and 1996 Elections of the 1994 assembly elections was for
the 14 ST seatswerecapturedby theTDP NTR and that the same electors would
and its allies. Crucialto the analysisof the 1996Lok legitimise her own choice as NTR's po-
Strategicto the TDP's overwhelming Sabhaelectionin thestateare:theremoval litical heiress.
victory in the 1994 assembly elections of N T RamaRaofromchief ministership Thus by the accidentof circumstances
were the promises of prohibition, in August1995andhis deathfourmonths LakshmiParvathiemergedasanewplayer
subsidisedrice, allotmentof house sites later.AfterNTR's comebackto powerin in Andhra Pradesh politics. Her only
andthe supplyof subsidisedjanatacloth. 1994. the TDP which had all along ap- politicalcapitalwasthepopularsympathy
These promisescould capturethe imagi- pearedas a monolithicorganisationunder at NTR's demise:she carvedout a niche
nationof the weakersections,especially the total grip of the supremo,saw an forherself,however,by addingto thisher
theSCs,andOBCs.Crucialto theanalysis internecinestrugglein its rank and file own oratorialskills. She went roundthe
of this appealare the statewidewomens which finally culminated in the coup stateexhortingpeople to undothe injus-
movementsagainstarrackandthedilution againstNTR.Thechiefreasonforthiswas tice meted out to her husbandand van-
of the subsidisedrice schemeduringthe the perception among NTR's family quishthe 'back-stabbers'. Publicresponse
Congressrule(1989-94).As a result,the membersof an increasingpoliticalhold was unprecedented,as evidencedin her
Congress campaign that these welfare of LakshmiParvathi,NTR's biographer firstpublicmeeting'SimhaGarjana' (lion's
programmescut into developmentalex- turned-secondwife, over NTR. NTR's roar) in Vijayawada, followed by
pendituredid not cut much ice. In any son-in-law, Nara ChandrababuNaidu, 'Ugrashankharavam'(clarion call) in
case, benefits from developmental supportedby family members,success- Tirupathi.Almostall the nationalleaders
programmesare not likely to be as tan- fully ralliedthe supportof 190MLAsand of JanataDal threwtheirweight behind
gibleas thosefromwelfareschemes.That forcedNTRtoresignfromthechiefminister- her, even if it was only to show respect
mostof these subsidyexpenditureswere ship,andhimselfassumedthe leadership to the departedleader of the National
extractedfrom the excise revenues and of both the party and the government. Front.Giventhispoliticalscenario,many
thattherecouldbe a difficultyin continu- Though this coup resembled the one political commentatorsconfidentlypre-
ing eitherthe welfareschemesor NTR's engineeredby NadendlaBhaskarRao in dictedthatshe mightsweepthepolls.But
new sloganfor total prohibition,did not 1984, this time therewas neithera sym- the absenceof any capableorganiseror
registerin the minds of voters. On the patheticpressnorany significantpopular strategistin herpartywho couldtranslate
contrary, a combination of both the protestto bring NTR back into power. the sympathyfactor into votes was her
schemesappealedto the electorate,espe- Further,with NTR's deathon January majordisadvantage.
cially the women voters in ruralareas, 18, 1996the politicalscenarioin the state Chief ministerNaidu, an astutepoliti-
mostof whomvoted for the TDP. In the changedsignificantly.The family mem- cian, was keenly looking forwardto the
1994elections,therewas also a clearshift bers,who hadearlierquarreledforpower, Lok Sabhaelectionsin orderto establish
of Muslimvotes fromthe Congressto the now startedfightingnot only for his dead hiscredibilityandprovehisclaimof being
TDP.It couldbe becausethe Muslimsin bodyandpropertybutalsoforhispolitical thetrueandrightfulpoliticalheirof NTR.
thestateheldtheCongress(I)andtheBJP legacy. Naidu, with the power of state Indeed,he was to face elections for the
equallyresponsiblefor the demolitionof governmentin hand,had alreadywalked first time as the leaderof his party.His
the Babrimasjid.Added to this, NTR's awaywiththe supportof the rankandfile and his party'sdestiny dependedon the
earliertenureas chief minister(1983-89) of the party.He was determinedto show outcomeof these elections.He got a shot
was remarkablefor its maintenanceof that the TDP electoratewere also with in thearmwhentheElectionCommission
communalharmony. him.LakshmiParvathi,headingthe NTR recognisedhis factionof TDP as the real
The entryof BSP into state politics in factionnow namedTDPLP.on the con- TDP and was renamedas TDPN,NTR's
a big way duringthe 1994 assemblyelec- TABLE 3: ELECTORALOUTCOME OF RECENT ELECTIONS
tions raisedsome hopes of a thirdforce
in the state. BSP supremoKanshiRam Parties Lok Sabha (Total Seats: 42) Vidhan Sabha (Total Seats: 294)
Year 1989 1991 1996 1998 1989 1994
generatedinitialeuphoriaamongtheSCs,
STs and OBCs by raisingthe slogan of Turn-out 70.4 61.4 63.0 66.0 70.4 71.0
politicalpowerto 'bahujans'(majority). INC Seats 39 25 22 22 181 25
TherewasanticipationthattheBSPwould Vote 51.0 45.6 39.7 38.5 47.2 33.2
be ableto cut intothe fortunesof boththe TDP Seats 2 13 16 12 74 217
Vote 34.5 32.3 32.6 32.0 36.8 43.3
Congress(I) and the TDP [Srinivasulu JD Seats - - - 1 1
1994].Itcouldnotwina singleseatthough Vote 1.6 0.6 - 0.9 0.4 0.1
it contestedfrom 218 constituencies.In BJP Seats - 1 - 4 5 3
fact, all candidatesexcept one lost their Vote 2.0 9.5 5.7 18.3 1.2 3.9
-
deposits.Only 12 candidatescouldsecure CPI Seats 1 2 2 8 21
morethan5,000 votes. The failureof the Vote 2.0 1.9 2.4 2.6 2.6 3.9
CPM Seats - 1 1 - 6 13
BSP to takeoff in thestate'spoliticscould Vote 2.4 2.4 2.9 2.9 2.5 2.4
be attributed to the disenchantment in the MIM Seats 1 I 1 1 4 1
ranksbecause of the arroganceand au- Vote 2.1 1.8 1.1 1.5 2.0 0.7
thoritarian attitudeof KanshiRam.Buthis Others Seats - - - - - 2
attemptto organisethevotesof theweaker Vote i.8 1.7 11.8 1.6 0.8 2.0
sections underone bannermight have a IND Seats - - - - 15 12
Vote 2.6 4.2 3.8 1.7 6.5 10.5
lastingimpacton the state'spoliticsin the
future. Note: 'Vote' is per cent to total vote cast.

