You are on page 1of 728

!

Table of Contents

Preface!""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!! #!
!
!"#$%&'()*+%'()$&!,-.!"#$%&'()*+%'('%&#,*'(/&#0$0,0%-(
0!(,1%('%-%&'#1(&!2(2%3%$*)4%!,(-,&5%(
!
!" OVERVIEW OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS!""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!!$$"
!
%&$! Status of Operation, Construction and Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Plants!!$'!
%&(! Status of Operation and Construction of Nuclear Power Plants!"""""""""""""""!!$)!
%&'! Nuclear Power Plant Site Map (as of the End of FY2009)!"""""""""""""""""""!!$*!
%&)! Dates When Nuclear Power Plants Attained the First Criticality and
Became Synchronized to the Electric Grid!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!!(+!
%&,! Installed Capacity of Nuclear Power Plants!""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!!((!
Table !-1! Trends in the Licensed Output of Nuclear Power Plants that
Supply General Electric Enterprises with Electricity!"""""""""""""""!!((!
Table !-2! Trends in the Electric Energy Produced by Different Power Generating
Sources at the End of Fiscal Years (Public Power Supply Industry)!""""!!('!
Table !-3! Trends in the Annual Electric Energy Generated
(Public Power Supply Industry)!""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!!()!
"
#" STATUS OF OPERATION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS!""""""""""""""""""!!(,!
!
-&$! General Situation!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!!(.!
Table "-1-1! Capacity factor of nuclear power stations
for the electric power industry in FY 2009!"""""""""""""""""""""!!(.!
Table "-1-2 BWR plants in shutdown with relatively large degree of influence
on capacity factor!""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!(.
Table "-1-3 PWR plants in shutdown with relatively large degree of influence
on capacity factor!""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!(.
Table "-1! Past Operation Records! """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!!(#!
Figure "-1! Trend in the Capacity Factor by Reactor Type!""""""""""""""""""""!!(#!
Table "-2! Trends in Periodical Inspection Duration (Average Excluding GCR)!"""!!'+!
Table "-3! Trends in Operating Period (Average Excluding GCR)!"""""""""""""!!'+!
Table "-4! Breakdowns of Output Loss!""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!!'+!
Table "-5! Circumstances of Reactor Shutdowns in FY2009!""""""""""""""""""!!'$!
Table "-6! Trends in the Frequency of Nuclear Reactor Shutdowns!""""""""""""!!'(!
Table "-7! Trends in the Frequency of Nuclear Reactor Shutdowns!""""""""""""!!''!
Table "-8! Operating Records by Nuclear Power Plant in FY2009!"""""""""""""!!')!
Table "-9! Operating Records by Unit in FY2009!""""""""""""""""""""""""""!!',!
!
-&(! Capacity Factor!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!!'/!
Table "-10! Trends in Capacity Factor!""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!!'/!
Table "-11! Trends in the Capacity Factor of Each Electric Power Company!""""""!!'.!
Table "-12! Capacity Factor by Unit (by Month in FY2009)!"""""""""""""""""""!!'*!
Table "-13! Trends in the Capacity Factor of Each Unit!""""""""""""""""""""""!!)+!
!

1
!"#$ Operation Factor$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$&&$
Table !-14$ Trends in Operation Factor$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$&&$
Table !-15$ Trends in Operation Factor of Each Electric Power Company$%%%%%%%%$$&'$
Table !-16$ Operation Factor by Unit (by Month in FY2009)$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$&($
Table !-17$ Trends in the Operation Factor of Each Unit$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$&)$
$
!"&$ Electric Energy Generated$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$'*$
Table !-18$ Trends in Electric Energy Generated$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$'*$
Table !-19$ Trends in the Electric Energy Generated by Each Electric Power
Company$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$'#$
Table !-20$ Electric Energy Generated by Unit (by Month in FY2009)$%%%%%%%%%%$$'&$
Table !-21$ Trends in the Electric Energy Generated by Each Unit$%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$'($
$
!"'$ Generating Time$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$(+$
Table !-22$ Trends in Generating Time$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$(+$
Table !-23$ Trends in Generating Time by Each Electric Power Company$%%%%%%%$$(,$
Table !-24$ Generating Time by Unit (by Month in FY2009)$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$(*$
Table !-25$ Trends in Generating Time of Each Unit$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$(&$
$
!"($ Power History of Each Unit$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$()$
$
!" STATUS OF PERIODICAL INSPECTIONS OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS$%%%$$,*#"
$
-",$ Overview of Periodical Inspections of Nuclear Power Plants$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$,*'$
-"*$ Periodical Inspections by Unit$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$,#,$
$
#"
OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$,'#"
$
STATUS OF PERIODICAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT REVIEWS

.",$ Outline of Periodical Safety Management Reviews of Nuclear Power Plants$%%$$,''$


."*$ Status of Periodical Safety Management Reviews of Nuclear Power Plants$%%%$$,'/$
"
$" STATUS OF SAFETY INSPECTION FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS$%%%%%%%$$,(/"
$
0",$ General Information on Safety Inspection for Nuclear Power Plants$%%%%%%%%$$,(1$
0"*$ Circumstances of Safety Inspections by Nuclear Power Plant$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$,/+$
$
%"
AND FUEL ASSEMBLY DESIGNS OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS$ %%%%%%%%%%$$*'#"
"
STATUS OF APPROVALS AND INSPECTIONS FOR CONSTRUCTION PLANS

2",$ Status of Approvals and Inspections for Construction Plans and


Fuel Assembly Designs of Nuclear Power Plants$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$*''$
2"*$ Approval of Construction Plans for Commercial Power Reactors$%%%%%%%%%%%%$$*'($
2"#$ Approvals for Fuel Assembly Designs Concerning Commercial Reactors$%%%%%$$*1&$
"
&" OPERATIONAL PLANS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$*11"
"
Table "-1$ FY2010 Operational Plan$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$#+,$
Figure "-1$ Diagram of FY2010 Reactor Shutdown Schedule$
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$#+*$
"

2
'" STATUS OF OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS$ $#+'$
"
3",$ Operational Management at Nuclear Power Plants$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$#+/$
$
3"*$ Education and Training of Operation Staff$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$#+)$
Table #-2-1$ Examples of Long-term Operator Development Plans$%%%%%%%%%%%$$#,,$
Table #-2-2$ Outline of Operator Training Centers in Japan (BTC)$%%%%%%%%%%%$$#,#$
Table #-2-3$ Outline of Operator Training Centers in Japan (NTC)$%%%%%%%%%%%$$#,&$
Table #-2-4$ Outline of Training Courses at BWR Operator Training Center$%%%$$#,'$
Table #-2-5$ Outline of Training Courses at the Nuclear Power Training
Center Ltd.$
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$#*#$
Table #-2-6$ Training Results at the BWR Operator Training Center$%%%%%%%%%$$#*&$
Table #-2-7$ Training Results at the Nuclear Power Training Center Ltd.$%%%%%%$$#*'$
Figure #-2-1$ Training Results at the BWR Operator Training Center$%%%%%%%%%$$#*($
Figure #-2-2$ Training Results at the Nuclear Power Training Center Ltd.$
%%%%%%$$#*/$
$
3"#$ Education and Training for Maintenance Staff$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$#*)$
Table #-3-1$ Maintenance Staff Development Pattern (Example 1)$%%%%%%%%%%%$$#*1$
Table #-3-2$ Maintenance Staff Development Pattern (Example 2)$%%%%%%%%%%%$$##+$
Table #-3-3$ Outline of Maintenance Training Facilities$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$##,$
$
$
!"#$%$%&'(%)*+",!(#)"+(#,-!$*,.$/%'(01"%.(#)"+(0./!,&"'(
!"1!/*"00$%&(,%2(!,2$/,*.$3"(4,0."(2$01/0,+(#,*$+$.$"0(
$
(" LISTS OF REFINING, NUCLEAR FUEL FABRICATION,

DISPOSAL FACILITIES$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$##'$
"
SPENT FUEL STORAGE, REPROCESSING AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE

4",$ Operation and Construction Status of Refining, Nuclear Fuel Fabrication,


Spent Fuel Storage, Reprocessing and Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities$%$$##/$
4"*$ List of Operation and Construction Status of Fabrication Facilities$%%%%%%%%%$$##)$
4"#$ List of Operation and Construction Status of Reprocessing Facilities$%%%%%%%%$$##1$
4"&$ List of Operation and Construction Status of Disposal Facilities$%%%%%%%%%%%%$$#&+$
4"'$
Waste Disposal Facilities$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$#&,$
Location Map of Nuclear Fuel Fabrication, Reprocessing and Radioactive

$
)" STATUS OF OPERATION OF REFINING, NUCLEAR FUEL FABRICATION,
SPENT FUEL STORAGE, REPROCESSING AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE

OF NUCLEAR FUEL MATERIAL$ %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$#&#


"
DISPOSAL FACILITIES, AND TRANSPORT CONFIRMATION RESULTS

5",$ Status of Operation of Refining, Nuclear Fuel Fabrication,


Spent Fuel Storage, Reprocessing and Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities$%$$#&'$
Table $-1$ Trends in Maximum Nuclear Fuel Material Capacity at
Fabrication Facilities at the End of Fiscal Years$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$#&($
Table $-2$ Trends in Maximum Nuclear Fuel Material Capacity at Fabrication
Facilities (Conversion Processing) at the End of Fiscal Years$%%%%%%%%$$#&/$

3
Table $-3$ Trends in Maximum Nuclear Fuel Material Capacity at Fabrication
Facilities (Uranium Enrichment) at the End of Fiscal Years$%%%%%%%%%$$#&/$
Table $-4$ Trends of Reprocessing Amounts by Fiscal Year$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$#&)$
Table $-5$ Trends in the Amount of Radioactive Waste Buried and Managed
at Waste Disposal Facilities$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$#&1$
5"*$ Transport Confirmation Results of Nuclear Fuel Material$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$#'+$
$
)
*" STATUS OF PERIODICAL FACILITY INSPECTIONS AT NUCLEAR

AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL FACILITIES$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$#',$


"
FUEL FABRICATION, SPENT FUEL STORAGE, REPROCESSING

5
6",$ Outline of Periodical Facility Inspections at Nuclear Fuel Fabrication,
Spent Fuel Storage, Reprocessing and Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities$%%$$#'#$
5
6"*$ Status of Periodical Facility Inspections by Plant$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$#'&$
$
)+"STATUS OF NUCLEAR FUEL SAFETY INSPECTIONS AT REFINING,

REPROCESSING AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL FACILITIES$%%%%%%$$#'1$


"
NUCLEAR FUEL FABRICATION, SPENT FUEL STORAGE,

5!",$ Status of Safety Inspections at Refining, Nuclear Fuel Fabrication,


Spent Fuel Storage, Reprocessing and Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities$%%$$#(,$
5!"*$ Status of Safety Inspections by Plant$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$#(*$
$
)!"STATUS OF APPROVAL AND INSPECTION OF DESIGN AND

WASTE DISPOSAL FACILITIES$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$#/'"


CONSTRUCTION METHODS AT NUCLEAR FUEL FABRICATION,

"
SPENT FUEL STORAGE, REPROCESSING AND RADIOACTIVE

5-",$Status of Approval and Inspection of Design and Construction Methods

Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$#//$


at Nuclear Fuel Fabrication, Spent Fuel Storage, Reprocessing and

5-"*$Approvals of Design and Construction Methods$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$#/)$


$
,**$2"%.(
$
)#"STATUS OF ACCIDENT$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$#1,"
"
5.",",$ Overview of Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants in FY2009
(Excluding Power Reactors in the Research and Development Stage)$%%%%$$#1#$
Table $%-1-1$ Trends in the Number of Reported Accidents
at Nuclear Power Plants$777777777777777777777777777777777$$#1&$
Figure $%-1-1$ Trends in the Number of Reported Accidents at Nuclear Power
Plants and the Average Number of Accidents per Reactor Unit$%%%$$#1&$
Figure $%-1-2$ Trends in the Number of Reported Accidents at Nuclear Power
Plants by Accident Type$7777777777777777777777777777777777$$#1'$
"
5.","*$ Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants to be Reported$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$#1($
5.","#$ Analysis of Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$#1)$

4
Table $%-1-2$ Trends in the Number of Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants
by the Number of Years Elapsed after the Start of Operation$
%%%%%$$#11$
Figure $%-1-3$ Trends in the Number of Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants
by the Number of Years Elapsed after the Start of Operation$
%%%%%$$#11$
Table $%-1-3$ Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants by Fiscal Year
(Automatic Shutdown)$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$&+&$
Table $%-1-4$ Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants by Fiscal Year
(Manual Shutdown)$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$&+($
Table $%-1-5$ Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants by Fiscal Year
(During Shutdowns such as Periodical Inspections)$%%%%%%%%%%%%$$&+)$
Table $%-1-6$ Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants by Fiscal Year
(Output Fluctuation)$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$&,+$
Table $%-1-7$ Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants by Fiscal Year
(Component Damage during Operation)$$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$&,+$
Table $%-1-8$ Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants by Fiscal Year (Others)$%%%%%%$$&,,$
Table $%-1-9$ Systems of Component involved in Accident
in Nuclear Power Plants$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$&,*$
Table $%-1-10$ Components involved in Accident in Nuclear Power Plants$%%%%%%$$&,*$
Table $%-1-11$ Causes of Accident in Nuclear Power Plants$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$&,#$
Table $%-1-12$ Operational Status When Accident Occurred
in Nuclear Power Plants$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$&,#$
Table $%-1-13$ How Accident detected in Nuclear Power Plants$ %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$&,#$
5.","&$ Numbers of Reported Accidents in Nuclear Power Plants$%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$&,&$
5.","'$ Overview of Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$&,)$
5.","($ Press Releases on Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$&*'$
"
5."*",$ Overview of Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors
in the Research and Development Stage in FY2009$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$'#1$
Table $%-2-1$ Trends in the Number of Reported Accidents at Nuclear Power
Reactors in a Research and Development Stage$777777777777777$$'&+$
Figure $%-2-1$ Trends in the Number of Reported Accidents at Nuclear Power
Reactors in the Research and Development Stage$7777777777777$$'&+$
Figure $%-2-2$ Trends in the Number of Reported Accidents at Nuclear Power

by Accident Type$777777777777777777777777777777777777777$$'&,$
Reactors in the Research and Development Stage

5."*"*$ Accidents Reported at Nuclear Power Reactors in the Research and


Development Stage$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$'&*$
Table $%-2-2$ Accidents in Nuclear Power Reactors in the Research and
Development Stage by Fiscal Year (Automatic Shutdown)$%%%%%%%%$$'&&$
Table $%-2-3$ Accidents in Nuclear Power Reactors in the Research and
Development Stage by Fiscal Year (Manual Shutdown)$%%%%%%%%%%$$'&'$
Table $%-2-4$ Accidents in Nuclear Power Reactors in the Research and

for an Inspection or Other Reason)$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$'&($


Development Stage by Fiscal Year (When Not in Operation

Table $%-2-5$ Accidents in Nuclear Power Reactors in the Research and


Development Stage by Fiscal Year (Others)$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%$$'&/$

5
Table #$-2-6! Systems of Component Involved in Accident in Nuclear Power
Reactors in the Research and Development Stage!""""""""""""""!,).!
Table #$-2-7! Component Involved in Accident in Nuclear Power Reactors
in the Research and Development Stage!
""""""""""""""""""""""!,)*!
Table #$-2-8! Causes of Accident in Nuclear Power Reactors in the Research
and Development Stage! """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!,)*!
Table #$-2-9! Operational Status When Accidents Occurred in Nuclear Power
Reactors in the Research and Development Stage!""""""""""""""!,)#!
Table #$-2-10!How Accidents Detected in Nuclear Power Reactors
in the Research and Development Stage!
""""""""""""""""""""""!,)#!
01&(&'! Numbers of Reported Accidents in Nuclear Power Reactors
in the Research and Development Stage!222222222222222222222222222!,,+!
01&(&)! Overview of Accidents in Nuclear Power Reactors
in the Research and Development Stage!222222222222222222222222222!,,$!
01&(&,!! Press Releases on Accidents in Nuclear Power Reactors
in the Research and Development Stage!222222222222222222222222222!,,(!
"
01&'&$! Overview of Accidents at Nuclear Fuel Fabrication, Reprocessing,
Radioactive Waste Disposal and Waste Management Facilities in FY2009!"!,/'!
Table #$-3-1!Trends in the Number of Reported Accidents at Nuclear Fuel

and Waste Management Facilities!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""!,/)!


Fabrication, Reprocessing, Radioactive Waste Disposal

01&'&(! Accidents Reported at Nuclear Fuel Fabrication, Reprocessing,


Radioactive Waste Disposal and Waste Management Facilities!"""""""""!,//!
01&'&'!! Overview of Accidents at Nuclear Fuel Fabrication, Reprocessing,
Radioactive Waste Disposal and Waste Management Facilities!"""""""""!,.+!
01&'&)!! Press Releases on Accidents at Nuclear Fuel Fabrication, Reprocessing,
Radioactive Waste Disposal and Waste Management Facilities!"""""""""!,.$!
!!
!
$%"EVALUATION OF EVENTS!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!,*.!
!
03&$! Outline of International Nuclear Event Scale (INES)!""""""""""""""""""""!,*#!
Table #%-1-1! The International Nuclear Event Scale! """""""""""""""""""""""!,#+!
03-2 Outline of Event Rating in FY2009!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!,#$
Table #%-2-1 Events at Nuclear Power Plants Evaluated in FY2009
(Events in FY2008)!""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!,#(
Table #%-2-2 Events at Nuclear Power Plants Evaluated in FY2009
(Events in FY2008)!""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!,#(
Table #%-2-3 Events at Nuclear Power Plants Evaluated in FY2010
(Events in FY2009)!""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!,#'
Table #%-2-4 Events at Nuclear Power Plant in the Research and
Development Stage Evaluated in FY2010 (Events in FY2009) !
""""!,#'
Table #%-2-5 Events at Reprocessing Facilities Evaluated in FY2010
(Evens in FY2009)&!""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!,#'

#%-3
(INES) for Accidents at Nuclear Facilities!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!,#)!
Press Release Documents Related to the International Nuclear Event Scale

6
'&20*&#,03%(+&-,%(4&!&5%4%!,(&!2(*##")&,0*!&$('&20&,0*!(%6)*-"'%(4&!&5%4%!,!

#'" RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT AND OCCUPATIONAL RADIATION


EXPOSURE MANAGEMENT!""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!/(.!

#'-1 Status of Radioactive Waste Management ! """"""""""""""""""""""""""""!/(#


#'-2 Status of Occupational Radiation Exposure Management !"""""""""""""""!/.+
#'-3 ISOE: Information System on Occupational Exposure!""""""""""""""""""""!/#(

-&/%,7('%5"$&,0*!(&240!0-,'&,0*!(
!
$&"SAFETY REGULATION ADMINISTRATION!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!/#.!
!
04&$!Overview of Safety Regulation Administration!""""""""""""""""""""""""""!/##!
04&$&$! Overview of Safety Regulations!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!/##!
Figure #(-1-1 Overview of Safety Regulations of Nuclear Facilities!
""""""""!/##
04&$&(! Safety Regulations of Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities!""""""""""""""!.++!
Figure #(-1-2
of Decommissioning Measures!""""""""""""""""""""""""!.+/
Legal Procedures from Site Selection to Completion

04&$&'! Safety Regulations of Refining, Fabrication, Storage and


Reprocessing Business!""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!.+*!
Figure #(-1-3! Procedures to Be Followed for Nuclear Fuel Facilities
According to the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law!""""""""""!.$'!
04&$&)! Safety Regulations of the Waste Disposal Business!""""""""""""""""""!.$,!
Figure #(-1-4! Procedures to Be Followed for Waste Disposal Facilities
According to the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law!""""""""""!.$*!
04&$&,! Operational Management and Supervision!""""""""""""""""""""""""!.$#!
04&(!Overview of Nuclear Safety Inspector Offices!"""""""""""""""""""""""""""!.()!
Table #(-2-1! List of Nuclear Safety Inspector Offices!""""""""""""""""""""!.(/!
Figure #(-2-1! Nuclear Safety Inspectors and Directors of Nuclear Disaster
Prevention Stationed at Nuclear Safety Inspector Offices!
""""""!.(*!
04&'!Nuclear Disaster Prevention!""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!.'+!
!
REFERENCE!""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!.'#
Trends in World Nuclear Electric Power Generation!""""""""""""""""""""""""""!.)$!
Table 1! World Nuclear Electric Power Generation Facilities (As of 1. Jan, 2010)!"!.)(!
Table 2! Trends in Capacity Factors of Nuclear Power Plants in the World!""""""!.))!
Figure 1! Trends in Capacity Factors of Nuclear Power Plants in the World
for the Past 10 Years!
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!.),!
Figure 2! Capacity Factors of Nuclear Power Plants in the World in 2009!""""""""!.),!
APPENDIX! """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""!.).!
Chronology: Major Trends in Nuclear Power Generation!"""""""""""""""""""""""!.)#!
!
Remarks: The contents of this annual report were compiled by the JNES based on items
appearing on the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency website and materials
obtained from the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, unless otherwise specified.
The supplementary chronological table was prepared by the JNES.

7
Preface

This document is a summary of the outline of the safety regulation


administration of nuclear facilities as well as various data on the commercial
nuclear power reactor facilities, research and development nuclear power
reactor facilities, fabrication facilities, reprocessing facilities, and disposal
facilities in fiscal year 2009 (from April 2009 to March 2010). We sincerely
hope this document is used widely by many people engaged in work related
to ensuring nuclear safety.

November 2010

Technology and Information General Office


Policy Planning and Coordination Division
Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization
Independent Administrative Agency

9
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS࣭
NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR FACILITIES
IN THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT STAGE

Ϩ OVERVIEW OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS


11
Ϩ-1 Status of Operation, Construction and Decommissioning of
Nuclear Power Plants

(1) Commercial power reactor facilities


As of the end of FY2009, the number of units in operation at nuclear
electric power plants were 54 with their total output 48,847,000 kW.
Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 (540,000 kW: BWR) and
2 (840,000 kW: BWR) were legally closed on January 30, 2009 and have
been in the decommissioning stage since FY2009
The Japan Atomic Power Company's Tokai Power Station (166,000 kW:
GCR) discontinued commercial operations at the end of FY1997 and has
been in the decommissioning stage since FY2001.

As of the end of FY2009

㹀㹕㹐 㹎㹕㹐 㹅㹁㹐 Total

Number of units   㸫 


Operating
Output (10,000 kW)   㸫 

Under Number of units  㸫 㸫 


construction Output (10,000 kW)  㸫 㸫 

Preparing for Number of units   㸫 


construction
Output (10,000 kW)   㸫 

Being Number of units  㸫  


decommissioned
Output (10,000 kW)  㸫  


(2) Nuclear power reactor facilities in the research and development stage
As of the end of FY2009

 㸿㹒㹐 㹄㹀㹐
prototype prototype Total

reactor㸧 reactor㸧
Under Number of units 㸫  
construction Output (10,000 kW) 㸫  

Being Number of units  㸫 


decommissioned
Output (10,000 kW)  㸫 



13
Ϩ-2 Status of Operation and Construction of Nuclear Power Plants
(1) Commercial power reactor facilities
Name of power stations
 Name of establisher Address Reactor type
(facility number)

Tokai Daini Power Station Tokai Village, Naka County, Ibaraki Prefecture BWR
TheJapanAtomicPower
Tsuruga Power Station Unit 1 Tsuruga City, Fukui Prefecture BWR
CompanyCo.,Ltd.
Tsuruga Power Station Unit 2 Tsuruga City, Fukui Prefecture PWR
Tomari Power Station Unit 1 Tomari Village, Furuu County, Hokkaido PWR
HokkaidoElectricPowerCo.,
Tomari Power Station Unit 2 Tomari Village, Furuu County, Hokkaido PWR
Inc.
Tomari Power Station Unit 3 Tomari Village, Furuu County, Hokkaido PWR
Onagawa Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 Onagawa Town Oshika County and Ishinomaki City, Miyagi Prefecture BWR
Tohoku Electric Power Onagawa Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 Onagawa Town Oshika County and Ishinomaki City, Miyagi Prefecture BWR
Co., Inc. Onagawa Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 Onagawa Town Oshika County and Ishinomaki City, Miyagi Prefecture BWR
Higashidori Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 Higashidori Village ,Shimokita County,Aomori Prefecture BWR
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 Futaba Town and Okuma Town , Futaba County, Fukushima Prefecture BWR
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 Futaba Town and Okuma Town , Futaba County, Fukushima Prefecture BWR
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 Futaba Town and Okuma Town , Futaba County, Fukushima Prefecture BWR
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 4 Futaba Town and Okuma Town , Futaba County, Fukushima Prefecture BWR
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 5 Futaba Town and Okuma Town , Futaba County, Fukushima Prefecture BWR
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 6 Futaba Town and Okuma Town , Futaba County, Fukushima Prefecture BWR
Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 Naraha Town and Tomioka Town, Futaba County, Fukushima Prefecture BWR
Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 Naraha Town and Tomioka Town, Futaba County, Fukushima Prefecture BWR
Tokyo Electric Power
Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 Naraha Town and Tomioka Town, Futaba County, Fukushima Prefecture BWR
Co., Inc.
Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station Unit 4 Naraha Town and Tomioka Town, Futaba County, Fukushima Prefecture BWR
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 Kariwa Village, Kariwa County, and Kashiwazaki City, Niigata Prefecture BWR
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 Kariwa Village, Kariwa County, and Kashiwazaki City, Niigata Prefecture BWR
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 Kariwa Village, Kariwa County, and Kashiwazaki City, Niigata Prefecture BWR
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 4 Kariwa Village, Kariwa County, and Kashiwazaki City, Niigata Prefecture BWR
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 5 Kariwa Village, Kariwa County, and Kashiwazaki City, Niigata Prefecture BWR
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 6 Kariwa Village, Kariwa County, and Kashiwazaki City, Niigata Prefecture ABWR
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 7 Kariwa Village, Kariwa County, and Kashiwazaki City, Niigata Prefecture ABWR
Operating

Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 Sakura, Omaezaki City, Shizuoka Prefecture BWR
Chubu Electric Power
Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit 4 Sakura, Omaezaki City, Shizuoka Prefecture BWR
Co., Inc.
Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit 5 Sakura, Omaezaki City, Shizuoka Prefecture ABWR
Shika Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 Shika Town, Hakui County, Ishikawa Prefecture BWR
HokurikuElectricPowerCo.
Shika Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 Shika Town, Hakui County, Ishikawa Prefecture ABWR
Mihama Power Station Unit 1 Mihama Town, Mikata County, Fukui Prefecture PWR
Mihama Power Station Unit 2 Mihama Town, Mikata County, Fukui Prefecture PWR
Mihama Power Station Unit 3 Mihama Town, Mikata County, Fukui Prefecture PWR
Takahama Power Station Unit 1 Takahama Town, Ohi County, Fukui Prefecture PWR
Takahama Power Station Unit 2 Takahama Town, Ohi County, Fukui Prefecture PWR
Kansai Electric Power
Takahama Power Station Unit 3 Takahama Town, Ohi County, Fukui Prefecture PWR
Co., Inc.
Takahama Power Station Unit 4 Takahama Town, Ohi County, Fukui Prefecture PWR
Ohi Power Station Unit 1 Ohi Town, Ohi County, Fukui Prefecture PWR
Ohi Power Station Unit 2 Ohi Town, Ohi County, Fukui Prefecture PWR
Ohi Power Station Unit 3 Ohi Town, Ohi County, Fukui Prefecture PWR
Ohi Power Station Unit 4 Ohi Town, Ohi County, Fukui Prefecture PWR
Chugoku Electric Power Shimane Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 Kashimacho, Matsue City, Shimane Prefecture BWR
Co., Inc. Shimane Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 Kashimacho, Matsue City, Shimane Prefecture BWR
Ikata Power Station Unit 1 Ikata Town, Nishiuwa County, Ehime Prefecture PWR
Shikoku Electric Power
Ikata Power Station Unit 2 Ikata Town, Nishiuwa County, Ehime Prefecture PWR
Co., Inc.
Ikata Power Station Unit 3 Ikata Town, Nishiuwa County, Ehime Prefecture PWR
Genkai Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 Genkai Town, Higashimatsura County, Saga Prefecture PWR
Genkai Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 Genkai Town, Higashimatsura County, Saga Prefecture PWR
Kyushu Electric Power Genkai Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 Genkai Town, Higashimatsura County, Saga Prefecture PWR
Co., Inc. Genkai Nuclear Power Station Unit 4 Genkai Town, Higashimatsura County, Saga Prefecture PWR
Sendai Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 Satsumasendai City, Kagoshima Prefecture PWR
Sendai Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 Satsumasendai City, Kagoshima Prefecture PWR
Subtotal (54 units)
  Continued over

14
As of the end of FY2009
Date of authorization by the Electric
Licensed output Date of the establishment Date of the construction start Date of the commercial
Power Development Coordination
(10,000 kW) license issue (see note 2) operation
Council
110.0 1972- 1 1972-12-23 1973- 4 1978-11-28
35.7 1965- 6 1966- 4-22 1967- 2 1970- 3-14
116.0 1979- 1 1982- 1-26 1982- 3 1987- 2-17
57.9 1982- 4 1984- 6-14 1984- 8 1989- 6-22
57.9 1982- 4 1984- 6-14 1984- 8 1991- 4-12
91.2 2000-11 2003- 7- 2 2003-11 2009-12-22
52.4 1970- 6 1970-12-10 1971- 5 1984- 6- 1
82.5 1987- 4 1989- 2-28 1989- 6 1995- 7-28
82.5 1994- 3 1996- 4-12 1996- 9 2002- 1-30
110.0 1996-7 1998-8-31 1998-12 2005-12-8
46.0 1966- 4 1966-12- 1 1967- 9 1971- 3-26
78.4 1968- 1 1968- 3-29 1969- 5 1974- 7-18
78.4 1969- 7 1970- 1-23 1970-10 1976- 3-27
78.4 1971- 7 1972- 1-13 1972- 5 1978-10-12
78.4 1971- 3 1971- 9-23 1971-12 1978- 4-18
110.0 1972- 1 1972-12-12 1973- 3 1979-10-24
110.0 1972- 7 1974- 4-30 1975- 8 1982- 4-20
110.0 1975- 3 1978- 6-26 1979- 1 1984- 2- 3
110.0 1977- 3 1980- 8- 4 1980-11 1985- 6-21
110.0 1978- 7 1980- 8- 4 1980-11 1987- 8-25
110.0 1974- 8 1977- 9- 1 1978-11 1985- 9-18
110.0 1981- 4 1983- 5- 6 1983- 8 1990- 9-28
110.0 1985- 4 1987- 4- 9 1987- 6 1993- 8-11
110.0 1985- 4 1987- 4- 9 1987- 6 1994- 8-11
110.0 1981- 4 1983- 5- 6 1983- 8 1990- 4-10
135.6 1988- 4 1991- 5-15 1991- 8 1996-11- 7
135.6 1988- 4 1991- 5-15 1991- 8 1997- 7- 2
110.0 1978-11 1981-11-16 1982- 6 1987- 8-28
113.7 1986-11 1988- 8-10 1988-10 1993- 9- 3
126.7 1997- 4 1998-12-25 1999- 3 2005- 1-18
54.0 1987- 1 1988- 8-22 1988-11 1993- 7-30
120.6 1997-4 1999-4-14 1999-8 2006-3-15
34.0 1966- 4 1966-12- 1 1967- 8 1970-11-28
50.0 1968- 1 1968- 5-10 1968-12 1972- 7-25
82.6 1971- 7 1972- 3-13 1972- 7 1976-12- 1
82.6 1969- 7 1969-12-12 1970- 4 1974-11-14
82.6 1970- 6 1970-11-25 1971- 2 1975-11-14
87.0 1978- 3 1980- 8- 4 1980-11 1985- 1-17
87.0 1978- 3 1980- 8- 4 1980-11 1985- 6- 5
117.5 1970-11 1972- 7- 4 1972-10 1979- 3-27
117.5 1970-11 1972- 7- 4 1972-11 1979-12- 5
118.0 1985- 2 1987- 2-10 1987- 3 1991-12-18
118.0 1985- 2 1987- 2-10 1987- 3 1993- 2- 2
46.0 1969- 7 1969-11-13 1970- 2 1974- 3-29
82.0 1981- 4 1983- 9-22 1984- 2 1989- 2-10
56.6 1972- 3 1972-11-29 1973- 4 1977- 9-30
56.6 1975- 3 1977- 3-30 1977-12 1982- 3-19
89.0 1983- 4 1986- 5-26 1986- 8 1994-12-15
55.9 1970- 6 1970-12-10 1971- 3 1975-10-15
55.9 1974- 8 1976- 1-23 1976- 5 1981- 3-30
118.0 1982-10 1984-10-12 1985- 3 1994- 3-18
118.0 1982-10 1984-10-12 1985- 3 1997- 7-25
89.0 1976- 3 1977-12-17 1978-11 1984- 7- 4
89.0 1978- 7 1980-12-22 1981- 3 1985-11-28 参
4,884.7



15

Name of power stations
Name of establisher Address Reactor type
(facility number)

Chugoku Electric Power Co.,


Shimane Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 Kashimacho, Matsue City, Shimane Prefecture ABWR
Inc.
Under construction Electric Power Development Ohma Town, Shimokita County, Aomori
Ohma Nuclear Power Station ABWR
Co., Ltd. Prefecture
Subtotal (2 units)

The JapanAtomic Power Tsuruga Power Station Unit 3 Tsuruga City, Fukui Prefecture APWR
Company Co., Ltd. Tsuruga Power Station Unit 4 Tsuruga City, Fukui Prefecture APWR

Namie-Odaka Nuclear Power Namie Town, Futaba County, and Odaka Town,
BWR
Tohoku Electric Power Co., Station Soma County, Fukushima Prefecture
Inc.
Higashidoori Village, Shimokita County, Aomori
Higashidori Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 ABWR
Prefecture
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Okuma Town, Futaba County, Fukushima
Station Unit 7 Prefecture ABWR
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Okuma Town, Futaba County, Fukushima
Preparing for construction Station Unit 8 Prefecture ABWR
Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.
Higashidoori Village, Shimokita County, Aomori
Higashidori Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 ABWR
Prefecture
Higashidoori Village, Shimokita County, Aomori
Higashidori Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 ABWR
Prefecture
Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc. Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit 6 Sakura, Omaezaki City, Shizuoka Prefecture ABWR
Kaminoseki Town, Kumage County, Yamaguchi
Kaminoseki Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 ABWR
Chugoku Electric Power Co., Prefecture
Inc. Kaminoseki Town, Kumage County, Yamaguchi
Kaminoseki Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 ABWR
Prefecture
Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc. Sendai Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 Satsumasendai City, Kagoshima Prefecture APWR

Subtotal (12 units)

Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc. Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 Sakura, Omaezaki City, Shizuoka Prefecture BWR

Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 Sakura, Omaezaki City, Shizuoka Prefecture BWR

The Japan Atomic Power Tokai Power Station Tokai Village, Naka County, Ibaraki Prefecture GCR
Company Co., Ltd.
Being decommissioned

Subtotal (3 units)

(2) Nuclear power reactor facilities in the research and development stage

Name of establisher Name of power station Address Reactor type

Monju Prototype Fast Breeder Tsuruga City, Fukui FBR


Under construction
Reactor Prefecture (prototype reactor)
Japan Atomic Energy
Agency
Being Fugen Decommissioning Tsuruga City, Fukui ATR
decommissioned Engineering Center Prefecture (prototype reactor)

16
As of the end of FY2009
Licensed output Date of authorization by the Electric Power Date of the commercial operation
Date of the establishment license issue Date of the construction start (see note 2)
(10,000 kW) Development Coordination Council (see note 3)

137.3 2000-9 (see note 1) 2005-4-26 2005-12 Dec. 2011 (planned)

138.3 1999-8 (see note 1) 2008-4-23 2008-5 Nov. 2014 (planned)

275.6

153.8 Aug. 2002 (see note 1) Application submitted Oct. 2010 (planned) Mar. 2016 (planned)

153.8 Aug. 2002 (see note 1) Application submitted Oct. 2010 (planned) Mar. 2017 (planned)

82.5 FY2016 (planned) FY2021(planned)

138.5 After FY2016 (planned) After FY2021 (planned)

138.0 Apr. 2012 (planned) Oct. 2016(planned)

138.0 Apr. 2012 (planned) Oct. 2017(planned)

138.5 Sep. 2006 Application submitted Dec. 2010 (planned) Mar. 2017 (planned)

138.5 Sep. 2006 After FY2014 (planned) After FY2020(planned)

140.0 FY2015 (planned) After FY2020 (planned)

137.3 Jun. 2001 (see note 1) Application being prepared Jun 2012 (planned) Mar 2018 (planned)

137.3 Jun. 2001 (see note 1) Application being prepared FY2017 (planned) FY2022 (planned)

159.0 FY2013 (planned) FY2019 (planned)

1,655.2

54.0 1969-7 1970-12-10 1971-2 1976-3-17


84.0 1972-3 1973-6-9 1973-9 1978-11-29
Approval of the decommissioning (commerced decommissioning) (operation was discontinued)
plan 2009-11-18 After FY2015 (planned) 2009-1-30

16.6 1959-12 1959-12-14 1961- 3 1966- 7-25


(Submission of the decommissioning (commerced decommissioning) (operation was discontinued)
plan (Nuclear Reactor Regulation 2001-12 1998- 3-31
Law))
(approval of business discontinuance
2001-10- 4
(Electricity Utilities Industry Law))
Approval of the decommissioning
plan 2001-11-29
2006-6-30
154.6

Notes: 1. The Basic Plan for Electric Power Development was canceled in October 2003. In February 2005, this reactor was
designated by the "Program for Designation of Important Points of Electric Power Development" which was established
as an alternative plan to the Basic Plan for Electric Power Development.
2. The date of the start of construction is the month when the first construction plan was approved.
3. The date of the start of operation (planned) is based on the power supply plan in FY2010.
4. "Preparing for construction" means the period from incorporation into the power supply plan to approval of the
construction plan.

As of the end of FY2009
Date of decision by the Date of issue of the Date of the start of
Licensed output
Power Development license for reactor construction (see note Date of the start of operation
(10,000 kW)
Council installation 1)

28.0 - 1983- 5-27 1985- 9 Apr. 5, 1994 (critical)

16.5 - 1970-11-30 (commerced decommissioning) 1979- 3-20


Approval of the 2008-5
decommissioning plan
2008-2-12
(operation was discontinued)
2003- 3-29 参
Note: 1. The date of the start of construction is the month when the first construction plan was approved.

17
Ϩ-3 Nuclear Power Plant Site Map (as of the end of FY2009)
Shika Nuclear Power Station,
Hokuriku Electric Power Co.
Unit 1 and 2 (operating㸧

Tsuruga Power Station, Japan Atomic Power Company Co., Ltd.


Units 1 and 2 (operating), Units 3 and 4 (preparing for
construction)

Japan Atomic Energy Agency


Fugen Decommissioning Engineering Center
(being decommissioned )

Japan Atomic Energy Agency


Monju (under construction)

Mihama Power Station,


Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.
Units 1, 2 and 3 (operating)

Ohi Power Station, Kansai Electric


Power Co., Inc.
Units 1, 2, 3 and 4 (operating)

Takahama Power Station, Kansai


Electric Power Co., Inc.
Units 1, 2, 3 and 4 (operating)

Shimane Nuclear Power Station, Chugoku


Electric Power Co., Inc. Units 1 and 2
(operating), Unit 3 (under construction)

Kaminoseki Nuclear Power Station, ‫ۑ‬Kanazawa


Chugoku Electric Power Co., Inc.
Units 1 and 2 (preparing for ‫ۑ‬Fukui
construction) ‫ۑ‬
Matsue

‫ۑ‬Yamaguchi

Saga ‫ۑ‬Matsuyama
‫ۑ‬

Ikata Power Station, Shikoku


Electric Power Co., Inc.
Kagoshima Units 1, 2 and 3 (operating)
‫ۑ‬
Genkai Nuclear Power Station,
Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc.
Units 1, 2, 3 and 4 (operating)

Sendai Nuclear Power Station,


Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc.
Units 1 and 2 (operating)
Units 3 (preparing for construction)

18
Tomari Power Station, Hokkaido
Electric Power Co., Inc.
Units 1, 2 and 3 (operating)

‫ۑ‬Sapporo

Ohma Nuclear Power Station, Electric


Power Development Co., Ltd.
(under construction )

Higashidori Nuclear Power Station Tokyo


Electric Power Co., Inc.
‫ۑ‬ Units 1 and 2 (preparing for construction)
Aomori
Higashidori Nuclear Power Station, Tohoku Electric
Power Co., Inc.
Unit 1 (operating), Unit 2 (preparing for construction)

Onagawa Nuclear Power Station,


Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.
Units 1, 2 and 3 (operating)
Sendai
‫ۑ‬ Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station, Tokyo
‫ۑ‬Niigata Electric Co., Inc.
Units 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 (operating)
Fukushima‫ۑ‬

Namie-Odaka Nuclear Power Station (preparing for


construction), Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.
Mito‫ۑ‬
Tokyo‫ە‬ Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station,
Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.
Units 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 (operating)
Shizuoka‫ۑ‬ Units 7 and 8 (preparing for construction)

Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station,


Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.
Units 1, 2, 3 and 4 (operating)

Japan Atomic Power Company Co., Ltd.


Tokai Power Station
(being decommissioned)
Tokai Daini Power Station (operating)

Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station,


Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc.
Units 3, 4 and 5 (operating)
Units 6 (preparing for construction)
Units 1 and 2 (being decommissioned)


19
!
I-4 Dates When Nuclear Power Plants Attained the First
Criticality and Became Synchronized to the Electric Grid
!!

Unit names !
Licensed Date of initial

fuel loading ! criticality ! connection !


Date of first Date of initial Date of grid

(10,000 kW)! operation !


output commercial

Tokai Daini ! ""#! ! ! "$%%&"'&'(! "$%)&!"&") "$%)&!(&"(! "$%)&""&')


Tsuruga Unit 1 ! (*&%! ! "$+$&!$&'#! "$+$&"#&!( "$+$&""&"+! "$%#&!(&",
Tsuruga Unit 2 ! ""+! ! ! "$)+&!,&"%! "$)+&!*&') "$)+&!+&"$! "$)%&!'&"%
*%&$! ! "$))&"#&"%! "$))&""&"+ "$))&"'&!+! "$)$&!+&''
*%&$! ! "$$#&!+&"(! "$$#&!%&'* "$$#&!)&'%! "$$"&!,&"'
Tomari Unit 1

$"&'! ! '##$&!"&'*! '##$&!(&!( '##$&!(&'#! '##$&"'&''


Tomari Unit 2

Onagawa Unit 1 ! ! *'&,! ! "$)(&!$&''! "$)(&"#&") "$)(&""&")! "$),&!+&!"


Tomari Unit 3

Onagawa Unit 2 ! )'&*! ! "$$,&"#&"(! "$$,&""&!' "$$,&"'&'(! "$$*&!%&')


Onagawa Unit 3 ! )'&*! ! '##"&!,&!'! '##"&!,&'+ '##"&!*&(#! '##'&!"&(#
Higashidori Unit 1! ""#! ! ! '##*&!"&"#! '##*&!"&', '##*&!(&!$! '##*&"'&!)
Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1! ! ,+! ! ! "$%#&!%&!,! "$%#&"#&"# "$%#&""&"%! "$%"&!(&'+
Fukushima Daiichi Unit 2! %)&,! ! "$%(&!(&"*! "$%(&!*&"# "$%(&"'&',! "$%,&!%&")
Fukushima Daiichi Unit 3! %)&,! ! "$%,&!)&!"! "$%,&!$&!+ "$%,&"#&'+! "$%+&!(&'%
Fukushima Daiichi Unit 4! %)&,! ! "$%%&"'&"*! "$%)&!"&') "$%)&!'&',! "$%)&"#&"'
Fukushima Daiichi Unit 5! %)&,! ! "$%%&!%&!'! "$%%&!)&'+ "$%%&!$&''! "$%)&!,&")
Fukushima Daiichi Unit 6! ""#! ! ! "$%$&!"&"+! "$%$&!(&!$ "$%$&!*&!,! "$%$&"#&',
""#! ! ! "$)"&!*&!)! "$)"&!+&"% "$)"&!%&("! "$)'&!,&'#
""#! ! ! "$)(&!,&!"! "$)(&!,&'+ "$)(&!+&'(! "$),&!'&!(
Fukushima Daini Unit 1

""#! ! ! "$),&!$&'%! "$),&"#&") "$),&"'&",! "$)*&!+&'"


Fukushima Daini Unit 2

""#! ! ! "$)+&"#&!"! "$)+&"#&', "$)+&"'&"%! "$)%&!)&'*


Fukushima Daini Unit 3

""#! ! ! "$),&""&'#! "$),&"'&"' "$)*&!'&"(! "$)*&!$&")


Fukushima Daini Unit 4

""#! ! ! "$)$&""&!)! "$)$&""&(# "$$#&!'&!)! "$$#&!$&')


Kashiwazaki- Kariwa Unit 1

""#! ! ! "$$'&"#&""! "$$'&"#&"$ "$$'&"'&!)! "$$(&!)&""


Kashiwazaki- Kariwa Unit 2

""#! ! ! "$$(&"#&!%! "$$(&""&!" "$$(&"'&'"! "$$,&!)&""


Kashiwazaki- Kariwa Unit 3

""#! ! ! "$)$&!+&')! "$)$&!%&'# "$)$&!$&"'! "$$#&!,&"#


Kashiwazaki- Kariwa Unit 4

"(*&+! ! "$$*&""&(#! "$$*&"'&") "$$+&!"&'$! "$$+&""&!%


Kashiwazaki- Kariwa Unit 5

"(*&+! ! "$$+&"#&"#! "$$+&""&!" "$$+&"'&"%! "$$%&!%&!'


Kashiwazaki- Kariwa Unit 6

Kashiwazaki- Kariwa Unit 7

!
!

20


Date of initial
Licensed output Date of first Date of initial Date of grid
Unit names commercial
(10,000 kW) fuel loading  criticality  connection 
operation 

Hamaoka Unit 1 ͤ 1       


Hamaoka Unit 2 ͤ 1       
Hamaoka Unit 3       
Hamaoka Unit 4      
Hamaoka Unit 5      
Shika Unit 1       
Shika Unit 2      
Mihama Unit 1       
Mihama Unit 2       
Mihama Unit 3      
Takahama Unit 1      
Takahama Unit 2      
Takahama Unit 3       
Takahama Unit 4       
Ohi Unit 1      
Ohi Unit 2      
Ohi Unit 3       
Ohi Unit 4       
Shimane Unit 1       
Shimane Unit 2       
Ikata Unit 1      
Ikata Unit 2      
Ikata Unit 3      
Genkai Unit 1      
Genkai Unit 2      
Genkai Unit 3       
Genkai Unit 4       
Sendai Unit 1       
Sendai Unit 2       

Fugen       

ͤ+DPDRND1XFOHDU3RZHU6WDWLRQ8QLWDQGZHUHOHJDOO\FORVHGRQ-DQXDU\
DQGKDYHEHHQLQWKHGHFRPPLVVLRQLQJVWDJHVLQFH)< 参



21
Ϩ-5 Installed Capacity of Nuclear Power Plants
Japan's nuclear electric power plants have an installed capacity of 54
units and 48,847,000 kW as of the end of FY2009, as shown in Table I-1.
The number of units accounts for 20.2% of all power generating facilities
operated to supply general electricity, while the electric energy generated
accounts for 29.3% of the total electric energy produced annually.

㼀㼍㼎㼘㼑㻌䊠㻙㻝㻌㼀㼞㼑㼚㼐㼟㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻸㼕㼏㼑㼚㼟㼑㼐㻌㻻㼡㼠㼜㼡㼠㻌㼛㼒㻌㻺㼡㼏㼘㼑㼍㼞㻌㻼㼛㼣㼑㼞㻌㻼㼘㼍㼚㼠㼟㻌㼠㼔㼍㼠㻌㻿㼡㼜㼜㼘㼥
㻳㼑㼚㼑㼞㼍㼘㻌㻱㼘㼑㼏㼠㼞㼕㼏㻌㻱㼚㼠㼑㼞㼜㼞㼕㼟㼑㼟㻌㼣㼕㼠㼔㻌㻱㼘㼑㼏㼠㼞㼕㼏㼕㼠㼥
8QLWN:
5HDFWRU7\SH
㹅㹁㹐 㹀㹕㹐 㹎㹕㹐 7RWDO
)LVFDO<HDU

       


        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       

1RWH2XWSXWYDOXHVDUHWKHYDOXHVDWWKHHQGRIHDFKILVFDO\HDU
ࠉࠉࠉࠉࠉ1XPEHUVLQSDUHQWKHVHVDUHWKHQXPEHUVRIXQLWV

22
㼀㼍㼎㼘㼑㻌䊠㻙㻞㻌㻌㼀㼞㼑㼚㼐㼟㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻱㼘㼑㼏㼠㼞㼕㼏㻌㻱㼚㼑㼞㼓㼥㻌㻼㼞㼛㼐㼡㼏㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㻰㼕㼒㼒㼑㼞㼑㼚㼠㻌㻼㼛㼣㼑㼞㻌㻳㼑㼚㼑㼞㼍㼠㼕㼚㼓㻌㻿㼛㼡㼞㼏㼑㼟㻌㼍㼠㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻱㼚㼐㻌㼛㼒㻌㻲㼕㼟㼏㼍㼘㻌㼅㼑㼍㼞㼟㻌㻔㻼㼡㼎㼘㼕㼏㻌㻼㼛㼣㼑㼞㻌㻿㼡㼜㼜㼘㼥㻌㻵㼚㼐㼡㼟㼠㼞㼥㻕
䠄㼁㼚㼕㼠㻦㻌㻝㻜㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼗㼃䠅
)LVFDO<HDU              
             
1XFOHDUSRZHU
             
*HQHUDO              
             
3XPSHG              
VWRUDJH
SRZHU              

3RZHU
             

+\GURHOHFWULF
7RWDO
             
             
&RDO
             
             
/1*
             
             
2LO
             
             
/3*

23
             
2WKHUV              

7KHUPDOSRZHU
*DV              
%LWXPLQRXV              
TXDOLW\
0L[WXUH              
             
7RWDO
             
*HRWKHUPDO              
KHDW              
7RWDO              
 7KHQXPEHUVLQSDUHQWKHVHVDUHDFRPSRQHQWUDWLRH[SUHVVHGLQDSHUFHQWDJH7KHWRWDORIFRPSRQHQWUDWLRVLVDOZD\V
 $VWKHQXPEHUVDUHURXQGHGRIIWKHWRWDOVIRUHDFKFROXPQPD\QRWHTXDWHZLWKWKHWRWDOVDWWKHERWWRPRIWKHWDEOH
6RXUFH2XWOLQHRI'HYHORSPHQWRI(OHFWULF3RZHU6RXUFHV



7DEOHϨ7UHQGVLQWKH$QQXDO(OHFWULF(QHUJ\*HQHUDWHG 3XEOLF3RZHU6XSSO\,QGXVWU\
䠄㼁㼚㼕㼠㻦㻌㻝㻜㻜㻘㻜㻜㻜㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼗㼃㼔㻕
)LVFDO<HDU              
             
1XFOHDUSRZHU
             
*HQHUDO              
             
3XPSHG              
VWRUDJH
SRZHU              

3RZHU
             

+\GURHOHFWULF
7RWDO
             
             
&RDO
             
             
/1*
             
             
2LO
             
             
/3*

24
             
2WKHUV              

7KHUPDOSRZHU
*DV              
%LWXPLQRXV              
TXDOLW\
0L[WXUH              
             
7RWDO
             
             
1HZHQHUJ\
             
6XEWRWDO              
2WKHUV     
7RWDO              
 7KHQXPEHUVLQSDUHQWKHVHVDUHDFRPSRQHQWUDWLRH[SUHVVHGLQDSHUFHQWDJH7KHWRWDORIFRPSRQHQWUDWLRVLVDOZD\V
 $VWKHQXPEHUVDUHURXQGHGRIIWKHWRWDOVIRUHDFKFROXPQPD\QRWHTXDWHZLWKWKHWRWDOVDWWKHERWWRPRIWKHWDEOH
 2WKHUVLQFOXGHVZKDWLWVSRZHUVRXUFHFODVVLILFDWLRQLVXQNQRZQVXFKDVGHDOLQJVLQDZKROHVDOHSRZHUH[FKDQJH
 1HZHQHUJLHVLQFOXGHZLQGVRODUELRPDVVDQGZDVWHJHQHUDWHGSRZHUDVZHOODVJHRWKHUPDOSRZHU
 6RXUFH2XWOLQHRI'HYHORSPHQWRI(OHFWULF3RZHU6RXUFHV
ϩ STATUS OF OPERATION OF NUCLEAR
POWER PLANTS


25
ϩ-1 General situation
At the end of FY2009, the capacity factor of nuclear power stations for electric power industry in Japan was
65.7% on average for all nuclear power stations in operation (54 units with a total power generating capacity of
48,847,000 kW).

Table ϩ-1-1: Capacity factor of nuclear power stations for the electric power industry in FY2009
Boiling water reactor Pressurized water
Total
(BWR) reactor (PWR)
Number of units 30 24 54
Power (10 MW) 2,856.9 2,027.8 4,884.7
Capacity factor (%) 55.5 80.6 65.7

Looking at the operational status of plants in Japan in FY2009, the total capacity factor was 65.7%, exceeding the
60.0% of the previous year.
Considering reactor types, the capacity factor of BWRs was 55.5%, exceeding the 51.1% of the previous year. The
major cause of this rise was increased power generation due to resumption of Kashiwazaki Nuclear Power Station
Units 6 and 7, and Shika Nuclear Power Station Unit 1.
The capacity factor of PWRs was 80.6%, exceeding the 73.7% of the previous year. The major cause of this rise
was increased power generation due to operation at rated thermal output, even although the hourly operating rate
fell under the planned value.

Table ϩ-1-2: BWR plants in shutdown with relatively large degrees of influence on capacity factor
Degree of influence in
Licensed Shutdown period (days)
FY2009
Plant power
(MW) Periodical External % of all
Trouble Others Total % of total
inspection factor BWRs
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 1 1100 365 365 3.9% 2.3%
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 2 1100 365 365 3.9% 2.3%
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 3 1100 365 365 3.9% 2.3%
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 4 1100 365 365 3.9% 2.3%
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 5 1100 365 365 3.9% 2.3%
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 6 1356 153 14 167 2.2% 1.3%
Hamaoka Unit 5 1267 17 88 216 321 3.9% 2.3%
Shika Unit 2 1206 108 80 188 2.2% 1.3%
Tokai Daini 1100 205 34 239 2.5% 1.5%

Table ϩ-1-3: PWR plants in shutdown with relatively large degrees of influence on capacity factor
Degree of influence in
Licensed Shutdown period (days)
FY2009
Plant power
(MW) Periodical External
Trouble Others Total % of all PWRs % of total
inspection factor
Ohi Unit 1 1175 114 54 168 2.8% 1.1%

Degree of influence: percentage of power generation loss of a plant in available power generating capacity
(licensed power × calendar time) by type of reactor or in total available power generating
capacity


27
The capacity factor, operation factor, generated power, etc. of nuclear power stations in Japan are summarized
in the following pages.
Please note that generated power is expressed by using the output at the generating end (gross).
Notes on the use of these tables are as follows; unless otherwise stated, commissioning before the start of
commercial operation is not included.

Generated power (MWh)


(1) Capacity factor = ! 100 (%)
Licensed power (MW) ! calendar time (h)

(Note) In case of constant rated thermal power operation, capacity factor may exceed 100%.

(2) Operation factor

! Operation factor of unit

Generation time ( h )
Operation factor (%) = ! 100
Calendar t ime ( h )

" Operation factor (average Operation factor) by station, by power company, and total
Average operation factor is power divided proportionally.

" [licensed power (MW) ! generation time (h)]


Average Operation factor (%) = n #1
! 100
N

" [licensed power (MW) ! calendar time (h)]


n #1

N: Number of units

Operating time of reactor (h)


(3) Reactor year =
Calendar time of one year (h)
Operating time of reactor is the time between the startup and shutdown of the reactor.

(4) The electric power generation and generation time in the fiscal year and month of startup are counted from
00:00 am on the commercial operation starting date.
(5) The capacity factor and operation factor in the fiscal year and month of startup are counted according to
calendar time from the commercial operation starting date.
(6) The total and subtotal by licensee and the sum total after startup are the summation of generated power
(minimum unit is MWh) and time (minimum unit is hour before FY1995, and minute after FY1996) for
each fiscal year and each unit.
(7) The Japan Atomic Power Company, Tokai Power Station finished commercial operation at the end of
FY1997 and has been in the decommissioning stage.
(8) Chubu Electric Power Company, Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 were legally closed on
January 30, 2009.
(9) The licensed power generation of Japan Atomic Power Company, Tsuruga Power Station, Unit 1 was
changed from 331 MW to 357 MW on December 15, 1970.
(10) The licensed power generation of Chubu Electric Power Company, Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station, Unit 5
was changed from 1,380 MW to 1,267 MW on March 13, 2007.
(11) The licensed power generation of Hokuriku Electric Power Company, Shika Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2
was changed from 1,358 MW to 1,206 MW on June 5, 2008.
(12) The following are the Total or Grand Total in table II-1, 8 to 11, 13 to 15, 17 to 19, 21 to 23, 25 as the Total
from the commercial operation starting date. It is not indicate the total of numbers in the table.
28
Table 䊡-1: Past Operational Records
Generated Generation Reactor
FY Capacity Factor Operation Factor
power time operation
(%) (%) (million kWh) (hr) time (hr)
2000 81.7 82.1 321,337 358,688 361,110
2001 80.5 80.9 317,539 359,541 361,900
2002 73.4 73.2 294,073 336,822 338,533
2003 59.7 59.0 240,013 275,388 277,796
2004 68.9 68.4 277,857 307,308 310,883
2005 71.9 71.4 299,163 327,921 331,538
2006 69.9 69.3 303,426 330,082 333,212
2007 60.7 60.3 263,832 294,513 297,527
2008 60.0 59.4 258,071 290,077 292,873
2009 65.7 65.0 277,470 314,102 317,669
Total 72.0 72.7 7,119,569 8,697,809 8,788,725

Figure 䊡-1: Trend in the Capacity Factor by Reactor Type

100 10,000

9,000

8,000
80
7,000
Capacity Factor (%)

6,000
(10 MW)

60 5,000
Licensed power

4,000

3,000
40
2,000

1,000

20 0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
㻲㼅
Total BWR PWR
(Note) values of each FY.


29
㼀㼍㼎㼘㼑㻌䊡㻙㻞䚷㼀㼞㼑㼚㼐㼟㻌㼕㼚㻌㻼㼑㼞㼕㼛㼐㼕㼏㼍㼘㻌㻵㼚㼟㼜㼑㼏㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㻰㼡㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㻔㻭㼢㼑㼞㼍㼓㼑㻌㻱㼤㼏㼘㼡㼐㼕㼚㼓㻌㻳㻯㻾㻕
Gjtdbm!Zfbs!xifo
qfsjpejdbm!jotqfdujpo 2::1 2::2 2::3 2::4 2::5 2::6 2::7 2::8 2::9 2:::
xbt!dpnqmfufe
Bwfsbhf!ovncfs!pg!ebzt 288 254 249 256 248 227 242 219 214 218
)ovncfs!pg!npouit*
)6/:* )5/9* )5/7* )5/9* )5/7* )4/:* )5/5* )4/7* )4/5* )4/7*

Gjtdbm!Zfbs!xifo
qfsjpejdbm!jotqfdujpo 3111 3112 3113 3114 3115 3116 3117 3118 3119 311:
xbt!dpnqmfufe
Bwfsbhf!ovncfs!pg!ebzt 239 232 :9 277 341 255 274 279 289 2:4
)ovncfs!pg!npouit*
)5/4* )5/1* )4/4* )6/6* )8/8* )5/9* )6/5* )6/7* )6/:* )7/5*
䠄㻺㼛㼠㼑㼟䠅䚷 3HULRGLFDOLQVSHFWLRQGXUDWLRQ'XUDWLRQRISHULRGLFDOLQVSHFWLRQ WRYHULI\RYHUDOOORDGUHVLVWDQFH
SHUIRUPDQFH IURPWKHVWDUWWRWKHFRPSOHWLRQ
'DWDRQWKHRSHUDWLRQRI0LKDPD3RZHU6WDWLRQ8QLWLVQRWLQFOXGHGLQWKHDYHUDJHQXPEHURIGD\VRI
)<'DWDRQWKHRSHUDWLRQRI)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL1XFOHDU3RZHU6WDWLRQ8QLWLVQRWLQFOXGHGLQWKH
DYHUDJHQXPEHURIGD\VDW)<'DWDRQWKHRSHUDWLRQRI0LKDPD3RZHU6WDWLRQ8QLWLVQRWLQFOXGHG
LQWKHDYHUDJHQXPEHURIGD\VDW)<'DWDRQWKHRSHUDWLRQRI.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD1XFOHDU3RZHU
6WDWLRQ8QLWLVQRWLQFOXGHGLQWKHDYHUDJHQXPEHURIGD\VDW)<
1XPEHURIPRQWKVGD\VDUHGHILQHGDVRQHPRQWK

ȁ
㼀㼍㼎㼘㼑㻌䊡㻙㻟䚷㼀㼞㼑㼚㼐㼟㻌㼕㼚㻌㻻㼜㼑㼞㼍㼠㼕㼚㼓㻌㻼㼑㼞㼕㼛㼐㻌㻔㻭㼢㼑㼞㼍㼓㼑㻌㻱㼤㼏㼘㼡㼐㼕㼚㼓㻌㻳㻯㻾㻕
Gjtdbm!Zfbs!xifo
qfsjpejdbm!jotqfdujpo!xbt 2::1 2::2 2::3 2::4 2::5 2::6 2::7 2::8 2::9 2:::
dpnqmfufe
Bwfsbhf!ovncfs!pg!ebzt 457 3:8 462 464 44: 475 478 487 489 482
)ovncfs!pg!npouit*
)22/6* ):/:* )22/8* )22/9* )22/4* )23/2* )23/3* )23/6* )23/7* )23/5*

Gjtdbm!Zfbs!xifo
qfsjpejdbm!jotqfdujpo!xbt 3111 3112 3113 3114 3115 3116 3117 3118 3119 311:
dpnqmfufe
Bwfsbhf!ovncfs!pg!ebzt 492 497 456 477 466 454 457 42: 469 457
)ovncfs!pg!npouit*
)23/8* )23/:* )22/6* )23/3* )22/9* )22/5* )22/6* )21/7* )22/:* )22/6*
䠄㻺㼛㼠㼑㼟䠅䚷 2SHUDWLQJSHULRG3HULRGIURPWKHFRPSOHWLRQRIWKHSHULRGLFDOLQVSHFWLRQ WRYHULI\RYHUDOOORDG
UHVLVWDQFHSHUIRUPDQFH WRWKHSODQWVKXWGRZQGXHWRWKHVWDUWRIWKHQH[WLQVSHFWLRQ H[FOXGLQJSHULRGV
GXULQJZKLFKSRZHUJHQHUDWLRQVWRSVIRUUHDVRQVRWKHUWKDQSHULRGLFDOLQVSHFWLRQV 
7KHQXPEHURIGD\VVSHQWWRSHUIRUPRSHUDWLRQVLQWKHILUVWF\FOHRIDQHZSODQWLVH[FOXGHG
1XPEHURIPRQWKVGD\VDUHGHILQHGDVRQHPRQWK

㼀㼍㼎㼘㼑㻌䊡㻙㻠䚷㻮㼞㼑㼍㼗㼐㼛㼣㼚㼟㻌㼛㼒㻌㻻㼡㼠㼜㼡㼠㻌㻸㼛㼟㼟㻌䠄䠂䠅
Gjtdbm!Zfbs 2::1 2::2 2::3 2::4 2::5 2::6 2::7 2::8 2::9 2:::
Dbqbdjuz!gbdups 83/8 84/9 85/3 86/5 87/7 91/3 91/9 92/4 95/3 91/2
Qfsjpejdbm
2XWSXWORVV

!Jotqfdujpo
35/8 35/3 34/9 34/4 32/4 29/4 29/1 27/: 25/7 28/2
Bddjefout!boe
Csfblepxot
2/5 1/8 2/5 2/1 2/7 2/4 1/8 2/6 1/: 3/7
Puifst 2/2 2/4 1/7 1/4 1/6 1/3 1/6 1/3 1/3 1/4

Gjtdbm!Zfbs 3111 3112 3113 3114 3115 3116 3117 3118 3119 311:
Dbqbdjuz!gbdups 92/8 91/6 84/5 6:/8 79/: 82/: 7:/: 71/8 71/1 76/8
Qfsjpejdbm
2XWSXWORVV

!Jotqfdujpo
27/4 28/8 31/8 4:/5 39/4 36/5 35/9 45/5 47/5 38/8
Bddjefout!boe
Csfblepxot
2/: 1/8 3/3 1/6 1/8 1/7 3/7 1/5 3/1 3/1
Puifst 1/2 2/3 5/4 2/5 4/4 4/3 4/9 6/5 3/7 6/:

30
㼀㼍㼎㼘㼑䚷䊡㻙㻡䚷㻯㼕㼞㼏㼡㼙㼟㼠㼍㼚㼏㼑㼟㻌㼛㼒㻌㻾㼑㼍㼏㼠㼛㼞㻌㻿㼔㼡㼠㼐㼛㼣㼚㼟㻌㼕㼚㻌㻲㼅㻞㻜㻜㻥
)UHTXHQF\RI
1XPEHURI
VKXWGRZQV
VKXWGRZQV
QXPEHURI 5HPDUNV
QXPEHURI
WLPHVUHDFWRU
WLPHV
\HDU
$FFLGHQWV
㻿㼔㼡㼠㼐㼛㼣㼚㼟

DQG  
%UHDNGRZQV
 +DPDRND8QLW
([WHUQDO
   +DPDRND8QLW
㻭㼡㼠㼛㼙㼍㼠㼕㼏

IDFWRUVHWF
VKXWGRZQV

6XEWRWDO  

 +DPDRND8QLW

 2QDJDZD8QLW
8QVFKHGXOHG

 7RNDL'DLQL

 2QDJDZD8QLW

0DQXDOVKXWGRZQV    6KLND8QLW

 0LKDPD8QLW

6XEWRWDO  

6FKHGXOHGVKXWGRZQV  

7RWDO  

䠄㻺㼛㼠㼑㼟䠅䚷㻝䠊㼀㼔㼑㻌㼐㼍㼠㼑㼟㻌㼟㼔㼛㼣㼚㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼞㼑㼙㼍㼞㼗㼟㻌㼏㼛㼘㼡㼙㼚㻌㼍㼞㼑㻌㼚㼛㼠㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼐㼍㼠㼑㼟㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼑㼢㼑㼚㼠㻌㼛㼏㼏㼡㼞㼞㼑㼐㻘㻌㼎㼡㼠㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼐㼍㼠㼑㼟㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼜㼘㼍㼚㼠㻌㼟㼔㼡㼠㼐㼛㼣㼚㻚
㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻞䠊㻾㼑㼍㼏㼠㼛㼞㻌㼥㼑㼍㼞㻌㻩㻌㼠㼛㼠㼍㼘㻌㼛㼜㼑㼞㼍㼠㼕㼚㼓㻌㼔㼛㼡㼞㼟㻌㼛㼒㻌㼍㻌㼞㼑㼍㼏㼠㼛㼞㻌㼕㼚㻌㼛㼚㼑㻌㼒㼕㼟㼏㼍㼘㻌㼥㼑㼍㼞㻌㻛㻌㼒㼕㼟㼏㼍㼘㻌㼥㼑㼍㼞㻌㼏㼍㼘㼑㼚㼐㼍㼞㻌㼠㼕㼙㼑


31
㼀㼍㼎㼘㼑㻌䊡㻙㻢 㼀㼞㼑㼚㼐㼟㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻲㼞㼑㼝㼡㼑㼚㼏㼥㻌㼛㼒㻌㻺㼡㼏㼘㼑㼍㼞㻌㻾㼑㼍㼏㼠㼛㼞㻌㻿㼔㼡㼠㼐㼛㼣㼚㼟
䚷䚷䚷䚷
㼁㼚㼟㼏㼔㼑㼐㼡㼘㼑㼐㻌㼟㼔㼡㼠㼐㼛㼣㼚㼟

㻭㼡㼠㼛㼙㼍㼠㼕㼏㻌㼟㼔㼡㼠㼐㼛㼣㼚㼟
㻹㼍㼚㼡㼍㼘 㻿㼏㼔㼑㼐㼡㼘㼑㼐
Fiscal Year 㻭㼏㼏㼕㼐㼑㼚㼠㼟 㻱㼤㼠㼑㼞㼚㼍㼘 㻿㼔㼡㼠㼐㼛㼣㼚㼟
㻿㼡㼎㼠㼛㼠㼍㼘 㼀㼛㼠㼍㼘
㻿㼔㼡㼠㼐㼛㼣㼚㼟
㼍㼚㼐 㼒㼍㼏㼠㼛㼞㼟㻘 㻿㼡㼎㼠㼛㼠㼍㼘
㻮㼞㼑㼍㼗㼐㼛㼣㼚 㼑㼠㼏㻚

㻝㻥㻥㻜 䠐 䠍 䠑 䠍䠍 䠍䠒 䠏䠐 䠑䠌

㻝㻥㻥㻝 䠐 䠎 䠒 䠒 䠍䠎 䠏䠒 䠐䠔

㻝㻥㻥㻞 䠐 䠉 䠐 䠍䠍 䠍䠑 䠏䠒 䠑䠍
䠄䠍䠅 䠄䠍䠅 䠄䠍䠅
㻝㻥㻥㻟 䠍 䠉 䠍 䠍䠌 䠍䠍 䠏䠎 䠐䠏
䠄䠍䠅 䠄䠍䠅 䠄䠍䠅 䠄䠍䠅
㻝㻥㻥㻠 䠎 䠉 䠎 䠔 䠍䠌 䠏䠒 䠐䠒
䠄䠍䠅 䠄䠍䠅 䠄䠍䠅
㻝㻥㻥㻡 䠍 䠉 䠍 䠔 䠕 䠏䠕 䠐䠔
䠄䠍䠅 䠄䠍䠅 䠄䠍䠅
㻝㻥㻥㻢 䠍 䠉 䠍 䠍䠌 䠍䠍 䠐䠍 䠑䠎
䠄䠍䠅 䠄䠍䠅 䠄䠍䠅
㻝㻥㻥㻣 䠎 䠉 䠎 䠍䠌 䠍䠎 䠏䠕 䠑䠍

