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Prompt Global Strike DA ................................................................................................................................... 1Y
1NC (1/2) ........................................................................................................................................................... 3Y
1NC (2/2) ........................................................................................................................................................... 4Y
aaa    aaaY
x ± No Support ............................................................................................................................................... 6Y
x ± No xe...................................................................................................................................................... 7Y
x ± Funding .................................................................................................................................................... 8Y
x ± Brink ........................................................................................................................................................ 9Y
x ± Timeframe .............................................................................................................................................. 10Y
x ± Reducing Talk ....................................................................................................................................... 11Y
x ± Laundry Lit ........................................................................................................................................... 12Y
x ± AT: NPR................................................................................................................................................. 13Y
aaa  aaaY
Link ± Drone/Troop....................................................................................................................................... 15Y
Link ± Troop................................................................................................................................................... 16Y
Link ± Bae .................................................................................................................................................... 17Y
Link ± Nuke.................................................................................................................................................... 18Y
Link ± Troop Takeout ....................................................................................................................................... 19Y
Link ± Troop withdrawal .................................................................................................................................. 20Y
Link ± Forward Bae ........................................................................................................................................ 21Y
aaa
 aaaY
„mpact ± More Effective ................................................................................................................................... 23Y
„mpact ± Stability ............................................................................................................................................. 24Y
„mpact ± Ruia Relation................................................................................................................................. 25Y
„mpact ± Ruia Relation................................................................................................................................. 26Y
„mpact ± Terrorim ........................................................................................................................................... 27Y
„mpact ± Nuclear War, Prolif ............................................................................................................................ 28Y
„mpact ± Prolif ................................................................................................................................................. 29Y
„mpact ± Accident ........................................................................................................................................... 30Y
„mpact ± Kill Ruian Relation ...................................................................................................................... 31Y
„mpact ± Doen¶t „mprove 1t Strike.................................................................................................................. 32Y
„mpact ± Fail: „ntelligence ............................................................................................................................... 33Y
„mpact ± Hegemony ......................................................................................................................................... 34Y
„mpact ± China Nuke War ................................................................................................................................ 35Y
„mpact ± Ruia Nuke War ............................................................................................................................... 36Y
„mpact ± China Nuke War ................................................................................................................................ 37Y
„mpact ± Statu uo Solve .............................................................................................................................. 38Y
„mpact ± „ntability........................................................................................................................................... 39Y
„mpact ± Ruian/Chinee ............................................................................................................................... 40Y
AT: No Retaliation ........................................................................................................................................... 41Y
AT: „mpact Nx /No Brink .............................................................................................................................. 42Y
AT: No Micalculation ..................................................................................................................................... 43Y
AT: No Micalculation ..................................................................................................................................... 44Y
AT: Obama Will xe PGS Now........................................................................................................................ 45Y
aaa  aaa!Y
Nx ± Obama Puhing PGS ............................................................................................................................ 47Y
Nx ± Reform ................................................................................................................................................. 48Y
Nx ± PGS Devlopment.................................................................................................................................. 49Y
Nx ± No Nuke ............................................................................................................................................. 50Y
Nx ± PGS Now ............................................................................................................................................. 51Y
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Nx ± PGS Now ............................................................................................................................................. 52Y
Link Turn ± Nuke K2 Deterrence .................................................................................................................... 53Y
„mpact Turn ± Rapid Deployment ..................................................................................................................... 54Y
„mpact Turn ± Rapid Deployment/Nuke .......................................................................................................... 55Y
„mpact Turn ± Readine .................................................................................................................................. 56Y
„mpact Turn ± Readine .................................................................................................................................. 57Y
„mpact Turn ± Deterrence ................................................................................................................................. 58Y
„mpact Turn ± Alliance/Deterrence .................................................................................................................. 59Y
„mpact Turn ± Nuclear Terror ........................................................................................................................... 60Y
„mpact Turn ± Nuclear Terror ........................................................................................................................... 61Y
„mpact Turn ± Power Projection ....................................................................................................................... 62Y
„mpact Turn ± Preemptive Strike ...................................................................................................................... 63Y
„mpact Turn ± WMD....................................................................................................................................... 64Y
„mpact Turn ± Hegemony ................................................................................................................................. 65Y
„mpact Turn ± No Nuke .................................................................................................................................. 66Y
AT: Micalculation ........................................................................................................................................... 67Y
AT: Not Safe .................................................................................................................................................... 68Y
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# c ()*) + 
,  & (Peter, Senior Fellow for National Security Affair [http://www.realclearpolitic.com/
article/2010/05/15/a_late_look_at_a_troubling_treaty_105593.html] AD: 6/30/10)JM
That' right: Mocow can actually raie the number of it launch/delivery platform under new START. „n other word, 
-+  - )*)   .  . . . *  /  +  
$,0   +
+   .1  2 +  . )  +   c    --  
$,0
armed with a non-nuclear payload   + + . on hort notice. )     32 2
+2 2.   . +   .   4  +     
  + +1 /.  .. The ame i true for other quick-turnaround military cenario that don't
require nuke, uch a taking out a WMD-armed ballitic miile ready for launch or vaporizing ome counterpace weapon before they
trike your atellite.

,5/    +c3  +  


$6 (Arm Control Aociation, nonpartian organization promoting public undertanding of and upport
for arm control, September 3, [http://www.armcontrol.org/print/2384] AD: 6/30/10)JM
„n addition to being ued againt terrorit, the panel aid prompt global trike ytem could be employed at the outet, or ³leading
edge,´ of major combat operation. „n uch a cenario,  +         + .
The    aociated with prompt global trike alo   +     , according to the panel. „t
tated that getting accurate and reliable hort-notice data on a target would be a ³daunting challenge´ and warned that deciion-maker
would have to rapidly weigh potential collateral damage and other rik. )+  +      
         +3  7   + 8   during their firt
decade of ervice. „t calculated that ³only a  terrorit leader +  of uch a weapon.´

$4/     .9      c (   3$  
  c 
0 6 (Vince, Center for Defene „nformation Reearch Aitant, [http://www.cdi.org/pdf/PGSfactheet.pdf]
AD: 7/2/10)JM
„n light of thee rik and potential operational complication, it i worth quetioning the rationale of the PGS program. )
    +   + .trategically+ .+  +    +   / +
    +     againt rogue tate and terrorit armed with weapon of ma detruction (WMD), 
two    . +9     c  .. Similarly,    +       
rapid and precie intelligence gathering   . . to execute a PGS,    .. . 
  /      /   +  +  .   „n addition to quetion about the primary
rationale for PGS, the quetion of whether or not the xnited State will ever poe the commenurate intelligence capabilitie to
execute a PGS cat doubt on the feaibility of the PGS concept. Neverthele, interet in PGS capability within the Pentagon and in
Congre remain trong. The Fical Year 2009 (FY 09) Houe and Senate defene authorization bill recommend additional funding for
DOD effort to achieve a PGS capability with hyperonic vehicle technology. Since PGS can be implemented in many different way, it
give DOD a broad mandate to purue a variety of new weapon ytem. A thi report demontrate, the Pentagon may not cloely
examine the political and trategic implication of every weapon ytem it explore it may alo fail to develop the commenurate
enabling capabilitie that are neceary for thee ytem to execute a PGS. Therefore, it i imperative that Congre exercie trict
overight over all apect of any PGS program. For tarter, Congre hould make further funding of PGS weapon ytem tudie
contingent upon their verifiable incluion of enabling capabilitie. The Rationale for a Prompt Global Strike Capability The x.S. PGS
program aim to provide the preident with the ability to plan and deliver limited duration and extended range trike anywhere on the
globe in le than one hour. The 2001 Nuclear Poture Review (NPR) formally introduced the global trike concept a part of a new triad
that integrate conventional and nuclear force option into an offenive trike capability uited for the 21t century: ³To meet the
nation¶ defene goal in the 21t century, the firt leg of the New Triad, the offenive trike leg, will go beyond the Cold War
Triad«with non-nuclear trategic capabilitie that trengthen the credibility of our offenive deterrence.´1 c. Jame
$   of the Marine, the former commander of x.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM),  + in a 2006 congreional
hearing  a c  .  . 7    .    /   /.
+  at the crucial moment when have an opportunity to top a WMD-armed threat far from our hore.´2 , + 
 9   , two critical aumption underlying PGS are that eluive threat to x.S. national ecurity can emerge and that 
 +         .    +.  .  :   +  
Therefore,
   c         +  /.  + 
   
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#$%&'
c        +  )     
/ + ++! („an and Robin, independent human ecurity and arm control conultant,
[http://www.baicint.org/pub/Paper/BP51.pdf] AD: 6/29/10)JM Y
The c capability alo   eriou  2     . Firt,  . +   
    +     other     eek to     ytem +/or
eek to protect their overeignty by  +    .         . „t eem likely,
for example, that    3  $ +* 3 +    SLBM and
„CBM converion  9 . )  + in turn        9 +     3
  )   3where tenion already run high.Second, c clearly +  ballitic
miile  2    effort,    2002 ; $ +  Conduct Againt Ballitic Miile
   3        in developing, teting, uing, and preading ballitic
miile.22      of the Code, < ,  , then xS xnder Secretary of State for Arm Control
and „nternational Security,  + xS   for it,  alo    + a number of qualifying factor
and  /  . 4  /   2            +   
= /               miile and pace-launch vehicle without
prior notification¶.23
   adminitration alo    =  > 2 /  c
  . $ +   + +++  +Third,       +    
  . And a Steve Andreaon, a former xS Nation Security Council taffer ha pointed out: ³Long-
range ballitic miile have never been ued in combat in 50 year´. But    +     
+     /        +   .   37    +  
   ´, he aid.24 4

5)      :  


$  (Ching, enior journalit with the Strait Time, June 25, 2000, lexi, AD: 6/21/10)JM
THE high-intenity cenario potulate a cro-trait war ecalating into a full-cale war between the xS and China. „f Wahington were
to conclude that plitting China would better erve it national interet, then a full-cale war become unavoidable. $   on
uch a cale + embroil other countrie far and near and -horror of horror -     . 
  . , 9  ha already told the xS and Japan privately that it   + .  .  / + 
bae and logitic   any     $         
   . „n the region,    ? 3<3     +3  :  3
  .
$      3       . And the conflagration may not end
there a opportunitic power elewhere may try to overturn the exiting world order. @   
+  +3* .  + 5  1   + . The balance of power in 
0 ++5 . imilarly   . the like of
. „n outh Aia,     
+ +
 3+     3 +  ++   @  2
  2  +   ? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the xS
Eighth Army which fought againt the Chinee in the Korean War,  +        
      $   /     .+ . „n hi book The Korean War, a peronal
account of the military and political apect of the conflict and it implication on future xS foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway aid that xS
wa confronted with two choice in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the ue of nuclear weapon. „f the xS
had to reort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a imilar capability,  
      a war againt China 50 year later,         . The xS
etimate that China poee about 20 nuclear warhead that can detroy major American citie. , 9 
alo  +       . A Chinee military officer dicloed recently that Beijing wa
conidering a review of it "non firt ue" principle regarding nuclear weapon. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, preident of the
military-funded „ntitute for Strategic Studie, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilon „nternational Centre for Scholar in Wahington
that although the government till abided by that principle, there were trong preure from the military to drop it. He aid   .
+   ++       + .    . ++   
       / . Gen Ridgeway aid that hould that come to pa, we would ee the
detruction of civilization. ) + /      @      
+  /)       /3   +  .3 $  
/  . //.   

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c .A (Denni M., Senior Fellow at Center for Non-Proliferation Studie, Fall,
[http://www.ifri.org/file/Securite_defene/PP29_Gormley.pdf] AD: 6/30/10)JM
Arming Trident with a conventional warhead i not the only way to deal with fleeting terrorit target. A examined earlier in thi paper,
the combination of x.S Special Force on the ground and armed Predator xAV in the air repreent a potent and now broadly ued new
capability to deal with fleeting target. The NRC panel noted the importance of xAV and pecial force a ource of intelligence
upporting conventional Trident trike, which beg the quetion: .>   /  /   ± if perhap
le effective under ome circumtance ± /   +  / ) + in regard to thi
limited miion?70 Another option to evaluate would be a new miile altogether, rather than one with a nuclear legacy, like the x.S.
Navy¶ concept of a ³Sea-Launched Global Strike Miile´, or even the Navy¶ effort to develop a uperonic verion of the Tomahawk
cruie miile.71 For the time being, the Obama adminitration and Congre have taken an appropriate time out with Prompt Global
Strike, which will urely not allay Ruian concern over the long run. But it doe provide pace to conider future prompt-trike miile
option and their effect on military tability in the context of a world that may well become far le dependent on long-range, nuclear-
armed ballitic miile in future. Reearch and development      /    
          ., frankly peaking,    at bet. ) 
 + .   /  that could take off and land from a x.S runway and be anywhere in
the world in one to two hour. ) + for uch a pace plane   +  A .72 Preident
Ronald Reagan accelerated the puh in hi 1986 State of the xnion Addre, yet hi director of the Strategic Defene „nitiative (Star
War), Henry Cooper, told a congreional panel in 2001 that after the expenditure of ome $4 billion on the development of the pace
plane concept from the early 1970 to the end of the 1990 (dicounting variou program in the 1950 and 1960, a well a the pace
huttle invetment), the only thing produced wa ³one crahed vehicle, a hangar queen, ome drop-tet article and tatic diplay´.73
Current    hyperonic   , among many, the difficult challenge of developing lightweight
and durable high-temperature material and thermal management technique needed to cope with hyperonic
peed. Thi i becaue hyperonic glide vehicle require a thermal protection ytem capable of preventing their payload from
melting at reentry peed of up to Mach 25 (or 25 time the peed of ound). )   mater and + ..  
.     ., not only becaue of the huge technical challenge aociated with thee
ytem but alo becaue the trategic environment i o uncertain. # + . + .
    .      2     +     . However,
the x.S. Congre appear to have choen to continue down the riky and potentially cotly path of puruing hyperonic delivery
vehicle. „f nothing ele, thi coure remove the nearer-term olution like conventional Trident from becoming any kind of impediment
to progre in trategic arm control negotiation.


 
c  
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(#  
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 +/ B (Pavel, Reearcher at the Center for „nternational Security and Cooperation at Stanford xniverity,
³Conventional Trident i Back?´http://ruianforce.org/blog/2007/04/conventional_trident_i_back.html)KFC
Finally,  a lot of talk about   +2 +   that are uppoed  / +*  
-   .-3   +.      yet. „n fact,  ."confidence-building
 -   +  +o far      +  that      , 
2     of launch it require certainly      + rompt clobal
trike. A „ undertand,  +          . are that that agreement +   
 /-    -. „n other word3*  going to be +    that  
+ + /  +   / the event that carry      + .
1 
/.  +   +2 + 
c  
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(C + 
# c ($     + 

/ + ++! („an and Robin, independent human ecurity and arm control conultant,
[http://www.baicint.org/pub/Paper/BP51.pdf] AD: 6/29/10)JM Y
)= +2 >   any fully operational c ytem, and therefore lack of rik to xS military
peronnel, at firt ight     any Preident   .     .  .
; /, many    reportedly highly   of the PGS concept +/  
++  +   for thi ame concept (once after 9/11 and again in 2003/04). Not only do tet uch a µDivine
Strake¶ ugget a lowering of the nuclear threhold but alo the idea of launching conventional SLBM or „nter-Continental Ballitic
Miile („CBM) create a dangerou international ambiguity.

