Japan’s International Internship System:

Aiding Development or Disguising Abuse?

Peter Lee

Foreword
 The study of foreign labour in Japan is far from a new phenomenon. Numerous English and Japanese language

studies have examined the potential economic and sociological implications of both “open door” (liberalisation) and

“closed door”(isolation) policies for the nation. However, there has been very little English language research conducted

specifically concerning Japan’s technical internship system. This motivated me to conduct this study in order to clarify

the role of the internship program and the recent debate surrounding it. In doing so this study seeks to gain an

understanding of the intricacies of the Japanese government’s policies regarding the employment of non-Japanese

workers.

Introduction

The liberalisation of labour migration has transformed both domestic and international labour markets beyond

recognition. As the disparity in incomes between developed and developing nations widens and low-cost air travel

connects the world, there is an ever-increasing number of migrant labourers the world over. As such, international

migration to developed nations is at an all time high. Across both Western Europe and the United States immigration and

the social integration of migrants have become much debated issues.

The experiences of most Western nations, however, differ greatly to immigration patterns found in Japan. The

Japanese government’s comparatively stringent approach to immigration has kept the number of foreign nationals low,

relative to other developed countries, and so the pressures associated with mass immigration have been largely avoided.

But with a shrinking population and a potential labour crisis looming it would seem that the acceptance of foreign labour

offers a viable short-term solution. That said, public opinion seems spilt regarding the acceptance of unskilled foreign

labour and although immigration has been on the rise in recent years there has been little in the way of a full scale

opening of borders to foreign nationals.

One international labour related initiative that the government has backed is the foreign technical internship

system (gaikokujin kensyú seido). Under this scheme foreign nationals are accepted to work in Japan for a period of one

to three years with the understanding that they are to be trained and taught new skills that will be of use to them upon

their return to their home nation.

Recently, however, there have been a number of reports of interns, receiving little in terms of training, being

used as nothing more than cheap unskilled labour. Disputes regarding pay, working hours, insurance and employment

conditions have also arisen leading to calls for systematic reform.

 This paper examines the extent to which the current structure of the internship system is directly responsible for

the mistreatment of interns and assesses current plans for reform. First, the development of the system is outlined.

Second, the relevant legislation and core structure of the scheme are critically assessed. Third, the abuse of interns is

discussed followed by an analysis regarding the existence of a link between these issues and the system’s structure. In the

concluding section potential remedies for the system are explored.

Background

Before analysing the internship system itself the circumstances in which it came into being must first be

understood. The economic, social and legislative implications of Japan’s declining population have been well

documented by the likes of Coulmas (2007), with reference to the social impacts, and Hamada et al (2006), regarding the

inevitable economic difficulties that arise from a diminishing population. In this chapter the economic implications and

government reaction to the declining population are discussed, focusing upon the factors that have driven the rise in

demand for foreign labour.

The total population of Japan peaked at 127 million in 2006 and is projected to fall by around 30 million people

by 2050 (MIC (2007), 10). The rate at which the population is set to age is unprecedented and without the introduction of

counter-measures the process will lead to a dramatic rise in the proportion of the population aged 65 and above from

25.2% in 2000 to 50.0% in 2030 (Makoto (2005), 6). This poses huge difficulties for Small and Medium-sized

Enterprises (SMEs) in Japan who operate in so-called 3K (dirty (kitanai), dangerous (kiken) or physically demanding

(kitsui)) industries.

The falling birth-rate coupled with improvements in education standards has resulted in a mass exodus of

workers from the industrial and manufacturing sectors to white collar positions with better pay and working conditions.

This has hit the SMEs that supply Japan’s larger firms and retailers hardest. Multi-nationals can simply outsource

production abroad or mechanise the production process to reduce labour costs; however, the vast majority of businesses

in Japan are small, often family owned, firms with no means of importing labour from outside the local area. As these

enterprises comprise the base of Japan’s industrial “keiretsu” structures rising labour costs could have knock-on effects

further down the supply chain, potentially impacting on Japan’s multi-national heavyweights and its competitiveness as a

nation.

With this in mind the Japanese government has taken measures to promote the participation of women and the

retired in the casual labour market, implementing legislation to ease this transition. This has led to a dramatic rise in the
participation of people aged over 65 in the labour market. Participation rates for both men (34.1%) and women (14.4%)

are now the highest in the developed world (JIL (2002), 17).

Although some progress has been made in alleviating labour shortages in the service industry through these

initiatives, they were less effective in the manufacturing and agriculture sectors due to the physically taxing nature of

these jobs. During the bubble economy returning Japanese emigrants and their offspring (Nikkeijin) were used to fill

vacancies in these labour intensive sectors (see De Carvalho (2002)). However, the worsening in labour shortages has led

to calls for Japan to follow in the footsteps of other western nations by encouraging the employment of an immigration

based labour policy.

The number of foreign nationals in Japan has historically been low in comparison with other developed nations:

foreign labour currently accounts for only a fraction of the work force. But as the population shrinks and demand for

foreign labour increases immigration into Japan is growing steadily.

In recent decades a dual tier system of immigration has emerged within which the inflow of skilled labour is

encouraged whilst the number of unskilled labourers entering Japan is strictly regulated. A recent OECD study of trends

in global migration states that:

“The general orientation of the Japanese government concerning work-related immigration consists in more

actively promoting the acceptance of foreign workers in professional and technical fields while moving

cautiously with respect to unskilled workers who would be expected to have a major impact on the Japanese

economy, society and national life.”

(OECD (2006), p 192)

The government seldom explores the exact nature of the aforementioned major economic and sociological

impacts of immigration into Japan. However, fears over crime, social cohesion and ethnic homogeneity hold centre stage

in the intense debate surrounding the matter. Ono’s (2007) nationalistic account of why foreign nationals should not be

permitted to work in Japan showcases the concern that many hold relating to the societal impacts of immigration.

A purely immigration based approach to labour sourcing, as seen in the US and many European states, is

deemed unlikely to prove effective in the case of Japan. Critics assert that allowing the permanent migration of foreign

nationals and their families into the country would simply perpetuate the pension crisis further down the line when

migrants retire and expect the same benefits as Japanese nationals.

In addition, the scale of immigration required to maintain the current workforce is seen by many as unattainable.

A 2001 study regarding the viability of population replacement through immigration conducted by the UN Population

Division concluded that immigrants would have to be accepted in their millions each year in order to stop the ageing of
Japan’s society. This would result in over half of the 2050 population being of non-Japanese origin (UN Population

Division (2001), 54). Thus, the unprecedented scale of immigration needed in order to counter-act the ageing process

renders it unpalatable in a nation with a long history of isolation from other nations.

As noted above Japan’s labour conditions are unique because of the rate at which the population is ageing. With

the viability of both current governmental measures and permanent immigration in doubt, firms are now looking to new

sources for labour. This not only perpetuated the rise in illegal workers seen in the 90s, but has also had implications for

the Technical Internship Program.

System Overview

In this section a brief history of the initiative’s development is outlined followed by a detailed analysis of its

current structure. A number of JITCO (Japan International Training Co-operation Organisation) publications are referred

to below the most notable being the Industrial Training and Technical Internship Guidebook (JITCO, 2004) which gives

a detailed explanation of the system and its regulations.