㻝㻥㻥㻤 䠏 䠉 䠏 䠓 䠍䠌 䠐䠎 䠑䠎

㻝㻥㻥㻥 䠏 䠏 䠒 䠒 䠍䠎 䠏䠕 䠑䠍

㻞㻜㻜㻜 䠍 㻝 䠎 䠍䠏 䠍䠑 䠏䠒 䠑䠍

㻞㻜㻜㻝 䠍 䠍 䠎 䠑 䠓 䠐䠎 䠐䠕

㻞㻜㻜㻞 䠌 䠌 䠌 䠔 䠔 䠐䠎 䠑䠌

㻞㻜㻜㻟 䠌 䠎 䠎 䠒 䠔 䠏䠎 䠐䠌

㻞㻜㻜㻠 䠎 䠎 䠐 䠍䠎 䠍䠒 䠐䠐 䠒䠌

㻞㻜㻜㻡 䠍 䠑 䠒 䠍䠓 䠎䠏 䠎䠕 䠑䠎

㻞㻜㻜㻢 䠎 䠌 䠎 䠍䠎 䠍䠐 䠐䠌 䠑䠐

㻞㻜㻜㻣 䠌 䠏 䠏 䠐 䠓 䠐䠒 䠑䠏

㻞㻜㻜㻤 䠌 䠏 䠏 䠒 䠕 䠏䠌 䠏䠕

㻞㻜㻜㻥 䠌 䠎 䠎 䠒 䠔 䠏䠔 䠐䠒
㻺㼛㼠㼑㻦㻌㼀㼔㼑㻌㼚㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼕㼚㻌㼜㼍㼞㼑㼚㼠㼔㼑㼟㼑㼟㻌㼕㼟㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼚㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㼟㼔㼡㼠㼐㼛㼣㼚㼟㻌㼠㼔㼍㼠㻌㼛㼏㼏㼡㼞㼞㼑㼐㻌㼐㼡㼞㼕㼚㼓㻌㼠㼑㼟㼠㻌㼛㼜㼑㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㼟㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼚㼛㼠㻌㼕㼚㼏㼘㼡㼐㼑㼐

32
㼀㼍㼎㼘㼑㻌䊡㻙㻣䚷㼀㼞㼑㼚㼐㼟㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻲㼞㼑㼝㼡㼑㼚㼏㼥㻌㼛㼒㻌㻺㼡㼏㼘㼑㼍㼞㻌㻾㼑㼍㼏㼠㼛㼞㻌㻿㼔㼡㼠㼐㼛㼣㼚㼟
㻔㼁㼚㼕㼠㻦㻌㻺㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㼠㼕㼙㼑㼟㻌㻛㻌㼞㼑㼍㼏㼠㼛㼞㻌㼥㼑㼍㼞㻕
㼁㼚㼟㼏㼔㼑㼐㼡㼘㼑㼐㻌㼟㼔㼡㼠㼐㼛㼣㼚㼟

㻭㼡㼠㼛㼙㼍㼠㼕㼏㻌㼟㼔㼡㼠㼐㼛㼣㼚㼟
㻹㼍㼚㼡㼍㼘 㻿㼏㼔㼑㼐㼡㼘㼑㼐
Fiscal Year 㻭㼏㼏㼕㼐㼑㼚㼠㼟 㻱㼤㼠㼑㼞㼚㼍㼘 㻿㼔㼡㼠㼐㼛㼣㼚㼟
㻿㼡㼎㼠㼛㼠㼍㼘 㼀㼛㼠㼍㼘
㻿㼔㼡㼠㼐㼛㼣㼚㼟
㼍㼚㼐 㼒㼍㼏㼠㼛㼞㼟㻘 㻿㼡㼎㼠㼛㼠㼍㼘
㻮㼞㼑㼍㼗㼐㼛㼣㼚 㼑㼠㼏㻚

㻝㻥㻥㻜 㻜㻚㻝 㻜㻚㻜 㻜㻚㻞 㻜㻚㻠 㻜㻚㻢 㻝㻚㻞 㻝㻚㻤

㻝㻥㻥㻝 㻜㻚㻝 㻜㻚㻝 㻜㻚㻞 㻜㻚㻞 㻜㻚㻠 㻝㻚㻞 㻝㻚㻢

㻝㻥㻥㻞 㻜㻚㻝 㻙 㻜㻚㻝 㻜㻚㻠 㻜㻚㻡 㻝㻚㻞 㻝㻚㻢

㻝㻥㻥㻟 㻜㻚㻜 㻙 㻜㻚㻜 㻜㻚㻟 㻜㻚㻟 㻝㻚㻜 㻝㻚㻟

㻝㻥㻥㻠 㻜㻚㻝 㻙 㻜㻚㻝 㻜㻚㻞 㻜㻚㻟 㻝㻚㻜 㻝㻚㻟

㻝㻥㻥㻡 㻜㻚㻜 㻙 㻜㻚㻜 㻜㻚㻞 㻜㻚㻞 㻝㻚㻜 㻝㻚㻞

㻝㻥㻥㻢 㻜㻚㻜 㻙 㻜㻚㻜 㻜㻚㻞 㻜㻚㻟 㻝㻚㻜 㻝㻚㻟

㻝㻥㻥㻣 㻜㻚㻜 㻙 㻜㻚㻜 㻜㻚㻞 㻜㻚㻟 㻜㻚㻥 㻝㻚㻞

㻝㻥㻥㻤 㻜㻚㻝 㻙 㻜㻚㻝 㻜㻚㻞 㻜㻚㻞 㻝㻚㻜 㻝㻚㻞

㻝㻥㻥㻥 㻜㻚㻝 㻜㻚㻝 㻜㻚㻝 㻜㻚㻝 㻜㻚㻟 㻜㻚㻥 㻝㻚㻞

㻞㻜㻜㻜 㻜㻚㻜 㻜㻚㻜 㻜㻚㻜 㻜㻚㻟 㻜㻚㻠 㻜㻚㻥 㻝㻚㻞

㻞㻜㻜㻝 㻜㻚㻜 㻜㻚㻜 㻜㻚㻜 㻜㻚㻝 㻜㻚㻞 㻝㻚㻜 㻝㻚㻞

㻞㻜㻜㻞 㻜㻚㻜 㻜㻚㻜 㻜㻚㻜 㻜㻚㻞 㻜㻚㻞 㻝㻚㻝 㻝㻚㻟

㻞㻜㻜㻟 㻜㻚㻜 㻜㻚㻝 㻜㻚㻝 㻜㻚㻞 㻜㻚㻟 㻝㻚㻜 㻝㻚㻟

㻞㻜㻜㻠 㻜㻚㻝 㻜㻚㻝 㻜㻚㻝 㻜㻚㻟 㻜㻚㻡 㻝㻚㻞 㻝㻚㻣

㻞㻜㻜㻡 㻜㻚㻜 㻜㻚㻝 㻜㻚㻞 㻜㻚㻠 㻜㻚㻢 㻜㻚㻤 㻝㻚㻠

㻞㻜㻜㻢 㻜㻚㻝 㻜㻚㻜 㻜㻚㻝 㻜㻚㻟 㻜㻚㻠 㻝㻚㻝 㻝㻚㻠

㻞㻜㻜㻣 㻜㻚㻜 㻜㻚㻝 㻜㻚㻝 㻜㻚㻝 㻜㻚㻞 㻝㻚㻠 㻝㻚㻢

㻞㻜㻜㻤 㻜㻚㻜 㻜㻚㻝 㻜㻚㻝 㻜㻚㻞 㻜㻚㻟 㻜㻚㻥 㻝㻚㻞



㻞㻜㻜㻥 㻜㻚㻜 㻜㻚㻝 㻜㻚㻝 㻜㻚㻞 㻜㻚㻞 㻝㻚㻜 㻝㻚㻟
㻺㼛㼠㼑㻦㻌㼀㼔㼑㻌㼟㼔㼡㼠㼐㼛㼣㼚㼟㻌㼠㼔㼍㼠㻌㼛㼏㼏㼡㼞㼞㼑㼐㻌㼐㼡㼞㼕㼚㼓㻌㼠㼑㼟㼠㻌㼛㼜㼑㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㼟㻌㼍㼞㼑㻌㼚㼛㼠㻌㼕㼚㼏㼘㼡㼐㼑㼐㻚

33

㼀㼍㼎㼘㼑㻌䊡㻙㻤䚷㻻㼜㼑㼞㼍㼠㼕㼚㼓㻌㻾㼑㼏㼛㼞㼐㼟㻌㼎㼥㻌㻺㼡㼏㼘㼑㼍㼞㻌㻼㼛㼣㼑㼞㻌㻼㼘㼍㼚㼠㻌㼕㼚㻌㻲㼅㻞㻜㻜㻥
(OHFWULFHQHUJ\
1DPHRI /LFHQVHG *HQHUDWLQJWLPH
&DSDFLW\IDFWRU㸦㸣㸧 2SHUDWLRQIDFWRU㸦㸣㸧 JHQHUDWHG
QXFOHDUSRZHU RXWSXW KRXUV
 N:K
VWDWLRQ
㸦㹋㹕㸧 )< *UDQGWRWDO )< *UDQGWRWDO )< *UDQGWRWDO )< *UDQGWRWDO

7RNDL'DLQL         

7VXUXJD         

7RPDUL         

2QDJDZD         

+LJDVKLGRUL         
)XNXVKLPD
        
'DLLFKL
)XNXVKLPD
        
'DLQL
.DVKLZD]DNL
        
.DULZD

34
+DPDRND         

6KLND         

0LKDPD         

7DNDKDPD         

2KL         

6KLPDQH         

,NDWD         

*HQNDL         

6HQGDL         
㼀㼍㼎㼘㼑㻌䊡㻙㻥䚷㻻㼜㼑㼞㼍㼠㼕㼚㼓㻌㻾㼑㼏㼛㼞㼐㼟㻌㼎㼥㻌㼁㼚㼕㼠㻌㼕㼚㻌㻲㼅㻞㻜㻜㻥
(OHFWULFHQHUJ\
/LFHQVHG &DSDFLW\IDFWRU 2SHUDWLRQIDFWRU *HQHUDWLQJWLPH
8QLW JHQHUDWHG
2XWSXW 㸦㸣㸧 㸦㸣㸧  KRXUV
 N:K
㸦㹋㹕㸧 )< *UDQGWRWDO )< *UDQGWRWDO )< *UDQGWRWDO )< *UDQGWRWDO
7RNDL'DLQL         
7VXUXJD8QLW         
7VXUXJD8QLW         
7RPDUL8QLW         
7RPDUL8QLW         
7RPDUL8QLW         
2QDJDZD8QLW         
2QDJDZD8QLW         
2QDJDZD8QLW         
+LJDVKLGRUL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLQL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLQL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLQL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLQL8QLW         
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW         
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW         
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW         
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW         
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW         
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW         
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW         
+DPDRND8QLW         
+DPDRND8QLW         
+DPDRND8QLW         
6KLND8QLW         
6KLND8QLW         
0LKDPD8QLW         
0LKDPD8QLW         
0LKDPD8QLW         
7DNDKDPD8QLW         
7DNDKDPD8QLW         
7DNDKDPD8QLW         
7DNDKDPD8QLW         
2KL8QLW         
2KL8QLW         
2KL8QLW         
2KL8QLW         
6KLPDQH8QLW         
6KLPDQH8QLW         
,NDWD8QLW         
,NDWD8QLW         
,NDWD8QLW         
*HQNDL8QLW         
*HQNDL8QLW         


*HQNDL8QLW         
*HQNDL8QLW         
6HQGDL8QLW         
6HQGDL8QLW         

35
ϩ㸫ࠉ&DSDFLW\)DFWRU
㼀㼍㼎㼘㼑㻌䊡䠉㻝㻜䚷㼀㼞㼑㼚㼐㼟㻌㼕㼚㻌㻯㼍㼜㼍㼏㼕㼠㼥㻌㻲㼍㼏㼠㼛㼞
8QLW㸣
㻾㼑㼍㼏㼠㼛㼞㻌㼀㼥㼜㼑
㻲㼕㼟㼏㼍㼘㻌㼅㼑㼍㼞 㹀㹕㹐 㹎㹕㹐 㹅㹁㹐 2YHUDOODYHUDJH
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
7RWDO    

36
㼀㼍㼎㼘㼑㻌䊡䠉㻝㻝䚷㼀㼞㼑㼚㼐㼟㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻯㼍㼜㼍㼏㼕㼠㼥㻌㻲㼍㼏㼠㼛㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㻱㼍㼏㼔㻌㻱㼘㼑㼏㼠㼞㼕㼏㻌㻼㼛㼣㼑㼞㻌㻯㼛㼙㼜㼍㼚㼥
(Unit:㸣)
㻱㼘㼑㼏㼠㼞㼕㼏㻌㼜㼛㼣㼑㼞 -DSDQ
㻯㼛㼙㼜㼍㼚㼥 $WRPLF3RZHU 2YHUDOO
+RNNDLGR 7RKRNX 7RN\R &KXEX +RNXULNX .DQVDL &KXJRNX 6KLNRNX .\XVKX
㻲㼕㼟㼏㼍㼘㻌㼅㼑㼍㼞 &RPSDQ\ $YHUDJH
    
    
    
     
     
    ࠉ    
    ࠉ    
    ࠉ     
    ࠉ     
    ࠉ     
    ࠉ     
    ࠉ     
    ࠉ     
    ࠉ     
     ࠉ     
     ࠉ     
     ࠉ     
     ࠉ     
     ࠉ     
      ࠉ     
      ࠉ     
      ࠉ     
      ࠉ     
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           

           
           
7RWDO           

37
㼀㼍㼎㼘㼑㻌䊡㻙㻝㻞䚷㻯㼍㼜㼍㼏㼕㼠㼥㻌㻲㼍㼏㼠㼛㼞㻌㼎㼥㻌㼁㼚㼕㼠㻌㻔㼎㼥㻌㻹㼛㼚㼠㼔㻌㼕㼚㻌㻲㼅㻞㻜㻜㻥㻕
㸦8QLW㸸㸣㸧
/LFHQVHG
)LVFDO<HDU
(VWDEOLVKHU 8QLW RXWSXW $SU 0D\ -XQ -XO $XJ 6HS 2FW 1RY 'HF -DQ )HE 0DU
㸦㹋㹕㸧
7RWDO
㹀ࠉ㹕ࠉ㹐
-DSDQ$WRPLF 7RNDL'DLQL              
3RZHU&RPSDQ\ 7VXUXJD8QLW              
2QDJDZD8QLW              
7RKRNX(OHFWULF 2QDJDZD8QLW              
3RZHU&R,QF 2QDJDZD8QLW              
+LJDVKLGRUL8QLW              
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW              
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW              
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW              
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW              
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW              
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW              
)XNXVKLPD'DLQL8QLW              
)XNXVKLPD'DLQL8QLW              
7RN\R(OHFWULF
)XNXVKLPD'DLQL8QLW              
3RZHU&R,QF
)XNXVKLPD'DLQL8QLW              

38
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW              
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW              
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW              
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW              
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW              
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW              
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW              
+DPDRND8QLW              
&KXEX(OHFWULF
+DPDRND8QLW              
3RZHU&R,QF
+DPDRND8QLW              
+RNXULNX(OHFWULF 6KLND8QLW              
3RZHU&R 6KLND8QLW              
&KXJRNX(OHFWULF 6KLPDQH8QLW              
3RZHU&R,QF 6KLPDQH8QLW              
6XEWRWDO              
1RWH7KHUHDUHFDVHVLQZKLFKWKHFDSDFLW\IDFWRUH[FHHGVGXULQJRSHUDWLRQDWUDWHGWKHUPDORXWSXW
㼀㼍㼎㼘㼑㻌䊡㻙㻝㻞䚷㻯㼍㼜㼍㼏㼕㼠㼥㻌㻲㼍㼏㼠㼛㼞㻌㼎㼥㻌㼁㼚㼕㼠㻌㻔㼎㼥㻌㻹㼛㼚㼠㼔㻌㼕㼚㻌㻲㼅㻞㻜㻜㻥㻕
㸦8QLW㸸㸣㸧
/LFHQVHG
)LVFDO<HDU
(VWDEOLVKHU 8QLW RXWSXW $SU 0D\ -XQ -XO $XJ 6HS 2FW 1RY 'HF -DQ )HE 0DU
㸦㹋㹕㸧
7RWDO
㹎ࠉ㹕ࠉ㹐
-DSDQ$WRPLF
7VXUXJD8QLW              
3RZHU&RPSDQ\
7RPDUL8QLW              
+RNNDLGR(OHFWULF
7RPDUL8QLW              
3RZHU&R,QF
7RPDUL8QLW      
0LKDPD8QLW              
0LKDPD8QLW              
0LKDPD8QLW              
7DNDKDPD8QLW              
7DNDKDPD8QLW              
.DQVDL(OHFWULF
7DNDKDPD8QLW              
3RZHU&R,QF
7DNDKDPD8QLW              
2KL8QLW              
2KL8QLW              
2KL8QLW              
2KL8QLW              

39
,NDWD8QLW              
6KLNRNX(OHFWULF
,NDWD8QLW              
3RZHU&R,QF
,NDWD8QLW              
*HQNDL8QLW              
*HQNDL8QLW              
.\XVKX(OHFWULF *HQNDL8QLW              
3RZHU&R,QF *HQNDL8QLW              
6HQGDL8QLW              
6HQGDL8QLW              
6XEWRWDO              
7RWDO              
1RWH7KHUHDUHFDVHVLQZKLFKWKHFDSDFLW\IDFWRUH[FHHGVGXULQJRSHUDWLRQDWUDWHGWKHUPDORXWSXW



㼀㼍㼎㼘㼑㻌䊡㻙㻝㻟䚷㼀㼞㼑㼚㼐㼟㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑
/LFHQVHG
(VWDEOLVKHU 8QLW RXWSXW        
0:
㹀ࠉ㹕ࠉ㹐

-DSDQ$WRPLF 7RNDL'DLQL         
3RZHU&RPSDQ\
7VXUXJD8QLW         
2QDJDZD8QLW         

7RKRNX(OHFWULF 2QDJDZD8QLW    


3RZHU&R,QF
2QDJDZD8QLW 
+LJDVKLGRUL8QLW 
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLQL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLQL8QLW         
7RN\R(OHFWULF
3RZHU&R,QF
)XNXVKLPD'DLQL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLQL8QLW         
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW         
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW         
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW      
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW     
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW         
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW   
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW  
+DPDRND8QLW         
+DPDRND8QLW         
&KXEX(OHFWULF
3RZHU&R,QF
+DPDRND8QLW         
+DPDRND8QLW      
+DPDRND8QLW 
+RNXULNX 6KLND8QLW      
(OHFWULF3RZHU
&R 6KLND8QLW 

&KXJRNX(OHFWULF 6KLPDQH8QLW         
3RZHU&R,QF
6KLPDQH8QLW         
6XEWRWDO         
1RWH&DSDFLW\IDFWRUZLOOH[FHHGLQWKHFDVHRIRSHUDWLRQDWUDWHGWKHUPDOSRZHU

40
㻌㻯㼍㼜㼍㼏㼕㼠㼥㻌㻲㼍㼏㼠㼛㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㻱㼍㼏㼔㻌㼁㼚㼕㼠 ࠉ
  䠄㼁㼚㼕㼠䠖䠂䠅
*UDQG
           
7RWDO

            
            
            
            
         
     
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
           㸫 
           㸫 
            
            
      
            
     
            
            
            


41
㼀㼍㼎㼘㼑㻌䊡㻙㻝㻟䚷㼀㼞㼑㼚㼐㼟㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑
/LFHQVHG
(VWDEOLVKHU 8QLW RXWSXW        
0:
㹎ࠉ㹕ࠉ㹐 ࠉ
-DSDQ$WRPLF
3RZHU&RPSDQ\
7VXUXJD8QLW         
7RPDUL8QLW         
+RNNDLGR
(OHFWULF3RZHU 7RPDUL8QLW        
&R,QF
7RPDUL8QLW 
0LKDPD8QLW         
0LKDPD8QLW         
0LKDPD8QLW         
7DNDKDPD8QLW         
7DNDKDPD8QLW         
ࠉ.DQVDL
(OHFWULF3RZHU 7DNDKDPD8QLW         
&R,QF
7DNDKDPD8QLW         
2KL8QLW         
2KL8QLW         
2KL8QLW        
2KL8QLW       
,NDWD8QLW         
6KLNRNX(OHFWULF
3RZHU&R,QF
,NDWD8QLW         
,NDWD8QLW     
*HQNDL8QLW         
*HQNDL8QLW         

.\XVKX(OHFWULF *HQNDL8QLW      


3RZHU&R,QF
*HQNDL8QLW  
6HQGDL8QLW         
6HQGDL8QLW         
6XEWRWDO         
㹅ࠉ㹁ࠉ㹐 
-DSDQ$WRPLF
3RZHU&RPSDQ\
7RNDL         
6XEWRWDO         
7RWDO         
1RWH&DSDFLW\IDFWRUZLOOH[FHHGLQWKHFDVHRIRSHUDWLRQDWUDWHGWKHUPDOSRZHU

42
㻌㻯㼍㼜㼍㼏㼕㼠㼥㻌㻲㼍㼏㼠㼛㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㻱㼍㼏㼔㻌㼁㼚㼕㼠 ࠉ
䠄㼁㼚㼕㼠䠖䠂䠅
*UDQG
           
7RWDO

            
            
            
 
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            

㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 
㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 
            


43
ϩ㸫ࠉ2SHUDWLRQ)DFWRU
㻌㻌㻌㼀㼍㼎㼘㼑㻌䊡㻙㻝㻠䚷㼀㼞㼑㼚㼐㼟㻌㼕㼚㻌㻻㼜㼑㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㻲㼍㼏㼠㼛㼞
 8QLW㸣
㻾㼑㼍㼏㼠㼛㼞㻌㼀㼥㼜㼑
㹀㹕㹐 㹎㹕㹐 㹅㹁㹐 2YHUDOODYHUDJH
㻲㼕㼟㼏㼍㼘㻌㼅㼑㼍㼞
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
7RWDO    
44
㼀㼍㼎㼘㼑㻌䊡㻙㻝㻡䚷㼀㼞㼑㼚㼐㼟㻌㼕㼚㻌㻻㼜㼑㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㻲㼍㼏㼠㼛㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㻱㼍㼏㼔㻌㻱㼘㼑㼏㼠㼞㼕㼏㻌㻼㼛㼣㼑㼞㻌㻯㼛㼙㼜㼍㼚㼥
ࠉࠉࠉ 8QLW㸣
㻱㼘㼑㼏㼠㼞㼕㼏㻌㼜㼛㼣㼑㼞 -DSDQ
㻯㼛㼙㼜㼍㼚㼥 2YHUDOO
$WRPLF +RNNDLGR 7RKRNX 7RN\R &KXEX +RNXULNX .DQVDL &KXJRNX 6KLNRNX .\XVKX
3RZHU $YHUDJH
㻲㼕㼟㼏㼍㼘 㼅㼑㼍㼞
    
    
    
     
     
       
       
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
         
         
         
         
         
          
          
          
      ࠉ     
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
            参
           
           
7RWDO           

45
㼀㼍㼎㼘㼑㻌䊡㻙㻝㻢䚷㻻㼜㼑㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㻲㼍㼏㼠㼛㼞㻌㼎㼥㻌㼁㼚㼕㼠㻌㻔㼎㼥㻌㻹㼛㼚㼠㼔㻌㼕㼚㻌㻲㼅㻞㻜㻜㻥㻕
㸦8QLW㸸㸣㸧
/LFHQVHG
)LVFDO<HDU
(VWDEOLVKHU 8QLW RXWSXW $SU 0D\ -XQ -XO $XJ 6HS 2FW 1RY 'HF -DQ )HE 0DU
㸦㹋㹕㸧 7RWDO
㹀ࠉ㹕ࠉ㹐
-DSDQ$WRPLF 7RNDL'DLQL              
3RZHU&RPSDQ\ 7VXUXJD8QLW              
2QDJDZD8QLW              
7RKRNX(OHFWULF 2QDJDZD8QLW              
3RZHU&R,QF 2QDJDZD8QLW              
+LJDVKLGRUL8QLW              
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW              
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW              
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW              
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW              
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW              
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW              
)XNXVKLPD'DLQL8QLW              
)XNXVKLPD'DLQL8QLW              
7RN\R(OHFWULF
)XNXVKLPD'DLQL8QLW              
3RZHU&R,QF
)XNXVKLPD'DLQL8QLW              

46
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW              
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW              
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW              
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW              
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW              
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW              
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW              
+DPDRND8QLW              
&KXEX(OHFWULF
+DPDRND8QLW              
3RZHU&R,QF
+DPDRND8QLW              
+RNXULNX(OHFWULF 6KLND8QLW              
3RZHU&R 6KLND8QLW              
&KXJRNX(OHFWULF 6KLPDQH8QLW              
3RZHU&R,QF 6KLPDQH8QLW              
6XEWRWDO              
㼀㼍㼎㼘㼑㻌䊡㻙㻝㻢䚷㻻㼜㼑㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㻲㼍㼏㼠㼛㼞㻌㼎㼥㻌㼁㼚㼕㼠㻌㻔㼎㼥㻌㻹㼛㼚㼠㼔㻌㼕㼚㻌㻲㼅㻞㻜㻜㻥㻕
㸦8QLW㸸㸣㸧
/LFHQVHG
)LVFDO<HDU
(VWDEOLVKHU 8QLW RXWSXW $SU 0D\ -XQ -XO $XJ 6HS 2FW 1RY 'HF -DQ )HE 0DU
㸦㹋㹕㸧 7RWDO
㹎ࠉ㹕ࠉ㹐
-DSDQ$WRPLF
3RZHU&RPSDQ\
7VXUXJD8QLW              
7RPDUL8QLW              
+RNNDLGR(OHFWULF
7RPDUL8QLW              
3RZHU&R,QF
7RPDUL8QLW      
0LKDPD8QLW              
0LKDPD8QLW              
0LKDPD8QLW              
7DNDKDPD8QLW              
7DNDKDPD8QLW              
.DQVDL(OHFWULF
7DNDKDPD8QLW              
3RZHU&R,QF
7DNDKDPD8QLW              
2KL8QLW              
2KL8QLW              
2KL8QLW              
2KL8QLW              

47
,NDWD8QLW              
6KLNRNX(OHFWULF
,NDWD8QLW              
3RZHU&R,QF
,NDWD8QLW              
*HQNDL8QLW              
*HQNDL8QLW              
.\XVKX(OHFWULF *HQNDL8QLW              
3RZHU&R,QF *HQNDL8QLW              
6HQGDL8QLW              
6HQGDL8QLW              
6XEWRWDO              
7RWDO              



㼀㼍㼎㼘㼑㻌䊡㻙㻝㻣㻌㼀㼞㼑㼚㼐㼟㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌
/LFHQVHG
(VWDEOLVKHU 8QLW RXWSXW        
0:
㹀ࠉ㹕ࠉ㹐

-DSDQ$WRPLF 7RNDL'DLQL         
3RZHU&RPSDQ\
7VXUXJD8QLW         
2QDJDZD8QLW         

7RKRNX(OHFWULF 2QDJDZD8QLW    


3RZHU&R,QF
2QDJDZD8QLW 
+LJDVKLGRUL8QLW 
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLQL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLQL8QLW         
7RN\R(OHFWULF
3RZHU&R,QF
)XNXVKLPD'DLQL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLQL8QLW         
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW         
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW         
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW      
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW     
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW         
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW   
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW  
+DPDRND8QLW         
+DPDRND8QLW         
&KXEX(OHFWULF
3RZHU&R,QF
+DPDRND8QLW         
+DPDRND8QLW      
+DPDRND8QLW 
+RNXULNX 6KLND8QLW      
(OHFWULF3RZHU
&R 6KLND8QLW 

&KXJRNX(OHFWULF 6KLPDQH8QLW         
3RZHU&R,QF
6KLPDQH8QLW         
6XEWRWDO         

48
㻻㼜㼑㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㻲㼍㼏㼠㼛㼞 ࠉ
  䠄㼁㼚㼕㼠䠖䠂䠅
*UDQG
           
7RWDO

            
            
            
            
         
     
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
           㸫 
           㸫 
            
            
      
            
     
            
            
            


49
㼀㼍㼎㼘㼑㻌䊡㻙㻝㻣㻌㼀㼞㼑㼚㼐㼟㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌
/LFHQVHG
(VWDEOLVKHU 8QLW RXWSXW        
0:
㹎ࠉ㹕ࠉ㹐 ࠉ
-DSDQ$WRPLF
3RZHU&RPSDQ\
7VXUXJD8QLW         
7RPDUL8QLW         
+RNNDLGR
(OHFWULF3RZHU 7RPDUL8QLW        
&R,QF
7RPDUL8QLW 
0LKDPD8QLW         
0LKDPD8QLW         
0LKDPD8QLW         
7DNDKDPD8QLW         
7DNDKDPD8QLW         
ࠉ.DQVDL
(OHFWULF3RZHU 7DNDKDPD8QLW         
&R,QF
7DNDKDPD8QLW         
2KL8QLW         
2KL8QLW         
2KL8QLW        
2KL8QLW       
,NDWD8QLW         
6KLNRNX(OHFWULF
3RZHU&R,QF
,NDWD8QLW         
,NDWD8QLW     
*HQNDL8QLW         
*HQNDL8QLW         

.\XVKX(OHFWULF *HQNDL8QLW      


3RZHU&R,QF
*HQNDL8QLW  
6HQGDL8QLW         
6HQGDL8QLW         
6XEWRWDO         
㹅ࠉ㹁ࠉ㹐 
-DSDQ$WRPLF
3RZHU&RPSDQ\
7RNDL         
6XEWRWDO         
7RWDO         

50
㻻㼜㼑㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㻲㼍㼏㼠㼛㼞 ࠉ
䠄㼁㼚㼕㼠䠖䠂䠅
*UDQG
           
7RWDO

            
            
            
 
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            

㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 
㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 
            


51
ϩ(OHFWULF(QHUJ\*HQHUDWHG
㻌㻌㼀㼍㼎㼘㼑㻌䊡㻙㻝㻤㻌㼀㼞㼑㼚㼐㼟㻌㼕㼚㻌㻱㼘㼑㼏㼠㼞㼕㼏㻌㻱㼚㼑㼞㼓㼥㻌㻳㼑㼚㼑㼞㼍㼠㼑㼐
 8QLWN:K
㻾㼑㼍㼏㼠㼛㼞㻌㼀㼥㼜㼑
㻲㼕㼟㼏㼍㼘㻌㼅㼑㼍㼞 㹀㹕㹐 㹎㹕㹐 㹅㹁㹐 7RWDO
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
*UDQGWRWDO    
52
㼀㼍㼎㼘㼑㻌䊡㻙㻝㻥㻌㼀㼞㼑㼚㼐㼟㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻱㼘㼑㼏㼠㼞㼕㼏㻌㻱㼚㼑㼞㼓㼥㻌㻳㼑㼚㼑㼞㼍㼠㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㻱㼍㼏㼔㻌㻱㼘㼑㼏㼠㼞㼕㼏㻌㻼㼛㼣㼑㼞㻌㻯㼛㼙㼜㼍㼚㼥
 8QLWN:K
㻱㼘㼑㼏㼠㼞㼕㼏㻌㼜㼛㼣㼑㼞
-DSDQ
㻯㼛㼙㼜㼍㼚㼥
$WRPLF +RNNDLGR 7RKRNX 7RN\R &KXEX +RNXULNX .DQVDL &KXJRNX 6KLNRNX .\XVKX 7RWDO
㻲㼕㼟㼏㼍㼘㻌㼅㼑㼍㼞 3RZHU

    

    

    

     

     

       

       

        

        

        

        

        

        

        

         

         

         

         

         

      ࠉ     

      ࠉ     

      ࠉ     

      ࠉ     

           

           

           

           

           

           

           

           

           

           

           

           

           

           

           

            参
           

7RWDO           

53
㼀㼍㼎㼘㼑㻌䊡㻙㻞㻜㻌㻱㼘㼑㼏㼠㼞㼕㼏㻌㻱㼚㼑㼞㼓㼥㻌㻳㼑㼚㼑㼞㼍㼠㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㼁㼚㼕㼠㻌㻔㼎㼥㻌㻹㼛㼚㼠㼔㻌㼕㼚㻌㻲㼅㻞㻜㻜㻥㻕
8QLWN:K
/LFHQVHG
)LVFDO<HDU
(VWDEOLVKHU 8QLW RXWSXW $SU 0D\ -XQ -XO $XJ 6HS 2FW 1RY 'HF -DQ )HE 0DU
㸦㹋㹕㸧 7RWDO
㹀ࠉ㹕ࠉ㹐
-DSDQ$WRPLF 7RNDL'DLQL              
3RZHU&RPSDQ\ 7VXUXJD8QLW              
2QDJDZD8QLW              
7RKRNX(OHFWULF 2QDJDZD8QLW              
3RZHU&R,QF 2QDJDZD8QLW              
+LJDVKLGRUL8QLW              
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW              
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW              
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW              
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW              
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW              
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW              
)XNXVKLPD'DLQL8QLW              
)XNXVKLPD'DLQL8QLW              
7RN\R(OHFWULF

54
)XNXVKLPD'DLQL8QLW              
3RZHU&R,QF
)XNXVKLPD'DLQL8QLW              
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW              
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW              
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW              
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW              
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW              
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW              
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW              
+DPDRND8QLW              
&KXEX(OHFWULF
+DPDRND8QLW              
3RZHU&R,QF
+DPDRND8QLW              
+RNXULNX(OHFWULF 6KLND8QLW              
3RZHU&R 6KLND8QLW              
&KXJRNX(OHFWULF 6KLPDQH8QLW              
3RZHU&R,QF 6KLPDQH8QLW              
6XEWRWDO              
㼀㼍㼎㼘㼑㻌䊡㻙㻞㻜㻌㻱㼘㼑㼏㼠㼞㼕㼏㻌㻱㼚㼑㼞㼓㼥㻌㻳㼑㼚㼑㼞㼍㼠㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㼁㼚㼕㼠㻌㻔㼎㼥㻌㻹㼛㼚㼠㼔㻌㼕㼚㻌㻲㼅㻞㻜㻜㻥㻕
8QLWN:K
/LFHQVHG
)LVFDO<HDU
(VWDEOLVKHU 8QLW RXWSXW $SU 0D\ -XQ -XO $XJ 6HS 2FW 1RY 'HF -DQ )HE 0DU
㸦㹋㹕㸧 7RWDO
㹎ࠉ㹕ࠉ㹐
-DSDQ$WRPLF
3RZHU&RPSDQ\
7VXUXJD8QLW              
7RPDUL8QLW              
+RNNDLGR(OHFWULF
7RPDUL8QLW              
3RZHU&R,QF
7RPDUL8QLW      
0LKDPD8QLW              
0LKDPD8QLW              
0LKDPD8QLW              
7DNDKDPD8QLW              
7DNDKDPD8QLW              
.DQVDL(OHFWULF
7DNDKDPD8QLW              
3RZHU&R,QF
7DNDKDPD8QLW              
2KL8QLW              
2KL8QLW              
2KL8QLW              

55
2KL8QLW              
,NDWD8QLW              
6KLNRNX(OHFWULF
,NDWD8QLW              
3RZHU&R,QF
,NDWD8QLW              
*HQNDL8QLW              
*HQNDL8QLW              
.\XVKX(OHFWULF *HQNDL8QLW              
3RZHU&R,QF *HQNDL8QLW              
6HQGDL8QLW              
6HQGDL8QLW              
6XEWRWDO              
7RWDO              



㼀㼍㼎㼘㼑㻌㻵㻵㻙㻞㻝㻌㼀㼞㼑㼚㼐㼟㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌

/LFHQVHG
(VWDEOLVKHU 8QLW RXWSXW        
0:
㹀ࠉ㹕ࠉ㹐

-DSDQ$WRPLF 7RNDL'DLQL         
3RZHU&RPSDQ\ 7VXUXJD8QLW         
2QDJDZD8QLW         

7RKRNX(OHFWULF 2QDJDZD8QLW    


3RZHU&R,QF 2QDJDZD8QLW 
+LJDVKLGRUL8QLW 
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLQL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLQL8QLW         
7RN\R(OHFWULF
3RZHU&R,QF
)XNXVKLPD'DLQL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLQL8QLW         
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW         
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW         
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW      
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW     
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW         
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW   
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW  
+DPDRND8QLW         
+DPDRND8QLW         
&KXEX(OHFWULF
3RZHU&R,QF
+DPDRND8QLW         
+DPDRND8QLW      
+DPDRND8QLW 

+RNXULNX(OHFWULF 6KLND8QLW      


3RZHU&R 6KLND8QLW 

&KXJRNX(OHFWULF 6KLPDQH8QLW         
3RZHU&R,QF 6KLPDQH8QLW         
6XEWRWDO         

56
㻱㼘㼑㼏㼠㼞㼕㼏㻌㻱㼚㼑㼞㼓㼥㻌㻳㼑㼚㼑㼞㼍㼠㼑㼐 ࠉ

  8QLWN:K

*UDQG
           
7RWDO

            
            
            
            
         
     
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
           㸫 
           㸫 
            
            
      
            
     
            
            
            


57
㼀㼍㼎㼘㼑㻌䊡㻙㻞㻝㻌㼀㼞㼑㼚㼐㼟㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌

/LFHQVHG
(VWDEOLVKHU 8QLW RXWSXW        
0:
㹎ࠉ㹕ࠉ㹐 ࠉ
-DSDQ$WRPLF
7VXUXJD8QLW         
3RZHU &RPSDQ\
7RPDUL8QLW         
+RNNDLGR(OHFWULF
3RZHU&R,QF
7RPDUL8QLW        
7RPDUL8QLW 
0LKDPD8QLW         
0LKDPD8QLW         
0LKDPD8QLW         
7DNDKDPD8QLW         
7DNDKDPD8QLW         
ࠉ.DQVDL(OHFWULF
3RZHU&R,QF
7DNDKDPD8QLW         
7DNDKDPD8QLW         
2KL8QLW         
2KL8QLW         
2KL8QLW        
2KL8QLW       
,NDWD8QLW         
6KLNRNX(OHFWULF
3RZHU&R,QF
,NDWD8QLW         
,NDWD8QLW     
*HQNDL8QLW         
*HQNDL8QLW         

.\XVKX(OHFWULF *HQNDL8QLW      


3RZHU&R,QF *HQNDL8QLW  
6HQGDL8QLW         
6HQGDL8QLW         
6XEWRWDO         
㹅ࠉ㹁ࠉ㹐 
-DSDQ$WRPLF
7RNDL         
3RZHU &RPSDQ\
6XEWRWDO         

7RWDO         

58
㻱㼘㼑㼏㼠㼞㼕㼏㻌㻱㼚㼑㼞㼓㼥㻌㻳㼑㼚㼑㼞㼍㼠㼑㼐 ࠉ

 8QLWN:K

*UDQG
           
7RWDO

            
            
            
 
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            

㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 
㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 

            


59
ϩ㸫*HQHUDWLQJ7LPH
㻌㻌㼀㼍㼎㼘㼑㻌䊡㻙㻞㻞㻌㼀㼞㼑㼚㼐㼟㻌㼕㼚㻌㻳㼑㼚㼑㼞㼍㼠㼕㼚㼓㻌㼀㼕㼙㼑
8QLW+RXUV
㻾㼑㼍㼏㼠㼛㼞㻌㼀㼥㼜㼑
㹀㹕㹐 㹎㹕㹐 㹅㹁㹐 7RWDO
㻲㼕㼟㼏㼍㼘㻌㼅㼑㼍㼞
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
   㸫 
*UDQGWRWDO    
60
㼀㼍㼎㼘㼑㻌䊡㻙㻞㻟㻌㼀㼞㼑㼚㼐㼟㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻳㼑㼚㼑㼞㼍㼠㼕㼚㼓㻌㼀㼕㼙㼑㻌㼎㼥㻌㻱㼍㼏㼔㻌㻱㼘㼑㼏㼠㼞㼕㼏㻌㻼㼛㼣㼑㼞㻌㻯㼛㼙㼜㼍㼚㼥
8QLW+RXUV
㻱㼘㼑㼏㼠㼞㼕㼏㻌㼜㼛㼣㼑㼞 -DSDQ
㻯㼛㼙㼜㼍㼚㼥
$WRPLF +RNNDLGR 7RKRNX 7RN\R &KXEX +RNXULNX .DQVDL &KXJRNX 6KLNRNX .\XVKX 7RWDO
㻲㼕㼟㼏㼍㼘㻌㼅㼑㼍㼞 3RZHU
    

    

    

     

     

       

       

        

        

        

        

        

        

        

         

         

         

         

         

          

          

          

           

           

           

           

           

           

           

           

           

           

           

           

           

           

           

           

           

           

7RWDO           

61
㼀㼍㼎㼘㼑㻌䊡㻙㻞㻠㻌㻳㼑㼚㼑㼞㼍㼠㼕㼚㼓㻌㼀㼕㼙㼑㻌㼎㼥㻌㼁㼚㼕㼠㻌㻔㼎㼥㻌㻹㼛㼚㼠㼔㻌㼕㼚㻌㻲㼅㻞㻜㻜㻥㻕
8QLW+RXUV
/LFHQVHG
)LVFDO<HDU
(VWDEOLVKHU 8QLW RXWSXW $SU 0D\ -XQ -XO $XJ 6HS 2FW 1RY 'HF -DQ )HE 0DU
㸦㹋㹕㸧 7RWDO
㹀ࠉ㹕ࠉ㹐
-DSDQ$WRPLF 7RNDL'DLQL              
3RZHU&RPSDQ\ 7VXUXJD8QLW              
2QDJDZD8QLW              
7RKRNX(OHFWULF 2QDJDZD8QLW              
3RZHU&R,QF 2QDJDZD8QLW              
+LJDVKLGRUL8QLW              
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW              
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW              
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW              
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW              
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW              
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW              
)XNXVKLPD'DLQL8QLW              
)XNXVKLPD'DLQL8QLW              

62
7RN\R(OHFWULF
)XNXVKLPD'DLQL8QLW              
3RZHU&R,QF
)XNXVKLPD'DLQL8QLW              
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW              
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW              
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW              
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW              
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW              
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW              
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW              
+DPDRND8QLW              
&KXEX(OHFWULF
+DPDRND8QLW              
3RZHU&R,QF
+DPDRND8QLW              
+RNXULNX 6KLND8QLW              
(OHFWULF3RZHU
&R 6KLND8QLW              
&KXJRNX(OHFWULF 6KLPDQH8QLW              
3RZHU&R,QF 6KLPDQH8QLW              
6XEWRWDO              
㼀㼍㼎㼘㼑㻌䊡㻙㻞㻠㻌㻳㼑㼚㼑㼞㼍㼠㼕㼚㼓㻌㼀㼕㼙㼑㻌㼎㼥㻌㼁㼚㼕㼠㻌㻔㼎㼥㻌㻹㼛㼚㼠㼔㻌㼕㼚㻌㻲㼅㻞㻜㻜㻥㻕
8QLW+RXUV
/LFHQVHG
)LVFDO<HDU
(VWDEOLVKHU 8QLW RXWSXW $SU 0D\ -XQ -XO $XJ 6HS 2FW 1RY 'HF -DQ )HE 0DU
㸦㹋㹕㸧 7RWDO
㹎ࠉ㹕ࠉ㹐
-DSDQ$WRPLF
3RZHU&RPSDQ\
7VXUXJD8QLW              

+RNNDLGR 7RPDUL8QLW              
(OHFWULF3RZHU7RPDUL8QLW              
&R,QF 7RPDUL8QLW      
0LKDPD8QLW              
0LKDPD8QLW              
0LKDPD8QLW              
7DNDKDPD8QLW              
7DNDKDPD8QLW              
.DQVDL(OHFWULF
7DNDKDPD8QLW              
3RZHU&R,QF
7DNDKDPD8QLW              
2KL8QLW              
2KL8QLW              

63
2KL8QLW              
2KL8QLW              
,NDWD8QLW              
6KLNRNX(OHFWULF
,NDWD8QLW              
3RZHU&R,QF
,NDWD8QLW              
*HQNDL8QLW              
*HQNDL8QLW              
.\XVKX(OHFWULF *HQNDL8QLW              
3RZHU&R,QF *HQNDL8QLW              
6HQGDL8QLW              
6HQGDL8QLW              
6XEWRWDO              
7RWDO              



㼀㼍㼎㼘㼑㻌䊡㻙㻞㻡㻌㼀㼞㼑㼚㼐㼟㻌㼕㼚㻌

/LFHQVHG
(VWDEOLVKHU 8QLW RXWSXW        
0:
㹀ࠉ㹕ࠉ㹐

-DSDQ$WRPLF 7RNDL'DLQL         
3RZHU&RPSDQ\ 7VXUXJD8QLW         
2QDJDZD8QLW         

7RKRNX(OHFWULF 2QDJDZD8QLW    


3RZHU&R,QF 2QDJDZD8QLW 
+LJDVKLGRUL8QLW 
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLLFKL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLQL8QLW         
)XNXVKLPD'DLQL8QLW         
7RN\R(OHFWULF
)XNXVKLPD'DLQL8QLW         
3RZHU&R,QF
)XNXVKLPD'DLQL8QLW         
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW         
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW         
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW      
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW     
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW         
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW   
.DVKLZD]DNL.DULZD8QLW  
+DPDRND8QLW         
+DPDRND8QLW         
&KXEX(OHFWULF
+DPDRND8QLW         
3RZHU&R,QF
+DPDRND8QLW      
+DPDRND8QLW 

+RNXULNX(OHFWULF 6KLND8QLW      


3RZHU&R 6KLND8QLW 

&KXJRNX(OHFWULF 6KLPDQH8QLW         
3RZHU&R,QF 6KLPDQH8QLW         
6XEWRWDO         

64
㻳㼑㼚㼑㼞㼍㼠㼕㼚㼓㻌㼀㼕㼙㼑 ࠉ

  8QLW+RXUV
*UDQG
           
WRWDO

            
            
            
            
         
     
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
           㸫 
           㸫 
            
            
      
            
     
            
            
            


65
㼀㼍㼎㼘㼑㻌䊡㻙㻞㻡㻌㼀㼞㼑㼚㼐㼟㻌㼕㼚㻌

/LFHQVHG
(VWDEOLVKHU 8QLW RXWSXW        
0:
㹎ࠉ㹕ࠉ㹐 ࠉ
-DSDQ$WRPLF
7VXUXJD8QLW         
3RZHU&RPSDQ\
7RPDUL8QLW         
+RNNDLGR(OHFWULF
7RPDUL8QLW        
3RZHU&R,QF
7RPDUL8QLW 
0LKDPD8QLW         
0LKDPD8QLW         
0LKDPD8QLW         
7DNDKDPD8QLW         
7DNDKDPD8QLW         
ࠉ.DQVDL(OHFWULF
7DNDKDPD8QLW         
3RZHU&R,QF
7DNDKDPD8QLW         
2KL8QLW         
2KL8QLW         
2KL8QLW        
2KL8QLW       
,NDWD8QLW         
6KLNRNX(OHFWULF
3RZHU&R,QF
,NDWD8QLW         
,NDWD8QLW     
*HQNDL8QLW         
*HQNDL8QLW         

.\XVKX(OHFWULF *HQNDL8QLW      


3RZHU&R,QF *HQNDL8QLW  
6HQGDL8QLW         
6HQGDL8QLW         
6XEWRWDO         
㹅ࠉ㹁ࠉ㹐 
-DSDQ$WRPLF
7RNDL         
3RZHU&RPSDQ\
6XEWRWDO         

7RWDO         

66
㻳㼑㼚㼑㼞㼍㼠㼕㼚㼓㻌㼀㼕㼙㼑 ࠉ

 8QLW+RXUV
*UDQG
           
WRWDO

            
            
            
 
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            

㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 
㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 

            


67
!-6 Power History of Each Unit [Image]
(1) Tokai Daini Power Station
FY2005
%
100
! !
Control !
rod pattern ! ! ! ! rod pattern!
Control ! ! !
adjustment adjustment

50
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
21st periodical inspection

! ! ! ! 26 ! ! ! ! !
0
23 30
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
Control rod pattern
Coast down operation adjustment
FY2006
%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! Low output as a!malfunctioning !
Control rod pattern turbine-driven reactor feedwater
Shutdown to
adjustment pump (A) was switched over to a
repair turbine-
motor-driven reactor feedwater
! !
50
! ! ! ! ! ! !pump (A, B). ! !
driven reactor
feedwater
22nd periodical inspection pump (A)

! 0 18 12 25
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2007
%
100
22nd periodical

23rd periodical
Control rod pattern Control rod pattern
inspection!

inspection!
adjustment adjustment
50
Power generation stopped to
repair turbine-driven reactor
feedwater pump (A)

0
23 18 18
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2008
%
100

Control rod pattern


adjustment
50
23rd periodical
inspection!

0
9 12
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

Coast down operation


FY2009
%
100
Power
generation
stopped to
Control rod pattern inspect
adjustment equipment
50 due to change
Drop in output due to performance of oil level in
the main oil
of reactor feedwater pump switch- tank 24th periodical inspection
over operation
0
18 20 7 30
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

68
(2) Tsuruga Power Station Unit 1
FY2005 Coast down operation
%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! Confirmation! of
Power drop due control rod integrity
Control rod pattern adjustment to commissioning Control rod pattern
of reactor alteration
50
! ! ! Power drop! due to inspection
! of reactor
! !
feedwater pump
! ! ! !
feedwater pump A and auxiliary oil A and switchover 30th periodical
pump of reactor feedwater pump C of reactor inspection!
feedwater pump

! 27 ! !
0
12 31
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

!
FY2006
%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Control rod pattern
adjustment Control rod pattern adjustment
!
50
! ! to replace ! Power down!due ! !
31st
Power stopped periodical
mechanical seals on B reactor to large quantity of
Power drop to repair the inspection!
jellyfish
condenser sea water leaking place! coolant recirculation pump

! 0 ! ! ! 22 30 16 !
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

!
FY2007
%
100
Control rod pattern
adjustment
50
31st periodical Power stopped to replace
inspection! mechanical seals on A and C
reactor coolant recirculation pumps
0
1 26 7 31
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

!
FY2008 Coast down operation
%
100
Power stopped
to replace Control rod pattern
mechanical adjustment
seals on A and
50 C reactor Power stopped to
recirculation replace mechanical
Power drop due to inspection of the mechanical
seals on B and C
pumps reactor
seal on the coupling side of the reactor 32nd periodical inspection!
replenishment water pump (A) and the
recirculation
mechanical seal on the auxiliary oil pump of the
pumps!
0 reactor feedwater pump (C)
15 1 16 31 7
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
!

FY2009
%
100

Control rod pattern


adjustment
50

32nd periodical inspection

0
10 8

Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.


69
(3) Tsuruga Power Station Unit 2
FY2005!
%
100
! * * * * * * * * * * *

! !
50
! ! ! Shutdown!to inspect and
! ! ! Isolated!operation with
! power for ! !
repair boric acid leak in the plant operation due to power
containment transmission line accident

! 0 ! ! 9 3 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2006!
%
100
! ! ! ! ! * * Power generation
* * * *
stopped to
inspect and
repair the cooling
! !
50 water cooler for
!15th periodical
! ! Power!generation !stopped ! !
the standby ! ! ! !
to repair water level reactor
inspection! control of deaeration pump

! 0 23 30 1 13 5 24 22 ! ! !
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2007!
%
100
* * *

50

16th periodical inspection!


Power drop to repair the damaged
equipment due to marine organisms
0
26
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2008!
%! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! !
100

! ! ! ! ! ! !
50
Power generation stopped due to cracked
welded section of the radial pin on the first
16th periodical inspection! high-pressure turbine blade ring

! ! ! ! ! 8
0
16 15 13
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2009
%! ! ! ! ! ! !
!
100
* * * * * * * * * *
17th periodical
inspection

! ! ! ! ! ! !
50

! ! ! ! ! !
0
21
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

70
(4) Tomari Power Station Unit 1!
FY2005
%
100
! * * * * * * * * *

!
50!
13th periodical
inspection!

! 0 26 16 14
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2006!
%
100
! * * * * * * * * * * * *

PCCS stop!
! !
50!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

! 0 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2007
%
100
! ! ! * * * * * * * * *

50
14th periodical
inspection! Stop due to failure to operate the
emergency diesel generator
0
13 10 5 20 30
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2008!
%
100
* * * * * * *

50

15th periodical inspection

0
4 16 15
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2009!
%
100
* * * * * * * * *

50
16th periodical


inspection

0
11 18
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve 付
71
(5) Tomari Power Station Unit 2
FY2005
%
100
! * * * * * * * * * *

!
50!
11th periodical
inspection!

! 0 5 23 19
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2006
%
100
! * * * * * * * * *

!
50!
12th periodical
inspection!

! 0 18 18 14
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2007
!%! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
!
100
* * * * * * * * * * *

13th periodical
inspection!
!
50

!
0
13
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2008!
%! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! !
100
* * * * * * * *

! ! !
50

13th periodical inspection

! ! !
0
31 27
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2009!
%! ! ! ! ! ! !
!
100
* * * * * * * *

!
50

14th periodical inspection

!
0
8 25 30
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve!

72
(6) Tomari Power Station Unit 3!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
FY2009!
%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! * * *
operation started)
(Commercial

50!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !


! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
0
22


Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve
!
73
(7) Onagawa Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
FY2005!
%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Reactor manually
shut down due to
50
! !
increase in amount
!
of nitrogen ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 17th periodical
!
Reactor automatically shut
supplied to reactor inspection!
down due to earthquake
containment

!
0
17 16 18
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
!
!
FY2006
%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

50!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
17th periodical inspection!

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
0
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

!
FY2007
!%! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50
18th periodical
17th periodical inspection inspection

! ! ! ! !
0
6 1 14
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
!
!
FY2008
!%! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !Drop in output
! due
100

to control rod full


insertion event

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50
18th periodical inspection!

! ! ! ! ! !
0
23
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
!
!
FY2009
!%! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100
19th periodical
18th periodical

Control rod pattern adjustment


inspection
inspection

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50

Intermediate
shutdown

! ! !
0
1 11 23 23
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

74
(8) Onagawa Nuclear Power Station Unit 2
FY2005
%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !Control rod! ! !
operation check

50!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! Reactor automatically
! !shut ! ! ! !
7th periodical Control rod pattern
inspection! down due to earthquake!
adjustment

! ! ! !
0
30 28 16 19
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2006 Control rod pattern adjustment


%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Inspection of shaft seal
portion of reactor
! !
50! recirculation pump!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Intermediate
shutdown 8th periodical inspection

! 0 ! 11 16 13 9 21 15 !
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2007
!%! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50
9th periodical inspection

! ! ! ! ! !
0
11 30 27
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
!
!
FY2008 Coast down operation
!%! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !Control rod!pattern adjustment


! ! 10th periodical
!
50

inspection

! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!!! 26
0
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
!
!
FY2009
!%! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50


10th periodical inspection

! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
0
27 22
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

75
(9) Onagawa Nuclear Power Station Unit 3
FY2005
%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

Reactor
50!
! ! ! due to a survey
! conducted ! to investigate
! ! due
automatically
! ! ! ! ! !
Power drop shut down 3rd periodical inspection
the cause of the increase in the reading on the to earthquake
gaseous waste processing system radiation monitor

! ! !
0
16 27 23
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2006
%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
3rd periodical
inspection!

! !
50!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Intermediate
Intermediate shutdown
shutdown

! 0 18 7 25 7 25
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2007
!%! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! due to a survey
! conducted ! to ! ! reactor!emergency shut
! ! ! !
100
Power drop Manual
investigate the cause of the increase in down due to increase of hydrogen
radioactive material concentration on the concentration in gaseous waste
gaseous radioactive waste treatment system treatment system

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50

4th periodical inspection!

!
0
10 10 23 25
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
!
!
FY2008
!%! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100

Control rod pattern adjustment


! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50

5th periodical inspection!

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !! 26 ! ! ! !
0
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
!
!
FY2009
!%! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! to inspect!the water ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100
Power down
level adjustment valve of the
2nd low-pressure feedwater
heater (A)

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50

5th periodical inspection

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
0
1 23 1 18
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
!

76
(10) Higashidori Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
FY2005
%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

operation started)

operation check
(Commercial

Control rod
! !
50!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

! 0 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 8 ! ! !
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2006
%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Power drop due Control rod pattern adjustment
to low air
! !
50!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
1st periodical inspection

! 0 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !7 ! !
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2007
!%! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100

Control rod pattern adjustment

50 1st
! ! periodical! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
inspection 2nd periodical
inspection!

! !
0
9 6 22
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
!
!
FY2008
!%! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100

Control rod pattern adjustment

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50
2nd periodical inspection!

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
0
18 13
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
!
!
FY2009 Coast down operation
!%! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100

Control rod pattern adjustment


! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50


3rd periodical inspection

! ! ! ! ! ! !
0
12 7 7
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
! 付
77
(11) Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
FY2005

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Control !rod pattern !adjustment ! !


%
100

Intermediate shutdown to

! !
check major plant facilities!

! ! ! ! from!basement of! ! ! ! ! !
Intermediate shutdown
50! to check spring water

23rd periodical inspection turbine building!

! ! ! ! 30 ! ! ! !
0
13 15 24 12 28
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2006

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
%
100

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Control rod pattern
50! adjustment
Generator output suppression to check
24th periodical inspection

! 0!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 28 ! ! !
tubes of condensers A1, A2!

Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2007
! %! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50

24th periodical inspection

"
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 3 5 ! ! !
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
!
!
FY2008
! %! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50

25th periodical inspection

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
0
17
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
!
!
FY2009
! %! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100

Control rod pattern adjustment


25th periodical
inspection

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50
Generator output 26th periodical
suppression to check tubes inspection
of condensers A1, A2

!
0
18 20 25
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

78
(12) Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 2
FY2005

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Power! down for !


%
100

Control rod pattern


control rod operation

! ! ! ! ! ! down due!to tripping ! ! ! ! ! !


confirmation test!
50! Reactor manually shut

adjustment!
Output Reactor manually shut
21st periodical of reactor coolant suppression to down due to tripping of
inspection recirculation pump (B) repair reactor coolant

!
condenser (B) recirculation pump (A)
0!
18 4 4 10 12 20
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2006

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
%
100
Reactor manually

! !coolant
shut down due to

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
tripping of reactor
50!
recirculation pump
(A)! 22nd periodical inspection

! 0 ! 20 4 ! ! ! 28 1
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2007
! %! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100!

23rd periodical
inspection
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50
Intermediate shutdown to repair the sea
water flow control valve of the residual
heat removal system

! ! ! ! ! ! !
0
12 21 12
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
!
!
FY2008
! %! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100

Control rod pattern adjustment


23rd
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50
periodical
inspection

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
0
21 20
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
!
!
FY2009
! %! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50
Drop in output due to


24th periodical inspection inspection of the main
condenser

! ! ! ! ! ! !
0
22 21 19
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

79
(13) Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 3
FY2005

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! drop for control


! rod pattern ! ! !
%
100
Power Intermediate
adjustment and verification test of shutdown due
to trouble with

! !
control rod operations

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! coolant
mechanical
50! seals on
reactor
20th periodical recirculation
Control rod pattern
inspection! pump (B)

!
adjustment
0!
11 22
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2006

! !shutdown due ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
%
100 Intermediate
to trouble
with

! !reactor ! 21st periodical


! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
mechanical
50! seals on

coolant
recirculation
Output suppression to
inspection check cleaning system of

! 0 ! ! ! ! ! !
pump (B)
condenser
29 7 10
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2007
! %! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! !Generator output
! ! ! ! ! Generator !output ! ! ! ! !
100
suppression to check
Control rod pattern

cleaning system of suppression to identify


condenser leaked fuel

! !Intermediate !shutdown due!to ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !


50
adjustment

leak from the outlet pipe drain


of the turbine gland seal steam 22nd periodical inspection
evaporator
0!
! ! ! 15 2 31 14 24 ! !
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
!
!
FY2008
! %! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! rod pattern
! adjustment
! !
50
Control 23rd
periodical
inspection

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
0
!!!!! 24
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
!
!
FY2009
! %! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! Intermediate
! shutdown! to inspect ! ! ! !
100

the electrically-powered valve in


the high-pressure injection
system
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50

23rd periodical inspection

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
0
10 8 13 28
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

80
(14) Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 4
FY2005

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! for an on-site
! check !
%
100 Power drop due to removing
scaffolding
of decreased vacuum in the

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! leaking ! ! tube at !
condenser
50! Intermediate shutdown due to
Intermediate
weld on a sample
shutdown due to the entrance of the condensate
leak from feed 20th periodical inspection!

!
booster pump
water heater room
0!
5 25 3 13 3
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2006 Control rod pattern adjustment

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
%
100
20th periodical

! ! ! ! ! !Intermediate! ! ! ! ! ! !
inspection!

Control rod pattern adjustment


50! 21st
periodical
Intermediate shutdown to shutdown to replace
Output suppression to check inspection
remove attached material

! 0 7
leaking fuel
on transmission line cleaning system of condenser

22 2 3 11
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2007
! %! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100!

Output control due to Coast down operation

22nd periodical
Control rod pattern adjustment thermal limit deviation
! !periodical ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50! 21st preventive operation

inspection
Generator output
inspection
suppression to
identify leaked fuel
! !
0!
2 1 28
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
!
!
FY2008
! %! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100

Control rod pattern adjustment

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50

22nd periodical inspection

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
0
17 5
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
!
!
FY2009
! %! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100

Control rod pattern adjustment


! ! ! ! ! ! ! !23rd periodical
! ! ! ! !
50


inspection

! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
0
29 30 8
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

81
(15) Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 5
FY2005

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
%
100

Reactor
Power drop for control rod Control rod pattern

! !
manually shut

! ! ! ! ! valve of! ! ! ! ! !
pattern adjustment and adjustment!
down due to verification test of control
50! trouble in test
rod operations!
bypass
20th periodical
core spray
inspection

! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
system (B)!
0!
10 21 23 10
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2006 Coast down operation!

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
%
100
Reactor
manually shut
Control rod pattern

! !
down due to

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! bypass
adjustment! trouble in
50! minimum flow
volume
21st periodical inspection valve of core

! 0 ! ! ! !
spray system
(A)!
31 13 27 20
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2007
! %! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100

Control rod pattern adjustment

! ! !Manual reactor
! shutdown
! due to trouble
! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50!
of minimum flow volume bypass valve 22nd periodical
of core spray system (A) inspection

! ! !
0
26 20
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
!
!
FY2008
! %! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100
Output suppressed to repair the
feedwater heater water level
adjustment valve
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50

22nd periodical inspection

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
0
22 1
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
!
!
FY2009
! %! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100

Control rod pattern adjustment

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50
23rd periodical
inspection

! 0! ! ! ! ! 1 2 3 ! ! !
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

82
(16) Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 6
FY2005

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! rod pattern
! ! ! !
%
100
Power adjustment due to Control
adjustment

! !
stop of turbine driven

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
reactor feedwater pump (A)!
50!

19th periodical inspection

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
0!
21
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2006

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
%
100

! !
Control rod pattern adjustment

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50!
19th periodical
inspection

! 0 ! ! 6 1 ! ! ! ! ! !
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2007 Coast down operation


! %! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100!

Control rod pattern adjustment


! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50!

20th periodical inspection

! ! ! ! ! !
0!
30 8 12
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
!
!
FY2008
! %! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100
21st periodical
inspection

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!11
0
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
!
!
FY2009
! %! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100

! !21st periodical
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !shutdown due
! to !
50 Intermediate
inspection and repair of the


inspection high-pressure turbine extraction
drain pipes
! ! !
0
12 14 4 15
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
! 付
83
(17) Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
FY2005
%
100
! ! ! ! ! shutdown!
Intermediate ! !Intermediate
! shutdown! ! ! !
17th periodical

Intermediate due to trouble with due to trouble with


shutdown due mechanical seals on Power drop for control rod
mechanical seals on
inspection

to incorrect reactor coolant pattern adjustment and


50! measurement reactor coolant
! ! !
of atmospheric
monitor in !
recirculation pump (A)
! ! ! !recirculation
! pump (B) ! !
verification test of control
! !
rod operations
reactor
containment

! 17 24 ! ! ! ! ! !
0
23 25 5 21 11 21
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2006
%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

! !
50!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
18th periodical inspection

! 0 20 24 7 ! ! ! ! ! !
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2007 Coast down operation


! %! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50!
Control rod pattern adjustment
19th periodical inspection

!0! ! ! ! ! 24 25 18 ! !
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2008
! %! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100

Control rod pattern adjustment

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50
Control rod pattern adjustment 20th periodical
inspection

! ! ! ! ! ! !
0
17
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
!
!
FY2009
! %! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100
20th periodical

Control rod pattern adjustment


inspection

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50

! 26 ! ! ! ! !
0
27
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

84
(18) Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station Unit 2
FY2005 Coast down operation
%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

50!
! ! ! ! ! ! rod pattern
! adjustment! ! ! ! ! !
Control
16th periodical inspection!

! ! ! ! ! ! !
0
25 26 28

!
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2006
%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Control rod pattern adjustment

! !
50!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! !Control rod! pattern adjustment
! !

Coast down operation


! 0 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

!
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2007
! % ! Coast down
! operation
! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100!

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50
Intermediate shutdown to
17th periodical inspection inspect switchyard
equipment
0
! ! ! ! !

!
6 10 5 1 17

!
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2008
! %! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100

Control rod pattern adjustment

! ! ! ! ! !Control rod!pattern adjustment


! ! ! ! ! !
50
18th periodical
inspection

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
0
5 12 6
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
!
!
FY2009
! %! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100
19th periodical

Control rod pattern adjustment


Control rod pattern adjustment
inspection

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50


! ! ! ! ! ! !
0
!6
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

85
(19) Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station Unit 3
FY2005
%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Power drop for control rod
pattern adjustment and
verification test of control
50! rod operations!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
13th periodical inspection

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
0
16
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2006 Control rod pattern adjustment


%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

14th periodical
13th periodical
inspection!

inspection
! !
50!
! ! ! Intermediate
! shutdown
! to !
Control !
rod pattern ! ! rod pattern
Control ! !
replace hafnium plate adjustment
type control rod! adjustment

! 0 27 14 6 9
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2007
! %! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100!

Control rod pattern adjustment


! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50!

14th periodical inspection

!0 ! ! 26 20 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2008 Coast down operation


! %! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50
Control rod pattern adjustment
15th periodical inspection
Intermediate shutdown due to trouble with mechanical
seals on reactor coolant recirculation pump (A)
0
! ! ! ! ! 9 16 6 6 9 ! !
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
!
!
FY2009
! %! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100

Control rod pattern adjustment

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50
16th periodical
Control rod pattern adjustment
inspection

! ! ! ! ! !
0
7 14
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

86
(20) Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station Unit 4
FY2005
%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Intermediate
shutdown due
to trouble with
50! mechanical
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! rod pattern
! adjustment
! coolant !
seals on reactor
Control
13th periodical inspection! recirculation
pump (A)!

! ! ! ! !
0
22 16 20
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2006
%
100
! ! !
Intermediate
shutdown
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
due to
trouble with
mechanical
seals on

! !
50! reactor
coolant
!
recirculation
! Control! rod pattern!adjustment! ! ! ! ! ! !
pump (A) Intermediate shutdown to 14th periodical inspection
inspect main transformer

! 0 15 16 24 21

!
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

! %! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
FY2007
100!
14th periodical

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! "! !
Control rod pattern adjustment
Control rod pattern adjustment
inspection

50!
15th periodical
inspection

!
0

!
30 25 3

!
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

! %! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
FY2008
100
15th periodical

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Control rod pattern adjustment
inspection

50

! ! ! ! ! !
0

!
27 23

!
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

! %! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
FY2009
100

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !Drop in output
! due to ! ! !
Control rod pattern adjustment
Control rod pattern
50 adjustment


16th periodical inspection stoppage of the reactor

! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
recirculation pump (A)
0

!
7 14 9
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

87
(21) Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
FY2005
%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Control rod pattern

50!
! !
Power
adjustment

! adjusted ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
operation due
to minor fuel 14th periodical inspection
leakage
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
0
14
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2006
%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Control rod pattern adjustment
Control rod pattern adjustment
50!14th
! periodical
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
inspection!

! 0 30 30 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2007
%
100!

Control rod pattern adjustment


50
15th periodical inspection

0
!4
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2008
%
100

50
15th periodical inspection

0
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2009
%
100

50

15th periodical inspection

0
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

88
(22) Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 2
FY2005 Coast down operation
%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Power drop due to control rod
operation verification test
50!
! ! ! Control rod
! pattern adjustment
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
11th periodical inspection

! ! ! ! ! ! 25 ! ! !
0
3
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2006
%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

Control rod pattern adjustment

! !11th
50! 12th
periodical
! ! ! ! ! ! !
Control rod !pattern adjustment
! ! !
periodical
inspection inspection

! 0 ! 9 19
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2007
%
100

50
12th periodical inspection Intermediate shutdown due to oil leak from the turbine control system

0
! 10 5
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2008
%
100

50

Intermediate shutdown due to oil leak from the turbine control system

0
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2009
%
100

50


Intermediate shutdown due to oil leak from the turbine control system

0
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

89
(23) Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 3
FY2005
%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Power ! ! ! !
Control rod pattern adjustment suppression
due to tripping
of PLR pump Power down
50!
! !8th
(B) caused by for control rod
! ! ! !
Intermediate ! due to !
shutdown ! the tripping !of !operation ! Control!rod
periodical inspection of relief valve of New Niigata confirmation pattern
inspection! 2nd feedwater heater A! trunk line No. 2 test adjustment

! ! ! ! ! ! !
0
13 8 7 15
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2006
%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Control rod pattern adjustment

! !
50!
! !
9th periodical ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
inspection! Control rod pattern adjustment

! 0 ! 12 27 15 ! ! ! ! ! !
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2007
%
100!

Automatic reactor
Control rod pattern adjustment shutdown due to
50 the Niigata
Chuetsu-Oki
Earthquake 10th periodical inspection

0
16 19
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2008
%
100

50
10th periodical inspection

0
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2009
%
100

50

10th periodical inspection

0
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

90
(24) Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 4
FY2005 Coast down operation!
%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Control rod pattern adjustment!
8th periodical

Control rod pattern adjustment


inspection

50!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
0
20
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2006
%
100
! ! Coast!down operation
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

! !
50!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
9th periodical inspection!

! 0 9 14 11 ! !
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2007
%
100

Control rod pattern adjustment


50 10th
Automatic reactor shutdown due to the Niigata Chuetsu-Oki periodical
Earthquake inspection

0
16 11
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2008
%
100

50

10th periodical inspection

0
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2009
%
100

50


10th periodical inspection

0
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

91
(25) Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 5
FY2005
%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

Control rod pattern adjustment Control rod pattern adjustment


50!
! ! ! !shut ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Reactor automatically
down due to condenser 11th periodical inspection
vacuum level drop

! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
0
34 8 2
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2006
%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

Control rod pattern adjustment


! !
50!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
12th periodical inspection

! 0 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 24 ! ! ! !
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2007
%
100

50!