C +      

 &B (John, one of the world' leading expert on defene, pace and intelligence policy,
[http://www.globalecurity.org/wmd/ytem/ctm.htm] AD: 6/29/10)JM
Conitent with the Houe-paed FY2007 bill authorizing appropriation for the Defene Department, the Houe Appropriation
Committee recommend $30,000,000 in RDT&E, Navy for development of a modification to the Trident Weapon Sytem to
accommodate non-nuclear payload. The Preident' budget included $127,000,000 for thi program, including $77,000,000 in reearch
and development and $50,000,000 in procurement account. The Committee believe the propoed chedule for thi program i
unrealitic, and prejudge the outcome of internal planning and programming review, including the analyi of alternative and the
vetting and documentation of operational requirement. @   provide  + for thi new tart, the
$     +         3   3+    +  
/  .++ +, and the Department' acquiition community ha not completed it review.
)CD6 +   +EB  ,  $ / )*
5#)0 +   %CTM)
   -+" in FY08 Appropriation Bill + +    + to a defene-wide
account [0604165D8Z - Prompt Global Strike Program] to invetigate all prompt global trike alternative
and technologie.

     c  / (  +  +  $      


+/  

$6 (Colin, reporter on national ecurity for Congreional uarterly and editor of Defene New, May 2nd,
[http://defenetech.org/2008/05/02/prompt-global-trike-not-quite-there-yet/] AD: 6/29/10)JM
xPDATE: One congreional aide told me: ³c   3  . 2 /   
   3   /.      #  */  . One of the
reaon i that +    +  ² $ / ) + 0 +   F  
 2   a majority   .
    .        . There now
appear to be conenu in Congre for thi type of capability it will be up to the next adminitration to put
forth a technically and operationally viable concept that i alo politically acceptable.´
c  
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(, 
)  .  +  $ / ) +    .>    .
/ ( .>  .   .     c   

  3A(Bill, editor and chief of Defene Technology „nternational, ³„ntant Sunhine,´ Defene Technology „nternational, Sept. 1,
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/tory.jp?id=new/NxKE090309.xml&headline=x.S.%20Rethink%20Nuclear%20Strategy&channel
=defene)KFC 
A new deterrent poture could include conventional ballitic miile ($,0 ),    + 3
   +     +/    Aked about CBM at the Space and Miile
Defene Conference in Huntville, Ala., in Augut, Marine Corp Gen. Jame E. Cartwright, vice chairman
of the Joint Chief of Staff, reponded: "You want to ee the car tiue?" The cae for CBM i trong. ")
. .     /           /  + 3" Cartwright
ay. "„that prudent?
 / 3    . /     it." Air Force Gen. (ret.)
Eugene Habiger, involved in the CBM effort, note, however, "32 /  + 
   CEP (    )          "3 ." $,0, Habiger
told the Omaha conference, "    +. )#/. calculated that they  + / +$,0  
E  . , Stratcom + +1    regional [ + 2 2 G / /+ to peruade the
ecretarie of State and Defene that we needed it, +      .   ." However, a
Cartwright noted, the initial $,022$ / ) + -- being         +
 ++  6   (a Congre directed). Alo3    +  + -   /   -
+        + -  .  "--   +     
     . "That' een a more of a way forward."

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+& (David E. and Thom, reporter for the New York Time,
[http://www.nytime.com/2010/04/23/world/europe/23trike.html] AD: 6/28/10)JM
xnder the Obama plan, the   c    + +  +  2  to
tart it journey toward a target. „t would travel through the atmophere at everal time the peed of ound, generating o much
heat that it would have to be hielded with pecial material to avoid melting. („n that regard, it i akin to the problem that confronted
deigner of the pace huttle decade ago.) But ince the vehicle would remain within the atmophere rather than going into pace, it
would be far more maneuverable than a ballitic miile, capable of avoiding the airpace of neutral countrie, for example, or teering
clear of hotile territory. „t deigner note that it could fly traight up the middle of the Perian Gulf before making a harp turn toward
a target. ThePentagon hope to deploy an early verion of the ytem by 2014 or 2015. But even +      ,
  .   3 + 3   +    .    : +    
 B 3  Mr.4 /   , even if he i elected to a econd term.

c  
   
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(*+  ) 
)   +  )#@  * +  

)H  * (Apr 1, 2010, http://englih.ruvr.ru/2010/04/01/5899853.html)KFC
The x.S Aitant Secretary for weapon control and international ecurity, Ellen Tocher ay that the x.S
Preident, Barack 4    +   *  +      
  after the igning of the START agreement. She aid that )*)   
 .    the   of       . *     the x.S
     +  , but while hailing the deire of the current incumbent in the White
Houe to rid the world of nuclear arm, two important thing hould be pointed out. Firt, the Ruian head of
tate ha repeatedly been canvaing that idea, meaning that Obama i not a pioneer or path finder.

extremely    though   + +.   + achieving  mot deirable
 . „n the middle of the lat century, the then leader of the demied Soviet xnion propoed for the firt
time that mankind hould be rid of nuclear threat once and for all time. „t i quite poible, a everal expert
contend, that it wa a pure propaganda gimmick, but the thinking of the then Soviet leader wa in the right
direction, and if their uggetion had been heeded, the world would not be in the terrible ituation that it now
find itelf. 0      @    for many year,   .  + tart talk aimed
at + ing the number of        , but in February thi year, the Ruian foreign
miniter, Sergei Lavrov declared that it ha proved impoible to make American partner liten to Ruia'
appeal. Ruian leader ay that before the talk about cutting back on the number of tactical arm can take
off,   +    /     5  . The x.S till ha plenty of tactical
weapon in Britain, Germany, Belgium, „taly, the Netherland and Turkey. Ruia on the other hand, ha
tactical weapon only on it own territory. The ball i in the American court.
     and incere
 wanting to tart     +      ,  + begin to  / 
  of the weapon  5  . „t can and hould be done parliament in Belgium, Germany, the
Netherland, Luxemburg and Norway have aked Wahington to take away it tactical arm from their
countrie, the more o, that #)4   .2:        
 
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c .A(Denni, Senior Fellow@Monterey „ntitute, Fall, ³The Path to Deep Nuclear Reduction: Dealing
with American Conventional Superiority´, http://cn.mii.edu/other/PP29_Gormley.pdf, Acced 6/29/10)jn
@+    c    + +. in the aftermath of Barack Obama¶ election and the Democrat taking
deciive control of both houe of the x.S. Congre? )#: 2c , , originally  +  deployment by
63 +.+ not only    +     but alo +           
  +     Strategic Arm Reduction Treaty ()*)'  /   : 
 + /. .  . 66 According to congreional taff member on the Senate Armed Service Committee,   
 .    Trident or Minuteman+2 +    +  /  
    >       /    , while reearch funding for hyperonic glide
vehicle will remain in place, but without propect for any deployment deciion any time oon. 67 A one enior x.S. Strategic
Command officer evinced to thi writer recently, ³Global Strike ha been throttled back´. 68 One might argue, of coure, and the
Ruian do, that the requirement for converting Trident might be reurrected in future. They urely oberved that an independent tudy
panel of the bipartian National Reearch Council (NRC) had endored a limited application for the conventionally-armed Trident before
the 2008 election. The NRC panel only gave it upport for the miion of a time-critical trike againt a fleeting target of opportunity
(e.g., counterterrorit target or rogue tate activity), which would involve no more than one to four weapon. ) #/.+
 +  +   /  ) +     of 12 deployed Trident   for a total of 24
conventionally armed Trident. „mportantly, #*$+ +       + 
+ / ) + >  +  The limited ue would not carry the ame tiff operational and political
demand a a larger ue of conventional Trident would in providing leading edge attack in upport of major combat operation. „n the
latter regard, Trident would probably join ubtantial number of Tomahawk and other PGM on bomber a part of a counterforce
trike at the outet of a major regional contingency. )#*$ . +          
 ) +  3.2    /    +      
++ related to intelligence upport and command and control, a well a dratically different political implication with regard
to warning ambiguity. Whether the contingency involve uing one or many conventional Trident, a the NRC panel oberved, ³the
ambiguity between nuclear and conventional payload can never be totally reolved . . .´. 69 Yet, the larger the Trident alvo of
conventional miile, the higher the propect for miinterpretation and inadvertent repone. At the ame time, becaue Ruian early-
warning ytem are incomplete, even maller number may be wrongly interpreted a a larger-than-actual alvo or incoming miile.
$     .+   +/    (  .   .  /+ ± largely
:    +       / ) + >  + .

# cF + 

, A(John, Reporter@Defene New, June 4, ³Cartwright: x.S. Force-Sizing, Baing Strategy Need
Overhaul´, http://www.defenenew.com/tory.php?i=4123641&c=AME&=LAN, acceed 6/29/10)
Additionally, $     +       +/    new     + 
@              . The Marine Corp general aid he ha
concluded conventionally +  -   +    /- .-   
  - $   for everal year  +/  + -rompt lobal trike" weapon, which would
be ultra-fat and fitted with a conventional warhead. $  3+ .         ,
like Ruia, +   .+     2   +   3 
 +  +  

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?"&" (Fred, journalit for Slate magazine with a PhD in poli ci from M„T,
[http://www.late.com/id/2246737/pagenum/all/#p2] AD: 7/2/10)JM
)  /  , like the two before it (the firt under Bill Clinton in 1994, the econd under Buh in
2002),  almot certainly     .   3/     . 5/  Preident
Barack 4+      nuclear     ,  +    /+  +   .
Whatever fu the review kick up, four fact are clear. Firt,        ., in
Congre or elewhere,  + any  x.S. nuclear   , nor ha there been for decade. Second,
4 +.  +          . There i no rational bai for not
lahing it, but       +  +.     : //  .
Third, whatever Obama ay about the circumtance under which he'd ue nuclear weapon (for intance,
were he to ay that he'd never ue them firt), there i no reaon for other world leader to believe him or to
aume that ome future preident might view the matter differently. Fourth, however deeply the xnited
State and Ruia cut their nuclear arenal, the move won't diuade other nuclear wannabe from puruing
arenal of their own. „n other word,  /  +   +   .  (and, apparently, there' till
ome internal debate on the fine point),    . 2

 
c  
   
    c

aaa  aaa
c  
   
    c

 (  &)  
)   + +  .    c (     .

$   &" (Joe, expert advior to the Congreional Commiion on the Strategic Poture of the xnited
State, [http://www.ploughhare.org/new-analyi/blog/global-trikeout] AD: 6/29/10)JM
But +     +   +    .J#  „t i difficult to imagine a cenario in which the xnited State
would ue thi weapon. The Pentagon ha better weapon in it arenal that, if updated, could accomplih long-range trike. Joint Chief
of Staff Vice Chairman Gen. Jame Cartwright favor uing modern, preciion-guided conventional munition to replace nuclear
weapon now aigned to uch miion. He' right. The xnited State i currently fighting two war againt enemie with no air
defene, plane, or hip. )   +       + /.++. +
  3     3+3  .3+  . Drone are already deployed, and they can track and
kill fleeting target. @. +    .+    $    + /
  /  3  +. +     3+. +    
   J
 
c  
   !
    c

 ()  
+    /       c 

, +  (Matt, ANSER, and Major Ruty, AFSPC/DRM, May, [http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?Location=x2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA394591] AD: 7/1/10)JM
@.cJK)      /   +, diverged ince end of Cold War ‡ Forward-
Deployed and ±Deployable Force (FDF) limited in number, very expenive, and face antiacce trategie ‡
Adding a PGS a complement to FDF could allow fater, cheaper repone with reduced rik Air Force
Doctrine Document 1 (AFDD-1): "    /  /+ +    .3   +
  9  +       +      +     .
 .."