2452 Economic and Political Weekly August 21-28, 1999

election symbol, the bicycle, was also
allotted to Naidu. He tried his best to
continue all the populist policies associ-
ated with NTR. He consolidated his po-
sition by deciding to give 10 lakh new
cards for subsidised rice and distribute
forest land to the poor through the co-
operatives. Government programmes like
'prajalavaddakupaalana' (goverment to
the doorsteps of the people) and
'shramdanam'(contributorylabour) were
used as vehicles to reach out to the people.
The left parties, the CPI and the CPM,
which have been sailing with the TDP
since 1984, sided with Naidu. By support-
ing Naidu they could get not only easy
access to him but also by allying with the
TDPN retain at least the two seats they
hadin the lastLok Sabha.Thattheirgamble
paidoff was clear from later developments.
Political contestation as far as the rival
Telugu Desam groupswere concerned was
for the political legacy of NTR. As a result,
NTR' s main political plank, ever since he
launched the TDP, of 'anti-Congressism'
got considerably diluted.
This was to turn out in favour of the
Congress(I). In the Lok Sabha elections
of 1991 the Congress Party had won only
25 seats, 22 of which were won after the
assassinationof Rajiv Gandhiin the middle
of the election process and hence with a
possible sympathy wave. This was fol-
lowed by the 1994 assembly elections
where the partywas trounced.NTR clearly
hoped to repeat this performance during
the Lok Sabha elections. But the sudden
demise of NTR and the developments in
the TDP camp considerably brightened
the prospects of the Congress(I). It is no
exaggeration to suggest that the more the
division in the TDP votes, the better would
be the performance of the Congress. In
fact the Congress Party has been com-
manding a solid votebank in Andhra
Pradesh. About one-third of the voters
were committed Congress supporterswho
have lent support to the party in the suc-
cessive elections since 1983 whether there
was an NTR wave or not. The Congress
leadership was so assured of success that
it made hardly any efforts to patch up its
internal dissensions. This was in spite of
the fact that winning a sizeable number
of seats from the state was very crucial
to the party's overall strategy of retaining
power at the centre. Andhra Pradeshbeing
the home state of P V Narasimha Rao, the
party's performance in AP was watched
all over the country and hence the political
stakes for the Congress Party were quite
high.
The rest of the political parties have
been only minor players in the political
Economic and Political Weekly August 21-28, 1999
battle. The BJP and MIM have their major
support bases only in the Hyderabad-
Secunderabad area. The BJP has been
trying to expand its support base and had
contested in 40 constituencies in the 1991
Lok Sabha elections but could win only
the Secunderabad seat. It did, however.
win an appreciablenumberof votes in many
constituencies, especially in the Telangana
region. But it was expected that minute
caste calculations in the state could over-
turn the hindutva plank of the BJP. The
JanataDal, which was an ally of the TDP
in the 1991 elections, had fared miserably
and had hardlyany organisational strength
left to activate itself in 1996.
The 1996 elections, the first election in
the post-NTR phase, were intensely fought
for the political legacy of NTR by both
the TDP groups. Lakshmi Parvathi, fol-
lowing NTR's practice, launched her
campaign from the temple town of
Tirupathi.In her 'TarakaRama Chaitanya
Ratham' - a modified version of the cam-
paign vehicle made famous by NTR - she
travelled throughout the state holding big
rallies as well as street corer meetings.
She proved to be a great crowd puller,
especially in ruralareas.Though she lacked
the electrifying appeal of NTR, she had
enough oratorialskills to enthusethe crowd
to listen to her. She appealed to the
emotions of the voters by playing a re-
corded speech of NTR which called Naidu
and his group of MLAs 'traitors'. She
sought help from the people for what she
called 'Naraasura Samhaaram', which
means elimination of the demon Nara
(referring to Nara Chandrababu Naidu).
She tried to convey the message that NTR
was the victim of back-stabbingby his own
family members and thatNTR had wanted
the back-stabbers to be taught a lesson.
Parvathi'searlierexperienceas a 'Harikatha9
artiste helped her to captivate the masses.
She had learnt well NTR's skill of turning
adversity into advantage. For example,
when she lost the 'bicycle' symbol to the
rival faction, she asked the people to vote
for her new 'lion' symbol because the
bicycle has been stolen by the thieves.
While Parvathi imbibed many aspects
of NTR's style of campaigning, she con-
TABLE
4: PRE-POLL
SURVEY
RESULTS
Support for Prohibition among
Political Party Supporters
Party Approving Disapproving
INC 44.5 57.8
TDPN and allies* 45.4 28.5
Others 12.0 13.8
Note: * CPI and CPM
Source: Pre-poll survey, CSDS, 1996.
veniently forgot NTR's most importai:,
plank, 'anti-Congressism'. She invariah,
projected herself as anti-Naidu and nevec
as anti-Congress. In fact, there were even
rumours that she might support the Con-
gress Partyafterthe elections. Itwas evident
that she lacked the knack, experience or
sane advice to convert the sympathy irnto
votes. While her crowd pulling abilities
were extolled by the media, differentphases
of CSDS pre-poll surveys4 revealed that
her support base among voters was only
between 5.45 per cent and 9.67 per cent.