12th periodical inspection

0
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2008
%
100

50

12th periodical inspection

0
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

!"#$$%&
%
100

50

12th periodical inspection

0
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

92
(26) Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 6
FY2005
%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

Control rod pattern adjustment


50!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
7th periodical inspection

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
0
9
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2006
%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
7th periodical

Control rod pattern adjustment


inspection

! !
50!
! ! ! ! Control rod
! pattern adjustment
! ! ! ! Power!down to inspect
! and
clean continuous cleaning
system of condenser (C)!

! 0 13 12 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2007
%
Intermediate shutdown

100
due to water leak in
Control rod pattern

condenser

50
adjustment

8th periodical inspection

0
27 24
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2008
%
100

50
8th periodical inspection

0
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2009
%
100

Control rod pattern


adjustment
50
Intermediate shutdown to inspect the
control rod position indication


8th periodical inspection function

0
31 26 8 19
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

93
(27) Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 7
FY2005
%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
CR
insertion/
Control rod pattern adjustment
removal test!
50!
! ! ! inspection!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
6th periodical

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
0
23 2
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2006 Coast down operation


%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

Control rod pattern adjustment

! !
50!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Power suppression to 7th periodical inspection
investigate leaked fuel!

! 0 ! ! ! ! 23 5 11 ! !
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

& %& & & & & & & & & & & &
& & & & & & & & & & & & &
FY2007
100!

& & & & & & to the Niigata


& Chuetsu-Oki
& & & & & &
50 Automatic reactor shutdown due

Earthquake 8th periodical inspection

& & & & & & & &


0

&
16 15

&
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

& %& & & & & & & & & & & &
& & & & & & & & & & & & &
FY2008
100

& & & & & & & & & & & & &
50

8th periodical inspection

& & & & & & & & & & & & &
0

&
&
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

& %& & & & & & & & & & & &
& & & & & & & & & & & & &
FY2009
100

& & & & & the & & &shutdown to


& & & & &
Control rod pattern adjustment
Power adjusted Intermediate
50 operation of
power generator 8th periodical replace fuel
due to fuel leakage inspection

& & 28 & & &


0

&
20 25 10
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

94
(28) Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit 3
FY2005
%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Verification test for
! Pattern !
hafnium plate type adjustment for
Control rod pattern adjustment control rod operations insertion of
hafnium plate
50!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
type control rods
13th periodical
inspection

! ! 22 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
0
31
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2006 Coast down operation


%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

Control rod pattern


adjustment!
! !
50!
! Temporary! power ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
suppression due to
14th periodical inspection
jellyfish

! 0 ! ! ! 21 10 20 ! ! !
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2007 Coast down operation


!%! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100

Control rod pattern adjustment


Control rod pattern adjustment
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50
15th periodical
inspection

! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
0
19
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
!
!
FY2008
!%! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100
15th periodical

Control rod pattern adjustment


! ! ! Inspection!of the low-pressure
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50
inspection

turbine rotor extensometer

! ! ! ! ! !
0
15 22 25 21
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
!
!
FY2009
!%! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100

Control rod pattern


adjustment Control rod pattern adjustment

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50


16th periodical inspection

! ! ! ! !
0
14 3 30
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

95
(29) Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit 4
FY2005
%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 9th !periodical
inspection!
Control rod pattern adjustment Control rod pattern adjustment
50!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Pattern adjustment for
! !
Full insertion !
confirmation test of hafnium operation using one
plate type control rod operation portion of hafnium
and control rod insertion plate type control rods

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
0
23
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2006 Control rod pattern adjustment Control rod pattern adjustment


%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Temporary power suppression
due to jellyfish

! !
50!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Shutdown !
to repair ! !
9th periodical inspection! instrumentation piping of moisture
separation heater drain tank

! 0 ! ! 29 27 24 25 !
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2007 Coast down operation Control rod pattern adjustment


%
100
Control rod pattern adjustment
Control rod pattern
Temporary power down due to trash adjustment
50
10th periodical Power down to
inspection! inspect feedwater
pump suction flange
0
25 2 27
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2008
%
100

Control rod pattern Control rod pattern Control rod pattern


adjustment adjustment adjustment
50 11th
Power down to inspect the water periodical
Power down to inspect level adjustment valve of the 3rd inspection
feedwater pump suction flange low-pressure feedwater heater (A)
0
27 5 10 13 25
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2009
%
100
Control rod pattern
Manual reactor
11th periodical

adjustment Control rod pattern adjustment


shutdown during
adjustment operation Reactor
inspection

50 (due to trouble with the automatically shut


down due to the
gaseous waste earthquake in
treatment system) Suruga Bay

0
5 17 11 17 16
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

96
(30) Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit 5
FY2005 Control rod pattern adjustment
%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

! !
50!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 1st!periodical !
inspection!

! 0 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 16 18
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

Control rod pattern adjustment


FY2006
%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
1st periodical

Shutdown to
inspection

! !
50! inspect first
! ! ! !Reactor automatically
! !shut down due
! to the automatic
! ! ! !
extraction
turbine stop caused by excessive vibration! check valve
(A)!

! 0 14 15 11 17 20 !
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

!
Control rod pattern adjustment
FY2007
!%! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100

Power down due to deviation from


limiting conditions for operation
! ! !2nd periodical
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50
inspection!

! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
0
27 30 9
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
!
!
FY2008 Coast down operation
!%! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100 Manual reactor
shutdown during
adjustment operation
(due to increased Manual reactor shutdown
temperature of the during adjustment operation
activated carbon-type (due to trouble with the
! ! ! ! ! ! ! 3rd periodical
! ! ! !gaseous ! !
50 noble gas hold-up tower waste treatment
Control rod pattern adjustment in the gaseous waste system)
inspection! treatment system)

! ! ! ! ! ! 30 ! ! !
0
8 5
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
!
!
Control rod pattern adjustment
FY2009
!%! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100
4th periodical
inspection

! ! adjustment!operation (due
! to ! ! ! Reactor automatically
! ! shut down!due to ! ! !
50 Manual reactor shutdown during

trouble with the gaseous waste


the earthquake in Suruga Bay
treatment system)

! ! !
0
27 29 11 15
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
! 付
97
(31) Shika Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
FY2005
%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

10th periodical
Control rod pattern adjustment!

inspection
50!
! ! !Shutdown due
! to ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
blackout of power
transmission system

!
0
2 24 5
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2006
%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

Control rod pattern adjustment Control rod pattern adjustment


! !
50!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! !Generator collector
! ring! !
10th periodical inspection cooling fan check! Total safety
inspection!
! 0 ! ! 20 19 7 24 16
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2007
%
100

50
Shutdown for full inspection,
etc. of safety measures 11th periodical inspection

!
0
7
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2008
%
100

50
11th periodical inspection

0
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2009
%
100
Control rod pattern adjustment
Control rod pattern adjustment
50

0
11 13
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

98
(32) Shika Nuclear Power Station Unit 2
FY2005
%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

operation started)
(Commercial
50!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
0
15
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2006
%
100
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

50!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 1st periodical
!
Steam turbine check inspection!

! ! ! ! !
0
5 1
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2007
!%! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50
1st periodical inspection!

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
0
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
!
!
FY2008
!%! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100

! ! 1st ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50
periodical
inspection!

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
0
16 11
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
!
!
FY2009
!%! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100

Reactor manually shut


down due to inspection
! ! ! in output due
! to ! ! ! ! ! ! emergency! diesel ! !
50 of the
Drop generator
2nd periodical inspection


identification of fuel
leak range

! ! ! ! !
0
10 25 13 31 18
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
! 付
99
(33) Mihama Power Station Unit 1
FY2005

!
%

! ! ! steam drain
! pipe thermometer
! ! !manually !
100
Power suppression due to leakage Reactor
from the moisture separating heater
heated * * * *

! !
shutdown due

! ! ! ! ! !pump seal ! ! ! ! !
base weld B to leakage of
50! primary coolant

21st periodical inspection water A

! "! 25 25 29 11 6 ! ! !
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve
!
FY2006

!
%
100

* * * * * * *

!
50!

22nd periodical inspection!

! 0 1
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve
!
FY2007
!%! ! ! ! ! ! !
!
100
23rd
* * * * periodical
inspection!

!
50
Shutdown due to steam leakage from
22nd periodical inspection! a level gauge outlet flange of the
moisture separator drain tank

!
0
31 27 6 14 25
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve!
!
FY2008
!%! ! ! ! ! ! !
!
100
* * * * * * * * *

!
50
Reactor shutdown due to
23rd periodical inspection! accident in the power
transmission system
!
0
23 18 20 22
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve!
!
FY2009
!%! ! ! ! ! ! !
!
100
Power generation
* * * * stopped due to * * * *
change in output
during increase of
the power generator
!
50
outputs
24th periodical inspection

!
0
17 12 13 24 18
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve!

100
(34) Mihama Power Station Unit 2
FY2005

!
%
100

23rd periodical
* * * * * * * * * * *

inspection!
50!

! 0 3
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve
!
FY2006

!
%

!
100

* * * * * * * *
*

! !
50!
23rd periodical Power suppression due to leakage of
inspection! 5A high-pressure water supply

! 0 !
heater drain line check plug flange

29 22
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve
!
FY2007
!%! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100

* * *

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50
24th periodical inspection!

! ! ! !
0
20
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve!
!
FY2008
!%! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! !
100

* * * * * * *

! ! ! !
50
Reactor shutdown due to
24th periodical inspection! accident in the power
transmission system
! ! ! !
0
30 22 2021
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve!
!
FY2009
!%! ! ! ! ! ! !
!
100

* * * * * * * *

!
50
Shut down due to leak from the
25th periodical
welded portion of the filling line


inspection
purge pipe of the chemical and
volume control equipment
!
0
3 28 23 19
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve! 付
101
(35) Mihama Power Station Unit 3
FY2005

!
%

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
100

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
50!

! "!!
21st periodical inspection!

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve
!
FY2006

! ! ! ! ! !
%
100
* *

! ! ! ! ! !
50!
21st periodical inspection!

! "!! ! ! ! ! 26 3 11 7
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2007

!
%
100
* * * * * * * *

50

22nd periodical inspection!

0
4 9 3
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2008
%
100
* * * * * * * * *

50
23rd periodical Independent system operation due to
inspection! accident in the power transmission
system
0
1 12 10
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve!

FY2009
%! ! ! ! ! ! !
!
100
* * * * * * * *

! ! ! ! ! ! !
50

24th periodical inspection

! ! ! ! !
0
13 22
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve
!
102
(36) Takahama Power Station Unit 1
FY2005
%
100
* * * * * * * * *

50! 23rd
periodical
inspection!

0 14 29 25
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2006
%
100
* * * * * * *

50!
24th periodical inspection

0 22 26 28
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2007
%
100
* * * * * * * * * *

25th periodical
inspection!
50!

0
19
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2008
%
100
* * * * * * * *

50

25th periodical inspection!

0
10 22
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2009
%
100
* * * * * * * * *

50
26th periodical
inspection!

0

14 18 15
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve 付
103
(37) Takahama Power Station Unit 2
FY2005
%
100
* * * * * * * * * * * *

50!

0
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2006
%
100
* * * * * * * *

50!
23rd periodical inspection

0 14 30 25
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2007
%
100
* * * *

50

24th periodical inspection!

0
17
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2008
%
100
* * * * * * *

50 25th
24th periodical
periodical
inspection! inspection

0
8 3 25
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2009
%
100
* * * * * * * * * *
25th periodical
inspection

50

0
10 4
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

104
(38) Takahama Power Station Unit 3
FY2005
%
100
* * * * * * * * *

50!
16th periodical
inspection!

0 21 17 11
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2006
%
100
* * * * * * * *

50! Reactor shutdown due


to an abnormally low
17th periodical inspection
water level alarm in
steam generator B
0 18 19 17 12
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2007
%
100
* * * * * * *

50!

18th periodical inspection!

0
23
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2008
%
100
* * * * * * *

50!

18th periodical inspection!

0
3 28
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2009
%
100
* * * * * * * *

50


19th periodical inspection!

0
24 25 18
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve 付
105
(39) Takahama Power Station Unit 4
FY2005
%
100
* * * * * * * *

50!
16th periodical inspection!

0 16 17 14
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2006
%
100
* * * * * * * * * * * *

50!

0
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2007
%
100
* * * * * * * *

50
17th periodical
inspection!

0
13 8 2
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2008
%
100
* * * * * * *

50
18th periodical inspection

0
23 24 21
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2009
%
100
* * * * * * * * * *

50
19th periodical
inspection!

0
4
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

106
(40) Ohi Power Station Unit 1
FY2005
%
100
* * * * * * * *
Reactor shutdown due to
accident in the power
50! transmission system

20th periodical
inspection!

0 20 8 22 27 18
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2006
%
100
* * * * * * *

50!
21st periodical inspection!

0 22
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2007
%
100
* * * * * * * * *
21st periodical
inspection!

50
Shutdown due to leak from sealing
water injection filter A

0
1 11 48
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2008
%
100
* * * * * * * * *
Shutdown of heater drain pump A due to
balancing (power suppression)!
50
22nd periodical
inspection!

0
4 3 28
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2009
%
100
* * * * *

50 Shutdown due to
increase of
23rd periodical inspection radioactivity in the


primary coolant

0
20 11 13 6
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve 付
107
(41) Ohi Power Station Unit 2
FY2005
%
100
* * * * * * *

50!
Power generation stopped due to
Reactor shutdown due to
minor leakage of cooling water
19th periodical inspection! accident in the power
from generator stator cooling water
transmission system
system
0 24 17 21 11 2226
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2006
%
100
* * * * * * *

50!

20th periodical inspection!

0 24 13 7
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2007
%
100
Shutdown due to steam
* * * * * leak from air vent pipe of * * *
moisture separation heater
Power suppression due to
50 alarm caused by
21st periodical inconsistent control rod
inspection in control rod movement
check test

0
30 15 23 18
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2008
%
100
* * * * * * * * * *

50
Drop in output due to repair work on 22nd periodical
the shell-side relief valve in the 6C inspection!
high-pressure feedwater heater
0
6
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2009
%
100
* * * * * * *
22nd periodical
inspection!

50
Reactor shutdown due to
increase of radioactivity in the
primary coolant
0
24 21 21 27
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

108
(42) Ohi Power Station Unit 3
FY2005
%
100
* * * * * * * * *

50!
11th Output On-site independent
periodical suppression to operation due to
inspection! replace rotary accident in power
screen B, etc. transmission system
0 24 4 1
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2006
%
100
* * * * * * * * * *

50!
12th periodical
inspection!

0 27 9 10
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2007
%
100
* * * * * * * * * *

50
13th periodical
inspection!

0
2
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2008
%
100
* * * *

50

13th periodical inspection

0
7 4
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2009
%
100
* * * * * * * * *

50
14th periodical


inspection!

0
31 23 19
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve 付
109
(43) Ohi Power Station Unit 4
FY2005
%
100
* * * * * * * * *

50!
On-site independent 10th periodical
operation due to accident in inspection!
power transmission system
0 27 11
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2006
%
100
* * * * * * * * * * * *

50!
10th periodical
inspection!

0 7
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2007
%
100
* * * * * * * * *

50
11th periodical
inspection!

0
6 21 17
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2008
%
100
* * * * * * *

50
12th periodical
inspection!

0
9 7 8
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2009
%
100
* * * * * * * * * *

50
13th periodical
inspection!

0
7
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

110
(44) Shimane Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
FY2005
%
100
Manual shutdown due to close
display trouble of drywell
vacuum destruction valve

50!

25th periodical inspection

0
6 12 10
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2006
%
100

Control rod pattern adjustment


50!
26th periodical inspection

0 9 13
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2007
%
100
26th periodical

Control rod pattern alteration


inspection

50

27th periodical inspection

0
27 5
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2008
%
100
27th periodical

Control rod pattern adjustment


inspection

50
Drop in output due to control
rod insertion failure

0
20 14
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2009
%
100

Control
rod
50 pattern
alteration


28th periodical inspection Shutdown to conduct
self-inspection
0
7 13 9 31
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

111
(45) Shimane Nuclear Power Station Unit 2
FY2005
%
100
Power drop due to control Shutdown to
inspect reactor

13th periodical
rod pattern adjustment at
startup after completion of recirculation
Control rod pattern alteration

inspection!
inspection of reactor pump B Control rod pattern
50! recirculation pump B and adjustment
adjustment of main steam
safety relief valve

0
19 28 28
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2006
%
100

50!
13th periodical
inspection!

0 3 28
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2007
%
100

Control rod
pattern
50 alteration
14th periodical
inspection!

0
8 22 10
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2008
%
100

Control rod pattern alteration


50
Control rod pattern adjustment
15th periodical inspection!

0
7 24
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

FY2009
%
100
15th periodical

16th periodical

Control rod pattern adjustment


inspection!

inspection!

50

0
17 18
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.

112
(46) Ikata Power Station Unit 1
FY2005
%
100
* Stem-free test * * *
and cleaning of
condenser room!
50!
23rd periodical
inspection!

0
10
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2006 Cleaning of condenser rooms 1A, 1B, 1D!


%
100
* * *
23rd periodical
inspection!

Stem-free test and cleaning of condenser room!


50!
Manual stop for crack in
welded portion of the moisture
separation heater 1B steam
current plate
0 27 23 5 24
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2007
%
100
Stem-free test and cleaning
* * * of water chambers 1A, 1B,
1C, and 1D of the
condenser
50
24th periodical Steam leak from level gauge of moisture
inspection! separation heater drain tank 1B

0
14 15 11
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2008
%
100
* * * *
26th periodical
inspection!

50
25th periodical
inspection!

0
26 22 17 9
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2009
%
100
* * * *

50


26th periodical inspection

0
13 6
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve 付
113
(47) Ikata Power Station Unit 2
FY2005
%
100

Stem-free test and cleaning


of condenser room
50!

18th periodical inspection!

0 5 2 1
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2006
%
100
* * * *

50! Manual stop for horizontal


development for crack of welded 19th periodical
portion of stream current board for
Unit 1 moisture separating heater
inspection!
1B!
0 27 29 11 20 16
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2007
%
100
* * *
Cleaning of water
chambers 2A, 2B, 2C, and
50 2D of the condenser
Stem-free test and cleaning of
Malfunction of heating steam 20th periodical
water chambers 2A, 2B, 2C,
control valve of moisture
and 2D of the condenser inspection!
separation heaters 2B and 2D
0
17 19
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2008
%
100
* * * *
20th periodical
inspection

50 21st
Stem-free test and cleaning of periodical
water chambers 2A, 2B, 2C, and inspection
2D of the condenser

0
16 24
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2009
%
100
* * * *

50

21st periodical inspection!

0
28 28
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

114
(48) Ikata Power Station Unit 3
FY2005
%
100
* * * * * *

50!
8th
periodical
inspection!

0 11
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2006
%
100
* * * *

50!
9th periodical
inspection!

0 30 12 8
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2007
%
100
* * * *

50 10th
periodical
inspection

0
7 17 14
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2008
%
100
* * * *
*

50
11th periodical
inspection!

0
7 8 9
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2009
%
100
* * * *
Inspection of the tube 3B in
the condenser water box
50
12th periodical


inspection!

0
7 4 30
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve 付
115
(49) Genkai Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
FY2005
%
100
* * * * * * * * *

50!
23rd periodical
inspection

0 5 1
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2006
%
100
* * * * * * * *

50!
24th periodical
inspection

0 27 13 7
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2007
%
100
* * * * * * * *

50

25th periodical inspection

0
25 21 19
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2008
%
100
* * * * * * * * * * *

50
26th periodical
inspection

0
26
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2009
%
100
* * * * * * * * *

50
26th periodical
inspection

0
8 3
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

116
(50) Genkai Nuclear Power Station Unit 2
FY2005
%
100
* * * * * * * * *

50! Shutdown due to increase of


iodine 131 concentration in 19th periodical
primary coolant for inspection
inspection
0 10 16 23 18
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2006
%
100
* * * * * * *

50!
20th periodical inspection

0 14
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2007
%
100
* * * * * * * * * * *
20th periodical
inspection

50
21st periodical
inspection!

0
19 16 28
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2008
%
100
* * * * * * * *

50

21st periodical inspection

0
15 13
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2009
%
100
* * * * * * * *

50


22nd periodical inspection!

0
12 10 8
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve 付
117
(51) Genkai Nuclear Power Station Unit 3
FY2005
%
100
* * * * * * * * *

50!
9th periodical
inspection!

0 13 3 29
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2006
%
100
* * * * * * * *

50!
10th periodical inspection!

0 17 16
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2007
%
100
* * * * * * * * * * * *

50
10th periodical inspection!

0
11
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2008
%
100
* * * * * * * * *

50
11th periodical
inspection!

0
2 6 31
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2009
%
100
* * * * * * * * *

50
12th periodical
inspection!

0
30 9 2
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

118
(52) Genkai Nuclear Power Station Unit 4
FY2005
%
100
* * * * * * * * *

50!
6th periodical
inspection!

0 14 5 30
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2006
%
100
* * * * * * * *

50!
7th periodical Inspection shutdown due to
inspection! temperature rise of pressurizer
bypass valve A outlet!
0 26 5 12 22 15
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2007
%
100
* * * * * * * * *

50
8th periodical
inspection!

0
5 22
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2008
%
100
* * * * * * * * * * *
8th periodical
inspection

50
Automatic generator shutdown due
to reduced differential pressure of
generator stator coil cooling water
0
16 2025
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2009
%
100
* * * * * * * *
Drop in output due to inspection of the
drain pump of B moisture separator
50
9th periodical
inspection!

0

15 13 7
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve 付
119
(53) Sendai Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
FY2005
%
100
* * * * * * * *

50!
17th periodical inspection

0 13 1 28
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2006
%
100
* * * * * * * * * * * *

50!

0
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2007
%
100
* * * * * * * *

50
18th periodical inspection!

0
16 12 8
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2008
%
100
* * * * * * * *

50
19th periodical inspection

0
7 14 10
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2009
%
100
* * * * * * * * *

50

20th periodical inspection

0
4
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

120
(54) Sendai Nuclear Power Station Unit 2
FY2005
%
100
* * * * * * * * * * * *

50!

0
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2006
%
100
* * * * * * * * * *

50! 16th
periodical
inspection!

0 2 22 20
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2007
%
100
* * * * * * * * *

50
17th periodical
inspection!

0
18 29 26
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2008
%
100
* * * * * * * *

50

18th periodical inspection!

0
25 28 25
Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve

FY2009
%
100
* * * * * * * * * * * *

50

0

Month Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
* Stem-free test for each turbine valve 付
121
Ϫ STATUS OF PERIODICAL INSPECTIONS OF
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS


123
Ϫ-1. Overview of Periodical Inspections of Nuclear Power Plants
(1) Periodical Inspections of Commercial Reactor Power Plants
Periodical inspections were conducted for the following 38 reactors (22 BWR and 16 PWR) in 2009 based
on Article 54-1 of the Electric Enterprise Law. Inspections were carried out on the appearance,
decomposition, leakage, function and performance of the reactors, reactor cooling system equipment,
instrumentation and control system equipment, fuel equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal
equipment, reactor containment facilities, emergency standby power generation devices, and steam turbines.
The results indicated that there was no abnormality.
It was also verified that the work related to the periodical inspections was carried out within the exposure
limit prescribed by laws.
In addition, responding to the “Our actions to be taken for the data falsification issues at electric power
companies” that was published on February 16, 2007, strict verifications were conducted on the subsequent
safety inspections in regard to the contents of the periodical licensee inspections and the appropriateness of
the equipment to be inspected and it was verified that there were no problems in particular.
The details of the periodical inspections are described in III-2 “Periodical Inspections by Unit.”
Note that based on Article 29-1 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law, Tokai Power Station, which has no
nuclear fuel materials, was approved in the decommissioning plan and does not need to undergo the
periodical facility inspections.
The periodical facility inspections for Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Units 1 and 2, approved in the
decommissioning plan on November 18, 2009, are performed in accordance with Article 29-1 of the Nuclear
Reactor Regulation Law. The periodical facility inspections at that power plant began on January 25, 2010
for Unit 1 and on January 27, 2010 for Unit 2.

<First Quarter>
Total exposure
Number Periodical inspection period
dose
Power Plant of (Date of Paralleling Off to Major Renewal Activities, etc.
transports Periodical Inspection End Date) Maximum
exposure dose
Onagawa 18 Feb. 14, 2008 to May 1, 2009 (1) Update and associated work on the pumps in the core spray system *1 2.35 person-Sv
Nuclear Power
(443 days) (2) Replacement of, and associated work on the emergency core cooling 17.56 mSv
Station
system strainers *1
Unit 1
(3) Repair of, and associated work on the piping in the reactor primary loop
of the re-circulator *2
(4) Inspection regarding the cracking of the piping in the core shroud and
the reactor primary loop of the re-circulator
(5) Inspection regarding high frequency metal fatigue
(6) Inspection related to the pipe wall thickness control
Fukushima 25 Oct. 18, 2008 to May 20, 2009 (1) Replacement of, and associated work on the cooling system piping at 1.70 person-Sv
Daiichi Nuclear the top of the reactor pressure and containment vessels *1
(215 days) 11.19 mSv
Power Station
(2) Inspection related to the pipe wall thickness control
Unit 1
(3) Inspection regarding the cracking of the piping in the core shroud and
the reactor primary loop of the re-circulator
(4) Inspection related to the measure for stress corrosion cracking caused
by chlorides of stainless steel piping such as the piping in the control
rod drive hydraulic system
(5) Inspection in accordance with the interpretation of cracks and other
defects that may cause destruction of nuclear power generation
equipment
Fukushima Daini 20 Feb. 17 to May 26, 2009 (1) Inspection related to the pipe wall thickness control 1.09 person-Sv
Nuclear Power
(99 days) (2) Inspection in accordance with the interpretation of cracks and other 10.37 mSv
Station
defects that may cause destruction of nuclear power generation
Unit 1 equipment
Shika Nuclear 11 Jul. 7, 2007 to May 13, 2009 (1) Increase of, and associated work on the storage capacity of the spent 2.90 person-Sv
Power Station fuel pool *1
(677 days) 19.24 mSv
Unit 1 (2) Replacement of, and associated work on the emergency core cooling
system strainers *1
(3) Inspection in accordance with the interpretation of cracks and other
defects that may cause destruction of nuclear power generation
equipment
(4) Inspection related to the pipe wall thickness control
(5) Inspection of the surroundings of the parts for water jet peening in the
structures within the reactor 参


125
Total exposure
Number Periodical inspection period
dose
Power Plant of (Date of Paralleling Off to Major Renewal Activities, etc.
transports Periodical Inspection End Date) Maximum
exposure dose
Takahama Power 25 Feb. 25 to Jun. 4, 2009 (1) Modification and replacement of, and associated work on the reactor 1.94 person-Sv
Station cooling system equipment valve and piping, etc. *1, 2
(100 days) 15.18 mSv
Unit 2 (2) Modification of, and associated work on the waste water evaporation
device, etc. *2
(3) Inspection in accordance with the “Inspection of the Ni-base alloy parts
within the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) of the PWR”
(4) Inspection related to the pipe wall thickness control
Ohi Power 22 Feb. 6 to May 21, 2009 (1) Modification and replacement of, and associated work on the excess 3.02 person-Sv
Station extracted water line piping *1, 2
(105 days) 11.41 mSv
Unit 2 (2) Removal of, and associated work on the boron thermal regenerator *1
(3) Inspection in accordance with the “Inspection of the Ni-base alloy parts
within the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) of the PWR”
(4) Inspection regarding high frequency metal fatigue
(5) Inspection related to the pipe wall thickness control
Shimane Nuclear 15 Sep. 7, 2008 to Apr. 17, 2009 (1) Repair of, and associated work on the piping in the reactor primary loop 2.24 person-Sv
Power Station of the re-circulator *2
(199 days) 14.55 mSv
Unit 2 (2) Inspection in accordance with the interpretation of cracks and other
defects that may cause destruction of nuclear power generation
equipment
(3) Inspection related to the pipe wall thickness control

<Second Quarter>
Total exposure
Number Periodical inspection period
dose
Power Plant of (Date of Paralleling Off to Major Renewal Activities, etc.
transports Periodical Inspection End Date) Maximum
exposure dose
Tomari Power 14 May 8 to Sep. 30, 2009 (1) Replacement of, and associated work on the reactor vessel top lid *1 0.87 person-Sv
Station
(146 days) (2) Replacement of, and associated work on the pressurizer safe ends *2 9.27 mSv
Unit 2
(3) Replacement of, and associated work on the pressurizer upper piping *1, 2
(4) Replacement of, and associated work on the emergency exhaust pipe *1
(5) Construction work on loading of high burn-up fuel *1
(6) Installation of, and associated work on added control rod clusters *1
(7) Replacement of, and associated work on the emergency core cooling
system safety valve *1
Onagawa 5 Nov. 26, 2008 to Aug. 18, 2009 (1) Construction work on seismic safety margin improvements 0.68 person-Sv
Nuclear Power
(266 days) (2) Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Additional Request 7.84 mSv
Station
Regarding Pipe Wall Thickness Control at Nuclear Power Plants”
Unit 3 (Heisei 19-11-29, NISA No. 3)
(3) Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Evaluations of and
request for inspections regarding high frequency metal fatigue” (Heisei
19-02-15, NISA No. 2)
Fukushima 24 Apr. 22 to Aug. 19, 2009 (1) Modification of, and associated work on the pipes in the residual heat 2.45 person-Sv
Daiichi Nuclear removal system *1, 2
(120 days) 12.83 mSv
Power Station
(2) Replacement of, and associated work on the low-pressure turbine No.
Unit 2 16 extraction pipe *2
Fukushima 23 Feb. 24 to Aug. 28, 2009 (1) Replacement of, and associated work on the main steam relief valves *1 2.94 person-Sv
Daiichi Nuclear
(170 days) (2) Modification of, and associated work on the pipes in the residual heat 16.04 mSv
Power Station
removal system *1, 2
Unit 3
(3) Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Additional Request
Regarding Pipe Wall Thickness Control at Nuclear Power Plants”
(Heisei 19-11-29, NISA No. 3)
Fukushima 21 Mar. 11 to Jul. 14, 2009 (1) Modification of, and associated work on the cooling system piping 3.87 person-Sv
Daiichi Nuclear during reactor isolation *1, 2
(94 days) 17.38 mSv
Power Station
(2) Increase of, and associated work on the capacity of the condensation
Unit 6 filters *2
(3) Alteration of the vacuum setting of the condenser and associated work *1
(4) Replacement of, and associated work on the process monitoring
equipment *1
(5) Replacement of, and associated work on the steam turbines *2
(6) Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Additional Request
Regarding Pipe Wall Thickness Control at Nuclear Power Plants”
(Heisei 19-11-29, NISA No. 3)
(7) Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Evaluations of and
request for inspections regarding high frequency metal fatigue” (Heisei
19-02-15, NISA No. 2)

126
Total exposure
Number Periodical inspection period
dose
Power Plant of (Date of Paralleling Off to Major Renewal Activities, etc.
transports Periodical Inspection End Date) Maximum
exposure dose
Hamaoka 3 Sep. 8, 2008 to Jul. 29, 2009 (1) Repair of, and associated work on the heat transfer tubes of the heat 0.35 person-Sv
Nuclear Power exchangers in the reactor building closed cooling water system *2
(325 days) 4.69 mSv
Station
(2) Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Evaluations of and
Unit 5 request for inspections regarding high frequency metal fatigue” (Heisei
19-02-15, NISA No. 2)
(3) Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Actions taken in
response to the bad coupling condition of the control rod drive
mechanism and the control rod of Unit 6 at the Tokyo Electric Power
Company, Limited Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Station” (Heisei
20-09-12, NISA No. 3)
Mihama Power 25 Apr. 3 to Jul, 23, 2009 (1) Replacement of, and associated work on the reactor cooling system 0.91 person-Sv
Station piping *2
(112 days) 9.20 mSv
Unit 2 (2) Modification of, and associated work on the valves in the residual heat
removal system *1
(3) Replacement of, and associated work on the pressurizer pipes *2
(4) Construction work on seismic safety margin improvements
(reinforcement of, and associated work on the support structure)
(5) Replacement of, and associated work on the moisture separator heater
Takahama Power 19 May 24 to Sep. 18, 2009 (1) Repair of, and associated work on the pressurizer pipes, etc. *2 2.26 person-Sv
Station
(118 days) (2) Modification of, and associated work on the reactor cooling system 12.84 mSv
Unit 3 equipment valve and piping *1
(3) Replacement of, and associated work on the reactor cooling system
equipment piping *2
(4) Removal of, and associated work on the reactor cooling system
equipment valve and piping *1
(5) Replacement of, and associated work on the low-pressure turbine
rotors, etc. *2
(6) Replacement of, and associated work on the containment gas monitor *2
(7) Replacement of, and associated work on the instrumentation power
supply
(8) Extraction of, and associated work on the reactor irradiation test pieces
(9) Construction work on seismic safety margin improvements
(reinforcement of, and associated work on the support structure)
Ikata Power 26 Mar. 9 to Aug. 6, 2009 (1) Alteration of, and associated work on the safety protective circuits *1 0.53 person-Sv
Station
(151 days) (2) Replacement of, and associated work on the main transformer *2 7.99 mSv
Unit 1
(3) Replacement of, and associated work on the uninterruptible power
supply *1
(4) Construction work on earthquake resistance improvements
(5) Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Inspection of the
Ni-base alloy parts within the reactor coolant pressure boundary
(RCPB) of the PWR” (Heisei 17-06-10, NISA No. 7)
Ikata Power 21 Feb. 24 to Jul. 28, 2009 (1) Alteration of, and associated work on the safety protective circuits *1 0.53 person-Sv
Station
(155 days) (2) Replacement of, and associated work on the main transformer *2 7.58 mSv
Unit 2
(3) Replacement of, and associated work on the uninterruptible power
supply *1
(4) Replacement of, and associated work on the primary piping *1
(5) Construction work on earthquake resistance improvements
(6) Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Inspection of the
Ni-base alloy parts within the reactor coolant pressure boundary
(RCPB) of the PWR” (Heisei 17-06-10, NISA No. 7)
Genkai Nuclear 26 Mar. 26 to Jul. 3, 2009 (1) Replacement of, and associated work on the pressurizer auxiliary spray 1.22 person-Sv
Power Station lines *1, 2
(100 days) 8.11 mSv
Unit 1 (2) Replacement of, and associated work on the pressurizer relief lines *1, 2
(3) Scheduled maintenance of, and associated work on the pressurizer pipe
welds *2
(4) Commoditization of, and associated work on the gaseous waste disposal
equipment *1, 2
(5) Replacement of, and associated work on the reactor vessel studs *2
(6) Construction work to change to one filling line system *1
(7) Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Inspection of the
Ni-base alloy parts within the reactor coolant boundary (RCPB) of the
PWR” (Heisei 17-06-10, NISA No. 7) 参
Genkai Nuclear 9 May 15 to Aug. 7, 2009 (1) Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Additional Request 0.83 person-Sv
Power Station Regarding Pipe Wall Thickness Control at Nuclear Power Plants”
(85 days) 5.60 mSv

(Heisei 19-11-29, NISA No. 3)
Unit 4

127
<Third Quarter>
Total exposure
Number Periodical inspection period
dose
Power Plant of (Date of Paralleling Off to Major Renewal Activities, etc.
transports Periodical Inspection End Date) Maximum
exposure dose
Onagawa 10 Mar. 26 to Oct. 22, 2009 (1) Inspection related to the pipe wall thickness control 2.22 person-Sv
Nuclear Power
(211 days) (2) Inspection regarding the cracking of the piping in the core shroud and 15.23 mSv
Station
the reactor primary loop of the re-circulator
Unit 2
(3) Construction work on seismic safety margin improvements
(4) Update of, and associated work on the control rod monitoring system
Fukushima 23 Sep. 1 to Dec. 3, 2009 (1) Modification of, and associated work on the pipes in the residual heat 2.58 person-Sv
Daiichi Nuclear removal system *1, 2
(94 days) 14.85 mSv
Power Station
(2) Replacement of, and associated work on the main steam safety relief
Unit 5 valves *1
Fukushima Daini 16 Jun. 7 to Oct. 9, 2009 (1) Installation of, and associated work on the cooling system piping vent 1.10 person-Sv
Nuclear Power line during reactor isolation *1, 2
(125 days) 11.26 mSv
Station
(2) Painting of, and associated work on the suppression chamber
Unit 4
Kashiwazaki- 8 Nov. 15, 2007* to Dec. 28, 2009 (1) Reinforcement of, and associated work on the exhaust pipe earthquake 3.35 person-Sv
Kariwa Nuclear resistance *2
(775 days) 15.50 mSv
Power Station
(2) Construction work on earthquake resistance improvements of piping, etc.
* The paralleling off date was
Unit 7
Jul. 19, 2007 (Automatic (3) Construction work on earthquake resistance improvements of the
reactor shutdown due to reactor building roof truss
Niigata Chuetsu-Oki
(4) Construction work on earthquake resistance improvements of the
Earthquake)
reactor building ceiling crane
(5) Construction work on earthquake resistance improvements of the
refueling machine
Hamaoka 16 Jun. 14 to Oct. 30, 2009 (1) Measures to reduce the condensation tank water level *2 1.69 person-Sv
Nuclear Power
(139 days) (2) Modification of, and associated work on the pipes in the inert gas 13.80 mSv
Station
system *2
Unit 3
Hamaoka 11 Feb. 25 to Oct. 16, 2009 (1) Replacement of, and associated work on the containment atmosphere 0.90 person-Sv
Nuclear Power monitor (hydrogen concentration in the containment) *1
(234 days) 7.30 mSv
Station
(2) Replacement of, and associated work on the containment atmosphere
Unit 4 monitor (oxygen concentration in the containment) *2
Mihama Power 24 Aug. 17 to Dec. 18, 2009 (1) Replacement of, and associated work on the No. 1 and 2 low pressure 1.21 person-Sv
Station feed water heaters (Unit B)
(124 days) 10.13 mSv
Unit 1 (2) Replacement of, and associated work on the primary coolant pump heat
shield devices (Unit B) *2
(3) Construction work on seismic safety margin improvements
(4) Installation of, and associated work on the power generator load
switchgear
(5) Replacement of, and associated work on the main transformer breaker
Takahama Power 26 Sep. 14 to Dec. 15, 2009 (1) Modification of, and associated work on the reactor cooling system 1.10 person-Sv
Station equipment valve and piping *1
(93 days) 8.06 mSv
Unit 1 (2) Replacement of, and associated work on the reactor cooling system
equipment piping *2
(3) Extraction of, and associated work on the reactor irradiation test pieces
(4) Construction work on seismic safety margin improvements
(reinforcement of, and associated work on the support structure)
Shimane Nuclear 28 May 7 to Oct. 9, 2009 (1) Construction work on seismic safety margin improvements 2.34 person-Sv
Power Station
(156 days) (2) Refueling and associated work 11.25 mSv
Unit 1
(3) Replacement of, and associated work on the control rod driving
mechanism
(4) Replacement of, and associated work on the power range
instrumentation
(5) Replacement of, and associated work on the control rod
(6) Inspection related to the pipe wall thickness control
Genkai Nuclear 12 Aug. 30 to Dec. 2, 2009 (1) Construction work on Mixed-Oxide Fuel loading *1 0.96 person-Sv
Power Station
(95 days) (2) Replacement of, and associated work on the low pressure No. 4 feed 6.26 mSv
Unit 3 water heaters

128
<Fourth Quarter>
Total exposure
Number Periodical inspection period
dose
Power Plant of (Date of Paralleling Off to Major Renewal Activities, etc.
transports Periodical Inspection End Date) Maximum
exposure dose
Higashidori 3 Sep. 12, 2009 to Jan. 7, 2010 (1) Pressure increase of, and associated work on the transformer *2 0.45 person-Sv
Nuclear Power
(118 days) 8.27 mSv
Station
Unit 1
Fukushima 23 Sep. 29, 2009 to Jan. 8, 2010 (1) Modification of, and associated work on the pipes in the residual heat 2.58 person-Sv
Daiichi Nuclear removal system *1
(102 days) 9.19 mSv
Power Station
Unit 4
Kashiwazaki- 8 May 24, 2007 to Jan. 19, 2010 (1) Reinforcement of, and associated work on the exhaust pipe earthquake 6.26 person-Sv
Kariwa Nuclear resistance *2
(972 days) 23.64 mSv
Power Station
(2) Construction work on earthquake resistance improvements of the
Unit 6 supports such as piping
(3) Construction work on earthquake resistance improvements of the
reactor building roof truss
(4) Construction work on earthquake resistance improvements of the
reactor building ceiling crane
(5) Construction work on earthquake resistance improvements of the
refueling machine
Shika Nuclear 2 Jul. 10, 2009 to Feb. 18, 2010 (1) Installation of, and associated work on the reserved reactor coolant 0.19 person-Sv
Power Station recirculation pump *1
(224 days) 4.15 mSv
Unit 2 (2) Installation of, and associated work on the reserved control rod driving
mechanism *1
(3) Adoption of, and associated work on the replacement fuel *1
(4) Inspection related to radioactive material leakage from the fuel
assembly
(5) Inspection and cleaning of inside of the reactor, related to radioactive
material leakage from the fuel assembly
(6) Investigation of the causes for and countermeasures against the leakage
of lube oil exhaust during preparation for the routine test of the
emergency diesel power generators
Tsuruga Power 32 Nov. 7, 2008 to Jan. 8, 2010 (1) Construction work on seismic safety margin improvements 5.20 person-Sv
Station
(428 days) 24.08 mSv
Unit 1
Ohi Power 23 Aug. 20, 2009 to Jan. 13, 2010 (1) Replacement of, and associated work on the pressurizer pipes *1, 2 8.16 person-Sv
Station
(147 days) (2) Modification of, and associated work on the reactor protective device *1 14.96 mSv
Unit 1
(3) Modification of, and associated work on the residual heat removal
equipment piping, etc. *1
(4) Replacement of, and associated work on the primary coolant circulation
system piping, etc. *2
(5) Modification of, and associated work on the refueling crane *1
(6) Removal of, and associated work on the boron thermal regenerator, etc. *1
(7) Construction work on seismic safety margin improvements
Ohi Power 14 Oct. 31, 2009 to Feb. 19, 2010 (1) Repair of, and associated work on the reactor vessel outlet pipes *2 1.69 person-Sv
Station
(112 days) (2) Modification and replacement of, and associated work on the primary 11.23 mSv
Unit 3 coolant circulation system piping, etc. (Preventive maintenance work to
prevent stress corrosion cracks, etc.) *1, 2
(3) Construction work on seismic safety margin improvements
Ikata Power 12 Jan. 7 to Mar. 30, 2010 (1) Construction work on Mixed-Oxide Fuel loading *1 1.13 person-Sv
Station
(83 days) (2) Replacement of, and associated work on the containment recirculation 11.48 mSv
Unit 3 sump screens *1
(3) Inspection related to radioactive material leakage from the fuel
assembly
Genkai Nuclear 22 Sep. 12, 2009 to Jan. 8, 2010 (1) Scheduled maintenance of, and associated work on the pressurizer pipe 0.89 person-Sv
Power Station welds *2
(119 days) 7.06 mSv
Unit 2 (2) Replacement of, and associated work on the pressurizer relief lines *1, 2
(3) Replacement of, and associated work on the pressurizer spray lines *1, 2
(4) Replacement of, and associated work on the pressurizer auxiliary spray
lines, and replacement and removal of, and associated work on the
filling lines *1, 2

Note: *1: Construction plan approval required
*2: Construction plan submission required

129
(2) Periodical Inspections of Research and Development Reactors

The periodical facility inspections for the Fugen Decommissioning Engineering Center, JAEA (normally
known as “Fugen”) are performed in accordance with Article 29, “Periodical Facility Inspections,” of the
Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law.

The 22nd periodical inspection of Fugen began on December 1, 2009 and was completed on March 23, 2010.

Note that Monju Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR), which is under construction, will undergo periodical
inspections after passing the pre-operational inspection.

(3) Period of Plant Shutdown due to Periodical Inspections of Commercial Reactors

Among the plants for which the periodical inspections were conducted in FY 2007, those listed in the table
below had a shutdown period (period from shutdown to startup of the power generator) of 150 days or
longer.

Shutdown
Unit Name
period
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 6 831
Shika Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 645
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 7 553
Onagawa Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 404
Tsuruga Power Station Unit 1 399
Onagawa Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 218
Shimane Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 199
Onagawa Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 186
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 183

The plants that had shutdown periods of less than 70 days are listed in the following table.

Shutdown
Unit Name
period
Takahama Power Station Unit 1 66
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 4 63
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 5 63
Genkai Nuclear Power Station Unit 4 60
Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit 5 58
Ikata Power Station Unit 3 57

130
Ϫ-2 Periodical Inspections by Unit
<First Quarter>
1. Applicant Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc. 1. Applicant Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.
2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Onagawa Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, 18th 2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, 25th
facilities facilities (2) Output: 460 MW
(2) Output: 524 MW
(3) Commissioning Date: June 1984 (3) Commissioning Date: March 1971
3. Inspection January 11, 2008 3. Inspection September 17, 2008
application date application date
4. Date of certificate May 1, 2009 4. Date of certificate May 20, 2008
issuance issuance
5. Inspection (1) February 14, 2008 (Periodical Inspection Start Date) 5. Inspection (1) October 18, 2008 (Periodical Inspection Start Date)
implementation –May 1, 2009 (Periodical Inspection End Date) implementation –May 20, 2009 (Periodical Inspection End Date)
period period (2) Deviations from the plan
(2) Deviations from the plan
Due to replacement of the cracked piping found during the inspection in accordance with the inspection of the Because time was required to investigate the cause of and take measures for the water leaching from the valve
reactor recirculation piping, etc. and investigation of the cause of and recurrence prevention measures for the casing in the control rod hydraulic system and the failure in the turbine bypass valve driving parts during
fire that occurred in the inspection building for outdoor electric motors, etc., the period from start of the activation operation, the date of startup was extended by 123 days and the inspection end date was extended by
periodical inspection to verification of overall load resistance performance was extended to 443 days. 117 days.
6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection 6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection
Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment, Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment, fuel
fuel equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal equipment, reactor containment facility, equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal equipment, reactor containment facility, and emergency
emergency standby power generation device, and steam turbine standby power generation device
(2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item (2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item
By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or
confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures, confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures,
inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to the
the periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards. periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards.
In addition, responding to the “Our actions to be taken for the data falsification issues at electric power (3) Standards used for inspections
companies” that was published on February 16, 2007, strict verifications were conducted in regard to the Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation
contents of the periodical licensee inspections and the appropriateness of the inspection equipment. Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan
(3) Standards used for inspections (alteration) approval and notification

131
Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation 7. Result Good
Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan 8. Related permission items None
(alteration) approval and notification
9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections
7. Result Good
None
8. Related permission items None
(2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection
9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections
1. Replacement of, and associated work on the reactor pressure vessel head cooling system pipe (construction
None plan approval required)
(2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection 2. Measurement inspection of pipe wall thickness in accordance with the NISA document, “Interpretation
1. Update and associated work on the pumps in the core spray system (construction plan approval required) (internal regulations) concerned with periodical licensee inspection of nuclear power stations” (Heisei 20-
06-23, NISA No. 6)
2. Replacement of, and associated work on the emergency core cooling system strainers (construction plan
approval required) 3. Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Concerning the inspection of the cracking of the
piping in the core shroud and the reactor primary loop of the re-circulator” (Heisei 15-04-09, NISA No. 4)
3. Repair of, and associated work on the piping in the reactor primary loop of the re-circulator (construction
plan submission required) 4. Inspection in accordance with the NISA document “Steps to deal with the stress corrosion cracking caused
by chlorides of stainless steel piping such as the piping in the control rod drive hydraulic system” (Heisei
4. Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Concerning the inspection of the cracking of the 14-11-26, NISA No. 2)
piping in the core shroud and the reactor primary loop of the re-circulator” (Heisei 15-04-09, NISA No. 4)
5. Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Concerning the interpretation (internal regulations) of
5. Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Inspection of and request for evaluation regarding cracks and other defects that may cause destruction of nuclear power generation equipment” (Heisei 20-07-
high frequency metal fatigue” (Heisei 19-02-15, NISA No. 2) 04, NISA No. 1)
6. Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Request Regarding Pipe Wall Thickness Control at (3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work
Nuclear Power Plants” (Heisei 17-02-16, NISA No. 1)
1. Total exposure dose: 1.70 person-Sv
7. Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Concerning wastage of the piping at Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station of Tokyo Electric Power 2. Average dose: 0.35 mSv
Co., Inc. and Shimane Nuclear Power Station of Chugoku Electric Power Co., Inc.” (Heisei 17-03-15, 3. Maximum exposure dose: 11.19 mSv
NISA No. 5)
8. Inspection in accordance with “Thorough Control of Pipe Wall Thickness Relating to Reactor Manually
Shut Down of Onagawa Nuclear Power Station Unit 2” (a directive dated June 7, 2006)
(3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work
1. Total exposure dose: 2.35 person-Sv
2. Average dose: 0.56 mSv
3. Maximum exposure dose: 17.56 mSv



1. Applicant Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. 1. Applicant Hokuriku Electric Power Co.
2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, 20th 2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Shika Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, 11th
facilities (2) Output: 1,100 MW facilities (2) Output: 540 MW
(3) Commissioning Date: April 1982 (3) Commissioning Date: July 1993
3. Inspection January 16, 2009 3. Inspection June 6, 2007
application date application date
4. Date of certificate May 26, 2009 4. Date of certificate May 13, 2009
issuance issuance
5. Inspection (1) February 17, 2009 (Periodical Inspection Start Date) 5. Inspection (1) July 7, 2007 (Periodical Inspection Start Date)
implementation –May 26, 2009 (Periodical Inspection End Date) implementation –May 13, 2009 (Periodical Inspection End Date)
period (2) Deviations from the plan period (2) Deviations from the plan
Due to corrective measures taken to rectify unsuitable occurrence of the cooling system turbine exhaust check Due to a full inspection of the safety measures and construction work on seismic safety margin improvements
valves at isolation of the reactor, the inspection period was extended by 4 days. in view of the critical accident that occurred during the 5th periodical inspection in June, 1999, the period from
start of the periodical inspection to verification of overall load resistance performance was extended to 677
6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection
days.
Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment,
fuel equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal equipment, reactor containment facility, 6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection
emergency standby power generation device, and steam turbine Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment, fuel
(2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal equipment, reactor containment facility, emergency
standby power generation device, and steam turbine
By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or
confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures, (2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item
inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or
the periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards. confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures,
(3) Standards used for inspections inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to the
periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards.
Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation
Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan In addition, responding to the “Our actions to be taken for the data falsification issues at electric power
(alteration) approval and notification companies” that was published on February 16, 2007, strict verifications were conducted in regard to the
contents of the periodical licensee inspections and the appropriateness of the inspection equipment.
7. Result Good
(3) Standards used for inspections
8. Related permission items None
Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation
9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan

132
None (alteration) approval and notification

(2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection 7. Result Good
1. Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Interpretation (internal regulations) concerned with 8. Related permission items None
periodical licensee inspection of nuclear power stations” (Heisei 20-06-23, NISA No. 6) 9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections
2. Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Concerning the interpretation (internal regulations) of None
cracks and other defects that may cause destruction of nuclear power generation equipment” (Heisei 20-
07-04, NISA No. 1) (2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection

(3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work 1. Increase of, and associated work on the storage capacity of the spent fuel pool (construction plan approval
required)
1. Total exposure dose: 1.09 person-Sv
2. Replacement of, and associated work on the emergency core cooling system strainers (construction plan
2. Average dose: 0.30 mSv approval required)
3. Maximum exposure dose: 10.37 mSv 3. Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Concerning the interpretation of cracks and other
defects that may cause destruction of nuclear power generation equipment” (Heisei 18-03-20, NISA No. 2)
4. Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Request Regarding Pipe Wall Thickness Control at
Nuclear Power Plants” (Heisei 17-02-18, NISA No. 1)
5. Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “About Inspection of the Surroundings of the Parts for
Water Jet Peening in the Structures within the Reactor” (Heisei 18-05-08, NISA No. 11)
(3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work
1. Total exposure dose: 2.90 person-Sv
2. Average dose: 0.93 mSv
3. Maximum exposure dose: 19.24 mSv
1. Applicant Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. 1. Applicant Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.
2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Takahama Power Station Unit 2, 25th 2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Ohi Power Station Unit 2, 22nd
facilities (2) Output: 826 MW facilities (2) Output: 1175 MW
(3) Commissioning Date: November 1975 (3) Commissioning Date: December 1979
3. Inspection January 22, 2009 3. Inspection December 25, 2008
application date application date
4. Date of certificate June 4, 2009 4. Date of certificate May 21, 2009
issuance issuance
5. Inspection (1) February 25, 2009 (Periodical Inspection Start Date) 5. Inspection (1) February 6, 2009 (Periodical Inspection Start Date)
implementation –June 4, 2009 (Periodical Inspection End Date) implementation –May 21, 2009 (Periodical Inspection End Date)
period (2) Deviations from the plan period (2) Deviations from the plan
None Since the balancing adjustment of the turbine power generator, which was scheduled before startup, was not
required as a result of the vibration measurement, the date of startup was brought forward by 2 days.
6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection
Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment, 6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection
fuel equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal equipment, reactor containment facility, Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment, fuel
emergency standby power generation device, and steam turbine equipment, radiation management equipment, reactor containment facility, emergency standby power
(2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item generation device, and steam turbine

By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or (2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item
confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures, By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or
inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures,
the periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards. inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to the
(3) Standards used for inspections periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards.

Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation (3) Standards used for inspections
Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation
(alteration) approval and notification Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan
(alteration) approval and notification
7. Result Good
7. Result Good
8. Related permission items None
8. Related permission items None
9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections
None 9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections

133
(2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection 1. Though the valve operation inspection and water discharge inspection can be carried out as separate
processes during the inspection of the accumulation injection system functions, the statements in the
1. Modification of, and associated work on the reactor cooling system equipment valve and piping procedures regarding checking to see if the target devices to be inspected for confirmation before start of
(construction plan approval required) the water discharge inspection can be actually inspected can be interpreted so that the main valve was
2. Replacement of, and associated work on the piping in the reactor primary loop of the re-circulator already checked during the valve operation inspection and should not be inspected further. In actual
(construction plan submission required) conditions, maintenance of the main valve was not carried out after the valve operation inspection and no
problems were found. However, it is desirable to organize the check concept before the inspection.
3. Modification of, and associated work on the reactor cooling system equipment piping (construction plan
approval required) (2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection
4. Modification of, and associated work on the waste water evaporation device, etc. (construction plan 1. Modification and replacement of, and associated work on the excess extracted water line piping
submission required) (construction plan approval and submission required)
5. Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Inspection of the Ni-base alloy parts within the 2. Removal of, and associated work on the boron thermal regenerator (construction plan approval required)
reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) of the PWR” (Heisei 17-06-10, NISA No. 7) 3. Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Inspection of the Ni-base alloy parts within the reactor
6. Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Additional Request Regarding Pipe Wall Thickness coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) of the PWR” (Heisei 17-06-10, NISA No. 7)
Control at Nuclear Power Plants” (Heisei 19-11-29, NISA No. 3) 4. Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Requests for inspection and evaluation of high
(3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work frequency metal fatigue” (Heisei 19-02-15, NISA No. 2)
1. Total exposure dose: 1.94 person-Sv 5. Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Additional Request Regarding Pipe Wall Thickness
Control at Nuclear Power Plants” (Heisei 19-11-29, NISA No. 3)
2. Average dose: 0.80 mSv
(3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work
3. Maximum exposure dose: 15.18 mSv
1. Total exposure dose: 3.02 person-Sv
2. Average dose: 1.18 mSv
3. Maximum exposure dose: 11.41 mSv



<Second Quarter>
1. Applicant Chugoku Electric Power Co., Inc. 1. Applicant Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Inc.,
2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Shimane Nuclear Power Station Unit 2, 15th 2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Tomari Power Station Unit 2, 14th
facilities (2) Output: 820 MW facilities (2) Output: 579 MW
(3) Commissioning Date: February 1989 (3) Commissioning Date: April 1991
3. Inspection August 6, 2008 3. Inspection April 3, 2009
application date application date
4. Date of certificate April 17, 2009 4. Date of certificate September 30, 2009
issuance issuance
5. Inspection (1) September 7, 2008 (Periodical Inspection Start Date) 5. Inspection (1) May 8, 2009 (Periodical Inspection Start Date)
implementation –April 17, 2009 (Periodical Inspection End Date) implementation –September 30, 2009 (Periodical Inspection End Date)
period (2) Deviations from the plan period (2) Deviations from the plan
Due to cracks found on the pipes in the reactor recirculation system, etc., the period from start of the Due to a shortened process (without balancing) during starting process, the date of startup was brought
periodical inspection to the verification of overall load resistance performance was extended to 223 days. forward by 1 day.
6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection 6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection
Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment, Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment,
fuel equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal equipment, reactor containment facility, fuel equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal equipment, reactor containment facility,
emergency standby power generation device, and steam turbine emergency standby power generation device, and steam turbine
(2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item (2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item
By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or
confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures, confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures,
inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to
the periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards. the periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards.
(3) Standards used for inspections (3) Standards used for inspections
Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation
Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan
(alteration) approval and notification (alteration) approval and notification
7. Result Good 7. Result Good
8. Related permission items None 8. Related permission items None
9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections 9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections

134
None None
(2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection (2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection
1. Repair of, and associated work on the pipes in the reactor recirculation system, etc. (construction plan 1. Construction work that directly affected the processes in the periodical licensee inspection
submission required) • Replacement of, and associated work on the reactor vessel top lid (construction plan approval required)
2. Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Concerning the interpretation of cracks and other • Replacement of, and associated work on the pressurizer safe ends (construction plan submission
defects that may cause destruction of nuclear power generation equipment” (Heisei 18-03-20, NISA No. 2) required)
3. Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Request Regarding Pipe Wall Thickness Control at • Replacement of, and associated work on the pressurizer upper piping (construction plan approval and
Nuclear Power Plants” (Heisei 17-02-16, NISA No. 1) submission required)
4. Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Additional Request Regarding Pipe Wall Thickness • Replacement of, and associated work on the emergency exhaust pipe (construction plan approval
Control at Nuclear Power Plants” (Heisei 19-11-29, NISA No. 3) required)
(3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work • Construction work on loading of high burn-up fuel (construction plan approval required)
1. Total exposure dose: 2.24 person-Sv • Installation of more control rod clusters (construction plan approval required)
2. Average dose: 0.92 mSv • Replacement of, and associated work on the emergency core cooling system facility safety valve
3. Maximum exposure dose: 14.55 mSv (construction plan approval required)
2. Other
None
(3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work
1. Total exposure dose: 0.87 person-Sv
2. Average dose: 0.49 mSv
3. Maximum exposure dose: 9.27 mSv
(4) Maintenance plan
According to the notification of alteration of safety preservation rules dated February 6, 2009, the
conventional maintenance plan was changed for the purpose of optimization of the maintenance method
(changes from corrective maintenance to time-based maintenance in order to check for deterioration, and
change from disassembly inspection to leak test because no deterioration was confirmed).
1. Applicant Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc. 1. Applicant Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.
2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Onagawa Nuclear Power Station Unit 3, 5th 2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 2, 24th
facilities (2) Output: 825 MW facilities (2) Output: 784 MW
(3) Commissioning Date: January 2002 (3) Commissioning Date: July 1974
3. Inspection October 23, 2008 3. Inspection March 18, 2009
application date application date
4. Date of certificate August 18, 2009 4. Date of certificate August 19, 2009
issuance issuance
5. Inspection (1) November 26, 2008 (Periodical Inspection Start Date) 5. Inspection (1) April 22, 2009 (Periodical Inspection Start Date)
implementation –August 18, 2009 (Periodical Inspection End Date) implementation –August 19, 2009 (Periodical Inspection End Date)
period (2) Deviations from the plan period (2) Deviations from the plan
Due to the extended work caused by review of the curing process in the construction work on seismic safety Due to repair of the recirculation water pipes (water discharge side), the date of startup was extended by 6
margin improvements for the horizontal spread of fire at the construction work site on seismic safety margin days. Also, due to adjustment of the schedule of the verification of overall load resistance performance, the
improvements, which occurred at Onagawa Unit 1 reactor building, etc., and due to observation of causes of periodical inspection end date was extended by 1 day.
and measures for control rod insertion, the period from start of the periodical inspection to verification of
6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection
overall load resistance performance was extended to 266 days.
Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment,
6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection fuel equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal equipment, reactor containment facility,
Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment, emergency standby power generation device, and steam turbine
fuel equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal equipment, reactor containment facility, (2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item
emergency standby power generation device, and steam turbine
By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or
(2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures,
By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to
confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures, the periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards.
inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to (3) Standards used for inspections
the periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards.
Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation
(3) Standards used for inspections Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan
Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation (alteration) approval and notification
Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan
7. Result Good
(alteration) approval and notification
8. Related permission items None
7. Result Good

135
9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections
8. Related permission items None
None
9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections
(2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection
None
1. Construction work that directly affected the processes in the periodical licensee inspection
(2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection
• Modification of, and associated work on the piping in the residual heat removal system (construction
1. Construction work that directly affected the processes in the periodical licensee inspection plan approval and submission required)
• Construction work on seismic safety margin improvements • Replacement of, and associated work on the low-pressure turbine 16th extraction pipe (construction plan
2. Other submission required)
• Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Additional Request Regarding Pipe Wall Thickness 2. Other
Control at Nuclear Power Plants” (Heisei 19-11-29, NISA No. 3) None
• Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Requests for inspection and evaluation of high (3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work
frequency metal fatigue” (Heisei 19-02-15, NISA No. 2)
1. Total exposure dose: 2.45 person-Sv
(3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work
2. Average dose: 0.50 mSv
1. Total exposure dose: 0.68 person-Sv
3. Maximum exposure dose: 12.83 mSv
2. Average dose: 0.21 mSv
(4) Maintenance plan
3. Maximum exposure dose: 7.84 mSv
According to the notification of alteration of safety preservation rules dated January 27, 2009, the maintenance
method was reviewed as a change to the conventional maintenance plan: e.g. the inspection interval was
reviewed by evaluating the inspection performance to convert the interval to an even number in order to
effectively implement the periodical inspection work and by standardizing the inspection intervals among the
licensee and other plants, etc.; and state monitoring technologies were introduced.



1. Applicant Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. 1. Applicant Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.
2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 3, 23rd 2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 6, 21st
facilities (2) Output: 784 MW facilities (2) Output: 1100 MW
(3) Commissioning Date: March, 1976 (3) Commissioning Date: May 1983
3. Inspection January 22, 2009 3. Inspection February 9, 2009
application date application date
4. Date of certificate March 28, 2009 4. Date of certificate July 14, 2009
issuance issuance
5. Inspection (1) February 24, 2009 (Periodical Inspection Start Date) 5. Inspection (1) March 11, 2009 (Periodical Inspection Start Date)
implementation –August 28, 2009 (Periodical Inspection End Date) implementation –July 14, 2009 (Periodical Inspection End Date)
period (2) Deviations from the plan period (2) Deviations from the plan
Due to investigation of, and measures for the nonconformance of the excessively inserted control rod and the Because the turbine adjustment work during activation of the plant had proceeded smoothly, the date of startup
nonconformance in inspection of the control rod hydraulic system, the date of startup was extended by 72 was brought forward by 2 days.
days. Due to investigation of, and measures for the ground fault of the reactor containment internal steam
6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection
isolation valve and the failure of the stop circuit in the cooling system at reactor isolation, the periodical
inspection end date was extended by 91 days. Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment, fuel
equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal equipment, reactor containment facility, emergency
6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection standby power generation device, and steam turbine
Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment, (2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item
fuel equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal equipment, reactor containment facility,
emergency standby power generation device, and steam turbine By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or
confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures,
(2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to the
By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards.
confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures, (3) Standards used for inspections
inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to
the periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards. Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation
Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan
(3) Standards used for inspections (alteration) approval and notification
Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation
7. Result Good
Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan
(alteration) approval and notification 8. Related permission items None
7. Result Good 9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections

136
8. Related permission items None None
9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections (2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection
None 1. Construction work that directly affected the processes in the periodical licensee inspection
(2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection • Replacement of, and associated work on the steam turbines (construction plan submission required)
1. Construction work that directly affected the processes in the periodical licensee inspection 2. Other
None • Modification of, and associated work on the cooling system piping at reactor isolation (construction plan
approval and submission required)
2. Other
• Increase of, and associated work on the capacity of the condensation filters (construction plan
• Replacement of, and associated work on the main steam safety relief valves (construction plan approval submission required)
required)
• Alteration of, and associated work on the low vacuum setting of the condenser (construction plan
• Modification of, and associated work on the piping in the residual heat removal system (construction approval required)
plan approval and submission required)
• Replacement of, and associated work on the process monitoring equipment (construction plan approval
• Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Additional Request Regarding Pipe Wall Thickness required)
Control at Nuclear Power Plants” (Heisei 19-11-29, NISA No. 3)
• Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Additional Request Regarding Pipe Wall Thickness
(3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work Control at Nuclear Power Plants” (Heisei 19-11-29, NISA No. 3)
1. Total exposure dose: 2.94 person-Sv • Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Requests for inspection and evaluation of high
2. Average dose: 0.59 mSv frequency metal fatigue” (Heisei 19-02-15, NISA No. 2)
3. Maximum exposure dose: 16.04 mSv (3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work
1. Total exposure dose: 3.87 person-Sv
2. Average dose: 0.68 mSv
3. Maximum exposure dose: 17.38 mSv
1. Applicant Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc. 1. Applicant Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.
2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit 5, 3rd 2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Mihama Power Station Unit 2, 25th
facilities (2) Output: 1267 MW facilities (2) Output: 500 MW
(3) Commissioning Date: January 2005 (3) Commissioning Date: July 1972
3. Inspection August 7, 2008 3. Inspection March 2, 2009
application date application date
4. Date of certificate July 29, 2009 4. Date of certificate July 23, 2009
issuance issuance
5. Inspection (1) September 8, 2008 (Periodical Inspection Start Date) 5. Inspection (1) April 3, 2009 (Periodical Inspection Start Date)
implementation –July 29, 2009 (Periodical Inspection End Date) implementation –July 23, 2009 (Periodical Inspection End Date)
period (2) Deviations from the plan period (2) Deviations from the plan
Due to additional inspection on the control rod drive mechanism, the date of startup was extended by 3 days. None
In addition, due to investigation of, and measure for the reactor manual shutdown caused by increase of
6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection
hydrogen concentration in the gaseous waste treatment system (performance deterioration of the exhaust gas
recombinator), the periodical inspection end date was extended by 243 days. Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment,
fuel equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal equipment, reactor containment facility,
6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection emergency standby power generation device, and steam turbine
Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment, (2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item
fuel equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal equipment, reactor containment facility,
emergency standby power generation device, and steam turbine By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or
confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures,
(2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to
By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or the periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards.
confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures, (3) Standards used for inspections
inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to
the periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards. Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation
Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan
(3) Standards used for inspections (alteration) approval and notification
Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation
7. Result Good
Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan
(alteration) approval and notification 8. Related permission items None
7. Result Good 9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections
8. Related permission items None It was confirmed that proper nonconformity treatment was conducted according to the steps defined in the

137
procedures for the variation of inspection pressure during the reactor containment partial leakage rate
9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections inspection, which was caused by the stop operation of the auxiliary building internal fan that replaced it.
None Because it cannot be assumed how the stop operation of the auxiliary building internal fan would affect the
(2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection inspection, it is preferable to continuously review and take measures.

1. Construction work that directly affected the processes in the periodical licensee inspection (2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection

• Repair of, and associated work on the heat transfer tubes of the heat exchangers in the reactor building 1. Construction work that directly affected the processes in the periodical licensee inspection
closed cooling water system (construction plan submission required) • Replacement of, and associated work on the pressurizer pipes (construction plan submission required)
2. Other 2. Other
• Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Requests for inspection and evaluation of high • Replacement of, and associated work on the reactor cooling system piping (construction plan submission
frequency metal fatigue” (Heisei 19-02-15, NISA No. 2) required)
• Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Actions taken in response to the bad coupling • Modification of, and associated work on the residual heat removal system valves (construction plan
condition of the control rod drive mechanism and the control rod of Unit 6 at the Tokyo Electric Power approval required)
Company, Limited Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Station” (Heisei 20-09-12, NISA No. 3) • Construction work on seismic safety margin improvements (reinforcement of, and associated work on
(3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work the support structure)
1. Total exposure dose: 0.35 person-Sv • Replacement of, and associated work on the moisture separation heater
2. Average dose: 0.16 mSv (3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work
3. Maximum exposure dose: 4.69 mSv 1. Total exposure dose: 0.91 person-Sv
2. Average dose: 0.44 mSv
3. Maximum exposure dose: 9.20 mSv
(4) Maintenance plan
According to the notification of alteration of safety preservation rules dated January 9, 2009, the conventional
maintenance plan was changed by reviewing the inspection intervals of individual devices based on the past
inspection results, operational integrity, and the study data obtained from the findings during replacement of
the devices, etc.



