PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TEODORO TAMANI, accused-appellant.

Issue as to dismissal of the appeal.

After the appellant had filed his brief, the Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss the appeal
on the ground that the notice of appeal was 47 days late. Appellant's counsel de oficio did not
oppose the motion. Action thereon was "deferred until this case is considered on the merits".
(Resolution of March 7, 1967). The motion to dismiss is reiterated in appellee's brief.

The lower court's decision convicting defendant Tamani was promulgated on February 14,
1963. A copy thereof was served on his counsel on February 25, 1963.

On March 1, 1963 he filed a motion for reconsideration. It was denied. A copy of the
order of denial was served by registered mail on July 13, 1963 on defendant's counsel
through his wife. He had eleven days or up to July 24, 1963 within which to appeal (if the
reglementary 15 day period for appeal should be computed from the date of notification and not
from the date of promulgation of the decision). He filed his notice of appeal only on September
10, 1963 or forty eight days from July 24th.

Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken.—An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from. This period for perfecting an
appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new trial is filed until notice of the order
overruling the motion shall have been served upon the defendant or his attorney.

Stat Con:
1) The word "must" in section 6 is synonymous with "ought". It connotes compulsion or
mandatoriness. The clear terms of section 6 leave no room for doubt that the appeal should be
effected within fifteen days from the promulgation of the judgment.

The counsel for appellant Tamani must have so understood that import of section 6 (which is
confirmed by the practice in trial courts) as evinced by the fact that his motion for
reconsideration was filed on March 1st, which was the fifteenth or last day of the reglementary
period.

The assumption that the 15-day period should be counted from February 25, 1963, when a copy
of the decision was allegedly served on appellant's counsel by registered mail, is not well-taken.

2) The word "promulgation" in section 6 should be construed as referring to "judgment" while the
word "notice" should be construed as referring to "order". That construction is sanctioned by the
rule of reddendo singula singulis: "referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression
to its appropriate object", or "let each be put in its proper place, that is, the words should be
taken distributively".

Therefore, when the order denying appellant's motion for reconsideration was served by
registered mail on July 13th on appellant's counsel, he had only one (1) day within which to file
his notice of appeal and not eleven days. That construction is an application by analogy or in a
suppletory character of the rule governing appeals in civil cases which is embodied in section 3,
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

Appellant Tamani's notice of appeal, filed on September 10, 1963, was fifty-eight days late. A
rigoristic application of section 6 justifies the dismissal of his appeal, as prayed for by the
prosecution.

However, considering that appellants right to seek a review of his case was lost by reason of his
counsel's inadvertence and considering further that the briefs have been submitted, the Court
has resolved to review the record to obviate any possible miscarriage of justice
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION),
FERDINAND E. MARCOS (REPRESENTED BY HIS ESTATE/HEIRS: IMELDA R. MARCOS, MARIA IMELDA
MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. AND IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA) AND IMELDA ROMUALDEZ
MARCOS, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner Republic filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan, pursuant to RA 1379 in
relation to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

In said case, petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million (now estimated
to be more than US$658 million inclusive of interest) deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth.

The petition sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded the
Marcos couple’s salaries, other lawful income as well as income from legitimately acquired property. The
treasury notes are frozen at the Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, by
virtue of the freeze order issued by the PCGG

Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements 1993
were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global
settlement of the assets of the Marcos family. Subsequently, respondent Marcos children filed a motion for
the approval of said agreements and for the enforcement thereof.

The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify, collate, cause the inventory of and
distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos family under the conditions contained therein.
The aforementioned General Agreement specified in one of its premises or “whereas clauses” the fact that
petitioner “obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on December 21, 1990, that the Three
Hundred Fifty-six Million U.S. dollars (US$356 million) belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines
provided certain conditionalities are met x x x.” The said decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court
affirmed the decision of Zurich District Attorney Peter Consandey, granting petitioner’s request for legal
assistance. Consandey declared the various deposits in the name of the enumerated foundations to be of
illegal provenance and ordered that they be frozen to await the final verdict in favor of the parties entitled
to restitution.

Petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment pertaining to the forfeiture of the US$356 million.
Petitioner contended that, after the pre-trial conference, certain facts were established, warranting a
summary judgment on the funds sought to be forfeited.

Sandiganbayan granted petitioner’s motion for summary judgment. It declared the Swiss deposits which
were transferred to and now deposited in escrow at the Philippine National Bank in the total aggregate
value equivalent to US$627,608,544.95 as of August 31, 2000 together with the increments thereof
forfeited in favor of the State

Sandiganbayan reversed its September 19, 2000 decision, thus denying petitioner’s motion for summary
judgment: The evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not prove that the money in the
Swiss Banks belonged to the Marcos spouses because no legal proof exists in the record as to the
ownership by the Marcoses of the funds in escrow from the Swiss Banks.

The basis for the forfeiture in favor of the government cannot be deemed to have been established and
our judgment thereon, perforce, must also have been without basis.

Issue:

Whether or not respondents raised any genuine issue of fact which would either justify or negate summary
judgment;

Ruling:
Respondent Marcoses failed to raise any genuine issue of fact in their pleadings. Thus, on motion of
petitioner Republic, summary judgment should take place as a matter of right.

A summary judgment is described as a judgment which a court may render before trial but after both
parties have pleaded. It is granted upon motion of a party for an expeditious settlement of the case, it
appearing from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits that there are no important questions
or issues of fact posed and, therefore, the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A motion
for summary judgment is premised on the assumption that the issues presented need not be tried either
because these are patently devoid of substance or that there is no genuine issue as to any pertinent fact.
The theory of summary judgment is that, although an answer may on its face appear to tender issues
requiring trial, if it is established by affidavits, depositions or admissions that those issues are not genuine
but fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering summary judgment for
petitioner
Marcoses merely made general denials of the allegations against them without stating facts admissible in
evidence at the hearing, thereby failing to raise any genuine issues of fact.

Under these circumstances, a trial would have served no purpose at all and would have been totally
unnecessary, thus justifying a summary judgment on the petition for forfeiture. There were no opposing
affidavits to contradict the sworn declarations of the witnesses of petitioner Republic, leading to the
inescapable conclusion that the matters raised in the Marcoses’ answer were false.

A genuine issue is an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an
issue which is fictitious and contrived, set up in bad faith or patently lacking in substance so as not to
constitute a genuine issue for trial.

Respondents’ defenses of “lack of knowledge for lack of privity” or “(inability to) recall because it
happened a long time ago” or, on the part of Mrs. Marcos, that “the funds were lawfully acquired” are fully
insufficient to tender genuine issues. Respondent Marcoses’ defenses were a sham and evidently
calibrated to compound and confuse the issues.

On the part of Mrs. Marcos, she claimed that the funds were lawfully acquired. However, she failed to
particularly state the ultimate facts surrounding the lawful manner or mode of acquisition of the subject
funds. Simply put, she merely stated in her answer with the other respondents that the funds were
“lawfully acquired” without detailing how exactly these funds were supposedly acquired legally by them.

Stat Con:
Negative pregnant - a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading
responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was
directed at
- a form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication
of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial
facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words
of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, has been held that the qualifying
circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.

The allegation of petitioner Republic in paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture stated:

23. The following presentation very clearly and overwhelmingly show in detail how both
respondents clandestinely stashed away the country’s wealth to Switzerland and hid the same under
layers upon layers of foundations and other corporate entities to prevent its detection. Through their
dummies/nominees, fronts or agents who formed those foundations or corporate entities, they opened and
maintained numerous bank accounts. But due to the difficulty if not the impossibility of detecting and
documenting all those secret accounts as well as the enormity of the deposits therein hidden, the following
presentation is confined to five identified accounts groups, with balances amounting to about $356-M with
a reservation for the filing of a supplemental or separate forfeiture complaint should the need arise.

Respondents’ lame denial of the aforesaid allegation was:

22. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23 insofar as it alleges that Respondents

clandestinely stashed the country’s wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of
foundations and corporate entities for being false, the truth being that Respondents’ aforesaid properties
were lawfully acquired.

The material allegations in paragraph 23 of the said petition were not specifically denied by respondents in
paragraph 22 of their answer. The denial contained in paragraph 22 of the answer was focused on the
averment in paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture that “Respondents clandestinely stashed the
country’s wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of foundations and corporate
entities.” Paragraph 22 of the respondents’ answer was thus a denial pregnant with admissions of the
following substantial facts:
(1) the Swiss bank deposits existed and
(2) that the estimated sum thereof was US$356 million as of December, 1990

Therefore, the allegations in the petition for forfeiture on the existence of the Swiss bank deposits in the
sum of about US$356 million, not having been specifically denied by respondents in their answer, were
deemed admitted by them

The form of denial adopted by respondents must be availed of with sincerity and in good faith, and
certainly not for the purpose of confusing the adverse party as to what allegations of the petition are really
being challenged; nor should it be made for the purpose of delay. In the instant case, the Marcoses did not
only present unsubstantiated assertions but in truth attempted to mislead and deceive this Court by
presenting an obviously contrived defense.
Simply put, a profession of ignorance about a fact which is patently and necessarily within the pleader’s
knowledge or means of knowing is as ineffective as no denial at all. Respondents’ ineffective denial thus
failed to properly tender an issue and the averments contained in the petition for forfeiture were deemed
judicially admitted by them.

(a) Respondent Marcoses argue that, by agreeing to proceed to trial during the pre-trial conference,
petitioner "waived" its right to summary judgment. [petitioner moved for summary judgment after pre-trial
and before its scheduled date for presentation of evidence]

Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Rule 35

Section 1. Summary judgment for claimant. - A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto
has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in
his favor upon all or any part thereof.

Section 2. Summary judgment for defending party. - A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-
claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting affidavits,
depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof

Petitioner Republic could validly move for summary judgment any time after the respondents’ answer was
filed or, for that matter, at any subsequent stage of the litigation. The fact that petitioner agreed to
proceed to trial did not in any way prevent it from moving for summary judgment, as indeed no genuine
issue of fact was ever validly raised by respondent Marcoses.

(b) Respondents further allege that the motion for summary judgment was based on respondents' answer
and other documents that had long been in the records of the case. Thus, by the time the motion was filed
on March 10, 2000, estoppel by laches had already set in against petitioner.

Stat Con:
Estoppel by laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable or unexplained length of time to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, warranting a presumption that
the person has abandoned his right or declined to assert it. In effect, therefore, the principle of laches is
one of estoppel because "it prevents people who have slept on their rights from prejudicing the rights of
third parties who have placed reliance on the inaction of the original parties and their successors-in-
interest".

Petitioner Republic initially filed its motion for summary judgment on October 18, 1996. The motion was
denied because of the pending compromise agreement between the Marcoses and petitioner. But during
the pre-trial conference, the Marcoses denied ownership of the Swiss funds, prompting petitioner to file
another motion for summary judgment now under consideration by this Court. It was the subsequent
events that transpired after the answer was filed, therefore, which prevented petitioner from filing the
questioned motion. It was definitely not because of neglect or inaction that petitioner filed the (second)
motion for summary judgment years after respondents' answer to the petition for forfeiture.