4/        +  +/ c

, " (Julian, reporter for the Guardian, 6/30/3, [http://www.rene.com/general38/uperwp.htm]AD:


7/2/10)JM
)     a new generation of   ,  +  .   drone and bomb
dropped from pace,                 +   
 .. Over the next 25 year,     . +   ++   +
  +       3   + / +  2   .  +. 
+                /  
 
c  
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    c

 (,  
@  >   /    3           

0  6 (Phillip, retired Col. of the xSAF, R YYY


Y  , Spring, p. 64)JM
)  +        /     .
 operation
 + 3 
   +"!   , many of which it had to hatily contruct or upgrade. Thi i not a new problem.
Air operation at the beginning of both the Korean and vietnam War were contrained by a hortage of air
bae having the requiite runway, ramp pace, utilitie acce, and maintenance facilitie.3 Air Bae
Politic A mentioned above, we may not have aured acce in future crie for two reaon. the firt i
political:   .. /        .       or overfly it territory.
„t may wih to help but nonethele demur due to diagreement over xS objective, dometic concern, or
fear of reprial.4 We witneed a demontration of the firt cae during „raqi freedom when france and
Germany did not agree that an invaion of „raq wa neceary and lent no upport to the xS-led effort.
Similarly, after operation Deert Storm,  +                
for trike againt „raq becaue of dometic opinion. furthermore, Spain¶ withdrawal from „raq in 2004 after
a terrorit attack on the Madrid train ytem howed how reprial can dictate government policy.5
 :   .+  2  .   /    thee   . thu, depite the denial
of airfield in Saudi Arabia, facilitie in Kuwait, bahrain, atar, Pakitan, and elewhere proved ufficient.
Yet, the coalition air commander in „raqi freedom²t. Michael ³buzz´ Moeley, then a lieutenant general²
warned that the xnited State could not count on uch bae: ³
  3   +  
      + 2/   +            . 
   .´6 „n hort, we have aumed that if a country i in trouble and requet our help, then it
will make bae available for our ue. now, however,   +    +   +@ 
    +         Will they be available?
c  
   6
    c

 (#  
 +       c (  . /

c 6 (Elaine, reporter with Global Security Newwire, Nov 7,


[http://gn.nti.org/gn/t_20081107_5200.php] AD: 6/30/10)JM
WASH„NGTON ² @   $  /    + +   a Buh adminitration propoal to
develop    + for the econd year in a row,          + for
fical 2009  largely +  /   . (ee GSN, Sept. 15). (Nov. 7) - ;.  
) H    ., developed by the Air Force and the Defene Advanced Reearch Project Agency,
 + +     / 7     8   (x.S. Defene Departmentl). The
trend might jut it well with Preident-elect Barack Obama, who aid lat year that, if voted into the White Houe, he would ³take the
lead to work for a world in which the role and rik of nuclear weapon can be reduced and ultimately eliminated.´ The impending rie
of long-range conventional arm come principally in the form of two futuritic effort: an Air Force ³Conventional Strike Miile´ and
an Army ³Advanced Hyperonic Weapon.´ Thee are the leading candidate to become ³prompt global trike´ weapon, which defene
leader enviion a a partial alternative to nuclear arm under limited circumtance (ee GSN, Oct. 29). For the new fical year,
Congre ha appropriated nearly $82 million to develop prompt trike weapon, while zeroing a requeted $33 million in Defene and
Energy department fund for deign work on a Reliable Replacement Warhead to upgrade the nuclear tockpile. "A nuclear weapon i
till a viable part of our inventory, but ... one ize doe not fit all," Gen. Jame Cartwright ² at the time the top x.S. trategic
commander ² told a Senate Armed Service panel in March 2006. "@  1+  +   +L / G
     /  ++  .        ." For the
emerging conventional miion, the Defene Department eek the capacity to attack target anywhere around the world within 60
minute of a launch order. Commander have aid uch a capability could be crucial if the nation were confronted by a eriou but
fleeting threat, uch a a terrorit leader pinpointed at a afe houe or a weapon of ma detruction being readied for firing by a rogue
nation. $  .3  .         + +  +   
 2+    A a x.S. preident would be unlikely to launch a nuclear weapon againt uch target,
conventional ballitic miile hould be developed that might be ued more readily, defene leader have argued (ee GSN, May 28).
³„n light of the appropriately extreme reluctance to ue nuclear weapon, conventional prompt global trike could be of particular value
in ome important cenario in that it would eliminate the dilemma of having to chooe between reponding to a udden threat either by
uing nuclear weapon or by not reponding at all,´ tated an Augut report by a National Academy of Science panel (ee GSN, Aug.
15).
c  
   A
    c

 () ) 
)  +  +   + /  +   

< A(Peter, guardian.co.uk, 24 July 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentifree/cifamerica/2009/jul/23/clinton-iran-
defence-umbrella-gulf)KFC
„n the wake of the „ranian election, the Obama adminitration ha probably downgraded it own internal
etimate of the propect for the ucce of talk with „ran on the nuclear iue. After all, if the „ranian
government can't obey it own internal rule,  the xS trut it  +    
 ? Still, the adminitration want to give talk with Tehran a hot at ucce. A Clinton herelf put
it: "We will till hold the door open." What $  1  hould do i tart a debate    
  . .    c   +  like    +      from „raq in
2011. Since the end of the cold war,    +   .      .  
 c . But   +       
,      
+    c  ecurity for the firt time in over two decade. ) + /   
    c  +         .     2      .  
that require outide involvement only in extremi. „n the ame interview in which he gave her defence
umbrella remark, $   aid the xS  -    + +      
 ". With the exception of miile defence, however,  1 c   /    1 
     .+      . 
1 
c  
   
    c

 ()  + 

        3   c



*+"&(John, 22 March 2010, http://www.defenenew.com/tory.php?i=4547989)KFC
     .        + it can  longer count on unfettered acce to
the    /     3the Pentagon i looking at developing a new generation of preciion
weapon that can penetrate 21t-century air defene and hit target from thouand of mile away. "„n the
future, x.S. force conducting power-projection operation abroad will face myriad challenge," read the
2010 uadrennial Defene Review ( DR). „t goe on to ay that      
+#  
?    +    and enor aimed at +  + .   
      r and blunting the operation of thoe force that deploy forward.
 
/   ,   +    1   9    +  or fly from aircraft
carrier ailing near enemy coatline      . Even if x.S. jet can operate from bae or
carrier near an enemy, next-generation air defene ytem that are being old around the world mean that
only the mot advanced jet will be capable of urviving over enemy territory in the future. )    thee
new  +  ,       + a hot of preciion weapon that can hit any target from
thouand of mile away. Known a a family of ytem, thee weapon could include whatever the Air Force
chooe a it next bomber, a new et of cruie miile and even, omeday, hyperonic weapon developed
under the Pentagon'   c    program that would give the peed and range of an „CBM to a
conventional warhead.
c  
   
    c

 (C  +, 

     + 3c .    +



 (Todd C., September 2005, http://www.np.edu/Academic/Center/CCC/reearch/StudentThee/hull05.pdf)KFC
c / +    . the xnited State ha experienced in it effort  +  + 
.  deigned to intercept relatively unophiticated intercontinental miile,  .   
     /+     / c       +..
Advanced air defene are not the only threat or obtacle that adverarie may employ to deny x.S. force
acce. +/   . threaten the ue or actually @0       + bae,
which could delay effective combat operation pending elimination of the WMD threat. The threat of WMD
ue may alo erve to limit the willingne of third-party nation to allow x.S. force to operate from their
territorie or through their airpace. $ / c   +       
  /         2   ..       +   
+/ .>   / .  . The refual to grant over-flight permiion can ignificantly impair the
utility of aircraft and cruie miile to acce the enemy¶ territory. At bet,        .++
+    . At wort, attack againt a land-locked country/target could be impoible without
over-flight permiion from the bordering nation. Operation EL DORADO CANYON againt Libya on 14
to 15 April 1986 provide an example of the firt poible outcome. 9       
 + C2C   +    +? + France and Spain denied the xnited State
over-flight right, o the trike aircraft had to fly a circuitou route over the Atlantic Ocean and then through
the Straight of Gibraltar to gain acce to the Mediterranean Sea and Libya.272 The route flown wa eaily
twice a far a would have been neceary with French or Spanih over-flight permiion that reulted in a
13-hour round trip for the F-111.273 „t i eay to imagine a ituation where the denial of over-flight right
by a third-party nation make an attack impoible. For example,    +   +  
  /2     Pakitan in 2001, 4 5# *
#cC*5540 +/
   . +    . Of coure, if the national need i great enough, the xnited State could chooe
the diplomatically (and potentially militarily) riky option of penetrating the third-party¶ airpace againt
their wihe.


c  
   
    c

aaa
 aaa
 
c  
   "
    c


 (0 5 /
)0    .     /  c . 
 
#/ +  , +6(xS Conventional Prompt Global Strike, Natl Academie Pre, p. 216)KFC
Early in the coure of thi tudy, the Committee on Conventional Prompt Global Strike Capability wa
indeed puzzled that  Department of Defene¶ (4> '   /.  ++   + + 
 +  /  +  0  

 , ince thoe miile and


operational procedure exit, are well undertood, +/    . +. Moreover, variou poible
application for the miile have been uggeted over the year by cientific panel conventional global
trike eemed to be another natural application to conider. xpon further inquiry, however,   
++ .  ++  for reaon decribed below, 0         / 
 2 +  /    3+        /     2
   )      +   .: ‡ ) Strategic Arm Reduction Treaty
%)*)) of 1991 . well : ++3     uing 0     /  prompt
global trike (Cc) + probably    . +    that would have be   d 
*  and other countrie,      .     , delay, and uncertaintie. ‡ „f treaty
iue did not exit, the Minuteman launched from current intallation in California or Florida would often
have to overfly Europe, Ruia, or China, creating nontrivial rik of international incident and poible
ambiguitie during crii. ‡ Deploying 0  elewhere, uch a in Hawaii, which the committee
analyzed,  +./ +  /    , but the political, economic, and procedural
difficultie of introducing a new and ecure operational bae for trategic miile, /    
   + / .+3   /  ++ +. . ‡ Even if 
 +      + /+ .3 0     /   /.  
    /    2 +  . „ndeed, it would probably have to be modified to
ue omething very imilar to the Conventional Trident Modification¶ (CTM¶) front end in order to achieve
adequate accuracy and to build conervatively on pat technology. Moreover, uch a modification would take
time and teting and would incur the difficultie that arie when one organization i aked to ue technology
developed by another (e.g., technology teted in a Defene Advanced Reearch Project Agency [DARPA]
program). )+      .  3    : organization have rich
infratructure developed over decade, which include people with a great deal of tacit knowledge that mut
alo omehow be captured and tranferred. ) C    +  . :+   +/ 
 /  $)02   +3 in which cae additional year might be required. Further,
development rik would be higher than in the Navy¶ incremental approach within a mature organization that
ha a long-term record of ucce with almot preciely the ame component a in the CTM or CTM-2. ‡
)   +3   3        .       
+     + , then perhap the Minuteman option would nonethele have ome advantage. „t
hould be poible to provide on-ite inpection and peritent intrumentation that would provide nation
uch a *   . /    .   +    / 
  (³reaonably high´ becaue nearly any ytem of aurance could probably be defeated with
ufficient cunning and lape of diligence by the oberver). However,   > .   ++
   . + .  /  , uch aurance could be provided with ubmarine-baed
option (ee Appendix H). For all of thee reaon, then, a well a     4+ 
  ++   +9 + 3   + + . 0       
:     + +   
c  
   
    c


 (   .
c +        . 

/ + ++! („an and Robin, independent human ecurity and arm control conultant,
[http://www.baicint.org/pub/Paper/BP51.pdf] AD: 6/29/10)JM Y
)   / .+
$,0   inherent    triggering a   . „t
eem likely, for example, that * +$  .  +  +  
+      + /  SLBM and/or „CBM   ,      
of both +  .21 )  ., by cauing doubt and uncertainty, and poible delay in
repone,  alo inevitably    .          . $   
targeted by any „CBM trike ++   .      .  / + 
 to a ucceful urprie xS nuclear firt trike. )  +         ., particularly if xS
commander may at time be inenitive to the unintentional ramification of the launch of a conventional
„CBM.

c  
   
    c


 (* *  
c .  . *   

c .A (Denni, Center for Nonproliferation Studie-Monterey „nt, Œ Y Y YY Y  ,
http://www.ifri.org/file/Securite_defene/PP29_Gormley.pdf)KFC
 ) +   /  +    . . +       .
A examined earlier in thi paper, the combination of  C     +++
+  H in the air repreent a potent and now broadly d    . +  
 . The NRC panel noted the importance of xAV and pecial force a ource of intelligence
upporting conventional Trident trike, which beg the quetion: .>   /  /   ±
if perhap le effective under ome circumtance ± /   +  / ) + in regard to
thi limited miion?70     /   +    , rather than one
with a nuclear legacy, like the x.S. Navy¶ concept of a ³Sea-Launched Global Strike Miile´, or even the
Navy¶ effort to develop a uperonic verion of the Tomahawk cruie miile.71 For the time being, 
4+    and Congre /         c   ,
   . .*    /   . But +   / +  conider
future   2      +   on military tability  the context of  +  
.   ++   long-range,  2+   in future.


c  
   !
    c


 (* *  
*       (#   + + 9  +  3c .  
 +   3+ ,0 .  /+

@ A(Richard, Hudon „nt, 7-9,
http://www.euraianet.org/department/inightb/article/eav070209a.html)KFC
„n return, they init on reolving three iue eparate from the weapon total. Firt, .    /
)*) /               /    +  .1 national
 .. Since Ruian negotiator have not indicated they eek to retrict the patrol of trategic nuclear
ubmarine and trategic bomber,     + .: +    2 
             . Given that the Obama adminitration ha no plan for uch
deployment, meeting thi requirement hould not be difficult. Second, *     /+++
  : ++   2+-     -  developed by the George H. W. Buh
adminitration. Thi Buh program would equip long-range ballitic miile with conventional warhead in
order to rapidly attack hard-to-reach target, uch a terrorit in Central Aia or Pakitan who have eized a
nuclear weapon. Although *      +       option becaue of the difficultie of
determining whether an „CBM in flight ha a conventional rather than a nuclear warhead,    
/ +  + they could accept * 2     + , whether nuclear or
conventional, +       :   .. Third, * + /demanded that the
xnited State addre Ruia'        +   (BMD)  +  
* 1    „n recent tatement, Medvedev did not explicitly demand that the xnited State
cancel the BMD ytem planned for deployment in Poland and the Czech Republic. [For background ee the
Euraia „night archive]. „ntead, the Ruian preident imply inited that Wahington acknowledge in the
next treaty the inter-relationhip between trategic offene and trategic defene.

c .  / *   +   



4  6(Randall, Col-xSAF, AF War College, www.afreearch.org/kin/rim/q_mod_be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-
8dfe-670c0822a153/q_act_downloadpaper/q_obj_36454d29-b24a-412c-b445-515dacfadd7c/diplay.apx)KFC
The ue of a CSM or CTM in a theater of operation would require a cooperative approach to eae tenion
and prevent an ecalation of military activity by regional tate.      /   
+  ++  + +   . However,  + will   .   
      . A a preventive meaure,    +   and exercie with alliance and
coalition partner in the region, including cenario building requiring   c  . Of prime
concern for the xS would be it ability to acclimate the civilian and military leaderhip on +  
+        +   Thi in turn would provide a better foundation to judge
the appropriate regional reaction to uch an event. The potential for an arm race or the development of
defenive meaure to counter the xS ue of c   + . / /   2
   . However, the financial cot in the development of uch a program would be high. ) .
       + / /$ +* . Current $  +/  
+      .  i beyond reach at thi time. Likewie,     
  *    / it weapon arenal and retaliatory capability. Even without the
introduction of c    3  .   +    
        .. A uch, the xS mut take the lead in developing technology which will
thwart attempt of rogue tate or terrorit faction to achieve firt-trike capability.


c  
   B
    c


 ()  
c .             