SeveralofNTR' s key organisersatthe local
level had already deserted her and she had
very few effective middle level leaders.
Naidu on the contrarydisplayed meticu-
lous planning and execution of electoral
strategy. Naidu made all possible efforts
to project his closeness to NTR and his
policies. He freely used NTR's portraits
and speeches to whip up voter enthusiasm.
While NTR's photograph found a place
on the cover of Naidu's election mani-
festo, he selectively used the speeches
where he was praised, especially the one
NTR made after his reinstatement as chief
minister in 1984, "ChandrababuNaidu is
an astute politician. But for his struggle,
the Telugu Desam would not have been
reborn. I will never forget his services"
(India Today. May 15, 1996:66). Naidu's
oratorial skill and crowd pulling capabili-
ties were poorer compared to that of
Parvathi. But he tried to make up by
using the privatesatellite channels to reach
the electorate in remote villages. Parvathi
did nothing to counter this propaganda,
not even by showing a clipping from
NTR's press conferences denouncing his
son-in-law. Naidu used the election as an
opportunity to widen his party's organi-
sational network. He made his MLAs
personally supervise the party's campaign
in their respective areas. He tried to
galvanise the civil servants to create an
impression that his is a responsive admin-
istration. He tried to prove time and again
that he was continuing with the populist
welfare policies associated with NTR. That
Naidu benefited from the continuation of
NTR's policies of prohibition and sub-
sidised rice scheme is clear from Table 4.
(Per cent)
Beneficiaries of Rice Scheme
Beneficiaries Non-Beneficiaries
38.3 53.6
49.5 33.2
13.8 13.2
2453
Perhapshe could convince the people nant.Thisin spiteof thefactthattheOBC Inthe 1996election,theCongresspolled
regardingthe continuationof welfareand voters who have traditionallysupported 39.7 percentvotesandwon22 of 42 seats.
developmentalprogrammeswhich stood NTRwereexpectedto be crucialdecision- This was much less than the 31 seats it
in starkcontrastto anessentiallynegative makersin the choice between the two held in the previousLok Sabha5andwas
campaigningby Parvathi.It is no wonder, TDPs.It wasclearthatwhiletheCongress measlycomparedto the earlypredictions
therefore,thatNaidu got the votes while and the TDPN kept the caste arithmetic of a clean sweep in the state. But if the
Parvathigot the crowds. in view in the processof nominationof votes of the two TDP groupswere to be
ComplacencyintheCongresscampwas candidates;the TDPLPlookedfor candi- aggregated,theCongresswouldhavewon
quiteevidentthroughoutthe campaign.It dates with greaterlocal influence. in only six constituencies.Moreover,the
had no novel programmesto announce, Theresultsof the 1996LokSabhaelec- TDPN andits allies could wrestas many
nor any charismaticleaderto project.It tions in AP reflect the resolutionof the as 15 seats which the Congresshad held
didnotdisplayanywell plannedcampaign contestation between the TDPN and in the last Lok Sabha.The Congressin
strategy.It was bogged down in its own TDPLPfor the legacy of NTR in favour turncould wrestonly four seats fromthe
internalfactionalismso muchthatit could of Naidu. The LakshmiParvathigroup, TDP.6 The split of the TDP votebank
not containdissidence even duringthis thoughit garnered10.6 per cent popular between the rival groupsthus benefited
crucialperiod.Severalseniorleadershad vote, failedto convertthis into seats.The the C--ngress(I).This is evidentfromthe
to be suspendedright in the middle of Naidu group securing 16 seats and its factthatthetwoTDgroupstogetherpolled
campaigning.The sorrystateof affairsin allies CPI andCPI(M)two andone seats 43.2 per cent which equals what the
the partywas evidentfromthe episodein respectivelytogetherwith 37.9 per cent undividedTDP securedin 1994assembly
Karimnagar wherea formerchiefminister, vote could succeed in establishing its elections.
K Vijayabhaskara Reddy,was humiliated supremacyvis-a-vistheLakshmiParvathi The BJP which lost its lone seat seat
byasectionof Congressmen inthepresence group.The majorbeneficiaryof thebattle of Secunderabadto the Congress,got a
of the party presidentand then prime betweenthetwo TD groupsfollowingthe second position both in Hyderabadand
minister,PV Narasimha Rao.Hence,it was split in the partywas the Congress(I). Secunderabadand a thirdpositionin six
clear thatthe CongressPartyin the state The CongressParty's performancein other constituencies. The sensitive
was simplywaitingto collectthespoilsof AP would seem to be spectacularif seen Hyderabadseat was retainedby Sultan
the warbetweenthetwo factionsof TDP. in theoverallcontextof thedebacleof the SalahuddinOwaisi of MIM. The voting
Its complacencywas increasedby media partythroughoutthe country.The voters patternin Hyderabadconstituencysug-
projectionsthatit could sweep the polls of AP havea reputationof beingdifferent geststhatwhileMIMhada strongsupport
witha tallyof 40 seatsout of a totalof 42 from the nationalmainstream.In 1977, base in the foururbansegments,the BJP
if it couldjust manageto keep its 1991 whentheJanataPartymadea cleansweep consolidatedits positionin the threerural
supportlevelintact(IndiaToday,April30, all over the country,AP elected41 Con- segments,sometimesatthecostof thetwo
1996:62).But it was not an easy gamble, gress MPs out of a total of 42. Again in TDP groups.