In invoking the doctrine of estoppel by laches, respondents must show not only unjustified inaction but
also that some unfair injury to them might result unless the action is barred.

This, respondents failed to bear out. In fact, during the pre-trial conference, the Marcoses disclaimed
ownership of the Swiss deposits. Not being the owners, as they claimed, respondents did not have any
vested right or interest which could be adversely affected by petitioner's alleged inaction.

But even assuming for the sake of argument that laches had already set in, the doctrine of estoppel or
laches does not apply when the government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental rights. Nor can
estoppel validate an act that contravenes law or public policy.

As a final point, it must be emphasized that laches is not a mere question of time but is principally a
question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. Equity
demands that petitioner Republic should not be barred from pursuing the people's case against the
Marcoses.

Petition is GRANTED. The Swiss deposits which were transferred to and are now deposited in escrow at the
Philippine National Bank in the estimated aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002,
plus interest, are hereby forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
ALU-TUCP, Representing Members: ALAN BARINQUE, with 13 others, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION (NSC), respondents.

Facts:

Petitioners plead that they had been employed by respondent NSC in connection with its Five Year
Expansion Program (FAYEP I & II) for varying lengths of time when they were separated from NSC's
service.

Petitioners filed separate complaints for unfair labor practice, regularization and monetary benefits with
the NLRC, Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City.

Labor Arbiter in a Decision dated 7 June 1991, declared petitioners "regular project employees who shall
continue their employment as such for as long as such [project] activity exists," but entitled to the salary
of a regular employee pursuant to the provisions in the collective bargaining agreement. It also ordered
payment of salary differentials.

Both appealed. Petitioners argued that they were regular, not project, employees. Private respondent, on
the other hand, claimed that petitioners are project employees as they were employed to undertake a
specific project — NSC's Five Year Expansion Program (FAYEP I & II).

NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's holding that petitioners were project employees since they were hired to
perform work in a specific undertaking — the Five Years Expansion Program, the completion of which had
been determined at the time of their engagement and which operation was not directly related to the
business of steel manufacturing. However, set aside the award to petitioners of the same benefits enjoyed
by regular employees for lack of legal and factual basis.

Article 280 of the Labor Code:

Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment — The provisions of the written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, and employment shall be deemed to
be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for
a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time
of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature
and the employment is for the duration of the season.

An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided,
That, any employee who has rendered at least 1 year service, whether such service is continuous or
broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and
his employment shall continue while such actually exists.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners are properly characterized as "project employees" rather than "regular
employees" of NSC.

Ruling:

"Project" could refer to one or the other of at least two (2) distinguishable types of activities:
 1.) A particular job or undertaking that is within the regular or usual business of the employer
company, but which is distinct and separate, and identifiable as such, from the other undertakings of the
company.
Such job or undertaking begins and ends at determined or determinable times.

eg. A particular construction job or project of a construction company. A construction company

ordinarily carries out two or more discrete identifiable construction projects: e.g., a twenty-five- storey
hotel in Makati; a residential condominium building in Baguio City; and a domestic air terminal in Iloilo City.
Employees who are hired for the carrying out of one of these separate projects, the scope and duration of
which has been determined and made known to the employees at the time of employment, are properly
treated as "project employees," and their services may be lawfully terminated at completion of the project.

2.) A particular job or undertaking that is not within the regular business of the corporation. Such a
job or undertaking must also be identifiably separate and distinct from the ordinary or regular business
operations of the employer. The job or undertaking also begins and ends at determined or determinable
times. The case at bar presents what appears to our mind as a typical example of this kind of "project."

The Five Year Expansion Program that the NSC undertook had a number of component projects. Instead of
contracting out to an outside or independent contractor the tasks of constructing the buildings with related
civil and electrical works that would house the new machinery and equipment, the installation of the newly
acquired mill or plant machinery and equipment and the commissioning of such machinery and
equipment, NSC opted to execute and carry out its Five Year Expansion Projects "in house," as it were, by
administration.

The carrying out of the Five Year Expansion Program (or more precisely, each of its component projects)
constitutes a distinct undertaking identifiable from the ordinary business and activity of NSC. Each
component project, of course, begins and ends at specified times, which had already been determined by
the time petitioners were engaged.

The particular component projects embraced in the Five Year Expansion Program, to which petitioners
were assigned, were distinguishable from the regular or ordinary business of NSC which, of course, is the
production or making and marketing of steel products. There is no showing that they (13 complainants)
were engaged to perform work-related activities to the business of respondent which is steel-making,
there is no logical and legal sense of applying to them the proviso under the second paragraph of Article
280 of the Labor Code

Petitioners next claim that their service to NSC of more than six (6) years should qualify them as regular
employees. We believe this claim is without legal basis. The simple fact that the employment of petitioners
as project employees had gone beyond one (1) year, does not detract from, or legally dissolve, their status
as project employees. The second paragraph of Article 280 of the Labor Code, quoted above, providing
that an employee who has served for at least one (1) year, shall be considered a regular employee, relates
to casual employees, not to project employees

Stat Con: The proviso in the second paragraph of Article 280 relates only to casual employees and is not
applicable to those who fall within the definition of said Article's first paragraph, i.e., project employees.
The familiar grammatical rule is that a proviso is to be construed with reference to the immediately
preceding part of the provision to which it is attached, and not to other sections thereof, unless the clear
legislative intent is to restrict or qualify not only the phrase immediately preceding the proviso but also
earlier provisions of the statute or even the statute itself as a whole. No such intent is observable in Article
280 of the Labor Code.

DISMISSED for lack of merit.

BRENT SCHOOL, INC., and REV. GABRIEL DIMACHE, petitioners, vs. RONALDO ZAMORA, the
Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, Office of the President, and DOROTEO R. ALEGRE,
respondents.

Facts:
Employment contract of which Doroteo R. Alegre as athletic director by Brent School, Inc.
 At a yearly compensation of P20,000.00.
 Fixed a specific term for its existence, five (5) years [from July 18, 1971, the date of
execution of the agreement, to July 17, 1976]

On April 20, 1976 Bent School sent Alegre a copy of a report advising of the termination of his
services effective on July 16, 1976. The stated ground for the termination was "completion of
contract, expiration of the definite period of employment."

Alegre accepted the amount of P3, 177.71, and signed a receipt therefor containing the phrase,
"in full payment of services for the period May 16, to July 17, 1976 as full payment of contract."

Alegre protested the announced termination of his employment. He argued that although his
contract did stipulate that the same would terminate on July 17, 1976, since his services were
necessary and desirable in the usual business of his employer, and his employment had lasted
for five years, he had acquired the status of a regular employee and could not be removed
except for valid cause.

Regional Director: considered Brent School's report as an application for clearance to

terminate employment (not a report of termination), and accepting the recommendation of the
Labor Conciliator, refused to give such clearance and instead required the reinstatement of
Alegre, as a "permanent employee," to his former position without loss of seniority rights and
with full back wages. The Director pronounced "the ground relied upon by the respondent (Brent)
in terminating the services of the complainant (Alegre) . . . (as) not sanctioned by P.D. 442,
(Labor Code)" and, quite oddly, as prohibited by Circular No. 8, series of 1969, of the Bureau of
Private Schools.

Brent School filed a motion for reconsideration. The Regional Director denied the motion and
forwarded the case to the Secretary of Labor for review. The latter sustained the Regional
Director. Brent appealed to the Office of the President. Again it was rebuffed. That Office
dismissed its appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the Labor Secretary's decision, ruling that
Alegre was a permanent employee who could not be dismissed except for just cause, and
expiration of the employment contract was not one of the just causes provided in the Labor Code
for termination of services.
Issue: Whether or not the provisions of the Labor Code, as amended, have anathematized "fixed
period employment" or employment for a term

Ruling: NO.

On one hand, there is the gradual and progressive elimination of references to term or fixed-
period employment in the Labor Code, and the specific statement of the rule that—

. . . Regular and Casual Employment.— The provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be
deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer except where the
employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of
which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or
service to be employed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the
season.

An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph:

provided, that, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such
service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the
activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such actually exists.

On the other hand, the Civil Code, which has always recognized, and continues to recognize,
the validity and propriety of contracts and obligations with a fixed or definite period, and
imposes no restraints on the freedom of the parties to fix the duration of a contract, whatever its
object, be it specie, goods or services, except the general admonition against stipulations
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Under the Civil Code,
therefore, and as a general proposition, fixed-term employment contracts are not limited, as
they are under the present Labor Code, to those by nature seasonal or for specific projects with
pre-determined dates of completion; they also include those to which the parties by free choice
have assigned a specific date of termination.

There can of course be no quarrel with the proposition that where from the circumstances it is
apparent that periods have been imposed to preclude acquisition of tenurial security by the
employee, they should be struck down or disregarded as contrary to public policy, morals, etc.
But where no such intent to circumvent the law is shown, or stated otherwise, where the reason
for the law does not exist, e.g., where it is indeed the employee himself who insists upon a
period or where the nature of the engagement is such that, without being seasonal or for a
specific project, a definite date of termination is a sine qua non, would an agreement fixing a
period be essentially evil or illicit, therefore anathema? Would such an agreement come within
the scope of Article 280 which admittedly was enacted "to prevent the circumvention of the right
of the employee to be secured in . . . (his) employment?"

*As it is evident from even only the three examples already given that Article 280 of the Labor
Code, under a narrow and literal interpretation, not only fails to exhaust the gamut of
employment contracts to which the lack of a fixed period would be an anomaly, but would also
appear to restrict, without reasonable distinctions, the right of an employee to freely stipulate
with his employer the duration of his engagement, it logically follows that such a literal
interpretation should be eschewed or avoided. The law must be given a reasonable
interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its application. Outlawing the whole concept of term
employment and subverting to boot the principle of freedom of contract to remedy the evil of
employer's using it as a means to prevent their employees from obtaining security of tenure is
like cutting off the nose to spite the face or, more relevantly, curing a headache by lopping off
the head.

Statutory Construction: It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a

valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure,
and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all
objectionable mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences.

Nothing is better settled than that courts are not to give words a meaning which would lead to
absurd or unreasonable consequences. That s a principle that does back to In re Allen decided oil
October 27, 1903, where it was held that a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be
unjust or lead to absurd results. That is a strong argument against its adoption. The words of
Justice Laurel are particularly apt. Thus: "The fact that the construction placed upon the statute
by the appellants would lead to an absurdity is another argument for rejecting it. . . ."

. . . We have, here, then a case where the true intent of the law is clear that calls for the
application of the cardinal rule of statutory construction that such intent of spirit must prevail
over the letter thereof, for whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, since
adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions and would defeat
the plain and vital purpose of the statute.

*Accordingly, and since the entire purpose behind the development of legislation culminating
in the present Article 280 of the Labor Code clearly appears to have been, as already
observed, to prevent circumvention of the employee's right to be secure in his tenure, the
clause in said article indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written or oral
agreements conflicting with the concept of regular employment as defined therein
should be construed to refer to the substantive evil that the Code itself has singled
out: agreements entered into precisely to circumvent security of tenure. It should have
no application to instances where a fixed period of employment was agreed upon knowingly and
voluntarily by the parties, without any force, duress or improper pressure being brought to bear
upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent, or where it
satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee dealt with each other on more or less
equal terms with no moral dominance whatever being exercised by the former over the latter.
Unless thus limited in its purview, the law would be made to apply to purposes other than those
explicitly stated by its framers; it thus becomes pointless and arbitrary, unjust in its effects and
apt to lead to absurd and unintended consequences.

