Connecticut Judicial Branch - Law Library, Foreclosure (Mortgage)

Copyright © 2002-2010, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. All rights reserved.
2010 Edition
Foreclosure (Mortgage)
in Connecticut A Guide to Resources in the Law Library
• “In Connecticut, a mortgagee [creditor] has legal title to the mortgaged property and the mortgagor
[debtor] has equitable title, also called the equity of redemption.” Barclays Bank of New York v. Ivler, 20
Conn. App. 163, 166, 565 A.2d 252, 253 (1989).
• “Connecticut is considered a ‘title theory’ state wherein the mortgagor [debtor] pledges property to the
mortgagee [creditor] as security for a debt and conveys ‘legal title’ to the mortgaged premises; the
mortgagor retains ‘equitable title’ or the ‘equity of redemption’….The equity of redemption permits the
mortgagor to regain legal title to the mortgaged property upon satisfying the conditions of the mortgage,
which usually entails the payment of the mortgage debt in full." In Re Fitzgerald, 237 B.R. 252, 261
(Bkrtcy. D.Conn. 1999).
• “Generally, foreclosure means to cut off the equity of redemption, the equitable owner’s right to redeem
the property.” Madison Hills Ltd. Partnership II v. Madison Hills, Inc., 35 Conn. App. 81, 90, 644 A.2d
363, 369 (1994).
• “Foreclosure is peculiarly an equitable action, and the court may entertain such questions as are necessary
to be determined in order that complete justice may be done.” Hartford Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v.
Lenczyk, 153 Conn. 457, 463, 217 A.2d 694, 697 (1966).
Table of Contents
Table 1 - Resources on the Internet: Homeowner’s Options for Avoiding Foreclosure...............................3
Section 1: Strict Foreclosure in Connecticut....................................................................................................4
Figure 1: Motion for Judgment of Strict Foreclosure ...................................................................................8
Section 2: Foreclosure by Sale...........................................................................................................................9
Figure 2: Motion for Foreclosure by Sale...................................................................................................13
Figure 3: Motion for Judgment of Foreclosure by Sale..............................................................................14
S e ct ion 3: Connecticut’s Emergency Mortgage Assistance Act.................................................................16
S e ct ion 4: Mediation ......................................................................................................................................20
Foreclosure-1
S e ct ion 5: Application for Protection from Foreclosure ............................................................................30
Table 2: Unreported Connecticut Cases: Application for Protection from Foreclosure .............................34
Figure 4: Application for Protection from Foreclosure ..............................................................................37
Figure 5: Objection to Application for Protection from Foreclosure..........................................................40
S e ct ion 6: Defenses to Foreclosure ...............................................................................................................42
Figure 6: Special Defense and Counterclaim to Foreclosure......................................................................48
Table 3: LaSalle National Bank v. Freshfield Meadows, LLC...................................................................49
Table 4: Disclosure of Defense...................................................................................................................51
Section 7: Redemption in Foreclosure ............................................................................................................53
Table 5: Reinstatement ...............................................................................................................................56
S e ct ion 8: Motion to Open Judgment of Foreclosure ................................................................................57
Table 6: Unreported Connecticut Cases: Motion to Open Judgment of Foreclosure, prior to 10/1/09 (see
PA 09-209, section 37) ...............................................................................................................................63
Figure 7: Motion to Open and Modify Judgment of Strict Foreclosure .....................................................65
Figure 8: Motion to Set New Law Day ......................................................................................................69
S e ct ion 9: Appeals and Foreclosure .............................................................................................................71
S e ct ion 10: Bankruptcy and Foreclosure.....................................................................................................73
Figure 9: Claim for Statutory Stay by Reason of Bankruptcy ....................................................................76
Figure 10: Notice of Relief from Stay from Bankruptcy Court..................................................................78
Section 11: Deficiency Judgment.....................................................................................................................79
Table 7: Defenses to a Deficiency ..............................................................................................................83
Table 8: Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure .........................................................................................................84
S e ct ion 12: Execution of Ejectment..............................................................................................................85
Figure 11: Sample Motion for Stay of Execution for Ejectment ................................................................88
S e ct ion 13: Tenant Issues in Foreclosure.....................................................................................................90
Copyright © 2000-2010, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. All rights reserved.
These guides are provided with the understanding that they

represent only a beginning to research.
View our other pathfinders at

http://www.jud.ct.gov/lawlib/selfguides.htm#Pathfinders
ACKNOWLEDGMENT: The grateful assistance of Douglas J. Apicella while he was an intern at the
Law Library at Middletown.
Foreclosure-2
Table 1: Resources on the Internet: Homeowner’s Options for Avoiding Foreclosure
Resources on the Internet
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2009/rpt/2009-R- Jillian L. Redding, State and Federal Mortgage

0159.htm Assistance Programs, CONNECTICUT GENERAL
ASSEMBLY, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE
RESEARCH, Report No. 2009-R-0159 (April 6, 2009).
http://www.hud.gov/foreclosure/index.cfm U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN

DEVELOPMENT, Avoiding Foreclosure.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR

http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/public_affairs/fac UNITED STATES TRUSTEES, U.S. Trustee Program: Don't
tsheet/docs/fs06.htm Get "Locked Out" of Your Home by a Bankruptcy Scam
Operator (October 16, 2000).
http://www.larcc.org/pamphlets/housing/my_ho STATEWIDE LEGAL SERVICES, My House is Being

use_is_being_foreclosed.htm Foreclosed. What Can I Do?
http://www.hud.gov/hopeforhomeowners/ Federal HOPE for Homeowners Program
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports Making Home Affordable Plan:

/guidelines_summary.pdf
Federal Home Affordable Refinance Program
Federal Home Affordable Modification Program
http://www.chfa.org/MainPages/ProgramsToHe
lpFamiliesFacingForeclosure.htm Connecticut: CT FAMILIES
http://www.chfa.org/FirstHome/CT-FAMLIES-
Brochure.pdf
http://www.chfa.org Connecticut: CT HERO
http://www.chfa.org/MainPages/ProgramsToHe
lpFamiliesFacingForeclosure.htm Connecticut: CT EMAP
http://www.chfa.org/firsthome/EMAP-
Brochure.pdf
Foreclosure-3
Section 1:
Strict Foreclosure in
Connecticut
A Guide to Resources in the Law Library
SCOPE: • Bibliographic resources relating to strict foreclosures in Connecticut.
DEFINITION: • Connecticut is a title state: “Both by common-law rule and by statute, a

mortgagee [creditor] in Connecticut is deemed to have taken legal title
under the execution of a mortgage on real property. Conference Center,
Ltd. v. TRC, 189 Conn. 212, 218, 455 A.2d 857 (1983); State v.
Stonybrook, Inc., 149 Conn. 492, 496, 181 A.2d 601, cert. denied, 371
U.S. 185, 83 S.Ct. 265, 9 L.Ed.2d 227 (1962). Nonetheless, the
mortgagee's legal title is a defeasible fee ‘subject to [an equitable] right
of redemption which persists until it is extinguished by an action of
foreclosure.’ State v. Stonybrook, Inc., supra, 496. Even after the
initiation of a foreclosure action, the mortgagee's title does not become
absolute until all eligible parties have failed to exercise their rights to
redeem the property. City Lumber Co. of Bridgeport, Inc. v. Murphy,
120 Conn. 16, 19, 179 A. 339 (1935).” New Milford Savings Bank v.
Jajer, 244 Conn. 251, 256 fn. 11, 708 A.2d 1378, 1382 (1998).
• Strict foreclosure: “‘Under our law, an action for strict foreclosure is
brought by a mortgagee [creditor] who, holding legal title, seeks . . . to
foreclose an equity of redemption unless the mortgagor [debtor] satisfies
the debt on or before his law day. Cook v. Bartholomew, 60 Conn. 24,
27, 22 A. 444 (1891).’ (Emphasis added.)” Connecticut National Bank
v. L & R Realty, 40 Conn. App. 492, 494, 671 A.2d 1315, 1316 (1996).
• Law day: “Where a foreclosure decree has become absolute by the
passing of the law days, the outstanding rights of redemption have been
cut off and the title has become unconditional in the [redeeming
encumbrancer] . . . The mortgagor has no remaining title or interest
which he can convey.” City Lumber Co. of Bridgeport, Inc. v. Murphy,
120 Conn. 16, 25, 179 A. 339, 342 (1935).
• Strict foreclosure vs. foreclosure by sale: “All liens and mortgages
affecting real property may, on the written motion of any party to any
suit relating thereto, be foreclosed by a decree of sale instead of strict
foreclosure at the discretion of the court before which the foreclosure
proceedings are pending.” CONN. GEN. STAT. (2009) § 49-24.
• Substantial excess equity: “It has been held, however, that when the
value of the property substantially exceeds the value of the lien being
foreclosed, the trial court abuses its discretion when it refuses to order a
foreclosure by sale.” Voluntown v. Rytman, 27 Conn. App. 549, 555,
Foreclosure-4
607 A.2d 896, 899 (1992).
STATUTES: • CONN. GEN. STAT. (2009)

Title 49. Mortgages and Liens
Chapter 846. Mortgages
§ 49-19. Title to vest in encumbrancer paying debt and costs.
§ 49-20. Redemption by holder of encumbrance on part of
property foreclosed.
§ 49-21. Defendant to receive and file certificate of satisfaction
or certificates of judgment of strict foreclosure or
foreclosure by sale.
§ 49-24. Court may foreclose lien or mortgage on land by sale.
COURT RULES • Listing of Law Days

“(a) In any action to foreclose a mortgage or lien, any party seeking a
judgment of strict foreclosure shall file, with the motion for judgment,
a list indicating the order in which law days should be assigned to the
parties to the action. The order of the law days so indicated shall
reflect the information contained in the plaintiff’s complaint, as that
information may have been modified by the pleadings. Objections to
the order of law days indicated on said list shall only be considered in
the context of a motion for determination of priorities, which motion
must be filed prior to the entry of judgment.” CT Practice Book 23-17
(2010).
• (NEW) Sec. 17-33A. Motions for Judgment of Foreclosure

“In all foreclosure actions motions for judgment shall not be filed
prior to the expiration of 30 days after the return date. (Adopted June
22, 2009, to take effect Jan. 1, 2010.)
COMMENTARY – 2010: The purpose of this rule is to attempt to
ensure that owners of the equity, borrowers and guarantors who have
not filed an appearance and risk losing their interest in the property are
given more time to protect their interests.” CT Practice Book 17-33A
(2010). (July 14, 2009 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page
59PB.)
PAMPHLETS: • REPRESENTING YOURSELF IN FORECLOSURE: A GUIDE FOR CONNECTICUT

HOMEOWNERS, CONNECTICUT FAIR HOUSING CENTER, PP. 13-14 & 27.
http://ctfairhousing.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/CFHC-
ForeclosureManualR3.pdf
FORMS: • DENIS R. CARON & GEOFFREY K. MILNE, CONNECTICUT FORECLOSURES:

AN ATTORNEY’S MANUAL OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (4th ed. 2004).
Appendix of official forms
Form 707.1 Judgment of strict foreclosure, p. 627
Form 707.5 Judgment of strict foreclosure after opening of
original judgment, p. 633
Appendix of unofficial forms
Form 9. Motion for judgment of strict foreclosure, p. 696
Form 26. Judgment for deficiency after strict foreclosure, p.
719
• 3 JOEL M. KAYE ET AL. CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK ANNOTATED
(2004).
Judgment of Strict Foreclosure, Form 707.1, pp. 655-656
Foreclosure-5
• Dennis P. Anderson, Denis R. Caron & Geoffrey K. Milne, Real
Property Foreclosure In Connecticut, CONNECTICUT LAWYERS’
DESKBOOK: FORMS INDEX (2d ed. 2000). Chapter XIV. “Motion for
Judgment of Strict Foreclosure”
• Certificate of Judgment - Strict Foreclosure, JD-CV-47
http://www.jud2.ct.gov/webforms/forms/cv047.pdf
RECORDS & BRIEFS • Motion for Judgment of Strict Foreclosure, CONNECTICUT

SUPREME COURT RECORDS & BRIEFS, Webster Bank v. Oakley
et al., 265 Conn. 539, 830 A2d 139 (2003). Term of January 2003.
Figure 1.
WEST KEY NUMBERS: • Mortgages #384 Strict foreclosure
DIGESTS: • DOWLING’S DIGEST: Mortgages §§ 20-24

• PHILLIP’S DIGEST: Mortgages §§ 20-22
COURT CASES • New Milford Savings Bank v. Jajer, 244 Conn. 251, 256, 708 A.2d
1378, 1382 (1998). “The law governing strict foreclosure lies at the
crossroads between equitable remedies provided by the judiciary and the
statutory remedies provided by the legislature.”
• New England Savings Bank v. Lopez, 227 Conn. 279, 284, 630 A.2d
1010, 1018 (1993). “whether to order a strict foreclosure or a
foreclosure by sale is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the
trial court, to be exercised with regard to all the facts and circumstances
of the case.”
• F.D.I.C. v. M.F.P. Associates, 870 F. Supp. 451, 454 (D. Conn. 1994).
“In Connecticut, it is within the Court’s discretion whether to order
foreclosure by sale or by strict foreclosure.”
• Farmers & Mechanics Savings Bank v. Sullivan, 216 Conn. 341, 352,
579 A.2d 1054, 1059 (1990). “Frequently strict foreclosures are ordered,
despite a property appraisal substantially higher than the mortgage debt,
because the owner believes he will be able to redeem and he seeks to
avoid the additional expense involved in a foreclosure by sale.”
• Fidelity Trust Co. v. Irick, 206 Conn. 484, 487-488, 538 A.2d 1027,
1029 (1988). “Because the total of all liens, taxes, costs and fees, plus
the estimated expenses of a foreclosure by sale of $7000, amounted to
$123, 580.22, and the appraiser valued the property at $96,750, the trial
court concluded, in the exercise of its discretion, and the Appellate
Court agreed, that strict foreclosure was proper in this case. We
disagree.”
• Bradford Realty Corporation v. Beetz, 108 Conn. 26, 31, 142 A. 395,
397 (1928). “As no equity in the property over and above the first
mortgage and the plaintiff’s mortgage was shown in defendant Cohen,
the trial court wisely refused, in the exercise of its discretion, to impose
upon the plaintiff the additional cost and expense of a foreclosure by
sale.”
ENCYCLOPEDIAS: • 55 AM. JUR. 2d Mortgages (1996).

§ 530 Strict foreclosure
• 59A C.J.S. Mortgages (1998).
§ 694 Strict foreclosure
Foreclosure-6
TEXTS & TREATISES: • DENIS R. CARON & GEOFFREY K. MILNE, CONNECTICUT
FORECLOSURES: AN ATTORNEY’S MANUAL OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE (4th ed. 2004).
§ 5.02D. Strict foreclosure or foreclosure by sale
§ 5.02D1. Judgment of strict foreclosure
(2004).
Authors' Comments following Forms 704.31 and 707.1
• 4 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY (2009).
Chapter 37. Mortgages and Mortgage Foreclosure
§ 37.43. Strict foreclosure
• DENNIS P. ANDERSON, DENIS R. CARON AND GEOFFREY K.
MILNE, CONNECTICUT LAWYERS’ DESKBOOK: A
REFERENCE MANUAL, 3D (2008)
Chapter 17, Real Property Foreclosure in Connecticut, p.401 et seq.
Types of Foreclosure Judgments, pp. 420-426
CURRENT Janet Zigadto, Connecticut Judicial Branch Law Library at

COMPILER: New Haven, 235 Church Street, New Haven, CT 06510.
(203) 503-6828. Email.
* Originally compiled by Lawrence Cheeseman, retired Connecticut Judicial Branch

Supervising Law Librarian.
Foreclosure-7
Figure 1: Motion for Judgment of Strict Foreclosure
CV-99-0498989S SUPERIOR COURT
WEBSTER BANK J.D. NEW BRITAIN
VS.
OAKLEY, LORNA T., ET AL DECEMBER 1, 2000
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF STRICT FORECLOSURE
The Plaintiff in the above-entitled action respectfully represents that the Defendant, VI
WEST CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., has filed a Disclosure of No Defense to
the above entitled matter, and a Summary Judgment as to liability has entered as to the
Defendant, LORNA T. OAKLEY.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff moves that a Judgment of Strict Foreclosure enter in the
above-entitled matter. The Plaintiff submits that Law Days ought to be assigned to the
Defendatns in the following order:
Law Day 1: Lorna T. Oakley

Law Day 2: VI West Condominium Association, Inc.
Law Day 3: Plaintiff to own if no prior redemption.
PLAINTIFF, WEBSTER BANK
By: _______________________
Name
Firm
Address
Telephone Number
Its Attorneys
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
Foreclosure-8
Section 2:
Foreclosure by Sale
SCOPE: • Bibliographic resources relating to foreclosure by sale mainly in

Connecticut.
DEFINITION: • "Connecticut provides for the foreclosure of a mortgage of real property

by either public sale or by strict foreclosure. The property is foreclosed
by strict foreclosure unless the court orders foreclosure by sale." In Re
Fitzgerald, 237 B.R. 252, 261 (Bkrtcy.D.Conn. 1999).
• "All liens and mortgages affecting real property may, on the written
motion of any party to any suit relating thereto, be foreclosed by a
decree of sale instead of a strict foreclosure at the discretion of the court
before which the foreclosure proceedings are pending." CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 49-24 (2009).
• “The purpose of the judicial sale in a foreclosure action is to convert the
property into money and, following the sale, a determination of the
rights of the parties in the funds is made, and the money received from
the sale takes the place of the property.” National City Mortgage v.
Stoecker, 92 Conn. App. 787, 794, 888 A2d 95, 100(2006).
• Termination of the equity of redemption in foreclosure by sale: “The
court finds that in Connecticut, the law is that the rights of a mortgagor
[debtor] in mortgaged property are terminated by confirmation of a
foreclosure sale, and that subsequent to such a sale, any interest the
mortgagor may claim is in proceeds of the sale solely and not in the
property. The delivery of a deed is a ministerial act only and does not
constitute the event which terminates an equity of redemption. ” Matter
of Loubier, 6 B.R. 298, 303 (1980).
“…where the value of the property foreclosed exceeds the amount of the
mortgage debt, the mortgagee is entitled to nothing more. Gruss v.
Curry, 132 Conn. 22, 25-26, 42 A.2d 358 (1945). Accordingly, when the
mortgagee takes title to the property, the fair market value of which
exceeds the amount of the debt, its debt is satisfied by virtue of its
ownership of the collateral. When the mortgagee becomes the owner of
the property and its debt is satisfied, its status as mortgagee ceases and
the rights and obligations established by the terms of the mortgage are
nullified. See First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Griebel, 20 Conn. Sup.
460, 463-64, 139 A.2d 503 (1957).
Under Connecticut law, the rights of the mortgagor in the mortgaged
property are terminated by confirmation of the foreclosure sale, and
subsequent to such sale, any interest the mortgagor may claim is in the
proceeds of the sale solely and not in the property. In Re Kane, 236 B.R.
131, 133 (Bankr.D. Conn. 1999). ‘[A] judicial sale becomes complete
and creates a legal right to obligations among parties when it is
Foreclosure-9
confirmed and ratified by the court.’ Hartford Federal Savings & Loan
Assn. v. Tucker, 13 Conn. App. 239, 536 A.2d 962, cert. denied, 207
Conn. 805, 540 A.2d 373 (1988). Although the court’s approval of a sale
extinguishes the rights of redemption of other parties, it does not
automatically vest title with the purchaser. General Statutes § 49-26
provides that after a sale has been ratified or confirmed by the court, ‘a
conveyance of the property sold shall be executed by the person
appointed to make the sale, which conveyance shall vest in the purchaser
the same estate that would have vested in the mortgagee or lienholder if
the mortgage or lien had been foreclosed by strict foreclosure….’
Accordingly, the muniment of title is the conveyance or the delivery of
the deed to the purchaser.” National City Mortgage v. Stoecker, 92
Conn. App. 787, 794-795, 888 A2d 95, 100-101 (2006).
• Appraisal of property: “When the court in any such proceeding is of
the opinion that a foreclosure by sale should be decreed, it shall, in its
decree, appoint a person to make the sale and fix a day therefor, and
shall direct whether the property shall be sold as a whole or in parcels,
and how the sale shall be made and advertised; but, in all cases in which
such sale is ordered, the court shall appoint one disinterested appraiser
who shall, under oath, appraise the property to be sold and make return
of the appraisal to the clerk of the court. Upon motion of the owner of
the equity of redemption, the court shall appoint a second appraiser in its
decree. If the plaintiff is the purchaser at sale, or if the property is
redeemed at any time prior to the approval of the sale, or if for any
reason the sale does not take place, the expense of the sale and appraisal
or appraisals shall be paid by the plaintiff and be taxed with the costs of
the case. If, after judgment has been rendered, the amount found to be
due and for which foreclosure is decreed, together with the interest and
the costs, is paid to the plaintiff before the sale, all further proceedings
in the suit shall be stayed.” CONN. GEN. STAT. § 49-25 (2009).