 $   ) +.B(http://www.armcontrol.org/act/2007_06/GlobalStrike)KFC
Still, the :   ed        capability     7c /  
  >  + +  conequent    .        will  ,  +
 the     of weapon of ma detruction, a truly global capability may oon be required, if it i
not required today,´ the panel tated. „n addition to being ued againt terrorit, the panel aid   
    .   + .+    outet, or ³+ +38 9      . „n
uch a cenario, the panel cautioned that        + . The brief time frame
aociated with         +     , according to the panel. „t tated that  
  +    2 +     +7+  ´ + warned that
deciion-maker + /  +.      + and other rik. The panel
predicted that             +, numbering ³at mot a few
dozen´ intance during their firt decade of ervice. „t calculated that ³only a few terrorit leader would
merit ue of uch a weapon.´
c  
   6
    c


 (# @3  
c       +   

? / +? A6(Andrew, defene policy analyt, and Steven, Director of Defene and
„nternational Affair@The office of Management and Budget, Œ Y   Y Y YR  Y  ,
November/December, pg. 30-1) jn
On the other hand,  +       . / 2  trategic  
  . + actually     .3.   +  ²or ³firebreak´² 
 2 +     „n other word,  +    nited tate 
than it ha in the pat  +        F    +    reorting to  
  . However,   .   / +. /   +   particularly   
+. well feel compelled to         . Similarly3  +   
+/    / 2  trategic   capability by the xnited State²   +
    than a nuclear trike capability² +     /    
+/          3    .  +/   +3 or at
leat ome portion of trategic target within it,  ++7  .8   Thi may be ? ? true  
+/ +    3  ./         /      
  .  . +   3 /       a relatively , albeit primitive, counter
to non-nuclear trategic trike operation.

c     2    +3      3+     



/ + ++!(„an, BAS„C director, and Robin, independent human ecurity and arm control activit, June,
³xS µPrompt Global Strike¶ Capability: A New Detabiliing Sub-State Deterrent in the Making?´,
http://www.baicint.org/pub/Paper/BP51.pdf, Acceed 6/29/10)jn
)c  . alo raie   2     . Firt,   . +   
   and countermeaure             ytem and/or eek to protect their
overeignty by building weapon ytem to counter xS capabilitie. „t eem likely, for example, that other nuclear power, uch a
China and Ruia, would embark on imilar SLBM and „CBM converion project. )  +      
   9 +     3   )   3    +. 
 . Second, c. +     2     , uch a the 2002 Hague Code of
Conduct Againt Ballitic Miile Proliferation,         +/  3  3 3+
+    .22 At the igning of the Code, John Bolton, then xS xnder Secretary of State for Arm Control and
„nternational Security, affirmed xS upport for it, but alo highlighted a number of qualifying factor and reervation. One uch
reervation concerning pre-launch notification wa that the xnited State µreerve the right in circumtance of war to launch ballitic
miile and pace-launch vehicle without prior notification¶.23 „f the xS adminitration i alo aerting it µright¶ to pre-emptive
launch of a PGS capability the Code i a good a dead and buried. Third,       +    
   And a Steve Andreaon, a former xS Nation Security Council taffer ha pointed out: ³Long-range ballitic miile have
never been ued in combat in 50 year´. But   nited tate   +     /        
+   .   37    +      ´, he aid.24
c  
   A
    c


 (  
c    

$ 6(Jacqueline, Activit for After Downing Street, ³The Hidden Architecture of x.S. Militarim´
http://www.afterdowningtreet.org/militarim, acceed 6/29/20)jn
„n it June 2006 report, Weapon of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arm, the Han Blix-led Weapon
of Ma Detruction Commiion recommended, 7           + 
     .      .´ But, while advocating, ³preparing for the outlawing of nuclear weapon
through joint practical and incremental meaure«´ $  + + +  .++   7   .
     8 . 4 +   /      .      
  + lat year . Robert 5  , a Clinton adminitration nuclear policy expert and arm control advocate. ³@
 +      +/    / /    38 he aid. ³„t¶ hard
to imagine a preident uing nuclear weapon under almot any circumtance, but   +        
 /    .´ Thi tatement, unfortunately, i all too true. But /  /   / 
  .   .   + +     +    . Moreover, how
practical would that approach be? ;  +           2  .    
7  8 2  +? @ +>  ./  / maintain or       
   /    /   .   .? And +>   3  , even further
  +      + +     , thu rendering the goal of nuclear
diarmament nearly impoible? Thi conundrum i one of the bigget challenge we face and it cannot be ignored. To it credit, the Blix
Commiion ended it report by acknowledging: ³The perpective of a world free of WMD mut be upplemented by the perpective of
a world in which the arenal of conventional weapon have been reduced dratically.´ The Commiion concluded: ³Tenion between
rich and poor ocietie, the pread of dieae like H„V and avian flu, environmental threat, competition over energy, the functioning of
international trade and financial market, cro-border crime and terrorim, and o forth, will be challenge for all. They will require the
development of an international ociety organized through cooperation and law rather than one controlled by overwhelming military
force, including weapon of ma detruction.´
c  
   "
    c


 ( + 
c      +    

 +/ !(Pavel, Stanford x, December 8, ³Ruia and the Prompt Global Strike Plan´,
http://ruianforce.org/podvig/2006/12/ruia_and_the_prompt_global_.html acceed 6/29/10) jn
Seriou    :      . rompt clobal trike. )   +     
  .    2   network  / ++        global-trike 3  
   . :      + /. .    / +      . and
power required to attack a broad enough range of target. 0    , perhap,     .  
    rompt clobal trike +      .  +  / / 
     5.      and radar  +    the launch of 
 /  + that of   )  ++      or
miundertanding potentially extremely       Furthermore,        
   3      / rompt lobal2 trike miion in the firt place3/ 
/.          3       
+    +      .  + 

c   . 2     

0 6(Vince, CD„ Reearch Aitant, ³An Examination of the Pentagon¶ Prompt Global Strike Program:
Rationale, „mplementation, and Rik´, http://www.cdi.org/pdf/PGSfactheet.pdf, acceed 6/29/10)jn
c /           („CBM) +,0 // . . +
  + 3 many analyt argue that     3  *  $ 3  7   
   / .2+  +  +   . +  
    8 35 Although thi concern ha been expreed in context of both Navy and Air Force conventional miile
program,   / $)0    I7To outide oberver, L) + G > 
 / +     + + Fthe ame ize, the ame peed, hooting from the ame
location.´36 „an Davi and Robin Dodd argue that the + .   /      9 
++ +      .  .  2  . A a conequence, countrie ³targeted
by any „CBM trike would need to treat any attack a nuclear one if they were to avoid being open to a ucceful urprie xS nuclear
firt trike.´ 37 „n other word,  nited tate  +  .:     ..    
     +    /  2  . The implication of thi argument i that
+ .  2     /  +       .  
+  +  /     >    , a they will feel that their arenal are even more
vulnerable to a x.S. firt trike. @ +   +  /       +  
+             3        + 
        .+ , not an unintended and unexamined conequence of a new weapon deployment. A recent
article in Arm Control Today quote a Ruian ource echoing thi very concern: 7      /.+ 
L G. /     +L ] when a trategic miile i launched.´ 38 Former Ruian Preident Vladimir
Putin ha expreed imilar concern: ³)     + /        
       , could provoke  2           .´ 39
Similarly, the congreionally-mandated NAS report affirmed that uch concern ³merit eriou conideration,´ and alo recommended
³providing a modet amount of applied reearch (6.2) funding toward meauring the more challenging hyperonic flight technologie
needed for other longer-term CPGS [conventional prompt global trike] option enviioned by the Air Force and the Army.´ 40

c  
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c   *   F     

 $      6(June, Ruia Want Limit on Prompt Global Strike
http://www.armcontrol.org/print/2945, acceed 6/29/10)jn
4+ / /   2*   on a future trategic weapon treaty * 1     /   
    2  ++ /. .  +  2  + . The , 
adminitration        :+  2     againt target around the world, but
Congre and a recent government watchdog report have raied ome concern about the initiative. Current x.S. effort to develop long-
range conventional-trike weapon grew out of call for uch a capability in the Pentagon' 2001 uadrennial Defene Review and the
Buh adminitration' Nuclear Poture Review the ame year. (See ACT, January/February 2002 .) Adminitration official contend that
thoe weapon, now generally referred to a "prompt global trike" and intended to trike target in le than an hour, would provide a
military option when the xnited State might otherwie face the choice of uing nuclear weapon or not acting againt a potential
danger. Official acknowledge thoe moment might be rare, but they include cenario uch a terrorit meeting briefly in remote
location or foe preparing a miile launch threatening x.S. troop, allie, or atellite. *  9 3 .     
++         +    +    againt it3+ 
*    .        nited tate. x.S. official maintain there are meaure, uch a
pre-launch notification or baing non-nuclear miile eparately from nuclear miile, to minimize poible miperception. (See
ACT, May 2006 .)
c  
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    c


 (  > 
 /   
c+  >  /    F 3   +     

+ !(Steve, National Security conultant, ³Off Target? The Buh Adminitration' Plan to Arm Long-
Range Ballitic Miile with Conventional Warhead´, http://www.armcontrol.org/act/2006_07-
08/CoverStory#bio, acceed 6/29/10)jn
Second,                / /      +   
  .    nited tate  / and ue if neceary to prevent an attack,    
 /  2    +   /      .+ / 
   .. „n hort,         +, we know where ³ungoverned´ area provide
terrorit haven, +   /   exiting and + /     +   
 . Moreover,       /  2   + 
 7 8    /   , given challenge aociated with identifying and locating
target, receiving authority to fire, and having ubmarine in poition to hoot. ).   3 for example,
  2 /     2 /.   North Korean ballitic miile or
$ >    during a conflict over Taiwan. „f North Korea were about to launch a nuclear miile at the xnited State,
however, there would be more²much more²than conventional Trident miile heading toward North Korea 
 /      $ >     +     
   ., 9 . We alo need to look cloely at the opportunity cot of the development, deployment, and potential ue of
long-range conventional ballitic miile. ) /       .   , including preventing the pread
of weapon of ma detruction and protecting againt terrorit,    9 +  :+     .
Thi i particularly true in the context of the ongoing war in „raq and Afghanitan, which the Congreional Budget Office now
etimate will cot $811 billion. Simply put, i it a wie invetment to pend hundred of million of dollar on conventional long-range
ballitic miile compared with other urgent defene prioritie uch a global port ecurity, military peronnel, and threat reduction
program? What of the rik? „ the niche capability that conventional Trident miile might provide worth it if it lead to more
countrie with more ballitic miile more willing to ue them in their own puruit of their ecurity interet? Moreover, +.
 +        /  2         
   /        . +  +   nited tate, perhap
with a nuclear-tipped miile? xp to thi point, the anwer and aurance that have been provided by x.S. official with repect to a
mitaken retaliatory launch have not been reauring. For example,  .        
:   + / +  +     ) +  . Moreover, it
i difficult to conclude that tranparency and Joint Data Exchange are ³tarting to work,´ a Cartwright claim, when there i no ytem
of hared early warning of operational miile launche in place among the xnited State, Ruia, and other tate. Even if there wa, it
may not work or be credible. Moreover3      /.  :   +
 / 7+ 28 .     /       .+    ++   /
     2   ,       . + / . + 
 .  . Finally, the iue of conventional Trident miile embedded in the concept of Prompt Global Strike
provide another opportunity to examine whether we are puruing the right balance in defending the xnited State, in particular whether
we are effectively utilizing all element of x.S. power or relying too heavily on our military to win the global war on terrorim. Our
trategy againt terrorit armed with weapon of ma detruction mut be more than jut reducing the time to target our enemie.
„ndeed, the ue of long-range conventional ballitic miile in volatile region of the globe might eaily lead to greater intability rather
than fewer terrorit, epecially when factoring in the political fallout overea from employing long-range ballitic miile for the firt
time in combat. „n thi context,         2    +     .
     ..   .    I     
      ²economic, political, diplomatic, and cultural²      .  .
c  
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    c


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c  F    /  .  

+ !(Steve, National Security conultant, ³Off Target? The Buh Adminitration' Plan to Arm Long-
Range Ballitic Miile with Conventional Warhead´, http://www.armcontrol.org/act/2006_07-
08/CoverStory#bio, acceed 6/29/10)jn
)   2    trategic  /          
   .   .+ . + . 2  , high-value      + to the
National Command Authority. Jut looking back over the pat decade or o3   /     
   2     of thi ort²mot recently, the ucce in tracking down a leading al aeda terrorit in „raq,
Abu Muab al-Zarqawi²     :  9  +        For intance, 
nited tate and many other tate   +        +    
 before the
x.S.-led March 2003 invaion, but there were not. The xnited State tried unuccefully to locate Saddam Huein at the outet of the
war, but even after x.S. troop occupied the country, it took eight month to find Huein (and three year to find al-Zarqawi).  
3            .  +   4  +. „n 1999
  +     +      +#  ?    at Kumchang-ni + +
  . „n 1993 the xnited State identified a Chinee freighter, the Yin He, for inpection, believing it wa carrying precuror for
chemical weapon. Again, nothing wa found.


c  
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 (; .
)  2c+  . +   .3     +     .