Respondent Alegre's employment was terminated upon the expiration of his last contract with
Brent School on July 16, 1976 without the necessity of any notice. The advance written advice
given the Department of Labor with copy to said petitioner was a mere reminder of the
impending expiration of his contract, not a letter of termination, nor an application for clearance
to terminate which needed the approval of the Department of Labor to make the termination of
his services effective. In any case, such clearance should properly have been given, not denied.

WHEREFORE, the public respondent's Decision complained of is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent Alegre's contract of employment with Brent School having lawfully terminated with
and by reason of the expiration of the agreed term of period thereof, he is declared not entitled
to reinstatement and the other relief awarded and confirmed on appeal in the proceedings
below.

AMADORA petitioners vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS,

VICTOR LLUCH SERGIO P. DLMASO JR., CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON
thru his parents and natural guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN, and ROLANDO
VALENCIA, thru his guardian, A. FRANCISCO ALONSO, respondents.

Facts:

April 13, 1972, while they were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his
expectations and his life as well. The victim was only seventeen years old.

Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Additionally, the herein
petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the
dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through
their respective parents.

Court of First Instance of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs in the sum of
P294,984.00, representing death compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation,
funeral expenses, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

On appeal to the CA reversed the decision and all the defendants were completely absolved.
CA found that Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was
not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. It also held that the
students were not in the custody of the school at the time of the incident as the semester had
already ended, that there was no clear identification of the fatal gun and that in any event the
defendant, had exercised the necessary diligence in preventing the injury.

Petitioner’s contention: Their son was in the school to show his physics experiment as a
prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was then under the custody of the private respondents.

Private respondents: Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school only for the purpose of submitting
his physics report and that he was no longer in their custody because the semester had already
ended.

There is also the question of the identity of the gun used which the petitioners consider
important because of an earlier incident which they claim underscores the negligence of the
school and at least one of the private respondents.

Issue: Whether or not Article 2180 covers even establishments which are technically not
schools of arts and trades, and, if so, when the offending student is supposed to be "in its
custody."

Ruling:
The provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic.

Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the
tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the
first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and
trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general
rule.

Stat Con: In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except
where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be
answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula singulis "teachers" should apply to the
words "pupils and students" and "heads of establishments of arts and trades" to the word
"apprentices."

Article 2180:

“Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody.”

There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the non-academic schools
insofar as torts committed by their students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from
the teacher over the students under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of the
school where he is teaching.

The teacher certainly should not be able to excuse himself by simply showing that he is teaching
in an academic school where, on the other hand, the head would be held liable if the school were
non-academic.

There does not seem to be any plausible reason for relaxing that vigilance simply because the
school is academic in nature and for increasing such vigilance where the school is non-academic.
Notably, the injury subject of liability is caused by the student and not by the school itself nor is
it a result of the operations of the school or its equipment. The injury contemplated may be
caused by any student regardless of the school where he is registered.

*These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher of the academic school is to be held
answerable for the torts committed by his students, why is it the head of the school only who is
held liable where the injury is caused in a school of arts and trades? And in the case of the
academic or non- technical school, why not apply the rule also to the head thereof instead of
imposing the liability only on the teacher?

The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically the head of the school of
arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of the
academic school.

It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present in view of the expansion of the
schools of arts and trades, the consequent increase in their enrollment, and the corresponding
diminution of the direct and personal contract of their heads with the students. Article 2180,
however, remains unchanged. In its present state, the provision must be interpreted by the
Court according to its clear and original mandate until the legislature, taking into account the
charges in the situation subject to be regulated, sees fit to enact the necessary amendment.

(2) The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the responsibility of the teacher or
the head of the school of arts and trades over the students. Is such responsibility co-
extensive with the period when the student is actually undergoing studies during the school
term, as contended by the respondents and impliedly admitted by the petitioners themselves?

It is clear that while the custody requirement does not mean that the student must be boarding
with the school authorities, it does signify that the student should be within the control and
under the influence of the school authorities at the time of the occurrence of the injury. This does
not necessarily mean that such, custody be co-terminous with the semester, beginning with the
start of classes and ending upon the close thereof, and excluding the time before or after such
period, such as the period of registration, and in the case of graduating students, the period
before the commencement exercises. In the view of the Court, the student is in the custody
of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school
and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already
ended.

As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a
legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the
enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student
privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues. Even if the
student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company of his
classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still
within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of
Article 2180.

During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-in-charge who must answer for his
students' torts, in practically the same way that the parents are responsible for the child when he
is in their custody. The teacher-in-charge is the one designated by the dean, principal, or other
administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils in the specific classes or sections
to which they are assigned. It is not necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher be
physically present and in a position to prevent it. Custody does not connote immediate and
actual physical control but refers more to the influence exerted on the child and the
discipline instilled in him as a result of such influence. Thus, for the injuries caused by the
student, the teacher and not the parent shag be held responsible if the tort was committed
within the premises of the school at any time when its authority could be validly exercised over
him.

*In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is supposed to fall
directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades and not on the school itself. If
at all, the school, whatever its nature, may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even
of the head thereof under the general principle of respondeat superior, but then it may exculpate
itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias. [diligence
of a good father of a family]

Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or the head of the school of arts and
trades directly held to answer for the tort committed by the student as it would otherwise be
unfair to hold him directly answerable for the damage caused by his students as long as they are
in the school premises and presumably under his influence. In this respect, the Court is disposed
not to expect from the teacher the same measure of responsibility imposed on the parent for
their influence over the child is not equal in degree. The parent can instill more discipline on the
child than the teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher for the
tort committed by the child.

It should be observed that the teacher will be held liable not only when he is acting in loco
parentis for the law does not require that the offending student be of minority age. Unlike the
parent, who will be liable only if his child is still a minor, the teacher is held answerable by the
law for the act of the student under him regardless of the student's age

And if it is also considered that under the article in question, the teacher or the head of the
school of arts and trades is responsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice even
if he is already of age — and therefore less tractable than the minor — then there should all the
more be justification to require from the school authorities less accountability as long as they can
prove reasonable diligence in preventing the injury. After all, if the parent himself is no longer
liable for the student's acts because he has reached majority age and so is no longer under the
former's control, there is then all the more reason for leniency in assessing the teacher's
responsibility for the acts of the student.

Conclusions:

1. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the custody of the authorities of
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that the fourth year classes had formally ended. It
was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics experiment or merely to
submit his physics report for what is important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. As
previously observed, even the mere savoring of the company of his friends in the premises of the
school is a legitimate purpose that would have also brought him in the custody of the school
authorities.

2. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none
of them was the teacher-in-charge as previously defined. Each of them was exercising only a
general authority over the student body and not the direct control and influence exerted by the
teacher placed in charge of particular classes or sections and thus immediately involved in its
discipline. The evidence of the parties does not disclose who the teacher-in-charge of the
offending student was. The mere fact that Alfredo Amadora had gone to school that day in
connection with his physics report did not necessarily make the physics teacher, respondent
Celestino Dicon, the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's killer.

3. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no showing that Dicon was
negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or that he had waived observance of the rules and
regulations of the school or condoned their non-observance. His absence when the tragedy
happened cannot be considered against him because he was not supposed or required to report
to school on that day. And while it is true that the offending student was still in the custody of
the teacher-in-charge even if the latter was physically absent when the tort was committed, it
has not been established that it was caused by his laxness in enforcing discipline upon the
student. On the contrary, the private respondents have proved that they had exercised due
diligence, through the enforcement of the school regulations, in maintaining that discipline.

4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys who should be held liable
especially in view of the unrefuted evidence that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun
from one of the students and returned the same later to him without taking disciplinary action or
reporting the matter to higher authorities. While this was clearly negligence on his part, for which
he deserves sanctions from the school, it does not necessarily link him to the shooting of Amador
as it has not been shown that he confiscated and returned pistol was the gun that killed the
petitioners' son.

5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly
liable under the article because only the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is
made responsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice. Neither can it be held to
answer for the tort committed by any of the other private respondents for none of them has been
found to have been charged with the custody of the offending student or has been remiss in the
discharge of his duties in connection with such custody.

In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and in the light of the
principles herein announced that none of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by
Pablito Damon on Alfredo Amadora that resulted in the latter's death at the auditorium of the
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972. While we deeply sympathize with the
petitioners over the loss of their son under the tragic circumstances here related, we
nevertheless are unable to extend them the material relief they seek, as a balm to their grief,
under the law they have invoked.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

ALEJANDRO ROQUERO, petitioner,vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondent

Facts:
Roquero with Rene Pabayo, were ground equipment mechanics of respondent PAL. From the
evidence on record, it appears that Roquero and Pabayo were caught red-handed possessing and
using Methampethamine Hydrochloride or shabu in a raid conducted by PAL security officers and
NARCOM personnel.

Roquero and Pabayo were subjected to a physical examination where the results showed that
they were positive of drugs. They were also brought to the security office of PAL where they
executed written confessions without the benefit of counsel

Roquero and Pabayo assailed their arrest and asserted that they were instigated by PAL to take
the drugs [by a certain Jojie Alipato who was introduced to them by Joseph Ocul, Manager of the
Airport Maintenance Division of PAL]. They argued that Alipato was not really a trainee of PAL but
was placed in the premises to instigate the commission of the crime. They based their argument
on the fact that Alipato was not arrested. Moreover, Alipato has no record of employment with
PAL.

July 14, 1994, Roquero and Pabayo were dismissed by PAL. Thus, they filed a case for illegal
dismissal.

Labor Arbiter's decision: the dismissal of Roquero and Pabayo was upheld. Found both parties at
fault — PAL for applying means to entice the complainants into committing the infraction and the
complainants for giving in to the temptation and eventually indulging in the prohibited activity.
Labor Arbiter awarded separation pay and attorney's fees to the complainants.

NLRC decision: found PAL guilty of instigation. Ordered reinstatement to their former positions
but without backwages. Complainants filed a motion for a writ of execution of the order of
reinstatement. The Labor Arbiter granted the motion but PAL refused to execute the said order
on the ground that they have filed a Petition for Review before this Court.

Court of Appeals decision: reversed the decision of the NLRC and reinstated the decision of the
Labor Arbiter insofar as it upheld the dismissal of Roquero.

Issue:
Whether or not the instigated employee shall be solely responsible for an action arising from the
instigation perpetrated by the employer

Ruling:
Petitioner Roquero is guilty of serious misconduct for possessing and using shabu. He violated
Chapter 2, Article VII, section 4 of the PAL Code of Discipline which states:

"Any employee who, while on company premises or on duty, takes or is under the influence of
prohibited or controlled drugs, or hallucinogenic substances or narcotics shall be dismissed."