Title 49. Mortgages and liens
§ 49-24. Court may foreclose lien or mortgage on land by sale.
§ 49-25. Appraisal of property.
§ 49-26. Conveyance; title of purchaser.
§ 49-27. Disposal of proceeds of sale.
§ 49-28. When proceeds of sale will not pay in full.
§ 49-29. Expenses of sale and costs.
COURT RULES: • (NEW) Sec. 17-33A. Motions for Judgment of Foreclosure

“In all foreclosure actions motions for judgment shall not be filed
prior to the expiration of 30 days after the return date. (Adopted June
22, 2009, to take effect Jan. 1, 2010.)
COMMENTARY - The purpose of this rule is to
attempt to ensure that owners of the equity, borrowers and
guarantors who have not filed an appearance and risk losing
their interest in the property are given more time to protect
their interests.” CT Practice Book 17-33A (2010 ed.) (July 14, 2009
CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 59PB.)
PAMPHLETS: • Representing Yourself in Foreclosure: A Guide for Connecticut
Foreclosure-10
Homeowners, Connecticut Fair Housing Center, pp. 13-14, 16 & 27
FORMS: • 2 CONN. PRACTICE BOOK (1997).

Form 706.3. Motion for foreclosure by sale. Figure 2.
• DENIS R. CARON, CONNECTICUT FORECLOSURES: AN ATTORNEY’S
MANUAL OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (4th ed. 2004).
Form 706.3. Motion for foreclosure by sale, p. 626
RECORDS & BRIEFS • Motion for judgment of foreclosure by sale, CONNECTICUT

APPELLATE COURT RECORDS & BRIEFS, Amresco New England
II, L.P. v. Dominic Colossale, et al., 63 Conn. App. 49, 774 A2d 1083
Judicial District of Hartford/New Britain at Hartford, term of December
2000, Figure 3.
COURT CASES • Fidelity Trust Co. v. Irick, 206 Conn. 484, 488, 538 A.2d 1027, 1029
(1988). "In a foreclosure proceeding the authority of the trial court to
order either a strict foreclosure or a foreclosure by sale is clear. General
Statutes § 49-24 provides: 'All liens and mortgages affecting real
property may, on the written motion of any party to any suit relating
thereto, be foreclosed by a decree of sale instead of a strict foreclosure at
the discretion of the court before which the foreclosure proceedings are
pending.' In interpreting this statute, we have stated that '[i]n
Connecticut, the law is well settled that whether a mortgage is to be
foreclosed by sale or by strict foreclosure is a matter within the sound
discretion of the trial court. General Statutes § 49-24; City Savings Bank
v. Lawler, 163 Conn. 149, 155, 302 A.2d 252 (1972); Hartford Federal
Savings & Loan Assn. v. Lenczyk, 153 Conn. 457, 463, 217 A.2d 694
(1966). `The foreclosure of a mortgage by sale is not a matter of right,
but rests in the discretion of the court before which the foreclosure
proceedings are pending.' Bradford Realty Corporation v. Beetz, 108
Conn. 26, 31, 142 A. 395 (1928).' Hartford Federal Savings & Loan
Assn. v. Tucker, 196 Conn. 172, 184, 491 A.2d 1084, cert. denied, 474
U.S. 920, 106 S.Ct. 250, 88 L.Ed.2d 258 (1985).”
WEST KEY NUMBERS: • Mortgage

Foreclosure by the exercise of power by sale # 329-379.
TEXTS & TREATISES: • Dennis P. Anderson, Denis R. Caron and Geoffrey K. Milne, Real
DESKBOOK: A REFERENCE MANUAL (3d ed. 2008).
“Foreclosure by sale procedures,” ch. 17, pp. 426-441.
• DENIS R. CARON & GEOFFREY K. MILNE, CONNECTICUT
PROCEDURE (4th ed. 2004) and 2008 supplement.
Chapter 5. Motions, the Hearing on Judgment, the Judgment File and
the Bill of Costs
§ 5.01H. Foreclosure by sale
§ 5.02D. Strict foreclosure or foreclosure by sale
§ 5.03B. Judgment of foreclosure by sale
Chapter 6. The Committee
Chapter 7. Representing the Purchaser
Foreclosure-11
Chapter 8. Determination of Priorities and the Supplemental
Judgment
• NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, FORECLOSURES: DEFENSES,
nd
WORKOUTS, AND MORTGAGE SERVICING (2 ed. 2007) with 2008
supplement.
Chapter 14. Issues arising after a foreclosure sale
14.1 Setting Aside a Completed Foreclosure Sale
14.1.3 Grounds on Which a Foreclosure May Be Set Aside
14.1.4 Setting Aside a Foreclosure Sale in Bankruptcy
14.2 Exercising the Right of Redemption After Sale
14.3 Deficiency Judgments
14.4 Claims for Damages for Wrongful Foreclosure
14.5 Claiming a Foreclosure Sale Surplus
14.6 Repurchasing the Home at the Foreclosure Sale
14.7 Tax Consequences of a Foreclosure Sale: An Introduction
• 4 Powell on Real Property (2009)
§ 37.40 Foreclosure by Action - Sale
(203) 503-6828. Email.

Foreclosure-12
Figure 2: Motion for Foreclosure by Sale
706.3
Motion for Foreclosure by Sale
(Caption of Case)
The defendant (name) moves that, if a judgment of foreclosure is rendered in the above entitled.
action, it be for a foreclosure by sale.
(P.B.1963, Form 362; see Gen. Stat., § 49-24.)
Foreclosure-13
Figure 3: Motion for Judgment of Foreclosure by Sale
DOCKET NO. CV-96-0563243-S : SUPERIOR COURT
AMRESCO NEW ENGLAND II, L.P. : JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
HARTFORD/NEW BRITAIN
v. : AT HARTFORD
DOMINIC COLOSSALE, ET AL. : SEPTEMBER 4, 1998
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE BY SALE
The defendant and subsequent encumbrancer, Bank United, hereby respectfully requests that if a
judgment of foreclosure is entered in this matter, that it be judgment of foreclosure by sale.
BANK UNITED
BY: _______________________
Name
Firm
Address
Telephone number
Its Attorneys
NO ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED,

NO TESTIMONY IS REQUIRED.
Foreclosure-14
ORDER
The foregoing Motion having been duly presented and heard by the Court, it is hereby
GRANTED/DENIED.
BY THE COURT ( _________, J.)
____________________________
Judge/Clerk/Assistant Clerk
Dated:
Foreclosure-15
Section 3:
Connecticut’s Emergency
Mortgage Assistance Act
SCOPE: • Bibliographic resources relating to the Connecticut’s Emergency

Mortgage Assistance Act.
AGENCY: • Connecticut Housing Finance Authority, 999 West Street, Rocky Hill,
CT 06067-4005. 860-721-9501. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-244(2009) .
DEFINITION: “Definitions.
(1) ‘Aggregate family income’ means the total income of persons
residing in the same household as the mortgagor and any other
resident of the household declared by the mortgagor as a dependent
for federal tax purposes, from whatever source derived, including, but
not limited to, pensions, annuities, retirement benefits and Social
Security benefits, provided the authority may exclude from income
(A) reasonable allowances for dependents, (B) reasonable allowances
for medical expenses, (C) all or any part of the earnings of gainfully
employed minors or family members other than the chief wage earner,
(D) income not regularly received and (E) such other expenses as the
authority may allow;
(2) ‘Authority’ means the Connecticut Housing Finance Authority
created under section 8-244;
(3) ‘Mortgage’ means a mortgage deed or other instrument which
constitutes a first or second consensual lien on one-to-four family
owner-occupied residential real property located in this state,
including, but not limited to, a single-family unit in a common
interest community;
(4) ‘Mortgagee’ means the original lender under a mortgage, or its
agents, successors, or assigns;
(5) ‘Mortgagor’ means the owner-occupant of a one-to-four family
residential real property located in this state, including, but not
limited to, a single family unit in a common interest community,
who is also the borrower under a mortgage encumbering such real
property;
(6) ‘Housing expense’ means the sum of the mortgagor's monthly
maintenance expense in a common interest community, utility
expense, heating expense, hazard insurance payment, taxes and
required mortgage payment, including escrows;” CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 8-265cc (2009)
“(7) ‘Financial hardship due to circumstances beyond the
Foreclosure-16
mortgagor's control’ means [: (A) A] a significant reduction [of
at least twenty-five per cent] of aggregate family household
income or increase in expenses which reasonably cannot be or
could not have been alleviated by the liquidation of assets by the
mortgagor as determined by the Connecticut Housing Finance
Authority, including, but not limited to, a reduction resulting from
(A) (i) unemployment or underemployment of one or more of the
mortgagors; (ii) a loss, reduction or delay in receipt of such
federal, state or municipal benefits as Social Security,
supplemental security income, public assistance and government
pensions; (iii) a loss, reduction or delay in receipt of such private
benefits as pension, disability, annuity or retirement benefits; (iv)
divorce or a loss of support payments; (v) disability, illness or
death of a mortgagor; [(vi) uninsured damage to the mortgaged
property which affects liveability and necessitates costly repairs;
or (vii)] or (B) (i) a significant increase in the dollar amount of
the periodic payments required by the mortgage; (ii) an
unanticipated rise in housing expenses; or (iii) expenses related to
the disability, illness or death of a member of the mortgagor's
family, but [is] does not include expenses related to the
accumulation of credit or installment debt incurred for
recreational or nonessential items prior to the occurrence of the
alleged circumstances beyond the mortgagor's control in an
amount that would have caused the mortgagor's total debt service
to exceed sixty per cent of aggregate family income at that time.
[; or (B) a significant increase in the dollar amount of the periodic
payments required by the mortgage. ];” (Effective 7/1/2009,
subsection 7 is replaced by section 27 of PA 09-209)
“(8) ‘Consumer credit counseling agency’ means a nonprofit
corporation or governmental agency located in this state which
has been designated by the authority to provide homeowners'
emergency mortgage assistance program counseling. A qualified
consumer credit counseling agency must either be certified as a
housing counseling agency by the federal Department of Housing
and Urban Development or otherwise determined accepted by the
authority;
(9) ‘Foreclosure mediation program’ means the foreclosure
mediation program established by section 49-31m; and
(10) ‘Periodic payments’ means principal, interest, taxes, insurance
and, if applicable, condominium fees.” CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-
265cc (2009)
(Deletions in brackets, additions in underlines.)

Chapter 134. Connecticut Housing Finance Authority Act
§8-265cc. Definitions. (Effective 7/1/2009, subsection 7 is replaced
by section 27 of PA 09-209)
§8-265dd. Emergency mortgage assistance payment program.
Foreclosure of eligible mortgage. (Effective 7/1/2009,
subsection (b) is replaced by section 28 of PA 09-209)
§8-265ee. Notice to mortgagee of foreclosure. Meeting or conference
with mortgagee or consumer credit counseling agency.
(Effective 7/1/2009, this statute is replaced by section
Foreclosure-17
29 of PA 09-209)
§8-265ff. Application for loan. Disclosure of assets by mortgagor.
Determination of eligibility by the authority. (Effective
10/1/09, this statute is replaced by section 30 of PA 09-
209)
§8-265gg. Monthly payments. Calculation of amount. Procedures for
review of mortgagor’s financial circumstances.
Modification to amount of payment. (Effective
10/1/2009, subsection (d) is replaced by section 32 of
PA 09-209)
§8-265hh. Repayment agreement. (Effective 10/1/09, subsection (a)
is replaced by section 33 of PA 09-209)
§8-265ii. Written procedures.
§8-265kk. Notification by authority to participating mortgagees of
unavailability of funds.

AN ATTORNEY’S MANUAL OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (4th ed.,
2004) and 2008 supplement.
Mortgagee’s Emergency Mortgage Assistance Notice to
Mortgagor, p. 640 et seq. (see also 2008 supp., p. 107).
Form 41 Mortgagee’s Affidavit of Compliance with the
Emergency Mortgage Assistance Program, p. 737 (see also 2008
supp., p. 109).
Form 42 Affidavit of Non-applicability of the Emergency
Mortgage Assistance Act, p. 738 (see also 2008 supp., p. 110).
Form 43 Affidavit of Mortgagor’s Default Under the Emergency
Mortgage Assistance Act, p. 739 (see also 2008 supp., p. 113).
OLR RESEARCH • Jillian L. Redding, State and Federal Mortgage Assistance

REPORTS: Programs, CONNECTICUT GENERAL ASSEMBLY, OFFICE
OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, Report No. 2009-R-0159 (April
6, 2009).
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2009/rpt/2009-R-0159.htm

Chapter 15 Protection from Foreclosure for Unemployed Persons
§15.13 The Emergency Mortgage Assistance Act (refer to 2008
supplement for substantial changes to chapter)
§15.13A Act’s scope ill-defined, then redefined
§15.13B “Eligible mortgage”
§15.13C “Mortgagor”
§15.13D The notice requirement
§15.13E The affidavit program
§15.13F Implementing the program
§15.13G Consequences of default
§15.13H Lender may limit period of participation
§15.13I Effect of unavailability of funding
§15.13J Mortgagor Assistance Agreement and open-end
mortgage
Foreclosure-18
(203) 503-6828. Email.

Foreclosure-19
Section 4:
Mediation
SCOPE: • Bibliographic resources relating to the Connecticut Judicial

Branch’s Foreclosure Mediation Program.
DEFINITION: • “Definitions. As used in this section and sections 49-31l to

49-31o, inclusive:
(1) "Mortgagor" means the owner-occupant of one-to-four
family residential real property located in this state who is also
the borrower under a mortgage encumbering such residential
real property, which is the primary residence of such owner-
occupant;
(2) "Residential real property" means a one-to-four family
dwelling occupied as a residence by a mortgagor;
(3) "Mortgagee" means the original lender or servicer under
a mortgage, or its successors or assigns, who is the holder of any
mortgage on residential real property securing a loan made
primarily for personal, family or household purposes that is the
subject of a foreclosure action;
(4) "Authority" means the Connecticut Housing Finance
Authority created under section 8-244; and
(5) "Mortgage assistance programs" means the mortgage
assistance programs developed and implemented by the
authority in accordance with sections 8-265cc to 8-265kk,
inclusive, 8-265rr and 8-265ss.” CONN. GEN. STAT. § 49-31k
(2009).
• “Foreclosure mediation program. Not later than July 1, 2008,