asCongress leadersmighthaverealisedlater. 1984, when the Congresshad a massive If we make a regionwise analysis
Thustherewere threemajorplayersin lead throughoutthe country,TDP andits (Table5), the performanceof the TDPN
mostof the constituencies:the Congress; allies had won 35 seats. In 1989, when and its allies in the coastal region was
TDPN and its allies, CPI and CPM;and the Congresslost powerat the centre,AP betterthan expected.They could secure
TDPLPsupportedby JanataDal andBSP. sent39 CongressMPsto LokSabha.Elec- 11 seats out of a total of 21 comparedto
As before,caste calculationshad gone toralpoliticsin AP has been different,so 10 seats of Congress.On the otherhand,
into the processof nominationof candi- also have the strategies,calculationsand theCongressParty's shareintheTelangana
dates by differentpolitical parties.The predictionsassociatedwith it. andRayalaseemaregionswas betterthan
reddys, who are traditionallyidentified 5: REGIONWISE
TABLE LOKSABHA
ANALYSIS: ELECTIONS
with the Congress(I)bagged 12 of its
nominationsfor the 34 generalcategory W/C Vote (Per Cent)
seats.TDPLPselected 10 reddysand 12 Region Year Turn- INC TDP TDPN TDPLP CPI+CPM BJP
kammasand was thereforedubbedas an (Total Seats) out
uppercaste party.The rival TDPN, fol- Telangana 1991 58.5 9/15 2/10 - - 2/3 1/15
lowing the time-testedstrategyof NTR, (15) 37.5 19.2 9.9 18.7
triedto courtOBCs,whoconstitute44 per 1996 61.3 8/15 - 4/12 0/15 2/3 0/14
cent of the statepopulation.Naidunomi- 37.3 26.8 7.7 6.4 10.8
1998 65.4 4/15 - 6/11 0/2 1/3 0/20
natedas many as nine OBC candidates, 32.5 23.5 0.5 7.9 26.3
besidesajudiciousselectionof reddysand Coastal 1991 62.9 10/21 11/19 - - 0/1 0/20
kammasdependingon theirstrengthand (21) 47.1 41.4 1.5 4.5
influence.Naidu even picked up an ST 1996 65.4 10.21 - 10/19 0/21 1/2 0/19
candidatein Warangalagainsta powerful 47.1 36.4 13.3 3.0 1.9
1998 67.1 13/21 - 5/19 0/2 1/2 2/18
reddycandidateof the Congress(I)and a 41.5 37.7 2.1 3.4 13.7
backwardcaste candidatein the velama 1991 64.1 6/6 0/6 - - - 0/6
Rayalasema
dominated Karimnagar constituency. (6) 59.7 33.2 5.0
TDPLP'sselectionof candidates,in con- 1996 61.6 4/6 - 2/5 0/6 0/1 0/6
trast, was not based on any reasoned 43.1 39.8 8.2 5.0 1.5
politicalcalculus.For instance,the party 1998 63.9 5/6 - 1/5 0/1 0/1 0/6
choseto give ticketsto richandinfluential 45.0 35.9 0.1 5.7 11.6
personsof forwardcastes in constituen- Notes: W: won; C: contested.
cies wherethe weakersectionsaredomi- Source: CSDS data unit.

2454 Economic and Political Weekly August 21-28, 1999

thatofTDPN andits allies. In theTelangana same level as before; but it is very low and prohibition. These segments could be
region the Congress Party secured eight compared to their strength in the popula- seen to have shifted their allegiance to the
out of 15 seats compared to six of its tion. Out of the seven backward class TDPN in the keenly contested 1996 elec-
adversaries. In the Rayalaseema region MPs, six belong to the TDPN and its allies tions.
the former won four out of six seats and one belongs to the Congress Party. In the absence of any large group of
compared to two of the latter. But the Eight out of 11 reddys belong to the people who identify themselves with any
performance of the Congress Party in Congress and only three to its rival. But political party,7 it is difficult to conclude
Rayalaseema region in 1996 was worse the latter has four out of seven kamma whether any of these traditional support
than that in 1991, when it had won all the MPs from the state and the rest belong to bases are going to be stable. This doubt
six seats. Its vote share also declined here, the Congress Party. Though both have is reinforced when we examine the 1998
from 59.7 per cent to 43.1 percent, though shared one seat each in ST constituencies, electoral outcome.
it has improved compared to its share of the TDPN could manage to get one of its
IV
37.4 percent, in the 1994 assembly elec- ST candidates elected in a general con-
Drifting Social Support:
tions. Its vote share declined also in the stituency at Warangal. Thus no politi-
coastal region, from 47.1 per cent in 1991 1998 Elections
cal group is dominated by an exclusive
to 41.1 per cent in 1996, but has increased caste category. However, higher propor- The elections to the Lok Sabha in 1998
from 37.1 per cent during-the 1994 assem- tions of reddys and SCs are found in the within two years were a consequence of
bly elections. Its support base in the Congress and those of kammas, BCs and the fracturedverdict in the 1996 elections.
Telangana area remained more or less the STs in TDPN and its allies. The formation of an unstable government
same at a little over 37 percent, both in The CSDS 1996 post-poll survey pro- by the United Front of 13 parties with
1991 and 1996, which is considerably vides us some useful clues to understand outside support by the Congress(I) has
more than its share of 27.6 per cent in the the socio-economic background of the been instrumental in bringing the regional
1994 assembly elections. Surprisingly,the supportersof different parties.Though the parties to the centre of Indian politics. The
vote share of TDPN and its allies in both survey data does not indicate a distinct historically dominant Congress Party has
the Telangana and Rayalaseema regions, polarisation of political forces on the basis been reduced to certain pockets of the
in the 1996 elections is more than that of of any single parameter, it is possible to country and its relevance made propor-
the undivided TDP and its allies in 1991 discern some general trends. Among the tionate to its ability to reflect the aspira-
elections, though for obvious reasons it SC voters the Congress Party had a larger tions of the regions. The apparently frag-
is less than that of 1994 assembly elec- support base whereas a larger share of ST mented verdict of the 1996 elections.
tions. While in Telangana its vote share votes had gone to the TDPN. The latter mirroringthe process of regionalisation of
increased from 29.1 per cent to 33.2 per had a slight edge in the support of OBCs. Indian politics, signals the celebration of
cent, in Rayalaseema it went up from 33.2 But among the upper castes, the Congress autonomy and distinctness of different
per cent to 44.8 per cent. In the coastal continued to get a higher level of support. regions that have been characterised by
area it marginally declined from 42.9 per No other political party, including the differential historical, linguistic andsocio-
cent to 39.4 percent. TDPLP, could claim a sizeable following economic background.