Basic Term:
Serious misconduct is "the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere
error in judgment."
For serious misconduct to warrant the dismissal of an employee, it
(1) must be serious;
(2) must relate to the performance of the employee's duty; and
(3) must show that the employee has become unit to continue working for the employer

It is of public knowledge that drugs can damage the mental faculties of the user. Roquero was
tasked with the repair and maintenance of PAL's airplanes. He cannot discharge that duty if he is
a drug user. His failure to do his job can mean great loss of lives and properties. Hence, even if
he was instigated to take drugs he has no right to be reinstated to his position. He took the drugs
fully knowing that he was on duty and more so that it is prohibited by company rules. Instigation
is only a defense against criminal liability. It cannot be used as a shield against dismissal from
employment especially when the position involves the safety of human lives.

Petitioner cannot complain he was denied procedural due process. PAL complied with the
twin-notice requirement before dismissing the petitioner. The twin-notice rule requires (1) the
notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is
being sought along with the opportunity for the employee to air his side, and (2) the subsequent
notice of the employer's decision to dismiss him. Both were given by respondent PAL.
II.

The order of reinstatement is immediately executory. The unjustified refusal of the employer to
reinstate a dismissed employee entitles him to payment of his salaries effective from the time
the employer failed to reinstate him despite the issuance of a writ of execution. Unless there is a
restraining order issued, it is ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter to implement the order of
reinstatement. In the case at bar, no restraining order was granted. Thus, it was mandatory on
PAL to actually reinstate Roquero or reinstate him in the payroll. Having failed to do so, PAL must
pay Roquero the salary he is entitled to, as if he was reinstated, from the time of the decision of
the NLRC until the finality of the decision of this Court.

Even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on
the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the
period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. On the other hand, if the employee has been
reinstated during the appeal period and such reinstatement order is reversed with finality, the
employee is not required to reimburse whatever salary he received for he is entitled to such,
more so if he actually rendered services during the period.

Dismissal of Roquero is AFFIRMED. PAL is ordered to pay the wages to which Roquero is entitled
from the time the reinstatement order was issued until the finality of this decision.
MEDARDO M. PADUA, complainant, vs. IRENEO S. PAZ, in his capacity as Sheriff IV, Branch 31,
Regional Trial Court, San Pedro, Laguna, respondent

Facts:
Padua charges respondent Ireneo S. Paz, Sheriff IV of Branch 31 of the Regional Trial Court, San
Pedro, Laguna, with grave misconduct, falsification of public document, perjury, giving false
testimony, and abuse of position in connection with Civil Case No. 3225

12 June 1997, a Toyota Tamaraw wagon model 1994 belonging to Padua ("complainant") figured
in a traffic accident with the vehicle of Ireneo S. Paz ("respondent sheriff"), a 1981 Ford Laser.
Complainant's 18-year old son Ryan Niño Padua ("Ryan Padua") was driving complainant's
vehicle at the time of the accident.

Complainant claimed that after the traffic accident, he gave respondent sheriff his calling card.
This card supposedly contained the addresses and telephone numbers of both the complainant
and his insurer, Covenant Assurance Company. Since respondent sheriff appeared satisfied with
the arrangement, complainant believed the matter was amicably settled. Thus, complainant
went his own way and so did respondent sheriff.

Complainant soon found out that on 30 June 1997 respondent sheriff filed with the Biñan MTC a
civil case for damages in connection with the traffic accident. The summons was allegedly sent
to complainant's mother in Novaliches, where complainant previously resided. This, complainant
claims, explains why he was not aware of the case filed against him until the sheriffs made their
surprise visit. Complainant was declared in default for failing to file an answer within the
reglementary period. Subsequently, there was an ex-parte presentation of evidence before a
commissioner. Soon after this ex-parte hearing, Estanislao S. Belan of the Biñan MTC rendered a
decision on 24 November 1997 in respondent sheriff's favor. Complainant vigorously opposed
the execution of this decision because of the alleged defective summons.

18 December 1998, complainant filed this administrative complaint against respondent sheriff
for falsification of public document, perjury, giving false testimony and abuse of position

Respondent sheriff contended that he only filed the civil case for damages because complainant
failed to honor his repeated promises that his insurer would pay for the damage to respondent
sheriff's vehicle.

Issue: W/N respondent sheriff is guilty of grave misconduct.

Ruling: YES.

Court received the report and recommendations of Investigating Judge Geraldez:

1.) That Ireneo Paz testified that he went to Novaliches to talk to him. Medardo Padua claimed
this was not true. There was no evidence to prove this.

2.) That Ireneo Paz falsified the Traffic Accident Investigation Report (Exhibit B-1). In said Exhibit
B-1 Ryan Padua's age was 13. He presented the same as evidence before the MTC.

Medardo Padua presented a copy of the same Traffic Accident Investigation Report
(Exhibit B) where the age of Ryan Padua was 18 years old. Respondent did not file any opposition
to the said Exhibit B. There was evidence to prove that Ireneo Paz may have committed
falsification of the Traffic Accident Investigation Report (Exhibit B-1).

It is interesting to note that Ryan Padua, as per his driver's licenseand Certification from
the Land Transportation Office was born on January 4, 1977. Therefore, Ryan Padua, at the time
of the accident on June 12, 1997 was 20 years and 5 months old and not 13 or 18 years old.

3.) That Ireneo Paz alleged that Ryan Padua had no driver's license. Ireneo Paz knew the same
was false as, as per Traffic Accident Investigation Report (Exhibit B), Ryan Padua had a driver's
license. And, Ireneo Paz was well aware of this. There was evidence to show that Ireneo Paz may
have committed perjury.

4.) That Ireneo Paz testified in court that he never filed a claim before the Covenant Insurance
Company when there was evidence to prove that he had filed a claim with said insurance
company and submitted.
Act of falsifying the police report respondent sheriff presented to the court.

Respondent sheriff presented a photocopy of the police report, showing that at the time of
the traffic accident Ryan Padua was only 13 yrs. old. It was Dahlia E. Borromeo, the Clerk of
Court of the Biñan MTC, who certified it.

Respondent sheriff never filed any opposition to the different copy of the same police report
which, presented by complainant which was certified by Police Officer Victoriano A. Sabuco, who
was the police officer who prepared the original document, states that Ryan Padua's age is18
yrs. old. He never contested its authenticity. His silence may be construed as a tacit admission of
the authenticity of the said report and necessarily also a tacit admission that the police report he
presented in court is a falsified copy.

Act of Perjury
perjury is the deliberate making of untruthful statements upon any material matter before a
competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law requires such oath.

4 elements of the crime of perjury:

(a) the accused made a statement under oath on a material matter;
(b) the statement was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer
oaths;
(c) the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood in the statement and,
(d) the sworn statement containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose.

Respondent sheriff in his verified complaint for damages stated that Ryan Padua had no
driver's license on 12 June 1997, which was the date of the vehicular accident. Respondent
sheriff knew that this statement he made under oath was false. This conclusion is drawn from the
tact that in respondent sheriff's own copy of the police report, at the time of the accident, Ryan
Padua possessed license number NO1-95-179337. This information contained in respondent
sheriff's copy of the police report completely contradicts the statement respondent sheriff made
in his very own complaint.

Act of giving false testimony. Complainant cites respondent sheriff's testimony in court that
he never filed a claim with complainant's insurer, Covenant. Complainant, however, points out
that respondent sheriff did file a claim with Covenant to collect on complainant's admitted
liability for his son's part in the vehicular accident.

Respondent sheriff did contact Covenant and even filed a claim with Covenant for
payment of the damage to his car, despite his sworn testimony to the contrary. Clearly,
respondent sheriff gave false testimony in the ex-parte hearing, an act also constituting grave
misconduct.

In grave misconduct, there must be substantial evidence showing that the acts complained of
are corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or constitute flagrant disregard of well-
known legal rules.26 Respondent sheriff's introduction in evidence of the falsified police report,
committing perjury and giving false testimony, are plainly corrupt acts and show an intent to
disregard flagrantly the law. They constitute grave misconduct that corrodes respect for the
courts. Incidentally, respondent sheriff's acts of perjury and of giving false testimony, which show
a predisposition to lie, defraud and deceive, also constitute dishonest

The penalty for grave misconduct is dismissal from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits
and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or agency of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.

Public confidence in our courts is vital to the effective functioning of the judiciary. Court
personnel who commit misconduct or dishonesty diminish the faith of the people in the
judiciary's ability to dispense justice.

Respondent sheriff failed to live up to the high ethical standards demanded by the office he
occupies. By committing the questioned acts, respondent sheriff undermined the integrity of the
service and jeopardized the public's faith in the impartiality of the courts.
ROBERTO FULGENCIO ant etc. petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIRST
DIVISION) and RAYCOR AIRCONTROL SYSTEMS, INC., respondents.

Facts:
Private respondent Raycor Aircontrol Systems, Inc. was engaged in the installation of
airconditioning systems in the buildings of its clients. In connection with such installation work,
the herein petitioners were among those hired by the private respondent to work in various
capacities, such as tinsmith, leadsman, aircon mechanic, installer, welder and painter.

On different dates in 1992, the private respondent served the petitioners with uniformly worded
notices of termination of employment. As a result, the petitioners joined other employees in
filing three separate cases of illegal dismissal against the private respondent.

January 22, 1993, Labor Arbiter rendered judgment dismissing the complaints for lack of merit.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission reversed the labor arbiter’s findings and
ruled reinstatement of the complainants and the payment of their backwages from the time they
were dismissed up to the time they are actually reinstated [This decision was also rendered by
the Supreme Court [G.R. No. 114290]]

The private respondent filed a motion for clarification claiming that it had offered
reinstatement to the petitioners on July 13, 1992 but that the latter spurned its offer. The Court
denied the said motion.
In due course, the Research and Information Unit of the NLRC computed the benefits due the
petitioners and submitted an updated computation on April 15, 1997

Labor Arbiter approved the computation. On motion of the petitioners, a writ of execution was
issued by the Labor Arbiter on January 28, 1998, directing the sheriff of the NLRC to garnish the
funds of the private respondent amounting to P3,960,668.45.

*Private respondent appealed the January 28, 1998 [Order of the Labor Arbiter] to the NLRC
which rendered judgment on June 16, 1998 that the computation of backwages stopped on July
13, 1992, when the return-to-work [order] was made by the respondent but was refused by the
complainants.

The petitioners filed a motion for the reconsideration of the above-quoted decision,
contending that by computing the backwages of the petitioners up to July 13, 1992 only, the
NLRC modified the already final and executory decision of the Supreme Court. The NLRC denied
the said motion.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction with the CA. CA outrightly dismissed the petition on the ground of technicality.

Issue:
W/N the NLRC committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in reversing the order of the Labor Arbiter

Ruling: YES.
1) As to the technicality: We agree that for the petitioners’ failure to comply with Section 3, Rule
46 and Section 11, Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, the petition should be
dismissed, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules.

Nonetheless, we resolve to give due course to the petition to avert a miscarriage of justice.
Where a rigid application of the rules will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice,
technicalities should be disregarded in order to resolve the case.
Litigations must be decided on their merits and not on technicality. Every party litigant must be
afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from
the unacceptable plea of technicalities. Thus, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is
frowned upon where the policy of the court is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits
and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of
procedure are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice

2) NLRC committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
reversing the order of the Labor Arbiter, for in so doing, the NLRC modified the decision of this
Court in Raycor Aircontrol Systems, Inc. v. NLRC.