the Chief Court Administrator shall establish in each judicial
district a foreclosure mediation program in actions to foreclose
mortgages on residential real property. Such foreclosure
mediation shall (1) address all issues of foreclosure, including,
but not limited to, reinstatement of the mortgage, assignment of
law days, assignment of sale date, restructuring of the mortgage
debt and foreclosure by decree of sale, and (2) be conducted by
foreclosure mediators who (A) are employed by the Judicial
Branch, (B) are trained in mediation and all relevant aspects of
the law, as determined by the Chief Court Administrator, (C)
have knowledge of the community-based resources that are
available in the judicial district in which they serve, and (D)
have knowledge of the mortgage assistance programs. Such
mediators may refer mortgagors who participate in the
foreclosure mediation program to community-based resources
when appropriate and to the mortgage assistance programs.”
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 49-31m (2009).
Foreclosure-20
• Procedure: PA 09-209
Sec. 34. Section 49-31l of the general statutes is repealed and the
following is substituted in lieu thereof (Effective July 1, 2009):
(a) Prior to July 1, 2010: (1) Any action for the foreclosure of a
mortgage on residential real property with a return date during the
period from July 1, 2008, to June 30, 2009, inclusive, shall be subject
to the provisions of subsection (b) of this section, and (2) any action
for the foreclosure of a mortgage on residential real property with a
return date during the period from July 1, 2009, to June 30, 2010,
inclusive, shall be subject to the provisions of subsection (c) of this
section.
[(a)] (b) (1) Prior to July 1, 2010, when a mortgagee commences an
action for the foreclosure of a mortgage on residential real property
with a return date [on or after] during the period from July 1, 2008, to
June 30, 2009, inclusive, the mortgagee shall give notice to the
mortgagor of the foreclosure mediation program established in
section 49-31m by attaching to the front of the foreclosure complaint
that is served on the mortgagor: [(1)] (A) A copy of the notice of the
availability of foreclosure mediation, in such form as the Chief Court
Administrator prescribes, and [(2)] (B) a foreclosure mediation
request form, in such form as the Chief Court Administrator
prescribes.
[(b) (1)] (2) Except as provided in subdivision [(2)] (3) of this
subsection, a mortgagor may request foreclosure mediation by
submitting the foreclosure mediation request form to the court and
filing an appearance not more than fifteen days after the return day
for the foreclosure action. Upon receipt of the foreclosure mediation
request form, the court shall notify each appearing party that a
foreclosure mediation request form has been submitted by the
mortgagor.
[(2)] (3) The court may grant a mortgagor permission to submit a
foreclosure mediation request form and file an appearance after the
fifteen-day period established in subdivision [(1)] (2) of this
subsection, for good cause shown, except that no foreclosure
mediation request form may be submitted and no appearance may be
filed more than twenty-five days after the return date.
[(3)] (4) No foreclosure mediation request form may be submitted to
the court on or after July 1, 2010.
[(c)] (5) If at any time on or after July 1, 2008, but prior to July 1,
2010, the court determines that the notice requirement of [subsection
(a) of this section] subdivision (1) of this subsection has not been
met, the court may, upon its own motion or upon the written motion
of the mortgagor, issue an order that no judgment may enter for
fifteen days during which period the mortgagor may submit a
foreclosure mediation request form to the court.
[(d)] (6) Notwithstanding any provision of the general statutes or any
rule of law to the contrary, prior to July 1, 2010, no judgment of
strict foreclosure nor any judgment ordering a foreclosure sale shall
be entered in any action subject to the provisions of this subsection
and instituted by the mortgagee to foreclose a mortgage on
residential real property unless: [(1)] (A) Notice to the mortgagor has
been given by the mortgagee in accordance with [subsection (a)]
subdivision (1) of this [section] subsection and the time for
submitting a foreclosure mediation request form has expired and no
foreclosure mediation request form has been submitted, or if such
notice has not been given, the time for submitting a foreclosure
Foreclosure-21
mediation request form pursuant to [subsection (b) or (c)]
subdivision (2) or (3) of this [section] subsection has expired and no
foreclosure mediation request form has been submitted, or [(2)] (B)
the mediation period set forth in subdivision (b) of section 49-31n, as
amended by this act, has expired or has otherwise terminated,
whichever is earlier.
[(e)] (7) None of the mortgagor's or mortgagee's rights in the
foreclosure action shall be waived by the mortgagor's submission of a
foreclosure mediation request form to the court.
(c) (1) Prior to July 1, 2010, when a mortgagee commences an action
return date on or after July 1, 2009, the mortgagee shall give notice
to the mortgagor of the foreclosure mediation program established in
section 49-31m by attaching to the front of the writ, summons and
complaint that is served on the mortgagor: (A) A copy of the notice
of foreclosure mediation, in such form as the Chief Court
Administrator prescribes, (B) a copy of the foreclosure mediation
certificate form described in subdivision (3) of this subsection, in
such form as the Chief Court Administrator prescribes, and (C) a
blank appearance form, in such form as the Chief Court
Administrator prescribes.
(2) The court shall issue a notice of foreclosure mediation described
in subdivision (3) of this subsection to the mortgagor not later than
three days after the mortgagee returns the writ to the court.
(3) The notice of foreclosure mediation shall instruct the mortgagor
to file the appearance and foreclosure mediation certificate forms
with the court no later than the date fifteen days from the return date
for the foreclosure action. The foreclosure mediation certificate form
shall require the mortgagor to provide sufficient information to
permit the court to confirm that the defendant in the foreclosure
action is a mortgagor, and to certify that said mortgagor has sent a
copy of the mediation certificate form to the plaintiff in the action.
(4) Upon receipt of the mortgagor's appearance and foreclosure
mediation certificate forms, and provided the court confirms the
defendant in the foreclosure action is a mortgagor and that said
mortgagor has sent a copy of the mediation certificate form to the
plaintiff, the court shall schedule a date for foreclosure mediation in
accordance with subsection (c) of section 49-31n, as amended by this
act. The court shall issue notice of such mediation date to all
appearing parties not earlier than the date five business days after the
return date. If the court does not receive the appearance and
foreclosure mediation certificate forms from the mortgagor by the
date fifteen days after the return date for the foreclosure action, the
court shall not schedule such mediation.
(5) Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection, the court may
refer a foreclosure action brought by a mortgagee to the foreclosure
mediation program at any time, provided the mortgagor has filed an
appearance in said action.
(6) Notwithstanding any provision of the general statutes or any rule
of law, prior to July 1, 2010, no judgment of strict foreclosure nor
any judgment ordering a foreclosure sale shall be entered in any
action subject to the provisions of this subsection and instituted by
the mortgagee to foreclose a mortgage on residential real property
unless: (A) The mediation period set forth in subdivision (c) of
section 49-31n, as amended by this act, has expired or has otherwise
terminated, whichever is earlier, or (B) the mediation program is not
Foreclosure-22
otherwise required or available.
(7) None of the mortgagor's or mortgagee's rights in the foreclosure
action shall be waived by participation in the foreclosure mediation
program.
Sec. 35. Section 49-31n of the general statutes is repealed and the
(a) Prior to July 1, 2010: (1) Any action for the foreclosure of a
mortgage on residential real property with a return date during the
period from July 1, 2008, to June 30, 2009, inclusive, shall be subject
to the provisions of subsection (b) of this section, and (2) any action
return date during the period from July 1, 2009, to June 30, 2010,
inclusive, shall be subject to the provisions of subsection (c) of this
section.
[(a) The] (b) (1) For any action for the foreclosure of a mortgage on
residential real property with a return date during the period from
July 1, 2008, to June 30, 2009, inclusive, the mediation period under
the foreclosure mediation program established in section 49-31m
shall commence when the court sends notice to each appearing party
that a foreclosure mediation request form has been submitted by a
mortgagor to the court, which notice shall be sent not later than three
business days after the court receives a completed foreclosure
mediation request form. The mediation period shall conclude not
more than sixty days after the return day for the foreclosure action,
except that the court may, in its discretion, for good cause shown,
[(1)] (A) extend, by not more than thirty days, or shorten the
mediation period on its own motion or upon motion of any party, or
[(2)] (B) extend by not more than thirty days the mediation period
upon written request of the mediator.
[(b)] (2) The first mediation session shall be held not later than
fifteen business days after the court sends notice to all parties that a
foreclosure mediation request form has been submitted to the court.
The mortgagor and mortgagee shall appear in person at each
mediation session and shall have authority to agree to a proposed
settlement, except that if the mortgagee is represented by counsel, the
mortgagee's counsel may appear in lieu of the mortgagee to represent
the mortgagee's interests at the mediation, provided such counsel has
the authority to agree to a proposed settlement and the mortgagee is
available during the mediation session by telephone or electronic
means. The court shall not award attorney's fees to any mortgagee for
time spent in a mediation session if the court finds that such
mortgagee has failed to comply with this subdivision, unless the
court finds reasonable cause for such failure.
[(c)] (3) Not later than two days after the conclusion of the first
mediation session, the mediator shall determine whether the parties
will benefit from further mediation. The mediator shall file with the
court a report setting forth such determination and mail a copy of
such report to each appearing party. If the mediator reports to the
court that the parties will not benefit from further mediation, the
mediation period shall terminate automatically. If the mediator
reports to the court after the first mediation session that the parties
may benefit from further mediation, the mediation period shall
continue.
[(d)] (4) If the mediator has submitted a report to the court that the
parties may benefit from further mediation pursuant to [subsection
(c) of this section] subdivision (3) of this subsection, not more than
Foreclosure-23
two days after the conclusion of the mediation, but no later than the
termination of the mediation period set forth in [subsection (a) of this
section] subdivision (1) of this subsection, the mediator shall file a
report with the court describing the proceedings and specifying the
issues resolved, if any, and any issues not resolved pursuant to the
mediation. The filing of the report shall terminate the mediation
period automatically. If certain issues have not been resolved
pursuant to the mediation, the mediator may refer the mortgagor to
any appropriate community-based services that are available in the
judicial district, but any such referral shall not cause a delay in the
mediation process.
[(e)] (5) The Chief Court Administrator shall establish policies and
procedures to implement this [section] subsection. Such policies and
procedures shall, at a minimum, provide that the mediator shall
advise the mortgagor at the first mediation session required by
[subsection (b) of this section] subdivision (2) of this subsection that:
[(1)] (A) Such mediation does not suspend the mortgagor's obligation
to respond to the foreclosure action; [in accordance with applicable
rules of the court; ] and [(2)] (B) a judgment of strict foreclosure or
foreclosure by sale may cause the mortgagor to lose the residential
real property to foreclosure.
[(f)] (6) In no event shall any determination issued by a mediator
under this program form the basis of an appeal of any foreclosure
judgment.
[(g)] (7) Foreclosure mediation request forms shall not be accepted
by the court on or after July 1, 2010, and the foreclosure mediation
program shall terminate when all mediation has concluded with
respect to any applications submitted to the court prior to July 1,
2010.
[(h)] (8) At any time during the mediation period, the mediator may
refer the mortgagor to the mortgage assistance programs, except that
any such referral shall not prevent a mortgagee from proceeding to
judgment when the conditions specified in [subsection (d)]
subdivision (6) of subsection (b) of section 49-31l, as amended by
this act, have been satisfied.
(c) (1) For any action for the foreclosure of a mortgage on residential
real property with a return date during the period from July 1, 2009,
to June 30, 2010, inclusive, the mediation period under the
foreclosure mediation program established in section 49-31m shall
commence when the court sends notice to each appearing party
scheduling the first foreclosure mediation session. The mediation
period shall conclude not later than the date sixty days after the
return date for the foreclosure action, except that the court may, in its
discretion, for good cause shown, (A) extend, by not more than thirty
days, or shorten the mediation period on its own motion or upon
motion of any party, or (B) extend by not more than thirty days the
mediation period upon written request of the mediator.
(2) The first mediation session shall be held not later than fifteen
business days after the court sends notice to each appearing party in
accordance with subdivision (4) of subsection (c) of section 49-31l,
as amended by this act. The mortgagor and mortgagee shall appear in
person at each mediation session and shall have authority to agree to
a proposed settlement, except that if the mortgagee is represented by
counsel, the mortgagee's counsel may appear in lieu of the mortgagee
to represent the mortgagee's interests at the mediation, provided such
counsel has the authority to agree to a proposed settlement and the
Foreclosure-24
mortgagee is available during the mediation session by telephone or
electronic means. The court shall not award attorney's fees to any
mortgagee for time spent in a mediation session if the court finds that
such mortgagee has failed to comply with this subdivision, unless the
court finds reasonable cause for such failure.
(3) Not later than two days after the conclusion of the first mediation
session, the mediator shall determine whether the parties will benefit
from further mediation. The mediator shall file with the court a report
setting forth such determination and mail a copy of such report to
each appearing party. If the mediator reports to the court that the
parties will not benefit from further mediation, the mediation period
shall terminate automatically. If the mediator reports to the court
after the first mediation session that the parties may benefit from
further mediation, the mediation period shall continue.
(4) If the mediator has submitted a report to the court that the parties
may benefit from further mediation pursuant to subdivision (3) of
this subsection, not more than two days after the conclusion of the
mediation, but no later than the termination of the mediation period
set forth in subdivision (1) of this subsection, the mediator shall file a
report with the court describing the proceedings and specifying the
issues resolved, if any, and any issues not resolved pursuant to the
mediation. The filing of the report shall terminate the mediation
period automatically. If certain issues have not been resolved
pursuant to the mediation, the mediator may refer the mortgagor to
any appropriate community-based services that are available in the
judicial district, but any such referral shall not cause a delay in the
mediation process.
(5) The Chief Court Administrator shall establish policies and
procedures to implement this subsection. Such policies and
procedures shall, at a minimum, provide that the mediator shall
advise the mortgagor at the first mediation session required by
subdivision (2) of this subsection that: (A) Such mediation does not
suspend the mortgagor's obligation to respond to the foreclosure
action; and (B) a judgment of strict foreclosure or foreclosure by sale
may cause the mortgagor to lose the residential real property to
foreclosure.
(6) In no event shall any determination issued by a mediator under
this program form the basis of an appeal of any foreclosure
judgment.
(7) The foreclosure mediation program shall terminate when all
mediation has concluded with respect to any foreclosure action with
a return date during the period from July 1, 2009, to June 30, 2010,
inclusive.
(8) At any time during the mediation period, the mediator may refer
the mortgagor to the mortgage assistance programs, except that any
such referral shall not prevent a mortgagee from proceeding to
judgment when the conditions specified in subdivision (6) of
subsection (c) of section 49-31l, as amended by this act, have been
satisfied.
Sec. 36. Section 49-31o of the general statutes is repealed and the
(a) Nothing in sections 49-31k to 49-31n, inclusive, as amended by
this act, shall require a mortgagee to modify a mortgage or change
the terms of payment of a mortgage without its consent.
(b) Information submitted by the mortgagor to a mediator, either
orally or in writing, including financial documents, shall not be
Foreclosure-25
subject to disclosure by the judicial branch. (Deletions in brackets,
additions in underlines).

§ 49-31k. Definitions.
§ 49-31l. Notice of foreclosure mediation program.
Request form. (Effective 7/1/2009, repealed
& substituted by PA 09-209, section 34)
§ 49-31m. Foreclosure mediation program.
§ 49-31n. Mediation period. (Effective 7/1/2009,
repealed & substituted by PA 09-209,
section 35)
§ 49-31o. Consent of mortgagee required for changes.
(Effective 7/1/2009, repealed & substituted
by PA 09-209, section 36)
COURT RULES: • Sec. 3-3. Form and Signing of Appearance
“Each appearance shall (1) be typed or printed on size 8 -

1/2 x 11 inch paper, (2) be headed with the name and number
of the case, the nam e of the court location to which it is
returnable and the date, (3) be legibly signed by the individual
preparing the appearance with the individual’s own name and
(4) state the party or parties for whom the appearance is being
entered and the official (with position or departm ent, if
desired), firm , professional corporation or individual whose
appearance is being entered, together with the juris number
assigned thereto if any, the mailing address and the telephone
number. This section shall not apply to mortgagors filing a
request for mediation under Public Act 08 -176, § 16, in which
case the request for mediation shall constitute an appearance.
This section shall not apply to appearances entered pursuant to
Section 3-1….
COMMENTARY - Section 16 of Public Act 08 -176 requires

the court to notify each appearing party that a foreclosure
mediation request has been submitted by the mortgagor.
Requiring the mortgagor to file an appearance is
redundant and places an unnecessary burden on the individuals
whom Public Act 08 -176, §16 is intended to assist. The new
sentence in this section addresses this.” CT Practice Book 3-3
(2010 ed.) (Page 25PB CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL
July 14, 2009.)
• Sec. 17-20. Motion for Default and Nonsuit for

Failure to Appear
“(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), if no appearance has
been entered for any party to any action on or before the
Foreclosure-26
second day following the return day, any other party to the
action may make a motion that a nonsuit or default be entered
for failure to appear.
(b) In an action commenced by a mortgagee prior to
July 1, 2010 for the foreclosure of a mortgage on residential
real property consisting of a one-to-four family dwelling
occupied as the primary residence of the mortgagor, with a
return date on or after July 1, 2008, if no appearance has been
entered for the mortgagor on or before the fifteenth day
after the return day or, if the court has extended the time for
filing an appearance and no appearance has been entered on or
before the date ordered by the court, any other party to the
action may make a motion that a default be entered for failure
to appear.
(c) It shall be the responsibility of counsel filing a motion for
default for failure to appear to serve the defaulting party with
a copy of the motion. Service and proof thereof may be made
in accordance with Sections 10-12 , 10-13 and 10-4. Upon
good cause shown, the judicial authority may dispense with
this requirement when judgment is rendered.
(d) Except as provided in Sections 17-23 through 17-30 ,
motions for default for failure to appear shall be acted on by
the clerk upon filing and shall not be printed on the short
calendar. The motion shall be granted by the clerk if the party
who is the subject of the motion has not filed an appearance.
The provisions of Section 17-21 shall not apply to such
motions, but such provisions shall be complied with before a
judgment may be entered after default. If the defaulted party
files an appearance in the action prior to the entry of judgment
after default, the default shall automatically be set aside by
operation of law. A claim for a hearing in damages shall not be
filed before the expiration of fifteen days from the entry of a
default under this subsection, except as provided in Sections
17-23 through 17-30.
(e) A motion for nonsuit for failure to appear shall be
printed on the short calendar. If it is proper to grant the
motion, the judicial authority shall grant it without the need for
the moving party to appear at the short calendar.
(f) The granting of a motion for nonsuit for failure to
appear or a motion for judgment after default for failure to
appear shall be subject to the provisions of Sections 9-1 and
17-21 . Such motion shall contain either (1) a statement that a
military affidavit is attached thereto, or (2) a statement, with
reasons therefore, that it is not necessary to attach a military
affidavit to the m otion….
C O M M EN T A R Y – 2010: A new subsection (b) has

been added to adopt the provisions of Public Act 08 -176, §
16 .” CT Practice Book 17-20 (2010 ed.) (Page 57PB
CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL July 14, 2009.)
Foreclosure-27
• Sec. 10-12. Service of the Pleading and Other
Papers; R esponsibility of Counsel or Pro Se Party:
D ocum ents and Persons to Be Served
“(a) It is the responsibility of counsel or a pro se party filing

the same to serve on each other party who has appeared one
copy of every pleading subsequent to the original complaint,
every written motion other than one in which an order is
sought ex parte and every paper relating to discovery, request,
demand, claim , notice or similar paper, except a request for
mediation under Public Act 08 -176, § 16. When a party is
represented by an attorney, the service shall be made upon the
attorney unless service upon the party is ordered by the
judicial authority…
COMMENTARY – 2010: Public Act 08 -176, § 16 requires

the court to notify each appearing party that a foreclosure
mediation request has been submitted by the mortgagor.
Requiring the mortgagor to serve a copy on each party is
redundant and places an unnecessary burden on the individuals
whom Public Act 08-176, § 16 is intended to assist. The new
language in subsection (a) addresses this.” CT Practice Book
(2010 ed.) (July 14, 2009 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL
Page 40PB.)
FORMS: • Foreclosure Mediation Request, JD-CV-93

• Foreclosure Mediation Notice to Homeowner, JD-CV-94
• Foreclosure Mediation – Objection, JD-CV-95
• Foreclosure Mediation — Motion For Permission To Request
Mediation Later Than 15 Days After Return Date Or To Change
Mediation Period, JD-CV-96
• Foreclosure Mediation Certificate, JD-CV-108
PAMPHLETS: • FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAM

http://www.jud.ct.gov/Publications/CV092.pdf
• Representing Yourself in Foreclosure: A Guide for Connecticut

Homeowners, CT Fair Housing Center, pp. 6, 8, 11, 17-18, 23 &
28
http://ctfairhousing.org/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2010/01/CFHC-ForeclosureManualR3.pdf

PROCEDURE (4th ed. 2004). 2008 Cumulative Supplement, pp.
114-119, section 15.14 Foreclosure Mediation
15.14A Limited Duration
15.14A1 Scope of the Program
15.14B The Notice Requirement
15.14C Program Commencement
Foreclosure-28
15.14D The Stay
15.14E The Mediation Sessions
15.14F Additional Provisions
COMPILER: Janet Zigadto, Connecticut Judicial Branch Law Library

at New Haven, 235 Church Street, New Haven, CT
06510. (203) 503-6828. Email.
Foreclosure-29
Section 5:
Application for Protection
from Foreclosure
SCOPE: • Bibliographic resources relating to the Connecticut’s Protection from

Mortgage Foreclosure Act.
DEFINITION: • CONN. GEN. STAT. (2009)

§ 49-31d. Definitions. For the purposes of sections 49-31d to 49-31i,
inclusive:
(1) "Unemployed person" means a person who is unemployed for
purposes of chapter 567 [Unemployment Compensation].
(2) "Homeowner" means a person who has an ownership interest in
residential real property secured by a mortgage which is the
subject of a foreclosure action, and who has owned and occupied
such property as his principal residence for a continuous period
of not less than two years immediately preceding the
commencement of such foreclosure action.
(3) "Restructured mortgage debt" means the adjustment by a court
of a mortgage debt to give protection from a foreclosure action.
(4) "Protection from foreclosure" means a court-ordered
restructuring of a mortgage debt designed to eliminate an
arrearage in payments on such debt and to provide a period not
to exceed six months during which foreclosure is stayed.
(5) "Lender" means any person who makes or holds mortgage loans
in the ordinary course of business and who is the holder of any
first mortgage on residential real estate which is the subject of a
foreclosure action.
(6) "Underemployed person" means a person whose earned income
during the twelve-month period immediately preceding the
commencement of the foreclosure action is (A) less than fifty
thousand dollars and (B) less than seventy-five per cent of his
average annual earned income during the two years immediately
preceding such twelve-month period.

§ 49-31d. Definitions.
§ 49-31e. Notice to homeowner of protections from foreclosure.
(b) A homeowner who is given notice of the availability
of the provisions of sections 49-31d to 49-31i,
Foreclosure-30
inclusive, must make application for protection from
foreclosure within twenty-five days of the return day.
§ 49-31f. Application for protection from foreclosure action.
Qualifications. Court determination of eligibility. Stay of
foreclosure action.
(g) No homeowner who files a defense to any action for
foreclosure shall be eligible to make application for
protection from such foreclosure pursuant to the
provisions of this section.
§ 49-31g. Restructuring of mortgage debt by court.
§ 49-31h. Partial payment by homeowner mandated by court as
condition for granting restructuring order.
§49-31i. Determination of restructured mortgage debt. Limitations
on amount of mortgage debt following restructuring.
Computation of new mortgage debt.
§49-31j. Regulations: “The Banking Commissioner shall adopt such
regulations, in accordance with chapter 54, as the
commissioner deems necessary specifying (1) the manner
in which a composite interest rate shall be computed for
the new mortgage debt pursuant to subsection (c) of
section 49-31i, (2) the method or standard by which
prevailing market rates of interest are to be determined,
and (3) a form a lender may use to give notice pursuant to
section 49-31e to a homeowner of the availability of the
provisions of sections 49-31d to 49-31i, inclusive.”
REGULATIONS: • CONN. AGENCIES REGS. §§ 49-31j-1 et seq. (through supp. for 4-09)
§ 49-31j-1. Definitions
§ 49-31j-2. Notice
§§ 49-31j-3 to 49-31j-4. Repealed, February 9, 2009
§ 49-31j-5. Composite interest rate
§§ 49-31j-6 to 49-31j-9. Repealed, February 9, 2009
LEGISLATIVE: • George Coppolo, Mortgage Foreclosure-Unemployed Homeowners,

CONNECTICUT GENERAL ASSEMBLY, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE
RESEARCH, Report No. 2002-R-0363 (March 22, 2002). URL:
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2002/olrdata/jud/rpt/2002-R-0363.htm
FORMS: • DENIS R. CARON & GEOFFREY K. MILNE, CONNECTICUT

Form 34. Application for protection from foreclosure, p. 727
RECORDS & BRIEFS • CONNECTICUT SUPREME COURT RECORDS AND BRIEFS,

May/June 1998. Shawmut Mortgage Company v. Wheat, 245 Conn.
744, 717 A2d 664 (1998)
Figure 4: Application for protection from foreclosure, p.34
Figure 5: Objection to application for protection from foreclosure
action, p.37
COURT CASES • Savings Bank Life Ins. Co. v. Linthicum, 43 Conn. App. 467, 469, 683
A.2d 737, 739 (1996). “The purpose of an application for protection
Foreclosure-31
from foreclosure under § 49-31f is to grant the defendant an opportunity
for the restructuring of the mortgage debt. General Statutes § 49-31g. If
the application is approved, the foreclosure action is stayed for the
restructuring period, pursuant to § 49-31f (f).”
• Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. v. Conant, 54 Conn. App. 529, 534, 736 A.2d
928, 931 (1999). "We agree, in this case, that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it denied the defendants’ application. Its
findings that the defendants' visions of their future earnings were
speculative, that they had no equity in the mortgaged property, that their
financial situation would make it unlikely that they would be able to
make timely payments on the restructured mortgage and that the
plaintiff would be prejudiced by a restructuring of the mortgage were
based on the evidence before it. We conclude, therefore, that the trial
court properly denied the defendants' application for protection from
foreclosure."
• Shawmut Mortgage Co. v. Wheat, 245 Conn. 744, 754-755, 717 A.2d
664, 670 (1998). “ . . . we conclude that the defendant, as an individual
who never previously has been employed, is not an ‘unemployed
person’ within the meaning of §49-31d (1) and , therefore, may not
qualify for protection from mortgage foreclosure under the mortgage
act.”
• See also Table 2: Unreported Connecticut decisions

Chapter 15 Protection from foreclosure for unemployed persons
§ 15.01 Legislative history
§ 15.02 What mortgages are subject to the Act?
§ 15.03 Who qualifies to invoke the protection under the Act
§ 15.04 How is the Act’s protection invoked?
§ 15.05 What factors does the court consider?
§ 15.06 When is the debt restructured?
§ 15.07 How is the debt restructured?
§ 15.08 What takes place during the restructuring period?
§ 15.09 How is the interest handled?
§ 15.10 How is the prevailing rate computed?
§ 15.11 Notice requirement
§ 15.12 Time limitations for invoking protection
§ 15.13 Emergency Mortgage Protection Act (2008 supp. only)
1. Lending Programs Old and New
A. The Homeowner’s Equity Recovery Opportunity
Loan (“HERO”)
B. Continuation of the CT FAMILIES Program
C. Changes to the Emergency Mortgage Assistance
Program (“EMAP”)
2. Which mortgages fall within the scope of the act?
3. Notice requirement
4. The affidavit requirement
5. What happens if the homeowner applies for
assistance?
6. Implementing EMAP
7. Consequences of Borrower’s default
Foreclosure-32
8. Coordination with other aspects of the act

(203) 503-6828. Email.