In the general and ST constituencies, in any specific category of voters (Table 8). It is in this context. that the TDPN has
both the groups, the Congress and the We might infer from these data that while come to assume a significant role in the
TDPN and its allies, were more or less NTR' s supportersamong the OBC and the unfolding theatre of politics at the centre
evenly placed in terms of both seats and ST groups have transferredtheir loyalties in the period following the 1996 elections.
votes (Table 6). But in SC constituencies, to Naidu, those among the SC groups have The TDPN, though it had just 16 MPs in
the Congress had a distinct edge. It won moved over to the Congress Party. The the 11th Lok Sabha, played a key role in
five out of a total of six seats. Its vote share survey confirms the established notion forging a non-Congress(I) and non-BJP
was 42.7 per cent compared to 37.6 per that the TDP has its stronghold among the coalition at the centre by actively negoti-
cent of the latter. It seems that the Con- ruralelectorate and especially among the ating with the time-tested and fairly suc-
gress continues to maintain its support women due to NTR's policies of welfare cessful strategy followed by the undivided
base among the scheduled castes.
There does not seem to be a remarkable TABLE6: CATEGORYWISE
ANALYSIS:
LOK SABHAELECTION
shift in the caste composition of the MPs W/C Vote (Per Cent)
after the 1996 election or of MLAs after Category Total Seats INC TDPN TDPLP CPI+CPM BJP
the 1994 election. As before, the reddys
and kammas are overrepresented. About 1996
General 34 16/34 15/30 0/34 2/4 0/32
26 per cent of the representativesarereddys 39.7 34.3 10.2 3.7 5.2
whereas they constitute only 6 per cent of SC 6 5/6 1/5 0/6 0/1 0/5
the population. Similarly, about 16 per 42.7 33.0 11.0 4.6 5.1
cent of the representatives are kammas, ST 2 1/2 0/1 0/2 1/1 0/2
who are only 4 per cent of the population 36.5 18.1 16.9 19.9 3.0
1998
(Table 7). These two communities have General 34 19/34 8/29 0/3 1/4 4/32
steadily maintained their share among the 38.7 32.2 1.0 4.7 18.3
state's MLAs and MPs at these levels SC 6 3/6 3/5 0/1 0/1 0/6
since independence [see Reddy (1989) for 38.7 32.2 1.0 4.7 18.3
comparative data on other elections]. The ST 2 0/2 1/1 0/1 1/1 -
share of brahmins is declining gradually. 37.9 23.7 9.6 20.8
The proportion of backward caste MLAs Notes: W: won: C: contested.
and MPs has remained more or less at the Source: CSDS Data Unit

Economic and Political Weekly August 21-28, 1999 2455

 TDP under NTR's leadership. It may be
recollected that it was NTR who, after his
coming to power in 1983, initiated the
process of forging a national alternative
through a series of conclaves of the non-
Congress parties. NTR followed a two-
pronged strategy of: (a) forging an anti-
Congress alliance with the left in the state;
(b) pursuing the politics of the non-Con-
gress coalition at the national level. The
culmination of this was the formation of
National Front of which NTR was the
chairman till his death. By actively par-
ticipating in this process Naidu sought to
demonstrate his conformity to NTR's
legacy and carve out a niche for himself
in the national politics.
But the major changes to be found were
initiated in the policy domain soon after
the 1996 elections. It is here that the
increasing distance of Naidu's govern-
ment from NTR's regime has to be seen.
Emerging confident from its performance
(vis-a-vis that of TDPLP) in 1996 elec-
tions, legitimised by the supportof the left
and further propelled by its newfound
place in the national politics, the TDPN
governmentinitiated a public dialogue on
some of the quintessentially NTR schemes
and policies like Rs 2 a kilo rice scheme
and prohibitionpolicy as a preparationfor
policy changes. As analysed earlier, these
policies were crucial in NTR's comeback
to power in the 1994 assembly elections.
NTR's mandate in 1994, needless to say,
was hinged on his commitment to imple-
ment them in spite of the problems of
resource mobilisation.
The supportfor NTR among the popular
classes was derived from these populist
policies. In contrast, the urban middle
classes have generally seen NTR's poli-
cies as being detrimental to the develop-
ment of the state. This obviously lent
credence to the view that the total prohi-
bition and Rs 2 a kilo scheme were major
causes for the fiscal crisis of the state.8
Further the flow of illicit liquor into the
state is seen as an evidence of the impracti-
cality of the proposition of total prohibi-
tion. The public dialogue exercise initi-
ated by the Naidu government vindicated
this view.
Following the opinion mobilisation
exercise and as a measure towards the
improvement of the state's fiscal position
TDPN government introduced modifica-
tions in the prohibition policy and
subsidised rice scheme. Thus prohibition
was partially lifted and the price of sub-
sidised rice was hiked from Rs 2 to Rs 3.50
a kilo and the quantity was reduced from
25 kilos to 16 kilos per family. In addition
the hike in slab rates on electricity and
2456
water cess for agriculture were effected.