The Industrial Training Program, was introduced in 1981 in order to promote the “international transfer of skills,

technology and knowledge” and to contribute to “the development of human resources, playing a central role in the

economic development of developing countries” (Ohmi (2005)). The scheme aims to develop the skills of interns from a

number of East Asian LDCs through practical work experience in Japan. JITCO differentiates the system from other

international temporary worker schemes by stating that “trainees and technical interns are not to be accepted as basic

labor, and they should work on training for the purposes of developing international human resources”(JITCO (2004), 2).

Participants are permitted to stay in Japan for a period of up to 3 years during which they must actively attempt

to obtain skills and knowledge unavailable in their home nation. On the Job Training (OJT) makes up the majority of the

course along with Japanese language and other classroom-based lectures.

Prior to 1993 the Industrial Training Program was operated under the guidance of five separate governmental

bodies and as such the system was inherently over-complex. This complexity made regulation difficult and soon it

emerged that many interns were being used as cheap labour in direct violation of the initiative’s regulations. This led to

calls for reform and the Japan International Training Co-operation Organisation (JITCO) was subsequently established in

1991 to both improve the program and consolidate its day to day operation into one body.

In 1993 JITCO introduced a new system that consisted of two segments. In addition to the Industrial Training

Program (ITP) a new initiative was introduced called the Technical Internship Program (TIP). This dual system remains
to this day and the differences between the two parts are outlined below (See ITP/TIP Comparison). To simplify matters

persons partaking in the ITP and TIP will be referred to as trainees and interns respectively.

Public and Private Channels

At this point it should be noted that trainees and interns can be accepted into the internship program through

either public or private channels. In addition to private JITCO supported trainees, a significant number are supported by

the Japanese state in the form of governmental bodies such as the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and

the Association for Overseas Technical Scholarship (AOTS). 13,817 (18.3% of total) trainees were permitted into the

program through such organisations in 2004 (Kawakami (2006), 71). Publicly supported interns receive governmental

subsidies to partly fund their training. A Korea Labour Institute report on trends in international labour migration states

that:

“Half the costs of air tickets, initial medical examination fees after arrival in Japan, training preparation fees,

and training allowances are all subsidized from the government coffers.”

(KLI (2004), 255).

Employers also receive subsidies to ensure that training is implemented to a sufficient standard. These funds alleviate the

costs incurred by businesses when taking on trainees and are integral to the success of the schemes supported by the

aforementioned organisations.

Direct and Indirect Placement

Having summarised the public transfer of trainees and interns the private form of transfer is explained below.

There are currently two methods by which trainees and interns are privately accepted. They may be transferred directly,

usually by a Japanese company with offices in developing nations that wishes to transfer skills to staff that can only be

taught domestically, or indirectly, by officially sanctioned organisations that represent SMEs. Both systems are regulated

by JITCO. Companies enacting a direct internship scheme tend to be larger than those going through indirect channels

(such as industrial bodies).

The number of cases in which companies directly employ ITP and TIP participants is decreasing, falling from

around 10,000 in 2001 to just under 7,000 in 2007. In stark contrast the number of trainees brought into Japan by the
indirect method rose by over 37,000 in the same period (JITCO figures (2007)). These figures show that SMEs are

becoming increasingly reliant on the labour provided through the internship system.

I have focused my research on the indirect, organisation backed method of internship for two reasons. Firstly,

the majority of trainees and interns now go through this channel. Secondly, prior research suggests that private interns

are at less risk of abuse. Of the 688 cases of illegal activity identified by the Ministry of Justice Immigration Bureau's

recent study, 97% related to indirect organisation supported internships (Fujieda (2007), 89).

Roles of Stakeholders

Figure 1 shows just how complicated the current system has become. Broadly speaking there are five key

component parts to the system: the individual trainee or intern, the employer, the sending organisation, the receiving (or

accepting) organisation and JITCO. Below both the individual roles of the five stakeholders and the way in which they

interact with one another are analysed. Although not integral to the internship process itself the role of trade unions is

also addressed as they too have a vested interest in the system.

1) Trainees/Interns

Figure 2 shows the number of ITP and TIP participants from 2001 to 2007. 71,819 individuals were admitted

into the ITP program in 2007. This marks a rise of 52% from the 2001 total. The majority come from developing nations

in East Asia with Chinese nationals making up 85% of the total as of 2006. The number of Vietnamese (5.4%),

Indonesian (4.7%) and Filipino (3.6%) trainees are less significant but show the geographical range of the catchment area

(Fujieda (2007), 88).

In 2006 41,000 trainees changed their visa status and were inducted into the Technical Internship Programme.

This number too has been rising along with the growth in total ITP participants. In 2007 64.2% of trainees continued on

to become interns (JITCO (2007)).

In recent years the number of female trainees and interns has risen noticeably and in some industries female

participants now outnumber males. The vast majority of female ITP and TIP participants work in the textiles industry.

According to JITCO (2005, 11) records, 65% of all female interns were engaged in internships in this sector in 2003. In

comparison, this sector made up only 5% of the total number of male interns. It would seem that the rise in the number of

female workers is directly linked to the sharp increase in the number of trainees and interns active in the textiles industry.
2) Employers

In 2006 the number of companies employing ITP and TIP participants totalled 21,665 and 17,218 respectively.

This marks a 76% rise in the number of employers accepting trainees and an increase of 89% in the number of companies

extending traineeships into internships from 1996 levels (Nakazawa (2007), p 58).

As mentioned above the number of cases in which intermediary organisations are used by businesses to provide

access to the two programs is increasing year after year. The majority of firms that utilise this method are SMEs that lack

the international networks of larger firms. Over half (56.5%) of enterprises accepting interns employ less than 20 people

(Fujieda (2007), p 89). When accepting interns indirectly employers pay a fee for the services provided by the receiving

organisation.

The textiles industry is the largest employer of trainees and interns, the number of ITP and TIP participants in

this sector exceeded 15,000 in 2006 and comprised 29.5% of the total number of interns admitted into the system

(Nakazawa (2007), 58). Machine work is the second largest employer of interns (12,557 placements) followed by food

production and packaging (6,117), agriculture (3,341) and construction (3,930). In should be noted that there are

limitations on the industries in which trainees and interns can participate. These are studied further below (see ITP/TIP

comparison).

3) Dispatching (Sending/Receiving) Organisations

Sending organisations handle the application process, administration of paperwork and pre-departure training of

interns in their respective home nations. Both private and governmental organisations facilitate this process. According to

JITCO statistics there are a total of 489 sending organisations currently operating across Asia (JITCO (2008a)). These

organisations are regulated by the governments of sender nations and receive a monthly payment of around ¥33,000 per

trainee which is split between receiving organisations and employers (MHLW (2007), 23).

Receiving organisations take over once the trainee arrives in Japan, allocating a workplace and inducting them

into the ITP. In many cases the receiving organisation is responsible for the provision of training. This is due to the fact

that the small firms that are represented by these bodies are not in a position to provide training of a sufficient standard.

Receiving organisations pay JITCO a license fee to partake in the initiative. As of 2005 there were 1,116 receiving

organisations active in Japan (MHLW (2007), 3).