Foreclosure-33
Table 2: Unreported Connecticut Cases: Application for Protection from Foreclosure
Unreported Connecticut Decisions:

Application for Protection from Foreclosure
In general “The court having reviewed the evidence and the statutory criteria found in General
Statutes 49-31d through 49-31i finds the following:
1. The mortgage being foreclosed is a residential first mortgage which has been the
principal residence of the defendants for more than two years.
2. The homeowners have not had a prior foreclosure action commenced against them in
the past seven years.
3. The defendants have not received emergency mortgage assistance.
4. The court finds the defendants to be underemployed and/or unemployed persons as
defined by the statutes.
5. The court finds the value of the property to be $240,000.00.

6. The court finds the new principal balance as of June 1, 2004 to be $172,287.07, which
is computed by adding 28 days of per diem interest at a rate of $45.43 per day which
equals $1,262.04, to the balance of $171,028.03 provided by the plaintiff. The court
finds the monthly payment at a variable interest rate of 11.95% for a period of 318
months to be $1,779.31. The first payment is due on June 1, 2004 and each month
thereafter in arrears. The defendants shall in addition continue to pay any escrows
previously collected under the terms of the mortgage.
7. The court finds the debt to be less than 90% of the property's value.
8. All other conditions of the mortgage and promissory note, including any escrows, shall
remain in effect.
9. The court finds the defendants have sufficient income to make the new payments.
The court notes there are subsequent encumbrancers whose debt exclusive of accrued
interest is in excess of $55,000.00. None of these encumbrancers have objected to this
application and in the court's opinion would benefit from the reinstatement of this
mortgage.
The defendants' application for relief is granted, further action on this mortgage is stayed
for six months in accordance with General Statute 49-31g, and the mortgage is ordered
reinstated.” Long Beach Mortgage Company v. Belmonte, No. CV 04-0092102 (Conn.
Super. Ct., Litchfield, May 4, 2004), 37 CLR 14.
Homeowner “Thus, the court concludes that the term ‘homeowner,’ as defined in § 49-31d(2), is limited
to one who has legal title, and, as Neola Wood is the sole record owner of the property in
this foreclosure action, James E. Wood, a mortgagor, does not have the requisite ownership
interest to qualify as a homeowner under the foreclosure moratorium act.” Home Loan &
Investment Bank v. Wood, No. CV 03-0399404 S (Conn. Super. Ct., Fairfield at
Bridgeport, Jul. 8, 2003), 35 CLR 108.
[cont’d]
Foreclosure-34
Unreported Connecticut Cases: Application for Protection from Foreclosure [cont’d]
“In this action the return date was September 30, 2003. General Statute 49-31e(b) requires
Untimely
the homeowner to file for protection within 25 days of the return date which would have
filing
been October 26, 2003. The application here was not filed until February 20, 2004 long
past the statutory period.
Accordingly the court finds due to the untimely filing of the application for protection the
Defendants' application is denied.” Country Wide Home Loans, Inc. v. Barth, No. CV03-
0091545 (Conn. Super. Ct., Litchfield, Mar. 8, 2004).
Restructured
“The court finds that the defendant is ineligible for protection from foreclosure under the
debt
provisions of Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 49-31i (b). Under that statute, assuming the applicant is
otherwise eligible for the protection from foreclosure afforded by 49-31f, the court cannot
grant the application if the amount of the restructured debt would be ninety per cent or less
of the fair market value of the property. At present, through June 30, 2003, based on the
unopposed submissions of the plaintiff, the debt stands at over $87,000, and the fair market
value of the property at 255 Oak Street, Waterbury, is $80,000.” National City Mortgage
Co. v. Minnis, No. CV 03-0176969 (Conn. Super. Ct., Waterbury, July 16, 2003).
Unemployed
“Likewise, the foreclosure moratorium act ‘was designed as a temporary mortgage
person
moratorium for unemployed workers; (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks
omitted) id., 752; and was intended’ only to help persons who are experiencing temporary
economic difficulties." (Emphasis in original.) Id., 753. In fact, ‘the legislature had in mind
only persons who are experiencing temporary employment-related losses or decreases in
earned income as beneficiaries when it enacted the [foreclosure moratorium] act.’
(Emphasis added.) Id. In the present case, according to the defendants, Neola Wood ‘has
not worked in many years, is of an age where she can collect Social Security Benefits, and .
. . is too ill currently to work . . .’ (Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum, p. 4.) Like the
plaintiff in Shawmut Mortgage Co. v. Wheat supra, 245 Conn. 753, Neola Wood ‘presently
is not experiencing a temporary employment-related decrease in earned income,’ and she
does not qualify, therefore, as an ‘unemployed person’ within the meaning of the
foreclosure moratorium act.” Home Loan & Investment Bank v. Wood, No. CV 03-
0399404 S (Conn. Super. Ct., Fairfield at Bridgeport, Jul. 8, 2003), 35 CLR 108.
“The plaintiff's first argument is that all of the defendant's special defenses should be
Filing
stricken because the defendant has waived her right to file special defenses by filing an
Defenses
application for protection from foreclosure action pursuant to General Statutes §§ 49-31d et
seq. In support of its argument, the defendant cites to General Statutes § 49-31f(g), which
provides that "[n]o homeowner who files a defense to any action for foreclosure shall be
eligible to make application for protection from such foreclosure pursuant to the provisions
of this section."
A literal reading of the language of General Statutes § 49-31f(g) demonstrates simply

that a homeowner who files a special defense in a foreclosure action is prevented from
thereafter filing an application for protection under the section. The plaintiff's argument,
however, seeks to obtain a converse result. Thus, the plaintiff has taken the position that
once an application is filed under that section, the homeowner may not subsequently file a
special defense in a foreclosure action. This converse reading of the statute is incorrect. The
Foreclosure-35
filing of an application for protection under General Statutes §§ 49-31d et seq. does not
vitiate a homeowner's right to file special defenses in a foreclosure action after an
application for protection has been filed. See Bancboston Mortgage Corp. v. McCormack,
Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 503184
(January 14, 1992, Satter, S.T.R., 8 CSCR 257); Dime Savings Bank v. Romano, Superior
Court, Judicial District of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 284925 (June 17, 1992, Katz,
J., 7 CSCR 890). The defendant's first argument, therefore, is without merit.” Berkeley Fed.
Bk. & Trust v. Phillips, No. CV94 031 79 57 S (Conn. Super. Ct., Fairfield at Bridgeport,
Jan. 23, 1996).
Foreclosure-36
Figure 4: Application for Protection from Foreclosure
RET. JANUARY 12, 1993 : SUPERIOR COURT
SHAMUT MORTGAGE COMPANY : J.D. OF STAMFORD/
VS. : NORWALK
MARY C. WHEAT : AT STAMFORD
: JANUARY 25, 1993
APPLICATION FOR PROTECTION FROM FORECLOSURE
The Defendant, Mary C. Wheat, being the owner of the premises which are the subject of the
above-referenced foreclosure action, hereby make application to this Honorable Court for protection!
From foreclosure, pursuant to the provisions of C.G.S. sections 49-31d through 49-31j, a n d represent as
follows:
a) that Mary C. Wheat is a homeowner as defined in section 49-31d, having owned and occupied the
subject property as her principal residence for a continuous period of not less than t w o years immediately
preceding the commencement of this action;
b) that the mortgage sought to be foreclosed is a first mortgage upon the subject property and the
Plaintiff, holder of s a i d mortgage, is a lender as defined in the act;
c) that neither Mary C. Wheat, nor Clayton E. Wheat, her husband who also signed the Note, have had
a foreclosure action commenced against their in the past seven years; and
d) that both Mary C. Wheat, and Clayton E. wheat are unemployed/under employed as defined in the
act . . . .
ORAL ARG. REQ.
TESTIMONY REQ.
Foreclosure-37
WHEREFORE, the applicant moves as follows:
I) That the Court determine her eligibility for protection from foreclosure
II) That the Court Order the Restructuring of the mortgage debt and establish a restructuring
period for the elimination of the arrearage on said debt; and
III) That further prosecution of the foreclosure be stayed during the restructuring period.
THE DEFENDANT, Mary C. Wheat
By______________________________
Name
Address
Juris No.
Telephone No.
Foreclosure-38
ORDER
The forgoing Application, having been heard, is HEREBY ORDERED:
GRANTED/DENIED
BY THE COURT,
_____________________________________________
Judge/Clerk
Certification
T h i s i s t o certify that a true copy of the foregoing Application has been mailed this 25th day of
January 1993 to all parties, and counsel of record.
________________________________________________
Commissioner of the Superior Court
Foreclosure-39
Figure 5: Objection to Application for Protection from Foreclosure
NO. CV-93 0128882 S : SUPERIOR COURT
SHAWMUT MORTGAGE COMPANY D/R/A

CONNECTICUT NATIONAL MORTGAGE COMPANY : J.D. OF STAMFORD/
VS. : NORWALK
MARY C. WHEAT A/K/A, ET AL. : AT STAMFORD
: APRIL 28, 1993
OBJECTION TO APPLICATION FOR PROTECTION

FROM FORECLOSURE ACTION
The plaintiff in the above-entitled action hereby objects to the defendant, MARY C. WHEAT's
Application for Protection from Foreclosure under Connecticut General Statutes 49-31d through 49-31j et seq.
and in support thereof states the following:
1. There is no likelihood that the mortgagors will be able to make timely payments on the
restructured mortgage commencing at the end of the restructuring period.
2. The restructured payments would be in the approximate amount of $7,084.97 per month, if
restructured as of March 1, 1993, and the mortgagors' monthly income is only $9,520.33.
3. The restructured payments do not take into account the living expenses of the mortgagors,
including but not limited to $300.00 per week for nursing care.
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED

TESTIMONY IS REQUIRED
Foreclosure-40
WHEREFORE, plaintiff moves that its Objection to Application for Protection be sustained and the
Application denied.
PLAINTIFF
By __________________________________
Name
Address
Phone number
Juris number
Its Attorneys
ORDER
T h e f o r e g o i n g O b j e c t i o n having been presented to this Court, it is hereby Ordered:
SUSTAINED/OVERRULED.
BY THE COURT
__________________________________
Judge/Clerk
Foreclosure-41
Section 6:
Defenses to Foreclosure
SCOPE: • Bibliographic resources relating to defenses to foreclosure including

equitable defenses.
DEFINITION: • "At common law, the only defenses to an action of this character would
have been payment, discharge, release or satisfaction; White v. Watkins,
23 Ill. 480; or, if there had never been a valid lien.” Petterson v.
Weinstock, 106 Conn. 436, 441, 138 A. 433, 435 (1927).
• “So, if the mortgagor is prevented by accident, mistake or fraud, from
fulfilling a condition of the mortgage, foreclosure cannot be had; 1
Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence (4th Ed.) § 162; Wilcox v. Allen, 36
Mich. 160; Bell v. Romaine, 30 N.J. Eq. 24; Bennett v. Stevenson, 53
N.Y. 508; and this equitable consideration has long been recognized in
this State. Doty v. Whittlesey, 1 Root, 310; Crane v. Hanks, 1 Root,
468; Bridgeport Savings Bank v. Eldredge, 28 Conn. 556; Bostwick v.
Stiles, 35 Conn. 195, 198.” Id., 442.
• “. . . our courts have permitted several equitable defenses to a
foreclosure action . . . . Other equitable defenses that our Supreme Court
has recognized in foreclosure actions include unconscionability; Hamm
v. Taylor, supra, 180 Conn. [491,]494-96; abandonment of security;
Glotzer v. Keyes, 125 Conn. 227, 233, 5 A.2d 1 (1939); and usury.
Atlas Realty Corp. v. House, 120 Conn. 661, 669-70, 83 A. 9 (1936),
overruled in part on other grounds, Ferrigno v. Cromwell Development
Associates, 244 Conn. 189, 202, 708 A.2d 1371 (1998).” Southbridge
Assoc. v. Garofalo, 53 Conn. App. 11, 15-16, 728 A.2d 1114, 1117
(1999).
• “In exercising its equitable discretion, however, the courts must comply
with mandatory statutory provisions that limit the remedies available to
a foreclosing mortgagee.” New Milford Savings Bank v. Jajer, 244
Conn. 251, 256-257, 708 A.2d 1378, 1382 (1998).

Chapter 668. Nondepository financial institutions
§ 36a-488. Mortgage lender, mortgage correspondent lender and
mortgage broker licenses. Requirements. Repealed &
substituted by PA 09-209, section 7, effective 7/31/09
Chapter 669. Regulated activities: Part IXa
§ 36a-746 et seq. Connecticut Abuse Home Loan Lending Practices
Act
Uniform Commercial Code, Article 3, Negotiable instruments
§ 42a-3-303. Value and consideration.
Chapter 821. Land titles
Foreclosure-42
§ 47-5. Conveyances to be in writing, acknowledged and attested.
Conveyance pursuant to power of attorney.
§ 47-17. Records of documents as notice of equitable rights.
Chapter 821b. Validation of conveyance defects
§ 47-36aa. Validations re conveyancing defects of instrument
recorded after January 1, 1997, insubstantial defects re power
of attorney, defects re conveyance by fiduciary.
Chapter 846. Mortgages and liens
§ 49-4a. Open-end mortgages, United States or its instrumentalities
and certain banks authorized to hold.
Chapter 847. Liens
§ 49-36. Liens limited; apportionment; payments to original
contractor.
Chapter 906. Postjudgment procedures
§ 52-380i. Foreclosure of lien when plaintiff holds mortgage.

Homeowners, Connecticut Fair Housing Center, pp. 10, 19-20
FORMS: • 2 CONN. PRACTICE BOOK Form 705.7 (1997).

Special defense and counterclaim to foreclosure: mistake, fraud or
accident in failure to make payment. Figure 6.
WEST KEY NUMBERS: • Mortgages # 415. Defenses

(1). In general
(3). Set-off or counterclaim
DIGEST TOPICS: • DOWLING’S DIGEST: Mortgages §§ 20-24

§ 20. Foreclosure
§ 21. ⎯In general
§ 22. ⎯Right to foreclose; Defenses
§ 23. ⎯ ⎯In general
§ 24. ⎯ ⎯Particular cases
• PHILLIPS’ DIGEST: Mortgages §§ 20-22
§ 20. Foreclosure
§ 21. ⎯In general
§ 22. ⎯Right to foreclose; Defenses
COURT CASES • Monetary Funding Group, Inc. v. Pluchino, 87 Conn. App. 401, 413,
867 A.2d 841, 850 (2005). “In the present case, the court determined
that the plaintiff acted with unclean hands and engaged in an
unconscionable transaction. The conduct of the plaintiff, therefore, was
unfair, oppressive and unscrupulous, and constituted a violation of
CUTPA.”
• Homecomings Financial Network, Inc. v. Starbala, 85 Conn. App. 284,
289, 857 A.2d 366, 369 (2004). “ . . . the defense of payment is a
legally sufficient defense in a foreclosure action, and whether payment
was tendered is a question of fact appropriately decided by the trier of
fact.”
• Morgera v. Chiappardi, 74 Conn. App. 442, 459, 813 A.2d 89, 100
(2003). “The judgment of strict foreclosure and the denial of the
defendant's counterclaim are reversed and the case is remanded for a
Foreclosure-43
new trial in which the plaintiff's complaint and the defendant's claim of
setoff and her special defenses and counterclaim are to be tried together
in the same trial.”
• Hooie v. Webster Bank, No. CV 000093117 (Conn. Super. Ct.,
Middletown, June 12, 2003), 35 CONN. L. RPTR. 91 (August 18, 2003),
2003 WL 21525116 (Conn. Super. 2003). Unjust enrichment in a strict
foreclosure action.
• Franklin Credit Management Corp. v. Nicholas, 73 Conn. App. 830,
838, 812 A.2d 51, 57 (2002). “In a mortgage foreclosure action, ‘[t]o
make out its prima facie case, [the foreclosing party] had to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that it was the owner of the note and
mortgage and that [the mortgagee] had defaulted on the note.’ Webster
Bank v. Flanagan, 51 Conn. App. 733, 750-51, 725 A.2d 975 (1999) . . .
Franklin Credit alleged, among other things, that it is the owner of
the note and that the note was in default. In response, the defendant
asserted the special defense that ‘[t]he debt subject of the lawsuit was
discharged and released, including as evidenced by Form 1099 issued by
[Franklin Credit's] predecessor to the right, title and interest in the debt
instruments.’”
• LaSalle National Bank v. Freshfield Meadows, LLC, 69 Conn. App.
824 , 832-833, 798 A.2d 445, 450 (2002). “The defendant next claims
that the court improperly granted the plaintiff's summary judgment
motions despite the special defenses that it had raised. Specifically, the
defendant argues that summary judgment should not have been granted
based on (1) the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (2) the
doctrine of unclean hands, (3) the common-law duty of good faith and
fair dealing, (4) the doctrine of unconscionability and (5) the doctrine of
equitable estoppel. We will address each special defense in turn.” See
Table 3.
• Webster Bank v. Oakley, 265 Conn. 539, 577, 830 A2d 139, 163
(2003). “In light of these well reasoned opinions in the closely
analogous factual context of insurance policies, we conclude that Title
III of the ADA regulates a lender’s provision of access to its mortgage
loans, which are the goods and services that it offers, but does not
regulate the content of those loan agreements. Thus, although a lender
like the plaintiff may not refuse to provide equal access to its mortgage
policies on the basis of the disabilities of potential mortgagors, it was
not required to alter the otherwise universally applicable terms or
conditions of its mortgage policies to accommodate the disabilities of
borrowers such as the defendant.”
• Southbridge Associates, LLC v. Garofalo, 53 Conn. App. 11, 15-16,
728 A.2d 1114, 1117-1118 (1999). “Other equitable defenses that our
Supreme Court has recognized in foreclosure actions include
unconscionability; Hamm v. Taylor, supra [180 Conn. 491, 429 A.2d
946 (1980)] 180 Conn. 494-496; abandonment of security; Glotzer v.
Keyes, 125 Conn. 227, 233, 5 A.2d 1(1939); and usury.”
• F.D.I.C. v. Altholtz, 4 F. Supp.2d 80 (1998) (D. Conn.). Discussion of
statute of frauds, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Defense of unclean hands.
• New England Savings Bank v. Bedford Realty Corp., 246 Conn. 594,
607, 717 A.2d 713, 720 (1998). “The problem of proving a debt that has
been assigned several times is of great importance to mortgage lenders
and financial institutions.”
• Shawmut Mortgage Co. v. Wheat, 245 Conn. 744, 754-755, 717 A.2d
Foreclosure-44
664, 670 (1998). “ . . . we conclude that the defendant, as an individual
who never previously has been employed, is not an ‘unemployed
person’ within the meaning of §49-31d (1) and , therefore, may not
qualify for protection from mortgage foreclosure under the mortgage
act.”
• Mechanics & Farmers Savings Bank, FSB v. Delco Development Co.,
43 Conn. Supp. 408, 414, 656 A.2d 1075, 1080 (1993). “The principle
that a bank’s violation of regulatory provisions in making a loan neither
precludes recovery on the loan nor provides a defense, unless
specifically provided by statute, has been well established for well over
100 years.”
• Petterson v. Weinstock, 106 Conn. 436, 441, 138 A. 433, 435 (1927).
“At common law, the only defenses to an action of this character would
have been payment, discharge, release or satisfaction . . . or, if there had
never been a valid lien.”
“So, if the mortgagor is prevented by accident, mistake or fraud, from
fulfilling a condition of the mortgage, foreclosure cannot be had.” Id. at
442.
• D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942)
ENCYCLOPEDIAS: • 59 C.J.S. Mortgages §§531-538

“Defenses to foreclosure in general”
§ 531 In general
§ 532 Collateral rights and agreements
§ 533 Invalidity of mortgage
§ 534 Payment or discharge
§ 535 Waiver or estoppel
§ 536 Effect of possession of additional or cumulative security
“Limitations and laches”
§ 537 Limitations
§ 538 Laches
• 59 CJS Mortgages § 700 “Defenses”