1. Applicant Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. 1. Applicant Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc.
2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Takahama Power Station Unit 3, 19th 2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Ikata Power Station Unit 1, 26th
facilities (2) Output: 870 MW facilities (2) Output: 566 MW
(3) Commissioning Date: January 1985 (3) Commissioning Date: September 1977
3. Inspection April 22, 2009 3. Inspection January 22, 2009
application date application date
4. Date of certificate September 18, 2009 4. Date of certificate August 6, 2009
issuance issuance
5. Inspection (1) May 24, 2009 (Periodical Inspection Start Date) 5. Inspection (1) March 9, 2009 (Periodical Inspection Start Date)
implementation –September 18, 2009 (Periodical Inspection End Date) implementation –August 6, 2009 (Periodical Inspection End Date)
period (2) Deviations from the plan period (2) Deviations from the plan
None Because the process was delayed due to replacement to a new valve in line with the steam leakage from the
steam drain valve driven by the turbine-driven auxiliary feed water pump at Ikata Unit 1 found during the
6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection
periodical inspection, the date of startup was delayed by 1 day.
Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment,
(scheduled periodical inspection end date: August 6, 2009)
fuel equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal equipment, reactor containment facility,
emergency standby power generation device, and steam turbine 6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection
(2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment,
By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or fuel equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal equipment, reactor containment facility,
confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures, emergency standby power generation device, and steam turbine
inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to (2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item
the periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards. By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or
(3) Standards used for inspections confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures,
Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to
Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan the periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards.
(alteration) approval and notification (3) Standards used for inspections
7. Result Good Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation
Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan
8. Related permission items None
(alteration) approval and notification
9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections
7. Result Good
None

138
8. Related permission items None
(2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection
9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections
1. Construction work that directly affected the processes in the periodical licensee inspection
None
• Replacement of, and associated work on the pressurizer pipes, etc. (construction plan submission
required) (2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection

• Extraction of, and associated work on the reactor irradiation test pieces 1. Construction work that directly affected the processes in the periodical licensee inspection

2. Other • Alteration of, and associated work on the safety protective circuits (construction plan approval required)

• Modification of, and associated work on the reactor cooling system equipment valve and piping • Replacement of, and associated work on the main transformer (construction plan submission required)
(construction plan approval required) • Replacement of, and associated work on the uninterruptible power supply (construction plan approval
• Replacement of, and associated work on the reactor cooling system equipment piping (construction plan required)
submission required) • Construction work on earthquake resistance improvements
• Removal of, and associated work on the reactor cooling system equipment valve and piping 2. Other
(construction plan approval required) • Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Inspection of the Ni-base alloy parts within the
• Installation of, and associated work on the low-pressure turbine rotors, etc. (construction plan reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) of the PWR” (Heisei 17-06-10, NISA No. 7)
submission required) (3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work
• Replacement of, and associated work on the containment gas monitor (construction plan submission 1. Total exposure dose: 0.53 person-Sv
required)
2. Average dose: 0.26 mSv
• Replacement of, and associated work on the instrumentation power supply
3. Maximum exposure dose: 7.99 mSv
• Construction work on seismic safety margin improvements (reinforcement of, and associated work on
the support structure)
(3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work
1. Total exposure dose: 2.26 person-Sv
2. Average dose: 0.94 mSv
3. Maximum exposure dose: 12.84 mSv
(4) Maintenance plan
According to the notification of alteration of safety preservation rules dated February 27, 2009, the
conventional maintenance plan was changed by extending the inspection interval, which was achieved by
replacement with longer-life parts, by evaluation of the deterioration trends, and by consideration on the
proven track record of similar devices at their plant.
1. Applicant Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc. 1. Applicant Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc.
2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Ikata Power Station Unit 2, 21st 2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Genkai Power Station Unit 1, 26th
facilities (2) Output: 566 MW facilities (2) Output: 559 MW
(3) Commissioning Date: March 1982 (3) Commissioning Date: October 1975
3. Inspection January 22, 2009 3. Inspection February 23, 2009
application date application date
4. Date of certificate July 28, 2009 4. Date of certificate July 3, 2009
issuance issuance
5. Inspection (1) February 24, 2009 (Periodical Inspection Start Date) 5. Inspection (1) March 26, 2009 (Periodical Inspection Start Date)
implementation –July 28, 2009 (Periodical Inspection End Date) implementation –July 3, 2009 (Periodical Inspection End Date)
period (2) Deviations from the plan period (2) Deviations from the plan
Because the plant activation process had proceeded smoothly, the date of startup was moved forward by 1 day. None
(scheduled periodical inspection end date: July 28, 2009) 6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection
6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment, fuel
Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment, equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal equipment, reactor containment facility, emergency
fuel equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal equipment, reactor containment facility, standby power generation device, and steam turbine
emergency standby power generation device, and steam turbine (2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item
(2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or
By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures,
confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures, inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to the
inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards.
the periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards. (3) Standards used for inspections
(3) Standards used for inspections Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation
Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan
Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan (alteration) approval and notification
(alteration) approval and notification 7. Result Good
7. Result Good 8. Related permission items None
8. Related permission items None 9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections
9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections None

139
None (2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection
(2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection 1. Construction work that directly affected the processes in the periodical licensee inspection
1. Construction work that directly affected the processes in the periodical licensee inspection • Scheduled maintenance of, and associated work on the pressurizer pipe welds (construction plan
• Alteration of, and associated work on the safety protective circuits (construction plan approval required) submission required)

• Replacement of, and associated work on the main transformer (construction plan submission required) • Replacement of, and associated work on the reactor vessel studs (construction plan submission required)

• Replacement of, and associated work on the uninterruptible power supply (construction plan approval 2. Other
required) • Replacement of, and associated work on the pressurizer auxiliary spray lines (construction plan approval
• Replacement of, and associated work on the primary piping (construction plan approval required) and submission required)

• Construction work on earthquake resistance improvements • Replacement of, and associated work on the pressurizer relief lines (construction plan approval and
submission required)
2. Other
• Commoditization of, and associated work on the gaseous waste disposal equipment (construction plan
• Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Inspection of the Ni-base alloy parts within the approval and submission required)
reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) of the PWR” (Heisei 17-06-10, NISA No. 7)
• Construction work to change to a one filling line system (construction plan approval required)
(3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work
• Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Inspection of the Ni-base alloy parts within the
1. Total exposure dose: 0.53 person-Sv reactor coolant boundary (RCPB) of the PWR” (Heisei 17-06-10, NISA No. 7)
2. Average dose: 0.27 mSv (3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work
3. Maximum exposure dose: 7.58 mSv 1. Total exposure dose: 1.22 person-Sv
2. Average dose: 0.52 mSv
3. Maximum exposure dose: 8.11 mSv



<Third Quarter>
1. Applicant Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc. 1. Applicant Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.
2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Genkai Power Station Unit 4, 9th 2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Onagawa Nuclear Power Station Unit 2, 10th
facilities (2) Output: 1180 MW facilities (2) Output: 825 MW
(3) Commissioning Date: July 1997 (3) Commissioning Date: July 1995
3. Inspection April 14, 2009 3. Inspection February 25, 2009
application date application date
4. Date of certificate August 7, 2009 4. Date of certificate October 22, 2009
issuance issuance
5. Inspection (1) May 15, 2009 (Periodical Inspection Start Date) 5. Inspection (1) March 26, 2009 (Periodical Inspection Start Date)
implementation –August 7, 2009 (Periodical Inspection End Date) implementation –October 22, 2009 (Periodical Inspection End Date)
period (2) Deviations from the plan period (2) Deviations from the plan
None Due to extended periods for the construction work on seismic safety margin improvements and the repair work
on the combined middle valve, the period from start of the periodical inspection to the verification of overall
6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection
load resistance performance was extended to 211 days.
Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment,
fuel equipment, radiation management equipment, reactor containment facility, emergency standby power 6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection
generation device, and steam turbine Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment,
(2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item fuel equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal equipment, reactor containment facility,
emergency standby power generation device, and steam turbine
By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or
confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures, (2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item
inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or
the periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards. confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures,
(3) Standards used for inspections inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to
the periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards.
Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation
Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan (3) Standards used for inspections
(alteration) approval and notification Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation
Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan
7. Result Good
(alteration) approval and notification
8. Related permission items None
7. Result Good
9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections
8. Related permission items None
None

140
9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections
(2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection
(Improvement on the periodical licensee inspection procedures definition process)
1. Construction work that directly affected the processes in the periodical licensee inspection
It was verified that insufficient consideration was given regarding changing the measurement errors on the
None control rod insertion time during revision of the inspection procedures for modification work on the
2. Other measurement panel for operation time of all control rods. As a result, though there were no problems with the
adequacy of the procedures, it is necessary to thoroughly recognize the roles that the procedures play to
• Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Additional Request Regarding Pipe Wall Thickness maintain appropriateness of the inspection and prepare the procedures with plenty of time to spare.
Control at Nuclear Power Plants” (Heisei 19-11-29, NISA No. 3)
(Improvement on the contents of the periodical licensee inspection procedures)
(3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work
In addition, items that affect judgments in the inspection (the accumulator pressure and reactor pressure affect
1. Total exposure dose: 0.83 person-Sv the control rod insertion time) must clearly describe considerations on the effects of pressure on the judgments
2. Average dose: 0.43 mSv in the inspection procedures.
3. Maximum exposure dose: 5.60 mSv (2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection
(4) Maintenance plan 1. Construction work that directly affected the processes in the periodical licensee inspection
According to the notification of alteration of safety preservation rules dated February 17, 2009, the • Construction work on seismic safety margin improvements
conventional maintenance plan was changed by reviewing the maintenance timings in terms of the preventive 2. Other
maintenance based on the deterioration mechanism (to maintain the parts of which deterioration is assumed
more frequently and the parts of which deterioration is not assumed less frequently). • Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Additional Request Regarding Pipe Wall Thickness
Control at Nuclear Power Plants” (Heisei 19-11-29, NISA No. 3)
• Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Concerning the inspection of the cracking of the
piping in the core shroud and the reactor primary loop of the re-circulator” (Heisei 15-04-09, NISA No. 4)
• Update of, and associated work on the control rod monitoring system
(3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work
1. Total exposure dose: 2.22 person-Sv
2. Average dose: 0.68 mSv
3. Maximum exposure dose: 15.23 mSv
1. Applicant Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. 1. Applicant Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.
2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 5, 23rd 2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station Unit 4, 16th
facilities (2) Output: 784 MW facilities (2) Output: 1100 MW
(3) Commissioning Date: April 1978 (3) Commissioning Date: August 1987
3. Inspection July 29, 2009 3. Inspection May 7, 2009
application date application date
4. Date of certificate December 3, 2009 4. Date of certificate October 9, 2009
issuance issuance
5. Inspection (1) September 1, 2009 (Periodical Inspection Start Date) 5. Inspection (1) June 7, 2009 (Periodical Inspection Start Date)
implementation –December 3, 2009 (Periodical Inspection End Date) implementation –October 9, 2009 (Periodical Inspection End Date)
period (2) Deviations from the plan period (2) Deviations from the plan
Due to a delayed activation process caused by the investigation of the failure of the turbine control oil high oil Due to adjustment of the setting value for the characteristic test of the automatic voltage regulator during
pressure pump (B) (overload trip warning issued), the date of startup was changed. activation of the reactor, the date of startup was extended by 1 day.
6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection 6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection
Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment, Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment,
fuel equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal equipment, reactor containment facility, fuel equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal equipment, reactor containment facility,
emergency standby power generation device, and steam turbine emergency standby power generation device, and steam turbine
(2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item (2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item
By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or
confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures, confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures,
inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to
the periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards. the periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards.
(3) Standards used for inspections (3) Standards used for inspections
Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation
Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan
(alteration) approval and notification (alteration) approval and notification
7. Result Good 7. Result Good
8. Related permission items None 8. Related permission items None
9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections 9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections

141
None (Improvements regarding deficiencies in the preparation for inspection)
(2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection Due to a deficiency in the preparation for inspection found during the inspection of the reactor protection
1. Construction work that directly affected the processes in the periodical licensee inspection system interlock function (4th), the interlock did not operate even when an activation signal was simulated.

• Modification of, and associated work on the piping in the residual heat removal system (construction The deficiency was that the control switch of the diesel generator (A) was set to the “Keep pulled (OFF)”
plan approval and submission required) position when it should be set to “Auto.”

• Replacement of, and associated work on the main steam safety relief valves (construction plan approval Though this issue was treated as a nonconformance and the inspection procedures have been revised as a
required) recurrence prevention measure, it is necessary to carry out the preparation for inspection appropriately.

2. Other Since the interlock operated properly when the inspection was carried out again after switching the control
switch of the diesel generator appropriately, it was verified that there were no problems with conformity to the
None technical standards.
(3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work (2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection
1. Total exposure dose: 2.58 person-Sv 1. Construction work that directly affected the processes in the periodical licensee inspection
2. Average dose: 0.65 mSv • Installation of, and associated work on the cooling system piping vent line at reactor isolation
3. Maximum exposure dose: 14.85 mSv (construction plan approval and submission required)
(4) Maintenance plan • Painting of, and associated work on the suppression chamber
According to the notifications of alteration of safety preservation rules dated June 4, 2009 and September 1, 2. Other
2009, as changes to the conventional maintenance plan, the inspection interval was reviewed by evaluating the None
inspection performance to convert the interval to an even number in order to effectively implement the
periodical inspection work and by standardizing the inspection intervals among the licensee and other plants, (3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work
etc.; the inspection interval of the waste disposal equipment was reviewed; the maintenance method was 1. Total exposure dose: 1.10 person-Sv
reviewed by introduction of state-based maintenance, etc.; and state monitoring technologies were introduced. 2. Average dose: 0.29 mSv
3. Maximum exposure dose: 11.26 mSv
(4) Maintenance plan
According to the notifications of alteration of safety preservation rules dated March 13, 2009 and May 21,
2009, as changes to the conventional maintenance plan, the inspection interval was reviewed to match the
improved reliability, which had been accomplished as the facilities were improved; and the maintenance
method was reviewed by introducing state-based maintenance, etc.



1. Applicant Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. (3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work
2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 7, 8th 1. Total exposure dose: 3.35 person-Sv
facilities (2) Output: 1356 MW 2. Average dose: 0.45 mSv
(3) Commissioning Date: July 1997 3. Maximum exposure dose: 15.50 mSv
3. Inspection October 11, 2007 (4) Maintenance plan
application date According to the notifications of alteration of safety preservation rules dated April 8, 2009 and July 23, 2009,
4. Date of certificate December 28, 2009 a maintenance plan with a new inspection system applied was submitted on April 1, 2009, since the plant had
issuance been stopped for a long time as of January 1, 2009. For some special maintenance plans, submission of the
inspection and evaluation plans was directed in accordance with the “Inspection and evaluation plans
5. Inspection (1) November 15, 2007 (Periodical Inspection Start Date) regarding the integrity of the facilities at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station hit by the Niigata
implementation –December 28, 2009 (Periodical Inspection End Date) Chuetsu-Oki Earthquake” (dated November 9, 2007, Heisei 19-11-06, NISA No. 2, NISA-163d-07-3), and the
period (2) Deviations from the plan implementation statuses of those inspections and evaluations were reviewed by the “Facility integrity
evaluation sub-working group in the working group for operation and management of the inspections and
Due to the Niigata Chuetsu-Oki Earthquake of July 16, 2007, the periodical inspection end date was
actions for the nuclear facilities at Chuetsu-Oki Earthquake and for evaluation of the integrity of the facilities”
“undetermined” at the time when the periodical inspection was started.
6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection
Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment,
fuel equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal equipment, reactor containment facility,
emergency standby power generation device, and steam turbine
(2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item
By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or
confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures,
inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to
the periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards.
In addition, responding to the “Our actions to be taken for the data falsification issues at electric power
companies” that was published on February 16, 2007, strict verifications were conducted in regard to the
contents of the periodical licensee inspections and the appropriateness of the inspection equipment.
(3) Standards used for inspections
Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation
Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan
(alteration) approval and notification
7. Result Good

142
8. Related permission items None
9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections
(Improvements regarding deficiencies in the rules for reading of the instrumentation)
During the function test of the reactor core isolation cooling system, the system flow rate, which was used as
the judgment criteria in the inspection, was read incorrectly from the flowmeter (the value of the relevant
flowmeter swings around the flow rate setting value). In addition, appropriate rules were not determined for
the data read method. Since the reading of the relevant instrumentation affects the judgment of the technical
standards, it is necessary to consider the reading method, etc. and organize rules for it.
Furthermore, since the judgment criterion of the system flow rate defined in the inspection procedures (“the
rate shall not fall under XX m3/h”) does not match the setting value of the system flow rate indicator
controller (“XX m3/h”), it is necessary to revise them.
(2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection
1. Construction work that directly affected the processes in the periodical licensee inspection
• Reinforcement of, and associated work on the exhaust pipe earthquake resistance (construction plan
submission required)
• Construction work on earthquake resistance improvements of piping, etc.
2. Other
• Construction work on earthquake resistance improvements of the reactor building roof truss
• Construction work on earthquake resistance improvements of the reactor building ceiling crane
• Construction work on earthquake resistance improvements of the refueling machinery
• Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Request Regarding Pipe Wall Thickness Control at
Nuclear Power Plants” (Heisei 17-02-16, NISA No. 1)
• Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Additional Request Regarding Pipe Wall Thickness
Control at Nuclear Power Plants” (Heisei 19-11-29, NISA No. 3)
• Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Evaluations of and request for inspections regarding
high frequency metal fatigue” (Heisei 19-02-15, NISA No. 2)
• Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Actions taken in response to the bad coupling
condition of the control rod drive mechanism and the control rod of Unit 6 at the Tokyo Electric Power
Company, Limited Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Station” (Heisei 20-09-12, NISA No. 3).
1. Applicant Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc. 1. Applicant Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc.
2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit 3, 16th 2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit 4, 11th
facilities (2) Output: 1100 MW facilities (2) Output: 1,137 MW
(3) Commissioning Date: August 1987 (3) Commissioning Date: September 1993
3. Inspection May 13, 2009 3. Inspection January 23, 2009
application date application date
4. Date of certificate October 30, 2009 4. Date of certificate October 16, 2009
issuance issuance
5. Inspection (1) June 14, 2009 (Periodical Inspection Start Date) 5. Inspection (1) February 25, 2009 (Periodical Inspection Start Date)
implementation –October 30, 2009 (Periodical Inspection End Date) implementation –October 16, 2009 (Periodical Inspection End Date)
period (2) Deviations from the plan period (2) Deviations from the plan
Due to the inspection work on the facility integrity caused by the earthquake in Suruga Bay, inspection work Due to investigation and actions of the reactor manual shutdown caused by an increase of hydrogen
on the main steam isolation valve, replacement work on the main control room activated carbon filter due to concentration in the gaseous waste treatment system (performance deterioration of the exhaust gas
its performance deterioration, and repair work on the feed water system pipe weld defects, the periodical recombinator) and additional inspection of the facility integrity caused by the earthquake in Suruga Bay, the
inspection was extended by 56 days. periodical inspection end date was extended by 134 days.
6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection 6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection
Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment, Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment,
fuel equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal equipment, reactor containment facility, fuel equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal equipment, reactor containment facility,
emergency standby power generation device, and steam turbine emergency standby power generation device, and steam turbine
(2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item (2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item
By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or
confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures, confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures,
inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to
the periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards. the periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards.
(3) Standards used for inspections (3) Standards used for inspections
Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation
Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan
(alteration) approval and notification (alteration) approval and notification
7. Result Good 7. Result Good
8. Related permission items None 8. Related permission items None

143
9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections 9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections
None None
(2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection (2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection
1. Construction work that directly affected the processes in the periodical licensee inspection 1. Construction work that directly affected the processes in the periodical licensee inspection
• Measures to reduce the condensation tank water level (construction plan submission required) • Replacement of, and associated work on the containment atmosphere monitor (hydrogen concentration
• Modification of, and associated work on the pipes in the inert gas system (construction plan submission in the containment) (construction plan approval required)
required) • Replacement of, and associated work on the containment atmosphere monitor (oxygen concentration in
2. Other the containment) (construction plan submission required)

None 2. Other

(3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work None

1. Total exposure dose: 1.69 person-Sv (3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work

2. Average dose: 0.88 mSv 1. Total exposure dose: 0.90 person-Sv

3. Maximum exposure dose: 13.80 mSv 2. Average dose: 0.42 mSv

(4) Maintenance plan 3. Maximum exposure dose: 7.30 mSv

According to the notifications of alteration of safety preservation rules dated March 19, May 27, and June 23,
all 2009, as changes to the conventional maintenance plan, the inspection frequencies of the inspections that
were conducted each time in the periodical inspection and related to the devices to be inspected in the
periodical licensee inspection were reviewed, the maintenance method was changed from corrective
maintenance to time-based maintenance based on the operations results at other power stations, and state
monitoring technologies were introduced, etc.



1. Applicant Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. 1. Applicant Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.
2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Mihama Power Station Unit 1, 24th 2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Takahama Power Station Unit 1, 26th
facilities (2) Output: 340 MW facilities (2) Output: 826 MW
(3) Commissioning Date: November 1970 (3) Commissioning Date: November 1974
3. Inspection July 16, 2009 3. Inspection August 11, 2009
application date application date
4. Date of certificate December 18, 2009 4. Date of certificate December 15, 2009
issuance issuance
5. Inspection (1) August 17, 2009 (Periodical Inspection Start Date) 5. Inspection (1) September 14, 2009 (Periodical Inspection Start Date)
implementation –December 18, 2009 (Periodical Inspection End Date) implementation –December 15, 2009 (Periodical Inspection End Date)
period (2) Deviations from the plan period (2) Deviations from the plan
Due to the investigation on the cause of, and measures regarding the “issuance of the Control Rod Driver None
Power Failure warning, etc.” and “output change during output increase operation of the power generator”
6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection
during the output increase test after start of the inspection, the periodical inspection was extended by 14 days.
Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment,
6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection fuel equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal equipment, reactor containment facility,
Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment, emergency standby power generation device, and steam turbine
fuel equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal equipment, reactor containment facility, (2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item
emergency standby power generation device, and steam turbine
By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or
(2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures,
By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to
confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures, the periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards.
inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to (3) Standards used for inspections
the periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards.
Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation
(3) Standards used for inspections Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan
Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation (alteration) approval and notification
Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan
7. Result Good
(alteration) approval and notification
8. Related permission items None
7. Result Good
9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections
8. Related permission items None
(Insufficient review of inspection implementation methods and inspection procedures)

144
9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections
In this function test of the emergency core cooling system (accumulation injection system), since the pressure
None required to operate the check valve was insufficient and injection to the primary cooling system failed when
(2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection the accumulator outlet valve was fully open, inspection was implemented again after an accurate pressure
1. Construction work that directly affected the processes in the periodical licensee inspection gauge was installed.

• Replacement of, and associated work on the No. 1 and 2 low pressure feed water heaters (Unit B) It is necessary to reflect the knowledge obtained through the re-inspection in the procedures for the next
periodical licensee inspection.
2. Other
(2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection
• Replacement of, and associated work on the primary coolant pump heat shield devices (Unit B)
(construction plan submission required) 1. Construction work that directly affected the processes in the periodical licensee inspection

• Construction work on seismic safety margin improvements (reinforcement of, and associated work on • Modification of, and associated work on the reactor cooling system equipment valve and piping
the support structure) (construction plan approval required)

• Installation of, and associated work on the power generator load switchgear • Replacement of, and associated work on the reactor cooling system equipment piping (construction plan
submission required)
• Replacement of, and associated work on the main transformer breaker
2. Other
(3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work
• Extraction of, and associated work on the reactor irradiation test pieces
1. Total exposure dose: 1.21 person-Sv
• Construction work on seismic safety margin improvements (reinforcement of, and associated work on
2. Average dose: 0.59 mSv the support structure)
3. Maximum exposure dose: 10.13 mSv (3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work
(4) Maintenance plan 1. Total exposure dose: 1.10 person-Sv
According to the notifications of alteration of safety preservation rules dated May 20, 2009, and July 16, 2009, 2. Average dose: 0.46 mSv
as changes to the conventional maintenance plan, inspection implementation frequencies were reviewed to
reflect the failure cases, inspection frequencies were changed based on the study results, etc. related to the 3. Maximum exposure dose: 8.06 mSv
replacement of the devices, and state monitoring technologies were introduced. (4) Maintenance plan
According to the notifications of alteration of safety preservation rules dated June 26, 2009, and August 21,
2009, as changes to the conventional maintenance plan, inspection frequencies were changed based on the
evaluation results of the motor bearing remaining service life, action was taken to thoroughly perform
corrective maintenance based on the importance of each maintenance, and state monitoring technologies were
introduced.
1. Applicant Chugoku Electric Power Co., Inc. 1. Applicant Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc.
2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Shimane Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, 28th 2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Genkai Power Station Unit 3, 12th
facilities (2) Output: 460 MW facilities (2) Output: 1180 MW
(3) Commissioning Date: March 1974 (3) Commissioning Date: March 1994
3. Inspection April 6, 2009 3. Inspection July 29, 2009
application date application date
4. Date of certificate October 9, 2009 4. Date of certificate December 2, 2009
issuance issuance
5. Inspection (1) May 7, 2009 (Periodical Inspection Start Date) 5. Inspection (1) August 30, 2009 (Periodical Inspection Start Date)
implementation –October 9, 2009 (Periodical Inspection End Date) implementation –December 2, 2009 (Periodical Inspection End Date)
period (2) Deviations from the plan period (2) Deviations from the plan
Because the construction work on seismic safety margin improvements had proceeded smoothly, the Due to the extension of the fuel loading process, the date of startup was extended by 13 days and the
inspection period was shortened by 48 days. periodical inspection end date by 13 days.
6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection 6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection
Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment, Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment,
fuel equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal equipment, reactor containment facility, fuel equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal equipment, reactor containment facility,
emergency standby power generation device, and steam turbine emergency standby power generation device, and steam turbine
(2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item (2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item
By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or
confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures, confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures,
inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to
the periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards. the periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards.
(3) Standards used for inspections (3) Standards used for inspections
Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation
Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan
(alteration) approval and notification (alteration) approval and notification
7. Result Good 7. Result Good
8. Related permission items None 8. Related permission items None
9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections 9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections

145
None None
(2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection (2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection
1. Construction work that directly affected the processes in the periodical licensee inspection 1. Construction work that directly affected the processes in the periodical licensee inspection
• Construction work on seismic safety margin improvements • Construction work on Mixed-Oxide Fuel loading (construction plan approval required)
• Refueling and associated work • Replacement of, and associated work on the low pressure No. 4 feed water heater
• Replacement of, and associated work on the control rod driving mechanism 2. Other
• Replacement of, and associated work on the power range instrumentation None
• Replacement of, and associated work on the control rod (3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work
2. Other 1. Total exposure dose: 0.96 person-Sv
• Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Additional Request Regarding Pipe Wall Thickness 2. Average dose: 0.50 mSv
Control at Nuclear Power Plants” (Heisei 19-11-29, NISA No. 3) 3. Maximum exposure dose: 6.26 mSv
(3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work (4) Maintenance plan
1. Total exposure dose: 2.34 person-Sv According to the notifications of alteration of safety preservation rules dated June 3, 2009 and July 28, 2009,
2. Average dose: 1.02 mSv the conventional maintenance plan was changed by reviewing maintenance timings in terms of preventive
3. Maximum exposure dose: 11.25 mSv maintenance based on the deterioration mechanism (by reviewing inspection frequencies for parts in which
deterioration is assumed and extending inspection intervals for parts in which deterioration is not assumed),
(4) Maintenance plan and state monitoring technologies were introduced.
According to the notifications of alteration of safety preservation rules dated February 6, 2009, and April 8,
2009, as changes to the conventional maintenance plan, the inspection interval was reviewed by evaluating
inspection performance, etc. in order to effectively implement periodical inspection work and by standardizing
inspection intervals among the licensee and other plants.



<Fourth Quarter>
1. Applicant Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc. 1. Applicant Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.
2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Higashidori Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, 3rd 2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 4, 23rd
facilities (2) Output: 1,100 MW facilities (2) Output: 784 MW
(3) Commissioning Date: December 2005 (3) Commissioning Date: October 1978
3. Inspection August 11, 2009 3. Inspection August 27, 2009
application date application date
4. Date of certificate January 7, 2010 4. Date of certificate January 8, 2010
issuance issuance
5. Inspection (1) September 12, 2009 (Periodical Inspection Start Date) 5. Inspection (1) September 29, 2009 (Periodical Inspection Start Date)
implementation –January 7, 2010 (Periodical Inspection End Date) implementation –January 8, 2010 (Periodical Inspection End Date)
period (2) Deviations from the plan period (2) Deviations from the plan
None None
6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection 6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection
Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment, Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment, fuel
fuel equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal equipment, reactor containment facility, equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal equipment, reactor containment facility, emergency
emergency standby power generation device, and steam turbine standby power generation device, and steam turbine
(2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item (2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item
By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or
confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures, confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures,
inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to the
the periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards. periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards.
(3) Standards used for inspections (3) Standards used for inspections
Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation
Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan
(alteration) approval and notification (alteration) approval and notification
7. Result Good 7. Result Good
8. Related permission items None 8. Related permission items None
9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections 9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections
None 1. Because the descriptions and the operation methods regarding the correction and traceability of the

146
(2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection instrumentation for the inspection are not standardized in the procedures, etc., it is desirable to organize
them.
1. Construction work that directly affected the processes in the periodical licensee inspection
2. Because the description regarding the accuracy of the instrumentation related to the flow rate during
• Pressure increase of, and associated work on the transformer (construction plan submission required) measurement is not clear, it is desirable to review the description.
2. Other 3. Because the definitions on how to handle the inspection records of the oscillographic recorder after end of
None the inspection are not defined, it is necessary to organize them.
(3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work (2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection
1. Total exposure dose: 0.45 person-Sv 1. Construction work that directly affected the processes in the periodical licensee inspection
2. Average dose: 0.24 mSv • Modification of, and associated work on piping in the residual heat removal system (construction plan
approval required)
3. Maximum exposure dose: 8.27 mSv
2. Other
(4) Maintenance plan
None
According to the notification of alteration of safety preservation rules dated August 14, 2009, the conventional
maintenance plan was changed by altering inspection frequencies to reflect the failure cases. (3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work
1. Total exposure dose: 2.58 person-Sv
2. Average dose: 0.66 mSv
3. Maximum exposure dose: 9.19 mSv
(4) Maintenance plan
According to the notifications of alteration of safety preservation rules dated July 3, September 16, and
December 8, all 2009, as changes to the conventional maintenance plan, the inspection interval was reviewed
by evaluating the inspection performance to convert the interval to an even number in order to effectively
implement periodical inspection work and by standardizing inspection intervals among the licensee and other
plants, etc.; the inspection interval of waste disposal equipment and steam turbine equipment was reviewed;
the maintenance method was reviewed by introduction of state-based maintenance, etc.; and state monitoring
technologies were introduced.
1. Applicant Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. • Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Actions taken in response to the bad coupling
condition of the control rod drive mechanism and the control rod of Unit 6 at the Tokyo Electric Power
2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 6, 8th
Company, Limited Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Station” (Heisei 20-09-12, NISA No. 3)
facilities (2) Output: 1356 MW
(3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work
(3) Commissioning Date: November 1996
1. Total exposure dose: 6.26 person-Sv
3. Inspection April 23, 2007
2. Average dose: 0.70 mSv
application date
3. Maximum exposure dose: 23.64 mSv
4. Date of certificate January 19, 2010
issuance (4) Maintenance plan
5. Inspection (1) May 24, 2007 (Periodical Inspection Start Date) According to the notifications of alteration of safety preservation rules dated April 8, 2009, August 25, 2009,
implementation –January 19, 2010 (Periodical Inspection End Date) and January 15, 2010, a maintenance plan with a new inspection system applied was submitted on April 1,
period 2009, since the plant had been stopped for a long time as of January 1, 2009. For some special maintenance
(2) Deviations from the plan plans, submission of the inspection and evaluation plans was directed in accordance with the “Inspection and
Before the Niigata Chuetsu-Oki Earthquake occurred on July 16, 2007, it was planned to bring forward the evaluation plans regarding the integrity of the facilities at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station hit by
date of startup by 4 days by adjusting the processes and to bring forward the periodical inspection end date by the Niigata Chuetsu-Oki Earthquake” (dated November 9, 2007, Heisei 19-11-06, NISA No. 2, NISA-163d-
1 day. After the earthquake occurred, the plan was altered to “undetermined.” 07-3), and the implementation statuses of those inspections and evaluations were reviewed by the “Facility
integrity evaluation sub-working group in the working group for operation and management of the inspections
6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection
and actions for the nuclear facilities at Chuetsu-Oki Earthquake and for evaluation of the integrity of the
Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment, facilities.”
fuel equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal equipment, reactor containment facility,
emergency standby power generation device, and steam turbine
(2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item
By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or
confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures,
inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to
the periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards.
In addition, responding to the “Our actions to be taken for the data falsification issues at electric power
companies” that was published on February 16, 2007, strict verifications were conducted in regard to the
contents of the periodical licensee inspections and the appropriateness of the inspection equipment.
(3) Standards used for inspections
Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation
Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan
(alteration) approval and notification

147
7. Result Good
8. Related permission items None
9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections
1. Since two types of correction conditions were listed in the instrument specification table for the oscillator
related to the monitoring instruments, it is desirable to review the instrument specification table in order to
prevent unnecessary confusion on the site.
2. Though the inspection procedures regarding checking the setting value of the steam adjustment valve
hydraulic gauge stated that “an inspection director shall check that the tester is within the measurement
range as defined in the inspection instrument records,” it was verified that the inspection instrument
records did not specify the measurement range and a check mark was added to indicate that the contents of
this inspection procedure was checked.
It was confirmed that the licensee appropriately took nonconformity measures, etc. for this case.
(2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection
1. Construction work that directly affected the processes in the periodical licensee inspection
• Reinforcement of, and associated work on the exhaust pipe earthquake resistance (construction plan
submission required)
2. Other
• Construction work on earthquake resistance improvements of the supports such as piping
• Construction work on earthquake resistance improvements of the reactor building roof truss
• Construction work on earthquake resistance improvements of the reactor building ceiling crane
• Construction work on earthquake resistance improvements of the refueling machine
• Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Request Regarding Pipe Wall Thickness Control at
Nuclear Power Plants” (Heisei 17-02-16, NISA No. 1)
• Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Additional Request Regarding Pipe Wall Thickness
Control at Nuclear Power Plants” (Heisei 19-11-29, NISA No. 3)
• Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Inspection of cracks in control rods” (Heisei 18-01-
19, NISA No. 1)
• Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Evaluations of and request for inspections regarding
high frequency metal fatigue” (Heisei 19-02-15, NISA No. 2)



1. Applicant Hokuriku Electric Power Co. 1. Applicant Japan Atomic Power Company Co., Ltd.
2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Shika Nuclear Power Station Unit 2, 2nd 2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Tsuruga Power Station Unit 1, 32nd
facilities (2) Output: 1,206 MW facilities (2) Output: 357 MW
(3) Commissioning Date: March 2006 (3) Commissioning Date: March 1970
3. Inspection June 9, 2009 3. Inspection October 3, 2008
application date application date
4. Date of certificate February 18, 2010 4. Date of certificate January 8, 2010
issuance issuance
5. Inspection (1) July 10, 2009 (Periodical Inspection Start Date) 5. Inspection (1) November 7, 2008 (Periodical Inspection Start Date)
implementation –February 18, 2010 (Periodical Inspection End Date) implementation –January 8, 2010 (Periodical Inspection End Date)
period (2) Deviations from the plan period (2) Deviations from the plan
Because it was confirmed that minute foreign materials were attached to the fuel for which leakage was Due to the review of the processes for construction work on seismic safety margin improvements, the repair of
verified during the second cycle operation, etc., the date of startup was extended by 23 days. the vent valve in the control rod hydraulic system, the repair of the thinning diesel cooling sea water pipes in
In addition, due to investigation of the causes and countermeasures for the leakage of lube oil exhaust from the the high pressure coolant injection system, and the balance adjustment of the steam turbines, etc., the
cylinder indicator valve in the emergency diesel power generator, the period from the date of startup to the periodical inspection end date was extended by 191 days.
periodical inspection end date was extended by 90 days, and due to other actions, the periodical inspection end 6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection
date was extended by 113 days in total.
Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment,
6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection fuel equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal equipment, reactor containment facility,
Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment, emergency standby power generation device, and steam turbine
fuel equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal equipment, reactor containment facility, (2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item
emergency standby power generation device, and steam turbine By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or
(2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures,
By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to
confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures, the periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards.
inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to (3) Standards used for inspections
the periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards. Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation
(3) Standards used for inspections Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan
Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation (alteration) approval and notification
Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan 7. Result Good
(alteration) approval and notification
8. Related permission items None

148
7. Result Good
9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections
8. Related permission items None
None
9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections (2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection
None 1. Construction work that directly affected the processes in the periodical licensee inspection
(2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection • Construction work on seismic safety margin improvements
1. Construction work that directly affected the processes in the periodical licensee inspection 2. Other
• Installation of, and associated work on the reserved reactor coolant recirculation pump (construction • Inspection in accordance with the NISA document, “Additional Requests Regarding Pipe Wall
plan approval required) Thickness Control at Nuclear Power Plants”
• Installation of, and associated work on a spare control rod drive mechanism (construction plan approval (Heisei 19-11-29, NISA No. 3)
required)
(3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work
• Adoption of, and associated work on the replacement fuel (construction plan approval required)
1. Total exposure dose: 5.20 person-Sv
2. Other
2. Average dose: 1.2 mSv
• Inspection to identify the fuel assembly from which radioactive materials were leaked.
3. Maximum exposure dose: 24.08 mSv
• Inspection and cleaning of the inside of the reactor, related to radioactive material leakage from the fuel
assembly
• Investigation of the causes and countermeasures for the leakage of lube oil exhaust during preparation
for the routine test of the emergency diesel power generators
(3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work
1. Total exposure dose: 0.19 person-Sv
2. Average dose: 0.08 mSv
3. Maximum exposure dose: 4.15 mSv
(4) Maintenance plan
According to the notifications of alteration of safety preservation rules dated April 15, July 1, and July 30, all
2009, the conventional maintenance plan was changed by reviewing inspection frequencies as well as by
adding inspection items and altering inspection methods to reflect failure cases.
1. Applicant Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. 1. Applicant Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.
2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Ohi Power Station Unit 1, 23rd 2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Ohi Power Station Unit 3, 14th
facilities (2) Output: 1175 MW facilities (2) Output: 1,180 MW
(3) Commissioning Date: March 1979 (3) Commissioning Date: December 1991
3. Inspection July 17, 2009 3. Inspection September 30, 2009
application date application date
4. Date of certificate January 13, 2010 4. Date of certificate February 19, 2010
issuance issuance
5. Inspection (1) August 20, 2009 (Periodical Inspection Start Date) 5. Inspection (1) October 31, 2009 (Periodical Inspection Start Date)
implementation –January 13, 2010 (Periodical Inspection End Date) implementation –February 19, 2010 (Periodical Inspection End Date)
period (2) Deviations from the plan period (2) Deviations from the plan
Due to investigation of the causes of the temporary increase of the indicator reading of the plant exhaust pipe None
gas monitor, the inspection period was extended by 6 days.
6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection
6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment,
Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment, fuel equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal equipment, reactor containment facility,
fuel equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal equipment, reactor containment facility, emergency standby power generation device, and steam turbine
emergency standby power generation device, and steam turbine (2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item
(2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or
By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures,
confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures, inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to
inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to the periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards.
the periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards. (3) Standards used for inspections
(3) Standards used for inspections Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation
Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan
Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan (alteration) approval and notification
(alteration) approval and notification
7. Result Good
7. Result Good
8. Related permission items None
8. Related permission items None
9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections
9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections None

149
None (2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection
(2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection 1. Construction work that directly affected the processes in the periodical licensee inspection
1. Construction work that directly affected the processes in the periodical licensee inspection • Repair of, and associated work on the reactor vessel outlet pipes (construction plan submission required)
• Replacement of, and associated work on the pressurizer pipes (construction plan approval and • Modification and replacement of, and associated work on the primary coolant circulation system piping,
submission required) etc. (Preventive maintenance work to prevent stress corrosion cracks, etc.) (construction plan approval
• Modification of, and associated work on the reactor protection equipment (construction plan approval and submission required)
required) 2. Other
• Modification of, and associated work on piping in the residual heat removal equipment, etc. • Construction work on seismic safety margin improvements
(construction plan approval required)
(3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work
• Replacement of, and associated work on the piping, etc. in the primary coolant circulation system
(construction plan submission required) 1. Total exposure dose: 1.69 person-Sv
• Modification of, and associated work on the refueling crane (construction plan approval required) 2. Average dose: 0.63 mSv
• Removal of, and associated work on the boric acid thermal regeneration facility, etc. (construction plan 3. Maximum exposure dose: 11.23 mSv
approval required) (4) Maintenance plan
2. Other According to the notifications of alteration of safety preservation rules dated August 7, 2009, and October 22,
• Construction work on seismic safety margin improvements (reinforcement of, and associated work on 2009, as changes to the conventional maintenance plan, the fuel replacement frequency was changed, the
the support structure) inspection frequencies were changed based on data before maintenance and on deterioration trends, action was
taken to thoroughly perform preventive maintenance based on the importance of each maintenance, etc., and
(3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work state monitoring technologies were introduced, etc.
1. Total exposure dose: 8.16 person-Sv
2. Average dose: 2.48 mSv
3. Maximum exposure dose: 14.96 mSv
(4) Maintenance plan
According to the notifications of alteration of safety preservation rules dated May 20, 2009, and August 11,
2009, as changes to the conventional maintenance plan, the fuel replacement frequency was changed, the
inspection frequencies were changed based on the study results, etc. related to replacement of devices, action
was taken to thoroughly perform preventive maintenance based on the importance of each maintenance, etc.,
and state monitoring technologies were introduced, etc.



1. Applicant Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc. 1. Applicant Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc.
2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Ikata Power Station Unit 3, 12th 2. Outline of plant and (1) Name: Genkai Power Station Unit 2, 22nd
facilities (2) Output: 890 MW facilities (2) Output: 559 MW
(3) Commissioning Date: December 1994 (3) Commissioning Date: March 1981
3. Inspection December 7, 2009 3. Inspection August 11, 2009
application date application date
4. Date of certificate March 30, 2010 4. Date of certificate January 8, 2010
issuance issuance
5. Inspection (1) January 7, 2010 (Periodical Inspection Start Date) 5. Inspection (1) September 12, 2009 (Periodical Inspection Start Date)
implementation –March 30, 2010 (Periodical Inspection End Date) implementation –January 8, 2010 (Periodical Inspection End Date)
period (2) Deviations from the plan period (2) Deviations from the plan
Due to identification of the leaked fuel and investigation of the causes of the radioactive material leakage from None
the fuel assembly, the date of startup was delayed by 8 days and the periodical inspection end date was delayed
6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection
by 6 days.
Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment,
6. Outline of inspection (1) Objects of inspection fuel equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal equipment, reactor containment facility,
Reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment, emergency standby power generation device, and steam turbine
fuel equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal equipment, reactor containment facility, (2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item
emergency standby power generation device, and steam turbine
By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or
(2) Contents of the inspection carried out for each item confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures,
By attending the periodical licensee inspections that are implemented by the periodical inspection taker or inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to
confirming the records of the periodical inspection taker, we confirmed the adequacy of the procedures, the periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards.
inspection staff, inspection equipment, inspection content, and inspection results, etc., which are relevant to (3) Standards used for inspections
the periodical licensee inspections, as well as the fact that it meets the technical standards.
Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation
(3) Standards used for inspections Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan
Settings, etc., based on the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation (alteration) approval and notification
Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965), safety preservation rule, application for construction plan
7. Result Good
(alteration) approval and notification
8. Related permission items None
7. Result Good
9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections
8. Related permission items None
None

150
9. Other remarks (1) Observations of periodical licensee inspections
(2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection
None
1. Construction work that directly affected the processes in the periodical licensee inspection
(2) Summary of major renewal activities, etc. carried out during the periodical inspection
• Scheduled maintenance of, and associated work on the pressurizer pipe welds (construction plan
1. Construction work that directly affected the processes in the periodical licensee inspection submission required)
• Construction work on Mixed-Oxide Fuel loading (construction plan approval required) • Replacement of, and associated work on the pressurizer relief lines (construction plan approval and
• Replacement of, and associated work on the containment recirculation sump screens (construction plan submission required)
approval required) • Replacement of, and associated work on the pressurizer spray lines (construction plan approval and
• Inspection related to radioactive material leakage from the fuel assembly submission required)
2. Other • Replacement of, and associated work on the pressurizer auxiliary spray lines, and replacement and
None removal of, and associated work, on the filling lines (construction plan approval and submission
required)
(3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work
2. Other
1. Total exposure dose: 1.13 person-Sv
None
2. Average dose: 0.73 mSv
(3) Exposure doses of workers engaged in radiation work
3. Maximum exposure dose: 11.48 mSv
1. Total exposure dose: 0.89 person-Sv
(4) Maintenance plan
2. Average dose: 0.39 mSv
According to the notifications of alteration of safety preservation rules dated October 7, 2009, December 11,
2009, January 29, 2010, and February 15, 2010, changes to the conventional maintenance plan include 3. Maximum exposure dose: 7.06 mSv
shortening or extension of the inspection frequencies based on the data before maintenance, actions to be taken (4) Maintenance plan
to thoroughly perform preventive maintenance based on expected deterioration cases, and introduction of state According to the notifications of alteration of safety preservation rules dated June 17, 2009, and August 10,
monitoring technologies, including operation of state monitoring technologies, etc. 2009, as changes to the conventional maintenance plan, inspection items related to replacement of devices
were changed and state monitoring technologies were introduced, etc.
1. Applicant Japan Atomic Energy Agency
2. Outline of plant and • Name: Japan Atomic Energy Agency
facilities Fugen Decommissioning Engineering Center
(Commonly known as: Fugen)
• Date of approval of the decommissioning plan: February 12, 2008
• Overall process: Roughly FY2008 to FY2028
Spent fuel transportation period: Roughly FY2008 to FY2013
Disassembly and removal period of the reactor surrounding facilities: Roughly FY2013 to FY2018
Disassembly and removal period of the reactor itself: Roughly FY2018 to FY2027
Disassembly period of the buildings: Roughly FY2027 to FY2028

3. Inspection October 30, 2009


application date
4. Date of certificate March 23, 2010
issuance
5. Inspection December 1, 2009 to March 23, 2010
implementation
period
6. Outline of inspection • Facilities subject to periodical inspection
Those facilities relating to the handling or storage of the nuclear fuel materials from among the following
facilities:
(1) Nuclear fuel material handling facility and storage facility
(2) Radioactive waste disposal facility
(3) Radiation management facility
(4) Emergency power supply facility

7. Result It was confirmed that the facilities subject to periodical inspection conform to the technical standards stipulated in
Article 21-2 of the Rules for the Installation, Operation, etc. of Nuclear Power Reactors in a Research and

151
Development Stage in accordance with Article 29-2 of the Law for the Regulations of Nuclear Source Material,
Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors, as a result of the function test of the emergency power source and the
inspection of the dose equivalent rate and radioactive material concentration, etc. Thus a certificate of conformance
to the facility periodical inspections was issued accordingly.

Radiation worker dose Measurement period: December 1, 2010 to March 23, 2010
during periodical Number of workers: 459 (101 employees and 358 outside workers)
facility inspection
period Measuring instrument: Personal electronic dosimeter
Average dose: 0.14 mSv
Maximum dose: 4.08 mSv
Internal exposure: none



ϫ STATUS OF PERIODICAL SAFETY
MANAGEMENT REVIEWS OF
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS


153
ϫ-1 Outline of Periodical Safety Management Reviews of Nuclear Power Plants

In periodical safety management reviews, the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization conducts
document review (including field reviews using the surprise method), based on the electric technology
rules (JEAC4111 and JEAC4209) of the Japan Electric Association, about an organization, inspection
methods, and process control, etc. for periodical licensee inspection conducted by a licensee in accordance
with Article 55-4 of the Electricity Utilities Industry Law; and the Minister of Economy, Trade and
Industry evaluates the result of the review.
18 applications for periodical safety management reviews were made by March 31, 2010. The review
results are as follows:

Evaluation
No. Target items of review
result
1 Periodical licensee inspection during the 18th periodical inspection of Sendai Nuclear Power A
Station Unit 2.
2 Periodical licensee inspection to be performed during the 15th periodical inspection of Shimane A
Nuclear Power Station Unit 2.
3 Periodical licensee inspection to be performed during the 16th periodical inspection of Tsuruga A
Power Station Unit 2.
4 Periodical licensee inspection to be performed during the 18th periodical inspection of Onagawa A
Nuclear Power Station Unit 1.
5 Periodical licensee inspection during the 22nd periodical inspection of Ohi Power Station Unit 2. A
6 Periodical licensee inspection to be performed during the 25th periodical inspection of Fukushima A
Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 1.
7 Periodical licensee inspection to be performed during the 20th periodical inspection of Fukushima A
Daini Nuclear Power Station Unit 1.
8 Periodical licensee inspection during the 25th periodical inspection of Takahama Power Station A
Unit 2.
9 Periodical licensee inspection to be performed during the 26th periodical inspection of Genkai B
Nuclear Power Station Unit 1.
10 Periodical licensee inspection to be performed during the 21st periodical inspection of Fukushima A
Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 6.
11 Periodical licensee inspection to be performed during the 3rd periodical inspection of Hamaoka A
Nuclear Power Station Unit 5.
12 Periodical licensee inspection during the 21st periodical inspection of Ikata Power Station Unit 2. A
13 Periodical licensee inspection during the 26th periodical inspection of Ikata Power Station Unit 1. A
14 Periodical licensee inspection to be performed during the 5th periodical inspection of Onagawa B
Nuclear Power Station Unit 3.
15 Periodical licensee inspection to be performed during the 23rd periodical inspection of Fukushima A
Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 3.
16 Periodical licensee inspection to be performed during the 11th periodical inspection of Hamaoka A
Nuclear Power Station Unit 4.
17 Periodical licensee inspection to be performed during the 10th periodical inspection of Onagawa A
Nuclear Power Station Unit 2.
18 Periodical licensee inspection to be performed during the 32nd periodical inspection of Tsuruga A
Power Station Unit 1.


155
The evaluation criteria, etc. are as follows:
(Review Items)
(1) Items based on the Electricity Utilities Industry Law, Articles 55-5
- Organizations relating to the periodical licensee inspection
- Inspection methods
- Process control
(2) Items specified in Article 73-8, which applies in Article 94-7-1 of the Rules for the Enforcement of
the Electric Utilities Industry Law.
- Items relating to management of a licensee if the licensee cooperates with us during the inspection
- Items relating to the management of the inspection records
- Items relating to education and training regarding the inspection

(Criteria that can be applied when appropriateness of the review items is assessed)
(1) Criteria relating to quality assurance
Electrical technology rules of the Japan Electric Association, “Nuclear Power Generating Facilities
Safety Quality Assurance Regulation” (JEAC4111-2003)
(2) Criteria relating to maintenance management
Electrical technology rules of the Japan Electric Association, “Code for Maintenance at Nuclear
Power Plants” (JEAC4209-2003 and JEAC4209-2007)
(3) Concerning the Interpretation of the Nuclear Power Station Periodical Licensee Inspection (Heisei
17.12.20, GenIn No. 11, Heisei 20.12.22 Gen No. 4)

(Review)
A: The periodical licensee’s inspection system of an organization examined and evaluated by a safety
review is capable of conducting periodical licensee’s inspections by a proper, self-sustaining system.
B: Although some improvements must be made in the periodical licensee's inspection system of an
organization examined and evaluated by a safety review, the periodical licensee's inspection system
is capable of conducting periodical licensee's inspections properly and autonomously.
C: Substantial improvements must be made in the periodical licensee’s inspection system of an
organization examined and evaluated by a safety review before the periodical licensee’s inspection
system becomes capable of conducting periodical licensee’s inspections by a proper, self-sustaining
system.

156
ϫ-2 Status of Periodical Safety Management Reviews of Nuclear Power Plants

<First Quarter>
1. Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc. 2. The Chugoku Electric Power Co., Inc.
Applicant for Toshio Manabe, President, Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc. Applicant for Takashi Yamashita, President and Director, The Chugoku Electric Power Co., Inc.
periodical safety (Date of application: October 21, 2008, application No.: GenHatsuHon 244) periodical safety (Date of application: August 6, 2008, application No.: DenGenSetsu 36)
management management
review review
Target items of Periodical licensee inspection during the 18th periodical inspection of Sendai Nuclear Target items of Periodical licensee inspection to be performed during the 15th periodical inspection of
review Power Station Unit 2 review Shimane Nuclear Power Station Unit 2
Periodical safety 1. Period of review Periodical safety 1. Period of review
management November 20, 2008 to April 24, 2009 management August 26, 2008 to May 15, 2009
review (Japan 2. Notification date of periodical safety management review results review (Japan 2. Notification date of periodical safety management review results
Nuclear Energy April 24, 2009 (Notification No. 08, KenKeiJuAn-0078) Nuclear Energy May 15, 2009 (Notification No. 08, KenKeiJuAn-0050)
Safety 3. Outline of review results Safety 3. Outline of review results
Organization) According to the notification of the periodical safety management review results, Organization) According to the notification of the periodical safety management review results,
which was submitted on April 24, 2009, by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety which was submitted on May 15, 2009, by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety
Organization to the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the subsequent Organization to the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the subsequent
explanation given by the Organization, no matters that were considered as serious explanation given by the Organization, no matters that were considered as serious
nonconformities and no matters that were considered to require improvement were found nonconformities and no matters that were considered to require improvement were found
as a result of review of the periodical licensee inspection of this Unit. as a result of review of the periodical licensee inspection of this Unit. It was also verified
In addition, since this power plant revised the Nonconformance Management that the corrective action was conducted properly for the items that were considered to
Standards last year to improve the scope of nonconformance management and judgment, require follow-up in the previous reviewed unit, and that this plant is actively involved in
finely categorize nonconforming events and their causes, and define the processing recurrence prevention measures for nonconformance by conducting activities such as
categories according to the details of the nonconformance, it was verified that the education regarding nonconformance pointed out in past inspections and
periodical licensee inspection was improved and managed properly. nonconformance events in the other plants, etc. Further, it was verified that the plant
Considering this situation, it is assessed that the quality management system for

157
sincerely accepted the comments, etc. from the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety
periodical licensee inspections in this plant is functioning without problems, and that Organization and was actively conducting activities for continuous improvements by
periodical licensee inspections are being performed properly and autonomously. reviewing the related regulations accordingly, etc.
4. Review items Considering this situation, it is assessed that the quality management system for
Document reviews and on-site reviews were conducted to verify the status of 10 items periodical licensee inspections in this plant is functioning without problems, and that
((1) monitoring function inspection of the instrumentation and control system, (2)
periodical licensee inspections are being performed properly and autonomously.
inspection of the heat exchangers in the secondary system, (3) check and inspection of
the integrity of the stoppage control circuits of the reactor, etc.) 4. Review items
Evaluation 1. Evaluation result: A Document reviews and on-site reviews were conducted to verify the status of 13 items
(Nuclear and ((1) performance inspection of the reactor purification system pump, (2) performance
2. Notification of evaluation
Industrial Safety inspection of the emergency gas treatment system filter, (3) inspection of the reactor
July 10, 2009 (Notification No. Heisei 21.04.27 Gen 5)
Agency) cooling system containers (heat exchangers), etc.)
3. Reasons for evaluation (results and grounds)
The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency carefully examined the review results based Evaluation 1. Evaluation result: A
on the notification of the results of a periodical safety management review and related (Nuclear and 2. Notification of evaluation
explanations given by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization. The Agency Industrial Safety July 10, 2009 (Notification No. Heisei 21.05.15 Gen 17)
considered that the license holder has the capability to perform appropriate periodical Agency) 3. Reasons for evaluation (results and grounds)
licensee inspections for the said reactor properly and autonomously. The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency carefully examined the review results based
4. State of holding evaluation committee meetings on the notification of the results of a periodical safety management review and related
Explanation of, and hearings into the review results and Q&A on May 14, 2009 explanations given by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization. The Agency
Review of evaluation on May 28, 2009 considered that the license holder has the capability to perform appropriate periodical
5. Special notes concerning the evaluation licensee inspections for the said reactor properly and autonomously.
None 4. State of holding evaluation committee meetings
Explanation of, and hearings into the review results and Q&A on May 28, 2009
Others
Review of evaluation on June 18, 2009
5. Special notes concerning the evaluation
None
Others



3. The Japan Atomic Power Company 4. Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.
Applicant for Yukinori Ichida, President, Japan Atomic Power Company Applicant for Hiroaki Takahashi, Representative Director and President, Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.
periodical safety (Date of application: June 29, 2007, application No.: HatsuShitsuHatsu 174) periodical safety (Date of application: January 11, 2008, application No.: TohokuDenGenUn 103)
management management
review review
Target items of Periodical licensee inspection to be performed during the 16th periodical inspection of Target items of Periodical licensee inspection to be performed during the 18th periodical inspection of
review Tsuruga Power Station Unit 2 review Onagawa Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
Periodical safety 1. Period of review Periodical safety 1. Period of review
management July 17, 2009 to April 13, 2009 management January 29, 2008 to June 1, 2009
review (Japan 2. Notification date of periodical safety management review results review (Japan 2. Notification date of periodical safety management review results
Nuclear Energy April 13, 2009 (Notification No. 07, KenKeiJuAn-0043) Nuclear Energy June 1, 2009 (Notification No. 07, KenKeiJuAn-0111)
Safety 3. Outline of review results Safety 3. Outline of review results
Organization) According to the notification of the periodical safety management review results, Organization) According to the notification of the periodical safety management review results,
which was submitted on April 13, 2009 by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety which was submitted on June 1, 2009, by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization
Organization to the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the subsequent to the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the subsequent explanation given by
explanation given by the Organization, no matters that were considered as serious the Organization, no matters that were considered as serious nonconformities and no
nonconformities and no matters that were considered to require improvement were found matters that were considered to require improvement were found as a result of review of
as a result of review of the periodical licensee inspection of this Unit. In addition, as a the periodical licensee inspection of this Unit. It was also verified that the corrective
result of the strict inspection during the Special Inspection such as inspection tours, it action was conducted securely for items that were considered to require follow-up in the
was verified that the relevant periodical licensee inspection was conducted according to previous reviewed unit, and that autonomous improvement to the quality management
the action plan defined by the Japan Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, and that system was being continuously conducted.
corrective action was conducted securely for items that were considered to require Considering this situation, it is assessed that the quality management system for
follow-up in the previous reviewed unit. periodical licensee inspections in this plant is functioning without problems, and that
Considering this situation, it is assessed that the quality management system for periodical licensee inspections are being performed properly and autonomously.
periodical licensee inspections in this plant is functioning without problems, and that 4. Review items
periodical licensee inspections are being performed properly and autonomously. Document reviews and on-site reviews were conducted to check on the status of 13

158
4. Review items items ((1) special in-service inspection of the class 1 equipment, (2) inspection of the
Document reviews and on-site reviews were conducted to verify the status of 12 items high-pressure coolant injection system, (3) inspection of the safety valve, etc.)
((1) overhaul inspection of the primary system pump (during shut down), (2) inspection Evaluation 1. Evaluation result: A
of the primary system valve (overhaul inspection), (3) reactor internal facilities (Nuclear and 2. Notification of evaluation
inspection, etc.) Industrial Safety August 12, 2009 (Notification No. Heisei 21.06.01 Gen 22)
Evaluation 1. Evaluation result: A Agency) 3. Reasons for evaluation (results and grounds)
(Nuclear and 2. Notification of evaluation The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency carefully examined the review results based
Industrial Safety July 10, 2009 (Notification No. Heisei 21.04.13 Gen 20) on the notification of the results of a periodical safety management review and related
Agency) 3. Reasons for evaluation (results and grounds) explanations given by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization. The Agency
The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency carefully examined the review results based considered that the license holder has the capability to perform appropriate periodical
on the notification of the results of a periodical safety management review and related licensee inspections for the said reactor properly and autonomously.
explanations given by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization. The Agency 4. State of holding evaluation committee meetings
considered that the license holder has the capability to perform appropriate periodical Explanation of, and hearings into the review results and Q&A on June 18, 2009
licensee inspections for the said reactor properly and autonomously. Review of evaluation on July 9, 2009
4. State of holding evaluation committee meetings 5. Special notes concerning the evaluation
Explanation of, and hearings into the review results and Q&A on May 14, 2009 None
Review of evaluation on June 18, 2009
Others
5. Special notes concerning the evaluation
None
Others
5. The Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. 6. Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.
Applicant for Shosuke Mori, President and Director, The Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. Applicant for Masataka Shimizu, President, Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.
periodical safety (Date of application: December 25, 2008, application No.: KanGenHatsu 527) periodical safety (Date of application: September 17, 2008, application No.: SouKanHatsu 197)
management management
review review
Target items of Periodical licensee inspection during the 22nd periodical inspection of Ohi Power Station Target items of Periodical licensee inspection during the 25th periodical inspection of Fukushima Daiichi
review Unit 2 review Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
Periodical safety 1. Period of review Periodical safety 1. Period of review
management January 19, 2009 to June 19, 2009 management October 1, 2008 to June 19, 2009
review (Japan 2. Notification date of periodical safety management review results review (Japan 2. Notification date of periodical safety management review results
Nuclear Energy June 19, 2009 (Notification No. 08, KenKeiJuAn-0094) Nuclear Energy June 19, 2009 (Notification No. 08, KenKeiJuAn-0067)
Safety 3. Outline of review results Safety 3. Outline of review results
Organization) According to the notification of the periodical safety management review results, Organization) According to the notification of the periodical safety management review results,
which was submitted on June 19, 2009, by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety which was submitted on June 19, 2009 by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization
Organization to the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the subsequent to the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the subsequent explanation given by
explanation given by the Organization, no matters that were considered as serious the Organization, no matters that were considered as serious nonconformity were found
nonconformities and no matters that were considered to require improvement were found as a result of review of the periodical licensee inspection of this Unit. Though one item
as a result of review of the periodical licensee inspection of this Unit. It was also verified considered to require improvement was found in the inspection relating to the
that maintenance management relating to the periodical licensee inspection was “inspection method,” it was considered that the PDCA cycle for safety and quality
conducted properly by considering the safety prevention policies and the inspection plan improvements was implemented because completion of the corrective action for this
based on the problems that occurred during the operation of this unit, etc. item was confirmed during the inspection of this review period.
Considering this situation, it is assessed that the quality management system for Considering this situation, it is assessed that the quality management system for
periodical licensee inspections in this plant is functioning without problems, and that periodical licensee inspections in this plant is generally functioning without problems,
periodical licensee inspections are being performed properly and autonomously. and that periodical licensee inspections are being performed properly and autonomously.
4. Review items 4. Review items
Document reviews and on-site reviews were conducted to verify the status of 12 items Document reviews and on-site reviews were conducted to verify the status of 13 items

159
((1) inspection of the ventilation and air-conditioning equipment in the primary system, ((1) inspection of the emergency gas processing system equipment, (2) inspection of the
(2) inspection of the heat exchangers in the primary system, (3) inspection of the interlock functions of the liquid waste storage and treatment facilities, (3) integrity check
secondary system piping, etc.) inspection of the stainless steel piping, etc.).
Evaluation 1. Evaluation result: A Evaluation 1. Evaluation result: A
(Nuclear and 2. Notification of evaluation (Nuclear and 2. Notification of evaluation
Industrial Safety August 12, 2009 (Notification No. Heisei 21.06.19 Gen 28) Industrial Safety August 12, 2009 (Notification No. Heisei 21.06.19 Gen 26)
Agency) 3. Reasons for evaluation (results and grounds) Agency) 3. Reasons for evaluation (results and grounds)
The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency carefully examined the review results based The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency carefully examined the review results based
on the notification of the results of a periodical safety management review and related on the notification of the results of a periodical safety management review and related
explanations given by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization. The Agency explanations given by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization. The Agency
considered that the license holder has the capability to perform appropriate periodical considered that the license holder has the capability to perform appropriate periodical
licensee inspections for the said reactor properly and autonomously. licensee inspections for the said reactor properly and autonomously.
4. State of holding evaluation committee meetings 4. State of holding evaluation committee meetings
Explanation of, and hearings into the review results and Q&A on July 9, 2009 Explanation of, and hearings into the review results and Q&A on July 9, 2009
Review of evaluation on July 31, 2009 Review of evaluation on July 31, 2009
5. Special notes concerning the evaluation 5. Special notes concerning the evaluation
None None
Others Others



<Second Quarter>
7. Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. 8. The Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.
Applicant for Masataka Shimizu, President, Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. Applicant for Shosuke Mori, President and Director, The Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.
periodical safety (Date of application: January 16, 2009, application No.: SouKanHatsu 20-288) periodical safety (Date of application: January 22, 2009, application No.: KanGenHatsu 549)
management management
review review
Target items of Periodical licensee inspection to be performed during the 20th periodical inspection of Target items of Periodical licensee inspection during the 25th periodical inspection of Takahama Power
review Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 review Station Unit 2
Periodical safety 1. Period of review Periodical safety 1. Period of review
management January 28, 2009 to June 26, 2009 management February 16, 2009 to July 3, 2009
review (Japan 2. Notification date of periodical safety management review results review (Japan 2. Notification date of periodical safety management review results
Nuclear Energy June 26, 2009 (Notification No. 08, KenKeiJuAn-0101) Nuclear Energy July 3, 2009 (Notification No. 08, KenKeiJuAn-0109)
Safety 3. Outline of review results Safety 3. Outline of review results
Organization) According to the notification of the periodical safety management review results, Organization) According to the notification of the periodical safety management review results,
which was submitted on June 26, 2009, by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety which was submitted on July 3, 2009 by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization
Organization to the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the subsequent to the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the subsequent explanation given by
explanation given by the Organization, no matters that were considered as serious the Organization, no matters that were considered as serious nonconformities and no
nonconformities and no matters that were considered to require improvement were found matters that were considered to require improvement were found as a result of review of
as a result of review of the periodical licensee inspection of this Unit. It was also verified the periodical licensee inspection of this Unit.
that improvement activities for the PDCA cycle were being continuously conducted in In addition, it was verified that along with introduction of the new inspection system,
this plant by holding the nonconformity management committee on a daily basis to the plant was also working actively to conduct new improvement activities relating to the
thoroughly implement nonconformance management and feedback activities for periodical licensee inspections by revising regulations related to the periodical licensee
nonconformance found during the periodical licensee inspection. inspection such as the “rules for maintenance activities” and “rules for conducting the
Considering this situation, it is assessed that the quality management system for periodical licensee inspection” and by starting to implement them from this unit.
periodical licensee inspections in this plant is functioning without problems, and that Considering this, it is assessed that a system to repeat the PDCA cycle to ensure safety
periodical licensee inspections are being performed properly and autonomously. has been established in this plant, and that periodical licensee inspections are being
4. Review items performed properly and autonomously.