It bears stressing that in our decision in G.R. No. 114290, we specifically enjoined the petitioners’
reinstatement coupled with the payment of backwages, from the time of their dismissal up to the
time of their actual reinstatement. However, the NLRC, in its assailed June 16, 1998 Decision,
directed the payment of the petitioners’ backwages from the time of dismissal up to July 13,
1992, thus sustaining the claim of the private respondent that when the petitioners were
directed to return to work on the said date, they refused. In so doing, the NLRC sought to
enforce the final judgment in G.R. No. 114290 in a manner contrary to the explicit terms thereof.

Basic Term:
Law of the case doctrine - when an appellate court passes on a question and remands the
case to the lower court for further proceedings, the question there settled becomes the law of
the case upon subsequent appeal.”

The manner of the computation of the petitioners’ backwages is an issue which was already
resolved by this Court in its decision in G.R. No. 114290 which had long acquired finality. Hence,
the Court’s decision in G.R. No. 114290, which directed the payment of the petitioners’
backwages from the time they were dismissed up to the time they are actually reinstated, has
become the “law of the case” which now binds the NLRC and the private respondent. The private
respondent, therefore, on appeal to the NLRC in the course of the execution proceedings in the
case, is barred from challenging anew the issue of the manner in which the petitioners’
backwages should be computed. Corollarily, the NLRC can no longer modify the ruling of the
Court on the matter. Judgment of courts should attain finality at some point in time, as in this
case, otherwise, there would be no end to litigation.

*Under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service and
filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the exception.
Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in light of the circumstances of
time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or
filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a
written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In
adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the
subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the
pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11.
RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. MAGWIN MARKETING CORPORATION, NELSON
TIU, BENITO SY and ANDERSON UY, respondents.

Facts:
RCBC filed a complaint for recovery of a sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment
against respondents. The writ was returned partially satisfied since only a parcel of land purportedly
owned by defendant Benito Sy was attached. Thereafter, discussions between petitioner and respondents
as parties in Civil Case No. 99-518 were undertaken to restructure the indebtedness of respondent Magwin
Marketing Corporation.

Petitioner approved a debt payment scheme for the corporation which was communicated to the latter by
means of a letter for the conformity of its officers, i.e., respondent Nelson Tiu as President/General
Manager of Magwin Marketing Corporation and respondent Benito Sy as Director thereof. Only respondent
Nelson Tiu affixed his signature on the letter to signify his agreement to the terms and conditions of the
restructuring

RTC of Makati City issued an Order dismissing without prejudice Civil Case No. 99-518 for failure of
petitioner as plaintiff therein to “prosecute its action for an unreasonable length of time x x x.”
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Order by informing the trial court of respondents’ unremitting
desire to settle the case amicably through a loan restructuring program.

The court a quo reconsidered the order dismissing CC No. 99-518 and (1) directed plaintiff to submit the
compromise agreement within 15 days from receipt hereof. (2) Failure on the part of plaintiff to submit the
said agreement shall cause the imposition of payment of the required docket fees for re-filing of this case
[Sept. 8, 2000 Order]

Petitioner filed in Civil Case No. 99-518 a Manifestation and Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial Conference
alleging that “[t]o date, only defendant Nelson Tiu had affixed his signature on the letter which informed
the defendants that plaintiff [herein petitioner] already approved defendant Magwin Marketing
Corporation’s request for restructuring of its loan obligations to plaintiff but subject to the terms and
conditions specified in said letter.”This motion was followed by petitioner’s Supplemental Motion to
Plaintiff’s Manifestation and Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial Conference affirming that petitioner “could not
submit a compromise agreement because only defendant Nelson Tiu had affixed his signature on the May
10, 2000 letter. The trial court denied petitioner’s motion to calendar Civil Case No. 99-518 for pre-trial for
failure of the plaintiff to submit a compromise agreement.

Petitioner elevated the case to the CA arguing that the court a quo had no authority to compel the parties
in Civil Case No. 99-518 to enter into an amicable settlement nor to deny the holding of a pre-trial
conference on the ground that no compromise agreement was turned over to the court a quo. CA
dismissed the petition.

Issue: Whether the dismissal without prejudice for failure to prosecute was unconditionally reconsidered,
reversed and set aside to reinstate the civil case and have it ready for pre-trial. Whether CC No. 99-518
proceeding should progress.

Ruling:

The Order of 8 September 2000 did not reserve conditions on the reconsideration and reversal of the Order
dismissing without prejudice Civil Case No. 99-518.
The 2nd paragraph upon the first is simply to illustrate what the trial court would do after setting aside the
dismissal without prejudice: submission of the compromise agreement for the consideration of the trial
court. Nothing in the second paragraph do we read that the reconsideration is subject to two (2)
qualifications.

The addition of the second sentence in the second paragraph does not change the absolute nullification of
the dismissal without prejudice decreed in the first paragraph. The sentence “[f]ailure on the part of
plaintiff to submit the said agreement shall cause the imposition of payment of the required docket fees
for re-filing of this case” is not a directive to pay docket fees but only a statement of the event that may
result in its imposition. The reason for this is that the trial court could not have possibly made such
payment obligatory in the same civil case, i.e., Civil Case No. 99-518, since docket fees are defrayed only
after the dismissal becomes final and executory and when the civil case is re-filed.

It must be emphasized however that once the dismissal attains the attribute of finality, the trial court
cannot impose legal fees anew because a final and executory dismissal although without prejudice divests
the trial court of jurisdiction over the civil case as well as any residual power to order anything relative to
the dismissed case; it would have to wait until the complaint is docketed once again. On the other hand, if
we are to concede that the trial court retains jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 99-518 for it to issue the
assailed Orders, a continuation of the hearing thereon would not trigger a disbursement for docket fees on
the part of petitioner as this would obviously imply the setting aside of the order of dismissal and the
reinstatement of the complaint

The subsequent actions of the trial court also belie an intention to revive the Order of dismissal without
prejudice in the event that petitioner fails to submit a compromise agreement. The Orders of 6 and 16
November 2000 plainly manifest that it was retaining jurisdiction over the civil case, a fact which would not
have been possible had the dismissal without prejudice been resuscitated. Surely, the court a quo could
not have denied on 6 November 2000 petitioner’s motion to calendar Civil Case No. 99-518 for pre-trial if
the dismissal had been restored to life in the meantime. By then the dismissal without prejudice would
have already become final and executory so as to effectively remove the civil case from the docket of the
trial court

The same is true with the Order of 16 November 2000 denying due course to petitioner’s Notice of Appeal.
There would have been no basis for such exercise of discretion because the jurisdiction of the court a quo
over the civil case would have been discharged and terminated by the presumed dismissal thereof.
Moreover, we note the ground for denying due course to the appeal: the “Orders dated 8 September 2000
and 6 November 2000 are interlocutory orders and therefore, no appeal may be taken from x x x.” This
declaration strongly suggests that something more was to be accomplished in the civil case, thus negating
the claim that the Order of dismissal without prejudice was resurrected upon the parties’ failure to yield a
compromise agreement.

A “final order” issued by a court has been defined as one which disposes of the subject matter in its
entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by
execution what has been determined by the court, while an “interlocutory order” is one which does not
dispose of a case completely but leaves something more to be decided upon

Ostensibly, while the rules allow the trial court to suspend its proceedings consistent with the policy to
encourage the use of alternative mechanisms of dispute resolution, in the instant case, the trial court only
gave the parties fifteen (15) days to conclude a deal. This was, to say the least, a passive and paltry
attempt of the court a quo in its task of persuading litigants to agree upon a reasonable concession.
Hence, if only to inspire confidence in the pursuit of a middle ground between petitioner and respondents,
we must not interpret the trial court’s Orders as dismissing the action on its own motion because the
parties, specifically petitioner, were anxious to litigate their case as exhibited in their several
manifestations and motions.

Plainly, submission of a compromise agreement is never mandatory, nor is it required by any rule.

We see no compelling circumstances to uphold the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint regardless of its
characterization as being without prejudice.
Civil Case No. 99-518 is deemed REINSTATED in. The trial court is ORDERED to exercise its jurisdiction over
Civil Case No. 99-518, to CONDUCT the pre-trial conference therein with dispatch, and to UNDERTAKE
thereafter such other proceedings as may be relevant, without petitioner being charged anew docket or
other legal fees in connection with its reinstatement

*Non prosequitur [He does not pursue, or follow up]

The name of a judgment rendered by a court against a plaintiff because he or she fails to take any
necessary steps, in legal proceedings, within the period prescribed for such proceedings by the practice of
court.

A court may dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur but the real test of the judicious
exercise of such power is whether under the circumstances plaintiff is chargeable with want of fitting
assiduousness in not acting on his complaint with reasonable promptitude. Unless a party’s conduct is so
indifferent, irresponsible, contumacious or slothful as to provide substantial grounds for dismissal, i.e.,
equivalent to default or non-appearance in the case, the courts should consider lesser sanctions which
would still amount to achieving the desired end.[38] In the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the
disposition of the case or of a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the
part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to dispense rather than wield their authority
to dismiss

DEVORAH E. BARDILLON, petitioner, vs. BARANGAY MASILI of Calamba, Laguna, respondent.

Facts:

Two [C]omplaints for eminent domain were filed by herein respondent for the purpose of expropriating the
land owned by petitioner.

1st [C]omplaint [Civil Case No. 3648] was filed before the MTC on Feb. 23, 1998, following the
failure of Barangay Masili to reach an agreement with herein petitioner on the purchase offer of
P200,000.00. The expropriation of Lot 4381-D was being pursued in view of providing Barangay Masili a
multi-purpose hall for the use and benefit of its constituents.

MTC dismissed the case ‘for lack of interest’ for failure of the [respondent] and its counsel to
appear at the pre-trial.

2nd [C]omplaint [Civil Case No. 2845-99-C] was filed before RTC on October 18, 1999. This
[C]omplaint also sought the expropriation of the said Lot 4381-D. Petitioner, by way of a Motion to Dismiss,
opposed this [C]omplaint by alleging in the main respondent’s cause of action is barred by prior judgment,
pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata.

Judge denied petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss, holding that the MTC which ordered the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 3648 has no jurisdiction over the said expropriation proceeding. 2nd complaint was ordered
in favor of Barangay Masili.

Court of Appeals

CA held that RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Orders. It ruled that the
second Complaint for eminent domain was not barred by res judicata. The reason is that the MTC had no
jurisdiction over the action.

Issues:
1. Whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the expropriation case;
2. Whether the dismissal of that case before the MTC constituted res judicata

Ruling: No merit.

1.) Jurisdiction Over Expropriation

Petitioner’s claim: value of the land is only P11,448, the MTC had jurisdiction over the case.

CA: held that the assessed value of the property was P28,960. Thus, MTC did not have jurisdiction over the
expropriation proceedings, because the amount involved was beyond the P20,000 jurisdictional amount
cognizable by MTCs.

An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise
by the government of its authority and right to take property for public use. As such, it is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and should be filed with the regional trial courts regardless of the value of the land.