Chapter 28. Defenses to foreclosure
§ 28.01. Introduction
Common law defenses
§ 28.02A. Payment
§ 28.02B. Duress
§ 28.02C. Release
§ 28.02D. Lack of consideration
§ 28.02E. Fraud in factum
§ 28.02F. Fraud
§ 28.02G. Negligent Misrepresentation (supp. only)
§ 28.03A. State law defenses
§ 28.03A1. Usury
§ 28.03B. Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA)
§ 28.03C. Connecticut Abusive Home Loan Practices Act
§ 28.03D. Defective mortgage instrument
§ 28.03E. Unlicensed lender
§ 28.03F. Connecticut Protection from Foreclosure Act
Foreclosure-45
§ 28.03G. Payoff letter
§ 28.03H. Loan to person only secondarily liable (C.G.S. § 49-
4a)
§ 28.03I. The Marshalling Statute−C.G.S. § 52-380i
§ 28.03J. Payment to contractor – re Mechanic’s lien foreclosure
§ 28.03K. Alteration
§ 28.03L. Conditions precedent under the loan documents
§ 28.03M. Failure to release mortgage (supp. only)
§ 28.03N. Sovereign Immunity (supp. only)
§ 28.03O. Statute of Limitations (supp. only)
§ 28.03P. Homestead Exemption (supp. only)
§ 28.04. Federal law defenses
§ 28.04A. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
§ 28.04B. Truth in Lending
§ 28.04C. RESPA
§ 28.05. Equitable defenses
§ 28.05A. The Clean Hands Doctrine
§ 28.05B. Meeting of the minds
§ 28.05C. Breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing
§ 28.05D. Unconscionability
§ 28.05E. Equitable estoppel
§ 28.05F. Equitable subrogation
§ 28.05G. Bad Faith Settlement Practices (supp. only)
§ 28.06. Counterclaims
§ 28.07. Jury Verdicts (supp. Only)
• Dennis P. Anderson, Denis R. Caron and Geoffrey K. Milne, Real
DESKBOOK: A REFERENCE MANUAL (3rd ed. 2008).
“Contested Matters,” pp. 418-419.
• 3 JOEL M. KAYE ET AL., CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK
ANNOTATED (1996).
Authors' Comment following Form 705.7
• JOHN RAO ET AL. FORECLOSURES: DEFENSES, WORKOUTS, AND
MORTGAGE SERVICING (2nd ed. 2007) with 2008 supplement.
Chapter 4. Legal Defenses to Home Foreclosures
§ 4.2. Introduction to the foreclosure process
§ 4.3. Procedural defenses
§ 4.4. Due Process Challenges to Foreclosure by Power of Sale
§ 4.5. Foreclosure of a Deed of Trust
§ 4.6. Enforceability of Due on Sale Contract Provisions
§ 4.7. Using Equitable Grounds to Prevent a Foreclosure
§ 4.8. State Moratorium on Foreclosures
§ 4.9. Protections from Foreclosure Available under the
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act
Chapter 5. Defending Foreclosures by Challenging Unfair Lending
Practices
§ 5.2. Market Incentives for Unfair Lending
§ 5.3. Common Types of Misconduct
§ 5.4. Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices (UDAP)
Statutes
Foreclosure-46
§ 5.5 The Truth in Lending Act
§ 5.6 The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act
(HOEPA)

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Foreclosure-47
Figure 6: Special Defense and Counterclaim to Foreclosure
Special Defense and Counterclaim to Foreclosure; Mistake,

Fraud or Accident in Failure to Make Payment
SPECIAL DEFENSES
1. The non payment of the installment of principal a n d interest described in the plaintiff's
complaint and the resulting default was due to mistake (or fraud or accident) in that (describe facts
which resulted in non payment ).
2. The defendant has offered t o and is now willing to pay the installment which is past due or is
willing to deposit it i n court for the use of the plaintiff.
COUNTERCLAIM
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the defendant's Special Defense are hereby made paragraphs 1 and 2 of this
counterclaim.
The defendant claims judgment
1. That foreclosure of the plaintiff's mortgage be denied.
2. That the defendant be permitted to pay the plaintiff the installment or deposit the same in court
for the plaintiff's use.
3. That upon such payment or deposit the defendant be relieved of any default which may have
occurred by reason of his failure to pay the installment when due and of any forfeiture which might
ensue by reason of such default.
(P.B.1963, Form 334; see 106 Conn. 436.)
Foreclosure-48
Table 3: LaSalle National Bank v. Freshfield Meadows, LLC
LaSalle National Bank v. Freshfield Meadows, LLC,

69 Conn. App. 824, 798 A.2d 445 (2002)
Implied covenant of “We recently stated that ‘special defenses and counterclaims alleging a breach of
good faith and fair an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing . . . are not equitable defenses to
dealing a mortgage foreclosure.’ New Haven Savings Bank v. LaPlace . . . 66 Conn. App.
[1,] 10; see also Southbridge Associates, LLC v. Garofalo . . . 53 Conn. App. [11,]
16-19. Even if a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing were
an equitable defense to a mortgage foreclosure, the clear language of the mortgage
and the note fails to support the defendant's claim that the plaintiff breached such
an implied covenant.” p. 835.
Unclean hands “The defendant next claims that the court improperly rendered summary
judgment despite the plaintiff's having unclean hands for refusing to accept future
payments. That claim is without merit.
‘The doctrine of unclean hands expresses the principle that where a plaintiff
seeks equitable relief, he must show that his conduct has been fair, equitable and
honest as to the particular controversy in issue. . . . Unless the plaintiff's conduct is
of such a character as to be condemned and pronounced wrongful by honest and
fair-minded people, the doctrine of unclean hands does not apply.’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Thompson v. Orcutt, 257 Conn. 301, 310, 777 A.2d 670
(2001).
As we stated in part IV A, the plaintiff did not have an obligation to renegotiate
the terms of the agreement upon the event of the defendant's default; nor did the
plaintiff have to accept payment after the indebtedness was accelerated due to the
default. Accordingly, because the plaintiff's conduct was not of ‘such a character
as to be condemned and pronounced wrongful by honest and fair-minded people,’;
id.; there is no genuine issue of material fact that the clean hands doctrine does not
apply.” pp. 835-836.
Common-law duty of “‘The common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing implicit in every contract
good faith and fair requires that neither party [will] do anything that will injure the right of the other
dealing to receive the benefits of the agreement. . . . Essentially it is a rule of construction
designed to fulfill the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties as they
presumably intended.’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Elm Street Builders,
Inc. v. Enterprise Park Condominium Assn., Inc., 63 Conn. App. 657, 665, 778
A.2d 237 (2001). As we discussed in part IV A, a reading of the unambiguous
language of the mortgage and note negates any claim that the plaintiff did not
comply with the common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing.” p. 836
Doctrine of “Because unconscionability is judged at the time of the making of the contract,
Unconscionability and the defendant's claim rests on alleged actions taken by the plaintiff subsequent
to the making of the contract, the doctrine of unconscionability is not applicable to
this case.”p. 837.
[Cont’d]
Foreclosure-49
LaSalle National Bank v. Fresfield Meadows, LLC [cont’d]
Doctrine of equitable “‘Our Supreme Court . . . stated, in the context of an equitable estoppel claim, that
estoppel [t]here are two essential elements to an estoppel: the party must do or say
something which is intended or calculated to induce another to believe in the
existence of certain facts and to act upon that belief; and the other party,
influenced thereby, must actually change his position or do something to his injury
which he otherwise would not have done. Estoppel rests on the misleading
conduct of one party to the prejudice of the other. In the absence of prejudice,
estoppel does not exist.’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) SKW Real Estate Ltd.
Partnership v. Mitsubishi Motor Sales of America, Inc., 56 Conn. App. 1, 8, 741
A.2d 4 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 931, 746 A.2d 793 (2000); see also 2 B.
Holden & J. Daly, Connecticut Evidence (2d Ed. 1988) § 60b, p. 365 & (Cum.
Sup. 2001) pp. 385-86.
In its appellate brief, the defendant has failed to state how it was misled by the
plaintiff's conduct. Without a showing that the defendant was misled, its argument
that the doctrine of equitable estoppel should have precluded the court from
rendering summary judgment has no basis.” p. 838.
Foreclosure-50
Table 4: Disclosure of Defense
Disclosure of Defense
DEFINITIONS:
“In order for foreclosure cases to move as swiftly as possible through our court
system, it is imperative that a defendant disclose any defenses to the mortgage
debt prior to the hearing. In the present case, the defendants' failure to disclose a
defense in a timely manner barred them from later contesting liability at the
foreclosure hearing. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly
refused to allow the defendants to present evidence of any defense to liability.”
Suffield Bank v. Berman, 25 Conn. App. 369, 373, 594 A.2d 493, 495 (1991).
COURT RULE: • Sec. 13-19. Disclosure of Defense

“In any action to foreclose or to discharge any mortgage or lien or to quiet title, or in
any action upon any written contract, in which there is an appearance by an attorney
for any defendant, the plaintiff may at any time file and serve in accordance with
Sections 10-12 through 10-17 a written demand that such attorney present to the
court, to become a part of the file in such case, a writing signed by the attorney
stating whether he or she has reason to believe and does believe that there exists a
bona fide defense to the plaintiff’s action and whether such defense will be made,
together with a general statement of the nature or substance of such defense. If the
defendant fails to disclose a defense within five days of the filing of such demand, or
within ten days of the filing of such demand in any action to foreclosure a mortgage,
the plaintiff may file a written motion that a default be entered against the defendant
by reason of the failure of the defendant to disclose a defense. If no disclosure of
defense has been filed, the judicial authority may order judgment upon default to be
entered for the plaintiff at the time the motion is heard or thereafter, provided that in
either event a separate motion for such judgment has been filed. The motions for
default and for judgment upon default may be served and filed simultaneously but
shall be separate motions….
COMMENTARY – 2010: The purpose of this amendment is to attempt to ensure that

owners of the equity, borrowers and guarantors who have not filed a disclosure of
defense and risk losing their interest in the property are given more time to protect
their interests.” CT PRACTICE BOOK § 13-19, 2010 ed., (Page 51PB
CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL July 14, 2009.)
FORMS: : • 3A JOEL M. KAYE AND WAYNE D. EFFRON, CONNECTICUT PRACTICE SERIES,

CIVIL PRACTICE FORMS (4th ed. 2004).
Demand for Disclosure of Defense – Form S-1, pp. 196-197
Motion for Default for Failure to Disclose Defense – Form S-2, pp. 197-198
Motion for Judgment upon Default for Failure to Disclose Defense – Form S-
2-A, p. 198
CASES: • First New Haven National Bank v. Rowan, 2 Conn. App. 114, 116, 476 A.2d
1079, 1081 (1984). “Since these defendants were not represented by an attorney,
the disclosure of defense was correctly expunged. Practice Book 236 [now 13-
19].”
Foreclosure-51
TEXTS AND TREATISES
• DENIS R. CARON & GEOFFREY K. MILNE, CONNECTICUT FORECLOSURES: AN ATTORNEY'S MANUAL OF

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (4th ed. 2004).
§ 5.01E. Disclosure of defense
• 1 WESLEY W. HORTON AND KIMBERLY A. KNOX, CONNECTICUT PRACTICE SERIES, CONNECTICUT
SUPERIOR COURT RULES (2009 edition).
Authors’ Comments following § 13-19
Foreclosure-52
Section 7:
Redemption in Foreclosure
SCOPE: • Bibliographic resources relating to the equity of redemption in

foreclosure.
DEFINITION: • “The equity of redemption gives the mortgagor the right to redeem the
legal title previously conveyed by performing whatever conditions are
specified in the mortgage, the most important of which is usually the
payment of money.” New Milford Savings Bank v. Jajer, 44 Conn. App.
588, 593, 691 A.2d 598, 601 (1997).
• Debt, Interest and costs: “In any action brought by a mortgagee of real
estate, or any person holding title under him, against the mortgagor, or
any person holding title to the estate under him, to obtain possession of
the estate by virtue of title derived by mortgage, a tender by the
defendant of the amount of the debt, with interest and the costs of the
suit, is a bar to its further prosecution.” Conn. Gen. Stats. § 49-23
(2009).
• Law Day (strict foreclosure): “Sec. 37. Section 49-15 of the general
statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof
(Effective October 1, 2009):
(a) (1) Any judgment foreclosing the title to real estate by strict
foreclosure may, at the discretion of the court rendering the [same]
judgment, upon the written motion of any person having an interest
[therein,] in the judgment and for cause shown, be opened and
modified, notwithstanding the limitation imposed by section 52-212a,
upon such terms as to costs as the court deems reasonable, [; but]
provided no such judgment shall be opened after the title has become
absolute in any encumbrancer except as provided in subdivision (2) of
this subsection.
(2) Any judgment foreclosing the title to real estate by strict foreclosure
may be opened after title has become absolute in any encumbrancer
upon agreement of each party to the foreclosure action who filed an
appearance in the action and any person who acquired an interest in the
real estate after title became absolute in any encumbrancer, provided
(A) such judgment may not be opened more than four months after the
date such judgment was entered or more than thirty days after title
became absolute in any encumbrancer, whichever is later, and (B) the
rights and interests of each party, regardless of whether the party filed
an appearance in the action, and any person who acquired an interest in
the real estate after title became absolute in any encumbrancer, are
restored to the status that existed on the date the judgment was entered.
(3) If a judgment is opened pursuant to this subsection, the person who
filed the written motion pursuant to subdivision (1) of this subsection
Foreclosure-53
shall record a certified copy of the court's order to open such judgment
on the land records in the town in which the real estate is situated.
(b) Upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition by a mortgagor under Title
11 of the United States Code, any judgment against the mortgagor
foreclosing the title to real estate by strict foreclosure shall be opened
automatically without action by any party or the court, provided, the
provisions of such judgment, other than the establishment of law days,
shall not be set aside under this subsection, [; but] provided no such
judgment shall be opened after the title has become absolute in any
encumbrancer or the mortgagee, or any person claiming under such
encumbrancer or mortgagee. The mortgagor shall file a copy of the
bankruptcy petition, or an affidavit setting forth the date the bankruptcy
petition was filed, with the clerk of the court in which the foreclosure
matter is pending. Upon the termination of the automatic stay authorized
pursuant to 11 USC 362, the mortgagor shall file with such clerk an
affidavit setting forth the date the stay was terminated.” PA 09-209,
section 37 (Deletions in brackets, additions in underlines).
• Termination of equity of redemption in foreclosure by sale: “The

court finds that in Connecticut, the law is that the rights of a mortgagor
[debtor] in mortgaged property are terminated by confirmation of a
foreclosure sale, and that subsequent to such a sale, any interest the
mortgagor may claim is in proceeds of the sale solely and not in the
property. The delivery of a deed is a ministerial act only and does not
constitute the event which terminates the equity of redemption. This
finding leads me to conclude that in the case at bar, the court can have
no jurisdiction over the property. When the foreclosure sale of June 7,
1980 was confirmed by superior court on July 7, 1980, at that moment,
Loubier’s equity of redemption in the property was terminated, and his
interest, if any, thereafter was in the proceeds of the sale. ” Matter of
Loubier, 6 B.R. 298 (1980).
• Time to Appeal: “A party may not effectively be deprived of the right
to appeal within the twenty days by having the law day pass within that
time, thereby causing a loss of the right of redemption. The defendant's
motion, therefore, cannot be deemed to be untimely filed under these
circumstances; she must be afforded due process in the form of a
hearing and a determination on the merits of her motion to open.”
Continental Capital Corp. v. Lazarte, 57 Conn. App. 271, 274, 749 A.2d
646, 648 (2000).

§ 49-19. Title to vest in encumbrancer paying debt and costs.
§ 49-20. Redemption by holder of encumbrance on part of
property foreclosed.
§ 49-21. Defendant to receive and file certificate of satisfaction
or certificates of judgment of strict foreclosure or
§ 49-23. Ejectment by mortgagee barred by tender of debt and
costs.
§ 49-25. Appraisal of property [Foreclosure by sale].
Foreclosure-54
COURT RULES: • “Unless otherwise ordered by the judicial authority at the time it
renders the judgment of strict foreclosure, the following provisions
shall be deemed to be part of every such judgment: (1) That, upon
the payment of all of the sums found by the judicial authority to be
due the plaintiff, including all costs as allowed by the judicial
authority and taxed by the clerk, by any defendant, after all
subsequent parties in interest have been foreclosed, the title to the
premises shall vest absolutely in the defendant making such
payment, subject to such unpaid encumbrances, if any, as precede
the interest of the redeeming defendant.” CT Practice Book 23-
17(b) (2010 ed.)

Homeowners, Connecticut Fair Housing Center, pp. 14, 40
FORMS: • Satisfaction Of Judgment, DENIS R. CARON & GEOFFREY K.

MILNE, CONNECTICUT FORECLOSURES: AN ATTORNEY'S MANUAL
OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (4th ed., 2004). Form 30, p. 723.
Redemption, p. 449.
§ 9.02. Redemption
§ 9.02A. In strict foreclosure
§ 9.02A1. Satisfaction of judgment
§ 9.02A2. Redemption by one cotenant
§ 9.02B. In foreclosure by sale
§ 9.02C. Effect of redemption on post-lis pendens attaching creditor

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Foreclosure-55
Table 5: Reinstatement
Reinstatement
Texts & Treatises

PROCEDURE (4th ed., 2004).
Chapter 1. Preliminary Considerations
§ 1.05B Reinstatement (see also 2008 supplement)
• DENNIS P. ANDERSON, DENIS R. CARON & GEOFFREY K. MILNE, Real

DESKBOOK: A REFERENCE MANUAL (3d ed., 2008)
Chapter 17. Real Property Foreclosure In Connecticut
Reinstatement, pp. 408-411
Foreclosure-56
Section 8:
Motion to Open
Judgment of Foreclosure
SCOPE: • Bibliographic resources relating to motion to open a judgment in either

strict foreclosure or foreclosure by sale in Connecticut.
DEFINITION: STRICT FORECLOSURE