/ M ++!(„an, Arm Control Conultant, and Robin, Britih American Security Council, Britih American Security „nformation
Council, Occaional Paper, „nternational Security Policy 51, June 2006, http://www.baicint.org/pub/Paper/BP51.pdf/)KFC 
The Pentagon¶ deire to field c  . yet  + +  recent 
+  .. A the Buh adminitration continue in what ha been decribed a =     
  .>3     mut be aked not only regarding    .    ,   a to
        . that project uch  c/        
   ..25 „n it puruit of a unilaterally haped global ecurity paradigm  preent  adminitration
   +  .    +  µha  patiently     . >.26 „n turn, 
not only +2     3    in the proce  +   /    . )
complex     .+  that the international community +   
   +    -baed repone that take into account the ecurity concern of the
community a a whole. )c  .     2   / and eek to buy
ecurity at the end of a $500 million miile ytem. Such  approach         and
alo create a heightened ene of global inecurity. + the  =  >      
   .  already be ing    aymmetric      latet propoed    in
the xS arenal.
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$,0  >  +   /.(       $ 

 !(Noah, contributing editor at Wired magazine, and the editor of it national ecurity blog,
³Red Phone v. Trident,´http://www.noahhachtman.com/archive/002465.html)KFC
„t would be $ >     . Perhap   +     2   /) 3
$     +     from the Pacific Ocean. A Trident miile i headed China¶
way. $    +     while Chinee „CBM go on high alert. The clock i ticking
« and      /    )  .        . 
     .  +  ome of it ) +  ubmarine-launched ballitic    
 /  +  A conventionally-armed Trident ha certain advantage over bomber, cruie
miile, or Special Force for taking out high-value target. „t¶ unmanned, extremely accurate for a miile
and fat: a Trident can hit any pot on the globe around 30 minute from launch. But    > 
)#)2 +) +   .   100-kiloton   +. So /.   
 + a conventional ) +     , * 3$  + /.    +
uffer a major 2 . [„nide Defene ha been all over thi controvery for a while -- ed.] „n thi
month¶ Proceeding (not yet online), Navy Capt. Terry Benedict admit the diplomatic complication of
uing conventional Trident. But he believe we can reolve them: ³Thi change in our nation¶ trategic
force will require that no tone be left unturned to improve the meaure we have in place to prevent
miundertanding. Area under invetigation and review include exiting hotline and other communication
with Ruia and China, diplomacy, military dialogue, plu training, tet and exercie.´ ) only 
  in Benedict¶ lit    by   the x.S. +     before
launching a conventional Trident. ,     +9    in a long chain of comm
connecting national command authoritie to trategic force:    +/    . ²
and quickly ² /.  / +9   + . And conider thi: /   3 Chinee +
+ ./      the buzzing red  .
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4. &*    :  

,  (Nick , profeor of philoophy - Oxford xniverity, March, 2002, Exitential Rik:
Analyzing Human Extinction Scenario and Related Hazard, Journal of Evolution and
Technology, p. http://www.nickbotrom.com/exitential/rik.html)KFC
A much  er :   +   +2        +  *.
An all-out nuclear war wa a poibility  both       . +      
  /      .  +  . There wa a real worry among
thoe bet acquainted with the information available at the time that  ++  +  
+              .+  .  /   .[4] * + 
        + +      , either accidentally or
deliberately. ) alo        . one day  +    . Note
however that a maller nuclear exchange, between „ndia and Pakitan for intance, i not an exitential rik,
ince it would not detroy or thwart humankind¶ potential permanently.      /
     for the citie mot likely to be targeted. xnfortunately,      
++ and comet or ateroid trike are mere prelude to the exitential rik that we   
   .


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) (    .(     $ 

,   !(Chritopher, Shirley A. Kan, and Amy F. Woolf , Foreign Affair, Defene,
and Trade Diviion of the CRS, 2006. ³xS Conventional Force and Nuclear Deterrence: A
China Cae Study,´ ftp.fa.org/gp/cr/natec/ RL33607.pdf)KFC
While  new  /      + , .   +    
  .         For example, in Scenario C (combined arm attack),    
$      +  .   +:   /) . Neither i
vulnerable to a firt trike from the other. However, the ame may not be true of conventional force. $ 
. /     /   . )     +   ., and that
uch an attack i about to occur. „t may then believe that,       of e and poible
attack (conventional or nuclear) on it own territory, that it +         
+    . „n eence, then,    . ++)  by attacking target,   .
7   / .38 $  + .   , + could  $  begin or
expand it   on ) . „t can alo be argued that potent conventional force,      .
/ $ > +  3. +  A decribed in the background ection of thi
report, during the Cold War, relatively   /   /  + by many a conitent
  +     +    + have to quickly      
 + by more potent Waraw Pact force in Europe.
c  
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    c


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@/   .  +     c

 A(Jaon, Defene Policy Analyt, July 6, ³Why µPrompt¶ Global Strike?´,


http://armchairgeneralit.typepad.com/my_weblog/2009/07/why-prompt-global-trike.html, acceed 6/29/10)jn
„'ve been puzzled by General Kevin Chilton' puh for what they call "  -    for the xS military. You ee3 1 
       +...    +. He believe (and „'m ure
there are other) that we need a conventional weapon that can trike anywhere in the world within an hour of launch - and that otherwie
we have to rely on nuclear weapon. Oh, and he want it in the next five or ix year. We can't get the preident' next generation
helicopter in five to ix year, and he want uper-fat conventional trike weapon... +  /   
    3         .    .  +  +
 9 !    of a launch order. Lacking uch a capability,  . 2    . .
/    +  +       +   , which military official
have decribed a unlikely to be ued. Prompt global trike advocate ay the conventional capability could be ueful in hitting
fleeting target like a terrorit leader in a afe houe or a weapon of ma detruction being prepared for launch. Above-ground launch
facilitie would be eaily ditinguihable from nuclear miile ilo in Wyoming, Montana and North Dakota, o potential adverarie
like Ruia or China would be unlikely to miinterpret a launch a the onet of a nuclear war, according to official. "„f you have
more time, then there are better ytem out there and more affordable ytem to cloe" in on a target with conventional weapon, Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Gen. Jame Cartwright told a Senate panel lat month. For example, if bomber aircraft are baed
cloe enough to a target, they might be ued more affordably in place of long-range miile. Each Conventional Strike Miile could
cot ten of million of dollar to procure -- or to replace after launch. Let' forget for the moment that the reearch and development
han't been done to allow uch an ambitiou project to uccefully field a uch capability. )   3 .J)
  +       -- /   . "We have to get that high-value target within the hour,
or... the world will be forfeit!"
 .               +   
  J  .   /    .  +   + +   
  ? Conidering that         /.  +, i there any doubt that  +    
   + + /  .  ? Thi i another bad idea by omeone who think that there ha to be a
technical olution to every poible military challenge. Tell me why a JDAM bomb off of a large xAV drone, or a conventional cruie
miile at the wort, won't do the ame thing that thi "prompt global trike" doe but much, much cheaper. Of coure, we'd have to
aume that our military actually can plan thing before it act. That' not too much to ak, i it?

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 &!(Jack A, Aia Time, 2010, http://www.atime.com/atime/Middle_Eat/LE06Ak02.html)KFC


The State Department on April 8 made a pecial point of the fact that "the  )*)  .+   
   .      current or planned xS conventional   c     .". We
have no evidence but aume the Ruian mut have raied the point and lot ince Mocow i on record a
trongly oppoing PGS. The DR and NPR, followed by  Obama adminitration' April 12-13  
   B  in New York   ++         the xS agenda at
the May 3-28 meeting of the xN' important 2010 review conference of the partie to the treaty on  2
        . Wahington want it principal prioritie -    #)+
  .          - to be acted upon. „t eek to have „ran and North Korea
punihed. And it want to be looked on a being compliant with the NPT in term working toward complete
nuclear diarmament.  /3 4+       /.    to the people
of the xS and the world    diligently .  +    3  +   3++   
+   .
 .3   /   +    , hiking military pending,
  +   . ++   /  ,             
 +  .
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)#* +   c .  3    +  +.  $  +
*  

C.&B(Robert, April 7, 2010, http://www.lawyergunmoneyblog.com/2010/04/prompt-global-trike-not-dead)KFC
„¶ll have an article about the NPR coming out tomorrow at TAP, but uffice to ay that „¶m not particularly
impreed with 4#* Every policy document      3+     .
   a +   focuing     . A multitude of different agencie and veted interet
have finger in the pie, and each demand to be part of the deciion-making proce. „n thi cae, 
+    +  // +2 2+     +      two
apparent compromie  + 3+     . Joh Rogin take a look at the miile
defene bit here „ raied ome quetion about     2    language   
DR, and uffice it to ay that the #* +     my   . Prompt global trike i mentioned a
everal point in the NPR a a replacement for firt trike nuclear capabilitie and a large nuclear tockpile.
While prompt global trike doen¶t necearily mean conventionally armed SLBM and „CBM, nothing in
the language of the NPR exclude uch option. Prompt     + , on the urface,   +
+ n Ohio cla   ++ / /  + +  to almot .
target   + The devil i in the detail   . +     +, and the
poibility of conventional ,0 being regularly launched from ubmerged ub +  
 $  + *  . „n other word, not uch a good idea. Perhap the thinking i that
rhetorical upport of the program now won¶t necearily mean appropriation for it later. „f that¶ true, „¶m not
ure that the hitory of the miile defene program i terribly comforting.
c  
   
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)I# *   
 >     (   .  .         
 . + 

4 !(„van, Preident of the Federation of American Scientit, 2006. ³Make Trident
Conventional,´http://www.fa.org/blog/p/2006/05/make_trident_conventional.php)KFC
)    .    . minor   by itelf that would mean thi new ytem would
be, at wort, imply a wate of money.  much /  +   .    .
„f the * n + the $ ee +  ) +     (and both can to a limited degree),
3      ,  +    potential target       
a  /  miile headed toward North Korea +   miile headed toward them? While
thinking about thi, conider that the Ruian are not tupid, they can look at the xS nuclear force poture
and figure out what it primary miion i. Alo,   +     3   2
 .  + . @  + for a time    $  *   +.
Doe the ³they¶ll trut u´ argument work the day after a xS reconnaiance plane ha been forced down?

$   *   ) +  3 .   (a)      + (b) ++
+  until they get evidence that it i not.


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*   .     c3  .   

6 (Thoma, reearcher for the National „ntitute for Public Policy, July 1, ×  Y, 27 p.
343)JM
Third, in December 2007, a team of retired enior *   .      their  
   in Wahington, D.C. The purpoe of the viit wa to dipel miundertanding regarding the
nuclear weapon policie of each country. The Ruian /    ++ retired Major c Vladimir
/  , a enior reearcher at the Center for „nternational Security at the Ruian Academy of Science.
Previouly, Dvorkin ha poken about the 1995 incident in which a Norwegian weather rocket triggered an
alarm in Ruia. /  +  +        *      +    
   $c   and repond with a nuclear trike. /    +    33"3
/    +   . ³No one [in Ruia] will launch a nuclear trike in
repone to a few miile.´ The other retired, enior *    ++  +  
+/    / .+            . and i
being purued in Ruia. Ruia currently deploy uch miile in hort-range verion.9


c  
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)I# 0   
c    F  +   3    3   .

 +/ !(Pavel, Stanford x, December 8, ³Ruia and the Prompt Global Strike Plan´,
http://ruianforce.org/podvig/2006/12/ruia_and_the_prompt_global_.html, acceed 6/29/10) jn
Other ign that *         /       pace-baed .  
.  alo exit. „n 2006, *   +   .  + and launched a atellite to
augment it firt-generation ytem. A new radar i being contructed near St. Peterburg at leat one more i cheduled to be deployed
in outhern Ruia. Baed on thi activity3   .     / / ++. * 
.         + Second,          
         / +   . and facilitating confidence building, at thi
time    /    3 whether bilateral or multilateral, : )   
        the rompt lobal- trike plan. The relevant x.S.-Ruian agreement tem
from the 1988 Ballitic Miile Launch Notification Agreement. „n 1991, proviion of thi agreement were included in the Strategic
Arm Reduction Treaty ()*)), and reponibility for handling the notification wa tranferred to the Nuclear Threat Reduction
Center. Thi i the only exiting formal arrangement requiring the xnited State and Ruia to provide advance notification of launche
of ea- or land-baed trategic ballitic miile. The mechanim, however,           
+/+, therefore, +             >   ± the goal of Prompt Global
Strike. Thi mean that hould the xnited State proceed with it plan, it would have to abandon or ignificantly weaken the exiting
launch notification mechanim. A potential ubtitute to the 1988 agreement i the Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC) arrangement,
which call for etablihing a jointly operated center that would allow x.S. and Ruian military operator to exchange information
provided by their early warning ytem almot in real time. The JDEC project, however, ha eriou limitation. Firt of all, it i not
even clear if the center will become operational. „n the more than eight year ince the agreement wa igned in 1998, neither ide ha
expreed ufficient interet in puruing the idea. No legal iue aociated with JDEC have been reolved and the contruction of the
facilitie required ha not yet begun. Second, the arrangement i far from comprehenive, allowing, for example, the withholding of
information about certain pace launche. The mot eriou problem with a center like JDEC, however, i that it wa deigned to rely on
real-time communication and that it provide no way to corroborate data provided during the exchange. Thi mean that in a crii
ituation a center like JDEC i more likely to add to rik than to mitigate them. Third,  *       2
     +  +        .   .+   
9 .    and to predict it target. At thi time, * > .   . . . 
/    .5/  +  , however,         +   
. The early warning and command-and-control ytem were deigned to react to a wide range of event in predetermined way,
and it i virtually impoible to know how thee ytem might react to certain development.
       
:        +  +    + :        +
      + +  +      )   .   + which could
lead to uch mitake i very mall, but it  +  +  +. For example, on the day of the terrorit attack of
September 11, 2001, Ruian trategic aviation wa conducting an exercie that involved flight of trategic bomber in the direction of
the xnited State. On the ame day, the x.S. air defene command, NORAD, wa planning to conduct an exercie, known a Vigilant
Guardian, which ³potulated a bomber attack from the former Soviet xnion.´ @  +   +   
+    *     . ++.   +    .  
    +. The pilot of one x.S. fighter that wa crambled on September 11, 2001, for example, admitted that he
³reverted to the Ruian threat,´ believing that ³the batard nuck [a cruie miile] by u.´ xltimately,    
    * +  nited tate / +  .      
         >     . Both jutify their trategic arenal by the exitence of thoe on the other
ide. The xnited State and Ruia continue to regularly conduct exercie that involve emulating nuclear trike, often limited one,
againt each other. A long a thi practice continue, there will alway be an opportunity for miundertanding and miinterpretation.
An even deeper problem i that  nited tate +* /     +/ +
      +  .. Many poitive change in the x.S.-Ruian relationhip
have been a reult of mechanim of dialogue, cooperation, and information exchange that were etablihed in the late 1980 and early
1990. Thee mechanim include arm reduction negotiation, dialogue on miile defene, the START treaty proce, and joint
peacekeeping miion. „f thee mechanim were developed, improved, and further trengthened, they could conceivably bring the
x.S.-Ruian relationhip to a level of true partnerhip, from which they would not have to worry about problem that could reult from
operating their trategic force or from implementing program like Prompt Global Strike. Thi, however, ha not happened. 0 
       .+  / +  +  Some of
their . 3 )*) verification and information exchange mechanim,   .  + 
 )   /          .  + + +
         
  nited tate goe ahead and  the rompt clobal trike
plan,     .  .  .
c  
   
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*  +   + +(   +      

N   (Alexander, Reporter, Freezer Box, ³Hair Trigger Planet,´
http://www.freezerbox.com/archive/article.php?id=285)KFC
Thee are jut a few of the lape and loophole that have been reported.   +*     
+   +  t3   of launch by accident, abotage or radar miread       .
)   .  Ruia or the x.S.        + many expert and planner in both
countrie     .  " 2 2 ." Thi mean   +  + . /
  +    ++   + and it launch trajectory confirmed beyond doubt.
Another way to reduce the chance of accidental nuclear war -+2 ." Thi +    
    2   footing +++    .   + , thu lengthening
the minimum repone time to any attack. The argument for doing thi ret on the aumption that both ide
have enough miile to aborb a firt trike and till guarantee the detruction of the enemy after the fact are
in. )  + / +      .      over a upiciou weather
balloon, a well a reduce the rik of accidental or terrorit launch. But the Pentagon' declaration of it
intent to achieve deciive x.S. military advantage--"full pectrum dominance"--over any conceivable
adverary doe not encourage the kind of thinking that lead to de-alerting and other trut-building meaure,
in Ruia or anywhere ele. uite the oppoite. And thi i where x.S. policy after the Cold War enter into
the picture. * .  / .      +  1 :  / . While the paranoia
and bitterne at the highet level of the Ruian military are partly a reult of hitory and dipoition, x
   +       and bitterne        .. „n 1991, a recently retired
member of the General Staff named c Yuriy ?    /  in Wahington, DC,   
+  + +   /       *   . "The mot
important thing the x.S. can do to contribute to world peace," he aid, "[i] convince the [Ruian] General
Staff that the x.S. doe not want to conquer the world." Since the end of the Cold War, the dialectic ha been
clear: @/  :    .  in breach of international law, announce hegemonic
ambition or pree for trategic advantage, * %+3 increaingly, $ '   ++  
  +     +   . Operation Deert Fox, the bombing of Belgrade, the
expanion of NATO eatward, the declaration of America' intent to "own" and weaponize pace, the
propoed building of a miile defene ytem and other high-tech weapon that threaten the effectivene of
Ruia' nuclear deterrent-- are         . after the Cold War   +
   * +  +     .
c  
   
    c

)I4@  c# 


4 +>   c

+& (David E. and Thom, reporter for the New York Time,
[http://www.nytime.com/2010/04/23/world/europe/23trike.html] AD: 6/30/10)JM
³@     +/+ . J8 Gary Samore, Mr. Obama¶ top advier on unconventional
weapon, aid at a conference in Wahington on Wedneday. But he noted that *   +. o
  +     .     +  . /     +     +
   +              .. „n a follow-on treaty, he
aid, the Ruian would certainly want to negotiate on Prompt Global Strike and ballitic miile defene