4) JITCO

According to its official website JITCO is a “charitable organization with a shared jurisdiction among five

Ministries: the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare, the

Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transportation.”(JITCO

(2008b)).

Since its establishment in 1991 the focus of JITCO’s activities has been the regulation and day to day running of

the TIP and ITP. A number of publications are printed and distributed by the organisation including Japanese textbooks,

newsletters and handbooks regarding life in Japan. As many ITP and TIP participants have only a basic understanding of

Japanese these publications are also made available in their native languages.

JITCO is partly funded by the government but also receives revenue in the form of registration fees paid by

dispatching organisations. Revenues for 2006 totalled over ¥1.2 billion (Braser (2007)). Dependence on state investment

is falling as the number of dispatching organisations rises in line with the system's expansion.

Both firms who accept interns directly and intermediary bodies must adhere to the regulations set out

by JITCO. Changes in regulations are communicated to firms though the organisation and failure to comply with

legislation can result in the cancellation of a company's internship agreement.

5) Unions

Japan’s influential organisation of labour unions Rengo (Japanese Trade Union Confederation) has, in the past,

been opposed to the acceptance of foreign labour. However, recent reports indicate that this stance is gradually changing

from one of opposition to grudging acceptance. Ohmi’s account of the 14th Central Executive Committee Rengo’s

position on foreign labour states that:

“The acceptance of foreign workers should be confined to occupations requiring specialized knowledge, skills

and technologies, and carried out, in principle, in the ways maintaining a balance with the employment of

Japanese workers and the public consensus.”

(Ohmi (2005, pp. 120)

Similarities with the government’s stance are evident and it is clear that there is concern that an influx of unskilled

migrant workers could have negative implications for the pay and working conditions of unskilled Japanese workers.
Rengo supports the idea of equal rights for non-Japanese workers although their policy on the ITP and TIP systems is

unclear.

One organisation that has a very clear stance on the foreign internship system is the Zentôitsu (All United)

Workers Union (ZWU). This union differs from many others as it works across a range of industries representing both

Japanese and foreign temporary (haken) workers, mostly employed in SMEs. As such Zentôitsu has been active in

campaigning for improvements in human rights for interns and trainees. They have organised protests and established the

Advocacy Network for Foreign Trainees in order to inform and educate both the public and the trainees themselves, who

often lack sufficient information regarding the system in which they are participating.

ITP/TIP Comparison

Having set out the roles played by the various stakeholder groups, the following section explains the numerous

differences between the Industrial Training Program and the Technical Internship Program. Figure 3 shows the defining

characteristics of the two programs.

The Industrial Training Program (ITP)

The Industrial Training Programme facilitates the acceptance of foreign nationals into Japan for the purpose of

obtaining basic technical skills. The maximum length of stay is limited to one year and trainees must return home or

continue on to the Technical Internship Programme upon completion of their stay. The ratio of trainees to regular staff is,

in principle, limited to one in twenty. However, this does not apply to all employers: “the “limit” on acceptable numbers

is relaxed for association managed training” (JITCO, 2004, 2).

Trainees hold a similar visa status to exchange students (defined as a “training” visa) during their stay and as

such they are not permitted to receive payment for their activities whilst in Japan. However, trainees must be provided

with an “allowance” by employers for every day expenses such as food and clothing. According to JITCO figures the

majority of trainees (58.7%) received between ¥60,000 and ¥80,000 per month in 2002 (JITCO, 2004, 43).

The average allowance received by both directly and indirectly employed trainees has been steadily declining

over the past decade. This is particularly evident in relation to indirect trainees whose average monthly remuneration fell

from ¥86,000 in 1997 to ¥66,000 in 2002 (Kawakami (2006), 77). There is also a discrepancy between the wages
received by direct and indirect trainees with company sponsored trainees receiving around ¥22,000 a month more than

indirectly employed interns.

To ensure that the educational aims of the initiative are met trainees are not permitted to engage in overtime

work and one third of their time must be spent in lectures. The contents of these classes vary from Japanese language to

skills related to their work placement. In the case of organisation backed employers, who often lack the funds to back

such classes, they are provided by the receiving organisation.

Upon competition of the traineeship interns have two options. They can return to their home country or continue

on to the Technical Internship Program. In order to advance onto the TIP trainees must first pass grade 2 of The National

Skills Test. Passing this test is thought to signify that the participant has endeavoured to learn new skills during their first

year and can be expected to actively develop these skills further during the TIP.

The Technical Internship Program (TIP)

Trainees who successfully pass the skills test are admitted into the Technical Internship Program. As an intern

participants are expected to develop the basic skills that they learnt as a trainee to an advanced level during a period of up

to two years. Interns must remain at the workplace where they undertook their traineeship but they are subject to different

employment standards.

Firstly their visa status changes from “training” to “designated activities”. This visa permits the holder to

receive wages for their activities. Also, unlike trainees, interns are protected by the same provisions as Japanese workers

such as the Labour Standards Act, Industrial Health and Safety Law, Workmen’s Accident Compensation Insurance Law

and Minimum Wage Legislation (MHLW (1993), 107).

JITCO figures for 2002 show that the average monthly wage of an intern was ¥120,000, with 76.2% receiving

between ¥110,000 and ¥140,000. However, it seems that interns’ wages too have been in decline in recent years.

Whereas in 1997 the percentage of interns receiving less than ¥120,000 was 23% by 2004 it had risen to 58% (Kawakami

(2006), 81).

Once the duration of the TIP is over an intern must return to their home country immediately. Return airfares are

provided by the accepting organisation for both trainees and interns upon competition of their respective programs.

Repeat application to either program is currently not permitted.

Complexity and Effective Application

As outlined above the present incarnation of the internship system is incredibly complex and bureaucratic. The

dual ITP/TIP system’s combination with a complicated international labour souring process presents many challenges for

JITCO as the initiative’s regulatory body.

The smooth running of both programs relies heavily on the conviction of all concerned stakeholders. First,

participants must actively engage with employers to obtain new skills and knowledge. Second, employers must be fully

aware of their responsibilities to train and educate trainees and interns. Third, sending and receiving organisations must

work in partnership to allow for a transparent flow of information. Finally JITCO must fulfil its role by providing

guidance and settling disputes when they arise.

In such a complicated system it is unsurprising that problems occur. In the next section these problems are

explored in detail through an analysis of several case studies.

Abuse of Trainees and Interns

Both the Industrial Training Program and the Technical Internship Program have suffered widespread criticism

in recent years. With cases of abusive treatment making headlines some argue that the government is disguising what is

essentially a guest worker program as a foreign aid scheme. In his summary of trends in post-war labour migration

Kuwahara states that:

“The internship program is…a device to maintain the official policy of not accepting unskilled labor from

abroad, while letting foreigners, in practice, work as such.”

(Kuwahara (2005), 39)

This disparity between the government’s stance on immigration and the labour needs of SMEs lies at the heart of the

current debate on the acceptance of foreign workers and has had profound implications for the current system. In this

chapter the issues surrounding the treatment of trainees and interns are critically assessed.