• Opening of judgments of foreclosure: “(A) (1) ANY JUDGMENT
FORECLOSING THE TITLE TO REAL ESTATE BY STRICT FORECLOSURE MAY,
AT THE DISCRETION OF THE COURT RENDERING THE [SAME] JUDGMENT,
UPON THE WRITTEN MOTION OF ANY PERSON HAVING AN INTEREST
[THEREIN,] IN THE JUDGMENT AND FOR CAUSE SHOWN, BE OPENED AND
MODIFIED, NOTWITHSTANDING THE LIMITATION IMPOSED BY SECTION 52-
212A, UPON SUCH TERMS AS TO COSTS AS THE COURT DEEMS
REASONABLE, [; BUT] PROVIDED NO SUCH JUDGMENT SHALL BE OPENED
AFTER THE TITLE HAS BECOME ABSOLUTE IN ANY ENCUMBRANCER
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED IN SUBDIVISION (2) OF THIS SUBSECTION.
(2) ANY JUDGMENT FORECLOSING THE TITLE TO REAL ESTATE BY STRICT
FORECLOSURE MAY BE OPENED AFTER TITLE HAS BECOME ABSOLUTE IN
ANY ENCUMBRANCER UPON AGREEMENT OF EACH PARTY TO THE
FORECLOSURE ACTION WHO FILED AN APPEARANCE IN THE ACTION AND
ANY PERSON WHO ACQUIRED AN INTEREST IN THE REAL ESTATE AFTER
TITLE BECAME ABSOLUTE IN ANY ENCUMBRANCER, PROVIDED (A) SUCH
JUDGMENT MAY NOT BE OPENED MORE THAN FOUR MONTHS AFTER THE
DATE SUCH JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED OR MORE THAN THIRTY DAYS
AFTER TITLE BECAME ABSOLUTE IN ANY ENCUMBRANCER, WHICHEVER IS
LATER, AND (B) THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF EACH PARTY,
REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE PARTY FILED AN APPEARANCE IN THE
ACTION, AND ANY PERSON WHO ACQUIRED AN INTEREST IN THE REAL
ESTATE AFTER TITLE BECAME ABSOLUTE IN ANY ENCUMBRANCER, ARE
RESTORED TO THE STATUS THAT EXISTED ON THE DATE THE JUDGMENT
WAS ENTERED.
(3) IF A JUDGMENT IS OPENED PURSUANT TO THIS SUBSECTION, THE
PERSON WHO FILED THE WRITTEN MOTION PURSUANT TO SUBDIVISION (1)
OF THIS SUBSECTION SHALL RECORD A CERTIFIED COPY OF THE COURT'S
ORDER TO OPEN SUCH JUDGMENT ON THE LAND RECORDS IN THE TOWN IN
WHICH THE REAL ESTATE IS SITUATED.
(B) UPON THE FILING OF A BANKRUPTCY PETITION BY A MORTGAGOR
UNDER TITLE 11 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE, ANY JUDGMENT AGAINST
THE MORTGAGOR FORECLOSING THE TITLE TO REAL ESTATE BY STRICT
Foreclosure-57
FORECLOSURE SHALL BE OPENED AUTOMATICALLY WITHOUT ACTION BY
ANY PARTY OR THE COURT, PROVIDED, THE PROVISIONS OF SUCH
JUDGMENT, OTHER THAN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LAW DAYS, SHALL NOT
BE SET ASIDE UNDER THIS SUBSECTION, [; BUT] PROVIDED NO SUCH
JUDGMENT SHALL BE OPENED AFTER THE TITLE HAS BECOME ABSOLUTE
IN ANY ENCUMBRANCER OR THE MORTGAGEE, OR ANY PERSON CLAIMING
UNDER SUCH ENCUMBRANCER OR MORTGAGEE. THE MORTGAGOR SHALL
FILE A COPY OF THE BANKRUPTCY PETITION, OR AN AFFIDAVIT SETTING
FORTH THE DATE THE BANKRUPTCY PETITION WAS FILED, WITH THE
CLERK OF THE COURT IN WHICH THE FORECLOSURE MATTER IS PENDING.
UPON THE TERMINATION OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY AUTHORIZED
PURSUANT TO 11 USC 362, THE MORTGAGOR SHALL FILE WITH SUCH
CLERK AN AFFIDAVIT SETTING FORTH THE DATE THE STAY WAS
TERMINATED.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 49-15 (2009) as amended by PA 09-
209, section 37, effective 10/1/2009. Deletions in brackets, additions in
underlines.
• Purpose: “ Section 49-15 has the remedial purpose of providing relief to
property owners and their creditors when this can be done without
jeopardizing the security interest of the foreclosing mortgagee. It has
often been utilized in the trial courts to extend law days or to convert a
strict foreclosure to a foreclosure by sale when, at the time of the
decision upon the motion to open, it appeared that a modification of the
terms of the original judgment would produce a more equitable result.”
Farmers & Mechanics Savings Bank v. Sullivan, 216 Conn. 341, 352,
579 A.2d 1054, 1059 (1990).
• Conditions: (See PA 09-209, section 37, subsection b for
updated/current conditions.) “Unlike General Statutes § 52-212,
which provides for opening default judgments generally and requires a
defaulted defendant to show that he had a good defense that he was
prevented from making by ‘mistake, accident or other reasonable cause,’
§ 49-15 prescribes only four conditions for opening a judgment of strict
foreclosure: (1) that the motion be in writing; (2) that the movant be a
person having an interest in the property; (3) that the motion be acted
upon before an encumbrancer has acquired title; and (4) that ‘cause,’
obviously good cause, be shown for opening the judgment.” Ibid., 352-
353.
• Bankruptcy: “Upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition by a mortgagor
under Title 11 of the United States Code, any judgment against the
mortgagor foreclosing the title to real estate by strict foreclosure shall be
opened automatically without action by any party or the court, provided,
the provisions of such judgment, other than the establishment of law
days, shall not be set aside under this subsection; [but] provided no such
judgment shall be opened after the title has become absolute in any
encumbrancer or the mortgagee, or any person claiming under such
encumbrancer or mortgagee. The mortgagor shall file a copy of the
bankruptcy petition, or an affidavit setting forth the date the bankruptcy
petition was filed, with the clerk of the court in which the foreclosure
matter is pending. Upon the termination of the automatic stay authorized
pursuant to 11 USC 362, the mortgagor shall file with such clerk an
affidavit setting forth the date the stay was terminated.” Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 49-15(b) (2009) as amended by PA 09-209, section 37, effective
10/1/2009. (Deletions in brackets, additions in underlines).
FORECLOSURE BY SALE
Foreclosure-58
• “. . . .Upon motion of the owner of the equity of redemption, the court
shall appoint a second appraiser in its decree. If the plaintiff is the
purchaser at sale, or if the property is redeemed at any time prior to the
approval of the sale, or if for any reason the sale does not take place, the
expense of the sale and appraisal or appraisals shall be paid by the
plaintiff and be taxed with the costs of the case. If, after judgment has
been rendered, the amount found to be due and for which foreclosure is
decreed, together with the interest and the costs, is paid to the plaintiff
before the sale, all further proceedings in the suit shall be stayed.”
CONN. GEN. STAT. 49-25 (2009).
• Washington Trust Company v. Smith, 241 Conn. 734, 742, 699 A.2d 73,
78 (1997). “. . . the duration of rights of redemption. Under our cases,
such rights survive the auction of the foreclosed property and may be
exercised until such time as the judicial authority approves the
foreclosure sale.”
• “The court finds that in Connecticut, the law is that the rights of a
mortgagor [debtor] in mortgaged property are terminated by
confirmation of a foreclosure sale, and that subsequent to such a sale,
any interest the mortgagor may claim is in proceeds of the sale solely
and not in the property. The delivery of a deed is a ministerial act only
and does not constitute the event which terminates the equity of
redemption. ” In the Matter of Loubier, 6 B.R. 298, 303 (1980).
• “ ‘The sale is not absolute until confirmed. The order of confirmation
gives the judicial sanction of the court, and when made it relates back to
the time of the sale and cures all defects and irregularities except those
founded in want of jurisdiction or fraud. The court has power to confirm
the sale, although the terms of the decree may not have been strictly
followed.’ ” Raymond v. Gilman, 111 Conn. 605, 613-614, 151 A. 248,
251 (1930). Citing Nevada Nickel Syndicate v. National Nickel Co., 103
F. 391, 395.

§ 49-15. Opening of judgments of strict foreclosure. REPEALED
& SUBSTITUTED BY PA 09-209, section 37 (effective
10/1/2009).
§ 49-25. Appraisal of property. [Foreclosure by sale]
COURT RULES: • Sec. 17-4. Setting Aside or Opening Judgments

“(a) Unless otherwise provided by law and except in such cases in
which the court has continuing jurisdiction, any civil judgment or
decree rendered in the superior court may not be opened or set aside
unless a motion to open or set aside is filed within four months
succeeding the date on which notice was sent. The parties may waive
the provisions of this subsection or otherwise submit to the
jurisdiction of the court.
(b) Upon the filing of a motion to open or set aside a civil judgment,
except a judgment in a small claims or juvenile matter, the moving
party shall pay to the clerk the filing fee prescribed by statute unless
such fee has been waived by the judicial authority.
(c) The expedited procedures set forth in this subsection may be
followed with regard to a motion to open a judgment of foreclosure
filed by a plaintiff in which the filing fee has been paid, the motion
Foreclosure-59
has been filed prior to the vesting of title or the sale date, the plaintiff
states in the motion that the committee and appraisal fees have been
paid or will be paid within thirty days of court approval, and the
motion has been served on each party as provided by Sections 10 -12
through 10 -17 and with proof of service endorsed thereon.
(1) Parties shall have five days from the filing of the motion to file an
objection with the court. Unless otherwise ordered by the judicial
authority, the motion shall be heard not less than seven days after the
date the motion was filed. If the plaintiff states in the motion that all
appearing parties have received actual notice of the motion and are in
agreement with it, the judicial authority may grant the motion without
a hearing.
(2) When a motion to open judgment is filed pursuant to this
subsection, the court will retain jurisdiction over the action to award
committee fees and expenses and appraisal fees, if necessary. If
judgment is not entered or the case has not been withdrawn within
120 of the granting of the motion, the judicial authority shall
forthwith enter a judgment of dismissal….
COMMENTARY - 2010: The purpose of this amendment is to

provide an expedited mechanism to address motions to open
judgments in foreclosure cases, including a procedure that
allows such motions to be granted by the court without the
necessity of all parties coming to court.” (CT Practice Book 17-4,
(2010 ed.), (p. 55PB CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL July 14,
2009.)
• CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK (2009 ed.)

Chapter 61. Remedy by appeal
§ 61-11. Stay of execution in noncriminal cases
Chapter 63. Filing the appeal; Withdrawals
§ 63-1. Time to appeal
PAMPHLETS: • REPRESENTING YOURSELF IN FORECLOSURE: A GUIDE FOR CONNECTICUT

HOMEOWNERS, CT FAIR HOUSING CENTER, PP. 15-16 & 21-22
HTTP://CTFAIRHOUSING.ORG/WP/WP-CONTENT/UPLOADS/2010/01/CFHC-
FORECLOSUREMANUALR3.PDF
FORMS: • DENIS R. CARON & GEOFFREY K. MILNE, CONNECTICUT

Appendix of Unofficial Forms
Form 29. Motion to open judgment and extend law day, p. 722.
• 2 CONN. PRACTICE BOOK Form 707.5 (1997). Judgment of strict
foreclosure after opening of original judgment.
RECORDS & BRIEFS: • CONNECTICUT SUPREME COURT RECORDS & BRIEFS (February 1990).
Farmers & Mechanics Savings Bank v. Sullivan, 216 Conn. 341, 579
A.2d 1054 (1990).
Motion to open and modify judgment of strict foreclosure. Figure 7.
Motion to set new law day. Figure 8.
Foreclosure-60
CASES • Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation v. Burton, 81 Conn. App. 662,
667-668, 841 A.2d 248, 252 (2004). “Because there was no procedural
Prior to 10/1/09 error, as the defendant claims there was, which would have resulted in
an improper rendering of the judgment of strict foreclosure and the
(see PA 09-209, denial of the motion to open the judgment, we conclude that title vested
section 37) properly and absolutely in the plaintiff following the law day on October
15, 2002, because the automatic stay had expired. As a result, there is no
practical relief that this court can grant the defendant. We therefore
conclude that the defendant's claims are moot and dismiss this appeal.”
• Continental Capital Corp. v. Lazarte, 57 Conn. App. 271, 273-274, 749
A.2d 646, 648 (2000). “Law days in a strict foreclosure cannot run if a
motion to open is filed during the appeal period but is yet to be ruled on
. . . . Law days are ineffective while the appeal period is pending. To
conclude otherwise would be tantamount to depriving a party of judicial
review and, therefore, of due process of law.”
• Farmers & Mechanics Savings Bank v. Sullivan, 216 Conn. 341, 354,
579 A.2d 1054,1060 (1990). “Since a mortgage foreclosure is an
equitable proceeding, either a forfeiture or a windfall should be avoided
if possible….We recently found an abuse of such discretion in the
failure to order a foreclosure by sale when a sale would have resulted in
making approximately $10,000 available to a subsequent encumbrancer
and thus reduced the indebtedness of the owner.”
• Melillo v. Spiro, 187 Conn. 333, 333-334, 445 A.2d 921 (1982). “In this
action for strict foreclosure, the named defendant has appealed from the
trial court's denial of his second ‘motion to reopen judgment and extend
law day.’ By way of this motion, the named defendant sought to obtain a
six month extension in the law day set for March 1, 1980. A motion to
open a judgment of strict foreclosure is addressed to the discretion of the
trial court; see General Statutes §49-15; and ‘unless that discretion was
abused or was based upon some error in law, the denial of the motion
must stand.’”
• Carrington v. Muhlfeld, 122 Conn. 334, 337, 189 A. 184, 185-186
(1937). “The trial court evidently believed that under the circumstances
Muhlfeld would not be able to, or would not, pay the debt before the
expiration of the time he sought to have fixed for redemption and that
the right of the plaintiff to have the debt paid or secure title to the
property should not be postponed for some months beyond the time
fixed in the judgment. Whether or not it should open the judgment was a
matter resting within its discretion and, unless that discretion was
abused or was based upon some error in law, the denial of the motion
must stand.”
• Raymond v. Gilman, 111 Conn. 605, 613, 151 A. 248, 251 (1930).
“While we have indulged in discussion of the several objections raised
by the appellants, the effect of the judgment confirming the sale, being
final and unappealed from, is ample, of itself, to dispose of these
contentions.”
WEST KEY NUMBERS: • Mortgage # 496. Opening or vacating judgment or decree
TEXTS & TREATISES: • CONNECTICUT LAWYERS’ DESKBOOK: A REFERENCE

MANUAL, (3d ed. 2008).
Chapter 17, Real Property Foreclosure in Connecticut by Dennis P.
Foreclosure-61
Anderson, Denis R. Caron and Geoffrey K. Milne
Opening the Judgment Following Strict Foreclosure, pp. 444-
446
Effect of Passing of Owner’s Law Day on §49-15 motion, pp.
446-448
Following Foreclosure by Sale, pp. 448-449
Extension of Law Day, p. 449
• DENIS R. CARON & GEOFFREY K. MILNE, CONNECTICUT FORECLOSURES:
Chapter 9. Post Judgment Proceedings
§ 9.01 Opening the Judgment
§ 9.01A Following Strict Foreclosure
§ 9.01B Following Foreclosure by Sale (and 2008 supp.)
§ 9.01C Extension of Law Day
§ 9.01D Extension of Sale Date
§ 9.01E Adding Defendants
§ 9.01F Other Reasons

(203) 503-6828. Email.

Foreclosure-62
Table 6: Unreported Connecticut Cases: Motion to Open Judgment of Foreclosure,
prior to 10/1/09 (see PA 09-209, section 37)
Unreported Decisions
Bank United v. “The defendant moves to open the judgment of strict foreclosure on the ground
Blancato, No. CV-00- that the court should use its equitable powers to open the judgment because (1)
0553756 S (Aug. 14, the defendant never received notice of the foreclosure proceedings ‘[d]ue to the
2001), 2001 Ct. Sup. fact that defendant's mail has been consistently tampered with and his home
11186, 11187-11188, burglarized on numerous occasions,’ and (2) the defendant ‘was misled into
2001 WL 1043184, believing that he had until 2/15/2001 to file for bankruptcy protection.’
2001 Conn. Super. (Defendant's motion to reopen judgment, ¶ 3.)
LEXIS 2427. The court does not have the authority to open a judgment of strict foreclosure
after the law day has passed and title has vested. New Milford Saving Bank v.
Jager, 244 Conn. 251, 708 Conn. App. 1378 (1998). See also GMAC Mortgage
Corporation v. Barclay, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No.
5937115 (June 15, 2000, Stengel, J.) (judgment of strict foreclosure could not be
opened once title had vested); Bridgeport v. Voll, Superior Court, judicial
district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 318563 (March 30, 2000,
Mottolese, J.) (denying motion to open where title had vested months before
motion to open was filed.)
Title vested in the plaintiff on February 9, 2001. Further, the defendant did not
move to open the judgment within four months as required by General Statues
52-212a. The court does not have the authority to open the judgment. Therefore,
the motion to reopen is denied.”
(see PA 09-209, section 37)

First National Bank v. “The plaintiff has asked that the court vacate its prior orders opening and
Luecken, No. CV99 036 reopening the judgment and extending the law day on the grounds that the court
74 43 (Feb. 28, 2001), had no jurisdiction to do so pursuant to § 49-15 of the General Statutes. The
2001 Ct. Sup. 3132-ex, defendant argues that title does not vest until the close of business on the first
28 CLR 722, 2001 WL day court is open following the last day set for a defendant to redeem (the last
254324, 2001 Conn. law day). There is no rational support for this argument because there is no need
Super. LEXIS 578. for any party to avail itself of the court's power because by that time all law days
would have expired. The defendant reads into the word "after' in the last line of
§ 49-15 a period of time consisting of the first business day after the expiration
of the last law day. Such a construction is untenable and unwarranted.”
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AT 66 CONN. APP. 606 (2001), CERTIFICATION
FOR APPEAL DENIED AT 259 CONN. 915 (2002)
(see PA 09-209, section 37) [Cont’d]
Foreclosure-63
Washington Mutual “The bank claims that this court has no jurisdiction of the motion for the stay
Bank v. Turner, No. because, pursuant to § 49-15 of the General Statutes, the judgment, having
CV98 0263975 (Jul. 19, resulted in title vesting in the bank, may not be reopened. This is so, but the
1999), 1999 Ct. Sup. defendants are not asking for the judgment to be opened. Rather, they are asking
9424, 25 CLR 126, for an equitable stay.
2000 WL 1405596, Similarly, this is not a writ of audita querela, which is a remedy granted to
1999 Conn. Super. one against whom execution has issued, the enforcement of which would be
LEXIS 1919. contrary to justice because of (1) matters arising subsequent to the rendition of
the judgment; (2) previously existing defenses which were not available at the
time of the original judgment, or (3) fraud on the part of the judgment creditor,
or circumstances over which the judgment debtor had no control. Oakland
Heights Mobile Park, Inc. v. Simon, 40 Conn. App. 30, 32 (1995); see also
Anthony Julian RR Construction Co. v. Mary Ellen Drive Assoc., 50 Conn.
App. 289, 294 (1998); Ames v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 206 Conn. 16, 20-22
(1988). If there is no defense so affecting the judgment, and no fraud by the
creditor nor circumstances beyond the control of the defendant affecting the
judgment, then the writ may not be granted. Ellington Ridge Condominium
Ass'n. v. Surrells, CV97-63402 (J.D. Tolland, September 24, 1997) (Zarella, J.).
Even if a writ is not appropriate and the judgment may not be opened, the
court has equitable jurisdiction to grant a stay, if the circumstances are
appropriate. See, e.g., Pleasant Valley Mobile Home Park v. Harl, CV10-96-
12806 (May 14, 1997) (Purtill, J.). Such an inquiry involves a balancing of the
hardships between the parties. Cf. Fellows v. Martin, 217 Conn. 57, 63 n. 9
(1991).”

People's Bank v. “It is well-established that the ‘power of the court to vacate a judgment for
Lemdon, No. CV 97 fraud is regarded as inherent and independent of statutory provisions authorizing
034 0634 (Jan. 5, 1999), the opening of judgments; [and] hence judgments obtained by fraud may be
1999 Ct. Sup. 135, 23 attacked at any time.’ Kenworthy v. Kenworthy, 180 Conn. 129, 131, 429 A.2d
CLR 683, 1999 WL 837 (1980). ‘Our courts have made clear, however, that while fraud may be
27170, 1999 Conn. grounds for collateral attack on a judgment of strict foreclosure by an
Super. LEXIS 25. independent action in equity, fraud is not ground for opening a judgment after
title has become absolute in an encumbrancer.’ Merry-Go-Round Enterprises,
Inc. v. Molnar, supra, 10 Conn. App. [160,]162 n.1[521 A.2d 1065 (1987)]. See
also Hoey v. Investors' Mortgage & Guaranty Co., 118 Conn. 226, 230-31, 171
A. 438 (1934); City Savings Bank of Bridgeport v. Miko, 1 Conn. App. 30, 34
n.2, 467 A.2d 929 (1983). Thus, even when the encumbrancer's conduct is
‘outrageous and unconscionable’ it is ‘sad to relate, [that] the only relief that can
be obtained by the plaintiffs . . . is through the medium of an independent action
. . .’ East Hartford v. Miller, 27 Conn. Sup. 503, 507, 245 A.2d 396 (1968).
The motion to reopen the strict foreclosure must therefore be denied.”
Foreclosure-64
Figure 7: Motion to Open and Modify Judgment of Strict Foreclosure
NO. CV-87-0050014S
FARMERS & MECHANICS SAVINGS : SUPERIOR COURT
BANK : JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
VS. : MIDDLESEX
MARTIN F. SULLIVAN, ET AL. : AT MIDDLETOWN
: MARCH 11, 1988
MOTION TO OPEN AND MODIFY JUDGMENT

OF STRICT FORECLOSURE
The defendants MARTIN F. SULLIVAN and PATRICIA M.
SULLIVAN respectfully represent:
1. A judgment entered in the above first mortgage
foreclosure on January 19, 1988 (Higgins, J.).
2. The Court ordered a strict foreclosure rather than a
3. The appraised value of the subject property is
$170,000.00.
4. The-debt owed the foreclosing plaintiff bank was $80,663.91
as of January 19, 1988, the day judgment entered.
5. Accordingly, there is over $80,000.00 of equity in the
property.
6. The order of strict foreclosure will foreclose the
interests of the undersigned defendants unless they redeem.
Foreclosure-65
7. The undersigned defendants have not the means to redeem.
8. The Wirtzes claim an interest in the subject premises by
virtue of a bond for deed recorded on December 30, 1986, which was
earlier than the recording of the mortgage of the defendants on
February 19, 1987.
9. The Wirtzes' bond for deed requires them to pay $116,000.00
for the subject property.
10. If the Wirtzes redeem the property for a sum in the
vicinity of $82,000.00, they will own the property without paying
the $116,000.00 required by their bond for deed. They will enjoy a
windfall of between $34,000.00 and $88,000.00 at the expense of,
among others, the undersigned defendants.
11. The Wirtzes' recorded contract at best constitutes a
purchaser's lien and the court's actions in granting a contract
under litigation a law day outweighs the undersigned defendants the
due process of law to litigate the claimed contract right.
12. A foreclosure by sale protects the Wirtzes' legitimate
rights in the property, while a strict foreclosure gives them the
property at a bargain price without having to prove the validity of
their claim at all.
Foreclosure-66
14. Since a strict foreclosure wipes out all the rights of the
undersigned defendants while creating the possibility of a windfall
for the Wirtzes, and a sale foreclosure protects the rights of all
of the defendants, a strict foreclosure is inequitable under the
circumstances and a sale foreclosure is the only equitable judgment
under the circumstances.
15. This motion is filed with the required fee and
memorandum of law.
WHEREFORE, the undersigned defendants move the Court
to open the judgment and modify it to order a foreclosure
by sale.
DEFENDANTS
MARTIN F. SULLIVAN
and PATRICIA M.
SULLIVAN
BY_____________________
Name
Firm
Address
Telephone
Juris No.
Foreclosure-67
ORDER
The foregoing Motion having been heard, it is hereby ORDERED:
GRANTED/DENIED BY THE COURT
_____________ CLERK
CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed to

all counsel of record on March 11, 1988.
___________________________________
_
Name
Foreclosure-68
Figure 8: Motion to Set New Law Day
NO. CV-87-0050014S
FARMERS & MECHANICS SAVINGS : SUPERIOR COURT
BANK : JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
VS. : MIDDLESEX
MARTIN F. SULLIVAN, ET AL. : AT MIDDLETOWN
: MAY 19, 1988
MOTION TO SET NEW LAW DAYS
The defendants, MARTIN F. SULLIVAN and PATRICIA M. SULLIVAN respectfully represent:
1. A judgment entered in the above first mortgage foreclosure on January 19, 1988 (Higgins, J.).
2. The Court ordered a strict foreclosure rather than a foreclosure by sale.
3. On February 8, 1988 prior to the law days set in the initial judgment a Motion to open and
Modify Judgment of Strict Foreclosure was filed which suspended said law days.
4. Said motion has not been heard and the law days set thereunder are void as they fall within
the appeal period as determined by § 400 of the Rules of Appellate Practice.
5. The setting of new law days are required should this court deny the motion to open and
modify the judgment.
Foreclosure-69
WHEREFORE, the undersigned defendants move the Court to set new law days should the Motion to Open
and Modify Judgment of Strict Foreclosure be denied.
DEFENDANTS,
MARTIN F. SULLIVAN and PATRICIA M.
SULLIVAN
By______________________________________
Name
Firm
Address
Telephone number
Juris No.
ORDER
GRANTED/DENIED BY THE COURT
_________________________________ CLERK
Foreclosure-70
Section 9:
Appeals and Foreclosure
SCOPE: • Bibliographic resources relating to appeals of foreclosure judgments

in Connecticut.
STATUTES: • “In no event shall any determination issued by a mediator under this
program (Foreclosure Mediation Program) form the basis of an
appeal of any foreclosure judgment.” PA 09-209, section 35 (b)(6)
and (c)(6) (effective 7/1/2009)
• “Upon the trial of all matters of fact in any cause or action in the
Superior Court, whether to the court or jury, or before any judge
thereof when the jurisdiction of any action or proceeding is vested in
him, if either party is aggrieved by the decision of the court or judge
upon any question or questions of law arising in the trial, including
the denial of a motion to set aside a verdict, he may appeal to the
court having jurisdiction from the final judgment of the court or of
such judge, or from the decision of the court granting a motion to set
aside a verdict, except in small claims cases, which shall not be
appealable, and appeals as provided in sections 8-8 and 8-9.”
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-263 (2009)
COURT RULES: • CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK (2009)