04+  + + + .  . , Mr. Samore aid,       +
 enough that Ruia and China would not fear that they could take out their nuclear arenal.



c  
   !
    c



aaa  aaa


c  
   B
    c

# (4  c
   c 

; +  .# &! (Homeland Security Newwire, leading e-information ervice,


[http://www.freerepublic.com/focu/f-new/2502952/pot] AD: 7/2/10)JM
The Obama adminitration i about to take up one of the more controverial cheme of the Rumfeld-era
Pentagon. The New York Time reported (ee alo Robert Farley¶ blog entry) that    
                /  + )
   + , in theory, +  .    + . ² a no-notice ³bolt from the
blue,´ triking in a matter of hour. Noah Shachtman write that there i jut one problem: the launche could
very well tart a Third World War.

  +  c  ( .>/+.   

H & (Bill, writer for the World Socialit Webite and former preidential candidate,
[http://www.ott.net/article/how/207487-Obama-adminitration-pending-billion-on-new-global-trike-weapon]
AD: 7/2/10)JM
The 4 adminitration  +    of dollar +/  new weapon ytem, including
powerful  /  +  capable of triking any target in the world within le than an hour.
)  C  +        April 22 - one at Vandenberg Air Force Bae in
California, and the other at Cape Canaveral, Florida - + +    +/  of thee
weapon ytem. The firt ytem, known a Conventional Prompt Global Strike, or CPGS, would be capable of triking
anywhere acro the globe within under an hour of a launch order, uing intercontinental ballitic miile fired from the xS to deliver
conventional warhead againt target in other countrie. Capable of triking a target with an impact peed of up to 4,000 feet per
econd and a payload of up to 8,000 pound, thee warhead would be able to obliterate everything within a 3,000-foot radiu. )
4+      +E   in appropriation by Congre to pay  +/  
$c in 2011,     over thi year' budget. The total cot of the program i expected to mount to
over $2 billion by 2015, by which time the Pentagon hope to have deployed the firt element of the weapon ytem. The Defene
Advanced Reearch Project Agency (*' +     Thurday  a pace plane known
a the Falcon, or ;.  )  .H  (HTV-2), a uborbital vehicle that i the prototype for the
$c+ /. . 


c  
   6
    c

# (* 
)@ ;        +3+   +c

;   !&(Rebeccah, June 21, 2010,
http://www.foxnew.com/opinion/2010/06/21/rebeccah-heinrich-obama-ruia-new-tart-treaty-
enate-pentagon-gate-clinton/)KFC
The adminitration claim that               .   / 
:  ++ . But Air Force official argue that they will need a next-generation bomber by 2018, not
becaue they expect their exiting B-52 bomber to be inufficient -- though mot of them are now decade
older than the pilot who fly them -- but becaue ,2 .  2 +  3  
itelf     Compounding the problem,     +   
$0. The ame problem exit for land-baed nuclear force, which are compried of Minuteman „„„
miile. Thee are lated to be maintained through 2030, but it i unclear what happen after thi. )
      +   >      +a ytem of non-nuclear „CBM called
  c   . )@ ; +   c   +.+ .
+ +   + /. .   + + # )*)) .. Thi i yet another
foolih conceion, though judging .     3 +     >    +
c. .
c  
   A
    c

# (c/  
)    .+/  c .  

*  &(Rick April 10, 2010, http://rickrozoff.wordpre.com/2010/04/10/prompt-global-


trike-world-military-uperiority-without-nuclear-weapon/)KFC
) long-delayed#uclear oture *eview Report of earlier thi month     Pentagon¶   
7      credible  +  +       . architecture  
+  «.´ [3] „t alo confirm that ++  7 2  .     + 
and reaurance goal  /+./ +       +  and preerving option
for uing heavy bomber and long-range miile ytem in conventional role.´ At an April 6 pre
conference on #uclear oture *eview with Secretary of Defene Robert Gate, Joint Chief of Staff
Chairman Navy Admiral Michael Mullen, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Energy Steven
Chu, Gate  +7         + 
$,0 [„ntercontinental Ballitic Miile],
 2  + 2    ´ and ³      +/ +
 / 2    3  +   +  8 Mullen poke of ³defend[ing] the
vital interet of the xnited State + thoe of our partner and allie  + :   
+ 2    /  +   +.8L]
c  
   
    c

# (# #  
)        

D &! (Yunzhu, Proliferation Analyi, MAY 6, 2010, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publication/?fa=view&id=40758)KFC
)4+   > #  */  (NPR)  ome    . )
         provide the bai for further nuclear diarmament,     
     regime, +  +          . to counter nuclear
terrorim, and to facilitate peaceful nuclear ue. The declaratory policy make it clear that   +  
             # # 2   ) . (NPT) non-
nuclear-weapon-tate who comply with their treaty obligation, even if they were to poe threat of chemical
weapon²and le clearly, biological weapon²attack. Thi indicate that      
   +   .   the other etablihed nuclear-weapon tate,  2#)   , and NPT
member who do not comply with treaty obligation. The NPR further promie that     .
  ++ 7:     ´ and   7/    8    +   , it allie and
partner. Although it fail to adopt the ³ole purpoe policy´ that many have called for, it doe make uch a
policy an objective in the future. )continued nuclear reduction in the new Strategic Arm Reduction
Treaty ()*))  + cheered a      +  3though not a big a tep a expected.
The ignificance lie in the momentum the treaty help to build up. The deciion to forake new nuclear
capabilitie aimed to fulfill new military miion hould not be underappreciated either.
c  
   
    c

# (c# 
)#*    >     .(c #  

 &!(Jack A, Aia Time, 2010, http://www.atime.com/atime/Middle_Eat/LE06Ak02.html)KFC


)#*1 econd 9 / i "+          ". Thi doe not  reducing
the number, deployed or in torage, 9   . And there i a very good reaon to reduce the role: )xS
i developing a 9  2   /. „t' +Prompt Global Strike (c) and ometime
Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS). The xS government realize that there are eriou problem
with uing     . Such weapon .9  + +  to avoid a nuclear exchange
   +  2   would     . ++   . But the entire world
would object to a preemptive unilateral trike againt a non-nuclear tate. For intance, had the , 
adminitration1 "  + -     ,++  ++    , the  
.- ubtantial to begin with - +/magnified  ++ +, and the act would never be
forgiven by much of the world. „ndeed, it would park proliferation a countrie crambled to build nuclear
deterrent of their own, a did North Korea, to foretall a poible nuclear attack. The document barely
mention Prompt Global Strike (c), revealing only that the Pentagon "  +.  appropriate  : 
 2     , including heavy bomber     2      ".
Global Strike uually mean nuclear bomb and miile warhead. PGS or CPGS mean conventional, i.e.,
non-nuclear. Prompt Global Strike relie on high-peed miile,     and other cutting edge
military technology to launch a devatating non-nuclear payload from a military bae    +  .
 .    +     . )     / the conundrum poed by
the      +          2    , thu greatly
trengthening the Obama adminitration' full pectrum military dominance.
c  
   
    c

# (c# 
)   . c .   (+   / 
c .A(Denni, Center for Nonproliferation Studie-Monterey „nt, Œ Y Y YY Y  ,
http://www.ifri.org/file/Securite_defene/PP29_Gormley.pdf)KFC
. plan to arm Trident D-5 miile with conventional payload a part of it         
+. +  ± in the xnited State and Ruia alike ±       . and inadvertent
retaliatory action. Thee development are of ufficient concern to Ruian planner that Mocow arm    /  +
   / + /./   + +              
      +   60 „f x.S. trategic conventional denial capabilitie are jut emerging today, Ruian military
planner mut alo worry about where uch program might be in a decade or two. ) . Strategic Command¶  
   force compriing c      ++ the x.S. Air Force¶ F-22 fighter providing
penetration corridor for ,23,23+,2   ++  /       .61
) x.S. #/. ha  / +   6) + Ohio-cla   each .)  +2
    , the latet verion of which feature a two-way atellite data link that permit the miile to attack one of 16
preprogrammed target or take new GPS coordinate to attack a fleeting target of opportunity. Auming it ha reerve fuel, 
    in the area for hour awaiting a more important target, a well a pa information from it own TV camera
on battle damage. „ntead of filling    ) +    with it full complement of 154 Tomahawk, a few
miile  be traded of for pecial-  ion   2   mall reconnaiance H . The Pentagon ha alo ought,
without ucce thu far, to pend $503 million to outfit a mall number of the Trident D-5 nuclear miile on the remaining 14
Ohiocla Trident ubmarine with conventional warhead (either mall diameter bomb or bunker-buter penetrating warhead). 5/
       .   +  from current reearch and development program,  +  
       . /.   +/  + 
 / . + /   +  + reuable + hyperonic  /  
 . 3. +  /3     .62

)   .   c .  


c .A(Denni, Center for Nonproliferation Studie-Monterey „nt, Œ Y Y YY Y  ,
http://www.ifri.org/file/Securite_defene/PP29_Gormley.pdf)KFC
Where doe   c    tand today in the aftermath of Barack Obama¶ election and the Democrat ing deciive
    of both houe  the x.S. Congre? )#: 2c , , originally lated for deployment by 2018,  
 +.+ not only becaue  +     but a due to           + 
       *+  ) . (START)   /   :  
+ /. .  .66 According to congreional taff member on the Senate Armed Service Committee,    
.    either ) +  0  +2 +   undergoing converion to meet the
Pentagon¶ requirement for prompt conventional trike, while   +  .   +/   
  , but without propect for any deployment deciion any time oon.67 A one enior x.S. Strategic Command
officer evinced to thi writer recently, ³c      +´.68 One might argue, of coure, and the
Ruian do, that the requirement for converting Trident might be reurrected in future. They urely oberved that an independent tudy
panel of the bipartian National Reearch Council (NRC) had endored a limited application for the conventionally-armed Trident before
the 2008 election. )#*$ ./ it         2     
        . (e.g., counterterrorit target or rogue tate activity), which would involve no more than one to
four weapon. ) #/.+ +  +   /  ) +   on each of 12 deployed
Trident ubmarine     / .+) + . „mportantly, the NRC panel drew a ditinction
between the more limited miion and conventional Trident¶ broader application. The limited ue would not carry the ame tiff
operational and political demand a a larger ue of conventional Trident would in providing leading edge attack in upport of major
combat operation. „n the latter regard, ) +  + .9       )   +
c0            t the outet of a major regional contingency. The NRC
panel properly noted that in contrat to uing one to four Trident alone, any large-cale prompt conventional trike would preent much
tiffer operational demand related to intelligence upport and command and control, a well a dratically different political
implication with regard to warning ambiguity. Whether the contingency involve uing one or many conventional Trident, a the NRC
panel oberved, ³   .  + / . + / . /+ . .
.´.69 Yet, the larger the Trident alvo of conventional miile, the higher the propect for miinterpretation and inadvertent repone.
At the ame time, becaue Ruian early-warning ytem are incomplete, /   .  .
  + 2 2  /        Concern about ambiguity leading to inadvertent
nuclear war ± rightly or wrongly conceived ± .:    +      
 / ) + >  + 
c  
   "
    c

 ) (#  ? 


) +     )#@ + 
+#  ? 

0#+ "&(Sally, Baker, March 4, 2010,


http://www.heritage.org/Reearch/Report/2010/03/Preident-Obama-Mut-Not-Remove-Nuclear-Weapon-from-Europe)KFC
From a trategic tandpoint, a   / national +     n the ability to defend .   .3
      . +  enemy       „n a highly dangerou world where hotile
tate²uch a
+#  ? ²    + /    
     + it allie, +  + , not unilateral diarmament,   
 . Therefore,  3 in conultation with it allie,  +     in
Europe and in the x.S   +++  +         . Thi poition
i conitent with  + /,  + trategic poture that +  + .  robut
defenive ytem, including   +  . Thi poture would alo require modernizing the
nuclear weapon in the x.S. arenal, including their delivery ytem, to make them better uited to
detroying target that are likely to be ued to launch trategic attack againt the x.S. and it allie, a well
a target whoe detruction require the more powerful force of nuclear weapon. Thee target could
include miile in hardened ilo, deeply buried command and control facilitie, and heavily protected
nuclear weapon depot.
c  
   
    c


 ) (* + . 
c.   . ++ . ( /    

c ! (Elaine, reporter with Global Security Newwire, April 8,


[http://www.military.com/feature/0,15240,93616,00.html] AD: 6/28/10)JM
x.S. Strategic Command   c. Jame Cartwright ha  ++      capability
 +      ; +  conventional     + /on target  
 of an order to launch,  . currently + .. 2+  . 
 /   / +    +          
+ .  .    #  ?    + +  +,
defene analyt ay.

c/      ++ . (  +      . 