These policy changes were part of the
larger agenda of economic reforms in
the state that made a departure from the
policy framework of NTR's regime
[Srinivasulu 1998].
The broad consensus among the politi-
cal parties, cutting across ideological
persuasion, posed no majorproblem to the
TDPN in pursuance of its reform agenda.
But it was not to be the case with the left
parties. But their being 'friendly opposi-
tion' forced them to remain silent on these
crucial issues.
The elections to the Lok Sabha in 1998,
occasioned by the fall of the UF govern-
ment following the withdrawal of support
by the Congress(I) was something neither
the AP Congress(I) nor the TDPN was
prepared for. Finding themselves once
again in the electoral fray, these two major
playersin the statepolitics displayed visible
disinterest as there could be no substantial
issues with regional relevance for them to
focus their attention on, except for their
traditional mutual opposition.
The BJP, which had lost even its lone
Secunderabad seat in 1996 elections, in
contrast, displayed enthusiasm and dyna-
mism. The BJP, it may be recollected, in
spite its meagre presence in most of the
constituencies, contested almost all the
seats since the 1991 parliamentary elec-
tions. What marked it out this time ob-
viously was its success in attracting a
number of cinema stars and dissidents not
only from the TDPN but a significant
chunk also from the Congress(I) on the
eve of the elections. The BJP's campaign
this time was in fact star-studded with all
the glamour and hype that goes with the
Telugu commercial cinema. But what the
BJP triedto harpon was the slogan of 'able
leader and stable government'. By focus-
ing on the failure of the UF coalition to
provide a stable government - in which
TABLE 7: CASTE COMPOSITIONOF MLAs
Caste Per Cent in MLAs in 1994 Elections
Population (Approx) Number
Brahmin 3.0
6.0
Reddy
Kamma 4.0
Velama (forward caste) 3.0
Vaishya or komati 2.0
Kshatriyaor raju 1.0
Kapu 8.0
Other forward caste
Backward castes 46.0
Scheduled castes 14.0
Scheduled tribes 5.0
Muslims 7.0
Not ascertained
Total
Note: * One ST candidate was elected in general category constituency.
Economic and Political Weekly
TDP was a partner- and the opportunist
support to it by the Congress(I) from
outside, the BJP vigorously projected
Vajpayee as the prime ministerial candi-
date to convey the message that it alone
could be a better bet for stable govern-
ment.
In the Congress (I) andthe TDPN camps,
especially at the grass roots, one could see
a sense of exhaustion. The dynamism and
issues that dominated the 1996 electoral
campaign were missing this time. In a
sense, the campaign issues in 1998 were
a mere repeat of that in 1996. While for
the Congress(I), the coming of the elec-
tions so soon was largely its own making,
for the TDPN, the failure of UF experi-
ment was enough to dilute its enthusiasm.
If the context of the 1998 elections, for
the reasons stated above, put both the
Congress (I) and the TDPN at a disadvan-
tage, the BJP tried to turn this to its ad-
vantage andmore specifically the BJP tried
to gain sympathy from its government's
collapse after 13 days in power in spite of
being a majorpartyas a resultof the actions
of the Congress(I) and UF partners.
If exigencies of the 'hung' Lok Sabha
constituted one dimension, then the re-
gional issues centred around the govern-
ance of the TDPN and its policy reversals
constituted another significant dimension
of the electoral campaign. Thus the BJP
focused on the TDP's failures. The BJP's
star campaigners were most vocal on the
TDPN's back-out from its stated adher-
ence to NTR's policies. Further, what
enthused the BJP in this respect was its
alliance with the TDPLP. There were the
suicides among cotton farmers in the
northern Telangana districts during
1997-98 due to the successive failure of
cotton crop on account of the failure of
governmental agencies to provide exten-
sion services, to supervise quality control
of seeds, fertilisers, pesticides and other
AND MPs IN ANDHRA PRADESH
MPs in 1996 Elections
Per Cent Number Per Cent
1 0.3 2 4.8
76 25.9 11 26.2
46 15.6 7 16.7
9 3.1 - -
3 1.0
10 3.4 - -
22 7.5 3 7.1
3 1.0 1 2.4
38 12.9 7 16.7
39 13.3 6 14.3
*16 5.4 *3 7.1
9 3.1 2 4.8
22 .7.5 - -
294 100.0 42 100.0
August 21-28, 1999
inputs[AndhraPradeshRythuSangham never witnessed any communal tensions along the mala-madiga caste line substan-
1998: Vaartha, February 16, 1998, and that BJP's popular vote percentage tially eroded Congress support. The agi-
Hyderabad].This in turnis seen to be a was just 1.9 in 1996, deserve serious tation of the madigas for the categorisation
consequenceof the liberalreforms.The attention. Thus it would be instructive to of the SCs into four groups for the benefit
failureof the governmentto respondto analyse the factors contributing to the of reservations in education and employ-
the crisis in any significantway, as the successful garnering of two seats, one ment took a serious form after the 1996
suicidescontinued,was sufficientground each from the TDP and the Congress(I) elections. The madiga reservationstruggle
for the BJP and Congressto target the in this region. against the existing policy of reservation
TDPN duringthe election. If the alliance with the TDPLP was a for the SCs that has benefited the malas
Thoughthe Congressmade the policy major factor in the BJP's performance, disproportionately to their size in the SC
reversalsby the Naidu governmentthe assuming that a substantial proportion of population has been supported by the
centralissue, its lack of conviction and its 10.7 percent supportin 1996 has shifted TDPN government. Its promise to strive
absenceof anypolicyalternativewasquite to the BJP, the gains from the TDPN and for the necessary modification had led to
conspicuous.Whatwas transparent in this Congress(I) could be no less important. the rallying of the madigas around the
election was an unprecedentedenthusi- Mudragada Padmanabham, a dissident TDPN thereby ensuing the political
asmfortheBJPnotonlyamongthemiddle Congress(I) leader belonging to the kapu polarisationof malas and madigas on party
classesbutalso in thefarmingcommunity community, with a considerable influence lines [for an analysis of the dalit move-
in northernTelanganaas well as in coastal in the two Godavari districts not only ment see Srinivasulu 1999]. As a result
districts.The messagethatseems to have among the kapus but also among other of this, with a substantial section of the
gone well with them this time was the communities, joining the BJP on the eve madigas shifting to the TDPN, the
BJP's stabilityplank.Thus 'let us give a of the elections, considerably tilted the Congress(I) could be said to have substan-
chanceto the BJP' was the refrainoften supportbase of the Congress(I) to the BJP. tially lost its base among the madigas.