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Chapter 60. General Provisions Relating to Appellate Rules and
Appellate Review
Chapter 61. Remedy by Appeal
Chapter 62. Chief Judge, Appellate Clerk and Docket: General
Administrative Matters
Chapter 63. Filing the Appeal; Withdrawals
Chapter 64. Procedure Concerning Memorandum of Decision
Chapter 66. Motion and Other Procedures
Chapter 67. Briefs
Chapter 68. Record
Chapter 69. Assignment of Cases for Argument
COURT CASES: • Time to Appeal: “A party may not effectively be deprived of the
right to appeal within the twenty days by having the law day pass
within that time, thereby causing a loss of the right of redemption.
The defendant's motion, therefore, cannot be deemed to be untimely
filed under these circumstances; she must be afforded due process in
the form of a hearing and a determination on the merits of her motion
to open.” Continental Capital Corp. v. Lazarte, 57 Conn. App. 271,
274, 749 A.2d 646, 648 (2000).
Foreclosure-71
Chapter 17. Appeals
§ 17.02. The Finality Test
§ 17.03. Strict Foreclosure
§ 17.04. Foreclosure by Sale
§ 17.04A Judgment of Foreclosure by Sale
§ 17.04B Approval of Sale
§ 17.04C Supplemental Judgment
§ 17.05. Appointment of Receiver of Rents
§ 17.05A Orders for Disbursement of Receiver’s Funds
§ 17.06. Motion to Reopen Judgment
§ 17.07. Appeal by Committee
§ 17.08 Appeals by Property Owner (supp. only)
§ 17.09 Motions to Strike (supp. only)
§ 17.10 Motions for Summary Judgment (supp. only)
§ 17.11 Executions of Ejectment (supp. only)
§ 17.12 Appeal of Order Granting Application for Protection
from Foreclosure (supp. only)
• CONNECTICUT LAWYERS’ DESKBOOK: A REFERENCE

MANUAL, (3d ed. 2008).
Chapter 17, Real Property Foreclosure in Connecticut by Dennis P.
Anderson, Denis R. Caron and Geoffrey K. Milne
Appeals, pp. 450-452
PAMPHLETS: • Handbook of Connecticut Appellate Procedure

http://www.jud.ct.gov/Publications/appellatehandbook.pdf
CURRENT COMPILER: Janet Zigadto, Connecticut Judicial Branch Law Library at

New Haven, 235 Church Street, New Haven, CT 06510.
(203) 503-6828. Email.
Foreclosure-72
Section 10:
Bankruptcy and Foreclosure
SCOPE: • Bibliographic resources relating to the effect of bankruptcy on an action

for foreclosure.
DEFINITION: • “Upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition by a mortgagor under Title 11

of the United States Code, any judgment against the mortgagor
foreclosing the title to real estate by strict foreclosure shall be opened
automatically without action by any party or the court, provided, the
provisions of such judgment, other than the establishment of law days,
shall not be set aside under this subsection; provided no such judgment
shall be opened after the title has become absolute in any encumbrancer
or the mortgagee, or any person claiming under such encumbrancer or
mortgagee. The mortgagor shall file a copy of the bankruptcy petition,
or an affidavit setting forth the date the bankruptcy petition was filed,
with the clerk of the court in which the foreclosure matter is pending.
Upon the termination of the automatic stay authorized pursuant to 11
USC 362, the mortgagor shall file with such clerk an affidavit setting
forth the date the stay was terminated.” PA 09-209, section 37,
subsection b, amending CONN. GEN. STAT. § 49-15(b) (2009).
• Automatic stay: “is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided
by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his
creditors. It stops all collection efforts, all harassment, and all
foreclosure actions.” H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 340-42
(1977), 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5787, 5963, 6296-97,
(emphasis added).
• “The filing of a petition under any chapter of the Bankruptcy Code
automatically stays all actions against the debtor, including foreclosure
actions. 11 U.S.C § 362 (a) (5).” Roy v. Beilin, No. 31 50 57 (Sep. 8,
1997), 1997 Ct. Sup. 9042, 1997 WL 583838.
• Stay continues: “The stay of any other act under subsection (a) of this
section continues until the earliest of—
(A) the time the case is closed
(B) the time the case is dismissed; or
(C) if the case is a case under chapter 7 of this title concerning an
individual or a case under chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 of this title,
the time a discharge is granted or denied.” 11 U.S.C § 362 (c)
(2) (2009).
STATUTES: • 11 UNITED STATES CODE (2009).

§ 362. Automatic stay
§ 522. Exemptions
Foreclosure-73
§ 541. Property of the estate
COURT RULES: • Claim for Statutory Exemption or Stay by Reason of Bankruptcy

“ When a claim for a statutory exemption or stay by reason of
bankruptcy is filed, it shall be accompanied by an affidavit setting
forth the date the bankruptcy petition was filed, the district of the
bankruptcy court in which it was filed and the address, the name of the
bankruptcy debtor and the number of the bankruptcy case.
When the stay has been relieved or terminated, the plaintiff, the
person filing the petition, or any other interested party shall file with
the court a copy of the relief or termination of stay issued by the
bankruptcy court.” CT Practice Book § 14-1 (2010 ed.)
COURT CASES • Roy v. Beilin, No. 31 50 57 (Sep. 8, 1997), 1997 Ct. Sup. 9042. “While
all property in which the debtors had an interest at the time the
bankruptcy petition was filed becomes property of the bankruptcy estate
under 11 U.S.C. § 541, any property that is exempted under 11 U.S.C. §
522 (b) is removed from the estate. In re Rodriguez, 9 B.R. 643 (S.D.
Florida 1981). Since the defendants contend that the subject property
was exempted, such property is no longer considered part of the
bankruptcy estate and the stay ‘continues only until the earliest of the
time when the case is closed or dismissed or the time when a discharge
is granted to the debtor.’ (Emphasis in original.) In re Rodriguez, supra,
9 B.R. 643-44 (granting mortgagee's motion to modify stay seeking to
continue its foreclosure action on the debtor's home even though the
property was exempted, on the ground that the stay had lifted since the
debtor had received a discharge).”
• Kilduff v. Adams, Inc., 219 Conn. 314, 321, 593 A.2d 478 (1991). “If
the plaintiffs had filed a bankruptcy petition prior to the redemption by
Adams, Inc., an automatic stay would have been imposed that would
have barred temporarily any further proceedings in the foreclosure
action, including the defendants' redemption. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a).”
• In Re Lohnes, 26 B.R. 593, 596 (Bkrtcy. D.Conn. 1983). “In the instant
proceeding, there is no question that the automatic stay was violated by
the foreclosure sale.”
TEXTS & TREATISES: • NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, FORECLOSURES: DEFENSES,

WORKOUTS, AND MORTGAGE SERVICING (2nd ed. 2007). [2008
Supplement].
Chapter 9. Using bankruptcy to prevent foreclosure
§ 9.2. Obtaining the Automatic Stay
§ 9.3. Curing Defaults on Home Loans
§ 9.4. Paying Secured Claims in Full
§ 9.5. Using Consumer Defenses in Response to a Motion for
Relief from Stay in Chapter 13
§ 9.6. Stripping Down Residential Mortgages to the Value of the
Collateral
§ 9.7. Avoiding Judicial Liens – Section 522(f)(1)
§ 9.8. Debtor’s Statement of Intention Regarding Secured
Property
§ 9.9 Sale of Property
§ 9.10 Impact of Bankruptcy on Later Foreclosure Prevention
Foreclosure-74
Efforts
PROCEDURE (4th ed. 2004). [2008 supplement].
Chapter 20. Bankruptcy
§ 20.2. The petition
§ 20.3. The proceeding
§ 20.4. The stay of the proceedings
§ 20.5. Relief from stay
§ 20.6. Chapter 11, Chapter 12, Chapter 13
§ 20.7. Selected problems
§ 20.08 “Waterfall” Analysis of the new Automatic Stay
Provisions (supp. only)
§ 37.48. Statutory Modifications – Bankruptcy
[1] Arrearages Protection
[2] The Automatic Bankruptcy Stay
[3] Sale of the property by the Bankruptcy Court
[4] Impact of a Reorganization Plan on the Mortgagee
[5] Famer Reorganizations
[6] Rents
• COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, Lawrence P. King, editor-in-chief,
15th rev. ed.
FORMS: • COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, Lawrence P. King, editor-in-chief,

15th rev. ed.
Volume 13, Pt. CS6 – Automatic Stay
CS6.22 Setting Aside Foreclosure Sale Made in Violation of
the Automatic Stay
CS6.22-2 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law;
Foreclosure Sale Violative of Automatic Stay
CS6.22-3 Judgment Setting Aside Foreclosure Sale in
Violation of Automatic Stay
• Claim for Statutory Stay by Reason of Bankruptcy, figure 9
• Notice of Relief from Stay from Bankruptcy Court, figure 10

(203) 503-6828. Email.

Foreclosure-75
Figure 9: Claim for Statutory Stay by Reason of Bankruptcy
Docket No. HHD-CV-08-5020417-S : SUPERIOR COURT
COUNTRYWIDE BANK, FSB : JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

HARTFORD
V. : AT HARTFORD
JOSE JIMENEZ A/K/A JUAN JOSE : NOVEMBER 07, 2008

JIMINEZ A/K/A JOSE JIMINEZ A/K/A
JUAN J. JIMENEZ A/K/A J. JOSE JIMINEZ,
ET AL.
CLAIM FOR STATUTORY STAY BY REASON OF BANKRUPTCY
The Plaintiff in the above captioned matter respectfully notifies this Court and the
other parties in this action that there is currently a proceeding pending in the United
States Bankruptcy Court, District of Hartford, Connecticut, as more fully set forth as
follows.
A Bankruptcy Petition under 11 U.S.C. Chapter 7 was filed by the Defendant Lissette
B. Jimenez, on october 29, 2008, under Case No. 08-22117. The bankruptcy debtor is the
Defendant in the above-entitled foreclosure case.
The filing of said bankruptcy Petition operates as an automatic stay against the assets
of the Defendant-debtor by virtue of Title 11 U.S.C. Section 362 in this proceeding.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
By ________________________
Plaintiff’s Attorney
Address
Juris No.
Foreclosure-76
CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed on November 7, 2008 to all
counsel and pro se parties of record, as follows:
____________________________
Foreclosure-77
Figure 10: Notice of Relief from Stay from Bankruptcy Court
DOCKET NO. HHD-CV-08-5025560-S : SUPERIOR COURT
COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS : JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF HARTFORD

SERVICING, L.P.
V. : AT HARTFORD
AHMED JILU, ET AL. : JUNE 05, 2009
NOTICE OF RELIEF FROM STAY FROM BANKRUPTCY COURT
The Plaintiff in the above-entitled action hereby gives Notice that on 6/4/09 the United
States Bankruptcy granted Plaintiff’s Relief from Stay, ending the automatic stay, which
went into effect upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition. A copy of the Order is attached
hereto.
By________________________
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

NO TESTIMONY REQUIRED
CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed, postage prepaid, by first
class mail on June 5, 2009 to the following:
No Appearances
______________________________
Foreclosure-78
Section 11:
Deficiency Judgment
SCOPE: • Bibliographic resources relating to the deficiency judgment after strict

foreclosure and foreclosure by sale.
DEFINITION: IN GENERAL
• “Historically, a foreclosure proceeding was an absolute bar to further
action on the mortgage debt. In M'Ewen v. Welles, 1 Root 202, 203
(1790), the Supreme Court enunciated that ‘[i]f [the mortgagee]
choose[s] to take the land and to make it his own absolutely, whereby
the mortgagor is totally divested of his equity of redemption, the debt is
thereby paid and discharged: And if it eventually proves insufficient to
raise the sum due, it is the mortgagee's own fault, and at his risk.’
Starting in 1835, a succession of statutes established a mortgagee's right
to a judgment for the deficiency when the value of the property proves
inadequate to satisfy the mortgage debt in full. ‘Since the entry of a
judgment of foreclosure precludes any further common law proceedings
upon the note, the legislatively created remedy of the deficiency
judgment is the only available means of satisfying a mortgage debt
when the security is inadequate to make the plaintiff whole.’ D. CARON,
CONNECTICUT FORECLOSURES (2d Ed.) § 9.05A, pp. 157-58; see
Eichman v. J & J Building Co., 216 Conn. 443, 448, 582 A.2d 182
(1990); First Bank v. Simpson, 199 Conn. 368, 370-72, 507 A.2d 997
(1986). The Simpson court articulated that ‘[u]nder General Statutes §
49-1, a judgment of strict foreclosure extinguishes all rights of the
foreclosing mortgagee on the underlying note, except those enforceable
through the use of the deficiency judgment procedure delineated in
General Statutes § 49-14.’” Factor v. Fallbrook, Inc., 25 Conn. App.
159, 161-162, 593 A.2d 520, 521-522 (1991).
STRICT FORECLOSURE
• Deficiency judgment: “At any time within thirty days after the time
limited for redemption has expired, any party to a mortgage foreclosure
may file a motion seeking a deficiency judgment.” CONN. GEN. STAT. §
49-14(a) (2009).
• Evidentiary hearing: “Such motion shall be placed on the short
calendar for an evidentiary hearing. Such hearing shall be held not less
than fifteen days following the filing of the motion, except as the court
may otherwise order. At such hearing the court shall hear the evidence,
establish a valuation for the mortgaged property and shall render
judgment for the plaintiff for the difference, if any, between such
valuation and the plaintiff's claim. The plaintiff in any further action
upon the debt, note or obligation, shall recover only the amount of such
judgment.” Ibid.
• State Referee: “Upon the motion of any party and for good cause
Foreclosure-79
shown, the court may refer such motion to a state referee, who shall
have and exercise the powers of the court with respect to trial, judgment
and appeal in such case.” CONN. GEN. STAT. § 49-14(b) (2009).
• “Any party to a mortgage foreclosure who has moved for an appraisal of
property for the purpose of obtaining a deficiency judgment, but has not
been granted a deficiency judgment, or has not received full satisfaction
of any deficiency judgment obtained subsequent to the filing of such
motion, may make a motion to the court for a deficiency judgment as set
forth in subsection (a) of this section. If such motion is made on or
before November 1, 1979, such moving party shall be deemed to have
complied with all of the requirements of subsection (a) of this section
and shall be entitled to the benefit of any deficiency judgment rendered
pursuant to said subsection (a).” CONN. GEN. STAT. § 49-14(c) (2009).
• Appeal: “Any appeal pending in the Supreme Court with regard to any
deficiency judgment or proceedings relating thereto shall be stayed until
a hearing is held pursuant to subsection (a) of this section. Any appellant
in such an appeal shall have the right for a period of thirty days after the
rendering of judgment pursuant to subsection (a) of this section to
amend his appeal. There shall be no stay of such an appeal if no motion
has been filed pursuant to this section on or before November 1, 1979.”
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 49-14(d) (2009)
FORECLOSURE BY SALE
• “If the proceeds of the sale are not sufficient to pay in full the amount
secured by any mortgage or lien thereby foreclosed, the deficiency shall
be determined, and thereupon judgment may be rendered in the cause
for the deficiency against any party liable to pay the same who is a party
to the cause and has been served with process or has appeared therein,
and all persons liable to pay the debt secured by the mortgage or lien
may be made parties; but all other proceedings for the collection of the
debt shall be stayed during the pendency of the foreclosure suit, and, if a
deficiency judgment is finally rendered therein, the other proceedings
shall forthwith abate.” CONN. GEN. STAT. § 49-28 (2009).
• “If the property has sold for less than the appraisal provided for in
section 49-25, no judgment shall be rendered in the suit or in any other
for the unpaid portion of the debt or debts of the party or parties upon
whose motion the sale was ordered, nor shall the same be collected by
any other means than from the proceeds of the sale until one-half of the
difference between the appraised value and the selling price has been
credited upon the debt or debts as of the date of sale; and, when there are
two or more debts to which it is to be applied, it shall be apportioned
between them.” Ibid.

§ 49-14. Deficiency judgment.
§ 49-28. When proceeds of sale will not pay in full.

• Motion for Deficiency Judgment, Form 25, p. 716
• Objection to Motion for Deficiency Judgment, Form 25B,
Foreclosure-80
p. 718
• Judgment for Deficiency after Strict Foreclosure, Form 26,
p. 719
• Motion for Deficiency Judgment, Form 27, p. 720
• Judgment for Deficiency after Foreclosure by Sale, Form
28, p. 721
• Dennis P. Anderson, Denis R. Caron & Geoffrey K. Milne, Real
DESKBOOK: A REFERENCE MANUAL, FORMS INDEX (2d ed. 2000).
Chapter XIV. “Motion for Deficiency Judgment”
(2004).
Motion for Deficiency Judgment – Strict Foreclosure, Form
706.1, pp. 630-635
Supplemental Judgment for Deficiency on Strict Foreclosure,
Form 707.4, pp. 671-673
CASES: • First Federal Bank, FSB v. Gallup, 51 Conn. App. 39, 42, 719 A.2d
923, 925 (1998). “A deficiency proceeding has a very limited
purpose. ‘In the hearing contemplated under § 49-14 to obtain a
deficiency judgment, the court, after hearing the party's appraisers,
determines the value of the property and calculates any deficiency.
This deficiency judgment procedure presumes the amount of the
debt as established by the foreclosure judgment and merely
provides for a hearing on the value of the property. First Bank v.
Simpson, 199 Conn. 368, 373, 507 A.2d 997 (1986).’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Ferrigno v. Cromwell Development
Associates, 44 Conn. App. 439, 444, 689 A.2d 1150 (1997), aff'd,
244 Conn. 189, 708 A.2d 1371 (1998). The deficiency hearing
concerns the fair market value of the subject property as of the date
title vests in the foreclosing plaintiff under § 49-14. Eichman v. J &
J Building Co., 216 Conn. 443, 449, 582 A.2d 182 (1990).”
• Factor v. Fallbrook, Inc., 25 Conn. App. 159, 163, 593 A.2d 520
(1991) “The trial court relied on Simpson [First Bank v. Simpson,
199 Conn. 368, 370-72, 507 A.2d 997 (1986)] in ruling that the §
49-1 bar applies only to a foreclosing mortgagee and that it does not
affect the rights of a subsequent encumbrancer to pursue its
remedies on the underlying obligation. Id., 377. This is a correct
statement of the law but the proposition is inapposite to the facts of
the present case.”
• Deficiency judgments after strict foreclosure, pp. 441-443
• Deficiency judgments after foreclosure by sale, pp. 443-444
• DENIS R. CARON AND GEOFFREY K. MILNE , CONNECTICUT
FORECLOSURES: AN ATTORNEY'S MANUAL OF PRACTICE AND
Chapter 9 Post Judgment Proceedings
§ 9.05. The deficiency judgment
§ 9.05A. After strict foreclosure
§ 9.05A(1) PJR to secure deficiency judgment.
Foreclosure-81
§ 9.05A(2) Time for filing motion for deficiency judgment.
§ 9.05A(3) Technical defects in motion for deficiency
judgment.
§ 9.05A(4) Substituting plaintiff prior to deficiency
judgment.
§ 9.05A(5) Time for filing defenses to deficiency judgment.
§ 9.05A(6) Section 49-1 as a defense.
§ 9.05A(7) Appraisals.
§ 9.05A(8) Blanket or multiple mortgages.
§ 9.05A1 Calculating the deficiency.
§ 9.05B After foreclosure by sale.
§ 9.05B1 Difference as to subsequent emcumbrancers.