160
Document reviews and on-site reviews were conducted to verify the status of 11 items 4. Review items
((1) inspection of the field monitor functions, (2) inspection of the feed water and Document reviews and on-site reviews were conducted to verify the status of 10 items
condensate system containers, (3) inspection of the control rod hydraulic system ((1) inspection of the locking cams of the refueling crane, etc. during the inspection for
facilities, etc.). aging problems, (2) inspection of the functions of the area process monitor, (3)
Evaluation 1. Evaluation result: A inspection of the functions of the spent fuel pit installations, etc.)
(Nuclear and 2. Notification of evaluation Evaluation 1. Evaluation result: A
Industrial Safety August 12, 2009 (Notification No. Heisei 21.06.26 Gen 27) (Nuclear and 2. Notification of evaluation
Agency) 3. Reasons for evaluation (results and grounds) Industrial Safety November 17, 2009 (Notification No. Heisei 21.07.03 Gen 16)
The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency carefully examined the review results based Agency) 3. Reasons for evaluation (results and grounds)
on the notification of the results of a periodical safety management review and related The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency carefully examined the review results based
explanations given by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization. The Agency on the notification of the results of a periodical safety management review and related
considered that the license holder has the capability to perform appropriate periodical explanations given by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization. The Agency
licensee inspections for the said reactor properly and autonomously. considered that the license holder has the capability to perform appropriate periodical
4. State of holding evaluation committee meetings licensee inspections for the said reactor properly and autonomously.
Explanation of, and hearings into the review results and Q&A on July 9, 2009 4. State of holding evaluation committee meetings
Review of evaluation on July 31, 2009 Explanation of, and hearings into the review results and Q&A on July 31, 2009
5. Special notes concerning the evaluation Review of evaluation on August 28, 2009
None 5. Special notes concerning the evaluation
Others None
Others
9. Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc. 10. Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.
Applicant for Toshio Manabe, President, Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc. Applicant for Masataka Shimizu, President, Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.
periodical safety (Date of application: February 23, 2009, application No.: GenHatsuHon 407) periodical safety (Date of application: February 9, 2009, application No.: SouKanHatsu 20-316)
management management
review review
Target items of Periodical licensee inspection to be performed during the 26th periodical inspection of Target items of Periodical licensee inspection to be performed during the 21st periodical inspection of
review Genkai Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 review Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 6
Periodical safety 1. Period of review Periodical safety 1. Period of review
management March 23, 2009 to August 3, 2009 management February 27, 2009 to August 14, 2009
review (Japan 2. Notification date of periodical safety management review results review (Japan 2. Notification date of periodical safety management review results
Nuclear Energy August 3, 2009 (Notification No. 08, KenKeiJuAn-0116) Nuclear Energy August 14, 2009 (Notification No. 08, KenKeiJuAn-0112)
Safety 3. Outline of review results Safety 3. Outline of review results
Organization) According to the notification of the periodical safety management review results, Organization) According to the notification of the periodical safety management review results,
which was submitted on August 3, 2009 by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety which was submitted on August 14, 2009, by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety
Organization to the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the subsequent Organization to the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the subsequent
explanation given by the Organization, no matters that were considered as serious explanation given by the Organization, no matters that were considered as serious
nonconformity were found as a result of review of the periodical licensee inspection of nonconformities and no matters that were considered to require improvement were found
this Unit. as a result of review of the periodical licensee inspection of this Unit. Also in this review
However, though the corrective actions for preparation of the inspection procedures, it was verified that the periodical licensee inspection was planned and conducted based
which were found as a nonconformance during the previous inspection, had been on a maintenance plan that reflected the follow-up from the previous periodical
completed, it was verified that part of them had not been reflected to the individual inspection work and the “reflected item list,” etc. as a result of the improvement
procedures, the target item of this review. The Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization activities to the periodical licensee inspection.
will follow up on the implementation status of those corrective actions. Considering this situation, it is assessed that the quality management system for
Considering this situation, it is considered that the quality management system for periodical licensee inspections in this plant is functioning without problems, and that
periodical licensee inspections in this plant is functioning without problems, and that periodical licensee inspections are being performed properly and autonomously.
periodical licensee inspections are generally being performed properly and 4. Review items

161
autonomously. Document reviews and on-site reviews were conducted to verify the status of 11 items
4. Review items ((1) inspection to confirm the soundness of monitor functions, (2) inspection of the
Document reviews and on-site reviews were conducted to verify the status of 10 items emergency standby power supply equipment, (3) inspection of the feed water and
((1) overhaul inspection of the primary system pump, (2) inspection of the primary condensate system containers, etc.).
system safety valve, (3) inspection of the functions of the radiation monitoring system, Evaluation 1. Evaluation result: A
etc.) (Nuclear and 2. Notification of evaluation
Evaluation 1. Evaluation result: B Industrial Safety November 17, 2009 (Notification No. Heisei 21.08.14 Gen 8)
(Nuclear and 2. Notification of evaluation Agency) 3. Reasons for evaluation (results and grounds)
Industrial Safety November 17, 2009 (Notification No. Heisei 21.08.03 Gen 14) The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency carefully examined the review results based
Agency) 3. Reasons for evaluation (results and grounds) on the notification of the results of a periodical safety management review and related
As a result of close examination of the review results based on the notification and the explanations given by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization. The Agency
explanation given by the Organization, the Agency concluded that the state of considered that the license holder has the capability to perform appropriate periodical
improvement should be examined continuously for the one matter that was considered to licensee inspections for the said reactor properly and autonomously.
require improvement and for which the result of implementation of corrective action 4. State of holding evaluation committee meetings
could not be verified. The Agency therefore decided that although there are some minor Explanation of, and hearings into the review results and Q&A on September 8, 2009
areas of nonconformance to be rectified, the licensee has the capability to perform Review of evaluation on September 30, 2009
appropriate periodical licensee inspections for the said reactor properly and 5. Special notes concerning the evaluation
autonomously. None
4. State of holding evaluation committee meetings Others
Explanation of, and hearings into the review results and Q&A on August 28, 2009
Review of evaluation on September 8, 2009
5. Special notes concerning the evaluation
None
Others



11. Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc. 12. Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc.
Applicant for Toshio Mita, President, Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc. Applicant for Akira Chiba, President and Director, Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc.
periodical safety (Date of application: December 25, 2008, application No.: KanGenHatsu 527) periodical safety (Date of application: January 22, 2009, application No.: GenHatsuHon 08226)
management management
review review
Target items of Periodical licensee inspection to be performed during the 3rd periodical inspection of Target items of Periodical licensee inspection during the 21st periodical inspection of Ikata Power Station
review Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit 5 review Unit 2
Periodical safety 1. Period of review Periodical safety 1. Period of review
management August 26, 2008 to August 28, 2009 management February 17, 2009 to August 28, 2009
review (Japan 2. Notification date of periodical safety management review results review (Japan 2. Notification date of periodical safety management review results
Nuclear Energy August 28, 2009 (Notification No. 08, KenKeiJuAn-0052) Nuclear Energy August 28, 2009 (Notification No. 08, KenKeiJuAn-0108)
Safety 3. Outline of review results Safety 3. Outline of review results
Organization) According to the notification of the periodical safety management review results, Organization) According to the notification of the periodical safety management review results,
which was submitted on August 28, 2009, by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety which was submitted on August 28, 2009, by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety
Organization to the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the subsequent Organization to the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the subsequent
explanation given by the Organization, one matter that was considered to require explanation given by the Organization, no matters that were considered as serious
improvement (incorrect judgment standards of the inspection procedures caused by nonconformities and no matters that were considered to require improvement were found
improperly revised “inspection plan management standards” relating to the judgment as a result of review of the periodical licensee inspection of this Unit. Also, efforts of the
criteria of the “inspection of the auxiliary boiler loads”) was found as a result of the licensee for continuous improvement of the safety management system was verified
document review and on-site review of the periodical licensee inspection of this Unit, because they promptly took nonconformance actions and corrective measures by
although no matters that were considered as serious nonconformities were found. It was reflecting in this unit nonconformance related to incorrect contents of the inspection
verified that the corrective measures such as reflection in the “policy handling guide,” procedures found in other units.
etc. of instructions to create a change list, etc. in advance; and get confirmation of the Considering this situation, it is assessed that the quality management system for
department manager before revising the list were taken appropriately. periodical licensee inspections in this plant is functioning without problems, and that
Considering this situation, it is assessed that the quality management system for periodical licensee inspections are being performed properly and autonomously.
periodical licensee inspections in this plant is functioning without problems, and that 4. Review items

162
periodical licensee inspections are generally being performed properly and Document review and on-site reviews were conducted to verify the status of 10 items
autonomously. ((1) inspection of the secondary system piping, (2) inspection of the control rod cluster,
4. Review items (3) inspection of the heat exchangers in the secondary system, etc.)
Document reviews and on-site reviews were conducted to verify the status of 13 items Evaluation 1. Evaluation result: A
((1) inspection of the piping, (2) inspection of the safety valves (reactor facility), (3) (Nuclear and 2. Notification of evaluation
inspection of the emergency gas treatment system facilities (electrical equipment), etc.). Industrial Safety November 17, 2009 (Notification No. Heisei 21.08.28 Gen 54)
Evaluation 1. Evaluation result: A Agency) 3. Reasons for evaluation (results and grounds)
(Nuclear and 2. Notification of evaluation The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency carefully examined the review results based
Industrial Safety November 17, 2009 (Notification No. Heisei 21.08.28 Gen 53) on the notification of the results of a periodical safety management review and related
Agency) 3. Reasons for evaluation (results and grounds) explanations given by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization. The Agency
The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency carefully examined the review results based considered that the license holder has the capability to perform appropriate periodical
on the notification of the results of a periodical safety management review and related licensee inspections for the said reactor properly and autonomously.
explanations given by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization. The Agency 4. State of holding evaluation committee meetings
considered that the license holder has the capability to perform appropriate periodical Explanation of, and hearings into the review results and Q&A on September 30, 2009
licensee inspections for the said reactor properly and autonomously. Review of evaluation on October 15, 2009
4. State of holding evaluation committee meetings 5. Special notes concerning the evaluation
Explanation of, and hearings into the review results and Q&A on September 30, 2009 None
Review of evaluation on October 15, 2009 Others
5. Special notes concerning the evaluation
None
Others
13. Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc. 14. Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.
Applicant for Akira Chiba, President and Director, Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc. Applicant for Hiroaki Takahashi, Representative Director and President, Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.
periodical safety (Date of application: January 22, 2009, application No.: GenshiryokuHatsu 08224) periodical safety (Date of application: October 23, 2008, application No.: TohokuDenGenUn 62)
management management
review review
Target items of Periodical licensee inspection during the 26th periodical inspection of Ikata Power Station Target items of Periodical licensee inspection to be performed during the 5th periodical inspection of
review Unit 1 review Onagawa Nuclear Power Station Unit 3
Periodical safety 1. Period of review Periodical safety 1. Period of review
management February 17, 2009 to September 4, 2009 management November 10, 2008 to September 18, 2009
review (Japan 2. Notification date of periodical safety management review results review (Japan 2. Notification date of periodical safety management review results
Nuclear Energy September 4, 2009 (Notification No. 08, KenKeiJuAn-0107) Nuclear Energy September 18, 2009 (Notification No. 08, KenKeiJuAn-0079)
Safety 3. Outline of review results Safety 3. Outline of review results
Organization) According to the notification of the results of periodical safety management reviews Organization) According to the notification of the periodical safety management review results,
that was submitted by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization to the Minister of which was submitted on September 18, 2009, by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety
Economy, Trade and Industry on September 4, 2009, and subsequent explanations given Organization to the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the subsequent
by the Organization, the periodical licensee inspection system for the said reactor was explanation given by the Organization, no matters that were considered as serious
reviewed, and one item that requires improvement was found during the document nonconformities were found as a result of review of the periodical licensee inspection of
reviews and on-site reviews but no serious nonconformity was found. For the one item this Unit. However, a nonconformance event, in which the auxiliary boiler (A) had been
that was considered to require improvement, which was relating to the safety protection operated longer than the standard operation time between periodical licensee inspections,
system involved in the replacement work of the central control panel, etc. to digital was found in this plant. Considering the fact that the periodical licensee inspection of
panels and the definitions of the inspection procedures, it was verified that corrective this boiler was not conducted at the proper timing, the Japan Nuclear and Industrial
measures were taken properly by reviewing part of the inspection, revising the rules, Agency confirmed during the review that identification of the root cause and recurrence
thoroughly notifying them to related parties, and adding this case in a textbook for preventive measures were being considered as follow-ups to the relevant nonconformity
educational use, etc. event.
Considering this situation, it is assessed that the quality management system for Considering this situation, it is assessed that the quality management system for
periodical licensee inspections in this plant is functioning without problems, and that periodical licensee inspections in this plant is functioning without problems, and that

163
periodical licensee inspections are generally being performed properly and periodical licensee inspections are generally being performed properly and
autonomously. autonomously.
4. Review items 4. Review items
Document reviews and on-site reviews were conducted to verify the status of 10 items Document reviews and on-site reviews were conducted to verify the status of 13 items
((1) inspection of the fuel handling system, (2) inspection of the functions of the area ((1) overhaul inspection of the vacuum break valve of the containment vessel, (2)
process monitor, (3) inspection of the inverter functions, etc.) inspection of the main valves (reactor facility), (3) inspection of the emergency gas
Evaluation 1. Evaluation result: A treatment system facilities (electrical equipment), etc.).
(Nuclear and 2. Notification of evaluation Evaluation 1. Evaluation result: B
Industrial Safety November 30, 2009 (Notification No. Heisei 21.09.04 Gen 11) (Nuclear and 2. Notification of evaluation
Agency) 3. Reasons for evaluation (results and grounds) Industrial Safety November 30, 2009 (Notification No. Heisei 21.09.25 Gen 3)
The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency carefully examined the review results based Agency) 3. Reasons for evaluation (results and grounds)
on the notification of the results of a periodical safety management review and related Since this nonconformance event was that the safety checks and application
explanations given by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization. The Agency procedures which should be conducted according to the law had not been conducted, the
considered that the license holder has the capability to perform appropriate periodical Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency considered that the status of improvements and
licensee inspections for the said reactor properly and autonomously. activities in this case require continuous surveillance, based on a separate report
4. State of holding evaluation committee meetings regarding the root cause of the nonconformance event, and that the license holder has the
Explanation of, and hearings into the review results and Q&A on September 30, 2009 capability to perform appropriate periodical licensee inspections autonomously, although
Review of evaluation on October 15, 2009 there are some points in the system to be improved for the reactor.
5. Special notes concerning the evaluation 4. State of holding evaluation committee meetings
None Explanation and hearings into the review results and Q&A on October 15, 2009
Others Review of evaluation on November 5, 2009
5. Special notes concerning the evaluation
None
Others



<Third Quarter>
15. Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. 16. Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc.
Applicant for Masataka Shimizu, President, Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. Applicant for Toshio Mita, President, Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc.
periodical safety (Date of application: Jan. 22, 2009, application No.: SouKanHatsu 20-286) periodical safety (Date of application: January 23, 2009, application No.: HonHatsuGenHatsu 85)
management management
review review
Target items of Periodical licensee inspection during the 23rd periodical inspection of Fukushima Daiichi Target items of Periodical licensee inspection to be performed during the 11th periodical inspection of
review Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 review Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit 4
Periodical safety 1. Period of review Periodical safety 1. Period of review
management February 10, 2009 to September 28, 2009 management February 13, 2009 to November 16, 2009
review (Japan 2. Notification date of periodical safety management review results review (Japan 2. Notification date of periodical safety management review results
Nuclear Energy September 28, 2009 (Notification No. 08, KenKeiJuAn-0106) Nuclear Energy November 16, 2009 (Notification No. 08, KenKeiJuAn-0110)
Safety 3. Outline of review results Safety 3. Outline of review results
Organization) According to the notification of the periodical safety management review results, Organization) According to the notification of the periodical safety management review results,
which was submitted on September 28, 2009, by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety which was submitted on November 16, 2009, by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety
Organization to the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the subsequent Organization to the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the subsequent
explanation given by the Organization, no matters that were considered as serious explanation given by the Organization, no matters that were considered as serious
nonconformities and no matters that were considered to require improvement were found nonconformities and no matters that were considered to require improvement were found
as a result of review of the periodical licensee inspection of this Unit. In this review, it as a result of review of the periodical licensee inspection of this Unit.
was also verified that the licensee holds a daily nonconformity management committee In addition, it was verified that improvement processes, such as reporting
and took appropriate nonconformance management, corrective actions, and nonconformance information at the regular CAP meeting held every morning in this
nonconformity management such as considering the necessity of the feedback activities, power plant, sharing information with in-house employees and cooperating partners,
and that corrective measures were taken for all nonconformance that occurred in the considering details of improvement activities for them, and notifying results to the
periodical licensee inspections during the periodical inspection period. It is therefore involved departments, are functioning continuously, and that nonconformity
considered that the PDCA cycle is operating. management and corrective actions relating to the periodical licensee inspections were
Considering this situation, it is assessed that the quality management system for taken properly.
periodical licensee inspections in this plant is functioning without problems, and that Considering this situation, it is assessed that the quality management system for

164
periodical licensee inspections are being performed properly and autonomously. periodical licensee inspections in this plant is functioning without problems, and that
4. Review items periodical licensee inspections are being performed properly and autonomously.
Document reviews and on-site reviews were conducted to verify the status of 13 items 4. Review items
((1) performance inspection (calibration) of the elements of the safety protection system Document reviews and on-site reviews were conducted to verify the status of 11 items
detector, (2) inspection of the main valves, (3) inspection of the control rod hydraulic ((1) inspection of the steam turbine facilities (mechanical equipment), (2) inspection of
system facilities, etc.) the control rod driving water pump, (3) overhaul inspection of the reactor core isolation
Evaluation 1. Evaluation result: A cooling system main valve, etc.).
(Nuclear and 2. Notification of evaluation Evaluation 1. Evaluation result: A
Industrial Safety November 30, 2009 (Notification No. Heisei 21.09.28 Gen 37) (Nuclear and 2. Notification of evaluation
Agency) 3. Reasons for evaluation (results and grounds) Industrial Safety February 15, 2010 (Notification No. Heisei 21.11.16 Gen 10)
The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency carefully examined the review results based Agency) 3. Reasons for evaluation (results and grounds)
on the notification of the results of a periodical safety management review and related The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency carefully examined the review results based
explanations given by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization. The Agency on the notification of the results of a periodical safety management review and related
considered that the license holder has the capability to perform appropriate periodical explanations given by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization. The Agency
licensee inspections for the said reactor properly and autonomously. considered that the license holder has the capability to perform appropriate periodical
4. State of holding evaluation committee meetings licensee inspections for the said reactor properly and autonomously.
Explanation of, and hearings into the review results and Q&A on October 15, 2009. 4. State of holding evaluation committee meetings
Review of evaluation on November 5, 2009 Explanation of, and hearings into the review results and Q&A on December 18, 2009
5. Special notes concerning the evaluation Review of evaluation on January 14, 2010
None 5. Special notes concerning the evaluation
Others None
Others
<Fourth Quarter>
17. Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc. 18. The Japan Atomic Power Company
Applicant for Hiroaki Takahashi, Representative Director and President, Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc. Applicant for Hiroshi Morimoto, President, Japan Atomic Power Company
periodical safety (Date of application: February 25, 2009, application No.: TohokuDenGenUnHatsu 105) periodical safety (Date of application: October 3, 2008, application No.: HatsuShitsuHatsu 361)
management management
review review
Target items of Periodical licensee inspection to be performed during the 10th periodical inspection of Target items of Periodical licensee inspection to be performed during the 32nd periodical inspection of
review Onagawa Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 review Tsuruga Power Station Unit 1
Periodical safety 1. Period of review Periodical safety 1. Period of review
management March 16, 2009 to November 20, 2009 management October 27, 2008 to February 8, 2010
review (Japan 2. Notification date of periodical safety management review results review (Japan 2. Notification date of periodical safety management review results
Nuclear Energy November 20, 2009 (Notification No. 08, KenKeiJuAn-0117) Nuclear Energy February 8, 2010 (Notification No. 08, KenKeiJuAn-0077)
Safety 3. Outline of review results Safety 3. Outline of review results
Organization) According to the notification of the periodical safety management review results, Organization) According to the notification of the periodical safety management review results,
which was submitted on November 20, 2009, by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety which was submitted on February 8, 2010, by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety
Organization to the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the subsequent Organization to the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the subsequent
explanation given by the Organization, no matters that were considered as serious explanation given by the Organization, no matters that were considered as serious
nonconformities and no matters that were considered to require improvement were found nonconformities and no matters that were considered to require improvement were found
as a result of review of the periodical licensee inspection of this Unit. as a result of review of the periodical licensee inspection of this Unit.
For the event where the auxiliary boiler (A) of the previous reviewed unit (Unit 3) had Because this plant was continuously organizing rules relating to the quality
been operated longer than the operation limit time, because the plant analyzed the root management system and improving systems relating to the periodical licensee
cause and defined a new “Guide for management of auxiliary boiler operation time, inspection, and revised the rules by reflecting organizational change in the plant for
etc./Application for periodical licensee inspection timing change,” etc., it was verified further improvement of the safety management system, it was verified that active efforts
that efforts for improvement were being conducted. for building and operating a better quality management system were being conducted.
Considering this situation, it is assessed that the quality management system for Considering this situation, it is assessed that the quality management system for
periodical licensee inspections in this plant is functioning without problems, and that periodical licensee inspections in this plant is functioning without problems, and that
periodical licensee inspections are being performed properly and autonomously. periodical licensee inspections are being performed properly and autonomously.

165
4. Review items 4. Review items
Document reviews and on-site reviews were conducted to verify the status of 13 items Document reviews and on-site reviews were conducted to verify the status of 13 items
((1) inspection of the main valves, (2) electric motor inspection, (3) inspection and ((1) management inspection, (2) inspection of the emergency standby power supply
measurement of wall thickness of piping, etc.). equipment (mechanical equipment), (3) electric motor inspection (during shutdown),
Evaluation 1. Evaluation result: A etc.).
(Nuclear and 2. Notification of evaluation Evaluation 1. Evaluation result: A
Industrial Safety February 15, 2010 (Notification No. Heisei 21.11.20 Gen 12) (Nuclear and 2. Notification of evaluation
Agency) 3. Reasons for evaluation (results and grounds) Industrial Safety June 23, 2010 (Notification No. Heisei 22.02.08 Gen 15)
The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency carefully examined the review results based Agency) 3. Reasons for evaluation (results and grounds)
on the notification of the results of a periodical safety management review and related The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency carefully examined the review results based
explanations given by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization. The Agency on the notification of the results of a periodical safety management review and related
considered that the license holder has the capability to perform appropriate periodical explanations given by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization. The Agency
licensee inspections for the said reactor properly and autonomously. considered that the license holder has the capability to perform appropriate periodical
4. State of holding evaluation committee meetings licensee inspections for the said reactor properly and autonomously.
Explanation of, and hearings into the review results and Q&A on December 18, 2009 4. State of holding evaluation committee meetings
Review of evaluation on January 14, 2010 Explanation of, and hearings into the review results and Q&A on March 9, 2010
5. Special notes concerning the evaluation Review of evaluation on May 11, 2010
None 5. Special notes concerning the evaluation
Others None
Others



Ϭ STATUS OF SAFETY INSPECTION FOR
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS


167
Ϭ-1 General Information on Safety Inspections for Nuclear Power Plants

(1) Commercial Power Reactors


i) Outline of Safety Inspection
The first criticality accident in Japan occurred at a uranium processing facility in
September, 1999. Based on the lessons learned from this accident, licensees now have a
legal duty to undergo periodical safety inspections on their commercial power reactors.
These inspections are to be performed periodically under ministerial authority, to verify the
observance status of safety preservation rules in power plants. To maintain the
effectiveness of the nuclear safety inspection system, the Law for the Regulation of
Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors (hereinafter called the
Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law) was amended to establish a nuclear safety inspection
system. This system mandates the appointment of nuclear safety inspectors who perform
nuclear safety inspections. This amended Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law went into effect
on July 1, 2000.
A total of 17 nuclear safety inspector offices have been established to govern
commercial power reactors throughout Japan. Nuclear safety inspectors in these offices
conduct safety inspections based on Article 37-5 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law, to
examine the observance status of safety preservation rules. They specifically perform the
following tasks:
1) Entering offices, plants, places of business, etc.
2) Inspecting accounts, documents, installations, devices, and other necessary objects
3) Asking employees and concerned parties questions
4) Requesting nuclear power stations to submit nuclear source material, nuclear fuel
material, materials contaminated by nuclear fuel material as well as other samples

(2) Nuclear Reactors in the Research and Development Stage


i) Outline of Safety Inspection
At the site where the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Monju was constructed, safety
inspections are conducted on the licensees and their personnel in order to evaluate the
observance status of the operational safety program. Based on Article 37-5 of the Nuclear
Reactor Regulation Law, they are conducted in much the same way as they are for
commercial power reactors.

(3) Nuclear Reactors in the Decommissioning Stage


i) Outline of Safety Inspection
At the Tokai Power Station, where graphite-moderated gas-cooled reactors and the
Fugen Decommissioning Engineering Center, JAEA (commonly known as “Fugen”) was
constructed, safety inspections are conducted on the licensees and their personnel in order
to evaluate the observance status of the operational safety program. Based on Article 37-5

of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law, they are conducted in much the same way as they
are for commercial power reactors. 付
169
Ϭ-2 Circumstances of Safety Inspections by Nuclear Power Plant

(1) Tomari Power Station Tomari Power Station


1st inspection 2nd inspection
Period of 1) Basic inspection period: June 1 (Mon) to June 12 (Fri), 2009 Period of 1) Basic inspection period: September 2 (Wed) to September 15 (Tue), 2009
inspection inspection
Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.) Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.)
items (1) Status of management review (inspections at the power station and the head office) items (1) Status of education and training
(2) Status of internal audits (inspections at the head office) (2) Status of nonconformance management
(3) Status of safety culture creation activities (inspections at the power station and the head office) (3) Status of radiation management
(4) Status of nonconformance management (inspections at the power station) (4) Status of operational management (response in the event of earthquake and fire)
(5) Status of maintenance management activities (inspections at the power station) (5) Status of routine tests (periodical test of the motor-driven auxiliary feed water pump)
(6) Status of actions relating to reinforcement of the operator qualification system (inspections at the (attendance) (surprise inspection)
head office) (6) Status of access management (attendance) (surprise inspection)
(7) Status of radioactive gaseous waste management (inspections at the power station)
(8) Status of fuel management (inspections at the head office)
(9) Status of measures implemented to resolve violations (surveillance) found in the past
(inspections at the power station and the head office)
(10)Status of routine tests (periodical test of the residual heat removal pumps) (attendance) (surprise
inspection)

Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of management review, the status of internal Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of education and training and the status of
Inspection
audits, the status of safety culture creation activities, the status of nonconformance management, and results nonconformance management, etc.
results
the status of maintenance management, etc. As a result of the basic inspection on the status of education and training, it was verified that the
As a result of the basic inspection, as for the status of management review and the status of education and training plans were defined based on the safety and in-house regulations, that
internal audits, as a result of the reviews of the report materials issued in 2008 and the plan for 2009, education and training to secure and maintain the abilities of the organization and staff, such as

170
it was verified that the management review, roll-out for quality goals, and internal audit were carried technical exchange among the personnel in charge of the Units 1, 2, and 3, were conducted for the
out properly, and improvements were continuously made. maintenance program operation, and that the results were assessed appropriately.
A follow-up was also conducted on the status of improvements made by the licensee regarding As for the status of nonconformance management, it was verified that recent major nonconforming
matters that were placed under surveillance in past inspections (i.e., “The status of management events had been extracted as individual items and the processes for and contents of the discussions,
reviews was unclear”). As a result, the implementation system of management reviews was clarified investigations to determine the causes, corrective actions, and that preventive actions determined by
and it was verified that these matters have been rectified by the improvements made. the nonconformance management committee, had been properly conducted according to the in-house
In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based and other necessary rules.
on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules. In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based
The status of daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also examined on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules.
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation The status of daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also examined
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests of Unit 1 (routine test of by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
the residual heat removal pumps), and so forth. As a result, no particular problem was found. records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (periodical test of the
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for motor-driven auxiliary feed water pump), and so forth. As a result, no particular problems were
examination in this inspection were conducted properly. found.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
examination in this inspection were conducted properly.
Tomari Power Station Tomari Power Station
3rd inspection 4th inspection
Period of 1) Basic inspection period: November 24 (Tue) to December 3 (Thu), 2009 Period of 1) Basic inspection period: February 22 (Mon) to March 5 (Fri), 2010
inspection December 7 (Mon) to December 9 (Wed), 2009 inspection
2) Additional inspection period: December 4 (Fri),
December 7 (Mon) to December 9 (Wed), 2009
Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.) Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.)
items (1) Status of quality assurance activities items (1) Status of nonconformance management
(2) Status of internal audits
(2) Status of maintenance management
(3) Status of nonconformance management
(4) Status of radioactive liquid waste management (3) Status of safety culture creation activities
(5) Status of operational management (attendance) (surprise inspection) (4) Status of procurement management
2) Additional inspection items (5) Status of routine tests (periodical operation test of the turbine-driven auxiliary feed water pump
(1) Status of improvement actions for the safety preservation rules violation (violation 2) caused by of Unit 3) (attendance) (surprise inspection)
function inhibition of the reactor protection system instrumentation (neutron flux in the neutron (6) Status of operational management (attendance) (surprise inspection)
source range) in Units 1 and 2
(2) Status of the root cause analysis of the safety preservation rules violation caused by function
inhibition of the reactor protection system instrumentation (neutron flux in the neutron source
range) in Units 1 and 2
Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of quality assurance activities, the status of Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of nonconformance management, the status
Inspection
internal audits, and the status of nonconformance management, etc. Also, during this inspection, the of maintenance management, and the status of safety culture creation activities, etc.
results “Status of improvement actions for the safety preservation rules violation (violation 2) caused by results
As a result of the basic inspection, it was verified that the status of nonconformance management
function inhibition of the reactor protection system instrumentation (neutron flux in the neutron
source range) in Units 1 and 2” and the “Status of the root cause analysis of the safety preservation had been reviewed by the nonconformance management committee, that controlled areas had been
rules violation (violation 2) caused by function inhibition of the reactor protection system established, and that an investigation to determine the cause, corrective actions, and preventive
instrumentation (neutron flux in the neutron source range) in Units 1 and 2” (hereinafter, referred to actions had been properly conducted according to the safety preservation, in-house and other
as RCA) were selected as additional inspection items. necessary rules. Also, as for the status of maintenance management, it was verified that the
As a result of the basic inspection on the status of quality assurance activities, it was verified that responsibilities and categories relating to maintenance management had been clarified and the
the accomplishment status of the quality goals for the first half of the fiscal year were reviewed by systems for maintenance activities at maintenance sections, etc. were operating. In addition, as for
the Tomari Power Station expert committee based on the safety preservation rules and in-house
regulations, etc. and that this committee played a role in improving the quality management system the status of safety culture creation activities, it was verified that the safety culture creation activities

171
(hereinafter, referred to as QMS). As for the status of internal audits, it was verified that an individual had been improved by completing a neutral evaluation and extracting challenges for the next year for
nuclear audit implementation plan was defined based on the nuclear audit basic plan 2009 and that each element of the safety culture, etc.
all the audit items were carried out. In addition, as for the status of nonconformance management, it In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based
was verified that recent major nonconforming events had been extracted as individual items and the on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules.
investigation to determine the causes, corrective actions, and preventive actions had been reviewed
The status of daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also examined
by the nonconformance management committee and properly conducted according to the in-house
and other necessary rules. by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
As a result of the additional inspection on the “Status of improvement actions for the safety records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests and so forth. As a result,
preservation rules violation (violation 2) caused by function inhibition of the reactor protection no particular problem was found.
system instrumentation (neutron flux in the neutron source range) in Units 1 and 2,” it was verified In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
that actions (such as revision of the in-house regulations and education and training of related examination in this inspection were conducted properly.
sections, etc.) that had been taken based on the “About causes and recurrence preventive measures
for the safety preservation rules violation caused by function inhibition of the reactor protection
system instrumentation (neutron flux in the neutron source range) in Units 1 and 2,” which was
reported to the nation, were completed on November 12.
Also, the “Status of RCA for the safety preservation rules violation (violation 2) caused by
function inhibition of the reactor protection system instrumentation (neutron flux in the neutron
source range) in Units 1 and 2” was reviewed and a certain amount of progress of the analysis was
verified. Root causes and organizational factors of this matter are now being closely examined, and
thus the status of this matter should be verified continuously by conducting safety inspections, etc.
In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based
on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules.
The status of daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also examined
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, and so forth. As a result, no particular problem
was found.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
examination in this inspection were conducted properly.



(2) Higashidori Nuclear Power Station Higashodori Nuclear Power Station
1st inspection 2nd inspection
Period of 1) Basic inspection period: June 1 (Mon) to June 12 (Fri), 2009 Period of 1) Basic inspection period: August 24 (Mon) to September 4 (Fri), 2009
inspection inspection
Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.) Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.)
items (1) Status of management review and internal audits items (1) Status of operational management
(2) Status of nonconformance management (2) Status of nonconformance management and corrective measures
(3) Status of maintenance management (3) Status of procurement management
(4) Status of actions relating to reinforcement of the operator qualification system (4) Status of safety preservation education
(5) Thorough countermeasures against fire (5) Status of measures implemented to resolve violations found in the past (surveillance)
(6) Status of measures implemented to resolve violations found in the past (surveillance) (6) Status of routine tests (manual start-up test of emergency diesel power generator (B))
(7) Status of routine tests (manual start-up test of the low-pressure core spray system pump) (attendance) (surprise inspection)
(attendance) (surprise inspection) (7) Status of management of radiation measuring instruments (attendance, etc.) (surprise inspection)
(8) Status of the on-site inspection tours (attendance) (surprise inspection)

Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of nonconformance management and the Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of nonconformance management and
results status of maintenance management, etc. results corrective measures and the status of procurement management, etc.
It was verified from the results of basic inspections that each safety preservation activity is As a result of the basic inspection on the status of nonconformance management and corrective
conducted properly based on the safety preservation rules and that there are no matters that violate measures, it was verified that occurrences of nonconformance were reduced by the efforts made to
the safety preservation rules. promote nonconformance management, corrective measures and the prevention of human errors. It
Also, as a result of inspection of the status of the licensee’s corrective action for past surveillance was verified that preventive measures are being taken by reviewing the preventive measures for
matters (“Incorrect injection into the reactor in rapid start-up tests of reactor core isolation cooling nonconformance events at other plants. As for the status of procurement management, efforts to
system (RCIC) of Higashidori Nuclear Power Station Unit 1” and “Positioning of the work clarify procurement requirements were taken by: defining the specifications and management
procedures and other documents on the safety preservation rules”), corrective action was ongoing. It processes in work specifications and other documents according to the importance and characteristics
was decided that the status of improvement of these matters should be verified at future safety of procurements and services; applying those specifications and management processes to the
inspections, etc. procurement operations; analyzing nonconformities of procurement management; and reflecting that

172
The status of daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also examined analysis in the work specifications, etc.
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (manual start-up test of on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules.
pump in the low-pressure core spray system, etc.), and so forth. As a result, no particular problems Also, as a result of the inspection on the status of the licensee’s corrective actions for past
were found. surveillance matters (“Incorrect injection into the reactor in rapid start-up tests of reactor core
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for isolation cooling system (RCIC) of Higashidori Nuclear Power Station Unit 1”), actions for
examination in this inspection were conducted properly. improvement were taken. Those actions included clarification of the positioning of each QMS
document in the safety preservation rules, and implementation of measures based on the corrective
actions determined by root cause analysis.
The status of daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also examined
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (manual start-up test of
the emergency diesel generator (B)), and so forth. As a result, no particular problem was found.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
examination in this inspection were conducted properly.
Higashodori Nuclear Power Station Higashodori Nuclear Power Station
3rd inspection 4th inspection
Period of 1) Basic inspection period: November 24 (Tue) to December 4 (Fri), 2009 Period of 1) Basic inspection period: February 25 (Thu) to March 11 (Thu), 2010
inspection 2) Additional inspection period: December 8 (Tue) to December 9 (Wed), 2009 inspection 2) Additional inspection period: March 10 (Wed), 2010
Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.) Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.)
items (1) Status of safety culture creation activities items (1) Status of maintenance management
(2) Status of nonconformance management and corrective measures (2) Status of nonconformance management and corrective measures
(3) Status of radiation management (3) Status of procurement management
(4) Status of routine tests (operational test of the blower (A) in the flammable gas concentration (4) Status of operational management
control system) (attendance) (surprise inspection) (5) Status of fuel management
(5) Status of radioactive solid waste treatment processes (attendance, etc.) (surprise inspection) (6) Status of radiation management
2) Additional inspection items (7) Status of maintenance management
(1) Status of improvement measures for “The unsubmitted revision approval application at the (8) Status of routine tests (manual start-up test of pumps in the reactor isolation cooling system)
periodical licensee inspection of the auxiliary boiler facilities” (attendance) (surprise inspection)
2) Additional inspection items
(1) Status of improvement measures for “The unsubmitted revision approval application at the
periodical licensee inspection of the auxiliary boiler facilities”

Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of nonconformance management and Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of maintenance management, the status of
results corrective measures, etc. To check the status of the improvement measures for “The unsubmitted results nonconformance management and corrective measures and the status of procurement management,
revision approval application at the periodical licensee inspection of the auxiliary boiler facilities,” etc. To check the status of the improvement measures for “The unsubmitted revision approval
this issue was also selected as an additional inspection item. application at the periodical licensee inspection of the auxiliary boiler facilities,” this issue was also
As a result of the basic inspection on the status of nonconformance management and corrective selected as an additional inspection item.
measures, the status of nonconformance management, etc. at Higashidori Nuclear Power Station was As a result of the basic inspection on the status of maintenance management, it was verified that
verified using the results of the root cause analysis of the following: “Incorrect injection into the the maintenance management operations in the 3rd periodical inspection were conducted according
reactor in the manual start-up test of the auxiliary sea water pump for rapid start-up tests of the to the procedures, etc. defined for the new inspection system and the maintenance management goals

173
reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC)” at Higashidori Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, defined based on the maintenance management implementation policies. The effectiveness of the
“Operation of the emergency core cooling system (core spray system) caused by incorrect signals,” maintenance management was evaluated by analyzing the results of those operations. As for the
“Pressure increase of the residual heat removal system (B),” and “Insertion of the non-operated status of nonconformance management and corrective measures, it was verified that preventive
control rod during start-up of the reactor” at Onagawa Nuclear Power Station Unit 1. The status of measures were taken by reviewing nonconformance information at Onagawa Nuclear Power Station
effectiveness evaluation should be checked by conducting safety inspections, etc. and other power stations and reflecting those reviews in the operation processes, etc. As for the status
In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based of procurement management, it was verified that efforts to clarify the procurement requirements were
on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules. conducted properly. In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was
As a result of the additional inspections, it was verified that recurrence prevention measures conducted properly based on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the
(action plan) for dealing with “The unsubmitted revision approval application at the periodical safety preservation rules.
licensee inspection of the auxiliary boiler facilities” were being taken and that the status of As a result of the additional inspections, it was verified that recurrence prevention measures
improvement of these measures should be verified by conducting safety inspections, etc. (action plan) for dealing with “The unsubmitted revision approval application at the periodical
The status of daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also examined licensee inspection of the auxiliary boiler facilities” were being taken and that the status of
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation improvement of these measures should be verified by conducting safety inspections, etc.
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (operational test of the The status of daily operational management activities during the safety inspection period was also
blower (A) in the flammable gas concentration control system), and so forth. As a result, no examined by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing
particular problems were found. operation records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (manual
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for start-up test of the pumps in the reactor isolation cooling system), and so forth. As a result, no
examination in this inspection were conducted properly. particular problem was found.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
examination in this inspection were conducted properly.



(3) Onagawa Nuclear Power Station Onagawa Nuclear Power Station
1st inspection 2nd inspection
Period of 1) Basic inspection period: June 11 (Thu) to June 24 (Wed), 2009 Period of 1) Basic inspection period: September 1 (Tue) to September 14 (Mon), 2009
inspection inspection
Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.) Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.)
items (1) Status of management review and internal audits items (1) Status of procurement management
(2) Status of nonconformance management (2) Status of safety culture creation activities
(3) Status of periodical safety reviews for Unit 1 (3) Status of activities for compliance with relevant laws and safety preservation rules
(4) Status of actions relating to reinforcement of the operator qualification determination system (4) Status of measures implemented to resolve violations found in the past
(5) Status of measures implemented to resolve violations found in the past (surveillance) (5) Status of fuel management (attendance) (surprise inspection)
(6) Status of routine tests (manual start-up test of pumps in the reactor isolation cooling system, etc.)
(attendance) (surprise inspection)
Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of management review and internal audits, Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of procurement management, the status of
results the status of nonconformance management, and the status of periodical safety reviews for Unit 1, etc. results safety culture creation activities, and the status of activities for compliance with relevant laws and
As a result of the basic inspection, some matters were found that require surveillance, in safety preservation rules, etc.
accordance with the requested items in “The periodical safety review implementation guideline for As a result of the basic inspection on the status of procurement management, it was verified that
commercial power reactor facilities.” The status of improvements made to rectify these matters the procurement plan for the facility renewal construction work, the supplier capability assessment,
should be verified by conducting safety inspections. the on-site construction management, and the test inspections, etc., which were conducted at
A follow-up was also conducted into the status of improvements made by the licensee regarding Onagawa Nuclear Power Station Unit 2, were all managed in proper accordance with the in-house
the matters that were placed under surveillance in past inspections (“Positioning of the work regulations.
procedures and other documents in the safety preservation rules”). As a result, it was verified that As for the status of safety culture creation activities and the status of activities for compliance with
corrective measures to clarify the positioning of the documents in the safety preservation rules were relevant laws and safety preservation rules, it was verified that action policies and an action plan
taken continuously and revisions to the safety preservation rules were under preparation. It was were defined based on the implementation guidelines. These actions were evaluated at meetings, and
decided that the status of improvement of these matters should be verified at future safety the problems that were extracted at the meetings were reflected in the plan for the next year.
inspections, etc. In addition, as a result of the review of the status of improvements made by the licensee to resolve
In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based violations found in the past, it was verified that root cause analyses were conducted and preventive
on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules. measures are under consideration for “Partially lost functions of the emergency core cooling system

174
The status of daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also examined (high pressure injection system) at Onagawa Nuclear Power Station Unit 1)” and “Delay of the start
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation date of the periodical licensee inspection of the auxiliary boiler (A) at Onagawa Nuclear Power
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, and so forth. As a result, no particular problems Station Unit 3.” As for the “Positioning of the documents required for safety activities on the safety
were found. preservation rules,” it was verified that a revision approval application for the safety preservation
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for rules had been submitted in order to clarify the relationship with the documents that satisfy the
examination in this inspection were, on the whole, conducted properly. requirements of Article 3 in the safety preservation rules, etc. These corrective measures are
conducted continuously, so it was decided that the status of improvement of these matters should be
verified at future safety inspections, etc. As for the “Requested items in the periodical safety review
implementation guideline for the commercial power reactor facilities” relating to the “Periodical
evaluation of the reactor facilities” at Onagawa Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, it was verified that the
effectiveness evaluation of the safety activities, conducted during the evaluation period, was
reviewed again and reflected in the report appropriately. It was also verified that the latest technical
expertise concerning safety activities was organized appropriately. As a result, it was decided that the
corrective actions were complete.
In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based
on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules.
The status of daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also examined
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (manual start-up test of
the pumps in the reactor isolation cooling system), and so forth. As a result, no particular problem
was found.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
examination in this inspection were conducted properly.
Onagawa Nuclear Power Station Onagawa Nuclear Power Station
3rd inspection 4th inspection
Period of 1) Basic inspection period: November 26 (Thu) to December 3 (Thu), 2009 Period of 1) Basic inspection period: March 1 (Mon) to March 7 (Sun), 2010
inspection December 5 (Sat) to December 11 (Fri), 2009 inspection March 10 (Wed) to March 16 (Tue), 2010
2) Additional inspection period: December 4 (Fri),
December 9 (Wed) to December 10 (Thu), 2009
Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.) Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.)
items (1) Status of maintenance management items (1) Status of nonconformance management
(2) Status of management review and internal audits (2) Status of action at the occurrence of trouble
(3) Status of radioactive solid waste management (3) Status of operational management during operation of the reactor
(4) Status of emergency measures (4) Status of water quality management
(5) Status of measures implemented to resolve violations found in the past (5) Status of recording and reporting
(6) Status of routine tests (scram function test with the reactor scram test switch) (attendance) (6) Status of routine tests (manual start-up test of pumps in the reactor auxiliary cooling system, etc.)
(surprise inspection) (attendance) (surprise inspection)
2) Additional inspection items
(1) Status of actions for “Partially lost functions of the high pressure injection system” in Unit 1
(2) Status of actions for “Delay of the start date of the periodical licensee inspection of the auxiliary
boiler (A)” in Unit 3

Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of maintenance management, etc. To check Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of nonconformance management, etc.
results the status of the root cause analysis and the status of the organizational common factor analysis of results As a result of the basic inspection, it was verified that a corrective actions management system
“Partially lost functions of the high pressure injection system” in Unit 1 and “Delay of the start date development plan and a computerization plan for the status of nonconformance management had
of the periodical licensee inspection of the auxiliary boiler (A)” in Unit 3, these issues were also been prepared based on the information system development standards. It was also verified that the
selected as additional inspection items. building work of the Corrective Actions Management System (K15) was being conducted
As a result of the basic inspection on the status of maintenance management, it was verified that a appropriately, aiming for launch in July, 2010. It was verified that this system should help reinforce
series of systems, such as definition of the maintenance program, were established appropriately, the domestic and overseas trouble data entry function, the electric approval function, and the data
based on the “Nuclear QMS repair operation procedures,” etc. It was also verified that activities search function. From the viewpoint of “awareness” of problems, a “Background factor list” of

175
relating to the “Maintenance plan in the 19th maintenance cycle for Unit 1” (submitted on November human factors will be built with the help of knowledge in the aeronautical industry, and this list will
25, 2009) were properly carried out. also be used as “cause codes” in nonconformance management. This plan was made to reflect the
In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based analysis results of the “organizational common factors” of the nonconformance of the auxiliary
on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules. boiler, which occurred in July, 2009, etc.
As a result of the additional inspections, it was verified that the direct cause analysis and root In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based
cause analysis of the status of actions for “Partially lost functions of the high pressure injection on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules.
system” in Unit 1 and “Delay of the start date of the periodical licensee inspection of the auxiliary The status of daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also examined
boiler (A)” in Unit 3 were carried out by an action team, which was organized by the analysis team by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
and the manager for conducting the actions, based on the “Root cause analysis procedures,” and that records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (manual start-up test of
the corrective actions and preventive measures were conducted as planned based on the analysis the pumps in the reactor isolation cooling system), and so forth. As a result, no particular problem
results. In addition, as for organizational common factors and company-wide actions, it was verified was found.
that an “Action review team” was established at the nuclear safety promotion meeting, with the In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
president at the helm. Common factors were extracted from the root cause analysis results of examination in this inspection were conducted properly.
multiple events in the past, including the events of the auxiliary boilers. Analysis was conducted to
find underlying organizational factors, and then activities were carried out based on the “Plan of
specific actions (action plan).”
The status of daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also examined
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (scram function test with
the reactor scram test switch), and so forth. As a result, no particular problem was found.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
examination in this inspection were conducted properly.



(4) Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station
1st inspection 2nd inspection
Period of 1) Basic inspection period: June 15 (Mon) to June 26 (Fri), 2009 Period of 1) Basic inspection period: August 31 (Mon) to September 11 (Fri), 2009
inspection inspection
Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.) Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.)
items (1) Status of maintenance management items (1) Status of maintenance management
(2) Status of nonconformance management (including inspections at the head office)
(2) Status of procurement management
(3) Status of management review (inspections at the head office)
(3) Status of management review (General Manager review) (4) Status of internal audits (inspections at the head office)
(4) Status of measures implemented to resolve violations found in the past (surveillance) (5) Status of procurement management (inspections at the head office)
(5) Status of routine tests (manual start-up test of emergency diesel power generators in the (6) Status of actions relating to reinforcement of the operator qualification determination system
high-pressure core spray system of Unit 6, etc.) (attendance) (surprise inspection) (inspections at the head office)
(6) Status of alarm setting change of the reactor building exhaust plenum radiation monitors (7) Status of improvement measures for past violation matters (surveillance) (including inspections
at the head office)
(attendance) (surprise inspection) (8) Status of routine tests (manual start-up test of electrically-powered valves in the emergency core
cooling system in Unit 6) (attendance) (surprise inspection)
(9) Status of radioactive waste management activities (surprise inspection)
Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of maintenance management, the status of Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of maintenance management, the status of
Inspection
procurement management, and the status of management review (General Manager review), etc. nonconformance management, the status of procurement management, the status of management
results results review, and the status of internal audits, etc. To verify the status of management review and the status
As a result of the basic inspection on the status of maintenance management, it was verified that
of internal audits, safety inspections were conducted at the head office in conjunction with the
the maintenance management activities of the new inspection system already started in Unit 2 were Fukushima Daini Nuclear Safety Inspector Office and Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Safety Inspector
operated in accordance with the relevant manuals, mainly based on the maintenance management Office. As for the status of nonconformance management and the status of procurement management,
basic manual. As for the status of procurement management, it was verified that procurement safety inspections were conducted at the head office individually by our safety inspector offices.
requirements compliance management, including construction management was conducted as As a result of the basic inspection on the status of maintenance management, it was verified that a
execution management, in accordance with the procurement management basic manual and other system to assure periodical inspection had been established by creating a new “Long-term inspection
relevant manuals. plan” and by defining the management method of feedback activities for the similar sections in an
in-house document. This system was established after considering the fact that, in February this year,
As a result of the inspection on the status of the licensee’s corrective action for past surveillance actions could not be taken in advance due to problems with the inspection method of troubles
matters (“Validation failure of appropriateness and effectiveness of the procurement processes” and relating to the driving mechanism of the turbine bypass valve in Unit 1. As for the status of
“No planning and approval of the radiation protection actions according to the work dose and work nonconformance management, it was verified that the revision history of the secondary manual was

176
environment in high-dose controlled areas and functional failure of the system to comply with the managed at the head office. However, because the review of the effectiveness of corrective actions
radiation protection actions (unexpected exposure of a worker of a cooperating firm)”), corrective and preventive measures and the progress management of each case for which feedback activities at
the other plants need to be considered (e.g. the processes before policies are determined take time,
actions were ongoing. It was decided that the status of improvement of these matters should be
even for the safety-significant equipment) were insufficient, it was determined that these two matters
verified at future safety inspections, etc. should be placed under surveillance. It was also determined that the status of improvement measures
In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based made to rectify these matters should be verified by conducting safety inspections.
on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules. In addition, as for the status of management reviews and the status of internal audits, which were
The status of daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also examined inspected at the head office in conjunction with the other offices, it was verified that their inspections
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation had been carried out in accordance with the in-house manuals. It was also verified that input items
for the management reviews were organized based on the outputs of the reviews conducted by
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (manual start-up test of management representatives, and that internal audit policies to clearly carry out activities for
the high-pressure core spray system emergency diesel generator of Unit 6), and so forth. As a result, recovery from earthquake and to improve items that are impractical or a waste of time, were defined
no particular problems were found. for the quality audit this year.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for As a result of the inspection on the status of the licensee’s corrective action for past surveillance
examination in this inspection were conducted properly. matters (“Validation failure of appropriateness and effectiveness of the procurement processes” and
two other matters), corrective action was ongoing. It was decided that the status of improvement of
this matter should be verified at future safety inspections, etc.
In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based
on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules.
The status of daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also examined
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (manual opening and
closing tests of power-operated valves in the high-pressure core spray system and residual heat
removal system of Unit 6), and so forth. As a result, no particular problem was found.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
examination in this inspection were, on the whole, conducted properly, excluding the matters that
were considered to need surveillance.
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station
3rd inspection 4th inspection
Period of 1) Basic inspection period: November 30 (Mon) to December 11 (Fri), 2009 Period of 1) Basic inspection period: February 15 (Mon) to February 21 (Sun), 2010
inspection 2) Additional inspection period: December 16 (Wed) to December 18 (Fri), 2009 inspection March 15 (Mon) to March 19 (Fri), 2010
Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.) 2) Additional inspection period: March 11 (Thu) to March 12 (Fri), 2010
items (1) Status of emergency measures Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.)
(2) Status of radioactive waste management items (1) Status of operational management
(3) Status of assessment and improvement of the quality assurance plan (2) Status of radiation management
(4) Status of measures implemented to resolve violations found in the past (surveillance) (3) Status of periodical management reviews
(5) Status of routine tests (insertion, pull-out, and coupling tests of the control rod in Unit 2) (4) Status of measures implemented to resolve violations found in the past (surveillance)
(attendance) (surprise inspection) (5) Status of emergency measures (surprise inspection)
(6) Status of reporting (surprise inspection) 2) Additional inspection items
2) Additional inspection items (1) Status of improvement measures for the “Safety preservation rules violation (violation 3) relating
(1) Status of the prevention measures for the exceeded operational limit event that occurred during to the incorrect connection and discharge to the drain pipe in the radioactive liquid waste
the period from 2007 to 2008 treatment system at Fukushima Daiichi, Fukushima Daini, and Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear
Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of emergency measures and the status of Power Stations”
assessment and improvement of the quality assurance plan, etc. Considering the results of the Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of emergency measures, the status of
results Inspection
comprehensive assessment on safety activities implemented in 2008, the “Status of the recurrence operational management, and the status of measures implemented to resolve violations found in the
prevention measures for the exceeded operational limit event that occurred during the period from results
past, etc. In addition, the status of the corrective measures at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
2007 to 2008” in Unit 4” was selected as an additional inspection item, to check the status of Station that were put together by the licensee (Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.) for the event when
improvement measures made by the licensee. radioactive liquid waste was connected and discharged to the drain pipes in the non-radioactive
As a result of the basic inspection on the status of emergency measures, it was verified that the liquid waste treatment system at Fukushima Daiichi, Fukushima Daini, and Kashiwazaki-Kariwa
operation management basic manual and its subordinate manual, the nuclear disaster Nuclear Power Stations, which was considered a “violation 3” during the fourth quarter safety
countermeasures manual, defined operational plans that satisfy the requirements of the Nuclear inspection in 2009, was selected as an additional inspection item.
Disaster Special Measures Law and safety preservation rules. However, because it was found that the As a result of the basic inspection on the status of emergency measures, the status of the PDCA
review of the requirements in the operational plans regarding emergency measures was insufficient cycle for the emergency exercise (defined in the nuclear disaster countermeasures manual) was
and the system to ensure that the relevant staff understand the requirements that had been changed verified and it was found that the PDCA cycle was not conducted in a convincing way. However,
during revision of the manuals was inadequate, it was determined that these two matters should be because it was verified during the inspection period that this matter would be managed autonomously
placed under surveillance and the status of improvement measures made to rectify these matters by the licensee as a nonconformance issue and the corrective measures for this matter would be

177
should be verified by conducting safety inspections. carried out, it was assessed that the nonconformance management was carried out properly and it
As for the status of the assessment and improvement of the quality assurance plan, it was verified was determined that the status of improvement of this matter should be verified at future safety
that both assessment and improvement of the quality assurance plan were carried out in accordance inspections, etc.
with the manuals, their weakness at the plant was recognized and improvement activities were As for the status of operational management, it was verified that a quality assurance plan system to
ongoing. check that each operational limit defined in the safety preservation rules was satisfied had been
A follow-up was also conducted into the status of improvements made by the licensee regarding established and that the operational management activities during reactor operation were carried out
the five matters that were placed under surveillance in past inspections. Appropriate corrective based on that system.
actions for the matters (“Validation failure of appropriateness and effectiveness of the procurement In addition, a follow-up was also conducted into the status of improvements made by the licensee
processes” and one other matter), such as revision of the manuals, were carried out. For the other regarding the five violations found in the past. As a result, it was verified that the improvement
matters that were placed under surveillance (“Insufficient implementation of the effectiveness measures are now being implemented, but are incomplete. Because of this, the status of
reviews in the activity reviews conducted as preventive and corrective measures,” and two other improvements made to rectify these matters should be verified continuously by conducting safety
matters), corrective action was ongoing. It was decided that the status of improvement of this matter inspections, etc.
should be verified at future safety inspections, etc. In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based
In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules.
on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules. As a result of the additional inspection on the five incorrect connection events found at Fukushima
As a result of the additional inspection, the background factor analysis and improvement activities Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, it was verified that emergency measures had been taken for all of the
for the exceeded operational limit event in Unit 4 that occurred during the period from 2007 to 2008 events, to prevent radioactive liquid waste from drawing into the non-radioactive waste treatment
were carried out and preventive measures and feedback activities were also conducted. No system through the incorrectly connected section.
recurrences were found. The status of daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also examined
The status of daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also examined by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests. As a result, no
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (insertion, pull-out, and particular problem was found.
coupling tests of the control rod in Unit 2). As a result, no particular problem was found. In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for examination in this inspection were conducted properly.
examination in this inspection were, on the whole, conducted properly, excluding the matters that
were considered to need surveillance.



(5) Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station
1st inspection 2nd inspection
Period of 1) Basic inspection period: June 8 (Mon) to June 19 (Fri), 2009 Period of 1) Basic inspection period: August 31 (Mon) to September 11 (Fri), 2009
inspection inspection
Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.) Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.)
items (1) Status of procurement management items (1) Status of maintenance management
(2) Status of design management (2) Status of management review (inspections at the head office)
(3) Status of radiation management (3) Status of internal audits (inspections at the head office)
(4) Status of actions relating to reinforcement of the operator qualification determination system (4) Status of nonconformance management (inspections at the head office)
(5) Status of measures implemented to resolve violations found in the past (surveillance) (5) Status of radioactive liquid waste management
(6) Status of activities related to preventive activities for human errors (surprise inspection) (6) Status of preventive measures related to nonconformance management (surprise inspection)
(7) Status of operator training (attendance) (surprise inspection) (7) Status of routine tests (manual start-up test of HPCS pumps) (attendance) (surprise inspection)
(8) Status of routine tests (insertion, pull-out, and coupling tests of the control rod in Unit 2, etc.)
(attendance) (surprise inspection)

Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of procurement management and the status Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of maintenance management, the status of
results of radiation management, etc. results management reviews, the status of internal audits, the status of nonconformance management, the
As for the status of procurement management, it was verified that the licensee fulfilled their status of radioactive liquid waste management, and the status of preventive measures related to
responsibilities in conducting procurement activities for the items for which modification was nonconformance management (surprise inspection), etc.
planned in this periodical inspection of Unit 4, according to the procedures defined in the manuals. As for the status of radioactive liquid waste management, as a result of the review of radioactive
As a result of the inspection on the status of radiation management, especially on measurements of liquid waste discharge, it was verified that water in the fuel pool makeup system (FPMUW) was
external radioactivity and management of the radioactivity instrumentation, it was verified that incorrectly discharged to the canal. Further investigation was conducted and found that this event had
operations were carried out by running the PDCA cycle, including verification of the status of no influence on safety at the plant. However, discharge from paths other than those defined in the
operational processes, segregation of business, and procurement activities. A follow-up was also safety preservation rules without control was considered as an item that needed surveillance. The
conducted into the status of improvements made by the licensee regarding the matters that were status of improvements made to rectify these matters should be verified by conducting safety
placed under surveillance in past inspections (“LCO deviation caused by the pressure applied to the inspections.

178
reactor pressure vessel in Unit 2 (during shutdown for the periodical inspection),” in December, 2008 As for the status of preventive measures related to nonconformance management (surprise
and “High hydrogen concentration alarm issued at the outlet of the exhaust gas dehumidification inspection), it was verified on-site and elsewhere that preventive measures for the “Incorrect
cooler caused by check failure before start-up in Unit 2 (at start-up)”) in January 2009. As a result of discharge of the regenerated replenishment water (MUWT) containing radioactive materials to the
the reviews of revised manuals and the results of the subsequent tentative operation of Unit 1, etc., it canal in Unit 1” were carried out. It was decided that the status of measures such as revision of the
was verified that improvements had been carried out. design management manual, etc. should be verified at future safety inspections, etc.
In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based
on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules. on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules.
The status of daily operational management activities during the safety inspection period was also The status of daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also examined
examined by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
operation records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, and so forth. As a result, no particular records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (manual start-up test of
problems were found. the HPCS pumps), and so forth. As a result, no particular problem was found.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
examination in this inspection were conducted properly. examination in this inspection were, on the whole, conducted properly.
Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station
3rd inspection 4th inspection
Period of 1) Basic inspection period: November 30 (Mon) to December 11 (Fri), 2009 Period of 1) Basic inspection period: February 22 (Mon) to March 5 (Fri), 2010
inspection inspection March 9 (Tue), 2010
2) Additional inspection period: March 8 (Mon), 2010
Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.) Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.)
items (1) Status of operational management items (1) Status of management review
(2) Status of fuel management (2) Status of internal audits
(3) Status of safety preservation education and training (3) Status of nonconformance management
(4) Status of management on the items stored within premises (4) Status of periodical management reviews (PSR)
(5) Status of preventive measures related to nonconformance management (surprise inspection) (5) Status of measures implemented to resolve violations found in the past (surveillance)
(6) Status of environmental monitoring area management (attendance) (surprise inspection)
(7) Status of routine tests (manual start-up test of the emergency diesel generator (A) of Unit 1)
(attendance) (surprise inspection)
2) Additional inspection items
(1) Status of improvement measures for the safety preservation rules violation (violation 3) relating
to the incorrect connection and discharge to the drain pipe in the radioactive liquid waste
treatment system at Fukushima Daiichi, Fukushima Daini, and Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear
Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of operational management and the status of Power Stations
results fuel management, etc. Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of management reviews, and the status of
Inspection
As a result of the inspections on the priority inspection items (the status of operational nonconformance management, etc.
results
management and the status of fuel management) and other inspection items (the status of safety In addition, the status of improvement measures for the safety preservation rules violation
preservation education and training, the status of management on the items stored within premises, (violation 3) relating to the “Incorrect connection and discharge of the radioactive liquid waste to the
and the status of preventive measures related to nonconformance management (surprise inspection)), drain pipe in the non-radioactive liquid waste treatment system at Fukushima Daiichi, Fukushima
it was verified that each safety activity was carried out based on the safety preservation rules, and Daini, and Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Stations” was selected as an additional inspection
there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules. item, to check the status of improvement made by the licensee, such as defining of the recurrence
The status of daily operation management during the safety inspection period was also examined prevention measures for the root causes of the nonconformance.

179
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation As a result of the basic inspection on the status of management reviews, it was verified that inputs
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, and so forth. As a result, no particular problems and outputs for each required business process was clarified, problems was addressed, and thus the
were found. management reviews were functioning. As for the status of nonconformance management, it was
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for verified that corrective countermeasures and preventive measures were functioning effectively.
examination in this inspection were conducted properly. In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based
on the predefined safety preservation rules and manuals, and there were no items that violate the
safety preservation rules.
A follow-up was also conducted on the status of improvements made by the licensee regarding a
matter that was placed under surveillance in past inspections (“Incorrect discharge of the regenerated
replenishment water (MUWT) to the canal”). As a result, it was verified that these matters have been
rectified by improving the facilities and providing radiation protection education, etc.
As a result of the additional inspection, it was verified that improvement was made regarding the
wrongly-connected drain pipe, from emergency countermeasures to permanent countermeasures. The
instruction to always check the water source and the drain destination, etc., was reflected in the
radiation protection education, and a root cause analysis was being carried out. Therefore, it was
decided that the status of improvement of this matter should be verified at future safety inspections,
etc.
The status of daily operation management during the safety inspection period was also examined
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (manual start-up test of
the emergency diesel generator (A) of Unit 1), and so forth. As a result, no particular problem was
found.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
examination in this inspection were conducted properly.



(6) Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station
1st inspection 2nd inspection
Period of 1) Basic inspection period: June 1 (Mon) to June 12 (Fri), 2009 Period of 1) Basic inspection period: September 7 (Mon) to September 18 (Fri), 2009
inspection inspection
Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.) Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.)
items (1) Status of root cause analyses items (1) Status of management review (including inspections at the head office)
(2) Status of actions relating to reinforcement of the operator qualification system (2) Status of internal audits (inspections at the head office)
(3) Status of the power plant quality assurance plan for 2009 (3) Status of root cause analyses
(4) Status of fire prevention measures (4) Status of nonconformance management relating to human errors
(5) Status of routine tests (manual start-up test of the emergency diesel generator (A) of Unit 6, etc.) (5) Status of fire prevention measures (including inspections at the head office)
(attendance) (6) Status of earthquake reinforcement work
(7) Status of nonconformance management (attendance) (surprise inspection)
(8) Status of routine tests (manual start-up test of emergency diesel power generator (B) of Unit 2)
and safety activities such as reception of new fuel (attendance) (surprise inspection)

Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of root cause analyses, the status of actions Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of root cause analyses and the status of fire
results relating to reinforcement of the operator qualification system, the status of the power plant quality results prevention measures, etc.
assurance plan for 2009, and the status of fire prevention measures, etc. As described below, it was verified from the results of basic inspections that safety preservation
As described below, it was verified from the results of basic inspections that safety preservation activities for each inspection item were conducted properly based on the safety preservation rules
activities for each inspection item were conducted properly based on the safety preservation rules and that there were no matters that violate the safety preservation rules.
and that there were no matters that violate the safety preservation rules. As for the status of root cause analyses, it was verified that the common cause analysis for the
As for the status of root cause analyses, the revised contents of the cause analysis implementation “Work conducted without issuance of the work permit (hereinafter, referred to as PTW)” was
manual and the status of the common cause analysis conducted for the “Work conducted without conducted properly and the system used for root cause analysis was appropriate.
issuance of the PTW work permit” were reviewed. As for the status of fire prevention measures, it was verified that drastic reinforcement
In regard to the status of actions relating to reinforcement of the operator qualification system, it countermeasures for fire prevention control were reviewed and developed by the “Special Committee
was verified that procedures up to the designation of an external judgment authority by the licensee of the Drastic Reinforcement of Fire Prevention Control at Nuclear Power Station” (hereinafter,
were carried out properly. It was also verified that the availability of the operators who were referred to as Fire Prevention Control Special Committee). It was also verified at the power plant that

180
involved in the operation of the reactors, etc., was secured, and the safety education of those recurrence prevention measures (action plan) were taken based on the cases of fire outbreak that had
operators, under direction of the person responsible for operation, was carried out properly. occurred in the past.
As for the status of the power plant quality assurance plan for 2009, it was verified that the QMS In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based
assessment was carried out properly at the power plant in 2008 and that the quality assurance plan for on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules.
2009 was planned appropriately based on the quality policies of 2009. The status of daily operation management during the safety inspection period was also examined
As for the status of fire prevention measures, it was verified that the recurrence prevention by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
measures (action plan) for frequently-occurring fires were conducted satisfactorily. records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (manual start-up test of
The status of daily operation management during the safety inspection period was also examined the emergency diesel generator (B) of Unit 2) and the nonconformance management committee, etc.,
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation and so forth. As a result, no particular problem was found.
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (manual start-up test of In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
the emergency diesel generator (A) of Unit 6, etc.), and so forth. As a result, no particular problem examination in this inspection were conducted properly.
was found.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
examination in this inspection were conducted properly.
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station
3rd inspection 4th inspection
Period of 1) Basic inspection period: November 30 (Mon) to December 15 (Tue), 2009 Period of 1) Basic inspection period: March 1 (Mon) to March 11 (Thu), 2010
inspection 2) Additional inspection period: December 10 (Thu), 2009 inspection March 15 (Mon), 2010
2) Additional inspection period: March 12 (Fri), 2010
Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.) Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.)
items (1) Status of maintenance management items (1) Status of recurrence prevention measures
(2) Status of nonconformance management (2) Status of nonconformance management
(3) Status of nonconformance management relating to human errors
(3) Status of fatal accident and fire prevention measures
(4) Status of safety culture creation activities
(4) Status of routine tests (manual start-up test of the emergency diesel generator (B) of Unit 6) (5) Status of radioactive waste management
(attendance) (surprise inspection) (6) Status of routine tests (manual start-up test of the reactor isolation cooling system of Unit 7)
2) Additional inspection items (attendance) (surprise inspection)
(1) Status of improvement measures for the safety preservation rules violation (violation 2) relating 2) Additional inspection items
to bad coupling condition of the control rod drive mechanism and the control rod of Unit 6 (1) Status of improvement measures for the safety preservation rules violation (violation 3) relating
to the incorrect connection and discharge of radioactive liquid waste to the drain pipe in the
non-radioactive liquid waste treatment system at Fukushima Daiichi, Fukushima Daini, and
Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of maintenance management and the status Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Stations
Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of recurrence prevention measures, the
results of fatal accident and fire prevention measures, etc. To check the status of improvement made by the Inspection
status of nonconformance management, and the status of nonconformance management relating to
licensee for the safety preservation rules violation (violation 2) relating to “Bad coupling condition results human errors, etc. To check the status of improvement made by the licensee for the safety
of the control rod drive mechanism and the control rod of Unit 6,” this issue was also selected as an preservation rules violation (violation 3) relating to the “Incorrect connection and discharge of the
additional inspection item. radioactive liquid waste to the drain pipe in the non-radioactive liquid waste treatment system at
As described below, it was verified from the results of basic inspections that safety preservation Fukushima Daiichi, Fukushima Daini, and Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Stations,” this issue
activities for each inspection item were conducted properly based on the safety preservation rules was also selected as an additional inspection item.
and that there were no matters that violate the safety preservation rules. As a result of the basic inspection on the status of recurrence prevention measures, it was verified
that recurrence prevention measures were carried out, as scheduled, for two items, based on the
As for the status of maintenance management, it was verified that the contents of the in-house results of the full inspection of the power generating equipment. Improvement measures, such as
manual, which was prepared in response to the introduction of the new maintenance program, modification of the sea water monitoring transmission facility, are being taken. As for the status of
complied with the standards of the Japan Electric Association and that efforts relating to the new fire prevention measures, it was verified that additional countermeasures were being taken in the
maintenance program were taken appropriately. event that special dangerous goods were mixed in the tool box, etc. It was also verified that actions in

181
It was verified from the results of the inspections on the status of fatal accident and fire prevention response to the matters that were pointed out during the on-site inspection on the status of fire
prevention measures were taken satisfactorily. As for the status of the action plan based on the
measures that the recurrence prevention measures relating to fire, the nonconformance
countermeasures for fatal accidents, it was verified that measures were taken satisfactorily, based on
countermeasures for the fire that occurred in the turbine building ceiling crane in Unit 3, and the the action plan. As for the status of nonconformance management, it was verified that improvement
recurrence prevention measures relating to fatal accidents, were planned, and are proceeding, measures relating to nonconformance management were being considered, the activities in 2009
appropriately. were being assessed and considered and the action plan for 2010 was being considered. It was also
In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based verified that nonconformance management activities relating to other matters (such as work
on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules. conducted without issuance of the PTW (work permit), gum and cigarettes, etc. found in controlled
areas, and contaminated objects exceeding 4 Bq/cm2 found in the contamination inspection during
As a result of the additional inspection on the status of improvement for the safety preservation transportation) were carried out appropriately. As a result of the inspections concerning the status of
rules violation (violation 2) relating to “Bad coupling condition of the control rod drive mechanism nonconformance management relating to human errors, it was verified that cause investigation and
and the control rod of Unit 6,” it was verified that the recurrence prevention measures, which were recurrence prevention measures for the nonconformities caused by human errors were carried out
“Being improved” at the time of the 4th safety inspection in 2008, was taken in accordance with the properly and that continuous efforts to reduce human errors were made.
plan. In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based
The status of daily operation management during the safety inspection period was also examined on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules.
As a result of the additional inspection on the status of improvement measures for the safety
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation preservation rules violation (violation 3) relating to the “Incorrect connection and discharge of
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (manual start-up test of radioactive liquid waste to the drain pipe in the non-radioactive liquid waste treatment system at
the emergency diesel generator (B) of Unit 6), and so forth. As a result, no particular problem was Fukushima Daiichi, Fukushima Daini, and Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Stations,” it was
found. verified that recurrence prevention measures are being taken as planned.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for The status of daily operation management during the safety inspection period was also examined
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
examination in this inspection were conducted properly.
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (manual start-up test of
the reactor isolation cooling system of Unit 7) and comprehensive disaster prevention training
relating to initial fire fighting and emergency actions, and so forth. As a result, no particular problem
was found.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
examination in this inspection were conducted properly.



