Soviet Armored Division Late 1960s

v.1.0 June 7, 2006

Ravi Rikhye

Notes
Source lost, may have been NATO’s 15 Nations.
In the first part of the 1970s, the manpower increased to 11,000 and more tanks
and artillery were added to the division. For example, MR companies were added
to each tank battalion.
Divisions in the first echelon of an army (NATO corps) had breakthrough sectors
of 4 km. One hour of fire from 50-75 guns/kilometer was provided.
For the division, in conventional operations, the immediate objective was 30 km
distant; for regiments 8-15 km distant; for battalions 4 km distant.
1/3rd of the first echelon went to form the 2nd echelon; 1/9th of the first echelon
formed the reserve.
Because in a command economy material was cheap, and because due to the
quality of Soviet conscripts and the training system specialists were expensive,
little maintenance support existed. Formations were considered expendable. A
tank division might fight for 10 days and then be replaced by another division.
The system probably reached an extreme with the Syrian Army, which in its
1973 offensive against the Golan Heights abandoned hundreds of tanks that
could have been returned to running status with relatively minor repair such as
provided within a western or South Asian tank battalion. The US armored
division maintenance battalion was 4+ times larger than its Soviet counterpart;
and every battalion had extensive maintenance capability. A US tank battalion of
54 tanks, for example, had a maintenance platoon of over 80 men.
The Soviet organization permitted them to field formations that were mostly
teeth with little tail, instead of the other way around for western divisions.
Conversely, because it could stay in combat indefinitely, with equipment losses
systematically replaced during combat, a US armored division was the equal of 3
Soviet armored divisions. The Soviet model emphasized shock; the western
emphasized staying power.
Since the Soviets believed any war would quickly become nuclear, they also
believed that creating divisions designed to fight for months at a time was
wasteful of resources. They preferred to create a large number of second and
third echelon divisions that would replace destroyed formations.
A critical difference between Soviet doctrine and that of most other armies is the
Soviets reinforced success, not failure.

TOE

8415 troops (approximately 990 officers)

320 MBT
12 light tanks
190 APC
 157 in combat regiments
17 in supply
16 in support
36 122mm howitzers
1300 trucks

HQ
Motorized Infantry Defense Company

Reconnaissance Bn
Light Aircraft Group (5-6 helicopters)

Transport Bn
Supply Bn
Chemical Bn
Medical Bn
Engineer Bn
Maint Bn (200+ troops)
Signal Bn
Signal Artillery Bn

3 x tank regiments, each

95 MBT (2 with regt HQ)
21 APC
3 amphib

3 x tank battalions each

175 officers and men

Supply Squad
Light Aid Detachment
Medical Squad

31 MBT
2 APC
1ARV (armored recovery vehicle)
12 trucks
1 x Motorized Rifle Regiment
1 tank battalion
3 MR battalions each including
Supply Platoon
Medical Platoon
Repair Platoon

Division Artillery
Observation Bn
 1 Frog Bn (3 launchers)
1 Rocket Launcher Bn
1 x battery (8 x 240mm)
2 x batteries (each 8 x 200 mm)
1 ADA Bn
4 x ADA batteries (each 6 x 57mm)
3 x 122mm Bns, each with
2 x batteries (each 6 x 122mm)

The US armored division (6 tank, 5 mechanized battalions) had the same number of
MBTs, but had twice the manpower and ~ 2.5 times the number of trucks. Conversely, it
had twice as many artillery tubes, twice as many AD weapons, 15-20 times as many
helicopters, and the reconnaissance battalion was much larger and more powerful than
the Soviet equivalent. 1

1
These figures are from memory as the author no longer has access to his manuals and notes from the
period.