(203) 503-6828. Email.

Foreclosure-82
Table 7: Defenses to a Deficiency
Defenses to a Deficiency Liability

• Dennis P. Anderson, Denis R. Caron and Geoffrey K. Milne, Real Property Foreclosure In
Connecticut, CONNECTICUT LAWYERS’ DESKBOOK: A REFERENCE MANUAL (3d ed. 2008), “Deficiency
Judgments after Strict Foreclosure,” pp. 441-443 and “Deficiency Judgments after Foreclosures by
Sale,” pp. 443-444.
Vignot v. Bank Of Mystic, 32

Conn. App. 309, 314, 628
A.2d 1339, 1342 (1993). • “While the hearing is a part of the foreclosure action, it is intended to
decide only the limited issue of the defendants' liability beyond the
amount secured by the property. We conclude that, because the
Kushmans failed to raise their defense in the course of the
foreclosure proceeding, the deficiency judgment is valid.”
• “A defendant in a foreclosure action, against whom there appears in

Bank of Stamford v. Alaimo, the complaint allegations sufficient to impose liability in personam
31 Conn. App. 1, 622 A.2d based on the mortgage note, must interpose a defense to such
1057 (1993). complaint in the same manner as though he were served in a separate
action to enforce such liability.” p. 6
• “Some defenses may be raised to a motion for deficiency judgment,
but not those that were or could have been raised in the foreclosure
hearing. Maresca v. DeMatteo, 6 Conn. App. 691, 506 A.2d 1096
(1986) (defense of usury) (timeliness of the filing of a motion for
deficiency judgment in a strict foreclosure); see also Baybank
Connecticut, N.A. v. Thumlert, 222 Conn. 784, 610 A.2d 658 (1992)
(the defense of laches as to the issue of timeliness in filing the
motion for deficiency in a foreclosure by sale proceeding under
General Statutes 49-28); Society for Savings v. Chestnut Estates,
Inc., 176 Conn. 563, 409 A.2d 1020 (1979) (the constitutionality of
49-14). The Court of Appeals of Maryland in McKenna v. Sachse,
225 Md. 595, 602, 171 A.2d 732 (Md. 1961), discussing which
defenses may be raised to a deficiency application, said ‘[t]he
mortgagor, when pressed for a deficiency decree, may raise any
`defense that could be made in an action at law on the covenants in
the mortgage,' . . . that is, any defense such as payment or release, or
any other defense to the claim which has arisen since confirmation of
the sale.’ (Citation omitted.) ”, pp. 9-10
Federal Deposit Ins. Co. v. • “We conclude that because a deficiency proceeding is not
Voll, 38 Conn. App. 198, 660 substantially similar to any common law claim triable to a jury in
A.2d 358 (1995). 1818, Guttman's claim that § 49-14 violates article first, § 19, fails.”
p. 210
• “Moreover, at no time during the foreclosure proceedings did
Guttman claim that he had been prejudiced by any of the delays. At a
minimum, Guttman could have filed an answer asserting the doctrine
of laches, or asserted the doctrine when New CBT moved that the
defendants disclose a defense, or objected to the calculation of debt
at the time the FDIC moved for a judgment of foreclosure. Defenses
Foreclosure-83
that could have been raised during the foreclosure proceedings may
not be raised at the deficiency hearing.” p. 211
Table 8: Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure
Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure

Texts & Treatises
• DENIS R. CARON & GEOFFREY K. MILNE, CONNECTICUT FORECLOSURES: AN ATTORNEY’S

MANUAL OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (4th ed. 2004).
Chapter 22. Connecticut deeds in lieu of foreclosure: Lender concerns and title issues
§ 22.02. Lender’s Concerns
§ 22.02A. Consideration
§ 22.02A1. Effect of Unaccepted Tender of Deed
§ 22.02B. “Clogging” the Equity of Redemption
§ 22.02C. Merger of Title
§ 22.02D. Deed Absolute
§ 22.02E. Bankruptcy
§ 22.02E1. Preference
§ 22.02E2. Fraudulent transfer
§ 22.02F. Effect of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
§ 22.02G. Conveyance Tax
§ 22.03. Title Issues
§ 22.03A. Lender Title Issues
§ 22.03A1. Consideration
§ 22.03A2. “Clogging”
§ 22.03A3. Merger
§ 22.04A. Deed Absolute
§ 22.03B. Insuring Good Faith Purchasers
§ 22.03B1. Common Law Issues
§ 22.03B2. Bankruptcy Issues
§ 22.04. Conclusion
§ 37.44. Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure
[1]—Introduction
[2]—Factors considered in determining whether an absolute conveyance is to be a mortgage
[3]—Effect of a decree that an absolute conveyance is a mortgage
[4]—Possible disadvantages of a deed in lieu of foreclosure
[5]—Procedures
§ 37.45. Foreclosure—Deed in lieu of foreclosure—Federal Income Tax Effects
[1]—In general
[2]—The Mortgagee Creditor
[3]—The Mortgagor Debtor
Foreclosure-84
Section 12:
Execution of Ejectment
SCOPE: • Bibliographic sources related to execution of ejectment as related to

mortgage foreclosures in Connecticut.
DEFINITION: • “In any action brought for the foreclosure of a mortgage or lien upon
land, or for any equitable relief in relation to land, the plaintiff may, in
his complaint, demand possession of the land, and the court may, if it
renders judgment in his favor and finds that he is entitled to the
possession of the land, issue execution of ejectment, commanding the
officer to eject the person or persons in possession of the land and to put
in possession thereof the plaintiff or the party to the foreclosure entitled
to the possession by the provisions of the decree of said court, provided
no execution shall issue against any person in possession who is not a
party to the action except a transferee or lienor who is bound by the
judgment by virtue of a lis pendens. The officer shall eject the person or
persons in possession and may remove such person’s possessions and
personal effects and set them out on the adjacent sidewalk, street or
highway.” CONN. GEN. STAT. § 49-22(a) (2009)
• Procedure: “Before any such removal, the state marshal charged with
executing upon the ejectment shall give the chief executive officer of the
town twenty-four hours notice of the ejectment, stating the date, time and
location of such ejectment as well as a general description, if known, of
the types and amount of property to be removed from the land. Before
giving such notice to the chief executive officer of the town, the state
marshal shall use reasonable efforts to locate and notify the person or
persons in possession of the date and time such ejectment is to take place
and of the possibility of a sale pursuant to subsection (c) of this section.
(c) Whenever a mortgage or lien upon land has been foreclosed and
execution of ejectment issued, and the possessions and personal effects of
the person in possession thereof are set out on the sidewalk, street or
highway, and are not immediately removed by such person, the chief
executive officer of the town shall remove and store the same. Such
removal and storage shall be at the expense of such person. If the
possessions and effects are not called for by such person and the expense
of the removal and storage is not paid to the chief executive officer within
fifteen days after such ejectment, the chief executive officer shall sell the
same at public auction, after using reasonable efforts to locate and notify
such person of the sale and after posting notice of the sale for one week
on the public signpost nearest to the place where the ejectment was made,
if any, or at some exterior place near the office of the town clerk. The
chief executive officer shall deliver to such person the net proceeds of the
sale, if any, after deducting a reasonable charge for removal and storage
of such possessions and effects. If such person does not demand the net
Foreclosure-85
proceeds with thirty days after the sale, the chief executive officer shall
turn over the net proceeds of the sale to the town treasury.” CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 49-22 (b) and (c) (2009)

§ 49-22. Execution of ejectment on
foreclosure judgment.
Disposition of property.
§ 49-22a. Execution of ejectment on foreclosure judgment on
mortgage guaranteed by Administrator of Veterans’
Affairs.
§ 49-23. Ejectment by mortgagee barred by tender of debt and
costs.
§ 49-26. Conveyance; title of purchaser.
COURT RULES: • “(b) Unless otherwise ordered by the judicial authority at the time it
renders the judgment of strict foreclosure, the following provisions shall
be deemed to be part of every such judgment:
(2) That the defendants, and all persons claiming possession of the
premises through any of the defendants under any conveyance or
instrument executed or recorded subsequent to the date of the lis pendens
or whose interest shall have been thereafter obtained by descent or
otherwise, deliver up possession of the premises to the plaintiff or the
defendant redeeming in accordance with this decree, with stay of
execution of ejectment in favor of the redeeming defendant until one day
after the time herein limited to redeem, and if all parties fail to redeem,
then until the day following the last assigned law day.” CT Practice Book
23-17 (2010 ed.)

Homeowners, Connecticut Fair Housing Center, pp. 16 & 29
FORMS: • JD-CV-30 Execution for Ejectment, Mortgage Foreclosure, Judicial

Branch Forms
• Sample Motion for Stay of Execution for Ejectment – Figure 11
• 3 JOEL M. KAYE AND WAYNE D. EFFRON, CONNECTICUT PRACTICE

SERIES, CIVIL PRACTICE FORMS (4th ed. 2004)
§ 707.7-A Execution of ejectment – mortgage foreclosure
Foreclosure-86
TEXTS & TREATISES: • DENIS R. CARON & GEOFFREY K. MILNE, CONNECTICUT FORECLOSURES:
§ 9.04 Execution of Ejectment.
§ 9.04A Veterans’ Administration Guaranteed Mortgages.
§ 9.04B Ejectment Barred.
• 3 JOEL M. KAYE AND WAYNE D. EFFRON, CONNECTICUT PRACTICE

SERIES, CIVIL PRACTICE FORMS (4th ed. 2004)
§ 707.7-A Execution of ejectment – mortgage foreclosure
Authors’ Commentary
• NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, FORECLOSURES: DEFENSES,

nd
WORKOUTS, AND MORTGAGE SERVICING (2 ed. 2007) with 2008
supplement.
§ 14.9 Former Owners in Possession of Property Following
Foreclosure
COMPILER: Janet Zigadto, Connecticut Judicial Branch Law Library at New

Haven, 235 Church Street, New Haven, CT 06510. (203) 503-
6828. Email.
Foreclosure-87
Figure 11: Sample Motion for Stay of Execution for Ejectment
Docket number: NNH-CV-10-012345-S : Superior Court
ABC Bank : Judicial District of New Haven
v. : at New Haven
Joseph Smith : January 4, 2010
Motion for Stay of Execution for Ejectment
1. The defendant was the owner of the property.

2. A judgment of foreclosure was granted on September 1, 2009.
3. An execution for ejectment has been served and the ejectment is scheduled for January 7,
2010 at 8:00 am.
4. The defendant needs more time because (state reason).
THE DEFENDANT
_____________________________
Joseph Smith
123 Main Street
Anytown, CT
(203) 123-4567
Foreclosure-88
ORDER
The foregoing motion having been heard, it is hereby ORDERED: GRANTED/DENIED.
THE COURT
BY: ____________________
Judge/Assistant Clerk
Certification
I hereby certify that a copy of the above was mailed on January 4, 2010 to all counsel
and pro se parties of record as follows:
Attorney for ABC Bank

123 Law Firm
456 Main Street
Anytown, USA
12345
_______________________
Joseph Smith
123 Main Street
Anytown, CT
(203) 123-4567
Foreclosure-89
Section 13:
Tenant Issues in Foreclosure
SCOPE: • Bibliographic resources relating to tenant issues in foreclosure.
STATUTES: • FEDERAL LAW:

SEC. 702. EFFECT OF FORECLOSURE ON PREEXISTING TENANCY.
(a) IN GENERAL.—In the case of any foreclosure on a federally-related mortgage
loan or on any dwelling or residential real property after the date of enactment
of this title, any immediate successor in interest in such property pursuant to the
foreclosure shall assume such interest subject to—
(1) the provision, by such successor in interest of a notice to vacate to any
bona fide tenant at least 90 days before the effective date of such
notice; and
(2) the rights of any bona fide tenant, as of the date of such notice of
foreclosure—
(A) under any bona fide lease entered into before the notice of
foreclosure to occupy the premises until the end of the
remaining term of the lease, except that a successor in interest
may terminate a lease effective on the date of sale of the unit
to a purchaser who will occupy the unit as a primary
residence, subject to the receipt by the tenant of the 90 day
notice under paragraph (1); or
(B) without a lease or with a lease terminable at will under State
law, subject to the receipt by the tenant of the 90 day notice
under subsection (1),
except that nothing under this section shall affect the requirements for
termination of any Federal- or State-subsidized tenancy or of any State or local
law that provides longer time periods or other additional protections for tenants.
(b) BONA FIDE LEASE OR TENANCY.—For purposes of this section,

a lease or tenancy shall be considered bona fide only if—
(1) the mortgagor or the child, spouse, or parent of the mortgagor under the
contract is not the tenant;
(2) the lease or tenancy was the result of an arms-length transaction; and
(3) the lease or tenancy requires the receipt of rent that is not substantially
less than fair market rent for the property or the unit’s rent is reduced or
subsidized due to a Federal, State, or local subsidy.
(c) DEFINITION.—For purposes of this section, the term ‘‘federally- related

mortgage loan’’ has the same meaning as in section 3 of the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 (12 U.S.C. 2602).” PROTECTING TENANTS
AT FORECLOSURE ACT, Title VII of Public Law (PL) 111-22, , 123 STAT. 1660
• STATE LAW:
“Protection of tenant in foreclosed property. (a) For purposes of this section:
Foreclosure-90
(1) "Bona fide tenant" means a tenant who (A) is not the mortgagor or owner
of the property, and (B) entered into the rental agreement in an arms-length
transaction; and
(2) "Premises", "rental agreement" and "tenant" have the same meanings as
provided in section 47a-1.
(b) Whenever a mortgage or lien of residential real property has been

foreclosed and there is a bona fide tenant in possession on the date absolute title
to the property vests in the mortgagee, lienholder or successor in interest, any
execution of ejectment issued pursuant to section 49-22 against such tenant shall
be stayed and no summary process action pursuant to chapter 832 or other
action to dispossess such tenant shall be commenced until (1) in the case of a
written rental agreement entered into more than sixty days before the
commencement of the foreclosure action, the expiration date contained in such
rental agreement or sixty days after the date absolute title vests in the
mortgagee, lienholder or successor in interest, whichever occurs first, or (2) in
the case of a rental agreement other than one described in subdivision (1) of this
subsection, thirty days after the date absolute title vests in the mortgagee,
lienholder or successor in interest, except that a summary process action or other
action to dispossess such tenant may be commenced prior to such date for a
reason set forth in section 47a-23 or 47a-31 other than for the reason that the
tenant no longer has the right or privilege to occupy the premises as a result of
such judgment of foreclosure.” CONN. GEN. STAT. 47a-20e (2009, effective
November 25, 2008)
“Offer of incentive to tenant in foreclosed property to vacate. Upon the

foreclosure of a mortgage or lien of residential real property, any money or
other valuable consideration offered by a mortgagee, lienholder or successor in
interest to a tenant in possession as an incentive to vacate the premises shall (1)
if there is evidence of the amount or value of the security deposit paid by the
tenant, be at least equal in amount or value to the security deposit and interest
that would be due such tenant pursuant to chapter 831 upon the termination of
the tenancy and be in addition to any such security deposit and interest, or (2) if
there is no evidence of the amount or value of the security deposit paid by the
tenant or no security deposit was paid by the tenant, be in the amount of two
months' rent or two thousand dollars, whichever is greater. No mortgagee,
lienholder or successor in interest may require a tenant in possession, as a
condition of the receipt of such money or other valuable consideration, to waive
or forfeit any rights or remedies such tenant may have under law against such
mortgagee, lienholder or successor in interest other than the right to bring an
action to reclaim the security deposit and interest that would be due such
tenant.” CONN. GEN. STAT. 47a-20f (2009, effective November 25, 2008)
PAMPHLETS: LEGAL ASSISTANCE RESOURCE CENTER:
Is Your Landlord Going Through Foreclosure?: What a Tenant Needs to Know

http://www.larcc.org/pamphlets/housing/is_landlord_foreclosing.pdf
NEW 2009 Federal Law Protects Tenants in Foreclosed Properties.

http://www.larcc.org/pamphlets/housing/foreclosure_act_of_2009.pdf
COMPILER: Janet Zigadto, Connecticut Judicial Branch Law Library at New
Haven, 235 Church Street, New Haven, CT 06510. (203) 503-
6828. Email.
Foreclosure-91

Connecticut Judicial Branch - Law Library, Foreclosure (Mortgage)

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Copyright © 2002-2010, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. All rights reserved.

Copyright © 2000-2010, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. All rights reserved.

These guides are provided with the understanding that they

View our other pathfinders at

Resources on the Internet

http://www.cga.ct.gov/2009/rpt/2009-R- Jillian L. Redding, State and Federal Mortgage

http://www.hud.gov/foreclosure/index.cfm U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR

http://www.larcc.org/pamphlets/housing/my_ho STATEWIDE LEGAL SERVICES, My House is Being

http://www.hud.gov/hopeforhomeowners/ Federal HOPE for Homeowners Program

http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports Making Home Affordable Plan:

Federal Home Affordable Modification Program

http://www.chfa.org Connecticut: CT HERO

SCOPE: • Bibliographic resources relating to strict foreclosures in Connecticut.

DEFINITION: • Connecticut is a title state: “Both by common-law rule and by statute, a

STATUTES: • CONN. GEN. STAT. (2009)

COURT RULES • Listing of Law Days

• (NEW) Sec. 17-33A. Motions for Judgment of Foreclosure

PAMPHLETS: • REPRESENTING YOURSELF IN FORECLOSURE: A GUIDE FOR CONNECTICUT

FORMS: • DENIS R. CARON & GEOFFREY K. MILNE, CONNECTICUT FORECLOSURES:

RECORDS & BRIEFS • Motion for Judgment of Strict Foreclosure, CONNECTICUT

WEST KEY NUMBERS: • Mortgages #384 Strict foreclosure

DIGESTS: • DOWLING’S DIGEST: Mortgages §§ 20-24

ENCYCLOPEDIAS: • 55 AM. JUR. 2d Mortgages (1996).

CURRENT Janet Zigadto, Connecticut Judicial Branch Law Library at

* Originally compiled by Lawrence Cheeseman, retired Connecticut Judicial Branch

CV-99-0498989S SUPERIOR COURT

WEBSTER BANK J.D. NEW BRITAIN

OAKLEY, LORNA T., ET AL DECEMBER 1, 2000

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF STRICT FORECLOSURE

Law Day 1: Lorna T. Oakley

PLAINTIFF, WEBSTER BANK

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

SCOPE: • Bibliographic resources relating to foreclosure by sale mainly in

DEFINITION: • "Connecticut provides for the foreclosure of a mortgage of real property

STATUTES: • CONN. GEN. STAT. (2009)

COURT RULES: • (NEW) Sec. 17-33A. Motions for Judgment of Foreclosure

PAMPHLETS: • Representing Yourself in Foreclosure: A Guide for Connecticut

FORMS: • 2 CONN. PRACTICE BOOK (1997).

RECORDS & BRIEFS • Motion for judgment of foreclosure by sale, CONNECTICUT

WEST KEY NUMBERS: • Mortgage

* Originally compiled by Lawrence Cheeseman, retired Connecticut Judicial Branch

Motion for Foreclosure by Sale

action, it be for a foreclosure by sale.

(P.B.1963, Form 362; see Gen. Stat., § 49-24.)

DOCKET NO. CV-96-0563243-S : SUPERIOR COURT

AMRESCO NEW ENGLAND II, L.P. : JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

DOMINIC COLOSSALE, ET AL. : SEPTEMBER 4, 1998

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE BY SALE

judgment of foreclosure is entered in this matter, that it be judgment of foreclosure by sale.

NO ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED,

BY THE COURT ( _________, J.)

SCOPE: • Bibliographic resources relating to the Connecticut’s Emergency

STATUTES: • CONN. GEN. STAT. (2009)

FORMS: • DENIS R. CARON & GEOFFREY K. MILNE, CONNECTICUT FORECLOSURES:

OLR RESEARCH • Jillian L. Redding, State and Federal Mortgage Assistance

TEXTS & TREATISES: • DENIS R. CARON & GEOFFREY K. MILNE, CONNECTICUT

* Originally compiled by Lawrence Cheeseman, retired Connecticut Judicial Branch

SCOPE: • Bibliographic resources relating to the Connecticut Judicial

DEFINITION: • “Definitions. As used in this section and sections 49-31l to

• “Foreclosure mediation program. Not later than July 1, 2008,

STATUTES: • CONN. GEN. STAT. (2009)

COURT RULES: • Sec. 3-3. Form and Signing of Appearance