(7) Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station
1st inspection 2nd inspection
Period of 1) Basic inspection period: June 1 (Mon) to June 12 (Fri), 2009 Period of 1) Basic inspection period: August 27 (Thu) to August 28 (Fri), 2009
inspection 2) Additional inspection period: June 18 (Thu) to June 19 (Fri), 2009 inspection September 2 (Wed) to September 11 (Fri), 2009
Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.) Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.)
items (1) Status of procurement management activities items (1) Status of operational management
(2) Status of fuel management (2) Status of facility maintenance relating to termination of Units 1 and 2
(3) Status of actions relating to reinforcement of the operator qualification system (3) Status of response to the earthquake that occurred on August 11, 2009
(4) Status of measures implemented to resolve violations found in the past (surveillance) (4) Status of regular inspection tours (attendance) (surprise inspection)
(5) Status of record management (surprise inspection) (5) Status of operation check of the high-pressure core spray pump (HPCS pump) system of Unit 3
(6) Status of routine tests (manual start-up test of the emergency diesel generator (C) of Unit 3, etc.) (attendance) (surprise inspection)
(attendance) (surprise inspection)
2) Additional inspection items
(1) Status of improvement measures for noncompliance with the procedures for the gaseous waste
treatment system of Unit 5 (violation 2)
Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of procurement management activities, the Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of operational management activities, the
results status of fuel management, and the status of actions relating to reinforcement of the operator results status of facility maintenance activities relating to termination of Units 1 and 2, and the status of
qualification system, etc. To check the status of improvement made by the licensee based on the response to the earthquake that occurred on August 11, 2009, etc.
recurrence prevention measures for the safety preservation rules violation (violation 2) relating to In the basic inspection on the status of operational management activities, the status of the
“Nonconformance with the procedures for the gaseous waste treatment system of Unit 5,” this issue business processes in the power generation section (for which operation management activities at the
was also selected as an additional inspection item. operation plant were to be covered due to organizational change) was reviewed, and it was verified
As a result of the basic inspection on the status of procurement management activities, it was that the processes required in the quality management system were clarified.
verified that major improvement work for Unit 4 was carried out appropriately based on the in-house As for the status of facility maintenance activities relating to termination of Units 1 and 2, it was
regulations. As for the status of fuel management, it was verified that transportation of MOX fuel
verified that the business processes that was continued from the previous organization and the
was carried out in accordance with the predefined in-house regulations. As for the status of actions
activities for new business operations were carried out appropriately. These conclusions were based
relating to reinforcement of the operator qualification system, it was verified that in-house
on the results of the review of facility maintenance status in the business processes conducted by the
regulations were defined, in order to help external authorities other than the licensee judge the status
of the system. These activities were carried out in accordance with the regulations. newly-established Environmental Conservation Department, which was put in charge of facility

182
A follow-up was also conducted on the status of improvements made by the licensee regarding maintenance and radiation waste management at terminated plants.
matters that were placed under surveillance in past inspections (partially unclear content about In addition, as for the status of response to the earthquake that occurred on August 11, 2009, it was
responsibilities and rights regarding the safety education for personnel of subcontractors), it was verified that maintenance activities, such as risk management activities taken in the emergency at the
verified that the in-house regulations were reviewed to clarify the responsibilities and rights of the power plant, were carried out properly, that the countermeasures at and after occurrence of the
licensee and the subcontractors and the matter was now rectified by making appropriate earthquake were based on the safety preservation rules and the special maintenance plan, and that
improvements. there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules.
In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based Surprise inspections were also conducted on the status of regular inspection tours and the status of
on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules. operation checks of the high-pressure core spray pump system of Unit 3. As a result, it was verified
Though it was verified from the results of the additional inspection that an individual corrective that the checks of the reactor facilities and power generating equipment that were required by the
measure implementation plan that reflected the corrective measure policies was prepared and safety preservation rules were conducted properly.
activities were carried out satisfactorily in accordance with it, corrective action, such as improvement The status of daily operation management during the safety inspection period was also examined
of the processes to be followed when the operation procedures were defined or revised, was ongoing. by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
It was decided that the status of improvement of these matters should be verified at future safety records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending the inspections and reviewing the
inspections, etc. records on the equipment and systems in Units 3 and 4 that were required to be checked at
The status of daily operation management during the safety inspection period was also examined occurrence of earthquake in the special maintenance plan, and so forth. As a result, no particular
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
problems were found.
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (operational test of the
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
electrically-powered valves in the boric acid injection system of Unit 3, start-up test of pumps (A)
examination in this inspection were conducted properly.
and (B), manual start-up test of the emergency diesel power generator (C) of Unit 3, manual start-up
test of the pump (B) in the high-pressure core injection system of Unit 5), and so forth. As a result,
no particular problem was found.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
examination in this inspection were conducted properly.
Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station
3rd inspection 4th inspection
Period of 1) Basic inspection period: November 16 (Mon) to November 26 (Thu), 2009 Period of 1) Basic inspection period: February 15 (Mon) to February 26 (Fri), 2010
inspection November 30 (Mon) to December 2 (Wed), 2009 inspection 2) Additional inspection period: March 1 (Mon) to March 2 (Mon), 2010
2) Additional inspection period: November 27 (Fri) to November 30 (Mon), 2009
Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.) Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.)
items (1) Status of nonconformance management and corrective/preventive measures items (1) Status of maintenance management
(2) Status of radioactive waste management (2) Status of the quality management system operations
(3) Status of internal audits (3) Status of prevention of deterioration in safety culture and organizational climate
(4) Status routine tests (routine test of the high-pressure core injection system of Hamaoka Unit 5) (4) Status of routine tests (routine test of the residual heat removal system (herein after, referred to
(attendance) (surprise inspection) as RHR) (B), etc. in Hamaoka Unit 3) (attendance) (surprise inspection)
2) Additional inspection items 2) Additional inspection items
(1) Status of improvement measures for noncompliance with the procedures for the gaseous waste (1) Status of improvement measures for the safety preservation rules violation (violation 3) relating
treatment system of Unit 5 (violation 2) to the radioactive waste water leakage from Hamaoka Unit 3

Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of nonconformance management and Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of maintenance management and the status
results corrective preventive measures and the status of radioactive waste management, etc. To check the results of the quality management system operations, etc. To check the status of improvement measures for
status of improvement measures made by the licensee for the safety preservation rules violation violation of the safety preservation rules violation (violation 3) relating to the “Radioactive waste
(violation 2) relating to “Noncompliance with the procedures for the gaseous waste treatment water leakage from Hamaoka Unit 3,” this issue was also selected as an additional inspection item.
system of Unit 5,” this issue was also selected as an additional inspection item. As a result of the basic inspection on the status of maintenance management, it was verified that
As a result of the basic inspection on the status of nonconformance management and corrective the president had defined long-term maintenance management policies and a maintenance
preventive measures, it was verified that nonconformities that occurred in 2009 was picked up by management implementation plan and that the organization defined maintenance management goals
the sampling method and were managed and processed based on the guidelines and procedures, and and carried out activities according to the president's policies. Also, as a result of the review of the
that the nonconformance management and corrective preventive measures were carried out maintenance assessment, it was verified that no particular problems were found.
properly. In regard to the status of the quality management system operations, as a result of the inspection
The status of radioactive waste management in the business processes conducted by the on the statuses of quality goal operations and accomplishment assessment of the implementation of
Environmental Conservation Department, which was newly established due to organizational the quality management system, it was verified that operations were properly conducted and directed

183
change on July 1, 2009, was also reviewed. As a result, it was verified that the business processes at accomplishing the goals defined in the duty execution plan. No particular problems were found.
were conducted properly based on the in-house regulations and the input data for the management In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based
reviews were created appropriately. on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules. As
As a result of the additional inspection on the status of improvement measures made by the a result of the additional inspection, it was verified that nonconformance management conducted at
licensee for the safety preservation rules violation (violation 2) relating to “Noncompliance with the occurrence of nonconformance was carried out properly and it was determined that a root cause
procedures for the gaseous waste treatment system of Unit 5,” it was verified that an individual analysis should be conducted as a corrective and recurrence prevention measure. Therefore, it was
corrective measure implementation plan that reflected the corrective measure policies was prepared determined that the status of improvement measures made to rectify this matter should be verified
and activities were carried out in accordance with it, and that comprehensive management of continuously by conducting safety inspections.
individual recurrence prevention measures, implementation of individual management activities The status of daily operation management during the safety inspection period was also examined
(system and schedule, etc.), review and implementation of the implementation plan, and planning by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
and implementation of effectiveness assessments were all operated properly. records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (routine test of the RHR
The status of daily operation management during the safety inspection period was also examined B) of Unit 3, etc.), and so forth. As a result, no particular problem was found.
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (routine test of the examination in this inspection were conducted properly.
equipment in high-pressure core injection system of Unit 5), questioning regarding and conducting
on-site investigation on the waste water leakage from Unit 3, attending and reviewing the
inspections on the equipment and systems in Unit 5 that were required to be checked following the
earthquake that occurred on August 11, 2009 in the special maintenance plan, and so forth. As a
result, no particular problems were found.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
examination in this inspection were conducted properly.



(8) Shika Nuclear Power Station Shika Nuclear Power Station
1st inspection 2nd inspection
Period of 1) Basic inspection period: June 1 (Mon) to June 12 (Fri), 2009 Period of 1) Basic inspection period: August 31 (Mon) to September 11 (Fri), 2009
inspection inspection
Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.) Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.)
items (1) Status of recurrence prevention measures concerning the result of the full inspection of the items (1) Status of improvements to the quality management system
power generating equipment (including inspections at the head office) (2) Status of maintenance management
(2) Status of management review (including inspections at the head office) (3) Status of fuel management
(3) Status of efforts to build a safety culture (including inspections at the head office) (4) Status of safety preservation education and training
(4) Status of radiation management (5) Status of measures implemented to resolve violations found in the past (surveillance)
(5) Status of internal audits (including monitoring and measurement) (including inspections at the (6) Status of routine tests (operational test of the reactor auxiliary equipment cooling water system
head office) and cooling sea water system (B) of Unit 1) (attendance) (surprise inspection)
(6) Status of actions relating to reinforcement of the operator qualification system (7) Status of reactor inspection tour activities by staff in the power generation section (attendance)
(7) Status of measures implemented to resolve violations found in the past (surprise inspection)
(8) Status of routine tests (manual start-up test of the HPCS diesel generator of Unit 1, operational
test of the reactor auxiliary equipment cooling water system and cooling sea water system (C) of
Unit 2) (attendance) (surprise inspection) Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of improvement of the quality management
(9) Status of committee operations regarding safety activities (review meeting of corrective and results system and the status of maintenance management, etc. As a result of the basic inspection on the
preventive measures) (attendance) (surprise inspection) status of improvement of the quality management system, it was verified that improvement of the
Safety inspections were conducted to verify the “Status of recurrence prevention measures management review system (input and output items, etc.), review of quality goals and surveillance
Inspection
concerning the result of the full inspection of the power generating equipment,” etc. items, and consideration of document standardization were completed and the in-house regulations
results
As a result of the basic inspection on the status of recurrence prevention measures (concerning the were revised in response. Improvements made to rectify this matter was conducted.
result of the full inspection of the power generating equipment), it was verified that a plan for 2009 As for the status of maintenance management, it was verified that a system was established in
was defined based on the in-house procedures and was being implemented continuously, in the same which each of the departments that were in charge of maintenance operations should set their own
way as the previous year. In addition, it was verified that a plan to conduct each of the recurrence maintenance management goals to be accomplished, assess the results, and conduct necessary
prevention measures as daily activities was being considered. reviews. A monitoring plan, etc. of the maintenance method and maintenance activity management
A follow-up was also conducted on the status of improvements made by the licensee regarding that corresponds to the importance in maintenance of each structure type and equipment was

184
matters that were placed under surveillance in past inspections (“Improper management of operations prepared based on the maintenance program and measures required to introduce the new inspection
related to the grease leak in the trash separation area on the 3rd floor of Unit 2 waste processing system were defined and implemented.
building”) (surveillance). As a result, it was verified that actions regarding waste handling and A follow-up was also conducted on the status of improvements made by the licensee regarding
sorting were carried out. It was also verified that the improvements regarding collection and matters that were placed under surveillance in past inspections (“Improper management of operations
treatment of waste were not completed yet but ongoing. related to the grease leak in the trash separation area on the 3rd floor of Unit 2 waste processing
In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based building (3rd inspection in 2008)” and “Incorrect operations steps regarding the operation for
on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules. function check of the reactor isolation cooling system at start-up of Unit 1 (1st inspection in 2009)”).
The status of daily operation management during the safety inspection period was also examined As a result, it was verified that the waste that caused the problem of “Improper management of
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation operations related to the grease leak in the trash separation area on the 3rd floor of Unit 2 waste
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (manual start-up of the processing building (3rd inspection in 2008)” was treated in accordance with the relevant procedures.
HPCS diesel generator of Unit 1, operational test of the reactor auxiliary equipment cooling water As for “Incorrect operations steps regarding the operation for function check of the reactor isolation
system and cooling sea water system (C) of Unit 2), and so forth. As a result, no particular problem cooling system at start-up of Unit 1 (1st inspection in 2009),” it was verified that review and revision
was found. of the relevant in-house procedures was completed.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based
examination in this inspection were conducted properly. on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules.
The status of daily operation management during the safety inspection period was also examined
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (operational test of the
reactor auxiliary cooling water system and sea water system (B) of Unit 1), and so forth. As a result,
no particular problem was found.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
examination in this inspection were conducted properly.
Shika Nuclear Power Station Shika Nuclear Power Station
3rd inspection 4th inspection
Period of 1) Basic inspection period: November 30 (Mon) to December 11 (Fri), 2009 Period of 1) Basic inspection period: March 1 (Mon) to March 12 (Fri), 2010
inspection inspection
Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.) Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.)
items (1) Status of procurement management items (1) Status of recurrence prevention measures concerning the result of the full inspection of the
(2) Status of radioactive waste management power generating equipment (including inspections at the head office)
(3) Status of measures implemented to resolve violations found in the past (2) Status of efforts to build a safety culture (including inspections at the head office)
(4) Status of routine tests (manual start-up test of the high-pressure core spray pump of Unit 1 and (3) Status of cause analysis, etc. relating to nonconformance management, corrective actions, and
manual full opening and full closing test of the electrically-powered valve in the high-pressure preventive measures
core spray system) (attendance) (4) Status of actions for the revision of safety preservation rules for reactor facilities
(5) Status of intermediate inspection tours of reactor facilities (attendance) (surprise inspection) (5) Status of routine tests (manual start-up test of the high-pressure core spray pump of Unit 1, etc.)
(attendance) (surprise inspection)
(6) Status of committee operations regarding safety activities (human performance improvement
promotion committee) (attendance) (surprise inspection)

Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of procurement management activities, etc. Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the “Status of recurrence prevention measures
results As a result of the basic inspection on the status of procurement management activities, it was results concerning the result of the full inspection of the power generating equipment,” etc.
verified that the importance management of procured products and services and the assessment and As a result of the basic inspection on the “Status of recurrence prevention measures concerning the
selection of procurement sources were conducted based on the procurement management rules. result of the full inspection of the power generating equipment,” it was verified that PDCA cycle
Subsequent transmission of procurement requests, etc. to the procurement sources and validation of activities were carried out based on the plan for recurrence prevention, activities for conducting the
the procured products were carried out properly. As for the entry of foreign material (cloth) found in recurrence prevention measures as daily activities, such as quick and assured announcement and
the 2nd periodical inspection of Unit 2, it was verified that both “System” (check timing and methods reporting, were carried out continuously and that promotional activities for conducting the contents
to prevent foreign substances from entering) and “Consciousness” (ideas for individual in the action plan as daily activities, such as clear description of in-house commitments at the
countermeasures based on human error reduction tasks) were being improved. departments in charge, were carried out.
In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based
on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules. on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules.

185
The status of daily operation management during the safety inspection period was also examined The status of daily operation management during the safety inspection period was also examined
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (manual start-up test of records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (manual start-up test of
the high-pressure core spray pump of Unit 1 and manual full opening and full closing test of the the high-pressure core spray pump of Unit 1, etc.) and the human performance improvement
electrically-powered valve in the high-pressure core spray system), and so forth. As a result, no promotion committee, and so forth. As a result, no particular problems were found.
particular problems were found. In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for examination in this inspection were conducted properly.
examination in this inspection were conducted properly.



(9) Mihama Power Station Mihama Power Station
1st inspection 2nd inspection
Period of 1) Basic inspection period: June 1 (Mon) to June 12 (Fri), 2009 Period of 1) Basic inspection period: September 1 (Tue) to September 14 (Mon), 2009
inspection inspection
Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.) Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.)
items (1) Status of safety culture creation activities (including inspections at the Nuclear Headquarters) items (1) Status of safety culture creation activities (including inspections at the Nuclear Headquarters)
(2) Status of maintenance management (2) Status of maintenance management
(3) Status of management review (including inspections at the Nuclear Headquarters) (3) Status of accident prevention activities (including inspections at the Nuclear Headquarters)
(4) Status of actions relating to reinforcement of the operator qualification system (inspection at the (4) Status of radiation management
Nuclear Headquarters only) (5) Status of construction work such as inspections during the 24th periodical inspection of Unit 1
(5) Status of emergency countermeasures (attendance) (surprise inspection)
(6) Status of the fire prevention patrol relating to the 25th periodical inspection of Unit 2 (surprise (6) Status of routine tests (start-up test of the charging pump of Unit 2) (attendance) (surprise
inspection) inspection)
(7) Status of routine tests (operational test of the control rod in Unit 1) (attendance) (surprise Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of safety culture creation activities, the
inspection) results status of accident prevention activities, the status of maintenance management, etc.
Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of safety culture creation activities, the As for the status of safety culture creation activities and the status of accident prevention activities,
results status of maintenance management, the status of management review, etc. the inspections were conducted at the Nuclear Headquarters. The inspections were also conducted at
As for the status of safety culture creation activities and the status of management review, the the Nuclear Headquarters in conjunction with the Ohi Nuclear Safety Inspector Office and the
inspections were conducted at the Nuclear Headquarters in conjunction with the Ohi Nuclear Safety Takahama Nuclear Safety Inspector Office and with cooperation from the General Nuclear Safety
Inspector Office and the Takahama Nuclear Safety Inspector Office and with cooperation from the Manager for the Wakasa region.
General Nuclear Safety Manager for the Wakasa region. As a result of the inspection on the status of safety culture creation activities, it was verified that
As a result of the inspection on the status of safety culture creation activities, it was verified that the “Five basic action policies,” which were based on the president’s speech about the lessons
policies for safety culture creation continued on from the quality policies of the previous year and learned from the accident that occurred in Mihama Unit 3, were maintained without deterioration or
were in accordance with the “Five basic action policies.” These policies were based on the transformation.
president's speech about the lessons learned from the accident that occurred in Mihama Unit 3. As for the status of the action plan concerning recurrence prevention measures for the accident in
It was also verified that an annual plan was defined based on the president's instructions, Mihama Power Station Unit 3, it was verified that for the only item for which a halting strategy had
considering the assessment results in the previous year. Continuous efforts for improvement were not been completed since last year (“Restrictions on entry to a plant in operation”), discussions on

186
made by defining six directions and eight priority measures. the definition of “in operation,” the work required to assure safety and quality in the turbine building,
As for the status of the action plan concerning recurrence prevention measures for the accident in etc., and the countermeasures to eliminate the concerns of affiliated companies were carried out by
Mihama Power Station Unit 3, it was verified that discussions on the only item for which a halting the “Review WG on maintenance activities during operation,” etc., under the basic policies of
strategy had not been completed since last year (“Restrictions on entry to a plant in operation”) were assuring transparency and prohibiting work other than that done from the viewpoint of “reactor
started by the “Review WG on maintenance activities during operation,” etc. in order to clarify that safety, labor safety, and power generation destruction prevention.”
work other than that done from the viewpoint of “reactor safety, labor safety, and power generation As for the status of accident prevention activities, it was verified that a specific recurrence
destruction prevention” was prohibited. prevention measure execution plan was defined and implemented in response to the fatal accident
In the management reviews, the effectiveness of the quality management system (QMS) activities matter that occurred at Ohi Power Station. In response to the common factors evident with the fatal
was discussed and assessed. As a result, it was verified that instructions was given by the president. accident at another power plant, Kansai Power Station, it was also verified that continuous efforts for
In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based improvement relating to nuclear safety were made by satisfactorily taking and assessing recurrence
on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules. prevention measures for the accident at Mihama Unit 3, as well as accident and trouble reduction
The status of daily operation management during the safety inspection period was also examined countermeasures, and safety culture creation activities.
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation As for the status of maintenance management, it was verified that the processes of setting the
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (operational test of the maintenance target range, planning the maintenance, implementing the maintenance, and checking
control rod in Unit 1), and so forth. As a result, no particular problem was found. and assessing the inspection results were all carried out properly.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based
examination in this inspection were conducted properly. on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules.
The status of daily operation management during the safety inspection period was also examined
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (start-up test of the
filling pump of Unit 2), and so forth. As a result, no particular problems were found.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
examination in this inspection were conducted properly.
Mihama Power Station Mihama Power Station
3rd inspection 4th inspection
Period of 1) Basic inspection period: December 1 (Tue) to December 14 (Mon), 2009 Period of 1) Basic inspection period: March 1 (Mon) to March 12 (Fri), 2010
inspection inspection
Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.) Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.)
items (1) Status of safety culture creation activities items (1) Status of safety culture creation activities (including inspections at the Nuclear Headquarters)
(2) Status of maintenance management (2) Status of maintenance management
(3) Status of recording and reporting (3) Status of management review (power station review) (including inspections at the Nuclear
(4) Status of identification management of outdoor facilities that are important in maintenance Headquarters)
(attendance) (surprise inspection) (4) Status of emergency countermeasures
(5) Status of routine tests (start-up test of the internal spray pump of Unit 1) (attendance) (surprise (5) Status of non-radioactive waste management
inspection) (6) Status of items taken out of controlled areas (surprise inspection)
(7) Status of routine tests (start-up test of the pump in the residual heat removal system of Unit 1)
(attendance) (surprise inspection)

Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of safety culture creation activities, the Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of safety culture creation activities, the
results status of maintenance management, etc. results status of maintenance management, the status of management review (power station review), etc.
As a result of the inspection on the status of safety culture creation activities, it was verified that As for the status of safety culture creation activities, the inspections were conducted at the Nuclear
the “Five basic action policies,” which were based on the president’s speech about the lessons Headquarters in conjunction with the Ohi Nuclear Safety Inspector Office and the Takahama Nuclear
learned from the accident that occurred in Mihama Unit 3, were maintained without deterioration or Safety Inspector Office and with cooperation from the General Nuclear Safety Manager for the
transformation. Wakasa region.
As for the status of the action plan concerning recurrence prevention measures for the accident in As a result of the inspection on the status of safety culture creation activities, it was verified that
Mihama Power Station Unit 3, it was verified that for the restrictions on entry to a plant in operation, the “Five basic action policies,” which were based on the president’s speech about the lessons
discussions on the work required to assure safety and quality in the turbine building, etc., in learned from the accident that occurred in Mihama Unit 3, were maintained without deterioration or
operation and the countermeasures to eliminate the concerns of affiliated companies were all carried transformation and that efforts for disintegration prevention will be made continuously in 2010 in
out satisfactorily by the “Review WG on maintenance activities during operation,” etc. These accordance with the quality policies.
activities will continue to be reviewed in future safety inspections, etc. As for the status of the action plan concerning recurrence prevention measures for the accident in

187
As for the status of maintenance management, the maintenance management activities, etc. that Mihama Power Station Unit 3, it was verified that in regards to the restrictions on entry to a plant in
correspond to the importance in maintenance were reviewed. As a result, it was verified that each operation, the public opinion invitation for the report of the discussion results at the “Review WG on
activity was carried out appropriately. maintenance activities during operation” was complete and efforts to define in-house standards as
In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based halting measures were proceeding satisfactorily. These activities will continue to be reviewed in
on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules. future safety inspections, etc.
The status of daily operation management during the safety inspection period was also examined As for the status of maintenance management, it was verified that the PDCA cycle regarding
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation maintenance management activities was properly implemented and that improvement activities for
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (start-up test of the the effectiveness of the maintenance management were carried out continuously.
internal spray pump of Unit 1), and so forth. As a result, no particular problem was found. As for the status of management review (power station review), it was verified that the assessment
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for of the quality assurance activities at the power station was carried out properly in the power station
examination in this inspection were conducted properly. review in 2009 and the results were transmitted accurately as input information for the quality
assurance meeting of the Nuclear Headquarters. It was also verified that the input information from
three power stations was reviewed properly at that quality assurance meeting and the output from the
meeting was applied as input information for the management reviews.
The status of daily operation management during the safety inspection period was also examined
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (start-up test of the
residual heat removal pump of Unit 1), and so forth. As a result, no particular problems were found.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
examination in this inspection were conducted properly.



(10) Ohi Power Station Ohi Power Station
1st inspection 2nd inspection
Period of 1) Basic inspection period: June 1 (Mon) to June 12 (Fri), 2009 Period of 1) Basic inspection period: August 31 (Mon) to September 11 (Fri), 2009
inspection inspection
Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.) Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.)
items (1) Status of safety culture creation activities (including inspections at the Nuclear Headquarters) items (1) Status of safety culture creation activities (including inspections at the Nuclear Headquarters)
(2) Status of management review, etc. (including inspections at the Nuclear Headquarters) (2) Status of accident prevention activities (including inspections at the Nuclear Headquarters)
(3) Status of actions relating to reinforcement of the operator qualification system (inspections at (3) Status of maintenance management
Nuclear Headquarters) (4) Status of internal audits
(4) Status of maintenance management (5) Status of routine tests (start-up test of the high-pressure injection pump of Unit 3, etc.)
(5) Status of routine tests (start-up test of the diesel power generator A of Unit 3, etc.) (attendance) (attendance) (surprise inspection)
(surprise inspection) (6) Status of work management (surprise inspection)
(6) Status of restrictions on entry to a turbine building in operation (surprise inspection)

Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of safety culture creation activities, the Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of safety culture creation activities, the
results status of maintenance management, etc. results status of accident prevention activities, the status of maintenance management, etc.
As for the status of safety culture creation activities, the inspections were conducted at the Nuclear As for the status of safety culture creation activities and the status of accident prevention activities,
Headquarters in conjunction with the Mihama Nuclear Safety Inspector Office and the Takahama the inspections were conducted at the Nuclear Headquarters. Inspections were also conducted at the
Nuclear Safety Inspector Office and with cooperation from the General Nuclear Safety Manager for Nuclear Headquarters in conjunction with the Mihama Nuclear Safety Inspector Office and the
the Wakasa region. Takahama Nuclear Safety Inspector Office and with cooperation from the General Nuclear Safety
As a result of basic inspection on the status of safety culture creation activities, it was verified that Manager for the Wakasa region.
the action plan for 2009 was defined appropriately by reflecting the assessment results in 2008 and As a result of basic inspection on the status of safety culture creation activities, it was verified that
the president's instructions, with collaboration between the Nuclear Headquarters and the power the action plan for 2009, which was designed to reflect the president's instructions, was deployed and
station. implemented as a specific action plan at the power station.
As for the status of maintenance management, it was verified that the construction work for As for the status of accident prevention activities, it was verified that the accident and trouble
earthquake resistance in the third extracting system and in the extracting and drain system piping, reduction activities that have been carried out continuously since 2008 were becoming settled. As for
etc., was carried out properly in accordance with the plan for earthquake safety assessment defined in the recurrence prevention measures for fatal accidents, it was verified that a specific recurrence

188
reports on aging technology assessments of Unit 2, etc. prevention measure execution plan was defined and implemented.
In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based As for the status of maintenance management, it was verified that the importance of each of the
on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules. systems and items of equipment included in the maintenance target range (which was defined in
The status of daily operation management during the safety inspection period was also examined accordance with the maintenance management implementation policies and the maintenance
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation management goals) was defined, and that the 23rd cycle maintenance plan for Unit 1 was defined
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (start-up test of the based on the inspection plan and the assessment results of maintenance effectiveness from the
diesel power generator (A) of Unit 3, etc.), and so forth. As a result, no particular problems were maintenance activities, etc., (monitoring results of the maintenance activity management indexes,
found. aging technology assessments and periodical safety review results, etc.)
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based
examination in this inspection were conducted properly. on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules.
The status of daily operation management during the safety inspection period was also examined
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (start-up test of the
high-pressure injection pump of Unit 3, etc), and so forth. As a result, no particular problems were
found.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
examination in this inspection were conducted properly.
Ohi Power Station Ohi Power Station
3rd inspection 4th inspection
Period of 1) Basic inspection period: December 2 (Wed) to December 15 (Tue), 2009 Period of 1) Basic inspection period: March 1 (Mon) to March 12 (Fri), 2010
inspection inspection
Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.) Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.)
items (1) Status of accident prevention activities items (1) Status of accident prevention activities (including inspections at the Nuclear Headquarters)
(2) Status of maintenance management (maintenance plan) (2) Status of safety culture creation activities (including inspections at the Nuclear Headquarters)
(3) Status of procurement management (3) Status of maintenance management
(4) Status of emergency countermeasures (4) Status of management review (power station review) (including inspections at the Nuclear
(5) Status of fire prevention activities (surprise inspection) Headquarters)
(6) Status of routine tests (start-up test of the charging pump C of Unit 4) (attendance) (surprise (5) Status of routine tests (start-up test of the motor-driven auxiliary feed water pump, etc.)
inspection) (attendance) (surprise inspection)
(6) Status of inspection tours (surprise inspection)

Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of accident prevention activities, the status Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of accident prevention activities, the status
results of maintenance management, etc. results of culture creation activities, the status of maintenance management, etc. As for the status of accident
As a result of the basic inspection on the status of accident prevention activities, it was verified prevention activities, the status of safety culture creation activities, and the status of management
that the efforts for accident and trouble reduction activities that have been carried out continuously review (power station review), the inspections were conducted at the Nuclear Headquarters in
since 2008 were being conducted as planned. In addition, it was verified that the recurrence conjunction with the Mihama Nuclear Safety Inspector Office and the Takahama Nuclear Safety
prevention activities for fatal accidents were carried out satisfactorily. Inspector Office and with cooperation from the General Nuclear Safety Manager for the Wakasa
As for the status of maintenance management, it was verified that selection of a maintenance region.
method, validity checking of time-based maintenance, and data collection and analysis of the As a result of the basic inspection on the status of accident prevention activities, it was verified
state-based maintenance were carried out as activities for optimization of maintenance management, that the assessment results regarding the efforts for accident and trouble reduction activities that have
and that the 14th cycle maintenance plan for Unit 3 was defined properly based on the activity been carried out continuously since last year were reviewed and the recurrence prevention activities
information and monitoring results relating to daily maintenance and the effectiveness assessment of for fatal accidents were carried out satisfactorily. As for the status of safety culture creation activities,
the maintenance plan for Unit 1. it was verified that the review for this year was conducted by the Nuclear Safety Culture Promotion
In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based Committee, and from the assessment results of the three pillars, “Leader’s commitment,”

189
on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules. “Communication,” and “Learning organization,” challenges and direction of priority measures for
The status of daily operation management during the safety inspection period was also examined the next year were derived. As for the status of maintenance management, it was verified that
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation maintenance management was conducted based on the repair activity guidelines summary and
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (start-up test of the effectiveness assessment of the maintenance was carried out. It was also verified that information
charging pump C of Unit 4, etc.), and so forth. As a result, no particular problems were found. was collected about the troubles at other power stations and NUCIA and discussions for further
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for improvement of maintenance management activities were held.
examination in this inspection were conducted properly. In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based
on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules.
The status of daily operation management during the safety inspection period was also examined
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (start-up test of the
motor-driven auxiliary feed water pump, etc.) and the review of the inspection tours conducted by
the licensee, and so forth. As a result, no particular problems were found.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
examination in this inspection were conducted properly.



(11) Takahama Power Station Takahama Power Station
1st inspection 2nd inspection
Period of 1) Basic inspection period: June 1 (Mon) to June 12 (Fri), 2009 Period of 1) Basic inspection period: August 31 (Mon) to September 11 (Fri), 2009
inspection inspection
Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.) Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.)
items (1) Status of management review, etc. (including inspections at the Nuclear Headquarters) items (1) Status of accident prevention activities (including inspections at the Nuclear Headquarters)
(2) Status of actions relating to reinforcement of the operator qualification system (inspections at (2) Status of procurement management activities (fuel division)
Nuclear Headquarters only) (3) Status of safety preservation education and training (for personnel)
(3) Status of safety culture creation activities (including inspections at the Nuclear Headquarters) (4) Status of fuel management (imported fuel) (including inspections at the Nuclear Headquarters)
(4) Status of emergency countermeasures (relating to nuclear disaster prevention) (5) Status of non-radioactive waste and radioactive solid waste management
(5) Status of recording and reporting management
(6) Status of water quality management
(7) Status of duties of chief reactor engineers (surprise inspection)
(8) Status of routine tests (start-up test of the turbine-driven auxiliary feed water pump of Unit 2,
etc.) (attendance) (surprise inspection)

Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of management review, the status of actions Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of accident prevention activities, the status
results relating to reinforcement of the operator qualification system, the status of safety culture creation results of procurement management activities (fuel division), the status of fuel management (imported fuel),
activities, etc. etc.
As for the status of management review, the status of actions relating to reinforcement of the As for the status of accident prevention activities and the status of fuel management (imported
operator qualification system, and the status of safety culture creation activities, the inspections were fuel), inspections were also conducted at the Nuclear Headquarters. Inspections were also conducted
conducted at the Nuclear Headquarters in conjunction with the Mihama Nuclear Safety Inspector at the Nuclear Headquarters in conjunction with the Mihama Nuclear Safety Inspector Office and
Office and Ohi Nuclear Safety Inspector Office and with cooperation from the General Nuclear Ohi Nuclear Safety Inspector Office and with cooperation from the General Nuclear Safety Manager
Safety Manager for the Wakasa region. for the Wakasa region.
As a result of the basic inspection on the status of management review, it was verified that the As a result of the basic inspection on the status of accident prevention activities, it was verified
effectiveness of the quality management system (QMS) activities was discussed and assessed that a specific recurrence prevention measure execution plan was defined and implemented in
properly in the power station steering meetings (Conference on Long-Term Planning) held at the response to the fatal accident that occurred at Ohi Power Station. As for the status of procurement

190
power station, and the results of the power station reviews were discussed and assessed in quality management activities (fuel division), it was verified that procurement activities for transportation,
assurance meetings held at the Nuclear Headquarters. As for the status of actions relating to storage, inspection, and replacement of fuel were all carried out properly based on the in-house
reinforcement of the operator qualification system, it was verified that the document network was standards.
reviewed internally by the licensee and that a system to maintain the independence, impartiality, and In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based
fairness of the judging authorities was organized. As for the status of safety culture creation on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules.
activities, it was verified not only that priority measures regarding safety culture creation activities The status of daily operation management during the safety inspection period was also examined
were reflected in the quality goals in the same way as in 2008 but also that these safety culture by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
creation activities were discussed in power station steering group meetings lead by the general records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (start-up test of the
manager at the power station. The results of these assessments were discussed and assessed at the charging pump and the high-pressure injection pump of Unit 2, etc.), and so forth. As a result, no
Nuclear Headquarters. In addition, it was verified that the direction of the priority measures forming particular problem was found.
the basis of the safety culture creation activities was shown. In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based examination in this inspection were conducted properly.
on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules.
The status of daily operation management during the safety inspection period was also examined
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (start-up test of
turbine-driven auxiliary feed water pump of Unit 2, etc.), and so forth. As a result, no particular
problem was found.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
examination in this inspection were conducted properly.
Takahama Power Station Takahama Power Station
3rd inspection 4th inspection
Period of 1) Basic inspection period: November 30 (Mon) to December 11 (Fri), 2009 Period of 1) Basic inspection period: March 1 (Mon) to March 12 (Fri), 2010
inspection inspection
Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.) Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.)
items (1) Status of procurement management items (1) Status of management review (power station review) (including inspections at the Nuclear
(2) Status of maintenance management Headquarters)
(3) Status of radioactive gaseous and liquid waste management (2) Status of safety culture creation activities (including inspections at the Nuclear Headquarters)
(4) Status of operational management (surprise inspection) (3) Status of fuel management (status of preparation for acceptance of MOX fuel) (including
(5) Status of radiation management (surprise inspection) inspections at the Nuclear Headquarters)
(6) Status of routine tests (start-up test of the air purification fan in the safety auxiliary system room (4) Status of accident prevention activities (inspections at the Nuclear Headquarters)
of Unit 4, etc.) (attendance) (surprise inspection) (5) Status of radiation management
(6) Status of activities of the Nuclear Power Generation Safety Committee (surprise inspection)
(7) Status of routine tests (operational test of the control rod in Unit 3) (attendance) (surprise
inspection)

Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of procurement management activities, the Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of safety culture creation activities, the
results status of maintenance management, etc. results status of fuel management (status of preparation for acceptance of MOX fuel), etc. As for the status
As a result of the basic inspection on the status of procurement management activities, it was of safety culture creation activities, inspections were conducted at the Nuclear Headquarters in
verified that the roles of the Nuclear Headquarters and the power station were clarified, procurement conjunction with the Mihama Nuclear Safety Inspector Office and Ohi Nuclear Safety Inspector
requirements were clarified in the work specifications, etc., and the validity check and verification, Office and with cooperation from the General Nuclear Safety Manager for the Wakasa region.
etc. of the requirements were conducted appropriately based on the in-house regulations. As a result of the basic inspection on the status of safety culture creation activities, it was verified
As for the status of maintenance management, it was verified that the regulations regarding that the results of the survey on “An atmosphere where opinions are easy to say,” which was the base
maintenance management activities were defined systematically, the maintenance management goals for communications with affiliated companies, indicated that there were significant differences in
that reflected the maintenance management implementation policies based on the regulations were thinking between the employees and the affiliated companies. However, it was also verified that an
set, and the maintenance program to achieve those goals was defined. In regard to the effectiveness attitude towards power station operation as cooperation between the employees and the affiliated
assessment of maintenance management, it was verified that it was decided that the effectiveness companies, with the idea of giving top priority to safety, was maintained.

191
should be assessed based on the results of the effectiveness assessment of maintenance and As for the status of fuel management (status of preparation for acceptance of MOX fuel), it was
achievements of the maintenance management goals and that maintenance activities should be verified that the procurement management of the MOX fuel handling equipment was conducted at
conducted repeatedly by trial and error. The status of improvements made to rectify this matter the Nuclear Headquarters and the maintenance of that equipment and training for using that
should be verified by conducting safety inspections. equipment were carried out at the power station in accordance with defined roles. It was also verified
In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based that the Nuclear Headquarters and the Takahama Power Station established a Plutonium Thermal
on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules. Information Communication Meeting, where comprehensive adjustments to and assessments of the
The status of daily operation management during the safety inspection period was also examined acceptance of the MOX fuel are made, at the Nuclear Headquarters. Four working groups were also
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation established, including the technical working group, which discusses the fuel handling, etc., and the
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (start-up test of the air power plant acceptance working group, which discusses the land transport, etc.
purification fan in the safety auxiliary machine room of Unit 4, etc.), and so forth. As a result, no In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based
particular problem was found. on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for The status of daily operation management during the safety inspection period was also examined
examination in this inspection were conducted properly. by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (operational test of the
control rod in Unit 3, etc.), and so forth. As a result, no particular problem was found.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
examination in this inspection were conducted properly.



(12) Shimane Nuclear Power Station Shimane Nuclear Power Station
1st inspection 2nd inspection
Period of 1) Basic inspection period: June 1 (Mon) to June 12 (Fri), 2009 Period of 1) Basic inspection period: August 18 (Tue) to August 27 (Thu), 2009
inspection 2) Additional inspection period: June 15 (Mon) to June 16 (Tue), 2009 inspection August 31 (Mon) to September 1 (Tue), 2009
Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.) 2) Additional inspection period: September 2 (Wed) to September 3 (Thu), 2009
items (1) Status of procurement management Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.)
(2) Status of maintenance management focused on the maintenance program (1) Status of maintenance management
(3) Status of quality goal setting items
(4) Status of actions relating to reinforcement of the operator qualification determination system (2) Status of education and training
(5) Status of routine tests (operational test of the electrically-powered valve in the reactor isolation (3) Status of nonconformance management and corrective countermeasures (surprise inspection)
cooling system, etc.) (attendance) (surprise inspection) (4) Status of routine tests (manual start-up test of emergency power supply diesel power generators
2) Additional inspection items of Shimane Unit 2) (attendance) (surprise inspection)
(1) Status of measures based on the root cause analysis results of the “Deviation from operational 2) Additional inspection items
limits (LCO) caused by inoperative condition of the high-pressure injection system of Shimane (1) Status of measures based on the root cause analysis results of the “Deviation from operational
Unit 1” limits (LCO) caused by inoperative condition of the high-pressure injection system of Shimane
(2) Status of measures based on the root cause analysis results of the “Trouble caused by incorrect Unit 1”
insertion of the control rod in Shimane Unit 1”
Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of procurement management activities, the (2) Status of measures based on the root cause analysis results of the “Trouble caused by incorrect
Inspection status of maintenance management focused on the maintenance program, etc. To check the status of insertion of the control rod in Shimane Unit 1”
results measures based on the root cause analysis results of the “Deviation from operational limits (LCO) Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of maintenance management, the status of
caused by inoperative condition of the high-pressure injection system of Shimane Unit 1” and the education and training, etc. To check the status of measures based on the root cause analysis results
“Trouble caused by incorrect insertion of the control rod in Shimane Unit 1,” they were selected as results
of the “Deviation from operational limits (LCO) caused by inoperative condition of the high-pressure
additional inspection items. injection system of Shimane Unit 1” and the “Trouble caused by incorrect insertion of the control rod
As a result of the basic inspection on the status of procurement management activities, it was in Shimane Unit 1,” they were selected as additional inspection items.
verified that the inspection was conducted to check the status of the procurement management As a result of basic inspection on the status of maintenance management, it was verified that a
processes that was conducted in the 28th periodical inspection of Unit 1, etc., that the manual was
revised as a corrective action for the nonconformance found in the past, that the procurement maintenance plan was determined and the inspections were conducted in accordance with the
management processes for the major construction work conducted in the 28th periodical inspection manuals, etc. that was newly defined due to introduction of the new inspection system. It was also
of Unit 1 complied with the manual, and that no particular problems were found. It was also verified verified that measures to reduce troubles, focused on the issue of deviation from operational limits
that though data regarding nonconformance of procurement management should be collected and (LCO), were also taken in the maintenance management activities.
analyzed, the data analysis was not carried out in 2008 because the data volume was not sufficient. It As for the status of education and training, it was verified that education was conducted based on
was verified that data collection and required analysis assessment should be conducted continuously the new personnel qualification standards and the qualification of the personnel that were involved in
in 2009 and continuous efforts to improve the procurement management processes were being made. the operations was conducted appropriately.

192
As for the status of maintenance management, particularly the maintenance program, an In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based
application to revise the maintenance plan was submitted before the 28th periodical inspection of
Unit 1, so an inspection was conducted to check the status of the plan. on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules.
It was verified that the document network was organized in accordance with the revised safety As a result of the additional inspection on the status of measures based on the root cause analysis
preservation rules, that “Appropriate adoption of the new inspection system” was included in the five results of the “Deviation from operational limits caused by inoperative condition of the high-pressure
maintenance management goals that reflected the maintenance management implementation policies, injection system of Shimane Unit 1,” it was verified that corrective and preventive measures was
and that the 28th cycle maintenance plan for Unit 1 was submitted and maintenance operations were taken as planned. This was done by conducting checks of the valves in the safety-significant
carried out in accordance with the maintenance program. equipment that had not been inspected, in order to address organizational problems, such as the
As for the status of measures based on the root cause analysis results of the “Deviation from non-inspected needle valve in the high-pressure injection system balance pipe, and to reflect the
operational limits (LCO) caused by inoperative condition of the high-pressure injection system of results in the inspection plan table, etc.
Shimane Unit 1,” it was verified that assessments into whether or not each of the actionable items
required corrective and preventive measures, their ranges, and side-effects, etc., were conducted in As for the status of measures based on the root cause analysis results of the “Trouble caused by
accordance with eight points of advice from the root cause analysis team. Specific measures incorrect insertion of the control rod in Shimane Unit 1,” it was verified that the relationships among
regarding all the points of advice were planned and implemented. events were organized chronologically and it was concluded that the control rod was inserted because
As a result of the additional inspection on the status of measures based on the root cause analysis incorrect screws were used in the terminal block and the screws were not tightened enough, etc.,
results of the “Trouble caused by incorrect insertion of the control rod in Shimane Unit 1,” it was which resulted in a contact failure of the terminals and non-energized solenoid used for the
verified that the root cause analysis team was established and the analysis team action plan had just operations of the control rod. It was verified that corrective countermeasures that can prevent
been defined, and that they are about to conduct interviews and create an event relationship diagram recurrence of the problem were advised, such as improvement of work management regarding the
and a factor relationship diagram to identify organizational factors. Therefore, it was determined that screw tightening method.
inspections should be conducted continuously in the future.
The status of daily operation management during the safety inspection period was also examined The status of daily operation management during the safety inspection period was also examined
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (operational test of the records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (manual start-up test of
electrically-powered valve in the reactor isolation cooling system, etc.), and so forth. As a result, no emergency power supply diesel power generators of Shimane Unit 2), and so forth. As a result, no
particular problem was found. particular problem was found.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
examination in this inspection were conducted properly. examination in this inspection were conducted properly.
Shimane Nuclear Power Station Shimane Nuclear Power Station
3rd inspection 4th inspection
Period of 1) Basic inspection period: November 30 (Mon) to December 11 (Fri), 2009 Period of 1) Basic inspection period: March 1 (Mon) to March 12 (Fri), 2010
inspection 2) Additional inspection period: December 14 (Mon) to December 15 (Tue), 2009 inspection March 15 (Mon) to March 16 (Tue), 2010
Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.) 2) Additional inspection period: March 11 (Thu) and March 15 (Mon), 2010
items (1) Status of maintenance management Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.)
(2) Status of internal audits items (1) Status of management review (including inspections at the head office)
(3) Status of radioactive waste management (2) Status of internal audits (inspections at the head office)
(4) Status of quality goal achievements (3) Status of maintenance management
(5) Status of safety culture creation activities (4) Status of nonconformance management
(6) Status of preventive measures (surprise inspection) (5) Status of operational management
(7) Status of nonconformance management and corrective countermeasures (surprise inspection) (6) Status of radiation management (surprise inspection)
(8) Status of routine tests (manual start-up test of the high-pressure injection system pump of (7) Status of routine tests (manual start-up test of the boric acid solution injection system pump of
Shimane Unit 1) (attendance) (surprise inspection) Shimane Unit 2) (attendance) (surprise inspection)
2) Additional inspection items 2) Additional inspection items
(1) Status of measures based on the root cause analysis results of the “Deviation from operational (1) Status of measures based on the root cause analysis results of the “Deviation from operational
limits (LCO) caused by inoperative condition of the high-pressure injection system of Shimane
limits (LCO) caused by inoperative condition of the high-pressure injection system of Shimane
Unit 1”
(2) Status of measures based on the root cause analysis results of the “Trouble caused by incorrect Unit 1”
insertion of the control rod in Shimane Unit 1” (2) Status of measures based on the root cause analysis results of the “Trouble caused by incorrect
Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of maintenance management, the status of insertion of the control rod in Shimane Unit 1”
Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of management review, the status of internal
internal audits, etc. To check the status of measures based on the root cause analysis results of the Inspection
results “Deviation from operational limits (LCO) caused by inoperative condition of the high-pressure audits, the status of maintenance management, etc. To check the status of measures taken based on
results
injection system of Shimane Unit 1” and the “Trouble caused by incorrect insertion of the control rod the root cause analysis results of the “Deviation from operational limits (LCO) caused by inoperative
in Shimane Unit 1,” they were selected as additional inspection items. condition of the high-pressure injection system of Shimane Unit 1” and the “Trouble caused by
As a result of the basic inspection on the status of maintenance management, it was verified that a incorrect insertion of the control rod in Shimane Unit 1,” they were selected as additional inspection
maintenance program reflecting the new inspection system was implemented and that preparation of items.
a maintenance plan and maintenance activities were carried out properly. As for the effectiveness In the basic inspection on the status of maintenance management, as a result of the review of the
assessment of the maintenance, it was verified that the assessment should be conducted in 4 months, status of “A nonconformance regarding the electric motor for driving steam outside the isolation
before start of the 29th periodical inspection of Unit 1 and the results should be reflected in the valve in the high-pressure injection system of Unit 1, which was reported at the nonconformance
maintenance plan as required. management review meeting, resulting in orders to investigate other equipment,” a failure of the

193
As for the status of internal audits, an audit execution plan for this year, which reflected the maintenance management was found, which was considered to be a safety preservation rules
analysis and assessment results of the executing department internal audits, was prepared by violation. A detailed investigation report from the licensee is expected and the improvements made to
conducting a survey targeting the auditors and audited departments in 2008. Audit goals were rectify this matter should be verified continuously by conducting safety inspections, etc.
clarified by checking whether the operations were carried out based on the procedures and
As for the status of management review, it was verified that the quality assurance activities
upper-level documents and whether the QMS was appropriate, valid, and effective considering the
room for improvement of the procedures, other documents and operations, etc., and that the items to conducted in 2009 were analyzed and assessed at the power plant. As for the status of management
be audited were clarified in the annual development table. review at the head office, it was verified that continuous improvement of the business process was
As a result of the additional inspection on the status of measures based on the root cause analysis made, such as assessment of the effectiveness of the quality management system.
results of the “Deviation from operational limits caused by inoperative condition of the high-pressure As for the status of internal audits, it was verified that the internal audits were conducted in
injection system of Shimane Unit 1,” it was verified that corrective and preventive measures were accordance with the audit program. It was also verified that in the internal audits, the effectiveness of
taken as planned; for example, the non-inspected valve related to the safety-significant equipment the QMS activities and their conformance to the business process were audited.
was reflected in the inspection plan. In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based
As for the status of measures based on the root cause analysis results of the “Trouble caused by on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules.
incorrect insertion of the control rod in Shimane Unit 1,” it was verified that specific plans, such as As a result of the additional inspection on the status of measures taken based on the root cause
clarification of the procurement requirements when a part that is not in the replacement part list is analysis of the “Deviation from operational limits caused by inoperative condition of the
replaced, reinforcement of the construction check at recovery of the cables in the terminal box, and high-pressure injection system of Shimane Unit 1” and the “Trouble caused by incorrect insertion of
using and sharing of the knowledge regarding electric repairs in the Machine Maintenance Division, the control rod in Shimane Unit 1,” it was verified that corrective and preventive measures were
were implemented properly as corrective and preventive measures. These items were chosen based conducted properly in accordance with the defined plan.
on advice from the root cause analysis team. The status of daily operation management during the safety inspection period was also examined
The status of daily operation management during the safety inspection period was also examined by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (manual start-up test of
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (manual start-up test of
the boric acid solution injection pump of Shimane Unit 2), and so forth. As a result, no particular
the high-pressure injection system pump of Unit 1), and so forth. As a result, no particular problem
was found. problem was found.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
examination in this inspection were conducted properly. examination in this inspection were, on the whole, conducted properly, excluding the
nonconformance relating to the status of maintenance management.



(13) Ikata Power Station Ikata Power Station
1st inspection 2nd inspection
Period of 1) Basic inspection period: June 1 (Mon) to June 12 (Fri), 2009 Period of 1) Basic inspection period: August 31 (Mon) to September 11 (Fri), 2009
inspection inspection
Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.) Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.)
items (1) Status of fuel management (attendance) (including inspections at the head office) items (1) Status of maintenance management (inspection and maintenance plans)
(2) Status of management review (inspections at the head office only) (2) Status of nonconformance management, corrective countermeasures, and preventive measures
(3) Status of actions relating to reinforcement of the operator qualification system (3) Status of radioactive liquid waste management
(4) Status of radiation protection activities of affiliated companies (surprise inspection) (4) Status of routine tests (load test of the emergency diesel power generators, etc.) (attendance)
(5) Status of routine tests (periodical operation of the residual heat removal pumps, etc.) (surprise inspection)
(attendance) (surprise inspection)

Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of fuel management, the status of Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of maintenance management (inspection
results management reviews, etc. results and maintenance plans), the status of nonconformance management, corrective countermeasures, and
In the basic inspection on the status of fuel management, a series of processes relating to fuel preventive measures, etc.
management were established at the head office and the power plant and inspections were conducted As a result of the basic inspection on the status of maintenance management (inspection and
to see if the procurement-requested design documents were submitted, if the safety of the maintenance plans), it was verified that a series of processes relating to maintenance management
replacement core was assessed, and so on. As a result of the review of the calculation results using that correspond to the new inspection system were established.
the specified core calculation program and assessment records, it was verified that the core As for the status of nonconformance management, corrective countermeasures, and preventive
parameters used for the replacement core, such as the maximum exposure output density, satisfied measures, it was verified that the internal regulations relating to nonconformance management were
the prerequisites for safety analysis, etc., appropriately. revised to clearly describe that in any event in which there is a deviation from the procedures or
As for the status of management review, it was verified that a series of processes, such as methods for safety activities, including maintenance management, which causes non-execution of a
putting-together of input information, management review by the president, and notification of given safety activity, that event should be considered to be nonconformance.
output, were carried out properly. In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based
In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules.

194
on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules. The status of daily operation management during the safety inspection period was also examined
The status of daily operation management during the safety inspection period was also examined by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (load running test of the
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (periodical operation emergency diesel power generator, etc.), and so forth. As a result, no particular problem was found.
tests of the residual heat removal pump, etc.), and so forth. As a result, no particular problem was In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
found. examination in this inspection were conducted properly.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
examination in this inspection were conducted properly.
Ikata Power Station Ikata Power Station
3rd inspection 4th inspection
Period of 1) Basic inspection period: November 24 (Tue) to December 7 (Mon), 2009 Period of 1) Basic inspection period: March 8 (Mon) to March 19 (Fri), 2010
inspection inspection
Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.) Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.)
items (1) Status of maintenance management (design and procurement) items (1) Status of maintenance management
(2) Status of operational management (2) Status of nonconformance management, corrective countermeasures, and preventive measures
(3) Status of radiation management (3) Status of education and training
(4) Status of internal audits (4) Status of management review (at the power plant)
(5) Status of routine tests (periodical operation of the turbine-driven auxiliary feed water pump of (5) Status of routine tests (load test of the emergency diesel power generators of Unit 1, etc.)
Unit 2, etc.) (attendance) (surprise inspection) (attendance) (surprise inspection)

Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of maintenance management (design and Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of maintenance management, the status of
results procurement), etc. results nonconformance management, corrective countermeasures, and preventive measures, etc.
As a result of basic inspection on the status of maintenance management (design and As a result of the basic inspection on the status of maintenance management, it was verified that
procurement), it was verified that a series of processes for procurement were established maintenance that reflected the new inspection system was conducted and that actions based on the
appropriately and that assessments of the suppliers, transmission of procurement requests from equipment diagnoses were taken properly. As a result of the basic inspection on the status of
affiliated companies to subcontractors, and so on were conducted in accordance with the in-house nonconformance management, corrective countermeasures, and preventive measures, it was verified
regulations. that nonconformance management was carried out based on the nonconformance management
In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based internal regulations and that the nonconformance management, corrective countermeasures, and
on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules. preventive measures were functioning effectively for recurrence prevention.
The status of daily operation management during the safety inspection period was also examined In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules.
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (routine operation of the The status of daily operation management during the safety inspection period was also examined
turbine-driven auxiliary feed water pump of Unit 2, etc.), and so forth. As a result, no particular by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation

195
problem was found. records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (load test of the
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for emergency diesel generator of Unit 1, etc.), and so forth. As a result, no particular problem was
examination in this inspection were conducted properly. found.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
examination in this inspection were conducted properly.



(14) Genkai Nuclear Power Station Genkai Nuclear Power Station
1st inspection 2nd inspection
Period of 1) Basic inspection period: May 20 (Wed) to June 2 (Tue), 2009 Period of 1) Basic inspection period: August 31 (Mon) to September 11 (Fri), 2009
inspection inspection
Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.) Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.)
items (1) Status of fuel management items (1) Status of operational management
(2) Status of actions relating to reinforcement of the operator qualification system (2) Status of education and training
(3) Status of periodical safety reviews (3) Status of radioactive liquid waste management
(4) Status of routine tests (start-up test of the emergency circulation fan in the central control room (4) Status of routine tests (start-up test of the air purification fan in the safety auxiliary system room,
of Unit 3, etc.) (attendance) (surprise inspection) etc.) (attendance)
(5) Status of measurements of dose equivalents regarding external radiation (surprise inspection) (5) Status of spent fuel transportation (surprise inspection)

Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of fuel management, the status of periodical Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of operational management, etc.
results safety reviews, etc. results As a result of the basic inspection on the status of operational management, it was verified that
As a result of the basic inspection on the status of fuel management, it was verified that those detailed procedures for individual operations of the items relating to core management, such as the
items which must be complied with when the new fuel transportation container holding the uranium “Evaluation of shaft direction neutron flux deviation target value” were defined appropriately in the
and plutonium mixed oxide fuel (hereinafter, referred to as MOX fuel) is transported and when the in-house standards and the processes to execute each operation were established satisfactorily,
MOX fuel is taken out of the new fuel transportation container and stored in the spent fuel pit, were considering that the loading of the uranium and plutonium mixed oxide fuel into Unit 3 had been
reflected in the in-house regulations, such as the “Fuel management standards.” It was also verified planned.
that a series of operations, starting with transportation of the new fuel transportation container of the In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based
MOX fuel and ending with storage in the spent fuel pit, were carried out properly at Unit 3. on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules.
As for the status of periodical safety reviews, it was verified that an implementation plan and an The status of daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also examined
implementation procedure were prepared based on in-house regulations such as the “Implementation by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
standards for periodical evaluation of reactor facilities.” It was also verified that this plan and records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (start-up test of the air
procedure reflected the requirements in the “Implementation guidelines for periodical safety review purification fan in the safety auxiliary machine room, etc.), and so forth. As a result, no particular

196
at commercial nuclear power reactor facilities,” as issued by the Nuclear and Industrial Safety problem was found.
Agency. In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based examination in this inspection were conducted properly.
on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules.
The status of daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also examined
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (start-up test of the
emergency circulation fan in the main control room of Unit 3, etc.), and so forth. As a result, no
particular problem was found.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
examination in this inspection were conducted properly.
Genkai Nuclear Power Station Genkai Nuclear Power Station
3rd inspection 4th inspection
Period of 1) Basic inspection period: December 7 (Mon) to December 18 (Fri), 2009 Period of 1) Basic inspection period: March 1 (Mon) to March 12 (Fri), 2010
inspection inspection
Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.) Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.)
items (1) Status of management review (inspections at the head office) items (1) Status of accomplishment assessment of quality goals
(2) Status of maintenance management (including inspections at the head office) (2) Status of periodical safety reviews
(3) Status of periodical safety reviews (3) Status of fire prevention measures
(4) Status of routine tests (start-up test of the residual heat removal pump, etc.) (attendance) (4) Status of earthquake reinforcement work
(5) Status of actions taken to more closely monitor Genkai Unit 3 (surprise inspection) (5) Status of water quality management (surprise inspection)

Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of management reviews, the status of Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of accomplishment assessment of quality
results maintenance management, etc. In particular, to verify the status of management review and the status results goals, etc.
of maintenance management, inspections were conducted at the head office in conjunction with the As a result of the basic inspection on the status of accomplishment assessment of quality goals, it
Sendai Nuclear Safety Inspector Office. was verified that the results of the data analysis on the management review in 2008 were considered
In the basic inspection on the status of management review, as a result of the analysis and in order to set quality goals for 2009, that major operations to be conducted in 2009, such as
assessment of the input information for the management reviews, which were created by organizing introduction of MOX fuel, earthquake reinforcement work, and actions for the new inspection
the assessment results of each safety preservation activity conducted by the executing department system, were included in the quality goals, and the quality goals were created based on the quality
and audit department at the head office, it was verified that activities to improve the effectiveness of policies defined by the president. Those goals matched the results of the management review. As for
the quality management system, planning of operations, and improvements required to execute them the quality goals that had been set, it was verified that daily monitoring of the activities was
were being carried out. conducted based on the status of nonconformance occurrence during implementation of the
As for the status of maintenance management, it was verified that the maintenance management operations and the results of the tests and inspections. Assessment of the results of the activities
goals were defined at the head office and the power plant, that the maintenance plan was defined at conducted by each department was carried out and an accomplishment assessment of the quality
the power plant, that the maintenance activity management indexes were set, that the planning of the goals of the whole power plant (during the period) was also carried out. Considering these actions, it

197
maintenance was executed, and that the maintenance management activities using the maintenance was verified that the assessment and improvement activities of the quality management system were
program were carried out properly, based on the maintenance management implementation policies conducted properly.
defined by the president. In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based
In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules.
on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules. The status of daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also examined
The status of daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also examined by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (start-up test of the boric
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (start-up test of the acid pump, etc.), and so forth. As a result, no particular problem was found.
residual heat removal pump, etc.), and so forth. As a result, no particular problem was found. In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for examination in this inspection were conducted properly.
examination in this inspection were conducted properly.



(15) Sendai Nuclear Power Station Sendai Nuclear Power Station
1st inspection 2nd inspection
Period of 1) Basic inspection period: June 1 (Mon) to June 12 (Fri), 2009 Period of 1) Basic inspection period: September 7 (Mon) to September 18 (Fri), 2009
inspection inspection
Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.) Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.)
items (1) Status of the measures taken to deal with deterioration due to aging items (1) Status of assessment and improvement activities
(2) Status of actions relating to reinforcement of the operator qualification system (2) Status of the measures taken to deal with deterioration due to aging
(3) Status of nonconformance management (3) Status of education and training
(4) Status of fire prevention measures (surprise inspection) (4) Status of radiation management (surprise inspection)
(5) Status of routine tests (start-up test of the charging high-pressure injection pumps of Units 1 and (5) Status of routine tests (start-up test of the charging pumps and the high-pressure injection pumps
2, etc.) (attendance) of Units 1 and 2, etc.) (attendance)

Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of measures taken to deal with deterioration Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of assessment and improvement activities,
results due to aging, the status of actions relating to reinforcement of the operator qualification system, etc. results the status of education and training, etc.
As a result of the basic inspection on the status of measures taken to deal with deterioration due to As a result of the basic inspection on the status of assessment and improvement activities, it was
aging, it was verified that systematic inspections were carried out properly, in order to understand the verified that autonomous activities were carried out; for example, improvement proposals found in
symptoms of aging. the safety preservation activities in 2008 were considered and included in this year’s activities.
As for the status of actions relating to reinforcement of the operator qualification system, it was As for the status of education and training, it was verified that safety education was provided as
verified that the licensee had confirmed that requirements such independence, impartiality, and planned and that the competence assessments required for maintenance management operations, such
fairness of the operator qualification authority should be assured. The licensee then designated the as basic knowledge of the maintenance management operations and specialist knowledge at each
qualification authority. facility, were carried out properly.
In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted based on the In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted based on the
safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules. safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules.
The status of daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also examined The status of daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also examined
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation

198
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (start-up test of the records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (start-up test of the
charging high-pressure injection pumps of Units 1 and 2), and so forth. As a result, no particular charging pumps and the high-pressure injection pumps of Units 1 and 2, etc.), and so forth. As a
problem was found. result, no particular problem was found.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
examination in this inspection were conducted properly. examination in this inspection were conducted properly.
Sendai Nuclear Power Station Sendai Nuclear Power Station
3rd inspection 4th inspection
Period of 1) Basic inspection period: November 30 (Mon) to December 11 (Fri), 2009 Period of 1) Basic inspection period: February 22 (Mon) to March 5 (Fri), 2010
inspection inspection
Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.) Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.)
items (1) Status of management review (inspections at the head office) items (1) Status of maintenance management
(2) Status of nonconformance management (2) Status of safety culture creation activities
(3) Status of maintenance management (including inspections at the head office) (3) Status of duties of chief reactor engineers
(4) Status of routine tests (start-up test of the residual heat removal pump of Units 1 and 2, etc.) (4) Status of nonconformance management
(attendance) (5) Status of electrical equipment work management during the periodical inspections
(5) Status of fuel management (surprise inspection) (6) Status of radioactive waste management activities (surprise inspection)

Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of management review, the status of Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of maintenance management, the status of
results maintenance management, etc. In particular, to verify the status of management review and the status results safety culture creation activities, the status of electrical equipment work management, etc.
of maintenance management, inspections were conducted at the head office in conjunction with the As a result of the basic inspection on the status of maintenance management, it was verified that a
Genkai Nuclear Safety Inspector Office. maintenance plan was defined by considering the maintenance management implementation policies
In the basic inspection on the status of management review, inspectors examined the results of the and the maintenance management goals. It was verified that inspection frequencies and items to be
management review input data analysis and assessment, created by organizing the assessment results inspected were defined in the maintenance plan for each system and piece of equipment, according to
of each safety preservation activity conducted by the executing department and audit department at their importance, and that construction management and procurement management activities were
the head office. It was verified that activities to improve the effectiveness of the quality management carried out in accordance with the work procedures and order specifications.
system, the planning of operations, and the improvements required to execute those operations were As for the status of safety culture creation activities, it was verified that the assessment results of
being carried out. the activities conducted in the previous year were reviewed by each department in charge and the
As for the status of maintenance management, it was verified that a series of processes relating to in-house audit organization. The reviews were conducted from the viewpoint of a third party, in
maintenance management were carried out properly based on the safety preservation rules. These accordance with the management standards for the safety culture creation activities.
processes included the setting of maintenance management implementation policies by the president, As for the status of electrical equipment work management during the periodical inspections, it

199
the setting of the maintenance management goals of organizations at the head office and was verified that the relevant in-house regulations regarding the recurrence prevention measures for
organizations at the power plant, and the definition of maintenance plans, including the planning of electric shock were reviewed in order to clarify the procedures and precautions. All related parties
inspections conducted by organizations at the power plant. were notified of the recurrence prevention measures, including the operators at affiliated companies,
In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted based on the through meetings, etc. It was decided that the status and results of efforts towards root cause analysis,
safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules. which were made by the licensee based on our instructions, should be verified by conducting safety
The status of daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also examined inspections, etc.
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (start-up test of the on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules.
residual heat removal pump of Units 1 and 2, etc.), and so forth. As a result, no particular problems The status of daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also examined
were found. by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (start-up test of the
examination in this inspection were conducted properly. exhaust fan in the safety auxiliary machine room of Unit 2, etc.), and so forth. As a result, no
particular problem was found.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
examination in this inspection were conducted properly, except those items that require continuing
verification.



(16) Tokai Daini Power Station Tokai Daini Power Station
1st inspection 2nd inspection
Period of 1) Basic inspection period: May 18 (Mon) to May 23 (Sat), 2009 Period of 1) Basic inspection period: August 24 (Mon) to September 3 (Thu), and 10 (Thu), 2009
inspection May 29 (Fri) to June 5 (Fri), 2009 inspection 2) Additional inspection period: September 9 (Wed), 2009
2) Additional inspection period: May 26 (Tue) to May 27 (Wed), 2009 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.)
Inspection
Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.) (1) Status of management review and internal audits
(1) Status of recurrence prevention measures concerning the results of the full inspection of the items
items (2) Status of radiation management
power generating equipment (3) Status of abnormality procedures
(2) Status of safety management systems (4) Status of maintenance management activities, etc. for the turbine lube oil related equipment
(3) Status of maintenance management (5) Status of measures implemented to resolve past violations (surveillance)
(4) Status of countermeasures for the smoke event in the high-frequency melter (6) Status of routine tests (function test of emergency diesel power generator HPCS system)
(5) Status of actions relating to reinforcement of the operator qualification system (attendance) (surprise inspection)
(6) Status of measures implemented to resolve past violations (surveillance) (7) Other
(7) Status of routine tests (start-up test of the boric acid solution injection pump) (attendance) 2) Additional inspection items
(8) Status of record management (surprise inspection) (1) Status of improvement measures for the safety preservation rules violation (violation 3) relating
2) Additional inspection items to incorrect discharge of the washing waste liquid
(1) Status of improvement measures for the safety preservation rules violation (violation 3) relating
Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of management review and internal audit,
to incorrect discharge of the washing waste liquid
the status of radiation management, etc. To check the status of improvements based on the recurrence
(2) Status of actions for the LCO deviation event results
prevention measures made by the licensee regarding the “Safety preservation rules violation
Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of “Recurrence prevention measures (violation 3) relating to incorrect discharge of the washing waste liquid,” this issue was also selected
concerning the results of the full inspection of the power generating equipment,” the status of as an additional inspection item.
results
maintenance management, etc. To check the status of improvements based on the recurrence As a result of the basic inspection on the status of management review in the “Status of
prevention measures made by the licensee for the “Safety preservation rules violation (violation 3) management review and internal audits,” it was verified that the results of the activities in 2008 that
relating to incorrect discharge of the washing waste liquid,” etc., this issue was also selected as an were conducted based on the quality policies were included as input information for 2009 and that an
additional inspection item. improvement plan was established for the output of the review results. As for the status of internal
As for the “Status of recurrence prevention measures concerning the result of the full inspection of audits, it was verified that the internal audits were conducted systematically based on the audit plan
the power generating equipment,” it was verified that as a result of a review of the implementation for 2008 and that the results of the internal audits were reported to the top levels of management.
results of each recurrence prevention measure, the action plan for the recurrence prevention measures As for the status of radiation management, it was verified that the safety preservation activities
was valid. It was also verified that the activities regarding that plan were able to function defined in the safety preservation rules were carried out under proper management; for example,
autonomously.

200
lectures on radiation measuring instruments were given as radiation protection education for
As for the status of maintenance management, it was verified that the in-house regulations, etc., affiliated companies and access to locations with high radiation was controlled. As a result of the
were revised based on the revised safety preservation rules and that the maintenance management inspection on the status of the licensee’s corrective actions for past violations (“Insufficient
targets of the new inspection system, such as the order of importance of items in the maintenance implementation of the procurement management for the entrusted operators and fuel assistants” and
plan, were being established. “Not wearing an electronic personal dosimeter (EPD) in a controlled area”), it was verified that both
As a result of the inspection on the status of the licensee’s corrective action for past violations of those events were reflected in the contract specifications and that the rules for wearing the EPD
(“Insufficient implementation of procurement management for the entrusted operators and fuel were known thoroughly.
assistants” and “Not wearing an electronic personal dosimeter (EPD) in a controlled area”), it was In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based
verified that because both of those events were reflected in the contract specifications and in the on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules.
education provided at the entry of the plant, improvements had been made. As a result of the additional inspection on the past violation (“Safety rules violation (violation 3)
In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based relating to incorrect discharge of washing waste liquid”), it was verified that computerization to
on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules. automatically transcribe and output data to the ledger sheet “Radioactive liquid waste measurement
As a result of the additional inspection on the past violation (violation 3) (“Improper discharge of results” was implemented as an improvement measure. Though the results of the root cause analysis
the radioactive liquid waste”), it was verified that a root cause analysis was conducted and were reviewed by the safety committee and approved by the general manager of the power plant,
improvements were made. As for the recurrence prevention measures currently being implemented, corrective measures were still under consideration. As a result, it was decided that the improvement
the status of improvement measures for them should continue to be verified because some items activities to rectify this matter should continue to be verified by conducting safety inspections, etc.
could not be verified in this safety inspection. As for the LCO deviation event, it was reflected in the The status of routine tests in daily operational management during the safety inspection period was
maintenance plan for the recurrence prevention measures. Since the improvement measures are to be also examined. An issue with surveillance was found, in which the routine tests were started without
implemented in the next periodical inspection, it was decided that the status of improvement should verification of the items defined in the safety preservation rules, so it was decided that the status of
continue to be verified at future safety inspections. improvement of this matter should be verified at future safety inspections, etc.
The status of daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also examined The status of the other items was also examined by questioning the licensee about the management
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation of facility operations, reviewing operation records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, and
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (function test of the so forth. As a result, no particular problems were found.
boric acid solution injection system), and so forth. As a result, no particular problem was found. In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
Considering all this, it was concluded that safety preservation activities examined with respect to examination in this inspection were, on the whole, conducted properly.
inspection items selected for the safety inspections are conducted properly.
Tokai Daini Power Station Tokai Daini Power Station
3rd inspection 4th inspection
Period of 1) Basic inspection period: November 24 (Tue) to December 8 (Tue), 2009 Period of 1) Basic inspection period: February 4 (Thu) to February 19 (Fri), 2010
inspection 2) Additional inspection period: December 7 (Mon), 2009 inspection 2) Additional inspection period: February 10 (Wed), February 12 (Fri), and February 16 (Tue), 2010
Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.) Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.)
items (1) Status of nonconformance management items (1) Status of compliance and safety culture creation activities (inspections at the head office)
(2) Status of fuel management (2) Status of maintenance management
(3) Status of safety preservation education and training (3) Status of radioactive waste management
(4) Status of safety culture creation activities (4) Status of nonconformance management, corrective measures, and preventive measures
(5) Status of measures implemented to resolve past violations (surveillance) (5) Status of operational management
(6) Status fire response measures (surprise inspection) (6) Status of measures implemented to resolve past violations (surveillance)
2) Additional inspection items (7) Status of recovery of the turbine building (surprise inspection)
(1) Status of improvement measures for the safety preservation rules violation (violation 3) relating 2) Additional inspection items
to incorrect discharge of the washing waste liquid (1) Status of improvement measures for the safety preservation rules violation relating to incorrect
discharge of the washing waste liquid (violation 3)
(2) Status of response to deviations from operational limits
(3) Status of improvement measures for the safety preservation rules violation relating to incorrect
discharge of the washing waste liquid at Tokai Daini Nuclear Power Station

Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of nonconformance management, etc. To Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of compliance and safety culture creation
results check the status of improvements based on the recurrence prevention measures made by the licensee results activities, etc.
regarding the “Safety preservation rules violation (violation 3) relating to incorrect discharge of the To check the status of improvements based on the recurrence prevention measures made by the
washing waste liquid,” this issue was also selected as an additional inspection item. licensee for the “Safety preservation rules violation (violation 3) relating to incorrect discharge of the
As a result of the basic inspection on the status of nonconformance management, it was verified washing waste liquid,” etc., this issue was also selected as an additional inspection item.
that causes of nonconformance were analyzed as a recurrence prevention measure. Corrective As a result of the basic inspection on the status of compliance and safety culture creation activities,
measures for the causes were taken. It was also verified that full use was made of acquired it was verified that 10 items (including the item “Implementation of education targeting the
knowledge and preventive actions were taken to prevent any form of nonconformance that can occur. improvement of technical capabilities,” which was newly added as a policy of the safety culture

201
In addition, it was verified that efforts for the prevention of human errors were also made and those creation activities for 2009) were carried out satisfactorily in accordance with their own specific
nonconformance management and human error prevention activities were reviewed periodically by action plans. The established system was functioning effectively, and continuous improvements were
the quality assurance steering committee. The results were reflected in the quality assurance plan. made.
In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted based on the In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted based on the
safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules. safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules.
As a result of the additional inspection on the past violation (“Safety rules violation (violation 3) As a result of the additional inspection on the improper discharge of the radioactive liquid waste,
relating to incorrect discharge of washing waste liquid”), it was verified that implementation policies which occurred in October 2008, it was verified that all the recurrence prevention measures that had
were defined from the results of the root cause analysis. It was decided that the status of been planned based on the results of the root cause analysis were taken.
improvement of these matters should be verified at future safety inspections, etc. As for the improper discharge of the radioactive liquid waste that occurred in December in the last
The status of daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also examined year, it was verified that a root cause analysis on the “The safety preservation rules violation relating
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation to discharge of washing waste liquid at Tokai Daini Nuclear Power Plant” was being conducted.
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, and so forth. As a result, no particular problems As for the status of response to deviations from operational limits, it was verified that the event
were found. was reflected in the maintenance plan as a recurrence prevention measure, that inspections were
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for conducted based on the revised maintenance plan, and that corrective actions were taken for the
examination in this inspection were conducted properly. equipment in which deviation from operational limits occurred.
The status of daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also examined
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, and so forth. As a result, no particular problems
were found.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
examination in this inspection were conducted properly.