Firstly, it should be noted that many of the firms who employ trainees and interns, either directly or indirectly,

do so in line with current legislation. In these companies the invaluable contribution of trainees and interns is fully

appreciated and as such they are treated with the same respect as Japanese workers. One account of best practice at a

Hiroshima shipbuilding yard portrays veteran employees working alongside trainees and interns facilitating an effective
transition of skills and knowledge (Keizai shinbun (2007a)). Unfortunately, this can not be said to be the case across the

board and the illegal treatment of interns has continued despite efforts to reform the two programs.

The exact number of cases in which trainees and interns are subject to abuse is difficult to calculate for several

reasons. A lack of Japanese language proficiency combined with fears of deportation lead to a situation in which trainees

and interns are often unwilling to come forward to report employers who are acting illegally. Figures compiled by the

Ministry of Justice state that the number of cases of illegal activity totalled 229 in 2006, up from 92 when records began

in 2003 (METI (2007a), p 5). However, for the reasons outlined above these statistics are unlikely to show the true extent

of abuse within the system. Also these numbers only account for the most serious disputes that develop into court cases.

The number of less serious offences is harder to ascertain however reports indicate that the majority of

employers are not acting in line with current regulations. A recent survey carried out by the Saitama Labour Bureau

found that as many as 88% of employers were acting in violation of current regulations. A breakdown of the

infringements states that in 63.3% of the firms consulted trainees were working on holidays and outside their regular

hours and 34.4% were not adhering to alterations in legislation (Keizai Shinbun (2007)). Such widespread ignorance of

the system's regulations is one factor that perpetuates abuse within the system.

Key to the debate as to whether the TIP and ITP are disguised migrant labour schemes or bona fide contributors

to international co-operation and skill transition is the standard of training received by trainees and interns. Despite

numerous studies the true level of training within the system remains unclear. A survey of 63 returnees conducted by

JITCO (2005, pp. 31) states that over 80% answered that they thought that their training had either been “conducted as

planned” or “more or less conducted as planned”. However this report conflicts with independent surveys. One such

study states that as many as 70% felt that they had not received sufficient training during their time in Japan (Fujimoto

(2002), 15). Both of these surveys suffer from small sample sizes and can not be considered representative of the entire

system. However the disparity in their results shows that training standards can vary from industry to industry or even

from workplace to workplace. A widespread, inter-industry census of ITP and TIP participants is needed in order to

establish whether or not trainees and interns are receiving sufficient training.

Case Study Analysis

A collection of accounts from trainees and interns who suffered abuse at the hands of Japanese employers

published by the Advocacy Network for Foreign Trainees in 2006 showcases a number of flaws in the current system.
These cases along with a number of newspaper articles are used below in an attempt to establish the realities of abuse

within the two programs.

The internship system has been at the heart of numerous legal disputes over the past decade. The failings in the

system were first brought to the attention of the public by the Chiba Case in which fifteen Chinese interns took their

receiving organisation to court. Since then a number of trainees and interns have taken legal action against employers,

dispatch organisations and JITCO. A closer analysis of these cases highlights numerous flaws in the current system.

Unpaid Wages: The Chiba Case

In December 1998 fifteen Chinese trainees who were employed in Choshi City, Chiba prefecture, took their

receiving company (The All-Japan Fresh Food Logistics Co-operative, hereafter referred to as the Co-operative) to court

over a dispute regarding unpaid wages.

The Co-operative’s main role was the dispatching of trainees and interns to seafood processing companies.

Under the agreement between employers and the Co-operative trainees wages were paid indirectly through the receiving

organisation.

Claims brought against the Co-operative in the Chiba case accused the organisation of deducting excessive

“management charges” from the pay of trainees who were also thought to have been forced to partake in so-called

“savings” schemes. These “savings” schemes amounted to the Co-operative deducted ¥24,000 a month from trainees’

salaries (Zha (2002), 146) after promising to return the money once the trainees had completed their stay in Japan and

returned home. This was thought to deter trainees from staying illegally in Japan once their visa expired. In numerous

cases this money was never returned.

When all of these factors are taken into account the actual salary received by the trainees differed dramatically

to that set out in their contracts. Zha’s account of the case states that they received only ¥37,000 of their ¥96,000

contracted monthly salary which amounts to less than a third of Chiba’s minimum wage of ¥124,600(Zha (2002), 146).

The Co-operative attempted to defend its actions by contending the application of Japanese law to a case of

international significance arguing that:

“The employment contract offered to the trainees was part of an international business exchange program

between Japan and China, and should not be regarded in the same way as contracts between employers and

individual employees.”(Zha (2002), 146)

However when the case came to a close in January 2001 the District Court held that the Co-operative’s actions were in

violation of Japan’s Labour Standards Law. The two defendants were issued jail sentences and the Co-operative was

ordered to return the wages owed to the trainees.

Significance of the Chiba Case

The Chiba Case highlighted the detrimental impact of illicit brokers acting within the system. Disguising

kickbacks from trainees’ wages as management charges and retaining money obtained through forced savings schemes

are two methods used by brokers to extort the very individuals that their organisation is supposed to be supporting.

This case is thought to be significant in that it was the first instance in which interns succeeded in claiming

unpaid wages. It was also the first time that individual members of an organisation were held directly responsible for the

mistreatment of trainees under their supervision (Moban (2006), p 5).

Although the Chiba Case brought the treatment of trainees to the attention of the public little progress was made

with regards to the reformation of the system. As a result trainees and interns have continued to suffer harsh working

conditions to this day. In December 2007 four Chinese interns dispatched to Kumamoto Prefecture took JITCO to court

over allegations of withheld pay, passport confiscation and extortionate overtime in a case echoing that of 1998 (Asahi

Shinbun (2007)). One account of the interns' working conditions states that they received just ¥300 an hour, less than half

the prefectural minimum wage (Asahi Shinbun (2008a)).

The two cases differ in that the Kumamoto case focuses on JITCO's role and not that of an individual employer

or dispatch organisation. A number of legal actions are currently in process alleging that the organisation often acts in

negligence of the abuses suffered by trainees and interns. In one recent case of sexual harassment JITCO stands accused

of ignoring its supervisorial duties (Hongo (2007)). The onus seems to have shifted from blaming rights abuses on

individuals to putting responsibility firmly in the hands of the regulators. The findings of these cases will say much about

the true nature of the entire system.

Brokers Burdening Trainees with Debt: The Nagano Case

In September 2004 two Mongolian trainees disappeared from their workplace in Nagano prefecture. There was

no sign of abuse by the employer and the reason for their disappearance only became clear when one of the interns tuned

up at the Mongolian embassy.

 Before coming to Japan she had paid ¥400,000 to a broker who was posing as a legitimate dispatch organisation

(Takahashi (2006), 48). With much of her monthly salary of ¥60,000 being spent on food and other necessities it soon

became clear that even if she saved enough to pay back her debt there would be little left over once she returned home.

This prompted her to run away in search of better-paid illegal employment.

Many potential trainees pay sending organisations in their home nation to participate in the ITP. This fee is said

to be used to cover pre-departure training and travel costs: however, these are, in principle, paid by employers to

receiving organisations and so should not be imposed upon individual trainees. Despite this many pay the fees with the

hope of profiting from their increased earning potential in Japan, often taking out large loans in the process. The low pay

received by trainees means that once in Japan they find it difficult to recoup their initial investment during the program.