heardduringthe campaign(field inter- This is evident in the fact that in Though it is difficult to assess the impact
views, February1998). Rajamundry and Kakinada, won in 1996 of this polarisation on the political pro-
In the social backgroundof the candi- by the Congress(I) andTDPN respectively, cess, it would not be an exaggeration to
dates fielded by both the TDPN and the Congress(I) has been reduced to a third say that it was one of the factors which
Congress(I) there was no significant position. had contributed to the shuffling of the
changefrom1996.WhiletheCongress(I) Though the Congress(I) has maintained seats in 1998.
had shown a preferencefor candidates its balance sheet by winning 22 seats this TABLE 8: WHO VOTED FOR WHOM IN ANDHRA
fromthedominantpeasantcastesof reddys time as well, it has seen a significant PRADESH
andkammas,the TDP as in 1996 fielded shuffling of seats. It could win only 12
candidates from OBC background.In of the seats it won in 1996 and lost as many Categories INC TDPN+ TDPLP+ Others
Left JD
addition,the Congress(I)contestantslist as eight seats to the TDP and allies and
included a numberof new candidates two seats to the BJP. In turn it gained 10 Age (years)
leadingeven to the exclusion of incum- seats from the TDP compensating even for 25 and below 46.4 47.3 2.7 3.4
bents.This could be seen as a reflection its losses to the BJP. 26-35 44.7 42.9 4.7 7.6
on the factionalinfightingin the party.In What is worth noting about the perfor- 36-45 42.2 46.9 7.0 3.9
46-55 47.3 50.0 2.0
contrast, the TDPN displayed greater mance of the Congress(I) are the upsets
56 and above 50.6 42.7 2.2 4.5
continuityand stability. it suffered in the reserved constituencies. Sex
For the firsttime the BJP has madeits While it won five of the six SC constituen- Male 49.0 40.6 5.7 4.7
markon thepoliticalscenarioof the state cies and one of the two ST constituencies Female 42.9 50.3 2.6 4.2
in a big way throughconsiderablegains in the state, this time it succeeded in Education
in termsof popularvote and seats. This winning only in three SC reserved con- Illiterate 38.4 55.4 2.6 2.6
election has seen a considerableshift in stituencies. It lost the ST seat it held last Primaryand
the social supportof the almost all the time. middle 48.7 42.7 5.3 3.3
Intermediate 60.9 30.9 3.6 4.5
parties.This turnedto the advantageof If the replacement of the candidates and
Graduateand
the BJP. Its convincingvictoriesin four denial of tickets to the incumbents is one above 48.7 23.1 5.1 23.1
constituencies,two each fromTelangana reason for the seat changes of the
Religion
and coastal Andhra demonstratesthis. Congress(I), then the deeper changes in Hindu 48.6 46.2 4.6 4.6
Thus,besidesits traditionalstrongholdof the socio-political context could be an- Muslim 56.7 36.7 1.7 5.0
Secunderabad,it won Karimnagarseat other. Though it is difficult to say anything Christian 46.4 53.6 - -
fromtheTDPinTelangana.Inthisvelama definite about the changing social bases Caste
dominatedconstituency,for the firsttime of the Congress(I), a significant drift in SC 55.8 40.3 1.3 2.6
in its history,a BC candidatewon on the its social support could be observed. The ST 32.3 57.3 9.4 1.0
OBC 44.5 46.5 4.3 4.7
TDP ticket in 1996. The BJP fielding a shifts away in two significant social con-
Others 50.6 40.7 2.3 6.4
velamacandidatedefeated the TDP in- stituencies of kapus and madigas in the
Locality
cumbentand a veteranCongress(I)can- Congress(I) social coalition could be seen Rural 42.9 49.9 5.1 3.1
didatebelongingto the velamacommu- as indicative of the changes in its support Urban 58.8 30.5 0.8 9.9
nity.Thusthe BJPgot one each fromthe base. Class
TDPandCongress(I)andcamesecondin If the Mudragada factor was critical to Very poor 34.4 59.7 3.8 2.2
as many as three constituenciesin this the shift of the kapus away from the Poor 49.0 40.7 8.3 2.1
Middle 50.0 41.3 2.5 6.3
region. Congress(I) to the BJP in the coastal 53.1 -w
The BJP's gains in coastal Andhra, Upper 37.0 9.9
districts, the schism in the traditionally
consideringthe fact that this region had Congress supporting scheduled castes Source: Post-poll survey, CSDS, 1996.

Economic and Political Weekly August 21-28, 1999 2457

 V failure to do so in the meantime turned
Concluding Remarks
The state projects a seriously contested
electoral scenario with the TDPN and
Congress(I) competing for power with
approximatelyequal support bases. In this
situation the probability of alteration in
power is very high. Whichever group is
in power tends to dominate, though for a
limited period. The Congress(I) lost its
monopoly of holding on to power in 1983
but continued to be an important player
in state politics.
The second party which dominated the
electoral scene both in 1996 and 1998 was
the TDPN and its allies CPI and CPI(M).