(17) Tsuruga Power Station Tsuruga Power Station
1st inspection 2nd inspection
Period of 1) Basic inspection period: May 25 (Mon) to June 5 (Fri), 2009 Period of 1) Basic inspection period: August 24 (Mon) to September 4 (Fri), 2009
inspection 2) Additional inspection period: June 8 (Mon) to June 9 (Tue), 2009 inspection
Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.) Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.)
items (1) Status of compliance and safety culture creation activities (including inspections at the head items (1) Status of management review (including internal audits, etc.) (including inspections at the head
office)
(2) Status of actions relating to reinforcement of the operator qualification system (inspections at the office)
head office) (2) Status of radioactive solid waste management
(3) Status of operational management (3) Status of operational management
(4) Status of measures implemented to resolve past violations (surveillance) (4) Status of record reviews (surprise inspection)
(5) Status of radiation management
(6) Status of routine tests (start-up tests of the annulus air purification fan and the motor-driven
auxiliary feed water pump)
2) Additional inspection items
(1) Status of measures implemented to resolve the safety preservation rules violation (violation 2)
during transportation of spent fuel
Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of compliance and safety culture creation Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of management review (including internal
Inspection
activities, etc. To check the status of improvements based on the recurrence prevention measures audits), etc.
results results
made by the licensee for the “Safety preservation rules violation (violation 2) during transportation The status of management review (including internal audits, etc.) was inspected at the head office
of spent fuel,” this issue was also selected as an additional inspection item.
of the Japan Atomic Power Company (hereinafter, referred to as “head office”) in conjunction with
As a result of the basic inspection on the status of compliance and safety culture creation activities,
it was verified from the minutes of the Recurrence Prevention Measures Verification Committee that the offices at the Tokai and Oarai Nuclear Safety Inspector Offices.
the overall effectiveness of the action plan for the recurrence prevention measures that had been As a result of the basic inspection on the status of management review (including internal audits),
created based on the results of the full inspection of power generators was assessed, and that a it was verified that the results of the activities in 2008 (conducted based on the quality policies) were
“Culture of reporting” and “Compliance consciousness” were taking root. It was also verified that included as input information for 2009. An improvement plan was established for the output of the
improvement measures relating to worksite climate, safety culture, corporate ethics and safety review results. As for the status of the internal audits, it was verified that the audits were conducted
consciousness should continue to be implemented. One item was added to the action plan for
compliance and safety culture creation activities for 2009. systematically based on the audit plan for 2008 and that the results of the internal audits were
In addition, the licensee's improvement activities conducted to resolve past violations reported to the top levels of management.
(surveillance) (“Discrepancies in the valve opening procedure for the emergency core cooling In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based
injection valve of Tsuruga Power Station Unit 2 between the procedure manual and the actual on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules.

202
implementation” and “Corrosion of the air-intake duct of the central control room ventilation and air The status of daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also examined
conditioning of Tsuruga Power Station Unit 1”) were verified. As for the “Discrepancies in the valve by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
opening procedure at Tsuruga Power Station Unit 2,” it was verified that an implementation plan for
preventive measures had been defined and its effectiveness should be verified one year later as records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, and so forth. As a result, no particular problems
planned. As for “Corrosion of the air-intake duct at Tsuruga Power Station Unit 1,” it was verified were found.
that replacement of the relevant duct had been completed based on the recurrence prevention In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
measures. This event and the points to be focused on in the inspections of piping and ducts were examination in this inspection were conducted properly.
added as new traditions for the plant inspection tour walkthrough (traditional knowledge education),
which was conducted by the president and vice president of the power plant in order to educate
operators. Since a root cause analysis will be conducted in future, it was decided that the status of
improvement of these matters should be verified at future safety inspections, etc.
In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based
on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules.
As a result of the additional inspection on the safety preservation rules violation during
transportation of spent fuel, it was verified that in response to the results of the root cause analysis,
the “Actions to be taken when the safety preservation rules were revised” were added to the
secondary documents relating to the six operations. An activity review, to be conducted based on the
safety preservation rules, was positioned in the implementation procedures for operation process
review. Since the effectiveness of those measures should be assessed in future, it was decided that the
status of improvement of these matters should be verified at future safety inspections, etc.
The status of daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also examined
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (start-up test of the
annulus air purification fan, etc.), and so forth. As a result, no particular problem was found.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
examination in this inspection were conducted properly.
Tsuruga Power Station Tsuruga Power Station
3rd inspection 4th inspection
Period of 1) Basic inspection period: December 7 (Mon) to December 21 (Mon), 2009 Period of 1) Basic inspection period: February 1 (Mon) to February 16 (Tue), 2010
inspection 2) Additional inspection period: December 8 (Tue), 2009 inspection 2) Additional inspection period: February 5 (Fri) to February 10 (Thu), 2010
Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.) Inspection 1) Basic inspection items (the underlines indicate priority inspection items.)
items (1) Status of root cause analyses items (1) Status of compliance and safety culture creation activities (including inspections at the head
office)
(2) Status of maintenance management (2) Status of nonconformance management and corrective action
(3) Status of spare parts management (3) Status of radioactive waste management
(4) Status of operational management (4) Status of procurement management
(5) Status of abnormality procedures (5) Status of duties of chief reactor engineers
(6) Status of routine tests (scram function test with the Unit 1 scram test switch and start-up test and
(6) Status of access management (attendance) (surprise inspection) status of the high-pressure injection pumps (A, B)) (attendance) (surprise inspection)
(7) Status of the hydrogen supply piping facility for cooling the power generator of Tsuruga Power (7) Other (response to deviations from operational limits in Unit 2)
Station Unit 1 (surprise inspection) 2) Additional inspection items
2) Additional inspection items (1) Status of measures implemented to resolve the safety preservation rules violation (violation 2)
during transportation of spent fuel at Tsuruga Power Plant Unit 2
(1) Status of the cause investigation conducted by the licensee regarding partially lost functions of (2) Status of measures implemented to resolve the safety preservation rules violation (violation 2)
the reactor protection system instrument in the primary coolant pump power supply system of regarding the lost functions of the reactor protection system instrument at Tsuruga Power Plant
Tsuruga Power Station Unit 2 Unit 2
Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of compliance and safety culture creation
Inspection
activities, the status of nonconformance management and corrective action, etc. To check the status
results of improvements based on the recurrence prevention measures made by the licensee for the “Safety
Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of maintenance management, etc. To check
preservation rules violation (violation 2) during transportation of spent fuel at Tsuruga Power Plant
results the status of the “Cause investigation conducted by the licensee regarding partially lost functions of
Unit 2” and the “Safety preservation rules violation (violation 2) regarding the lost functions of the
the reactor protection system instrument in the primary coolant pump power supply system of Unit reactor protection system instrument at Tsuruga Power Plant Unit 2,” these issues were also selected
2” that occurred on December 2, 2009, this issue was also selected as an additional inspection item. as additional inspection items.
As a result of the basic inspection on the status of maintenance management, it was verified that As a result of the basic inspection on the status of compliance and safety culture creation activities,
the 17th maintenance cycle maintenance plan for Tsuruga Power Station Unit 2 was defined and it was verified that 10 items (including the item “Implementation of education targeting the
added to the safety preservation rules regarding electrical structures for electric operations. An improvement of technical capabilities,” which was newly added as a policy of safety culture creation
activities for 2009), were carried out satisfactorily in accordance with their own specific action plans,
inspection plan for those items was also verified, in which a maintenance method was set based on
by the organizations at the head office, etc. The established system was functioning effectively, and

203
the operational rules, including ways to perform the inspections, implementation frequency, and continuous improvements were being made. As for the status of nonconformance management and
timings. It was also verified that a system to assess the effectiveness of the maintenance based on the corrective action, it was verified that they were executed properly based on the in-house regulations.
input information obtained during the maintenance activities was established. In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based
In regard to other inspection items, each safety preservation activity was conducted properly based on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules.
on the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules. As a result of the review of the status of the improvement made by the licensee for the “Safety
preservation rules violation (violation 2) during transportation of spent fuel at Tsuruga Power Plant
In the additional inspection on “Partially lost functions of the reactor protection system instrument Unit 2,” it was verified that improvement measures had been implemented appropriately. It was also
in the primary coolant pump power supply system of Unit 2,” the status of the cause investigation decided that the effectiveness of those measures should continue to be assessed at future safety
conducted by the licensee was reviewed. As a result, it was verified that it was highly possible that inspections, etc.
the relevant system power supply (NFB) had been turned “OFF” since July 11, 2008 because of the As a result of the review of the status of the improvement made by the licensee for the “Safety
fact that the NFB was set to “OFF” on July 11, 2008 and that the “OFF” operation of the NFB was preservation rules violation (violation 2) regarding the lost functions of the reactor protection system
not included in the records of entry to the safety system inverter room, where the distribution board instrument at Tsuruga Power Plant Unit 2,” it was verified that the improvement measures to be
conducted before the next periodical inspection were implemented appropriately. Since further cause
with this NFB is installed. Since further cause investigations and recurrence prevention measures investigations and recurrence prevention measures should be implemented by the licensee in future,
should be implemented by the licensee in future, it was decided that the status of improvement of it was decided that the status of improvement of these matters should be verified at future safety
these matters should be verified at future safety inspections, etc. inspections, etc.
The status of daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also examined Since a leak from the No. 2 air lock inner door of the reactor containment was found at Unit 2
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation during the period of the safety inspection, the status of actions for deviations from operational limits
was also checked. As a result, it was verified that the actions were taken properly based on the safety
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, and so forth. As a result, no particular problems
preservation rules.
were found. The status of the other daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for examined by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing
examination in this inspection were conducted properly. operation records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending routine tests (scram
function test with the Unit 1 scram test switch, and start-up test of the high-pressure injection pumps
(A, B) of Unit 2), and so forth. As a result, no particular problem was found.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
examination in this inspection were conducted properly.



(18) Tokai Power Station Tokai Power Station
1st inspection 2nd inspection
Period of May 11 (Mon) to May 15 (Fri), 2009 Period of July 13 (Mon) to July 17 (Fri), 2009
inspection inspection
Inspection The nuclear safety inspector conducted the inspection by entering the facility, examining certain Inspection The nuclear safety inspector conducted the inspection by entering the facility, examining certain
items objects such as records, and questioning concerned parties with regard to the status of safety items objects such as records, and questioning concerned parties with regard to the status of safety
preservation activities based on the safety preservation rules. preservation activities based on the safety preservation rules.

(Inspection Items) (Inspection Items)


- Status of decommissioning construction management - Status of management review
- Status of radiation management - Status of radioactive (gaseous and liquid) waste management
- Status of procurement management - Status of maintenance management
- Status of compliance with the changed conditions related to changed safety preservation rules - Status of decommissioning construction management
- Attendance at the status review of safety storage and isolation - Follow-up on items that require surveillance
- Attendance at the status review of maintenance management facilities - Status of non-radioactive waste assessment and management
- Attendance at the maintenance management status review of environmental monitoring area - Attendance at the status review of safety storage and isolation
facilities
- Attendance at the maintenance management status review of radiation management equipment

Inspection Safety inspections were conducted by entering the facility, examining certain objects and Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of management review, the status of
results questioning concerned parties with regard to the status of decommissioning construction results radioactive (gaseous and liquid) waste management, the status of maintenance management, the
management, the status of radiation management, the status of compliance with the changed status of decommissioning construction management, etc. As a follow-up on items that require
conditions related to changed safety preservation rules, and so forth. As a result, a safety preservation surveillance, safety inspections were also conducted with regard to the “Status of actions for the
rules violation (an item that requires surveillance) was discovered. (Corroded holes on the exhaust corroded holes on the exhaust duct in storage bunker (A)” and the “Status of non-radioactive waste
duct in storage bunker (A), found during attendance at the maintenance management status review of assessment and management.” The status of management review and the status of radioactive
the radiation management equipment.) As for the status of decommissioning construction (gaseous and liquid) waste management were selected as priority inspection items.
management, we have submitted a list items that require improvement regarding the omission of a It was verified from the results of safety inspections that with regard to the inspection items related

204
required review by the Reactor Facilities Safety Committee when the construction plan was partially to this inspection, safety preservation activities are conducted based on the safety preservation rules
revised. and that there are no matters that violate the safety preservation rules.
In addition, the decommissioning construction and facility management status during the safety The daily decommissioning construction and facility management status during the safety
inspection period were also examined by questioning each licensee about management status, inspection period were also examined by questioning the licensee about decommissioning
reviewing operation records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, attending the status review construction management status and about the reactor facility management status, reviewing
of safety storage and isolation, and so forth. As a result, it was verified that safety preservation operation records, making inspection tours of facilities, attending the status review of safety storage
activities were conducted properly. and isolation, confirming the status of decommissioning construction management, and so forth. As a
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for result, no problems were found and it was verified that safety preservation activities were conducted
examination in this inspection were, on the whole, conducted properly, excluding the properly.
above-mentioned items that require surveillance and improvement. In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
For the items that require surveillance and improvement, the status of the improvement measures examination in this inspection were conducted properly.
specified by the licensee should be verified in future safety inspections, etc.
Tokai Power Station Tokai Power Station
3rd inspection 4th inspection
Period of October 19 (Mon) to October 23 (Fri), 2009 Period of January 25 (Mon) to January 29 (Fri), 2010
inspection inspection
Inspection The nuclear safety inspector conducted the inspection by entering the facility, examining certain Inspection The nuclear safety inspector conducted the inspection by entering the facility, examining certain
items objects such as records, and questioning concerned parties with regard to the status of safety items objects such as records, and questioning concerned parties with regard to the status of safety
preservation activities based on the safety preservation rules. preservation activities based on the safety preservation rules.

(Inspection Items) (Inspection Items)


(1) Status of safety preservation activities related to the revision of the safety preservation rules - Status of required facility maintenance (for 2009)
accompanying the revision of ministerial ordinance - Status of decommissioning construction management (disassembly and removal work of heat
(2) Status of radioactive waste management activities (management of the facilities that handle solid exchangers, etc. (in buildings of Units 1 and 2))
waste, waste generated at the decommissioning stage, non-radioactive waste, and waste from - Status of safety preservation education and training (for personnel at the power plant and
clearance processes) employees at affiliated companies)
(3) Status of nonconformance management - Status of emergency measures
(4) Status of external audits (audits of the decommissioning construction subcontractors) - Status of nonconformance management (for 2009)
(5) Status of changed and approved safety preservation rules - Attendance at the status review of safety storage and isolation
(6) Follow-up on matters (maintenance management, etc.) that were identified in the inspections as - Attendance at the status review of maintenance management facilities (AETP, CCP, and so on)
being in need of improvement
(7) Status of improvement measures for activities relating to non-radioactive waste
(8) Attendance at the status review of maintenance management facilities (turbine hall, outdoor)

Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of safety preservation activities related to the Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of required facility maintenance (for 2009),
results revision of the safety preservation rules accompanying the revision of ministerial ordinance, etc. results the status of decommissioning construction management (disassembly and removal work of heat
Also, the status of “Safety preservation activities related to the revision of the safety preservation exchangers, etc. (in buildings of Units 1 and 2)), the status of safety preservation education and
rules accompanying the revision of ministerial ordinance” and the status of radioactive waste training (for personnel at the power plant and employees at affiliated companies), the status of

205
management activities (management of the facilities that handle solid waste, waste generated at the emergency measures, the status of nonconformance management (for 2009), etc. The status of
decommissioning stage, non-radioactive waste, and waste from clearance processes) were selected as required facility maintenance (for 2009) and the status of decommissioning construction
priority inspection items. The status of changed and approved safety preservation rules was selected management (disassembly and removal work of heat exchangers, etc. (in buildings of Units 1 and 2))
as another inspection item and matters that were identified as being in need of improvement in past were selected as priority inspection items.
inspections were selected as follow-up items. It was verified from the results of safety inspections that with regard to the inspection items related
It was verified from the results of safety inspections that with regard to the inspection items related to this inspection, safety preservation activities are conducted based on the safety preservation rules
to this inspection, safety preservation activities are conducted based on the safety preservation rules and that there are no matters that violate the safety preservation rules.
and that there are no matters that violate the safety preservation rules. The daily decommissioning construction and facility management status during the safety
The daily decommissioning construction and facility management status during the safety inspection period were also examined by questioning the licensee about decommissioning
inspection period were also examined by questioning the licensee about decommissioning construction management status and about the reactor facility management status, reviewing
construction management status and about the reactor facility management status, reviewing operation records, making inspection tours of facilities, attending the conformation of the status of
operation records, making inspection tours of facilities, attending the conformation of the status of the maintenance management facilities, confirming the status of decommissioning construction
the maintenance management facilities, confirming the status of decommissioning construction management, and so forth. As a result, it was verified that safety preservation activities were
management, and so forth. As a result, no problems were found and it was verified that safety conducted properly.
preservation activities were conducted properly. In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for examination in this inspection were conducted in accordance with the safety preservation rules.
examination in this inspection were conducted properly.



(19) Decommissioning Engineering Center, JAEA (formerly called “Fugen”) Decommissioning Engineering Center, JAEA (formerly called “Fugen”)
1st inspection 2nd inspection
Period of June 15 (Mon) to June 19 (Fri), 2009 Period of September 14 (Mon) to September 18 (Fri), 2009
inspection inspection
Inspection The nuclear safety inspector conducted the inspection by entering the facility, examining certain Inspection The nuclear safety inspector conducted the inspection by entering the facility, examining certain
items objects such as records, and questioning concerned parties with regard to the status of safety items objects such as records, and questioning concerned parties with regard to the status of safety
preservation activities based on the safety preservation rules. preservation activities based on the safety preservation rules.

(Inspection Items) (Inspection Items)


- Status of safety preservation activities related to management reviews and internal audits - Status of safety preservation activities related to emergency measures
- Status of safety preservation activities related to preventive measures - Status of safety preservation activities related to radioactive solid waste management
- Status of safety preservation activities related to radiation management - Status of recurrence prevention measures and preventive actions concerning the leak from the
ground section of the concentrated liquid pump

Inspection Safety inspections were conducted by entering the facility, examining certain objects, and Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of safety preservation activities related to
results questioning concerned parties with regard to the status of safety preservation activities related to results emergency measures, the status of safety preservation activities related to radioactive solid waste
management reviews and internal audits, the status of safety preservation activities related to management, the status of recurrence prevention measures and preventive actions concerning the
preventive measures, and the status of safety preservation activities related to radiation management. leak from the ground section of the concentrated liquid pump, etc. The status of safety preservation
As a result, no violations of the safety preservation rules were discovered. activities related to emergency measures was selected as a priority inspection item.
Furthermore, questioning about the operational management status, a review of its records and a It was verified from the results of safety inspections that with regard to each inspection item,
tour of the nuclear reactor facilities, etc., during the safety inspection period also found that safety safety preservation activities are conducted properly based on the safety preservation rules and that
preservation activities were conducted without problems. there are no matters that violate the safety preservation rules.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for The status of daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also examined
examination in this inspection were conducted properly. by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
records, attending inspection tours of nuclear facilities, and so forth. As a result, no particular

206
problems were found.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
examination in this inspection were conducted properly.
Decommissioning Engineering Center, JAEA (formerly called “Fugen”) Decommissioning Engineering Center, JAEA (formerly called “Fugen”)
3rd inspection 4th inspection
Period of November 9 (Mon) to November 13 (Fri), 2009 Period of February 22 (Mon) to February 26 (Fri), 2010
inspection inspection
Inspection The nuclear safety inspector conducted the inspection by entering the facility, examining certain Inspection The nuclear safety inspector conducted the inspection by entering the facility, examining certain
items objects such as records, and questioning concerned parties with regard to the status of safety items objects such as records, and questioning concerned parties with regard to the status of safety
preservation activities based on the safety preservation rules. preservation activities based on the safety preservation rules.

(Inspection Items) (Inspection Items)


- Status of activities related to procurement management - Status of activities related to maintenance management
- Status of decommissioning management - Status of safety management at affiliated companies
- Status of nonconformance management regarding accidents and failures - Status of nonconformance management regarding accidents and failures

Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of activities related to procurement Inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of activities related to maintenance
results management, the status of decommissioning management, and the status of nonconformance results management, the status of safety management at affiliated companies, and the status of
management regarding accidents and failures. The status of activities related to procurement nonconformance management regarding accidents and failures. The status of nonconformance
management was selected as a priority inspection item. management regarding accidents and failures was selected as a priority inspection item.
It was verified from the results of safety inspections that with regard to each inspection item, It was verified from the results of safety inspections that with regard to each inspection item, safety
safety preservation activities are conducted properly based on the safety preservation rules and that preservation activities are conducted properly based on the safety preservation rules and that there
there are no matters that violate the safety preservation rules. are no matters that violate the safety preservation rules. The status of daily operational management
The status of daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also examined during the safety inspection period was also examined by questioning the licensee about the
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation management of facility operations, reviewing operation records, making inspection tours of nuclear
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, and so forth. As a result, no particular problems facilities, and so forth. As a result, no particular problems were found.
were found. In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for

207
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for examination in this inspection were conducted in accordance with the safety preservation rules.
examination in this inspection were conducted properly.



(20) Monju Power Station Monju Power Station
1st inspection 2nd inspection
Period of June 3 (Wed) to June 30 (Tue), 2009 Period of September 14 (Mon) to September 30 (Wed), 2009
inspection inspection
Inspection When NISA was assessing the comprehensive safety inspection report of the reactor institute, Inspection The following inspection items were verified in the safety inspections by entering the facility,
items aiming for the commissioning resumption of Monju, quality assurance problems in March last year, items examining certain objects, questioning concerned parties with regard to the status of compliance with
such as insufficient commitment by the management at Monju, were found in the wake of incorrect the safety preservation rules, reviewing the status of activities for the items that were found in the
issuance of a sodium leak alarm. Because of this, NISA decided to start checking problem-response safety investigations conducted before the start of the safety inspection, questioning concerned
systems including the quality assurance system of the reactor institute by conducting “Special safety parties about the status of daily operational management, reviewing records, making inspection tours
inspections” in May last year. On May 25 of this year, NISA decided on the “Safety check concept of nuclear facilities, and so forth.
for the commissioning resumption of Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Monju,” specifying the
following 4 items as priority items for safety management. The concept indicated the goals which I. Status of quality assurance activities
should be checked in the “Special safety inspections,” for example, the autonomous PDCA cycle (1) Progress of the priority items for safety management, which should be accomplished before
should have started running and the facility integrity check method should be valid. commissioning resumption (interviews with the chief and general manager of the plant)
This inspection was conducted to verify if these goals were accomplished at the reactor institute. (2) Status of the action plan (including the status of flow creation by identifying operational
items)
I. Establishment of autonomous quality assurance system
II. Steady implementation of integrity checks for long-term non-operating facilities II. Status of preparation and implementation of related manuals, such as the operational
III. Reliable implementation of countermeasures for sodium leaks management manual
IV. Reliable implementation of maintenance management based on the maintenance program (1) Status of preparation of related manuals for issuance of a sodium leak alarm
(2) Status of manual revision activities related to operational management, exposure
management, radiation management, procurement management, fuel management, core
management, and education and training
(3) Status of internal audits

III. Status of maintenance management


(1) Status of the maintenance plan

208
(2) Status of nonconformance management
(3) Status of repair ticket processing

Inspection As per attachment Inspection As per attachment


results results
Monju Power Station Monju Power Station
3rd inspection 4th inspection
Period of November 16 (Mon) to November 27 (Fri), 2009 Period of January 19 (Tue) to January 29 (Fri), 2010
inspection inspection
Inspection The following inspection items were verified in the safety inspections by entering the facility,
Inspection The following inspection items were verified in the safety inspections by entering the facility, examining certain objects, questioning concerned parties with regard to the status of compliance with
items examining certain objects, questioning concerned parties about the status of compliance with the items the safety preservation rules, reviewing the status of activities for the items that were found in the
safety preservation rules, reviewing the status of activities for the items that were found in the safety safety investigations conducted before the start of the safety inspection, questioning concerned
investigations conducted before the start of the safety inspection, questioning concerned parties about parties about the status of daily operational management, reviewing records, making inspection tours
the status of daily operational management, reviewing records, making inspection tours of nuclear of nuclear facilities, and so forth.
facilities, and so forth. I. Status of quality assurance activities
I. Status of quality assurance activities (1) Status of quality goals review by using provisional management reviews
(1) Status of provisional management review (2) Status of improvement measures implemented to resolve surveillance items in the previous
(2) Status of the action plan safety inspection
(3) Comprehensive status of preparation for commissioning resumption (interviews with the II. Status of preparation of the operational procedures, etc.
chief and general manager of the plant) (1) Status of preparation of the reactor pre-start up/post shutdown inspection procedures, etc.
II. Status of preparation and implementation of related manuals, such as the operational (2) Status of revision of operational procedures related to facilities
management manual (3) Status of preparation of the notification and public announcement standards relating to
(1) Status of cause investigation and recurrence prevention measures for issuance of a sodium issuance of the sodium leak alarms
leak alarm III. Status of nonconformance management and repair ticket management
(2) Status of revision of the operational procedures, etc., such as the plant start up/shutdown (1) Status of actions for nonconformance
procedures and the abnormal operating procedures (2) Status of repair ticket processing
(3) Status of measures to reduce high dosage in radiation management and the measures to IV. Pre-check of the status of the inspections before start up (partial attendance)
improve the abilities of internal auditors (1) Check of the system configuration
(4) Status of education and training (2) Check of equipment statuses (including the safety system equipment)
(5) Status of systems to deal with accidents and trouble (3) Check of parameters (operation status)
III. Status of maintenance management V. Surprise inspection (notification and communication drills)
(1) Status of actions for nonconformance (including the cause investigation of and recurrence The safety inspection was conducted to verify the status of preparation for commissioning
Inspection resumption, continuing on from the 3rd safety inspection, including important items in safety
prevention measures for the isolation failure)
(2) Status of repair ticket processing results management that should be accomplished.
(3) Status of revision of maintenance programs More specifically, the status of preparation of the operational procedures (such as the plant start
The safety inspection was conducted to verify the status of preparation for commissioning up/shutdown procedures that are required before commissioning resumption), the status of revision
Inspection resumption, continuing on from the 2nd safety inspection. More specifically, safety items relating to of the operational procedures related to facilities, the checking of the system configuration and
results the operational procedure-related manuals (such as the plant start up/shutdown procedures, etc., that equipment statuses (pre-start up inspection statuses), and the status of actions for nonconformance

209
are required for commissioning resumption), items relating to education and training and actions in and repair ticket processing were selected as basic inspection items. The status of notification and
communication drills was also verified as a surprise inspection.
response to accidents, as well as provisional management reviews conducted by the president, etc., As a result of the inspections, it was verified that the important items in safety management that
were selected as basic inspection items. should be accomplished before commissioning resumption were prepared satisfactorily and that
As a result of the inspections, it was verified that the important items in safety management that continuous improvements were being made.
should be accomplished before commissioning resumption were prepared satisfactorily and that As for the status of preparation of the operational procedures (such as the plant start up/shutdown
continuous improvements were being made. procedures that are required before commissioning resumption), the status of revision of the
As for the safety items relating to the operational procedure-related manuals (such as the plant operational procedures related to facilities, the check of the system configuration and equipment
start up/shutdown procedures, etc., that are required for commissioning resumption), the items statuses (pre-start up inspection statuses), and the status of actions for nonconformance and repair
relating to the education and training, the actions in response to accidents, and the provisional ticket processing, it was verified that the safety preservation activities were conducted properly based
management reviews conducted by the president, etc., it was verified that safety preservation on the safety preservation rules and no items that were considered violations of the safety
activities were conducted properly based on the safety preservation rules and no violations of the preservation rules were found.
safety preservation rules (violations 1, 2, and 3) were found. As for the issue related to the air cooler blower in the auxiliary cooling facility, which was not
However, as a result of the review of the LOC deviation due to stoppage of the sampling pump for operating, (found during the automatic start-up test of the emergency diesel power generator (A) in
the secondary sodium leak detector, which occurred on October 23, it was verified that the duties of December last year), problems with quality assurance were found in the system, education,
each position involved were unclear. For example, the chain of command was unclear and the procedures, and so on for the test. However, the measures taken after the occurrence of the event
managers in charge, etc., set the seal without confirmation of the work details. In addition, basic were considered good. Those measures included the revision of the relevant procedures, the
operations to be conducted based on the procedures were not complied with; for example, the system conducting of feedback activities with intention to revise upper-level documents, and the providing
was not verified by using the related documents and an isolation tag was not attached due to lack of of education to teach the importance of “Stopping to think.” With the expectation that the PDCA
knowledge. cycle would continue to be run autonomously, it was determined that the status of corrective action
It was considered, however, that the licensee had the intention of thoroughly eliminating the for this matter should be verified at future safety inspections, etc.
causes of the problems relating to the commissioning resumption, since the licensee declared their As for the status of notification and communication drills, which was verified as a surprise
intentions to proactively conduct feedback activities in sections other than the relevant section in inspection, since the personnel in charge of reporting appropriately determined the actions to be
charge. Considering all this, the status of corrective action for these surveillance matters should be taken and conducted the reporting operations as appropriate, the case can be considered
verified at future safety inspections, etc. well-handled.
The status of daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also examined The status of daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also examined
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, and so forth. As a result, no particular problems records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, and so forth. As a result, no particular problems
were found. were found.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
examination in this inspection were conducted properly. examination in this inspection were conducted properly.



(21) Hamaoka Power Station (decommissioned) Hamaoka Power Station (decommissioned)
3rd inspection 4th inspection
Period of November 16 (Mon) to December 2 (Wed), 2009 Period of March 8 (Mon) to March 18 (Thu), 2010
inspection (Reactor decommissioning period: November 30 (Mon) to December 2 (Wed), 2009) inspection
Inspection The nuclear safety inspector conducted the inspection by entering the facility, examining certain Inspection The nuclear safety inspector conducted the inspection by entering the facility, examining certain
items objects such as records, and questioning concerned parties with regard to the status of safety items objects such as records, and questioning concerned parties with regard to the status of safety
preservation activities based on the safety preservation rules. preservation activities based on the safety preservation rules.
(Inspection Items) (Inspection Items)
Status of actions in response to the start of decommissioning Status of actions in response to the start of decommissioning

Inspection Since the approval of the decommissioning plan for Units 1 and 2 and the approval of the revision On November 18, 2009, which was in the middle of the 3rd safety inspection for 2009, approval of
Inspection
results of the safety preservation rules were given on November 18, 2009, in the middle of this safety the decommissioning plan for Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Units 1 and 2 and approval of the
results
inspection, the safety inspection plan was changed to add this new inspection item. Then the status of revision of safety preservation rules were given.
decommissioning for Units 1 and 2 was verified as the “Status of actions in response to the start of Along with this, the plan for the 3rd safety inspection for 2009 was changed to add an inspection
decommissioning.” item regarding the “Status of actions in response to the start of decommissioning,” and the inspection
As a result of the inspection, it was verified that operations relating to the status of organizational was conducted by using the clause-by-clause investigation method, targeting Articles 3 to 10, 14, 15,
change, to the quality assurance system (status of definition and revision of guidelines and 19 to 21, 23, 39, 46, and 63 to 74 in Part 2 of the safety preservation rules.
procedures, etc.), to the status of safety education for personnel, etc., to the status of fuel In this 4th inspection (March 2010), the status of actions in response to the start of
management, and to the status of permanent actions for the shut-down of reactors, etc., were all decommissioning was verified by using the clause-by-clause investigation method, targeting the
carried out properly. remaining articles in Part 2 of the safety preservation rules.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for It was verified from the results of the safety inspections that related in-house regulations were

210
examination in these inspections of Units 1 and 2 were conducted properly. prepared and were being organized in order to properly conduct the safety preservation activities
regarding the start of decommissioning. It was verified that these regulations were based on the
safety preservation rules, and that there were no matters that violate the safety preservation rules.
As for the integrity reviews of the decommissioning plan, the safety preservation rules, and the
related in-house regulations, it was verified that the reviews were being conducted systematically.
However, since continuous preparation of these in-house regulations is required, the status of the
preparation should be verified in future safety inspections, etc.
The status of daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also examined
by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation
records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, and so forth. As a result, no particular problems
were found.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
examination in this inspection were conducted properly.
(Attachment)

Outline of the Results of the FY2009 Safety Inspection


(Special Safety Inspection) No. 1 of Monju

July 30, 2009


Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency

1. Establishment of autonomous quality assurance system


• The Senior Director General of the Tsuruga Head Office reflected on his/her insufficient involvement
in business management and expressed the following basic strategies: (1) devote themselves to
operational management as a nuclear power plant, (2) proceed steadily and soundly and stop in a
courageous manner if required, and (3) respond appropriately at the occurrence of trouble with safety
given first priority. This clarified their awareness of and attitude towards management.
• Organizational change was performed; e.g. establishing a three-section system comprising operation,
maintenance, and technologies, and promoting the Monju Development Department Manager, who
issues the safety preservation activities to the General Manager of the plant. Three experts were invited
from electric utilities and placed in important positions relating to operations and maintenance
(Assistant Manager, Deputy Executive Director of Department).
• Measures to add personnel (increased by 39 persons as of April 2009, including 19 persons who were
positioned in the plant maintenance department) and additional budget measures (approx. 1.5 billion
yen in total for the period from August 2008 to March 2009) were taken in accordance with the agile
decision-making of the president.
• The on-site master process, which summarizes on-site work processes, was defined in order to manage
projects based on precise assessment of the site status. Progress is monitored and reviewed in each
April, May, and June.
• The number of issued nonconformance management sheets was increased due to the proactive
operations of the nonconformity management committee. A system to pre-check the integrity of the
related regulations for each operational process was built and implemented before fuel replacement.
Fuel management in June and July was completed without any major trouble.

2. Reliable implementation of integrity checking in long-term nonoperating facilities


• The suitability of facility integrity checking methods (such as inspection method and inspection
period) was assessed considering past nonconformance, and inspection manuals were re-organized
based on the results of this assessment.
• In the new system, facility integrity checking should be implemented using the inspection methods
verified. For facilities targeted for pre-use inspection, the pre-use inspection standards should be used
and surveillance should be conducted on deterioration trends of any facilities that satisfied the
standards but were considered to be deteriorated.

3. Reliable implementation of countermeasures for sodium leakage (relating to detectors)


• Upgrading to improved detectors was almost complete. The inspection items, inspection frequencies,
and so on, which are required for preventive maintenance, were organized for each detector type and
installation place, and reflected in the maintenance program. 参


211
• The person in charge of checking alarm issuance causes (which are used as factors in judging LCO
deviation), was changed from a maintenance supervisor to an operator in order to reduce the time
required to judge LCO deviation. When a false alarm is not verified as being false within a range
where an operator can check, this is considered an LCO safety deviation. The checking methods of
operators, an estimate of the time required for the check, the alarm issuance cause checking methods
(to be conducted by the maintenance personnel after an LCO deviation is judged to have occurred),
and an estimate of the time required for that check were defined for each detector type and installation
location.

4. Reliable implementation of maintenance management based on the maintenance program


• Preventive maintenance should be considered as fundamental. Preventive maintenance should be
conducted for the special facilities that handle sodium at Monju. Corrective maintenance should be
limited to the facilities that are not directly required for operational management, such as the ones used
for the inspections.
• Reflecting the inspection records in the past, the maintenance plan was reviewed based on the
recurrence prevention measures for the events “Corrosion on the outdoor exhaust duct” and “CLD
false alarm.”

5. Conclusion and future handling


• The JAEA assessed that the special safety inspections that had been organized based on the “Safety
Check Concept” had attained their goals. The special safety inspection is now complete.
• From now on, the JAEA should report on the actions for commissioning resumption and the integrity
checking of long-term nonoperating facilities as additional full safety inspection reports. In response to
these reports, the NISA should conduct normal or on-site safety inspections to check the
accomplishment of their goals and contents. The check results should be reported to the Monju safety
check review meeting for review and the NISA should gather the assessment results on the validity of
commissioning resumption.
• The JAEA is required to take actions to deepen the Check and Action portions in the PDCA cycle.
Required actions include: recognizing their commitment to a large project aiming to resume a nuclear
power generation system that has been shut down for more than 13 years; conducting further analysis
and assessment of the effectiveness of their commitment; clarifying and quickly taking actions for the
items in which they should be further involved, aiming for commissioning resumption; and building a
master process at the Head Office relating to not only the Monju on-site operations but also to the
entire organizational QMS operations, in order to further improve reliable project management with
safety as a top priority. It is desirable that the top management exercise more leadership ability. It is
also desirable that all of the personnel at the JAEA who are involved in Monju should recognize their
own responsibilities and pride once again and keep up their feelings of motivation and morale.

212
(Reference)

Summary of Safety Check Concepts for Commissioning Resumption of


Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Monju (May 25, 2009)

Considering the fact that problems were found with safety assurance and deterioration due to aging of
facilities that have been shut down for a long period, the pre-use inspections of the facilities, the important
items regarding safety management and the goals to be checked by the NISA before commissioning
resumption were well-organized.

#$Check of Facilities
• Even facilities that have already undergone pre-use inspection should undergo pre-use inspection again
if they have deteriorated due to aging.
• Important facilities should be inspected on-site even if they have not been targeted for pre-use
inspection.
• The JAEA must report the results of the integrity checking of long-term nonoperating facilities in an
additional full safety inspection report. In response to that report, the NISA should check the contents
of the report by conducting an on-site inspection.

Check of Safety Management


#$
1) Mid-term goal
Important item in safety 2) Goal to be accomplished before
(Completion requirement of the special
management commissioning resumption
safety inspection)
I. Establishment of
Autonomous PDCA cycle shall Autonomous quality assurance system
autonomous quality
assurance system have started running. shall be established.
II. Reliable implementation of Facility integrity checking methods,
integrity checking of including the targets of the facility The facility integrity checking required for
long-term nonoperating integrity checking and the inspection commissioning resumption shall be completed.
facilities methods, shall be valid.
The construction of countermeasure systems for
The maintenance management methods the sodium leak detectors shall be completed.
regarding the sodium leak detectors and The maintenance management methods
III. Reliable implementation of
the procedures to be followed at regarding the sodium leak detectors and the
countermeasures for sodium
issuance of an alarm relating to sodium procedures to be followed at issuance of an
leakage
leakage or LCO deviation shall have alarm relating to sodium leakage or LCO
been clarified. deviation shall be reflected in the safety
preservation rules and related documents.
IV. Reliable implementation of The maintenance program shall be reviewed by
A maintenance program shall have been
maintenance management reflecting on the results of the inspections that
defined based on the characteristics of
based on the maintenance were conducted based on the maintenance
Monju and past inspection results.
program program.
Once accomplishment of the goals in 1) is verified and the special safety inspection is complete, the
JAEA needs to report the actions taken to accomplish the goals in 2) in an additional full safety inspection
report. In response to that report, the NISA should check the accomplishment of those goals by conducting
regular safety inspections.

# Comprehensive Assessment
The results of the checks of facilities and safety management should be reported to the Monju safety
check review meeting for review and the NISA should gather the assessment results on the validity of 参
commissioning resumption. The status should be actively explained to the local community, etc.

213
Japan Atomic Energy Agency “Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Monju”
Results of the FY2009 Safety Inspection (Special Safety Inspection) No. 1

July 30, 2009


Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency

1. Introduction

(1) Background of past special safety inspections


As for the prototype fast breeder reactor Monju (hereinafter, referred to as Monju), the NISA defined
specific actions in June 2001 based on the result of the Monju full safety inspection (conducted by using
the comprehensive safety preservation measures summarized by the Science and Technology Agency),
considering the sodium leak from the secondary system (December, 1995), and then instructed the former
Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (currently the Japan Atomic Energy Agency) to report the
implementation status of those specific actions.
The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter, referred to as the JAEA) has submitted these reports four
times up to now and the NISA has assessed their contents. Since an incorrect alarm issuance event occurred
in March 2008 due to a failure in the sodium leak detectors (CLD) in the primary system when the NISA
was assessing the fourth report and deformed electrodes were found in multiple detectors during the cause
investigation by the JAEA, the NISA instructed the JAEA to define an inspection plan for the sodium leak
detectors and decided to conduct special safety inspections for the time being in order to rigorously verify
the status of the inspections, etc.
As a result of the first special safety inspection that was conducted from May to June 2008, the NISA
pointed out challenges in regard to quality assurance such as the insufficient commitment of the top
management and the Tsuruga Head Office of the JAEA to Monju and instructed them on July 10 to define
an action plan for countermeasures to these challenges. In response, the JAEA submitted their action plan
on July 31. In the middle of the second special safety inspection to verify the implementation status of the
action plan, which was conducted in September, an incorrect alarm issuance of the CLD in the secondary
system and corroded holes on the outdoor exhaust duct were found, which clarified the problems in
maintenance management. As a result of the inspections on those matters, it was verified that the system to
encourage top management's involvement in operations at Monju (e.g. establishing the Monju Total
Control Group to assist the decision making by the top levels of management at the Tsuruga Head Office)
had been strengthened. However, some items whose scheduling and goals were not clear were found in the
implementation plan that reflects the action plan, and it was concluded that many items, such as the
clarification of the chain of command (e.g. organizing the duties of the General Manager of the Plant and
the Monju Development Department Manager) and the root cause analysis, are still in-progress.
As a result of the third special safety inspection that was conducted in November to December, the NISA
concluded that the scheduling and goals of each item defined in the action plan had been clarified and their
progress was well-managed. The NISA also concluded that organizational problems had been dealt with
based on the results of the root cause analysis of organizational factors, and that reinforcement policies for
the management system were implemented. (These policies included the promotion of the Monju

214
Development Department Manager who commands the safety preservation activities to General Manager
of the plant, the clarification of the roles of the Operation Control Office and the Safety Quality Control
Office that assist the General Manager of the plant, and the organizational change to a three-section system
comprising operations, maintenance, and technologies.) However, it was considered that actions in regard
to important problems (such as the root cause analysis of organizational climate and safety culture, validity
check of the facility integrity checking of the long-term nonoperating plant (hereinafter, referred to as the
facility integrity checking), inspection of the sodium leak detectors, and review of the judgment criteria for
deviations from operational limits (hereinafter, referred to as LCO) at issuance of the sodium leak alarm
were still in-progress.
As a result of the fourth special safety inspection conducted in March 2009, the NISA verified that the
management system had been strengthened by revising the safety preservation rules based on the policies
that were indicated in the previous inspection. However, it also verified that a system in which it can be
clearly confirmed that the new organization fulfills the desired functions was not yet established. As for the
implementation of the action plan, the NISA verified that the action plan was, on the whole, implemented
satisfactorily. Measures were indicated based on the results of the root cause analysis of organizational
climate and safety culture and the detector inspection report was valid, but actions in regard to important
problems, such as the validity check of the facility integrity checking and the review of the judgment
criteria for the LCO deviation at issuance of the sodium leak alarm, were still in-progress. the NISA
therefore decided that special safety inspections should be conducted again in the future.

(2) Goals to be accomplished before commissioning resumption, and goals whose accomplishment should
be checked in special safety inspections
Prior to the implementation of the first special safety inspection 2009, the NISA defined the “Safety
Check Concept for Commissioning Resumption of Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Monju” (hereinafter,
referred to as “Safety Check Concept”) on May 25, 2009 through the review of the Monju safety check
review meeting. This Safety Check Concept organizes and defines the pre-use inspections of facilities that
are required for commissioning resumption and the important items in safety management and their goals
that should be checked by the NISA before commissioning resumption. These separate aspects of facilities
inspection and safety management are organized and defined considering the problems of autonomous
quality assurance and the deterioration due to aging of long-term nonoperating facilities. This “Safety
Check Concept” is summarized as follows:

#$Check of Facilities
• Even facilities that have already undergone pre-use inspection should undergo pre-use inspection again
if they have deteriorated due to aging.
• Important facilities should be inspected on-site even if they have not been targeted for pre-use
inspection.
• The JAEA must report the results of the integrity checking of long-term nonoperating facilities in an
additional full safety inspection report. In response to that report, the NISA should check the contents
of the report by conducting a safety inspection and an on-site inspection.


215
# Check of Safety Management

1) Mid-term goal (goals whose


accomplishment should be checked in
Important item in safety 2) Goal to be accomplished before
special safety inspections = completion
management commissioning resumption
requirement of the special safety
inspection)

I. Establishment of
Autonomous PDCA cycle shall have started Autonomous quality assurance system shall
autonomous quality
running. be established.
assurance system

Facility integrity checking methods,


II. Reliable implementation
including the targets of the facility integrity The facility integrity checking required for
of integrity checking in
checking and the inspection methods, shall commissioning resumption shall be
long-term nonoperating
be valid, considering the failures that have completed.
facilities
occurred in the past.

The construction of countermeasure


The construction of countermeasure systems for the failure in the sodium leak
systems for the failures in the sodium leak detectors shall be complete, including the
III. Reliable implementation detectors shall have been taken, and their assessment of the results, and their
of countermeasures for maintenance management method and the maintenance management method and the
sodium leakage procedures to be followed at issuance of an procedures to be followed at issuance of an
alarm relating to sodium leak or LCO alarm relating to sodium leak or LCO
deviation shall have been clarified. deviation shall be reflected in the safety
preservation rules and related documents.

IV. Reliable implementation Inspections shall be conducted based on the


A maintenance program shall have been
of maintenance maintenance program, and the maintenance
defined based on the characteristics of
management based on program shall be reviewed by reflecting on
Monju and past inspection results.
the maintenance program the results of the inspections.

Once accomplishment of the goals in 1) is verified, the special safety inspection is complete. After
that, the JAEA needs to report the results of the actions that have been taken to accomplish the goal in
2), as well as future plans, in an additional full safety inspection report. In response to that report, the
NISA should check the accomplishment of those goals by conducting regular safety inspections.

Comprehensive Assessment
#$
The results of the checks of facilities and safety management should be reported to the Monju safety
check review meeting for review as needed, and the NISA should gather the assessment results on the
validity of commissioning resumption. The status should be actively explained to the local community,
etc.

216
2. Results of this special safety inspection

This inspection was conducted to verify the following four items, in the same way as the previous
inspection. Each item was inspected based on the “Safety Check Concept.”
I. Status of establishment of an autonomous quality assurance system by expansion and
implementation of the action plan
II. Validity check of inspection based on Equipment Integrity Confirmation Plan for Long-Term
Nonoperating Plants
III. Status of actions relating to sodium leak checks
IV. Status of maintenance management based on the maintenance program
The check and assessment results of these items and their details are summarized in an attachment. The
following summarizes whether these items have accomplished the goals which should be checked in the
special safety inspections, as shown in “Check of Safety Management” in 1. (2) “Safety Check Concept” (1
in the Summary Table).

(1) Establishment of autonomous quality assurance system

[Situation up to the previous inspection]


As a result of the special safety inspection conducted in March 2009, it was verified that reinforcement
of the organizational system (Note 2) was conducted in February 2009 to improve the issues that were pointed
out in the previous special safety inspections and to improve the organizational problems (Note 1) that were
found by the root cause analysis of the failures in the sodium leak detectors, etc. The alterations to the
safety regulations were approved and implemented, and thus it was judged that the “Monju” management
system was reinforced properly.
However, it was also verified that the progress of some actions was insufficient. These included:
clarification of procedures at the issuance of an alarm relating to sodium leakage and at the occurrence of
an LCO deviation; a validity check of the facility integrity check; and a check to see whether the defined
maintenance program is based on the characteristics of Monju. All of these were considered highly
important, taking into account the failure of the sodium leak detectors that caused a series of special safety
inspections to be conducted and the problems in maintenance management that were found after start of
these inspections. Therefore, it could not be clearly verified whether the new reinforced management
system fulfilled the desired functions.

(Note 1) (1) Dissociation of the management from on-site operations, (2) Unclear operation control functions, (3)
Inappropriate management scope, (4) Insufficient cross-sectional adjustment functions, (5) lack of line
personnel’s awareness of their own responsibilities and roles, (6) Insufficient response to issues pointed out by
outsiders, (7) Insufficient information sharing within Monju and Tsuruga Head Office
(Note 2) Unification of the safety management control to the General Manager of the plant; Clarification of the role of the
Operation Control Office that assists the General Manager of the plant with project management as well as role of
the Safety Quality Control Office that assists the General Manager of the plant with promotion and checking of
quality assurance; Separation of the Monju development department into three departments: Plant Management
Department, Plant Maintenance Department, and Technical Department (Particularly for the maintenance
operations, where the existing two-section system was reinforced and made a five-section system.)


217
[Items checked in this inspection and their assessment results]
i) Reinforcement of the management system
The Senior Director General of the Tsuruga Head Office stated that “Reflecting on our insufficient
involvement in business management, I repeatedly told the personnel about our vision of management
through the following basic strategies: (1) devote themselves to operational management as a nuclear
power plant, (2) proceed steadily and soundly and stop in a courageous manner if required, and (3) respond
appropriately at the occurrence of trouble with safety given first priority. As a result, I feel that the
awareness and actions of the personnel have changed.” Therefore, it can be considered that personnel’s
awareness of and attitude to these management issues have been clarified.
As for the organizational plan to reinforce the management system, the Senior Director General of the
Tsuruga Head Office weighed heavily on the fact that Monju is a power generation plant and instructed the
personnel to consider basic concepts for the operational system by referring to the status of the light water
reactor. The Monju Total Control Group (Note 3) and others submitted proposals, such as the
three-department system composed of Operation, Maintenance, and Technical departments and promotion
of the Monju Development Department Manager who commands the safety preservation activities to
General Manager of the plant. Organizational change was carried out in February, 2009. At the same time,
three experts were invited from electric utilities and positioned as Assistant Manager in charge of
maintenance and operation management, Deputy Executive Director of the Plant Maintenance Department,
and Deputy Executive Director of the Plant Management Department, in order to learn from their
experience and expertise at commercial nuclear power plants.
The number of personnel at Monju has been steadily increased (by 39 persons as of April 2009,
compared with the previous year, including 19 persons in the plant maintenance department). Also, to
perform repair work on the outdoor exhaust duct and for a facility integrity check, an additional budget was
taken from the overall budget of the plant (approx. 1.5 billion yen in total for the period from August 2008
to March 2009. These measures were a result of agile decision-making by the President, based on a precise
understanding of the on-site situation via the Monju Special Promotion Office (Note 4).
The General Manager of the plant, who took over the management of safety preservation activities from
the Monju Development Department Manager, instructed each relevant division in the plant to participate
in consideration of the processes in which they had not been sufficiently involved in the past. Each division
was directed to prepare the work processes at their sites, and the Operation Control Office (Note 5) was
directed to create an on-site master process to summarize the divisional work processes (in March 2009).
The Operation Control Office checked the progress of those processes and reviewed them in April, May,
and June.
As for nonconformance management, nonconformance management committee meetings (Note 6) are held
every day. Even though the number of issued nonconformance management sheets has increased, items
whose processing is delayed have decreased. Therefore, it can be considered that the awareness of the
importance of nonconformance management is deepening. With the Safety Quality Control Office (Note 7)
playing a central role, a system to pre-check the integrity of the related regulations for each operational
process was built and implemented before the fuel replacement service. The fuel replacement, which was
conducted in June and July 2009, was completed without any trouble. The same measures are planned for
the preparation processes relating to activation of the plant in future.

218
As for important items such as the validity check of the facility integrity check, substantial progress was
shown. The reinforcement of the management system can be considered to be showing an effect.

(Note 3) An organization in the Policy Planning and Co-ordination Department, Tsuruga Head Office, that assists the
Senior Director General in controlling the Monju project. Established in September 2008.
(Note 4) An organization that assists the decision making of the President, with the President at the top and other
membership limited to related executive directors (different from the Management Board), and the General
Manager of Monju, who is responsible for the site. Established in November 2008.
(Note 5) An organization directly under the General Manager of the plant, that assists the decision making of the General
Manager of the plant regarding overall plant management. Established in October 2008. An office director was
promoted to division manager level in February 2009.
(Note 6) Since a matter that required nonconformance management but was not reported as nonconformance was found, a
system in which the nonconformance management committee can perform nonconformance judgment by
themselves, not leaving it to the relevant section chief, was built based on the results of improvement training that
was conducted by the chief reactor engineer. A committee composed of the Director of the Safety Quality Control
Office at the top, the chief reactor engineers, and management from each section or personnel at the level of team
leader. Established in June 2008.
(Note 7) An organization directly under the General Manager of the plant, that checks each relevant division on site from
the viewpoint of quality assurance. Established in October 2008. An office director was promoted to division
manager level in February 2009.

ii) Organizational climate and safety culture


As for organizational climate and safety culture, according to the “Survey on safety climate in the work
place” conducted by an external organization, “Communication” and other items were not evaluated as
highly by general personnel as they were by managerial personnel. Therefore, the safety culture creation
action plan for 2009 contains reinforcement actions, such as the starting of visits by the President and the
Senior Director General of the Tsuruga Head Office to the central control room to talk directly with the
shift staff. Also included were actions for the speeding-up of opinion exchange feedback. To assess the
effects of this action plan, the conducting of a similar survey by an external organization and reflection on
the assessment results in order to review the measures is planned.

[Conclusion]
In consideration of the above, it was judged that systems to assist the top levels of management have
been built step-by-step, that the top levels of management (the President and the Senior Director General)
and the personnel who are responsible for the site (the General Manager of the plant) have made important
decisions, and that the action plan is being implemented and followed up on by using the systems that have
been built. As a result, it was concluded that improvement activities regarding both the reinforcement of the
Monju management system, and the problems in the organizational climate, safety culture, and quality
assurance systems, are being carried out. Considering this, it was judged that the autonomous PDCA cycle
has started running and that the goals to be verified in the special safety inspections on these items, which
are indicated in the “Safety Check Concept,” have been attained.
However, in regard to the action plan, although a certain level of analysis, assessment, and resulting
reflection were carried out by the Action Plan Follow-up Committee (Note 7) and during the management
reviews, in order to establish an autonomous quality assurance system, which is a goal that should be 参
accomplished before commissioning resumption, deeper analysis and assessment are required of the


219
effectiveness of the activities. Identification and prompt implementation of more concrete actions to be
taken for commissioning resumption are also required. In addition, although the on-site master process that
summarizes the work processes at each on-site division in Monju enabled accurate project management at
Monju according to the situation at the site, preparation of on-site master processes for the Tsuruga Head
Office and the Tokai Head Office, which are involved in the overall plant QMS operations, are required.
This should be prepared in the same way as the on-site master process for Monju have been, to further
improve a safety-first, stable project management system, that can see and understand the entire operation.
In other words, a check of the PDCA cycle and further deepening of actions are required. It is desirable that
the top management exercise more leadership ability on these matters.

(Note 7) An organization composed of the Executive Vice President (= Senior Director General of the Tsuruga Head
Office) as chairperson, the Executive Director of Safety as a vice chairperson, related directors, General
Managers, department managers, and so on, that checks and assesses the action plan and its implementation
results. Established in August 2008.

(2) Reliable implementation of integrity checking in long-term nonoperating facilities

[Situation up to the previous inspection]


As for the validity check of the facility integrity check, which is required because of problems that were
found in maintenance management, it was verified that the basic concept of the validity check had been
defined and based on that, checking was being carried out. However, according to the assessment of the
inspection results of individual equipment, it was found that the deterioration check range, assessment
criteria, and assessment processes were unclear.

[Items checked in this inspection and their assessment results]


As for the validity check of the facility integrity check, a system has been established in which personnel
other than the section chief and related personnel in charge of the inspection assess the validity of checking
methods (such as inspection methods and inspection period). Assessment items include: whether all the
facilities extracted from the latest Monju facility documents are targeted for inspection; whether the
inspections can identify deterioration events that occurred in the past. As a result, additional inspections
were conducted for items that had not been inspected sufficiently, and check methods were reviewed to
reorganize the manuals related to the inspections. An example of an item whose inspection method has
been reviewed is: the description level and measurement method regarding the wall thickness measurement
for external surface deterioration. Inspection methods of the equipment and the facilities were unified and a
common manual that clarifies the standards for dealing with corroded locations was prepared in
consideration of the corrosion event in the outdoor exhaust duct. Another example is: the manual to manage
the isolation deterioration trends of the electric and measurement control facilities was defined in
consideration of the incorrect alarm issuance in CLD. Items that do not meet the judgment standards will be
repaired and feedback activities will be conducted for other facilities if required.

220
The facility integrity check will be conducted by using check methods whose validity has been verified.
As for the judgment standards, the pre-use inspection standards will be employed for the facilities targeted
for pre-use inspection and the deterioration trends of the items that satisfied the standards but were found to
have deteriorated will be monitored.

[Conclusion]
In consideration of the above, it was judged that the goals to be verified in the special safety inspection
of relevant items, (e.g. the target and inspection methods of the facility integrity check) were appropriate,
and have been attained.
For commissioning resumption in the future, it will be necessary to proceed with the facility integrity
check based on the system now built and to complete all facility integrity checks required for
commissioning resumption, including those of facilities other than the pre-use inspection targets.

(3) Reliable implementation of the measures for sodium leak

[Situation up to the previous inspection]


It was judged that the sodium leak inspection report that was submitted in February 2009 (modified in
April) was appropriate. It was also verified that the progress of the organization of the procedures to be
followed at issuance of an alarm relating to sodium leakage or LCO deviation was insufficient.

[Items checked in this inspection and their assessment results]


Measures are being taken based on the reports on the causes of and countermeasures for failures in the
sodium leak detectors, and these measures were judged by the NISA to be appropriate. Since the incorrect
issuance of the alarm regarding the primary system CLD (in March 2008) was caused by construction
performed in a non-standard way, the procurement management procedures were revised in August 2008 to
instruct the construction trustees to submit information regarding potential nonconformance, such as
employment of any installation construction method that is different from the standard method. Also, the
upgrading to improved detectors (the swagelock method was employed for the fixing) was completed in
June 2008. Since the incorrect issuance of the alarm regarding the secondary system CLD (in September
2008) was caused by not reflecting on the experience of the failures that had occurred in the past,
investigations and inspections of past failure events were conducted. These investigations and inspections
included the inspection items and inspection frequencies, etc., required for preventive measures for each
detector type and installation location as listed in the “Guidance to deal with the sodium leak detection
equipment” and reflected them in the maintenance program. Also, the upgrading to improved detectors
(gold solder was employed to solder the electrodes) was almost complete (90 out of 91 detectors).
As for the procedures at issuance of an alarm regarding sodium leakage or at occurrence of LCO
deviation, it was defined that a sodium leak would be judged to have occurred not only when alarms are
issued from two or more types of leak detectors but also when leak alarms are issued from two or more leak
detectors that are installed in the same piece of equipment or installed adjacent to each other in the same
piping. In cases where an alarm is issued from only one detector, the personnel in charge of checking the
cause of alarm issuance, which is used to judge LCO deviation, was changed from maintenance personnel
to an operator, in order to reduce the time required to judge LCO deviation. Regarding this, when a false
alarm is not verified as being false within a range where an operator can check, this is considered an LCO
safety deviation. The check methods of the operator, an estimate of the time required for the check, the 参
check methods into the cause of issuance of the alarm (to be conducted by the maintenance personnel after


221
an LCO deviation is judged to have occurred), and estimate of the time required for that check were
defined for each detector type and installation location. Also, details of actions taken and the time required
from when a leak alarm is issued to when it is judged whether or not that alarm is valid were summarized
in the Summary Table. The time required to judge an LCO deviation when an alarm was issued incorrectly
in the primary CLD in March 2008 was approximately 1 hour and 40 minutes. However, it is estimated that
the time required for similar events in the CLD in the future will be reduced to approximately 20 to 30
minutes.
In addition, not only the procedures for when the reactor is in operation but also the procedures for when
an LCO deviation occurs during cold reactor shutdown or during fuel replacement were defined.
In regard to reporting, when a sodium leak alarm is issued, a report should be issued to the public.
However, when an alarm is issued in connection with work planned in advance, reporting is considered
inapplicable. Procedures for this are defined.

[Conclusion]
In consideration of the above, it was judged that the goals to be verified in the special safety inspections
of relevant items (e.g. the development of countermeasures for the failures in the sodium leak detectors,
their maintenance management methods, and the clarification of procedures to be followed at issuance of
an alarm relating to sodium leakage or LCO deviation) have been attained.
For commissioning resumption in the future, it will be necessary to complete the development of
countermeasures for the failure in the sodium leak detectors, including assessment of the results, and to
complete the reflection of maintenance management methods and procedures to be followed at issuance of
an alarm relating to sodium leakage or LCO deviation in the safety preservation rules and related
documents.

(4) Reliable implementation of maintenance management based on the maintenance program

[Situation up to the previous inspection]


It was confirmed that a maintenance program had been defined and a system for maintenance
management had been built based on the procedures defined in the safety preservation rules, and that
inspections had been implemented based on the maintenance program. However, although the maintenance
program had been defined by setting the importance selection standards for the facilities in maintenance
based on the power plant's maintenance management regulations (JEAC4209-2007), it could not be clearly
confirmed that the sodium monitoring systems had taken into account the specific characteristics of Monju,
nor could it be confirmed that the concept of the scope of facilities targeted for maintenance had been
clarified.

222
[Items checked in this inspection and their assessment results]
As for the collection of and reflection on the latest knowledge in the field of nuclear energy (done in
order to define the maintenance program), it was verified that information on the latest accidents and
failures, etc., at domestic nuclear power generation plants was obtained from NUCIA, etc. Information
regarding overseas fast reactors was obtained from the resident officers at the Phoenix reactor in France,
and the information regarding “Joyo” was obtained from daily communications. It was verified that a
system to review the necessity of information feedback activities at Monju, to reflect on that information,
and then to implement those feedback activities had been built. This was done at the “Reliability
improvement measure review meeting,” by a team composed of the Director of the Safety Quality Control
Office acting as chairperson, the chief reactor engineers, and members of management from each section.
As for the definition of the maintenance plan, it was verified that preventive maintenance should be
considered as fundamental, that preventive maintenance should be conducted for the special facilities that
handle sodium at Monju, and that either “time-based maintenance plus status monitoring” or only
“time-based maintenance” should be conducted at the facilities according to their importance in
maintenance. Corrective maintenance is limited to facilities not directly required for operational
management, such as the ones used for the inspections.
Reflecting the directives of past inspection records, inspection tours of the outdoor facilities were added
to examine the corrosion on the outdoor exhaust duct, and to gain an understanding of the isolation
deterioration trends of the electric and measurement control facilities related to the incorrect issuance of the
CLD alarms.

[Conclusion]
In consideration of the above, it was judged that the goals to be verified in the special safety inspections
of relevant items (e.g. the maintenance program definition based on the specific characteristics of Monju
and reflection on past inspection results) have been attained.
For commissioning resumption in the future, it will be necessary to conduct inspections based on the
maintenance program, and review the maintenance program by reflecting on the results of the inspections
as required.

3. Comprehensive conclusion and future handling

For each of the four items that are defined as important for safety management in the “Safety Check
Concept,” it was judged that the JAEA has attained the goals to be verified in the special safety inspections.
Therefore, this special safety inspection is now complete.
From now on, the JAEA must report the results of all actions taken to accomplish the goals for
commissioning resumption (as indicated by the NISA), as well as future plans, in an additional full safety
inspection report. In response to that report, the NISA should check the accomplishment of those goals by
conducting regular safety inspections.


223
In addition, the integrity of the facilities should be checked in pre-use inspections as necessary, including
the re-inspection of facilities that have not been inspected in a long time. The JAEA also needs to report the
results of the integrity check of long-term nonoperating facilities including facilities that are not targeted
for the pre-use inspections, as additional full safety inspection reports. In response to those reports, the
NISA should conduct safety inspections or enter the power plant to check the details of the reports
submitted by the JAEA.
The results of the checks of facilities and safety management should be reported to the Monju safety
check review meeting for review, and the NISA should gather the assessment results on the validity of
commissioning resumption. The status should be actively explained to the local community, etc.
In order to accomplish the goals for commissioning resumption, the JAEA is required to deepen their
commitment to the “Check” and “Action” portions of the PDCA cycle. Required actions include:
recognizing their commitment to a large aiming to resume a nuclear power generation system that has been
shut down for more than 13 years; conducting further analysis and assessment of the effectiveness of their
commitment; clarifying and quickly taking actions for the items in which they should be further involved;
and building a master process at the Head Office relating to not only the Monju on-site operations but also
to the entire organizational QMS operations, in order to further improve reliable project management with
safety as the top priority. It is desirable that the top management exercise more leadership ability on these
matters. It is also desirable that all of the personnel at the Nuclear Plant who are involved in Monju should
recognize their own responsibilities and pride once again and keep up their feelings of motivation and
morale.