In such cases the individual has no choice but to work overtime for low pay in an effort to repay their debt. Efforts to

crack down on this practice have had little impact as many brokers have established makeshift organisations to give

themselves an air of authenticity.

Rising Number of Disappearances

The increase in the number of brokers abusing the system and the low rate of pay received by trainees has

pushed up the number of trainees disappearing from their workplaces. In 1999 the number of cases of interns and trainees

disappearing from their workplace stood at 513. This number exceeded 2000 for the first time in 2003 and totalled 2201

as of 2006. At the start of 2007 there were an estimated 3,333 trainees and interns illegally staying in Japan (MOJ (2007),

2) and this number has remained fairly constant over recent years in a period in which the government cracked down on

visa over-stayers.

A number of methods are used to deter trainees and interns from running away. The most direct approach is the

confiscation of passports. Under Japanese law any non-native who does not hold an Alien Registration Card has to carry

their passport with them at all times and failure to do so can incur fines of up to ¥100,000 (Fujimoto (2002), 19). Despite

this trainees are often forced to sign over their passports to receiving organisations. In one form designed to facilitate this

process, written in Japanese and Indonesian, a phrase stating that “whenever necessary your passport will be returned to

you” (author's translation) is omitted from the Indonesian text (Pramudiono (2006), 39). This practice amounts to theft

and suggestions that organisations hold onto the passports for “safekeeping” are laughable. Although on occasions such

as the transition into the TIP system receiving organisations need access to a participant's passport these are exceptional

cases and the illegal confiscation of passports is inexcusable.

Institutionalised Abuse of Trainees and Interns: The Toyota Case

The aforementioned cases epitomise the faults within the system but each focuses on a small group of trainees

or interns. The Toyota case differs from these in the sheer scale of mistreatment.

In May 2006 the Toyota Technology Exchange Cooperative, a receiving organisation that provided trainees for

twenty three of Toyota’s suppliers, was ordered to cease all activities by the Ministry of Justice Immigration Bureau

(Sawata (2008), 84). Reports of low pay, unpaid overtime, forced saving schemes and sexual harassment show the

variety of abuses suffered by the trainees and interns dispatched by the organisation.

One chairman has been quoted as saying that “working conditions were set by the co-operative” (Sakamaki

(2007)). Firms who lack knowledge regarding the correct treatment of trainees and interns often turn to receiving

organisations for advice. Nishioka ((2004), 29) notes that 74.1% of firms decide interns’ salaries after consulting their

receiving organisation. Such reliance on these organisations can become problematic if the advice that they provide is not

accurate. In the Toyota Case the guidelines provided by the receiving organisation seem to be at least partly responsible

for the treatment suffered by trainees and interns.

In total two hundred trainees and interns were affected by the court’s injunction. They were told that they would

be deported if another supporting organisation could not be found within four months. Temporary visas were issued but

these did not permit the holder to engage in any form of paid activity (Sawata (2008), 85). Essentially the trainees and

interns were forced into unemployment with no means of earning a living until another supporting organisation was

found. In September all two hundred trainees and interns were transferred to a new organisation and so were able to stay

in Japan. An undisclosed sum was subsequently paid out to those involved in compensation for unpaid earnings but no

remuneration was provided for the three months spent with no source of income.

Large Scale Abuse

In a statement made to the BBC a JITCO official asserted that “individual cases should not be used to generalise

about the whole scheme” (Hogg (2007)). This case shows that abuse within the system amounts to more than a few

isolated cases and the institutional abuse of interns as labourers seems to be far more widespread than JITCO is willing to

admit. When one organisation is at fault this can have repercussions for dozens of firms and in turn hundreds of

individuals.
 The disregard shown to the two hundred trainees and interns affected is also concerning. They were left without

an income for months and without union intervention may have been forced to return home. It was the receiving

organisation and the firms that it supplied that are at fault in this case and yet it is the very people who suffered abuse at

their hands that have been indirectly punished.

As the cases above have shown there is widespread malpractice across several areas of the system. The Chiba

and Kumamoto cases highlight the employment conditions endured by some migrants. In the Nagano case the existence

of illegal brokers was brought to light in addition to the factors that provoke trainees and interns to run away from their

placements. Finally the Toyota case proves that abuses occur not only as isolated incidents but can be instigated on a

large scale to the detriment of hundreds of individual trainees and interns.

The Impact of the Current System on Intern Abuse

The cases highlighted above give an insight into the abuses prevalent in the current system. Employers, sending

organisations and receiving organisations have all found ways to bypass regulations resulting in the use of trainees and

interns as labourers. But where do the flaws in the current system lie and can the system itself be considered partly

responsible for the offences that occur? In this chapter the extent to which the structure of the system contributes to the

use of trainees and interns as labourers is analysed.

A 2007 report by the Ministry of Health Labour and Welfare regarding the problem areas of the TIP and ITP

identified three possible types of internship, each varying in the extent to which the aims of the schemes are met. Fig 4 is

based upon this model. “Type A” corresponds to interns who receive training in line with JITCO regulations, returning

home with greater employment prospects. “Type B” refers to interns who although, at first, are accepted in order to

counter-act labour shortfalls, manage to procure skills through on-the-job training. In this way the aims of skill transition

are met albeit not to the same standard as in the “Type A” case. “Type C” refers to interns who receive little or no

training who are used as unskilled labour resulting in violations of their rights and a total failure to meet the goals of the

system. These three categories are used below to clarify the scope of the problems within the system.

I have identified four aspects of the ITP and TIP system that contribute to the use of interns as labourers. They

are the legal status of trainees, the existence of brokers in sender nations, the limitations imposed on the activities of

participants and the regulatory role of JITCO.

1) Lack of Protection for Trainees

As noted previously a lack of clarity regarding the legal status of trainees has allowed them to be exploited as

unskilled labourers. The disparity between the rights of trainees and interns is hard to justify as they are essentially

performing the same day to day tasks but for different amounts of pay and with differing labour standards.

This difference in standards has pushed up the number of “Type B” trainees as although they often perform

activities banned by JITCO regulations, such as overtime, there is still potential for training to occur through class based

lectures and OJT.

“Type A” cases can also be perpetuated by the lack of legal protection offered to trainees. Preventing the illicit

practices of low pay and harsh working conditions outlined above is made difficult by the lack of applicable legislation.

2) Broker System

The existence of brokers in sender nations is a particularly worrying phenomenon as sending organisations are

inherently harder to regulate than domestically based companies. Public channels alone can not cope with the increasing

demand for trainees and so private organisations have filled this void to great effect. However firms that illegally profit

from individuals by charging false fees must be more actively sought out and punished.

Brokers exploit two aspects of the current system. First, they profit from the lack of information available

regarding the system. Although JITCO has made efforts to translate documents into other languages and makes them

available online more needs to be done so that applicants can easily distinguish genuine sending organisations from

brokers. Second, insufficient international regulation of sending organisations creates an environment in which once a

license is awarded very little is done to ensure that standards are being maintained.

The practice of international labour contracting via a broker is normally associated with illegal people

trafficking but it has been unwillingly legitimised by the current internship system. As seen in the Nagano case these

organisations increase the likelihood of a trainee becoming a “Type C” case. It is the sending country’s government that

licenses and regulates sending organisations (MHLW (2007), 8), as such international communication between the

relevant governmental bodies must be improved to combat the activities of brokers.