Condemnation proceedings are within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance, the forerunners of the
regional trial courts. The Judiciary Act of 1948 which, like BP 129 in respect to RTCs, provided that courts
of first instance had original jurisdiction over ‘all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not
capable of pecuniary estimation’.

While it is true that the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the
court is duty-bound to determine the just compensation for it, this, however, is merely incidental to the
expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of
the expropriation.

2.) Res Judicata

Petitioner’s contention: MTC’s dismissal of the first Complaint for eminent domain was with prejudice,
since there was no indication to the contrary in the Order of dismissal. She contends that the filing of the
second Complaint before the RTC should therefore be dismissed on account of res judicata.

Res judicata [ a matter adjudged, judicially acted upon or decided, or settled by judgment]
It provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies; and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent
actions involving the same claim, demand or cause of action.

Requisites of res judicata:

(1) Former judgment must be final;
(2) The court that rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(3) It is a judgment on the merits; and
(4) There is -- between the first and the second actions -- an identity of parties, subject matter and
cause of action.

Since the MTC had no jurisdiction over expropriation proceedings, the doctrine of res judicata finds no
application even if the Order of dismissal may have been an adjudication on the merits.

ASTURIAS SUGAR CENTRAL, INC., petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and COURT OF TAX APPEALS

Facts:

Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. made two importations of jute bags. The 2 shipments were entered free of
customs duties and special import tax conditioned upon the exportation of the jute bags within one year
from the date of importation. However, of the total number of imported jute bags to be exported, only
33,647 bags were exported within one year after their importation and the remaining 86,353 bags were
exported after the expiration of the one-year period but within three years from their importation.

Petitioner asked for a week’s extension of Re-exportation and Special Import Tax Bond giving the following
as the reasons for its failure to export the remaining jute bags within the period of one year but which was
denied by the commissioner. The Collector of Customs of Iloilo then required the petitioner to pay the
amount of P28,629.42 representing the customs duties and special import tax due thereon, which the
petitioner paid under protest.

Petitioner now demanded the refund of the amount it had paid, on the ground that its request for
extension of the period of one year was filed on time, and that its failure to export the jute bags within the
required one-year period was due fortuitous events. Alternatively, the petitioner asked for refund of the
same amount in the form of a drawback under section 106(b) in relation to section 105(x) of the Tariff and
Customs Code.

Issue: Whether the Commissioner of Customs is vested, under the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909, the then
applicable law, with discretion to extend the period of one year provided for in section 23 of the Act.

Ruling:
1.) SEC. 23.” That containers, such as casks, large metal, glass, or other receptacles which are, in the
opinion of the collector of customs, of such a character as to be readily identifiable may be delivered to the
importer thereof upon identification and the giving of a bond with sureties satisfactory to the collector of
customs in an amount equal to double the estimated duties thereon, conditioned for the exportation
thereof or payment of the corresponding duties thereon within one year from the date of importation,
under such rules and regulations as the Insular Collector of Customs shall provide”

To implement the said section 23, Customs Administrative Order 389 dated December 6, 1940 was
promulgated, paragraph XXVIII of which provides that "bonds for the re-exportation of cylinders and other
containers are good for 12 months without extension,"

Bureau of Customs issued Administrative Orders 389 and 66, already adverted to, to eliminate confusion
and provide a guide as to how it shall apply the law, and, more specifically, to make officially known its
policy to consider the one-year period mentioned in the law as non-extendible.

Considering that the statutory provisions in question have not been the subject of previous judicial
interpretation, then the application of the doctrine of "judicial respect for administrative
construction," would, initially, be in order.

Only where the court of last resort has not previously interpreted the statute is the rule applicable
that courts will give consideration to construction by administrative or executive departments of the state.
The formal or informal interpretation or practical construction of an ambiguous or uncertain statute or law
by the executive department or other agency charged with its administration or enforcement is entitled to
consideration and the highest respect from the courts, and must be accorded appropriate weight in
determining the meaning of the law, especially when the construction or interpretation is long continued
and uniform or is contemporaneous with the first workings of the statute, or when the enactment of the
statute was suggested by such agency

How applied: The administrative orders in question appear to be in consonance with the intention of the
legislature to limit the period within which to export imported containers to one year, without extension,
from the date of importation. Otherwise, in enacting the Tariff and Customs Code to supersede the
Philippine Tariff Act of 1909, Congress would have amended section 23 of the latter law so as to overrule
the long-standing view of the Commissioner of Customs that the one-year period therein mentioned is not
extendible.

Considering that the Bureau of Customs is the office charged with implementing and enforcing the
provisions of our Tariff and Customs Code, the construction placed by it thereon should be given
controlling weight.

If it is further considered that exemptions from taxation are not favored, and that tax statutes are to be
construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority, 10 then we
are hard put to sustain the petitioner's stand that it was entitled to an extension of time within which to
export the jute bags and, consequently, to a refund of the amount it had paid as customs duties.

*strictissimi juris [The most strict right or law]

In general, when a person receives an advantage, as the grant of a license, he is bound to conform
strictly to the exercise of the rights given him by it, and in case of a dispute, it will be strictly construed

In point of fact nowhere in the record does the petitioner convincingly show that the so-called fortuitous
events or force majeure referred to by it precluded the timely exportation of the jute bags. In the second
place, assuming, arguendo, that the one-year period is extendible, the jute bags were not actually
exported within the one-week extension the petitioner sought.

2.) Drawback

Petitioner claims entitlement to a drawback of the duties it had paid, by virtue of section 106 (b) of the
Tariff and Customs Code.
No. The provisions invoked by the petitioner (to sustain his claim for refund) offer two options to an
importer. The first, under sec. 105 (x), gives him the privilege of importing, free from import duties, the
containers mentioned therein as long as he exports them within one year from the date of acceptance of
the import entry, which period as shown above, is not extendible. The second, presented by sec. 106 (b),
contemplates a case where import duties are first paid, subject to refund to the extent of 99% of the
amount paid, provided the articles mentioned therein are exported within three years from importation.

The Government would forego collecting duties on the articles mentioned in section 105(x) of Tariff and
Customs Code as long as it is assured, by the filing of a bond, that the same shall be exported within the
relatively short period of one year from the date of acceptance of the import entry. Where an importer
cannot provide such assurance, then the Government, under sec. 106(b) of said Code, would require
payment of the corresponding duties first.

Statutory Construction:

A construction of a statute which creates an inconsistency should be avoided when a reasonable

interpretation can be adopted which will not do violence to the plain words of the act and will carry out the
intention of Congress.

In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the legislature intended to
enact an effective law, and the legislature is not to be presumed to have done a vain thing in the
enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a general principle, embodied in the maxim, "ut res magis valeat quam
pereat," that the courts should, if reasonably possible to do so without violence to the spirit and language
of an act, so interpret the statute to give it efficient operation and effect as a whole. An interpretation
should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as
otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered
insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory.

How applied:

Under section 105(x) full exemption is granted to an importer who justifies the grant of exemption by
exporting within one-year. The petitioner, having opted to take advantage of the provisions of section
105(x), may not, after having failed to comply with the conditions imposed thereby, avoid the
consequences of such failure by being allowed a drawback under section 106(b) of the same Act without
having complied with the conditions of the latter section.

It is not to be supposed that the legislature had intended to defeat compliance with the terms of section
105(x) thru a refuge under the provisions of section 106(b). A construction should be avoided which
affords an opportunity to defeat compliance with the terms of a statute. 13 Rather courts should proceed
on the theory that parts of a statute may be harmonized and reconciled with each other.

*Ut res magis valeat quam pereat That the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed.

RAUL H. SESBREÑO, petitioner, vs. CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS and THE CITY ASSESSOR
OF CEBU CITY, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner purchased two (2) parcels of land. Petitioner declared the real property constructed on the said
lots for purposes of tax assessment as a residential house of strong materials with a floor area of sixty (60)
square meters. During a tax-mapping operation conducted, the field inspectors of the Cebu City Assessor
discovered that the real property declared and assessed under was actually a residential building
consisting of four (4) storeys with a fifth storey used as a roof deck. The building had a total floor area of
500.20 square meters. Based on the findings, Respondent City Assessor of Cebu City issued another Tax
Declaration, effective in the year 1989, canceling the previous one [TD 1980] and assessing the building
therein at a net market value of P499,860.00 and an assessed value of P374,900.00.

Petitioner protested the new assessment for being "excessive and unconscionable," contending that it was
increased by more than 1,000% as compared to its previous market value and "that he bought the building
including the lots for only P100,000.00, which amount should be the market value of the building for
purposes of determining its assessed value
Issue:
Whether or not Respondent Central Board of Assessment Appeals erred in resolving the issue of back
taxes from 1981 to 1988 despite the fact that such issue was not raised in the appeal, under its pretext
that it is applying Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 464

Petitioner’s contention: The issue of back taxes has never been raised before the Local Board of
Assessment Appeals or the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. Hence, respondents are barred by due
process and fair play from alleging them before Respondent CBAA and now before this Court.

Ruling:

As a rule, no issue may be raised on appeal unless it has been brought before the lower tribunal for its
consideration.
The Court has held in several cases, however, that an appellate court has an inherent authority to review
unassigned errors
(1) which are closely related to an error properly raised, or
(2) upon which the determination of the error properly assigned is dependent, or
(3) where the Court finds that consideration of them is necessary in arriving at a just decision of
the case.

Although the foregoing citations specifically referred to "appellate courts," there appears no reason why
these should not apply to appellate administrative agencies, where rules of procedure are liberally
construed.

In the present case, we hold that Respondent CBAA did not err in considering the issue of back taxes, the
same being closely related to an error properly raised. Petitioner himself assailed the subject assessment
before the Respondent CBAA for being "excessive and unconscionable." In resolving this issue, Respondent
CBAA was duty-bound to review the factual antecedents of the case and to apply thereon the pertinent
provisions of law. In the process, Respondent CBAA applied Section 25 of PD 464 which had authorized the
imposition of back taxes. In any event, consideration of the question of back taxes is essential to a just
decision on the case, as will be shown below.

SMITH KLINE BECKMAN CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and TRYCO
PHARMA CORPORATION, Respondents.

Facts:

Smith Kline Beckman Corporation, a corporation existing by virtue of the laws of the state of Pennsylvania,
U.S. and licensed to do business in the Philippines, filed, as assignee, before the Philippine Patent Office
(now Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer) an application for patent over an invention

Letters Patent No. 1456 for the aforesaid invention was issued to petitioner for a term of seventeen (17)
years.
The patented invention consisted of a new compound in fighting infections caused by gastrointestinal
parasites and lungworms in animals such as swine, sheep, cattle, goats, horses, and even pet animals
Tryco Pharma Corporation is a domestic corporation that manufactures, distributes and sells veterinary
products including Impregon, a drug that has Albendazole for its active ingredient and is claimed to be
effective against gastro-intestinal roundworms, lungworms, tapeworms and fluke infestation in carabaos,
cattle and goats.

Petitioner sued private respondent for infringement of patent and unfair competition before the RTC,
claiming that its patent covers or includes the substance Albendazole such that private respondent, by
manufacturing, selling, using, and causing to be sold and used the drug Impregon without its
authorization. RTC dismissed the complaint for violation of Patent Law and declared the patent letter null
and void. CA affirmed the ruling of RTC however, modified the nullification and cancellation thereof.