The contest forNTR's legacy by the TDPN
and TDPLP has been settled in favour of
the former and this has been vindicated
by its electoral performance in the last two
elections and further by the decimation of
the TDPLP.
The analysis of the 1996 and 1998 Lok
Sabhaelections providesinterestingtrends
in the politics of the state. Seen against
the background of the long-term align-
ment of political forces which began with
the emergence of the TDP in 1983 and
consolidated over the years with signifi-
cant shifts in the support of the OBCs,
STs and also the Muslims towards the
TDP, the last two elections show certain
volatility and uneasiness in these social
groups.
Though in 1996 the Congress(I) and the
TDPN could largely retain the support of
the constituents of their respective social
coalitions, in 1998, in contrast, there could
be witnessed a markeddeparture.The seat
changes and swings in the vote margins
of these parties across regions and con-
stituencies could be read as indicative of
significant shifts in the social support of
the Congress(I) and the TDPN. The pro-
cess of increasing articulation of aspira-
tions and interests by different social
groups, especially those in the subaltern
ranks. through both issue based move-
ments and leader centred mobilisation can
be said to have contributed to the volatility
of their electoral support. This has ren-
dered the social coalition of support of
both the parties critical.
Inthis process the political partieswhich,
dictated by the exigencies of their elec-
toral calculus, have directly or otherwise
encouraged specific caste articulation
could find themselves at the receiving
end. The case of madigas illustrates this.
If the support of the madigas could be
rallied successfully by the TDPN in the
1998 elections with its promise to fulfil
theirdemand for the SC categorisation, its
2458
the madigas against it subsequently. In
varying degrees it is true of other com-
munities and their allegiance to political
parties. In such a situation even denial of
party ticket to a particular community
could become a sufficient reason for the
withdrawal of its support.The case of the
kapus in coastal Andhra is an instance of
this.
If the overall performance of the BJP
in the 1998 election is an outcome of the
contextual specificity of this election, then
its dramatic gains are indicative of the
disequilibrium in the social coalitions of
the TDP and Congress(I). Though the BJP
succeeded in rallying the support of a
significant section of Andhra electorate,
its victory in the four constituencies is
largely due to the weakness of the main
rival party in these constituencies. The
seat changes witnessed between the last
two elections, which have been between
the TDPN and the Congress(I), vindicate
the inference that supportbases of the two
dominant rivals is fluid and the electoral
pendulum can swing in favour of either
of them.
Yet it would be pertinent to note that
the unstable nature of existing social
coalitions of support of the two major
partiesand the resultantpolitical volatility
provides space for alternativearticulation.
In the absence of such a possibility, the
social forces, needless to say, would settle
down in the existing political equation.
perhaps with some alterations.
Notes
I There are 10 districts in Telangana. nine in
coastal Andhra and four in Rayaiaseema. Reddy, G Ram (1989): 'The Politics of
Coastal Andhra has veryfertile delta areas
formed by the Godavari and the Krishna
rivers.The Telangana and Rayalaseema
regions.on theotherhand,arebackwardregions
with low agricultural productivity. Both Srinivasulu,K (1990): 'Telugu Desam Partyand
these regions have vast natural resources
which are largely unexploited.TheTelangana
region is industriallybetter off, though most
of the industries are located in and around - (1994): 'BSP and Caste Politics', Economic
Hyderabad.
2 The referenceis to: (a) the dramaticouster of - (1998): 'World Bank, Economic Reforms and
NTR from chief ministership by governor
Ramlal following the revolt in the TDP led
by Nadendla Bhaskar Rao and NTR's
subsequent comeback to power following
massivepublicprotest;and(b)theassassination
of Indira Gandhi.
3 'Patel-patwaris' were traditional village
officers: the former was vested with powers Upadhya.Carol B ( 1988): 'TheFarmer-Capitalist
to maintain law and the order and the latter
to collect land revenue. These hereditary
positions invariablyheld by the uppercastes - (1997): 'Culture,Class and Entrepreneurship:
the former by the reddis and latter by the
kammas, not only provided access to power
and wealthbutwere also sourcesof corruption.
Furtherthey were traditionalsupportstructures
of the Congress Party. By abolishing them,
Economic and Political Weekly
NTR not only gained popularappreciationas
these institutions had acquired notoriety of
sorts in the perception of the popularclasses
but also strucka serious blow at the Congress
support system. In their place NTR created
village administrativeofficers to be recruited
throughopen competition. Some of the patels
and patwaris fulfilling the requisite
qualificationswere also accommodated.These
reforms were partof the largeradministrative
reforms(which include the restructuringof the
revenue and panchayat raj institutions)
introducedby NTR duringhis firstterm(1983-
89) in office [Srinivasulu 1990].
4 The first phase of the survey was conducted
about one month before the election and the
second one about 10 days before the election.
5 It had won 25 seats in 1991 election and six
MPs joined the party later.
6 TDPN wrested 13 seats from the Congress:
Adilabad, Srikakulam. Bobbili, Anakapalle,
Kakinada, Machilipatnam, Chittoor, Karim-
nagar, Narsapur, Narasaraopet, Warangal,
Nagarkurnool,Hindupur. Its allies, the CPI
and CPI(M) wrested the Badrachalam and
Kammam seats respectively. The four seats
wrested by the Congress are Guntur,
Vijayawada,AmalapuramandVishakapatnam.
7 Only 11.7 per cent of the respondents from
AP felt that they were close to any political
party during the 1996 post-poll survey
conducted by the CSDS.
8 The white paper on the state of AP economy
entitled, 'StateFinances:The FactualPosition'
brought out by the state government
(GovernmentofAP: 1996)reinforcesthisview.
References
AndhraPradeshRythu Sangam (1998): Distress
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Madras.
Accommodation:Caste,ClassandDominance
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M S A Rao, Dominance and State Power in
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August 21-28, 1999