3) Limitation to Menial Jobs

 The limitation of the two programs to primary sector and manufacturing positions also casts doubt on the

effectiveness of the system. It seems highly unlikely that an intern will continue to develop new skills over the three-year

period in such positions. This fact is compounded by the immobility of trainees and interns. If training is truly the

primary aim of the system then surely gaining experience at more than one employer during their stay would allow

participants to pick up a greater variety of skills in a range of industries.

JITCO guidelines also state that in the case of association managed training applicants should “have had

experience working on the same types of duties that they will experience in training in Japan” (JITCO (2004), 5).

Participants are required to have several years experience in the industry in which they wish to work and this too seems

to contradict the aim of skills transition as trainees and interns often find themselves employed in positions similar to that

which they held in their home nation. Surely training an unemployed worker from a developing nation would better fit

the aims of the system.

These limitations on an individual’s economic activity do not necessarily impact on the transition of skills to

participants but the inability to change workplace raises the risk of an intern falling into the “Type B” or “Type C”

categories. Enabling individuals to transfer from one firm to another within the same industry would allow for the

improvement of labour standards as firms would no longer be able to abuse trainees and interns as they could simply

report the employer and move to a new location. Many participants, especially those with only a basic knowledge of

Japanese, feel trapped by the current regulations.

4) Weakness of JITCO

The lack of intervention by JITCO prior to the Chiba Case shows its weakness as a regulatory body. To deflect

responsibility for the incident JITCO claimed that the resources at its disposal were limited and so effective monitoring

of all its member groups was inherently difficult (Zha (2002), 147). However JITCO has a well-established network of

regional offices throughout Japan and so this defence seems to put in question their role. If the regional office in Chiba

did not have sufficient power to deal with the dispute when and where it occurred then this could be seen as one

contributing factor that led to the escalation of the Chiba Case to its eventual conclusion in the courts.

There is a mounting body of evidence that suggests that trainees and interns are not receiving the support they

need from JITCO. In addition to the cases outlined above Sawata discusses one case in which calls for help were ignored

by JITCO officials who stated that they were “too busy to help”(Sawata (2007), 83). Such ignorance of offences
undoubtedly allows “Type C” cases to continue unchecked. JITCO’s role within the system needs to be reassessed, as it

is currently not performing its regulatory duties to a sufficient standard.

It is clear that employers who wish to use trainees and interns as unskilled labourers can easily exploit certain

aspects of the current system. The international nature and complexity of the initiative makes regulation difficult but that

does not justify the lack of action taken by JITCO to protect trainees and interns. The government has come to realise

that without reform matters will only become worse.

Plans for Reform

As discussed above many of the issues faced by trainees and interns are deeply rooted in the shortcomings of the

current system and calls for reformation have put pressure on the government to take action. Domestically the work of

the Japanese media and unions such as Zentôitsu has raised the public profile of the system and its abuse. International

concerns have also been raised regarding the use of interns as labourers. The US State Department’s 2007 report on

human trafficking suggested that “the government should make greater efforts to investigate the possible forced labor

conditions of workers in the "foreign trainee" program”(US State Dept. (2007), 125).

The government has reacted to calls for reform by promising to improve the system to better meet the needs of

its stakeholders. The plans currently being considered are discussed below with reference to their potential as remedies

for the flaws in the system. In March of 2006 representatives from several government ministries formed the “Foreign

Labour Project Team” (FLPT) to look into the various issues posed by the inflow of immigrant workers (MoJ (2007), p

3). In their first report the group recognised that within the TIP and ITP the use of trainees and interns as unskilled

labourers for low pay was common. It was also noted that the number of cases of illegal practice was particularly high

amongst indirectly transferred trainees and suggested measures such as the stricter regulation of dispatching

organisations to prevent the infringement of participants' rights in the future.

The cabinet approved the “3 year reform plan” in June 2007. It builds upon the suggestions made by the FLPT

and focuses on three key areas of the system: the legal protection of trainees, the regulation of an intern's visa status and

the reformation of the systems regulations. The government hopes to use the findings of this study to develop new

legislation in 2009 (MoJ (2007), 3).

Three plans for the systematic reform have been put forward by Justice Minister Jinen Nagase the Ministry of

Economy, Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Health Labour and Welfare. The former has latter has proposed that

the system be replaced by a guest worker scheme and the latter two have suggested similar schemes in which the current
internship program is amended to better protect the rights of trainees and interns (Kiguchi (2007), 100). The applicability

of these two approaches is discussed below.

Conversion to a Guest Worker Program

The Justice Minister’s proposal to introduce a 3-year guest worker scheme in the place of the current system has

received a mixed response. Although this tactic would better meet the needs of SMEs suffering from labour shortages

there is widespread concern regarding the implications for Japanese society as a whole. A report by the Japan Council of

Metalworkers’ Unions states that the introduction of a guest worker program would make conditions worse for migrants

and points to the issues now posed by immigration in several European countries (HIC-JC (2007), 2).

The Korean government has recently enacted a guest worker scheme to replace the carbon copy of the ITP

introduced in 1993. The Industrial Technical Training Program (ITTP) was introduced in an attempt to stem the flow of

illegal workers into the country. However Korea’s trainee system suffered from the same issues as the original scheme.

Dong-Hoon ((2005), 100) notes that trainees were “put to work despite not being recognised as workers under existing

labour laws”. This led to the introduction of the Employment Permit Program (EPP) in 2003. This initiative does away

with the focus on training of the previous program. Korea now operates a dual system with the aim of gradually phasing

out the trainee program. Although the success of the EPP in stamping out abuse it is as yet unclear, migrant labour

schemes have been used to great effect elsewhere to the mutual benefit of both labourers and employers.

When planned properly guest worker schemes can benefit both employers and migrants in equal measure. One

case of best practice in Canada, where Mexican agricultural workers are employed on a seasonal basis, proves that a well

thought out, strictly regulated system can pay dividends for all involved (Martin (2006), 18).

In theory the introduction of a guest worker program would rectify many of the issues that are faced by migrants

in the internship and trainee programs. The application of labour laws to participants would prevent the abuses caused by

the lack of clarity regarding the legal position of trainees. Also, JITCO’s role as middleman would also be cut out

resulting in direct regulation by governmental bodies and less red tape.

However in order to successfully introduce such a scheme in Japan several hurdles would have to be overcome.

Opposition from unions, who fear that an influx of foreign labour may lead to lower employment standards for Japanese

workers, is just one of my challenges faced by this course of action. Drastic changes in both public opinion and

governmental policy are required before this course of action can be considered applicable in Japan’s case.
Alteration of the Current System

The planned reforms for the internship system put forward by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry

(METI) and the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) aim to combat both the use of trainees and interns as

labourers in Japan and the activities of brokers in sender nations.

MHLW Plan

The MHLW plan to improve the current system is based on the findings of the ITP/TIP research group (a think

tank established in October 2006 made up of academics and MHLW officials (Kiguchi (2007), 100)). A report published

by the group in 2007 suggests several recommendations such as replacing the trainee program with a third year as an

intern, cracking down on brokers in sender nations and the introducing an option to return for a further two years to

develop skills to an advanced level (MHLW (2007)).