  

 ! (Noah, nonreident fellow at the Brooking „ntitution, December 4


[http://www.popularmechanic.com/technology/military/4203874?page=1] AD: 6/28/10)JM
A tip et the plan in motion--a whipered    a #  ?   ,  of a hipment of
 :   +  a ;  tronghold in Lebanon. Word         
     x.S. Strategic Command headquarter,    and, eventually, the White
Houe. „n the Pacific, a nuclear-powered Ohio cla ubmarine urface, ready for the preident' command
to launch. @  +  3    !2 ) + 

      ky.


@     3    /  more than 3   +. xp and over the ocean and
out of the atmophere      +    . At the top of it parabola, hanging in pace, the
Trident' four warhead eparate and begin their creaming decent down toward the planet. Traveling a fat
a 13,000 mph,  +  +   +   +        . Jut
above the target,  + +  , howering the area with thouand of rod-each one up to 12 time
a detructive a a .50-caliber bullet. .    "  . of thi whirling, metallic torm 
  + „f Pentagon trategit get their way,        +  
    ) part of a program -- in low development ince the 1990, and now quickly
coalecing in military circle -- +  c   . „t will begin with modified Trident. But
eventually, Prompt Global Strike could encompa new generation of aircraft and armament five time
fater than anything in the current American arenal. One candidate: the X-51 hyperonic cruie miile,
which i deigned to hit Mach 5 -- roughly 3600 mph. ) , according to the x.S. Strategic Command'
deputy commander Lt. Gen. C. Robert Kehler3 -   /  ..     5 
 !   -

c.  ++ . ++ +     

)   
+ & (The Time of „ndia, newpaper with larget circulation among all Englih-language
newpaper in the world, [http://timeofindia.indiatime.com/world/u/„n-the-work-A-miile-to-hit-anywhere-in-1-
hr/articlehow/5857401.cm] AD: 6/28/10)JM
WASH„NGTON: ;  +.  memory of a      . in 1998   Oama , + in
Afghanitan, even   + hatch the plan to   @ +)+$  in New York, 
  . /  + ,41         2 +
      ++   .  5    . The non-nuclear weapon
programme, called   c   , + feature hyperonic miile that can + /  
 .+    . + .+    1      . Yet
even now, concern about the technology are o trong that the Obama adminitration ha acceded to a demand by Ruia that the xS
decommiion one nuclear miile for every one of thee conventional weapon fielded by the Pentagon. That proviion, the White
Houe aid, i buried deep inide the New Start treaty that Obama and Ruian Preident Dmitri Medvedev igned in Prague two week
ago. ) .  + +      picking off Oama in a cave, if it could be found   
#  ?     .   +O +  . 
     
      +.
c  
   
    c


 ) (* + . &#  
)c . >  +    ++ .    + +     

c ! (Elaine, reporter with Global Security Newwire, July 1,


[http://www.globalecuritynewwire.org/gn/nw_20090701_5635.php] AD: 6/28/10)JM
+  /       3         .    
.  +  +  9 !    of a launch order.     ., 
. long-range attack   typically available to a x.S. preident under urgent circumtance +
   , which military official have decribed a unlikely to be ued.
      advocate ay the conventional capability  +       
    +        +    +  . Above-
ground launch facilitie would be eaily ditinguihable from nuclear miile ilo in Wyoming, Montana and North Dakota, o potential
adverarie like Ruia or China would be unlikely to miinterpret a launch a the onet of a nuclear war, according to official.
"„f you have more time, then there are better ytem out there and more affordable ytem to cloe" in on a target with conventional
weapon, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Gen. Jame Cartwright told a Senate panel lat month. For example, if bomber
aircraft are baed cloe enough to a target, they might be ued more affordably in place of long-range miile. Each Conventional Strike
Miile could cot ten of million of dollar to procure -- or to replace after launch (ee GSN, Nov. 26, 2008).
"But + /  +      + +LG L.G
   + ," aid the Marine Corp general, explaining the limitation of uing bomber
aircraft. "@1/  / . ++   L    G+ .  +    
L  G-
c  
   !
    c


 ) (*+  
c .  /      +

 +A(Bruce, Defene analyt, „nternational Security 34(1), Mue)KFC
Proponent of c   that there i an immediate, niche miion that can be fulªlled only by
CBM. ).    3 /   3$,0        2 
       + +  + / + a wider range of prompt,     
  to the xnited State. Furthermore, ome advocate of CBM deployment aert that    
 + + 2      and to hape adverary military invetment. A
background,         /     2     
 +3   3+       O   .  O     O   O   
+ /./  O++  . The regime¶ purpoe i to trike  2/   and to  
+      .  . Thee trike may be executed within hort time line and at
extended ditance from the continental xnited State and forward operating bae. Within thi regime i a
ix-tage ³kill chain´: ªnd, ªx, track, target, engage, and ae. A dicued below, c +
$,0 +  +    7´ part of the cycle, but c    . 
  3    3.   +     in other area a well, uch a the amount
of time required for ªnding a target.12
c  
   B
    c


 ) (*+  
c .        +.>   +

 +A(Bruce, Defene analyt, „nternational Security 34(1), Mue)KFC
)       expanding   $,0 ++    + 2 
+2+      and many tandoff miile deigned for tealthy defene penetration
are capable of circumventing and defeating the threat, but thi capability might grow relatively weaker.
Becaue  .  2  /3  .  + +    / 2+  .  
 +  +  +    3 it behoove the defene community to conduct a
functional net aement of foreign advance in area-denial technology vi-à-vi x.S. defene penetration
capabilitie. The ªnding of thi future tudy could help determine midterm and long-term requirement for
PGS weapon ytem. Second, given that 2   $,0  + .      
        2+   , x.S. policymaker hould upport thi option only
from ite outide the continental xnited State that could more eaily avoid generating concern over
nuclear ambiguity. )  +  +3 /3    +   +/ +$,0 
: ++ and reentry vehicle capable of cro-range maneuver. )     +
              /  2+     +  
     +    Third, for the long term, the xnited State hould continue inveting reource
into reearch and development of improved ballitic miile technologie and payload. „f it become feaible
to build improved booter and reentry vehicle, uch a the hyperonic glide vehicle, that can accurately
deliver heavy payload comparable to aircraft in a cot-effective manner, then $,0  +  
   +++.  +  . Fourth, to cover the emerging target et and compenate for
potential longterm capabilitie gap, the xnited State hould build a portfolio of PGS option encompaing
CBM and long-range, tealthy, unmanned aircraft. Moreover,  . +    ++
+.  +   $,0     , .   +    +.  
     .+    . Thee requirement will encompa technological
capabilitie and tactic. Fifth, if CBM cannot ue GPS aitance for greater weapon delivery accuracy, it
then follow from the analyi that   +     +         .3
+ H   c  H can carry the ame payload a manned aircraft but have longer
ºight endurance. To avoid prolonged violation of overeign airpace, the xAV might have to loiter outide,
a their remote pilot await execution order. )    +     +2 +3 2
 H . Thi would not be the optimal option for PGS miion, but it would be the bet option if
CBM do not achieve the required accuracy. „n the long term, aircraft capable of hyperonic peed might be
able to execute PGS miion from the continental xnited State. Finally,   / 3
 2     +        3   .   +
  +                 $,0   . Soft-ite launch
pad, for example, would beneªt CBM operation in Guam and other forward operating location. Thi treaty
option mut be weighed, however, againt the cot of opening up trategic option for other tate.
c  
   6
    c


 ) ( 
c /    +  

@  &6 (Craig, Wahington Pot taff writer, [http://www.wahingtonpot.com/wp-


dyn/content/article/2010/04/07/AR2010040704920.html] AD: 6/28/10)JM
"Capabilitie like an adaptive miile defene hield,  /  +   + + and
other that we are developing enable u to +        ," Vice Preident Biden aid
in a February peech at the National Defene xniverity. "@    +   , even with deep
nuclear reduction,    undeniably  ." Nuclear arm have formed the backbone of x.S.
deterrence trategy for ix decade. Although the trategy worked during the Cold War,   .+  .
.+           + +/           +
    +     :    +     "  
 9     
   +," Marine Gen. Jame E. Cartwright, vice chairman of
the Joint Chief of Staff and a leading proponent of Prompt Global Strike, told a conference lat month.
Some x.S. military official ay their           +    . xnlike
intercontinental ballitic miile, which travel at everal time the peed of ound,    
         .  . Long-range bomber likewie can take many hour to fly
into poition for a trike.

c .   +  .      

 +A(Bruce, Defene analyt, „nternational Security 34(1), Mue)KFC


Should the xnited State deploy conventional ballitic miile (CBM) in upport of the prompt global trike
(PGS) miion?1 Mot important, do the political-military beneªt outweigh the cot and rik of CBM
deployment and ue? )x.Separtment f efene      +   /  
         . /  +  and defene policy choice of potential
adverarie,    +     , and to hedge againt future trategic
uncertainty.2 Foremot among       $ / ) + 0 + P (CTM) propoal,
    + .  ) + D-5  2 +   (SLBM), armed 
 /  + ,  +/. 24-tube Ohio-cla ballitic miile  .3

c .     ++ 



?!(Karl, Aug, Konrad-Audenauer-Siftung-Security policy coordinator,
http://www.ka.de/wf/doc/ka_8973-544-2-30.pdf)KFC
Given    
       #  ? 3    / 
           . While nuclear debate in Europe are frequently limited
to the conviction that  +  +      . / + .   $ .
and urgently need to be updated for the future requirement, in the xSA thi proce ha long been in effect.
Largely unnoticed by European,   +     + .     .
and the aociated arenal. Since new development in trategic planning by    .. in
NATO have  . +     on 5  ean partner,  +/    + 
  be ignored in Europe. The experience of the lat decade have hown, epecially   
, that   +.       + and concern of the European into conideration,  
   .  .   + Given that, a in the pat,      
 + 5    through NATO, European cannot avoid articulating their idea on the role of
nuclear weapon. Thi hold particularly true for Germany a one of the major NATO-partner and a a
country where part of NATO¶ nuclear poture are till deployed.
c  
   A
    c


 ) (  & 
c. : +++ +         

6 (Thoma, reearcher for the National „ntitute for Public Policy, July 1, ×  Y, 27 p.
337)JM
      + 2     .         and friend. For
mot contingencie,   and friend will likely  + more        +     
   +  / 2      rather than with nuclear weapon. Nonethele,
for threat of nuclear, biological, chemical, or overwhelming conventional attack,    .  
.   +   +  and repone capabilitie on their behalf. Such
+          effort .+     /   +.     
     of their own. )       +        .    
+   +   /  + .     nuclear and  2     .
The fielding of advanced  2     .  that manifet American preeminence in advanced
military technology, and the maintenance of a nuclear force of the firt rank can      .  
 +    +  +   
c  
   !
    c


 ) (# ) 
c.  . / +         F   
 + 

 !(Jame, Secretary of Defene under Nixon and Ford, May 22, ³A Miile Strike Option We Need´.
http://belfercenter.kg.harvard.edu/publication/1554/miile_trike_option_we_need.html?breadcrumb=%2Fexpert
%2F335%2Fjame_chleinger, acceed 6/29/10)jn
Within the pat hour3      3   / + everal     3 
 /+.    .  +     onto vehicle and preparing to leave for an unknown
detination. +. /  or two    x.S   on that location  +  
++ , contact might be lot, +     +  + into the xnited State or an allied nation +
+  +. „f the terrorit group happened to be cloe to an Air Force deployment or the right kind of Navy force, an air attack might
conceivably be carried out within a few hour -- poibly catching the group till in camp and unaware. But      
        3  .  /    +  +  +
     -- a land-baed Minuteman or ubmarine-baed Trident D5 -- either one of which could hit a target
almot anywhere on the globe within a half-hour. One big problem, though:    3      +
.   + . Would the preident order a preventive nuclear trike in uch circumtance? „t' conceivable, but
very unlikely. ) + +              3 and /    3 
      + +     +   ++   22 in term
of the rik to innocent live, of environmental damage and of the expected political repercuion around the world. 0  
 .3  +  + +    +  .    .       
and eek later opportunitie to hit it with Special Force or aircraft armed with conventional weapon. )    3   
+ +1       +    
         +  
 --     3 3     --         congreional
authorization    +     ) +   /. deployed trategic
  with a new type of warhead incorporating four highly accurate, independently targetable, nonnuclear reentry bodie.
Thee are likely to be very effective againt urface target, uch a expoed miile, docked hip and vehicle, and aircraft on the
ground -- capable of attacking uch target virtually anywhere in Europe, Africa or Aia within one hour of a command to do o. And
not only would the trike be prompt and precie, it could alo hit the target without warning. The new weapon would probably not be
effective againt mot hardened target, ay, miile ilo, or deeply buried target uch a command pot. „t i not intended for, nor
would it be capable of, countering the deterrent capability of Ruian or Chinee nuclear force. The early miile tage would be
programmed to plah down in the ocean, thu avoiding potential problem of damage from their reentry. Later tage of the miile'
trajectory might fly over the territory of other countrie, but they would not fall outide the target area. 4. * .2
 ytem .   . +        1tandard operating area3+
      of the aim point +      +2 +
      . Neverthele, to our urprie, there ha been oppoition to the propoal on Capitol Hill.
Some have argued that it i unwie to ubtitute conventional warhead for nuclear one on trategic ubmarine even if it' only on two
miile per ubmarine. They fear it could be the beginning of a wholeale attempt to replace nuclear capabilitie with conventional
weapon. Given that ubmarine-baed warhead contitute roughly two-third of the x.S. deterrent, and are the component bet able to
urvive, thee capabilitie hould not be compromied, they maintain. But the concept doe not require a reduction in ubmarine-baed
warhead. Additional nuclear warhead would be added to the remaining nuclear-armed miile on each ubmarine to keep the number
contant. 4         ++ in the action meage conveyed to the ubmarine or that, for ome
other reaon, the granting of a dual miion to trategic ubmarine could compromie the trict control that enure that nuclear miile
are not launched inadvertently. But #/.  +   + +.      
/ +.   , and it ha high credibility in thi regard. C ++ during the Cold War #/.
   +  / + /  of air defene miile, cruie miile, torpedoe and bomb 
   +         + . Still   +     / 
 2  , nuclear-armed or not,  +  +/   *  and even a
counter-launch if Ruian leader feared that they themelve were under attack.  :  +     +   
    (epecially from a ubmarine operating area), even if detected and unannounced,    
+    3   +1     .    „n any cae, * +  +  +
and the reaon for the trike dicloed a the miile neared it target. )+       in the xnited
State .     + + ++   „t i eential that Congre approve the fund for thi
program. Moreover, a mall reprogramming action in the current fical year could accelerate the miile' initial deployment. „n a world
in which terrorit group may have acce to nuclear weapon, it i imperative to give future x.S. preident more option to prevent
nuclear attack.
c  
   !
    c