Issue:
W/N the CA erred in not finding that Albendazole is included in petitioner’s letters patent and that
consequently Tryco is answerable for patent infringement.

Petitioner’s contention: That under the doctrine of equivalents for determining patent infringement,
Albendazole, the active ingredient it alleges was appropriated by private respondent for its drug Impregon,
is substantially the same as the compound covered by its patent since both of them are meant to combat
worm or parasite infestation in animals. That the two substances substantially do the same function in
substantially the same way to achieve the same results, thereby making them truly identical.

Ruling: Private respondent has not committed patent infringement to the prejudice of petitioner.

The 9 claims of Letters Patent No. 14561 in relation to the other portions thereof, no mention is made of
the compound Albendazole.

When the language of its claims is clear and distinct, the patentee is bound thereby and may not
claim anything beyond them. And so are the courts bound which may not add to or detract from the claims
matters not expressed or necessarily implied, nor may they enlarge the patent beyond the scope of that
which the inventor claimed and the patent office allowed, even if the patentee may have been entitled to
something more than the words it had chosen would include.

Doctrine of equivalents
An infringement also takes place when a device appropriates a prior invention by incorporating its
innovative concept and, although with some modification and change, performs substantially the same
function in substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same result

How applied:
A scrutiny of petitioners evidence fails to convince this Court of the substantial sameness of petitioners
patented compound and Albendazole. While both compounds have the effect of neutralizing parasites in
animals, identity of result does not amount to infringement of patent unless Albendazole operates in
substantially the same way or by substantially the same means as the patented compound, even though it
performs the same function and achieves the same result. In other words, the principle or mode of
operation must be the same or substantially the same

The doctrine of equivalents thus requires satisfaction of the function-means-and-result test, the patentee
having the burden to show that all three components of such equivalency test are met

Nothing more is asserted and accordingly substantiated regarding the method or means by which
Albendazole weeds out parasites in animals, thus giving no information on whether that method is
substantially the same as the manner by which petitioners compound works.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. GUILLERMO MANANTAN, defendant-appellee.

Facts:

Defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The
defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of the peace the defendant is one
of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court dismissed the
information against the accused.

Issue:
Is a justice the peace included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code?
 Section 54:

“No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army,
no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no classified civil service
officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in a election or take part
therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer”

Defendant’s contention:

(1)Submits the aforecited section was taken from Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code:

SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. — No judge of the First Instance, justice of
the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or employee of the Philippine
Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert
influence in any manner in any election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote.

Thus, when section 54 of the Revised Election Code omitted the words "justice of the peace," in Section
449 of the Revised Administrative Code, the omission revealed the intention of the Legislature to exclude
justices of the peace from its operation.

Ruling: NO.

Under Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, the word "judge" was modified or qualified by the
phrase "of First instance", while under Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, no such modification
exists. In other words, justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised
Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified,[ i.e., judge of the First Instance
and justice of the peace].
In Section 54, however, there was no necessity therefore to include justices of the peace in the
enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic and broader term, "judge." It
was a term not modified by any word or phrase and was intended to comprehend all kinds of judges, like
judges of the courts of First Instance, Judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of
Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace.

In other words, whenever the word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance", the words
"justice of the peace" would follow; however, if the law simply said "judge," the words "justice of the
peace" were omitted

(2) That he cannot possibly be among the officers enumerated in Section 54 inasmuch as under that said
section, the word "judge" is modified or qualified by the phrase "of any province." The last mentioned
phrase, defendant submits, cannot then refer to a justice of the peace since the latter is not an officer of a
province but of a municipality

Ruling:
The more sensible and logical interpretation of the said phrase is that it qualifies fiscals, treasurers and
assessors who are generally known as provincial officers.

(3) Rule of Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est [a person, object or thing omitted from an
enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally.]

Ruling: NO APPLICABILITY.

The maxim "casus omisus" can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly
established.

In the case under consideration, it has already been shown that the legislature did not exclude or omit
justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political
activities. Rather, they were merely called by another term. In the new law, or Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code, justices of the peace were just called "judges."

Casus omisus vs Strict application of penal statutes

The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is
criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been
omitted from a legislative enumeration. It is to be noted that a strict construction should not be permitted
to defeat the policy and purposes of the statute. The strict construction of a criminal statute does not
mean such construction of it as to deprive it of the meaning intended.

The purpose of the statute is to enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, and various judges, such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of the
Court of Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not included in the prohibition under the old statute, are now
within its encompass. If such were the evident purpose, can the legislature intend to eliminate the justice
of the peace within its orbit? Certainly not.

Justices of the peace are authorized to hear and decided inclusion and exclusion cases, and if they are
permitted to campaign for candidates for an elective office the impartiality of their decisions in election
cases would be open to serious doubt. We do not believe that the legislature had, in Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code, intended to create such an unfortunate situation.

Expressio unius, est exclusion alterius

The rule has no application. If the legislature had intended to exclude a justice of the peace from the
purview of Section 54, neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals has given the reason for the
exclusion. Indeed, there appears no reason for the alleged change. Where a statute appears on its face to
limit the operation of its provisions to particular persons or things by enumerating them, but no reason
exists why other persons or things not so enumerated should not have been included, and manifest
injustice will follow by not so including them, the maxim expressio unius est exclusion alterius, should not
be invoked

The dismissal of the Information is setaside and remanded the case for trial on merits.

JOSE ANTONIO MAPA, petitioner, vs. HON. JOKER ARROYO, in his Capacity as Executive Secretary, and
LABRADOR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
Facts:

Jose Antonio Mapa and appellee Labrador Development Corporation, owner/developer of the Barangay Hills
Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, entered into 4 contracts to sell over 4 lots of the said subdivision. Mapa
defaulted w/ its obligations prompting Labrador to cancel the 4 contracts. However, Mapa's counsel sent
Labrador a letter demanding its compliance with, Clause 20 of the four (4) contracts to sell which relates to
Labrador's obligation to provide, among others, lighting/water facilities to subdivision lot buyers. Mapa
filed a complaint against Labrador for the latter's neglect to put 1) a water system that meets the
minimum standard as specified by HSRC, and 2) electrical power supply. By way of relief, Mapa requested
the HSRC to direct Labrador to provide the facilities aforementioned, and to issue a cease and desist order
enjoining Labrador from cancelling the contracts to sell.

The complaint was dismissed declaring that after the lapse of 5 years from complainant's default
respondent had every right to rescind the contract pursuant to Clause 7 thereof. . HSRC, affirmed the
aforesaid OAALA decision

Issues:

W/N the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 957 and implementing rules form part of the contracts to
sell executed by him and respondent corporation, hence the obligations imposed therein had to be
complied with by Labrador within the period provided.

W/N Labrador failed to perform the aforementioned obligations therein, thus precluded from rescinding the
subject contracts to sell

Ruling:

1) It is jurisprudentially settled that absent a clear, manifest and grave abuse of discretion amounting to
want of jurisdiction, the findings of the administrative agency on matters falling within its competence will
not be disturbed by the courts. Specifically with respect to factual findings, they are accorded respect, if
not finality, because of the special knowledge and expertise gained by these tribunals from handling the
specific matters falling under their jurisdiction.
Such factual findings may be disregarded only if:

1. Not supported by evidence

2. Where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion;
3. Where the procedure which led to the factual findings is irregular;
4. When palpable errors are committed; or
5. When grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness or capriciousness is manifest.

The findings are duly supported by evidence.

2) Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 957 must be rejected.

Said decree was issued on July 12, 1976 long after the execution of the contracts involved. Obviously and
necessarily, what subsequently were statutorily provided therein as obligations of the owner or developer
could not have been intended by the parties to be a part of their contracts. No intention to give
restrospective application to the provisions of said decree can be gathered from the language thereof.
Section 20, in relation to Section 21, of the decree merely requires the owner or developer to construct the
facilities, improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development but only such as are offered and
indicated in the approved subdivision or condominium plans, brochures, prospectus, printed matters,
letters or in any form of advertisements. Other than what are provided in Clause 20 of the contract, no
further written commitment was made by the developer in this respect. To read into the contract the
matters desired by petitioner would have the law impose additional obligations on the parties to a contract
executed before that very law existed or was contemplated.
3.) Doctrine of last antecedent

A doctrine of interpretation (construction) of statutes that any qualifying words or phrases can only
refer to the language immediately preceding the qualifier and not to remote phrases, unless common
sense reading clearly dictates that the context or whole of the statute intends it to apply more broadly.

Construing a statute in accord with the rule is accepted as being quite sensible as a matter of grammar.

How applied:

We further reject petitioner's strained and tenuous application of the doctrine. He would thereby
have the enumeration of "facilities, improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development"
interpreted to mean that the demonstrative phrase "which are offered and indicated in the approved
subdivision plans, etc." refer only to "other forms of development" and not to "facilities, improvements and
infrastructures."

SEC. 20. Time of Completion. — Every owner or developer shall construct and provide the facilities,
improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development, including water supply and lighting
facilities, which are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision or condominium plans, brochures,
prospectus, printed matters letters or in any form of advertisements, within one year from the date of the
issuance of the license for the subdivision or condominium project or such other period of time as may be
fixed by the Authority.

The complete and applicable rule is ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sentencia.

In the present case, the employment of the word "and" between "facilities, improvements,
infrastructures" and "other forms of development," far from supporting petitioner's theory, enervates it
instead since it is basic in legal hermeneutics that "and" is not meant to separate words but is a
conjunction used to denote a joinder or union.

*Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sentencia - Relative words refer to the nearest
antecedent, unless it be prevented by the context.
RODOLFO O. TIRONA, petitioner-appellee, vs. M. CUDIAMAT as City Treasurer of Manila, respondent-
appellant.

Facts:

Petitioner is the original holder of a backpay certificate (Acknowledgment No. 8506) issued under Republic
Act No. 897.
Petitioner is a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

He offered to respondent his said backpay certificate in payment of his realty taxes for the year 1962 in
the amount of P1,887.90.

Respondent did not accept petitioner's backpay certificate and alleges that

under section 2 of Republic Act 304, as amended, backpay certificates are admissible in payment of
obligations subsisting on the date of approval of the said acts, i.e., on June 20, 1953, at the latest, being
that of the approval of the latest amendatory law, Republic Act No. 897

SEC. 2. ... Provided, That upon application and subject to such rules and regulations as may be
approved by the Secretary of Finance a certificate of indebtedness may be issued by the Treasurer of the
Philippines covering the whole or part of the total salaries or wages the right to which has been duly
acknowledged and recognized, provided that the face value of such certificate of indebtedness shall not
exceed the amount that the applicant may need for the payment of (1) obligations subsisting at the time
of the approval of this amendatory Act for which the applicant may directly be liable to the government or
to any of its branches or instrumentalities, ...; (2) his taxes; (3) government hospital bills of the applicant;
(4) lands purchased or leased or to be purchased or leased by him from the public domain; and (5) any
amount received by the applicant as gratuity or pension which he has to refund to the Government or to
any of its branches or instrumentalities; ... .