By replacing the first year of ITP with a third year as an intern it is hoped that the application of labour

legislation will eliminate the legal grey area in which trainees now find themselves. Thus this measure should bring about

a rise in both pay levels and general working conditions in the first year.

The MHLW report warns against extending the internship period as preventing interns to bring their families to

Japan over a longer timeframe may be seen as an infringement of human rights (MHLW (2007), 20). In light of this the

introduction of an “Advanced Internship System” has been suggested. This would allow former interns who showed

exceptional ability during the program to return to Japan through private channels for a further two years in order to

develop advanced skills (MHLW (2007), 21).

Plans to crack down on the illegal actions of sending organisations and brokers are also an integral part of the

proposed reforms. It is suggested that international co-operation is needed to crack down on brokers as the regulation of

sending organisation falls under the jurisdiction of the sender nation’s government (MHLW (2007), 23).

METI Plan

The METI plan is similar to that of the MHLW in that it favours the alteration of the current internship program

as to the radical restructuring of the Justice Minister’s proposal. METI too supports the introduction of an “Advanced
Internship System” (although extends this program to public as well as private methods of dispatch) and wants to see

stricter regulation for both sending and receiving organisations.

Their 2007 report (METI(2007))does differ to the MHLW’s plans, however, in numerous ways. Firstly, the first

year as a trainee remains essentially the same. However it is proposed that trainees should partake in an induction course

in which they are taught about their rights and what to do if problems occur. The allocation of “trainee cards”, that

would include information such as JITCO helpline number, to trainees is also stipulated as a means of empowering

individuals to act against abuses should they encounter any (METI (2007), 10).

METI’s proposal varies to that of MHLW in that the onus is on education and greater transparency throughout

the system. The MHLW plan seems to be more applicable to the current faults in the system as attempting to reduce the

number of cases of abuse through education whilst maintaining the trainee program is unlikely to see substantial results.

What is to stop employers or dispatch organisation from confiscating trainee cards along with passports upon their

arrival?

Moving Forward

The three proposals for reform outlined above all have potential to improve the system. Scrapping the current

system in favour of a guest worker program would better meet the needs of SMEs but with immigration policies

becoming harsher such a scheme is unlikely to be implemented in the near future. METI’s plan to educate trainees offers

some interesting proposals but lacks the strong reforms needed to tackle the large scale abuses occurring within the

trainee program.

The MHLW’s proposed reforms seem to be the most applicable of the three in the current climate. The

proposals put forward look to have the potential to greatly benefit trainees and interns by tackling the root causes of

abuse. However the realisation of this potential relies heavily on the enforcement of stricter penalties for illegal activities

and a higher standard of regulation. Both JITCO and the governmental bodies associated with the program will need to

reconsider their roles if this new system is to succeed in preventing the use of interns as unskilled labourers.

Conclusion
 Japan’s SMEs are becoming increasingly dependent on labour supplied through the Industrial Training and

Technical Internship Programs. The labour shortages caused by the ageing population have led to year on year growth in

ITP and TIP participation and this trend is set to continue in coming years. But as the two programs have expanded the

use of trainees and interns as unskilled labour has become more widespread.

When the needs of participants and employers clash it is the trainees or interns who often find themselves

disadvantaged. As seen in the cases outlined above many employers are ignoring their responsibility to provide training

to trainees and interns, instead foreign nationals are used as unskilled labour to reduce labour costs. The Toyota case

study shows that abuses can no longer be considered isolated incidents as institutional abuses have now come to light.

Since the Chiba Case trainees and interns have been able to stand up to employers and dispatching

organisations. It is concerning, however, that the issues faced ten years ago are essentially the same as those faced today.

Low pay, forced savings, passport confiscation and excessive overtime are, for many, the realities of life as a trainee. The

protection offered to interns by Japanese labour law puts them in a better position to take legal action but problems

remain and neither trainees nor interns now hold the same rights as Japanese workers.

Numerous aspects of the system’s current structure contribute to the abuse of trainees and interns. Insufficient

regulation has caused many employers and dispatching organisations to become apathetic towards regulations. More

must be done to ensure that JITCO has sufficient powers to settle disputes when and where they occur in a timely

manner. Although interns are supposedly on an equal footing to native workers limitations on which industries they are

permitted to work in and their economic immobility are the two biggest remaining barriers to true equality. Greater

transparency between all those involved in the migration and employment of foreign nationals is needed so that the

loopholes in the system can be closed in an effort to prevent future abuse.

Plans to reform the current initiative look set to curb several of the issues outlined in this paper. The MHLW

plan to end the Industrial Trainee Program in favour of a third year of the Technical Internship Program is a step in the

right direction. However this move would detract from the governments continued assertions that the current initiative is

not a guest worker program as the reformed system would more closely resemble schemes such as Korea’s EPP.

Continuing the pretence of training in such a system will prove difficult and as such it can be expected that Japan’s

worsening labour crisis will force the government to expand the boundaries of the system in coming decades.

The introduction of reformed legislation in 2009 will hopefully lead to better working conditions for migrant

workers wishing to learn new skills in Japan. However the impact of these reforms will depend heavily on effective

regulation. Without improved communication and co-operation between employers, JITCO and the government abuses

will undoubtedly continue.

Further Research

This study has focused upon the way in which the workings of the current internship system have perpetuated

the abuse of trainees and interns. However, my research has been predominantly limited to secondary sources and a more

exhaustive survey based upon primary data from the participants themselves would undoubtedly prove valuable as the

government looks to reform the current initiative.

Glossary

English Japanese (roman script) Japanese (kanji)

Industrial Trainee Program Kenshû seido 研修制度

Technical Internship Program Ginôjishfû seido 技能実習制度

Japan International Training Co- Kokusai kenshû kyôryoku kikô 国際研修協力機構

operation Organisation (JITCO)
Sending Organisation Sôshutsu kikô 送出機構

Receiving Organisation Ukeire kikô 受入機構

Ministry of Justice (Immigration Hômushô (nyûkoku kanrikyoku) 法務省（入国管理局）

Bureau)
Ministry of Health Labour and Kôsei rôdôshô 厚生労働省
Welfare
 Ministry of Economy Trade and Keizai sangyôshô 経済産 業 省
Industry
Japan International Co- Kokusai kyôryoku kikô 国際協力機構
operation Agency (JICA)
Association for Overseas Kaigai gijutsusya kensyû kikô 海外技術者研修協会
Technical Scholarship (AOTS)
Zentôitsu Workers Union Zentôitsu rôdô kumiai 全統一労働組合
Toyota Technology Exchange 豊田技術
Cooperative

Appendix

Fig 1: Overview of the Current Internship System

Sending JITCO
Organisation

Fee Consultation
Contract Regulation
Contract

Receiving
1 Industrial Trainee Organisation
Year Trainee
Allowance

Fee Provision of classes

Administrative support

Technical Intern
 Pre-departure Selection of
training interns

“Employment”

2 Employer
Years Wages

Employment

Adapted and translated by author from Moban (2006), p.11 – 12

Fig 2: ITP and TIP Participation 2001 - 2007

ITP and TIP Participation 2001 - 2007

80000

70000

60000
No of trainees/interns

50000

Industrial Trainee
40000 Program
Technical Internship
Program
30000

20000

10000

0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Year
Source: JITCO (2007)

Fig 3: Comparison between Industrial Trainee Program and Technical Internship Program

Industrial Trainee Program Technical Internship Program

Eligible duties and occupations In keeping with applicable
immigration control laws and
regulations; must not be purely
repetitive tasks.
Target Skill Levels The National Trade Skills Tests
basic Grade 2 (training within a
period of one year).
Measures for assuring skill Formation of and adherence to
acquisition training plans.
The 62 occupations and 112 work
tasks allowed for proficiency
measurement.
The National Trade Skills Tests
basic Grade 3 (technical internship
within a period of two years).
Formulation of and adherence to
technical internship plans.