 ) (# ) 
c. /     

09 .A(Jaon, xSAF Chief, February, Î  Y  , Volume 5, No. 2


http://www.afpc.af.mil/hared/media/document/AFD-090224-115.pdf , acceed 6/29/10)jn
n al- aeda    
  . +@0 and intelligence report indicate    
 .    at a crucial xS command and control node and center of gravity,   the next   . „ran ha
fielded and flight-teted a new hort-range ballitic miile (SRBM) that can eaily reach the node with minimal indication and warning.
)      a miile-erectorlauncher (MEL) with *,0 ++++.  .

   effort / geo-  +   of the training camp where the MEL i in garrion +  +   
/  +. Time i of the eence, the xS mut act now!       +   Global @
)  , which it will be for the near future,  + +    .   becaue it
give terrorit the ability to attack xS interet on non-xS oil. A number of countrie with regional ambition do not welcome the xS
role a a tabilizing power in their region and have not accepted it paively. Becaue of their ambition, they want to place retraint on
the xS capability to project power or influence into their region. ).     +@0
  .  . +  o. 1 @       /    , the rie of international terrorim, +
/   . @03         . + ++  
  /++ .. A variety of Congreional Reearch Service (CRS) report have identified a number of
cenario like the one previouly mentioned that require rapid repone and precie targeting on a global cale. 2 CRS Report RS21057,
Miile Defene, Arm Control, and Deterrence: A New Strategic Framework, 31 October 2001, tate ³the challenge i to deter multiple
potential adverarie not only from uing exiting weapon but alo diuade them from developing new capabilitie in the firt place.
Thee potential adverarie include nation uch a China and a number of other tate uch a North Korea and „ran for whom terror and
blackmail are a way of life. Thee nation might threaten xS allie and interet, xS force advancing xS interet, and xS territory in
an effort to blackmail the xS to retreat from it interet around the world.´ „t i crucial to undertand an adverary¶ mindet a terror
and blackmail could be a mean to carry out their deterrence trategy. The future will continue to be dynamic and complex, with greater
emphai placed on non-traditional truggle, environment, and adverarie. )     9 +   
    .  + +  +   3    @0+
+ /. .  , large conventional force, and non-traditional threat and adverarie. 3 According to G. Peter Nano, former
director of the Lo Alamo National Laboratory, there are two reaon why   . +    @0. The
firt reaon i    /   /   and the econd i they want to be perceived a a bad actor
on the international cene. )   +   ++      Dr. Lewi
Dunn, enior vice preident with Science Application „nternational Corporation and a former aitant director of the xS Arm Control
and Diarmament Agency, tated in a peer review titled, ³Cooperative Security Management²Exploring a Concept´ that there are three
trategic challenge in term of containing the threat of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear terrorim. Firt, the xS mut
continue to trengthen global habit of cooperation acro a pectrum of repone. The econd challenge i building up national control
capabilitie. The third deal with reducing terrorit cell¶ motivation behind acquiring and ultimately uing WMD. The March 2006
National Security Strategy tated the Department of Defene (DoD) i tranforming itelf to better balance it capabilitie acro four
categorie of challenge: (1) traditional challenge poed by tate employing conventional armie, navie, and air force in well-
etablihed form of military competition, (2) irregular challenge from tate and non-tate actor employing method uch a terrorim
and inurgency to counter our traditional military advantage, (3) catatrophic challenge involving the acquiition, poeion, and ue
of WMD by tate and non-tate actor, and (4) diruptive challenge from tate and non-tate actor who employ technologie and
capabilitie « in new way to counter military advantage the xS currently enjoy. For the purpoe of thi article,   
 +  + in number two above  . .     . The 2006 uadrennial Defene
Review define irregular warfare a conflict in which enemy combatant are not regular military force of nation tate. @ 
    + +  .   +   . +  3  
   /    /    to deter and defeat irregular warfare challenge. The
Nuclear Poture Review (NPR) of 2001 put in motion a major role of nuclear force in our deterrent trategy. The NPR emphaized the
need for a broader range of deterrent option and capabilitie and etablihed a new triad compoed of offenive trike ytem (nuclear,
non-nuclear, and non-kinetic) defene (both active and paive) and a revitalized defene tructure²all upported by adaptive
planning, command and control, and intelligence, urveillance, and reconnaiance capabilitie (reference figure 1). )   +
 +  +  ++     +  /   . +    
    @0. 4 )#*+        /    
          /   .  . Ballitic and non-ballitic   + 
 /  +        .   /   . „n
addition,    +  +  F  c    (PGS). 5
c  
   !
    c


 ) (  9 
c+  +         

/ + ++!(„an, BAS„C director, and Robin, independent human ecurity and arm control activit, June,
³xS µPrompt Global Strike¶ Capability: A New Detabiliing Sub-State Deterrent in the Making?´,
http://www.baicint.org/pub/Paper/BP51.pdf, Acceed 6/29/10)jn
)c concept  .+  :      =2 />      .
„ndeed3   +/  from a purely trategic /            .
(ince 2002) the Buh doctrine of µ >   .   =/ >. ) evolving
  + the c concept     in emphai  .  a =   > +  
 =   ++ > deigned    + / +   or adverary a or when it hould arie.
11  .  c .  + / +  . +  = 2++> 
 9  capability deigned to µhold at rik¶ a variety of perceived threat, both trategic and tactical. On a trategic level  
  + =  >  +      nearpeer competitor and potential major
adverarie uch a $ . ==)    + /     / 2 ( a trike firt
capability ± "   , to attack North Korean or „ranian WMD or leaderhip facilitie´, aid William Arkin, a former Army
intelligence analyt and independent defence conultant. 12 On a tactical level, + + .    
+      .   = 2  > =   >(  .@0
 + .+ for launch or ue ± in retricted or µanti-acce¶ environment or environment     . 
  +  +2+ .+ . The miile¶ payload would alo enable the xS military to target what are commonly
referred to a µhard and deeply buried target¶.
c  
   !"
    c


 ) ( /  
 /    . +  

c .A(Denni, Center for Nonproliferation Studie-Monterey „nt, Œ Y Y YY
Y  , http://www.ifri.org/file/Securite_defene/PP29_Gormley.pdf)KFC
A +*    + the challenge and pitfall of achieving deep +     
  3 they hould begin ytematically to appraie additional novel way of achieving tability a arenal drop
to le than 500 warhead and then fall further. )  ..    ++   /
 +    employing advanced conventional weapon +        /   +
However difficult it urely will be for tate to hed thi predilection toward preemption ± or prevention ± through
prompt action,  .   .  , it i that while   . ucceed in  /ing ome  
  +  , .+    /    + /  political and financial     .
Witne America¶ eightyear tragedy in „raq.  /   +    employing conventional weapon 
clearly  .+  2+ +. But they will alo be dangerou in a world devoid of
all nuclear weapon, particularly a they may be detabilizing during regional or international crie. One way i to
tone down, if not entirely eliminate, the preemption option now.
 + .  /    .
  ± aeed a abolutely critical under dangerouly threatening circumtance ± to a national doctrine, a the
Buh adminitration did after 9/11
c  
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    c


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c .  . /    @0      

4  6(Randall, Col-xSAF, AF War College, www.afreearch.org/kin/rim/q_mod_be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-
8dfe-670c0822a153/q_act_downloadpaper/q_obj_36454d29-b24a-412c-b445-515dacfadd7c/diplay.apx)KFC
)   + . + #/.$)0  over conideration of the Air Force CSM program. The
Navy CTM program  / +   .2          2c
   The Navy CTM program provide    /     
      +/  , operational, command and control, and political rik. Aociated
concern regarding the ue of the Navy CTM can be ufficiently mitigated by variou diplomatic and military
aurance meaure. )      +       . 
  .operation including defene          @0 and anti-wetern
ideology + /   @0   peronnel and   .
c  
   !
    c


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?. 
*  &(Rick April 10, 2010, http://rickrozoff.wordpre.com/2010/04/10/prompt-global-
trike-world-military-uperiority-without-nuclear-weapon/)KFC
A      +. H  .  +  +/ . know it i
/      and +  , overwhelming and +/      
  . ++  or retaliate. What applie to an individual country doe alo to all potential
adverarie and indeed to every other nation in the world. )  .   .      .
and cientific  .+  .  +    n to achieve that ability. )   what
it current head of tate defined lat December a  +>    .   [1] 4  
       . tate in hitory to wield full pectrum   . +   +3   3
   +  .
c  
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    c


 ) (# #  
c .    +  +   

*  &(Rick April 10, 2010, http://rickrozoff.wordpre.com/2010/04/10/prompt-global-
trike-world-military-uperiority-without-nuclear-weapon/)KFC
Having gained that tatu in large part through being the firt country to develop and ue nuclear weapon, it
i now in a poition to trengthen it global upremacy by upereding the nuclear option. ) + 
9       . againt Yugolavia, Afghanitan and „raq from 1999-2003 + in all
three cae + .+ from ten to  ++    +  7    +8     +
   . The Pentagon etablihed military bae in all three war zone and, although depleted
uranium contamination and cluter bomb are till pread acro all three land, American troop have not
had to contend with an irradiated landcape.       /   / 
    +  +  . /  .  . . On April 8 American and
Ruian preident Barack 4+Dmitry 0+/+/ + Strategic Arm Reduction Treaty
()*))    $    +   repective  >    
and delivery ytem (ubject to ratification by the x.S. Senate and the Ruian Duma). Earlier in the ame
week   +  #  */  (NPR)  for the firt time appeared to
+        

c .    +      

c .A(Denni, Center for Nonproliferation Studie-Monterey „nt, Œ Y Y YY


Y  , http://www.ifri.org/file/Securite_defene/PP29_Gormley.pdf)KFC
    /   +    , rather than one with a nuclear legacy, like the x.S.
Navy¶ concept of a ³Sea-Launched Global Strike Miile´, or even the Navy¶ effort to develop a uperonic
verion of the Tomahawk cruie miile.71 For the time being, 4+    and Congre /
        c   ,    . .*    /
  . But +   / +  conider future   2      +   on
military tability  the context of  +  .   ++   long-range,  2
+   in future.
c  
   !B
    c

)I0   
#     (  / 

c ! (Elaine, reporter with Global Security Newwire, April 8,


[http://www.google.com/earch?ourceid=chrome&ie=xTF-8&q=Elaine+M.+Groman] AD: 6/28/10)JM
„n defending the Pentagon deciion to move ahead with the conventional Trident, ome defene    
have  + / +2 +  /could be problematic becaue*  $ .
                Patenaude took pain to make
clear the Air Force ³ha no plan to put conventional warhead on current operational „CBM or [ue] their
ilo.´ Other defene official have decribed how a +2 +  +   +   
 .  . + +  a 9 . to it target   +    other
nuclear weapon nation.
  +   +. *  under exiting arm control regime
baed on a x.S. coatline in Florida or California o launch debri could fall in the ocean rather than on land
and made capable of being rapidly retargeted. By contrat, critic have complained the Trident ubmarine would ue a
weapon virtually identical to it nuclear-armed twin remain on patrol typically jut off Ruian coat, potentially poing at leat a
debri threat to Ruia likely be cloed to Ruian onite inpection and poibly take hour or longer to receive target data and team
within range of nation where fleeting threat may appear. Cartwright offered ubtle acknowledgment of the geographic challenge
during March 29 tetimony before the Senate Armed Service trategic force ubcommittee. ³Prompt global trike . . . tart to get at
the iue of thoe target that will not necearily emerge next to where we're baed or where our normal patrol route are,´ he aid.
Although there would be ome technologie common to both nuclear-armed „CBM on alert and the new Conventional Strike Miile,
the land-baed option offer ome ³unique advantage[],´ ay Col. Patenaude. One i ³   .   .
  / +    ,´ he ay. ³That eparation       
+  international concern     and miundertanding8  / +2 +
  alo ++  from it nuclear counterpart  7   3  
/   and concept of operation,´ according to Patenaude. „n Senate tetimony alongide
Cartwright on March 29, Aitant Secretary of Defene for „nternational Security Policy Peter Flory aid of
) +   that the Pentagon  + ue diplomatic tool to    .+  
the rik of + +  )#/.      .        / 
2 ) +       *  (or, in the future, other nation with early warning capability)
 ++    from a nuclear-tipped miile, he aid. ³„n addition to hotline and the potential for
advanced notification of a launch, we have other mean for creating tranparency and building confidence.
One of thoe would include military-to-military talk between our repective force o other would
undertand our concept of operation for thi new capability,´ Flory told lawmaker. ³Other   would
 + . in which we could tructure and    .   / +notably+  
   .  3   a launch of     .   + in factlook9  
    . 8 ³)1           .   be able to+ ,´
Cartwright told „TP during a brief rece in the hearing. The Navy could ³alter the flight profile [or] change
the range to convert energy,´ among other poibilitie, he aid.
c  
   !6
    c

)I# 
c .   

#/ +  , +6(xS Conventional Prompt Global Strike, Natl Academie Pre, p. 216)KFC
„t i clear that   /      +   +  , and, even
more o, that      +/     .  /    2 
+   +  a  ilo or ubmarine. Of coure an engineering tudy need to be done to
chooe the appropriate encrypted, validated camera approach for thi cooperative mitigation of ambiguity. „t
i not the purpoe of thi appendix to advocate the adoption of the cooperative meaure decribed here. A
decribed in the main text of the report,     ++     .   +
+   However, for reader who diagree and believe that ambiguity i a major concern,
thi appendix outline a feaible technical olution that depend only on a low-rik extenion of proven
technology. For thoe who doubt the utility of thi olution, it hould be noted again²a in the main text²
that     ++ /+.. 2    , even if that aircraft or
miile had not previouly been aociated with nuclear weapon. )  +   +  .
       ++  + /. The fundamental ambiguity problem of CPGS would not
be reolved by adopting a trategic delivery platform other than the Trident.