Ruling:

It will be seen that while the applicability of the backpay certificate to the payment of holder's obligations
to the government or any of its branches or instrumentalities is limited to those subsisting at the time of
the approval of the amendatory act (Rep. Act No. 897), the statute declares the applicability of the
backpay certificates to the payment by the holder of "(2) his taxes; (3) government hospital bills of the
applicant; ... etc.", without any limitation in point of time.

As remarked by the court below, had it been intended to apply to the taxes the same limitation as to the
time imposed upon the other obligations, the limitation would have been repeated or stated after the
expression "his taxes."

LACESTE vs SANTOS

Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code reads as follows:

ART. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they
favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in rule 5 of article
62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced
and the convict is serving the same.

That this article applies to crimes committed before the new Code took effect, cannot be doubted, for
article 366 of said Code unmistakably provides for such cases in the following words:

ART. 366. Application of laws enacted prior to this Code. — Without prejudice to the provisions contained
in article 22 of this Code, felonies and misdemeanors, committed prior to the date of effectiveness of this
Code shall be punished in accordance with the Code or Acts in force at the time of their commission.

Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, in force since the first of this year, providing as follows:

In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the offender with the
offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. The
provisions of this paragraph shall also be applicable to the coprincipals, accomplices and accesories after
the fact of the above-mentioned crimes.
MUNICIPALITY OF KANANGA vs. MADRONA
Facts:
A boundary dispute arose between the Municipality of Kananga and the City of Ormoc.

To settle the boundary dispute, the City of Ormoc filed before the RTC of Ormoc City a Complaint
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following ground that the Honorable Court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the claim. RTC held that it had jurisdiction over the action under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129

Hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether respondent court may exercise original jurisdiction over the settlement of a boundary dispute
between a municipality and an independent component city.

Ruling:
Jurisdiction is the right to act on a case or the power and the authority to hear and determine a cause. It
is a question of law. As consistently ruled by this Court, jurisdiction over the subject matter is vested by
law. Because it is "a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force at the time
of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court.

Both parties aver that the governing law at the time of the filing of the Complaint is Section 118 of the
1991 Local Government Code. However, Section 118 of the LGC applies to a situation in which a
component city or a municipality seeks to settle a boundary dispute with a highly urbanized city, not with
an independent component city. While Kananga is a municipality, Ormoc is an independent component
city. Clearly then, the procedure referred to in Section 118 does not apply to them.

Nevertheless, a joint session was indeed held, but no amicable settlement was reached. A resolution to
that effect was issued, and the sanggunians of both local government units mutually agreed to bring the
dispute to the RTC for adjudication.

The question now is: Does the regional trial court have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim?

YES. Jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by the parties." It must exist as a
matter of law and cannot be conferred by the consent of the parties or by estoppel. It should not be
confused with venue.

General rules governing jurisdiction should then be used. The applicable provision is found in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129
Section 19(6) of this law provides:

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

"(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions."

Since there is no law providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or agency over the settlement of
boundary disputes between a municipality and an independent component city of the same province,
respondent court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the Motion to Dismiss. RTCs have
general jurisdiction to adjudicate all controversies except those expressly withheld from their plenary
powers. They have the power not only to take judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for
the first time, but also to do so to the exclusion of all other courts at that stage. Indeed, the power is not
only original, but also exclusive.

DELA RAMA vs. MENDIOLA

Whether or not the specific performance case (Civil Case No. 97-0734) is barred by the petition for
declaratory relief case (Civil Case No 96-1725 and CA-G.R. SP No. 44094) on the ground of res judicata.

Res judicata [bar by prior judgment]

4 essential conditions concur, viz:
(1) there must be a final judgment or order;
(2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and
(4) there must be, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action
- only a substantial identity is necessary to warrant the application of res judicata

Subject matters and causes of action of the two cases are likewise identical. A subject matter is the item
with respect to which the controversy has arisen, or concerning which the wrong has been done, and it is
ordinarily the right, the thing, or the contract under dispute. In the case at bar, both the first and second
actions involve the same real property.

Cause of action, broadly defined, is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the
other.
Elements are the following:
(1) the legal right of plaintiff;
(2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and
(3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.

Causes of action are identical when there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two
actions, or where the same evidence will sustain both actions.

Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514

The Act of June 15, 1917, c. 29, 40 Stat. 182, empowered the President, within the limits of amounts
appropriated, "to modify, suspend, cancel, or requisition any existing or future contract for the building,
production, or purchase of ships or material," and to exercise the authority "through such agency or
agencies as he shall determine from time to time," "material" being defined as including stores, supplies,
and equipment for ships and everything required for or in connection with the production thereof.

The President was authorized to exercise the authority conferred upon him by the act and expend the
money therein and thereafter appropriated "through such agency or agencies as he shall determine from
time to time." The authority, so far as it concerned the Navy, was by him delegated to the Secretary of the
Navy in an order

Issue:

W/N the cancellation of the contract made by the Secretary of the Navy was within the authority conferred
by the statute. YES.

Petitioner’s contention: That such power of the Sate is limited to private contracts and affords no authority
for the cancellation by the government of its own contracts. NO

Ruling:

NO APPLICABILITY OF NOSCITUR A SOCIIS

It must be apparent, we think, that the words of the provision, "any existing or future contract," read with
literal exactness, include all contracts, whether private or governmental. But it is pointed out that the
power to "requisition" cannot apply to a governmental contract, and this may be conceded, since the
government cannot requisition what it already has. Then it is said that, inasmuch as the application of the
word "requisition" must be confined to private contracts, the other words associated with it must be
likewise restricted by virtue of the maxim "noscitur a sociis."

That a word may be known by the company it keeps is, however, not an invariable rule, for the word may
have a character of its own not to be submerged by its association. Here, we have one word which it may
be conceded applies only to private contracts, [the word “requisition”] but the other three words, standing
alone, it likewise must be conceded, naturally apply to governmental contracts as well. Indeed, they more
naturally apply to such contracts.

The meaning of the four predicate words is not doubtful; in that respect, as well as in their operative
scope, they obviously differ from one another. The question we are called upon to answer is whether,
because the words "any . . . contract" must be given a narrower meaning when qualified by the predicate
"requisition," their meaning must be limited in like manner when qualified by one of the other three
predicates.

"Noscitur a sociis" is a well established and useful rule of construction where words are of obscure or
doubtful meaning, and then, but only then, its aid may be sought to remove the obscurity or doubt by
reference to the associated words. But here, the meaning of the words, considered severally, is not in
doubt, and the rule is invoked not to remove an obscurity, but to import one. There is nothing in the rule or
in the statute which requires us to assimilate the words "modify" and "cancel" to the scope of the word
"requisition" simply because the latter has a necessarily narrower application. The meaning of the several
words, standing apart, being perfectly plain, what should be done is to apply them distributively, diverso
intuitu, giving to each its natural value and appropriate scope when read in connection with the object
(any contract) which they are severally meant to control. Thus, the predicate "requisition" will be limited to
private contracts, while the other words may be appropriately extended to include governmental contracts
as well.
The maxim noscitur a sociis is used only to solve ambiguity. Verbs in an enumeration whose meaning,
when they are separately applied to their common object, is plain should be interpreted distributively.

* Noscitur a sociis [That the meaning of a word may be known from accompanying words]

A rule of interpretation that states that the meaning of unclear language in a contract or other legal
document should be construed in light of the language surrounding it.

Lambert v. California

A Los Angeles municipal ordinance makes it an offense for a person who has been convicted of a crime
punishable in California as a felony to remain in the City or more than five days without registering with
the Chief of Police. On appeal from a conviction for failure to register,

Appellant committed forgery in California, and was convicted under California law. Furthermore, she was
convicted in Los Angeles itself, and there she resided for over seven years before the arrest leading to the
present proceedings.

Issue:

Whether a registration act of this character violates due process where it is applied to a person who has no
actual knowledge of his duty to register, and where no showing is made of the probability of such
knowledge.

Held: when applied to a person who has no actual knowledge of his duty to register, and where no
showing is made of the probability of such knowledge, this ordinance violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

Statcon rule:
"A law which punished conduct which would not be blameworthy in the average member of the community
would be too severe for that community to bear."

Its severity lies in the absence of an opportunity either to avoid the consequences of the law or to defend
any prosecution brought under it. Where a person did not know of the duty to register, and where there
was no proof of the probability of such knowledge, he may not be convicted consistently with due process.
Were it otherwise, the evil would be as great as it is when the law is written in print too fine to read or in a
language foreign to the community.

Actual knowledge of the duty to register or proof of the probability of such knowledge and
subsequent failure to comply are necessary before a conviction under the ordinance can stand.

Conduct alone, without regard to the intent of the doer, is often sufficient. There is wide latitude in the
lawmakers to declare an offense and to exclude elements of knowledge and diligence from its definition.

But we deal here with conduct that is wholly passive -- mere failure to register

Ignorance of the law excuses no one.

Police power

Registration laws are common, and their range is wide. Many such laws are akin to licensing statutes in
that they pertain to the regulation of business activities. But the present ordinance is entirely different.
Violation of its provisions is unaccompanied by any activity whatever, mere presence in the city being the
test. Moreover, circumstances which might move one to inquire as to the necessity of registration are
completely lacking.

Due process
Requirement of Notice

The appellant, on first becoming aware of her duty to register, was given no opportunity to comply with
the law and avoid its penalty, even though her default was entirely innocent
PEOPLE vs. ALMA BISDA y GAUPO and GENEROSA "JENNY ROSE" BASILAN y PAYAN

The appellants were convicted by RTC with the felony of kidnapping for ransom of a female minor victim [5
yrs old]

Appellant’s contention:
The trial court's reliance on Angela's testimony is misplaced because the records do not show that
Angela had the capacity to distinguish right from wrong when she testified in open court. The appellants
point out that she was merely six years old at the time. Although Angela took an oath before she testified,
the trial judge failed to ask any questions to determine whether or not she could distinguish right from
wrong, and comprehend the obligation of telling the truth before the court. Hence, one of the standards in
determining the credibility of a child witness was not followed

HELD: NO.

Taking of an oath is an examination of witnesses presented in trial in that the witness’ attestation
is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to God. The object of the rule is to affect the
conscience of the witness and thus compel him to speak the truth, and also to lay him open to punishment
for perjury in case he willfully falsifies.

Application:
In the instant case, Angela was 6 yrs old when she took the oath and testified.

It cannot be argued that simply because a child witness is not examined on the nature of the oath and the
need for her to tell the whole truth, the competency of the witness and the truth of her testimony are
impaired. so long as the child, irregardless of age, can perceive and perceiving, can make known to others,
and that she is capable of relating truthfully facts for which she is examined.

A person is not disqualified as a witness simply because he is unable to tell the nature of the oath
administered to a witness. In order that one may be competent as a witness, it is not necessary that he
has a definite knowledge of the difference between his duty to tell the truth after being sworn and before,
or that he be able to state it, but it is necessary that he be conscious that there is a difference.

The determination of the competence and capability of a child as a witness rests primarily with the trial
judge. The trial court correctly found Angela as competent witness and her testimony entitled to full
probative weight.
IMELDA Y. MADERADA, complainant, vs. Judge ERNESTO H. MEDIODEA,