Required residence status “Trainee” “Designated Activities”

Worker Status Trainees have no worker status; Interns are treated as workers.
not permitted to work.
Overtime or holiday duty Not allowed. Allowed.
Protective measures for foreigners Protection is offered under
immigration control laws and
regulations.
Transparency of terms and Trainees are sent notification
conditions stipulating training hours,
allowances and other terms and
conditions.
Welfare guarantees provided by Trainees are paid a training
accepting organizations allowance to cover their living
expenses.
Insurance against accidents and Private insurance coverage is
illness obligatory; arranged by accepting
organizations as per the
immigration control laws.
Adapted from JITCO (2004), p. 12
Protection is offered under laws and
regulations.
Interns are provided contracts or
notification stipulating working
terms and conditions.
Interns are rewarded with wages for
their labor performance as an intern.
National social and worker
insurance programs are obligatory.

Fig 4: The three types of intern (or trainee)

Overview Training Result

Type A Transferred explicitly Pre-departure training Aims of the system are
for the purposes of allows for the effective met
training transition of skills
Type B Brought in to Occasionally used as Although not as
compliment the labour but skills are effective as A, skill
existing workforce. transferred through on transfer occurs and so
the job training can be seen as meeting
the program’s aims
Type C Used as unskilled Rights abuses and In direct conflict with
labourers for low pay illegal activities both the regulations
prevent the intern from and aims of the system
learning new skills
Adapted and Translated from MHLW (2007), p 26

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Keizai Shinbun (2007a) “jigyôjyô 88% hôrei ihan (88% of firms in violation of regulations)” Keizai Shinbun, August 18
2007, p 40

____________ (2007b) “rinjin no kenri motome honsô (Pushing for the rights of our “neighbors”)” Keizai Shinbun,
November 8 2007, p 9

____________ (2007c) “kokusaika no atsuryoku uchigawa kara (International Pressures from the Japanese Perspective)”
Leizai Shinbun December 18 2007, p 23

Kiguchi, Shinichi (2007), “gaikokujin kenshû ginôjisyûseido no minaoshi no arikata nitsuite (Summary of reforms in the
TIP and ITP system)” kikanrôdôhô (Labour Law Quarterly), Winter 2007, No. 219, pp. 100 - 114

KLI (2004) “A Comparitive Study on Labor Migration in Selected Countries” Korea Labor Institute

Kuwahara, Yasuo (2005), “Migrant Workers in the Post Was History of Japan” Japan Labor Review, Vol 2 (No 4), p 25 -
47
OECD (2006), “International Migration Outlook,” Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris

Ohmi, Naoto (2005) “Problems of Foreign Worker Policy in Japan – From the Labor Union Viewpoint” Japan Labour
Review, Vol 2 (No 4), Aug 2005

Ono, Gorou (2007) “gaikokujin roudousya ukeireha nihonwo mudanisuru (Accepting Foreign Workers Spoils Japan)”
Yosensha Publishing

Pramudiono, Iko (2006), “aru indoneshiajin kensyûsei no niki (An Indonesian Trainee’s Diary)” gaikokujin kenshûsei
jisyû 300 en no rôdôsha (Foreign Trainees: The 300 Yen per hour labourers), Advocacy Network for Foreign Trainees
(Tokyo), p 35-39

Makoto, Ogawa (2005) “Current Issues Concerning Foreign Workers in Japan” Japan Labour Review, Vol 2 (No 4), Aug
2005

Martin, Philip (2006), “Regulating private recruiters: The core issues,” Merchants of Labour, International Labour
Organization, Geneva, pp. 13-26

METI (2007a), “gaikokujin kenshûsei ginôjisyûseido ni kansuru kenkyûkai torimatome (Findings of the ITP/TIP
research group)” Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry

____ (2007b), “White Paper on International Economy and Trade 2007” Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry

MHLW (1993), “ ginôjisyûseido suishin jigyô unei kihon hôshin (General Policies for Businesses Enacting the Technical
Internship Program)” Ministry of Health Labour and Welfare

______ (2007), “kenshû ginôjisyûseido kenshûkaichûkan hôkoku (ITP/TIP research group interim report)” Ministry of
Health Labour and Welfare

MIC (2007), “Statistical Handbook of Japan” Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication

Moban, Fu (2006), “Chôshi jiken ikô, nani ga kawatanoka? (What has changed since the Choshi incident?)” gaikokujin
kenshûsei jisyû 300 en no rôdôsha (Foreign Trainees: The 300 Yen per hour labourers), Advocacy Network for Foreign
Trainees (Tokyo), p 5 – 15

MoJ (2007), “ kenshûsei oyobi ginôjisyûseido nyuukoku zairyuu kannri ni kannsuru shishin (Guidance relating to the
management and immigration of ITP and TIP participants)” Ministry of Justice Immigration Bureau, Dec 2007

Nakazawa (2007) “gaikokujin rôdôsha wo dô ukeireruka (How can foreign workers be admitted into Japan?)” sekai no
rôdô (World Labour Journal) 2007, No. 10, p 50 – 61

Nishioka (2004) “ginôjisyûsei no katsuyô jitai to nihonjin shain tono daitai kankei nitsuite (The use of interns to replace
Japnese employees)” nihon rôdô kenkyû zashi (Japan Labour Research Journal), No 351 (Oct 2004), p 26 - 34

Sakamaki, Sachiko (2007) ““slave labour”for overseas trainees sent to Japan” The Hong Kong Standard, July 27 2007,
http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news_print.asp?art_id=49953&sid=14666027*

Sawata, Yukiko (2008) “gaikokujin kenshû ginôjisyûseido no jitai to kadai (Realities and Issues of the ITP/TIP System)”
jyosei rôdô kenkyû (Women Workers Research Journal), No 52, Jan 2008, p 81 -88

Stalker, Peter (2000) “Workers Withour Frontiers” Lynne Rienner

Takahashi, Toru (2006), “chôei no shisetsu kara shisô (Trainees Disappear from Municipal Plant)” gaikokujin kenshûsei
jisyû 300 en no rôdôsha (Foreign Trainees: The 300 Yen per hour labourers), Advocacy Network for Foreign Trainees
(Tokyo), p 47 - 51

UN Population Division (2001), “Replacement Migration: Is it a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?” United
Nations Population Division

US State Dept. (2007), “2007 Trafficking in Persons Report” US State Department, June 2007
Zha, Daojiong (2002), “Chinese Migrant Workers in Japan: Policies, Institutions and Civil Society” Globalizing Chinese
Migration, p 129 - 157

*All links to websites active as of April 16th 2008