224
(Appendix)
Japan Atomic Energy Agency “Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Monju” Summary Table of Detailed Results of the FY2009 Special Safety Inspection No. 1 (June 3–30, 2009)
Check Item Observation Point Description Evaluation Future tasks
1. Establishment of
autonomous quality
assurance system
(1) Reinforcement of # Whether or not an • It was verified that the following teams, offices and committees have been established. The “Monju Special Team,” led # It was assessed that the top # To improve communications
by the Senior Director General of the Tsuruga Head Office, which is in charge of making necessary business levels of management, at Monju, communication
the management autonomous quality management and the persons in meetings between the
system at Monju assurance system has judgments. The “Operation Meeting,” led by the General Manager of the plant, which quickly and reliably verifies the
system status by overseeing information sharing in the plant and by conducting direct hearings on-site, allowing the charge work with one another to President and the employees
been established conduct business while have been held 20 times.
General Manager of the plant to make timely decisions on important issues that are found, and instruct and command
the assured roll-out of those decisions. The “Operation Control Office,” which creates the “On-site master processes considering the purpose, details, These meetings are planned
(basic processes for overall work)” for plant-wide operations to be conducted before completion of the plant importance, and urgency, etc., of to continue at a rate of twice
verification tests, manages the progress of those processes, takes actions for the problems that occur during those their respective businesses, per month. The evidence
processes, coordinates with related divisions, and assists the General Manager of the plant. Three departments, which recognizing their duties. It was check found some cases in
are in charge of Operation Management, Maintenance Management, and Performance Tests, respectively. The assessed that the position of which requirements needed to
“Nonconformance Management Committee,” which is in charge of nonconformance management. Finally, the “Safety coordinator (the person who be rewritten in a different
Quality Control Office,” which follows up on the decisions of the Nonconformance Management Committee. It was makes judgments) to manage format before submission and
also verified that project management, timely response to any problems that occur, and nonconformance management progress on these items was they should be considered by
were carried out in an organized fashion. clarified. the section in charge. Care
• In order to quickly make plant-wide business judgments, it was verified that a “Monju Special Promotion Office” led must be taken that no sincere
by the President has been established, that required personnel and budgets were added, and that considerations and # It was assessed that a response to the submitted
judgments regarding the overall processes were made. Those considerations and judgments were made based on the management system that comments wastes a huge
well-executed on-site master processes and with consideration of any relationships with external organizations and of performs self-checking and amount of time.
the results of the earthquake safety assessment, etc. correction of any problems has
• It was verified that the “Action Plan Implementation Office” conducted the first self-assessment and the General been established. # Continuous verification of the
Manager of the Tsuruga Head Office confirmed the assessment results through checking by a third-party in the plant; system’s functioning and
that the “Monju Action Plan Follow-up Committee,” led by the Vice-President, reviewed the results and the General # More specifically, the Monju effectiveness is required.
Manager of the Tsuruga Head Office confirmed the review results; that the “Supervising Committee on Safety at on-site master processes, which
Monju,” composed of experts from external organizations, established a system to conduct objective assessments; and were earlier prepared by the # As for the action plan, though
as a result of those, that the implementation status of the Monju action plan was assessed and the results were reflected technical section, have now been a certain level of analysis,
in the action plan. In addition, it was verified that a system that allows provisional management reviews to be implemented by the Operation assessment, and their result
conducted by the President has been established and that activities to improve plant-wide quality assurance activities Control Office, which oversees reflection are carried out by

225
were carried out. management of the whole plant. the Action Plan Follow-up
• It was verified that the top management (General Manager of the Tsuruga Head Office) reflected on the insufficient As a result, each relevant section Committee and during the
involvement of the management in the following matters and presented the “Basic strategies of operations at Monju” which formerly could not be management reviews, in
to the employees. involved sufficiently, now order to establish the
# The goal is to resume operation. To accomplish this, safety should be placed as the top priority and the trust of the participates in the review of autonomous quality assurance
local community is important. Monju is a national project and is aiming for early operation resumption. However, each process proactively. This system, which is a goal that
in reality, it is regretful that the management has not been sufficiently involved and has left it to the personnel now causes the Operation should be accomplished
on-site. Control Office to continually before commissioning
# Reflecting on this, we have created the “Basic strategies of operations at Monju” and repeatedly presented them to check progress and review the resumption, it is necessary to
the employees. processes at any time as deepen their commitments to
(1) Since Monju is a nuclear power generation plant, we must be devoted to business management for that purpose. required. The on-site master the Check and Action
processes were reviewed in portions in the PDCA cycle:
(2) Conduct operations step-by-step, steadily and reliably. Stop in a courageous manner if required. April and May, 2009. for example, conduct further
(3) In the real world, troubles do occur. At those times, respond steadily with safety given the highest priority It is considered that an analysis and assessment of
• It was verified that the General Manager of the plant quickly and steadily verifies the status by information sharing in autonomous PDCA cycle has the validity of the
the plant and by conducting direct hearings on-site, makes timely decisions on important matters that were found from started running well. commitment; clarify and
those activities, and instructs and commands the assured roll-out of those decisions. It was also verified that the quickly take actions for the
General Manager of the plant gives instruction on work policies at management meetings, which are held every items in which they should be
morning, presents the fundamental attitudes for well-conducted operations at the safety conferences, and gives further involved; and build a
instruction on actions to improve operations to the employees and affiliated companies. master process at the
[1] Whether or not (1)-[1]-(A) Project management headquarters relating to not
required consideration, <Improvements regarding involvement in business management> only the Monju on-site
appropriate The following were verified as improvements regarding involvement in business management. operations but also the whole
decision-making and For business management, the “Monju Special Team,” led by the General Manager of the Tsuruga Head Office and the organizational QMS
appropriate “Monju Total Control Group,” which focuses on the support of management at Monju, have been established at the operations to further improve
instructions are given Tsuruga Head Office. These improvements help rapid reporting of the daily status at Monju and the problems on-site to the steady project
in accordance with the the management, which allows the management to give accurate instructions about the building of systems from the
events, at the management with safety put
Management Board, viewpoint of project management and operation of the nuclear power generation plant. on the top priority. It is
Management Review In addition, to quickly make decisions on problems that require business judgment as a whole plant, a system that desirable that the top
Meetings, Tsuruga allows the President to conduct hearings with the relevant directors, etc., and then to make decisions (the “Monju Special management exercise more
Head Office Meetings, Promotion Office”) has been established. With this improvement, personnel have been increased by 39 during the period leadership ability on those
and the meetings at the from April last year to April this year and an additional budget of approx. 1.49 billion yen has been allocated to matters. It is also desirable
Monju plant compensate the heavy investment in business resources, i.e. personnel and supplementary budget, at Monju. that all of the personnel at the



As for decision making on the extension of the commissioning period, which was conducted in January this year, the Nuclear Plant who are
management played a central role in assembling the “Monju Special Team,” to consider a summary of the status of actions involved in Monju should
taken for on-site matters, such as investigation and repair of exhaust ducts, inspection of sodium leak detectors (CLD), review recognize their own
of plant verification tests, and earthquake safety assessment, as well as the status of coordination with related organizations.
The Team holds meetings where the President makes decisions. It instructs on additional actions such as announcement responsibilities and prides
methods, and makes judgments on the process change in January 2009 and the announcement of that change. once again and keep up their
feelings of tension and
<Improvements regarding process definition> morale.
The following were verified as improvements regarding process definition.
• The basic plan regarding Monju (commissioning period, three-year operation plan) was not only reviewed by the “Monju
Special Team” based on the on-site status but also reviewed at the Tsuruga Head Office Meetings based on local situations,
etc., and at the Management Board based on nuclear trends, etc. It was then settled by the President after checking with the
General Manager. This enabled the management to make business decisions based on the daily on-site status at Monju, etc.
The management gave instruction to consider processes that sufficiently reflected on-site viewpoints, such as duct repair
construction and the required facility inspection plan, based on the summarized results of the cause of and actions for the
corroded holes on the outdoor exhaust ducts, etc. Management also reviewed the timing for commissioning resumption at
Monju in the future, and decided to judge the processes leading to commissioning resumption with due coordination with
related parties.
• Since it was considered that a responsible on-site master process was required to systematically and steadily conduct on-site
preparations for commissioning resumption at Monju, the President gave instruction to define the on-site master process up to
completion of plant verification tests. As a result, with the Operation Control Office as the central office, the President
approved the on-site master process in March this year through a review at the on-site master process review meeting, where
personnel ranging from the President to the employees in charge participated. Based on this on-site master process, the
employees on the site became able to focus on the on-site work for commissioning resumption, such as plant verification
testing and the maintenance inspections, with high morale.
• In addition, in accordance with the General Manager's instruction that the on-site master process should be the best process
possible at Monju, each relevant department became sufficiently involved in the consideration of the on-site master process
when responding to trouble, under the general coordination of the Operation Control Office. More specifically, each relevant
department can now review individual schedules based on the progress of the outdoor exhaust duct construction and the
instrumentation re-calibration work plan, and at the same time, the Operation Control Office always checks the progress,
which enables timely review of the process as required. As a result, through the reviews of the on-site master process in April
and May 2009, a high precision process, which always reflects the on-site status, is maintained.

(1)-[1]-(B) Integrity checking of long-term nonoperating facilities

226
The following were verified as integrity checking of long-term nonoperating facilities.
• Based on the experience of past response to trouble (incorrect alarm issuance of the sodium leak detectors, which was found
in March 2008 and the corroded holes on the outdoor exhaust duct, which were found in September 2008), it was reaffirmed
that the integrity checking of long-term nonoperating facilities is an important item, for which action should be taken before
commissioning resumption. It was also determined that the Tsuruga Head Office should be closely involved in the progress of
the integrity checking and that goals for these items should be set and their progress checked at the “Monju Special Team”
meetings, to enable steady follow-up of business management.
• Because the “Operation Meeting” led by the President was newly established in the center, information sharing among
departments was promoted and the President can now verify statuses, such as the progress of operations, more quickly and
steadily than ever. The President can also, in accordance with the progress of operations, make timely decisions required for
the work, issue operational instructions, control goal management, and establish an effective collaboration system among
related parties in the plant. As a result, each office can now respond to problems more quickly and accurately. In the past, the
President instructed the head of the Operation Control Office to coordinate with each department in order to respond to the
issue of insufficient manpower for the validity assessment of the facility integrity checking, based on the status explanation
and requests from the Plant Management Department manager and with business support from the next-generation
departments, which enabled timely improvement activities and completion of the validity check within the targeted time
limit..
• In cases where the President needs to make decisions on important items regarding the operation of the center or on the
running of operations, the “Operation Meeting” is one of the places where comments from the management personnel of the
center can be heard. The President makes decisions based on the comments of the management personnel of the center and
takes action in accordance with the predefined procedures. This meeting enabled the President and the management personnel
to share important information, and the President to exercise leadership.
[2] Whether or not the (1)-[2]-(A) Project management
personnel who The following were verified as improvements regarding on-site goal setting and management.
manage the progress • The responsible on-site master process, which was assured to be accomplished at Monju, was defined on March 30, 2009
of the items on through review at a meeting where personnel ranging from the President to the employees in charge participated. Since then,
which decisions awareness of steadily conducting daily operations as planned with safety as the highest priority has been improved and active
were made are discussions have been held at the meetings regarding processes, from the viewpoint of process management.
clarified and • The head of the Operation Control Office understands and manages the progress of on-site work through the meetings which
whether or not those address the above-mentioned processes, and when he/she finds any matter that may cause changes to the process, he/she
personnel manage
and promote the performs in-house coordination responsibly. As a result, the on-site work is proceeding as planned, as of the end of May
items responsibly 2009.
• In addition, the Process Management Team was established within the Operation Control Office in June, and since then, the
assistant manager in charge of management in the Operation Control Office has checked daily progress of the above on-site
processes, which has enabled more precise management targeting the process goals.

(1)-[2]-(B) Integrity checking of long-term nonoperating facilities


The following were verified as integrity checking of long-term nonoperating facilities.
• Clarification of the Plant Maintenance Department manager as the person who is responsible for implementation enabled
comprehensive practical business management of that department and related departments.
• If a failure is found during the facility integrity checks that are conducted based on the “Equipment integrity verification
plan,” it is determined that actions such as repair should be taken. For items considered to require additional inspections, etc.,
during the validity check of the facility integrity check, the office for the validity check (led by the Vice President of the
technology section) should check them and take action such as repair.
• In addition, a plan was defined and implemented for additional inspections and repairs, etc., which the Plant Maintenance
Department manager should check. For important items such as repair of the exhaust ducts, etc., repair execution policies
were submitted from the Plant Maintenance Department manager to the “Operation Meeting.” The President makes the final
decision.
• The Operation Control Office and the Plant Maintenance Department report their respective work management goals and
their progress to the “Operation Meeting” as needed, and the President considers the progress of the operations, such as status
explanations and requests from the Plant Maintenance Department manager, and instructs the Operation Control Office and
the Plant Maintenance Department to conduct scheduled operations, such as the addition of personnel and process
management. As a result, a more organizational response in line with the President’s decisions is now possible, compared
with the past.
[3] Whether or not the (1)-[3]-(A) Project management
details and progress Same as (1)-[2]-(A).
of decision making
are shared among (1)-[3]-(B) Integrity checking of long-term nonoperating facilities
related parties and The following were verified as integrity checking of long-term nonoperating facilities.
whether or not each • The Operation Control Office checks the progress of work at meetings where personnel in charge of work in the plant
party deals participate. As for explanations to those outside the plant and implementation of future operations, holding meetings to
problems while coordinate with the Operation Control Office and read relevant materials, as well as having a third party in the plant (such as
recognizing roles the Vice President, and the Tsuruga Head Office) to check the organization and contents of the materials, enabled the related
parties in the plant to share a common awareness of the details of decision making and the progress of work. As a result, all
parties can respond systematically according to their own roles and more smooth operations are possible.
• The Operation Control Office makes efforts to share information among the related parties in the plant, is involved in

227
promotion of the operations, performs cross-sectional coordination in the organization, and checks technical matters (for
example, they check if the details and direction of each operation are properly defined as needed, and if required, reinforce
the information and order review of the materials). As a result, the facility integrity checks, which are conducted by the Plant
Maintenance Department, can now be conducted more smoothly.
[4] Whether or not the (1)-[4]-(A) Project management
Head Office and the The following were verified as improvements regarding problem response.
Tsuruga Head • As improvement activities for problems that were found in the series of responses caused by the incorrect issuance of the
Office understand sodium leak detectors (CLD) in March 2009, it was determined that the management should become more involved in the
the status and on-site operations, and not only the top levels of management but also the Tsuruga Head Office. They should support Monju,
problems of the so that all personnel at Monju work together to resolve problems, such as failures, which are found. More specifically, the top
operations at Monju levels of management now participate in the management meetings that are held every morning whenever possible to check
the progress of major problems and give instructions as needed. Because the personnel in the Monju Total Control Group at
Tsuruga Head Office always participate in the Monju management meetings that are held every morning to collect
information and report to the management, and because a desk for a member of the Monju Total Control Group is provided in
the Tsuruga Head Office to frequently exchange information with the Operation Control Office, the Tsuruga Head Office can
now understand any failures and concerns that are found in Monju even if they are small, and not only matters that may affect
the processes but also the daily status is now reported to the top levels of management.
• Because processes may be affected by the issue discovered on March 22 with the reactor vessel long liquid-level gauge,
whose liquid level had dropped due to isolation, and the issue discovered on May 11, where the valve      
between the tanks was stuck open, the Monju Total Control Group at Tsuruga Head Office reported them to the top levels of
management.

(1)-[4]-(B) Integrity checking of long-term nonoperating facilities


The following were verified as integrity checking of long-term nonoperating facilities.
• Because the progress of work is reported as needed at the meetings of “Monju Special Team” from the Plant Maintenance
Department manager directly to the top levels of management at the Tsuruga Head Office, the top levels of management can
now understand the status quickly and accurately and make precise business judgment on, for example, how to distribute
business resources (such as manpower and budget). As for the earthquake reinforcement work including instrumentation
inspections and repair of exhaust ducts, the Plant Maintenance Department manager provided information to the top levels of
management through the “Monju Special Team” meetings and the explanation of each matter to the General Manager. After
that, the top levels of management at the Tsuruga Head Office reviewed the information and took scheduled actions based on
the judgment and instructions of the General Manager.



• Also, the President made a detailed check of the plant status at the “Operation Meeting” and instructed the Operation Control
Office and the maintenance department to add personnel (dispatched from the next-generation departments) to resolve lack of
personnel for the validity assessment, which allowed the realization of timely improvement activities aiming for completion of
the work.The Head Office reviews the reports on the progress of operations at Monju, the reports on future processes, and the
reports on matters regarding distribution of business resources (budget, manpower), etc., at the Management Board Meetings
and “Monju Special Promotion Office,” where the President assembles related parties in order to understand the status of the
operations and any problems which occur at Monju.
[5] Whether or not the (1)-[5]-(A) Project management
Operation Control The following were verified as process management
Office and the • The Operation Control Office, which was established after organizational change, fulfills the technical total control function
Safety Quality by understanding the status of Monju through management meetings, reporting any failures that may affect the processes to
Control Office the President, and giving instructions or training to related departments and offices to resolve any problems under the direction
understand the status of the President. As a result, an organizational response to failures that may affect the processes, in accordance with each
and problems of the division’s role, is possible and quick resolutions are realized. In addition, the President can now give necessary instructions
operations at each through the overall control exercised by the Operation Control Office, which improves the control function of the President.
department well Specific actions for failures are as follows. (All failures affecting processes were avoided, as a result of quick response.)
enough and give #$Isolation drop of the liquid measured by the reactor vessel long liquid-level gauge (found on March 22)
necessary #$Valve between the tanks stuck open (occurred on May 11)
instructions and
training #$Failure in the calibration of the sodium liquid-level gauge (occurred on May 29)
• The Safety Quality Control Office has each office or section report any that occurs during the process of operations to the
Nonconformance Management Committee and checks if instructions or training for resolving the nonconformance and
corrections are being conducted without delay. As a result, the number of nonconformance issues, which was approx. four per
month in the second semester of 2007, has increased to approx. 26 per month in the second semester of 2008 and any small
nonconformance is reported to the Nonconformance Management Committee. Improvement activities are now conducted to
deal with those issues.
• In addition, since May this year, the Safety Quality Control Office has played a central role in checking the operation
processes in each section or office and has started a “QA Diagnosis Meeting,” where necessary instructions and training are
given. These activities extract problems with the QMS, which cannot be found by the relevant section or office, resulting in
improvement.

(1)-[5]-(B) Integrity checking of long-term nonoperating facilities

228
The following were verified as integrity checking of long-term nonoperating facilities.
• As a result of the organizational change to a new system composed of three Technical Departments (Plant Maintenance , Plant
Management Department, and Technical Department) and two offices (Operation Control Office, Safety Quality Control
Office), the Operation Control Office can now advise on each process in the integrity checking of long-term nonoperating
facilities as a leader, correct operations as required and organize a system to promote smooth operations.
• It was determined that the Operation Control Office should conduct hearings on the status of the integrity checking at the Plant
Maintenance Department, present the goals and an image of the output to the Plant Maintenance Department, in its role as
leader the new organization, based on the relationship with the overall operations in the center and the Tsuruga Head Office,
and give appropriate advice on the long-term action policies for the specific problems that the Plant Maintenance Department
has. As a result, the progress management regarding this matter is now conducted systematically, smoother business operation
is possible compared with that in the past, and the organizational considerations on the problems are now satisfactorily made.
In consequence, the check was completed at the end of March as planned, and the initially defined plan was achieved by
conducting assessments of the results of the operations by persons other than the responsible personnel and taking additional
measures as required.
• Same as (1)-[5]-(A), regarding the Safety Quality Control Office.
[6] Whether or not the (1)-[6]-(A) Project management
employer and the The following were verified as process management
management are • Same as (1)-[5]-(A).
sufficiently involved • The top levels of management now participate in the management meetings that are held every morning whenever possible to
in dealing with understand the on- status at Monju, and also to give necessary instructions and comments on problems that occur on-site at
pending issues Monju. As for the issue found on March 22 of the reactor vessel long liquid-level gauge whose liquid level dropped due to
isolation, specific instructions were given when the head of the Operation Control Office directly explained the matter to the
General Manager on March 27. Those instructions were: (1) closely check the on-site status, (2) position the relevant
liquid-level gauge appropriately, whether or not it is required for operation, and (3) check any alternative methods.
(1)-[6]-(B) Integrity checking of long-term nonoperating facilities
The following were verified as integrity checking of long-term nonoperating facilities.
• It was reaffirmed that the checking of long-term nonoperating facilities is required for commissioning resumption, and the
actions necessary should be taken before commissioning resumption. It was determined that the Tsuruga Head Office should
be closely involved in its progress, and that the goals for each item should be set and their progress should be checked at the
“Monju Special Team” meetings to enable reliable follow-up for business management.
• Based on this, the General Manager checked the achievement status of the tasks, the implementation schedule of the tasks that
have not been completed yet, and any risks included in it, as factors for decision making regarding the announcement of the
schedule for commissioning resumption. Also, the President assessed the necessity of the increase of manpower to achieve the
goals, and took necessary actions, such as obtaining business support staff from the next-generation departments (16
personnel).
[7] Are issues dealt with (1)-(7)-(A) Project management
properly? The following were verified as actions taken to deal with troubles and issues relating to processes.
• The newly established “Operation Control Office” plays a central role in responding to troubles. It fulfills a comprehensive control
function but has avoided any delay to the processes caused by troubles. When an issue related to the process management
(instrumentation re-calibration, check to maintain precision, re-execution of the pre-use inspections, etc.) occurs, the Operation Control
Office also reviews the issue at the on-site master process review meeting. Here, in order to optimize the processes, the Office shares
the problem and checks and reviews any effects, as required, based on feedback from related parties.
• Keeping in mind the future start of performance tests (commissioning resumption), the test planning section of the technical department
prepares proposals of a basic test plan and management manual procedures, etc. Proposals of test processes covering the entire range of
tests, such as core verification tests, 40% output tests, and 100% output tests, were also defined and case studies are being conducted.
(1)-(7)-(B) Integrity checking of long-term nonoperating facilities
The following were verified as integrity checking of long-term nonoperating facilities.
• Because the Operation Control Office was proactively involved in business development control, presented work goals and output
images, and gave advice on the activities of the plant maintenance department, the check by the person(s) in charge was completed at
the end of March as planned, and the initially defined plan was achieved by conducting assessments of the results of the operations by a
person other than the person(s) in charge and taking additional measures required.
• Through a series of integrity checks, the plant maintenance department is taking concrete actions to resolve problems and improve
operations as follows:
(1) Guidance to deal with the equipment in the sodium leak detectors
A maintenance plan regarding how to deal with the sodium leak detector equipment was prepared for each failure mode that occurred
in the failure cases in the past, and handling precautions were defined to maintain the functions of that equipment and improve
maintenance activities, in order to prevent incorrect issuance of alarms.
(2) Preparation of the new isolation resistance control manual for the electric and measurement control equipment (established at the
Section-level on May 26, 2009: currently under establishment at the Department-level)
To aid a system-wide consideration and reflection on failures such as the incorrect issuance of alarms in the secondary system sodium
leak detectors (CLD), isolation resistance control standards were newly established to control deterioration trends of the electric and

229
measurement control equipment at Monju. Maintenance plan reference values that cover the inspection standards (judgment criteria)
were also set, in order to improve the safety of maintenance management, as part of a general aim to improve maintenance activities.
This manual was positioned as the third document in the QMS.
(3) Preparation of the new wall thickness measurement manual for the equipment and facilities whose outside surface is deteriorated
(established on January 7, 2009)
It had been found from the results of the inspections within the plant maintenance department (to consider the failure caused by the
corroded holes on the outdoor exhaust duct) that the description levels and measurement methods for the wall thickness of the
deteriorated equipment and facilities differed among the inspections for each facility. It had been found that no clear standards exist
for how to deal with the corroded positions. Defining a new wall thickness measurement manual for the equipment and facilities
whose outside surface is deteriorated at Monju helped standardization of the procedures for wall thickness measurements, visual
inspections (status of coating), and so on, and allowed appropriate understanding of the statuses of the Monju outdoor equipment
and facilities. This manual was applied to the visual inspections on the exhaust pipes (pipe shafts). This manual was positioned as the
third document in the QMS.
(4) Commitment to organize inspection data
An assessment sheet that records inspection results of facility equipment was created for each equipment or facility, for which a
validity check of the facility integrity check is conducted. With this sheet, the assessment results can be summarized based on the
inspection results and reflected in the maintenance plan. It is planned to reflect organization of those inspection data, etc., in the
assessment work of the facility inspections and maintenance, and in maintenance management in the future. In particular, data that
shows the reasons why the items were chosen to be inspected and their inspection frequencies will be used to define a maintenance
plan in the future.
[8] Are the underlying (1)-(8)-(A) Project management
problems in the The following were verified as process management.
management system • Same as (1)-(2)-(A).
clarified proactively • Since the repair work of the outdoor exhaust duct had proceeded smoothly and the action plan had been implemented, it was assessed
and dealt with that a responsible on-site master process, assured to be accomplished by Monju, had been defined by the personnel on the site
appropriately? themselves. Improvements had been made, so that the top levels of management can now reliably implement the operation plan of
Monju.
• The Operation Control Office established a new “pre-activation inspection TF” to organize all the actions required before
commissioning resumption and defined the “pre-activation inspection execution plan for the core verification tests” in April 2009 to
manage the progress of the projects, including not only the on-site facilities but also the factors to be considered externally. As a result,
the Operation Control Office and the assistant manager in charge of management now check the progress periodically through the
process management team in the Operation Control Office. This new activity has enabled precise project management of the whole
project.



(1)-(8)-(B) Integrity checking of long-term nonoperating facilities
The following were verified as integrity checking of long-term nonoperating facilities.
• Because the Operation Control Office was proactively involved in business development control, presented work goals and output
images, and gave advice on the activities of the plant maintenance department for the problems found, a shared commitment to resolve
these problems was established among related parties and additional support systems were also established. As a result, it was
considered that work on this matter is proceeding smoothly. For example: a check by the person(s) in charge was completed at the end
of March as planned, and the initially defined plan was achieved by conducting assessments of the results of the operations by a person
other than the person(s) in charge and taking additional measures required.
• It was determined that comments in regard to plant maintenance work from not only the Tsuruga Head Office but also from the other
departments in the plant should be proactively accepted when the plant reports to external organizations, e.g. at the Monju safety
verification review meeting. Since the Operation Control Office took personnel assistance measures (operational support from the
next-generation departments) and performed correction of the reported contents and assessment of the work, the work was completed
within the time limit.
• At the same time, the newly defined support system with quickly-responding support personnel was employed to dispatch two support
personnel from the Tsuruga Head Office to Monju, enabling the continuance of smooth operations in the plant maintenance
department, whose workload had become larger.
(2) Clarification of issues #$Is sufficient The following were verified as operation planning and implementation. #$It is assessed that communications #$It is important to perform deeper
in organizational explanation given to • In addition to the existing operation plan that aims to request budget allocation, a plan to run the operations of the plant was proposed in nuclear power stations cause analyses in the future to
climate, safety the personnel on-site by the Operation Control Office, defined by the President, and then explained to the employees by the President at an explanation including Monju were reinforced prevent recurrence of past
when operations are meeting. and necessary explanations to nonconformance events.
culture, and the external organizations were given,
planned and • That operation plan was made available on the Intranet within the plant, which enabled each department, section, or office to execute
quality assurance implemented, and are scheduled operations. when individual operation was #$In addition, a process flow of
system based on root the comments from implemented. approximately 550 items that
cause analyses, etc., the personnel on-site #$It is assessed that when decisions were extracted from
and implementation heard sufficiently? are made to implement individual identification of operation items
and enrichment of operations according to individual (completed in March 2009) is
#$Is due consideration The following were verified as external explanation on trends at Monju, etc. responsibilities, the technical now being created and is planned
countermeasures given on how to • As for fuel replacement, a proposal of countermeasure policies including external explanation was prepared by the Operation Control validity, suitability of the to completed by August 2009. As
externally explain Office. After that, there was sufficient discussion with the plant on how to check basic processes and potential troubles, and how to judgment to the goals, and how of the end of May 2009, 71
important troubles and respond to the occurrence of trouble. The results of this discussion were reviewed at the Tsuruga Head Office meetings, and then settled such decisions should be accepted process flow charts have been
trends, etc., related to by the President. According to the resultant policies, announcement and press study meetings were held before the start of the fuel externally, etc., are considered created. Some items that require
Monju, and are those replacement to explain the fuel replacement work externally. sufficiently. improvement have been extracted
troubles and trends #$It is assessed that issues in the and document revision is being

230
announced in a organizational climate, safety considered. Approximately 550
proactive and timely culture, and safety assurance are operation items for which process
manner? inspected and being improved. flows should be created is an
#$Is related knowledge Appropriate recurrence prevention measures were taken by collecting and referring to external knowledge and feedback on the following enormous number and the period
collected to deal with nonconformance: #$More specifically, it can be assigned to complete this work
trouble and is • Corroded holes on the outdoor exhaust duct: Collection of the knowledge and feedback of in-house experts on corrosion and the evaluated that the number of period is too short. Therefore, it
multifaceted information related to corrosions in external institutes issues that would cause delay in has become very important to not
consideration given to • Modification of the support structure of exhaust pipes (construction work on seismic safety margin improvements): Collection of processing has been reduced by prevent achievement of the goal
determine action with related information, such as construction specifications, construction manufacturers, oil dumper manufacturers, and approval establishing a nonconformance “Improvement activities should
an attitude of problem procedures, from electric companies that have experience with similar constructions management committee in June be taken autonomously by the
consciousness? 2008. The reduction is achieved person(s) in charge, not though
by holding committee meetings instruction of the head of an
#$Are problems in The following were verified as actions to deal with issues in organizational climate and safety culture. every day, building a system that office or section,” which is
organizational climate 1. Questionnaire for safety culture in the workplace enables the nonconformance defined in the certainty and
and safety culture • As for the issues recognized by the questionnaire, conducted in November 2008, regarding safety culture in the workplace (including management committee to make effectiveness assessment results
found in group “Safety attitudes of the organization” and “Communication,” etc.), “Commitment of the top management” and “Good communication” nonconformance judgments of the “Process chart and actual
reviews and were reflected in the action plan as major safety culture creation activities for FY2009. without leaving it to the work integrity verification.”
questionnaires, etc., • Also, based on the “Action plan for the year regarding creation of the safety culture in FY2009,” an “Action plan for the year to create responsible section managers, and
quickly reviewed, and safety culture” that defines concrete activities such as “The top levels of management and the plant executive personnel's visit to the following up on the processing #$Continuous verification of the
are their improvement central control room” and “Setting of the management's attendance core time,” etc., was defined at Monju, and activities are being status at the monthly system’s functioning and
countermeasures conducted based on it. nonconformance management effectiveness is required.
implemented? • According to the questionnaire regarding improvement activities at Monju (May 29 to June 3), approximately two thirds of answers committee (once in a month).
were positive, regarding quick response to the issues in organizational climate and safety culture.
#$It is also evaluated that the cycle
2. Opinion exchange between the General Manager and general personnel of the activities that summarize
• By providing a place where the General Manager himself can hear the opinions from the personnel on-site, in order to understand the opinions obtained from the
problems and concerns held there, and by also providing a place where the general personnel can exchange their opinions with the communication meetings between
General Manager, quick improvements could be made on the site and mutual understanding was boosted. the President and the employees
• The opinions obtained from the communication meeting in FY2008 are treated as issues to be resolved by the plant and improvement has been shortened from quarterly
activities for them are being prepared, as appropriate. Also, the opinions and measures obtained from the opinion exchange were posted to monthly.
on the Intranet, so that all the personnel in the plant can recognize them.
• The PHS radio wave failure in the inspection tour path, as reported by the person(s) in charge of the reactor plant inspection tour, is
being discussed by the section in charge of communication and the section in charge of inspection tours. Improvement activities are
being taken accordingly.

3. Opinion exchange with the plant executive personnel


• As for the opinions derived from the opinion exchange between the President and the plant personnel, feedback is underway, including
actions such as posting the opinions on the Intranet with responses.
• For the items or priorities that are difficult to improve immediately because of limited resources (budget, manpower, etc.), reasons and
thoughts are explained to personnel in order to win their understanding.

4. Collection of near-miss cases regarding nuclear safety


• A system that enables reporting of near-miss cases regarding nuclear safety was established and a “Near-miss collection campaign”
was held in September 2008, targeted on the employees in affiliated companies as well. As a result, 86 near-miss cases regarding
nuclear safety were collected. The near-miss cases reported are shared amongst the employees and necessary improvement activities
are implemented according to the contents of the reports. A system that can continuously collect near-miss cases regarding nuclear
safety has been standardized.
• Among the near-miss cases regarding nuclear safety reported, 15 cases which may require countermeasures were selected. In each
responsible section it was considered whether the cases really required countermeasures and the necessary responses are being made
accordingly. Seven improvement measures have been implemented up to now. (Out of the 15 cases: measures have already been taken
for seven cases, measures are planned (for FY2009) for three cases, and information has been announced for five cases.)
• In response to the General Manager's comment “We should check for near-miss cases that should be fed back to other offices and
sections,” review was started at the human error prevention review meeting in May. Up to now, 20 reviews have been completed, and
two near-miss case reports have been selected and submitted to the nonconformance management committee for review.
Countermeasures have been completed for one out of the two cases. For the remaining case, each office or section is now preparing a
preventive action plan including consideration on the necessity of countermeasures.
• Since no reports were submitted except during this campaign, near-miss cases were posted on the Intranet (on May 26), which has
boosted the employees' awareness of near-miss cases, in order to encourage the regular submitting of reports. As a result, one near-miss
case was reported (on June 11).
(3) Action plan #$Is the implementation The following were verified as implementation and management of the action plan. #$It is assessed that the #$Continuous verification of the
enhancements status of the action • The implementation system of the action plan was established with the President as the top, the Senior Director General of the Tsuruga implementation status of the system’s functioning and
responding to the plan identified Head Office as the person responsible for overall management, and the Deputy Senior Director General of the Tsuruga Head Office as action plan is always checked, the effectiveness is required.
appropriately and is a the person responsible for implementation. Under these were placed the Head Office, the Tsuruga Head Office, and the Fast Breeder action plan is revised or enriched
clarifications pointed

231
system that manages Reactor Research and Development Center. The Manager of the Policy Planning and Co-ordination Department is responsible for in accordance with the
out in the previous it clarified? general affairs for implementation, the Monju Total Control GR functions as an office, and the Head Office, the Tsuruga Head Office, implementation status of each
Special Safety and the Fast Breeder Reactor Research and Development Center manage the implementation statuses, etc. Those system structures are item, and the implementation
Inspection and Monju clearly defined in the basic implementation plan. In addition, along with the reviews of the organization, the implementation system of system is reviewed as required.
Safety Check Study the action plan has also been reviewed and the basic implementation plan has been revised.
Meeting, and • The organization of the Center was reviewed in October 2008 and it was determined that the Operation Control Office executes overall
implementation control of the whole Center. As a result, the Operation Control Office takes the leadership in checking the implementation status of the
results of the action action plan at the Center, extracting issues regarding implementation, and considering actions for those issues. In addition, instructions
for taking action on issues, such as the presentation of countermeasure policies and schedule policies, are now given more quickly and
plan
the repair of the outdoor exhaust duct and actions for the items that were considered to require improvement in the peer review by
WANO in 2006 have been completed.
• The “Monju Action Plan Follow-up Committee” meeting, comprising the vice President as chairman and the top levels of
management, is held almost every month to review the implementation status of the action plan, extract required issues, and issue
feedback to the places where the action plan is implemented. The results are reported from the committee to the President, who gives
instructions to take appropriate measures for any items regarding business resources, such as personnel distribution and budget
allocation measures, for which measures should be taken by the whole plant.
• As a follow-up by external experts, the “Supervising Committee on Safety at Monju” meeting, comprising experts from external
organizations, was held, where a follow-up on the implementation status of the action plan was conducted and comments and advice on
the integrated implementation of the action plan, internal communication method, enrichment of compliance education, and so on were
given. Those comments and advice were considered in the Tsuruga Head Office and the Center for specific activities, and reflected in
the action plan, in order to enrich improvement activities.
#$Are the problems in The following were verified as identification of problems in implementation of the action plan.
implementation of the • The Monju Total Control GR and the Operation Control Office checked the reports every week on the implementation status of the
action plan identified action plan that had been submitted from the places where the plan was implemented, and also conducted hearings with the person(s)
appropriately and are in charge who implemented the plan, one month before the self-assessment (January, April) and during the self-assessment (February,
countermeasures for May). These activities enabled the group to check the accomplishments and results required to achieve the goals at each time, and to
them considered? clarify the implementation processes and any issues in implementation to be solved. This contributed to the reliable implementation of
the action plan, including the reinforcement of the immediate support function at Monju.



#$Are the executive The following were verified as review of the organization of the Center, enrichment of manpower, and budget allocation.
personnel of the plant • The “Monju Special Team” and the “Monju Special Promotion Office,” which were established in the Tsuruga Head Office and the
proactively involved Head Office, respectively, enabled the management to make quick judgments on important issues such as the re-distribution of
in the review and business resources (manpower, budget) resulting in quick action to improve issues in the whole plant.
enrichment of the • The management made the decision to re-position or increase manpower to the plant maintenance department, the Operation Control
action plan to secure Office, and the Safety Quality Control Office in November 2008 and in February and April 2009, which reinforced the action plan
budget allocation and implementation promotion system in the Center. (The number of personnel in the whole Center has been increased by 39 since April
manpower required to 2008.)
implement the plan? • The management made the decision to increase the budget allocation by approximately 1.49 billion yen for repair work, etc., in
FY2008. As a result, both the facility inspections aiming for commissioning resumption and the repair work of the outdoor exhaust
duct, which are important for safety, were implemented smoothly.
#$Is the action plan The following were verified as the President's involvement in management reviews.
reviewed • The President implemented a provisional management review (MR) (on October 17, 2008) and based on the results, revised part of the
appropriately based quality policies regarding nuclear safety, in order to clarify the top's commitment regarding the “Promise to society.” Also, the
on the implementation President reviewed the safety control system at Monju and gave instructions for improvement, such a review of the systems related to
status? nonconformance management.
• The President implemented a regular MR for FY2008 (on March 12, 2009) to verify the follow-up status on the output results of the
provisional MR and gave instructions to (1) clarify requirements for managers’ own operations in the “operation plan” and (2) assess
the organizational system regarding the new safety control system at Monju, etc. Also, the President gave instructions on (3) the
sharing of information so that lessons learned from the root cause analysis on the nonconformance at Monju can be shared.

The following were verified as review of the action plan and enrichment of its contents.
• The implementation plan was created in August 2008, and based on the implementation statuses after that, the plan has been revised
seven times to enrich and review the activities in the action plan.
• To consider the reflection in the action plan of the advice in the root cause analysis (RCA) reports on corrosion on the outdoor exhaust
duct and the sodium leak detectors (CLD), the Operation Control Office and the Safety Quality Control Office assembled related
parties, including the Tsuruga Head Office, to hold discussions. These discussions were held in order to use the advice in more precise
improvement activities. At this time, the parties related to the RCA were also assembled to verify the gist and background of the
proposals so that more effective and essential countermeasure consideration can be taken.
(4) Implementation of the #$Are the judgment The following were verified as assessment of the implementation status of the action plan. #$It is assessed that the effectiveness #$Because this questionnaire was
action plan criteria clarified for • As for the countermeasures for the sodium leak detectors (CLD) and the corrosion on the outside surface of the pipes in the reactor assessment, based on the conducted only once, it is
assessment of the auxiliary cooling sea water system, the root cause analyses, etc., were re-organized to extract problems and factors. Based on that background or problems for which important to compare its results

232
implementation status re-organization, the goals of each improvement activity were clarified to concretize their achievement levels. As a result, the the action plan was defined, is to the results of the questionnaire
of the action plan, and implementation status of the action plan is now assessed comprehensively based on the two standards, “Achievement status” and conducted appropriately, that the to be conducted by an external
are objective “Effectiveness” of the goals. action plan has already been research agency in August 2009,
assessments made? • To make a unified self-assessment, the Action Plan Implementation Office created “About implementation of the assessment of the implemented, and that actions for in order to analyze any trends.
action plan,” based on which the self-assessment is conducted. To make this self-assessment more objective, the “Verification and the matters that are considered to
check by a third-party in the plant” was implemented, in which the self-assessment can be verified and checked from the standpoint of need long-term involvement are #$Continuous verification of the
a third party, if the assessment results output by the person(s) in charge of implementation match the set concept of the assessment. taken reliably. system’s functioning and
Also, the “Monju Action Plan Follow-up Committee,” with the vice President as chairman reviewed the assessment results. effectiveness is required.
Considering those results, the General Manager of the Tsuruga Head Office (the person responsible for overall management of the #$More specifically, it can be
action plan) confirmed the assessment results. evaluated that 70 to 90% of the
• In addition, the “Monju Safety Committee,” comprising experts from external organizations, was held to follow up on the #$However, in regard to the action
results of the questionnaire on the plan, although a certain level of
implementation status of the action plan. action plan regarding analysis, assessment, and
#$Is the implementation The following were verified as implementation of the action plan. “Involvement of the Tsuruga Head resulting reflection were carried
schedule of the action • The implementation schedule up to June 2009 was already defined. The implementation schedule after that is under consideration at Office, Operation Control Office, out by the Action Plan Follow-up
plan clarified, has the the plant. and Safety Quality Control Committee (Note 7) and during the
action plan been • When each item in the action plan that was implemented in accordance with the defined implementation schedule was assessed (based Office,” “Role sharing within the management reviews, in order to
implemented in on the results as of the end of May), it was verified that: plant and positioning of establish an autonomous quality
accordance with the #$ 31 out of 42 items meet the achievement level and have attained their goals (rank A). responsibilities,” and “Information assurance system, which is a goal
judgment criteria, and #$ 11 out of 42 items had associated activities which are being implemented as planned, and are expected to meet the achievement sharing regarding decision making that should be accomplished
are actions for matters levels and thereby attain their goals through continuous future implementation (rank B). and progress,” etc., were positive. before commissioning
that are considered to resumption, deeper analysis and
need long-term assessment are required of the
involvement based on effectiveness of the activities.
the action plan taken Identification and prompt
steadily? implementation of more concrete
actions to be taken for
commissioning resumption are
also required. In addition,
although the on-site master
process that summarizes the
work processes at each on-site
division in Monju enabled
accurate project management at
Monju according to the situation
at the site, preparation of on-site
master processes for the Tsuruga
Head Office and the Tokai Head
Office, which are involved in
the overall plant QMS
operations, are required. This
should be prepared in the same
way as the on-site master
process for Monju have been, to
further improve a safety-first,
stable project management
system, that can see and
understand the entire operation.
In other words, checking of the
PDCA cycle and further
deepening of actions are
required. It is desirable that the
top management exercise more
leadership ability on these
matters.

233


Check Item Observation Point Description Evaluation Future tasks
2. Reliable #$For commissioning
implementation of resumption in the future, it
integrity checking of is necessary to proceed
long-term with the facility integrity
nonoperating facilities check based on the
(1) Implementation of #$Are all the important The following were verified. already-built system and to
inspections facilities, including 1. To verify that the target facilities had no leak failures in the facility integrity check, the item “Check if all the targeted facilities were inspected” #$It is assessed that the complete the facility
the facilities for which was clearly defined in the “Evaluation of the Appropriateness (Implementation Plan Document) of the Result of Equipment Integrity facilities that are important integrity checks required
countermeasures Verification Plan for Long-Term Nonoperating Plants.” It was verified that a system that ensures the inclusion of the inspected areas for all for safety (target facilities for commissioning
against sodium facility integrity checks was established. The coverage of the inspection targets was checked by filling in the inspected areas in the piping plan of the pre-use inspections) resumption, including at
leakage should be or the instrumentation list, based on the results of the inspections. In addition, the facilities to be inspected were extracted from the latest facility and will be used in facilities other than the
taken, targeted for documents (system list, equipment list, etc.) and all the facilities in Monju were targeted. These lists are managed by the Document commissioning resumption pre-use inspection targets.
inspections? Management Guidelines and Equipment Document Management Guidelines, and revision of the documents, along with modification or update, have been confirmed to
etc., are managed centrally in the document center. satisfy the judgment criteria
2. To conduct reliable management, a database of the sodium leak detectors (organization of lists, specifications, and drawings) was built. This (Pass criteria for the
enabled faster response to trouble (the time to identify causes based on the relevant documents and specifications and to define a corrective pre-use inspections).
countermeasure plan, and time to determine feedback activities were both shortened). Creation of databases for the control system, the electric
instrumentation system, and so on has also begun. #$For the items that were
#$Is an inspection To identify all past failures and deterioration events and ensure that those events are verified in inspections, the following investigations and considered as a result of
method that allows verifications were conducted to verify that inspections allowing proper identification of the deterioration events due to long-term shutdown are inspections to not satisfy
proper identification conducted. the judgment criteria, it is
of the deterioration (1) The failures and deterioration events that occurred in the Monju-specific facilities during the period between completion of construction and assessed that repair or other
events due to the the present were extracted from the inspection reports, nonconformance reports, repair tickets, and technical documents. Also, the deterioration work was conducted
long-term shutdown events that were based on the aging assessment of the PWR (Japan Atomic Energy Agency's Standards’ “Nuclear Power Plant Aging appropriately.
set? Countermeasure Implementation Standards,” 2008) were also taken into consideration.
(2) As a result of (1), it was found that there were deterioration events that were not clearly described in the facility integrity check plan, such as #$It is assessed that
the fixing of equipment. However, it was verified that the status of those deterioration events were identified by using the inspection method re-inspections, etc., were
used for the facility integrity checks conducted up to now. conducted for the items that
(3) No problems were found as a result of assessment for each inspection item and facility to see if the method used in past facility integrity checks had not been inspected in a
long time.

234
functions as an inspection method that allows identification of the past failures and deterioration events in the Monju-specific facilities.
(4) The person(s) in charge of assessment assessed the inspection items and the section manager in charge of the facility verified that the
inspection method used for the facility integrity check can fully cover all the envisaged deterioration events (appropriateness of the inspection
method) based on the “Evaluation of the Appropriateness (Implementation Plan Document) of the Result of Equipment Integrity Verification
Plan for Long-Term Nonoperating Plants.”

Based on experiences during this work, a system that verifies deterioration events, the inspection method, and the appropriateness of the cycle
every time each facility is inspected was built and defined as the “Guidelines for verification and assessment of the results of inspections, repairs,
and so on.” This system was then applied to the inspections relating to the facility integrity check and the maintenance plan. By implementing this
guideline, it is now possible to identify deterioration events before a failure occurs, judge the appropriateness of the existing inspection method and
cycle, and change them appropriately, as required.
#$Is the auxiliary All of the auxiliary equipment in the control systems and electric instrumentation systems are inspected. By checking the inspection results against
equipment in the the instrumentation list, etc., the coverage of inspection targets is verified to cover the entire scope of the facility integrity check.
control systems and
electric
instrumentation
systems, etc., also
inspected?
#$Are deterioration The following were verified.
events due to aging • Failures and deterioration events that should be identified in the facility integrity check were extracted from past failures and deterioration events
identified precisely and the deterioration events based on the aging assessment of PWR (Japan Atomic Energy Agency's Standards, “Nuclear Power Plant Aging
based on the latest Countermeasure Implementation Standards,” 2008). The extraction of these items was based on the “Extraction of Deterioration Events to be
knowledge, and are Considered in Equipment Integrity Verification Plan for Long-Term Nonoperating Plants (Implementation Plan Document).” An assessment was
the integrity conducted to verify if the inspection method that was used in the facility integrity check can be continuously used to identify all of those
assessment and deterioration events (validity assessment).
required repair, etc., • Through this validity assessment, all the inspection items that cannot be identified with the current inspection method were clarified. For those
also conducted? inspection items and others, an additional inspection and repair plan was defined (“Additional Inspections, etc., Extracted from the Integrity
Check of the Equipment Integrity Verification Plan for Long-Term Nonoperating Plants and Future Plan”). Based on that plan, the off-precision
instrumentation, the piping in the reactor auxiliary cooling sea water system (wall thinning), the reactor auxiliary cooling water heat exchanger
heat transfer tubes (wall thinning), the piping in the liquid waste treatment equipment (corroded holes), and the piping in the outdoor water/steam
systems (wall thinning) were repaired or are being repaired.
#$Are the inspection The following were verified.
processes clarified To clarify the processes and records of the validity assessment of the facility integrity check, the implementation plans relating to the evaluation
and are the inspection of appropriateness were revised. In this revision, some new viewpoints were clarified, such as whether or not the inspection method can cover all
details and results failures and deterioration events, whether or not the judgment criteria are appropriate, and whether or not the assessment of the inspection results is
recorded conducted appropriately. The roles of the person(s) in charge of the inspection, the person(s) in charge of the validity assessment, and the section
appropriately? manager in charge of the facility were defined, and also a process flow chart was attached. In addition, it was clearly noted that any knowledge
regarding the inspection methods obtained from the validity assessment should be reflected in future inspections. The inspections are conducted
and recorded in accordance with the revised implementation plan.
(1) The facility integrity check was conducted based on the “Equipment Integrity Confirmation Plan for Long-Term Nonoperating Plants.”
(2) Past failures and deterioration events were investigated based on the “Extraction of Deterioration Events to be Considered in Equipment
Integrity Verification Plan for Long-Term Nonoperating Plants (Implementation Plan Document)” and events that were not considered when
the integrity check plan was defined were extracted.
(3) The person(s) in charge of assessment assessed the inspection results, considering whether the inspection method used covers all failures
and deterioration events and whether the verification results are appropriate. The section manager in charge of the facility then confirmed the
assessment, based on the “Evaluation of the Appropriateness (Implementation Plan Document) of the Result of Equipment Integrity
Verification Plan for Long-Term Nonoperating Plants.”
#$Are appropriate The following were verified.
inspection frequencies • It was determined that during the facility integrity check, all the failures and deterioration events in each facility should be extracted based on the
and methods “Extraction of Deterioration Events to be Considered in Equipment Integrity Verification Plan for Long-Term Nonoperating Plants
considered based on (Implementation Plan Document),” and during the validity assessment, the inspection frequencies and inspection details should be assessed by
the inspection results the person(s) in charge of assessment and confirmed by the section manager in charge of the facility, based on past maintenance status, in order
and past operation and to maintain the integrity of the facilities. The results should then be reflected in the maintenance plan (Article 17 in the procedures for
maintenance management of the facility integrity check for long-term nonoperating plants). As for measures for the outdoor exhaust duct and incorrect alarm
management statuses, issuance in the CLD, their inspection methods and frequencies should be reflected in the maintenance plan based on the causes and
etc? countermeasures.
• In addition, as one of the maintenance operations based on the maintenance program, a system was built in which the data before the inspections
were obtained from some facilities and compared with the data after the inspections, in order to review the inspection frequencies and methods.
• The items whose maintenance plans (inspection details, management standards, inspection frequencies) have been reviewed so far include:
frequencies of the primary argon gas system compressor disassembly inspections, frequencies of the secondary main circulation pump

235
mechanical seal disassembly inspections, frequencies of replacement of the pressure release boards for steam generators and containers,
frequencies of the ventilation air conditioning fan disassembly inspections, frequencies of the sealed secondary system CLD inspections, details
of the reactor auxiliary cooling sea water system piping inspections, and inspection tours of the equipment installed outside.
(2) Review of the #$Were assessments The following were verified. #$It is assessed that assessment
inspection plan conducted for the • Same as “Are appropriate inspection frequencies and methods considered based on the inspection results and past operation and maintenance of the maintenance of the
inspections, repairs, management statuses, etc?” judgment criteria in the
and past troubles, and • Based on the lessons learned from the incorrect issuance of alarms in the secondary system CLD and the corroded holes on the outdoor exhaust Equipment Integrity
was the inspection duct, the guidelines for handling the sodium leak detector equipment, the wall thickness measurement manual for the equipment and facilities Conformation Plan for
plan reviewed based whose outside surface is deteriorated, and the isolation resistance management manual for electric and instrumentation equipment (created on Long-term Nonoperating
on those results? May 26, 2009; the manuals for the electric repair section and the maintenance department are being prepared), were defined as the third Plants was appropriate, that
document in the QMS, in order to improve the maintenance management quality and prevent the occurrence of trouble. the assessment was based on
• In addition, for the trouble at the PWR, the items to be reflected in Monju were reviewed at the “Reliability improvement measure review the times when the
meeting” and feedback activities were conducted based on the results. Examples of the topics reflected on after the plan was created include: the inspections were conducted
reactor shutdown to inspect the steam isolation valves in the reactor isolation cooling system (Shika Power Plant Unit 2, January 2006); the in the past and the status of
failure in the air compressor A for control (Ikata Power Plant Unit 3, February 2007); the leak of hydrochloric acid from the hydrochloric acid deterioration, and that it was
container (JAEA NRSS facility, July 2007); the leak from the auxiliary steam drain pipe (Ikata Power Plant Unit 2, August 2007); the manual also reviewed as required.
reactor shutdown due to activation failure of the diesel power generator (Tomari Power Plant Unit 1, September 2007); and the foreign
substances found in the fuel replacement canal (to the side of the fuel handling wing) (Tomari Power Plant Unit 2, December 2007).
#$Were reviews The following were verified.
conducted on similar • When a deterioration event was found, the validity of the feedback activities were assessed by the person(s) in charge of assessment and
facilities to the facility confirmed by the section manager in charge of the facility, considering the installation environment, experience of operation, and design of each
where deterioration facility, based on the “Evaluation of the Appropriateness (Implementation Plan Document) of the Result of Equipment Integrity Verification Plan
was found in the for Long-Term Nonoperating Plants.” For items that require additional action, additional inspections are now being conducted. For the
process of the Monju-specific facilities, it was also verified that the inspection method used can identify the past failures and deterioration events found in that
inspection, and are facility. Along with this, inspections to prevent recurrence of the same type of failures and deterioration events were conducted.
inspections conducted • As for the troubles in the outdoor exhaust duct and the incorrect alarm issuance in the CLD, feedback activities are conducted based on the
for them as required? causes and countermeasures. As for the outdoor exhaust duct, inspections were conducted for the same type of facilities and for the incorrect
alarm issuance of the CLD, the installation method of the same type of facilities was verified, and replacement to the ion migration products, etc.,
was carried out.



(3) Implementation of #$Are knowledge from The following were verified. In addition to the standard investigations, the following items were investigated based on the “Extraction of #$It is assessed that potential
validity checks past repair work and Deterioration Events to be Considered in Equipment Integrity Verification Plan for Long-Term Nonoperating Plants (Implementation Plan deterioration events and
concerning inspection experiences at Joyo Document),” in order to apply the latest knowledge and experience to the operation at Monju. deteriorated parts are
targets, ranges and and PWR collected as 1) Facilities that are similar to the PWR clarified and inspected for
methods in much as possible and (1) PWR integrity checks.
Equipment Integrity referenced in order to
The Japan Atomic Energy Agency's Standards, “Nuclear Power Plant Aging Countermeasure Implementation Standards, 2008,” which
Confirmation Plan for perform deterioration
summarizes the deterioration events that are based on the aging assessment of the PWR and have been found since 2006, when the Equipment #$It is assessed that additional
Long-Term extraction? inspections are conducted to
Integrity Confirmation Plan was created.
Nonoperating Plants understand all the
Sample extracted items: (Mechanical deterioration) Peeling-off, looseness, adherence of foreign substances, fixing, etc.
deterioration conditions
(Electrical deterioration) Off-precision, wire breaking, malfunction, etc. when a deterioration event is
(2) All facilities at Monju found.
• Failures and deterioration events that were extracted in the facility integrity checks (2006 to 2008)
Sample of extracted items: (Deterioration due to environment) Delayed cracking, alkali corrosion
(Mechanical deterioration) Peeling-off, looseness, adherence of foreign substances, fixing, etc.
(Electrical deterioration) Off-precision, wire breaking, malfunction, etc.
• Nonconformance reports (2004 to 2008) (Since the nonconformance report was first created)
• Advice and requests for safety promotion council safety patrols
2) Monju-specific facilities
The following documents, created during the period from 1991 when construction of Monju was complete to 2008, were investigated:
• Repair tickets (Approximately 600 tickets)
• Inspection reports (Inspection reports submitted by manufacturers) (Approximately 1800 reports)
• Technical documents (Investigation of failures submitted by manufacturers, facility improvement proposals, and technical documents
regarding the grounds for judgment criteria, etc.) (Approximately 1300 documents)
• Nonconformance reports
Whether or not the inspection method covers the failures and deterioration events extracted from the above-mentioned investigations was
assessed for each facility by the person(s) in charge of assessment and confirmed by the section manager in charge of the facility based on the
“Evaluation of the Appropriateness (Implementation Plan Document) of the Result of Equipment Integrity Verification Plan for Long-Term
Nonoperating Plants.” The typical failures and deterioration events for which appropriateness was evaluated included deteriorations due to
environment (delayed cracking, alkali corrosion), mechanical deteriorations (peeling-off, adhere of foreign substances, fixing, cracking of
refractory), and electric deteriorations (off-precision, wire breaking).

236
#$Are all the conditions The following were verified.
for a deterioration Whether or not the inspection method (selection of the parts whose wall thickness should be measured) was appropriate and whether an
verified and assessed understanding was found of the trends in deterioration that require trend management (isolation drops) was assessed. As a result of the evaluation
when a deterioration of the appropriateness of the inspection results that was conducted by the person(s) in charge of assessment and confirmed by the section manager
event is found? in charge of the facility, it was verified that the inspection results were evaluated to be appropriate. In addition, the inspection results were reflected
in the maintenance plan as inspection details and frequencies to be used in the future, in order to maintain the integrity of the facilities.
Also, for the deterioration and failure events that would not affect the performance and functions of the facility, such as minor corrosions, it was
decided to conduct continuous surveillance or scheduled repair for them, rather than leaving them unresolved. This was decided in order to prevent
progress of the deterioration and assure to conduct preventive measures. Examples of these activities include: trend monitoring of the oil leak
volume from the main circulation pump mechanical seals in the primary and secondary systems; trend monitoring of the corrosion on the sea water
pumps in the reactor auxiliary cooling sea water system; monitoring of the lube oil in the diesel power generators and the cooling performance of
the purified water coolers; trend monitoring of the nuclear instrumentation; trend monitoring of the primary sodium leak detectors; trend
monitoring of the isolation resistances of the space heaters, etc., in the diesel power generators; and saline concentration measurement in the
building.
#$Is an alternative The following were verified.
method used on parts For parts that cannot be visually checked, the person(s) in charge of assessment assessed the inspection results for each facility, in regard to
whose deterioration whether or not it was verified (by using the alternative method) that no deterioration exists. The section manager in charge of facilities then
cannot be visually confirmed the assessment, based on the “Evaluation of the Appropriateness (Implementation Plan Document) of the Result of Equipment Integrity
checked, in order to Verification Plan for Long-Term Nonoperating Plants.”
verify that no With this activity, it was verified that deterioration assessment was conducted by using an alternative method.
deterioration exists? • Examples of the facilities assessed included the equipment located in places people cannot enter because it is always in a nitrogen atmosphere
(reactor vessel room, etc.), the piping, etc., where dew condensation is formed, and the sodium equipment and piping.
#$Are the inspection The following were verified.
processes clarified To clarify the processes and records of the validity assessment of the facility integrity check, the implementation plans relating to the evaluation
and are the inspection of appropriateness were revised. In this revision, some new viewpoints were clarified, such as whether or not the inspection method can cover all
details and results failures and deterioration events and whether or not the scope of the inspection is appropriate. The roles of the person(s) in charge of the
recorded inspection, the person(s) in charge of the validity assessment, and the section manager in charge of facilities were defined, and also a process flow
appropriately? chart was attached. In addition, it was clearly noted that any knowledge regarding the inspection methods obtained from the validity assessment
should be reflected in future inspections.
The inspections are conducted and recorded in accordance with the revised implementation plan, as described above.
(1) The facility integrity check was conducted based on the “Equipment Integrity Confirmation Plan for Long-Term Nonoperating Plants.”
(2) Past failures and deterioration events were investigated based on the “Extraction of Deterioration Events to be Considered in Equipment
Int(egrity Verification Plan for Long-Term Nonoperating Plants (Implementation Plan Document)” and events that were not considered when
the integrity check plan was defined were extracted.
(3) The person(s) in charge of assessment assessed the inspection results, in regard to whether the inspection method covered failures and
deterioration events and whether the verification results were appropriate, and then the section manager in charge of the facility confirmed that
assessment, based on the “Evaluation of the Appropriateness (Implementation Plan Document) of the Result of Equipment Integrity
Verification Plan for Long-Term Nonoperating Plants.”
(4) Appropriateness of #$Are the pre-use The following were verified. #$It is assessed that assessment
the actions inspection standards The Facility Integrity Confirmation Plan was revised to clarify judgment criteria. In addition, in the effectiveness assessment that was conducted is appropriately conducted
(expansion of (construction approval based on the “Evaluation of the Appropriateness (Implementation Plan Document) of the Result of Equipment Integrity Verification Plan for for deterioration events, in
inspection, repair documents, technical Long-Term Nonoperating Plants,” the facilities that were targeted for pre-use inspections were assessed by the person(s) in charge of assessment regard to whether or not it
method, and so on) standards, and so on) and confirmed by the section manager in charge of the facility, in regard to whether the pre-use inspection standards (construction approval satisfies the judgment
regarding used as judgment documents, technical standards, and so on) were used for them. criteria.
deterioration found in criteria? Through these assessments, It was verified that appropriate standards were used as judgment criteria. Also, it was assessed that the integrity of
the inspection facilities was maintained in light of these judgment criteria. #$It is assessed that repair, etc.,
In addition, the isolation resistance management manual for electric and instrumentation equipment is now under preparation, and this manual is conducted in accordance
defines new management standards for isolation resistance, in order to check the integrity at the time of inspection against the judgment criteria with the deterioration so that
and also to manage the deterioration trends of the electric and instrumentation equipment. Maintenance plan reference values that cover the the judgment criteria are
inspection standards (judgment criteria) were also set in order to allow safer performance of maintenance management, in an aim to improve satisfied.
overall maintenance activities.
#$Are the scope of The following were verified. #$It is assessed that
repair and the repair As a result of the effectiveness assessment on how to handle each facility (such as repair method) that was conducted by the person(s) in charge management is carried out
method appropriate of assessment and confirmed by the section manager in charge of the facility based on the “Evaluation of the Appropriateness (Implementation for even those deterioration
when deterioration is Plan Document) of the Result of Equipment Integrity Verification Plan for Long-Term Nonoperating Plants,” it was verified that the scope of events that have no problems
found? repair and the repair method were appropriate. In addition to the deterioration status at the time of the inspection, the deterioration trends were also according to the judgment
assessed, in order to confirm that the integrity of the facility can be maintained until the next inspection. Assessment and verification were also criteria.
conducted, in regard to whether the repairs were carried out as required (e.g. implementation of scheduled repair for minor corrosions). In addition,
the inspection results were reflected in the maintenance plan as inspection details and frequencies to be used in the future, in order to maintain the #$It is assessed that feedback
integrity of the facilities. activities are conducted to
#$Is assessment The following were verified. see if any similar

237
conducted properly, in deterioration events have
Based on the “Evaluation of the Appropriateness (Implementation Plan Document) of the Result of Equipment Integrity Verification Plan for
regard to whether or occurred in other facilities.
Long-Term Nonoperating Plants,” the person(s) in charge of assessment assessed the effectiveness of the facilities, in regard to: whether or not the
not or not the facility facility had any problems according to the judgment criteria, even if that facility did not require immediate repair; whether or not the integrity of
has any problems the facility would be maintained until the next inspection; the scheduled repairs (the repair coating, etc., for minor corrosion should be conducted
according to the within a year), the regular wall thickness measurements (outdoor exhaust duct), and the regular isolation resistance measurements (CLD, etc.) The
judgment criteria, section manager in charge of the facility then defined countermeasures for the facilities, such as surveillance.
even if that facility Through these activities, appropriate management was conducted for even minor deterioration, in order to prevent progress of the deterioration
does not require and to ensure that preventive measures are conducted. Examples of these activities include: trend monitoring of the oil leak volume from the main
immediate repair, and circulation pump mechanical seals in the primary and secondary systems; trend monitoring of the corrosion on the sea water pumps in the reactor
are countermeasures auxiliary cooling sea water system; monitoring of the lube oil in the diesel power generators and the cooling performance of the purified water
for the facility, such as coolers; trend monitoring of the nuclear instrumentation; trend monitoring of the primary sodium leak detectors; trend monitoring of the isolation
surveillance, defined resistances of the space heaters, etc., in the diesel power generators; and saline concentration measurement in the building.
accordingly?
#$Are feedback The following were verified.
activities conducted The validity of the feedback activities was assessed and confirmed during each facility inspection, considering the installation environment,
sufficiently when a experience of operation, and design of the facility, based on the “Evaluation of the Appropriateness (Implementation Plan Document) of the Result
deterioration event is of Equipment Integrity Verification Plan for Long-Term Nonoperating Plants.” For items that require additional actions, additional inspections are
found? being conducted. For the Monju-specific facilities, it was also verified that failures and deterioration events that may occur in each facility were
reliably identified by verifying that the inspection method used could identify the failures and deterioration events that were found in that facility in
the past. Cause investigation and feedback activities are being conducted for not only the troubles in the outdoor exhaust duct and the incorrect
alarm issuance in the CLD (which were described in No. 27) but also for the isolation deterioration of the liquid-level gauge and the failure in the
extension valve. In addition, for the failures and deterioration events found in the facility integrity check, appropriate actions such as a cause
investigation, countermeasures, and feedback activities were taken, as shown in the attachment.



Check Item Observation Point Description Evaluation Future tasks
3. Reliable
implementation of
countermeasures for
sodium leakage
(1) Action for past #$Are the past failures The following were verified.
sodium leak detector relating to sodium 1. In regard to the CLD at the reactor vessel entrance primary stop valve (430MV5B) in the primary maintenance cooling system, where an alarm #$It is assessed that the cause #$For commissioning
failures leak detectors was incorrectly issued on March 26, 2008, it was verified that the cause of the incorrect issuance of the alarm was that the fixing position of the investigation and recurrence resumption in the future, it is
(including attached sealant was shifted due to an installation failure and the CLD was inserted too far. prevention measures related necessary to complete the
equipment) organized, (1) As a countermeasure against this failure, the general specifications in the “Procurement Management Procedure” were revised for to past failures in the sodium construction of
are all countermeasure standardization, in order to clearly describe that even when proven equipment is used, any irregular use of information should be notified to leak detectors are almost countermeasures for the
preparations complete the JAEA, and that when information regarding the existence of potential nonconformance is found (for example, when a failure is found in complete. failure in the sodium leak
and in accordance the construction method for equipment that has been already installed), such information should also be reported to the JAEA immediately. detectors, including the
with the “Inspection (2) It was determined that the method of use should also be verified during reviews of the design and the procedures, and when the equipment #$It is assessed that the assessment of the results of
Report on the is used in an irregular way, the effectiveness of such use should be verified. To accomplish this, a rule was written in the relevant design maintenance management such measures, and to
Sodium Leak review sheet in the “Design Review Guideline” for standardization. methods related to the complete reflection of
Detectors at (3) It was also determined that even when proven equipment is used, if it is used in an irregular way, the validity of its construction method sodium leak detectors were maintenance management
Prototype Fast should be verified in the reviews of the inspection procedures and the construction procedures which are used for on-site construction. To do clarified based on past methods into the safety
Breeder Reactor this, the descriptions of the inspections and test items in the “Inspection and Test Management Guideline” were enhanced and the items to failures in the sodium leak preservation rules and related
Monju,” which describe work details in the “Standard Description Guidelines for Work Guide” were also enhanced. detectors. documents.
summarizes the
actions regarding 2. It was verified that the cause of the sodium leak alarm issued from the CLD in the secondary overflow tank, which occurred on September 6,
cause investigation 2008, was the drop in isolation resistance due to electrolysis, caused by due condensation and ion-migration of silver.
and recurrence As a countermeasure against this, it was determined that when there is a possibility that due condensation may occur, protective measures
prevention measures, should be taken for the CLD, and a rule reflecting this was described in the “Guidance to deal with the equipment in the sodium leak
and are the results detectors.”
assessed (1) It was also determined that a similar type of CLD, that is, the silver-brazed sealed CLDs (91 CLDs), should be replaced with alternative
appropriately? gold-brazed CLDs. As of the end of May 2009, 90 CLDs out of 91 CLDs have been replaced.
During the replacement, a visual installation inspection and an alarm test were conducted to verify their integrity, and after that, the CLDs
underwent a pre-use inspection and passed. Since the one remaining CLD is in a nitrogen atmosphere, replacement of this CLD is planned
to take place in September, when the air will be displaced.
(2) Both for the CLDs that have already been replaced and for those that have not been replaced, the isolation resistances have been measured

238
on a regular basis to verify that the resistance is higher than the maintenance management reference value. Furthermore, it was determined
that the silver-brazed sealed CLDs should be measured at the following intervals, depending on the isolation resistance value:
!"Higher than 50 M$: Once a month
!"Between 50 M$ and 5 M$: Once every two weeks
(3) It was verified from the results of the accelerated test that the gold-brazed CLDs were superior to the silver-brazed CLDs in terms of
ion-migration durability.

For past failure events related to the sodium leak detector equipment, the CLD, SID, DPD, and RID were investigated in comprehensive
functional tests, etc., by using the records and other data that have been obtained since the sodium leak detectors were activated, and the results
were summarized in the “Inspection of Failure Events Regarding Sodium Leak Detectors that Occurred in the Past.”
As a result, 18 events related to the detectors and 56 events related to the attached equipment (a total of 74 events) were extracted as
deterioration events or failures in the equipment. These were separated into the events related to the detectors and the events related to the
attached equipment, and then summarized per failure mode. For each failure mode (isolation drop, installation failure, deterioration of parts,
etc.), the statuses of the measures taken for the detectors and the attached equipment, such as inspections, replacement, and so on, were verified,
and the current integrity of each facility was assessed to check if there were any items that require replacement or re-inspection. For the purpose
of recurrence prevention, items that should be reflected in future maintenance were also considered.

3. Based on the feedback activities related to the cause investigation, measures, recovery, and recurrence prevention of the failures, the
maintenance method for the sodium leak detectors was reviewed. This review included: setting and review of the inspection frequencies,
scheduling of the replacement of parts, and review of the items to be monitored to identify deterioration trends, including monitoring
frequencies. To appropriately reflect the results of these activities in a future maintenance plan and ensure the execution of preventive
maintenance, these results were summarized in the “Guidance to deal with the equipment in the sodium leak detectors” in order to
standardize the maintenance methods related to the sodium leak detectors.

4. Considering all the above, it was assessed that a series of countermeasure constructions regarding the sodium leak detector equipment were
complete, except the one detector in the secondary system, and that the following goals that should be accomplished were satisfied.
(1) The cause investigation and recurrence prevention measures related to the past failures in the sodium leak detectors were complete.
[Grounds for Evaluation]
!"The cause investigation and recurrence prevention measures related to the past failures in the sodium leak detectors were summarized in
the “Inspection of the failure events related to the sodium leak detectors that were found in the past” in the “Inspection Report on the
Sodium Leak Detectors at Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Monju.”
!"The cause investigation and recurrence prevention measures related to the past failures in the sodium leak detectors were complete.
(Except for one CLD in the secondary system.)

(2) The maintenance management methods related to the sodium leak detectors were settled based on the past failures found in the sodium leak
detectors.
[Grounds for Evaluation]
The maintenance management measures related to the sodium leak detectors were established by preparing the “Guidance to deal with the
equipment in the sodium leak detectors” based on the past failures in the sodium leak detectors and reflecting its contents in the
maintenance plan (inspection plan).
#$Are the maintenance The following were verified.
management methods 1. Based on the past deterioration and failure events in the sodium leak detectors, which were summarized in the “Inspection Report on the
related to the sodium Sodium Leak Detectors at Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Monju,” the maintenance management methods related to the sodium leak
leak detectors detectors were established as the “Guidance to deal with the equipment in the sodium leak detectors.”
established based on (1) This has enabled the inheritance of past failures to aid recurrence prevention.
the past failures in the (2) Also, in the “Guidance…,” a rule was set so that the past deterioration and failure events in the sodium leak detectors, which were
sodium leak detectors, summarized in the “Inspection Report on the Sodium Leak Detectors at Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Monju,” should be reflected as
and are those methods “preventive maintenance” in the maintenance plan (inspection plan) for the sodium leak detector equipment.
reflected in the 2. The rule described in 1. (2) above was reflected in the maintenance plan for the sodium leak detector equipment in the maintenance program.
maintenance
program?
(2) Definition of #$Have the procedures The following were verified. #$It is assessed that the #$For commissioning
countermeasures for to quickly judge 1. Review of the Alarm Procedures regarding the sodium leak alarms procedures to judge whether resumption in the future, it is
issuance of a sodium whether a sodium leak The Alarm Procedures regarding the sodium leak alarms were reviewed as follows: or not a sodium leak alarm is necessary to complete
leak alarm and alarm was issued (1) Based on the causes and effects of incorrect issuance of alarms, summarized as responses to incorrect issuance of leak alarms in the issued incorrectly and the reflection of the procedures
preparation of the incorrectly or not been “Inspection Report on the Sodium Leak Detectors at Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Monju,” the causes for incorrect alarms, items to be operation procedures to be to be conducted at issuance
related manuals considered and verified, and judgments on incorrect alarm issuance were organized for each sodium leak detector type and reflected in the procedures. conducted when it is judged of a sodium leak alarm or at
clarified for each (2) As for the filter analysis operations (including removal of the filters) to be conducted at issuance of a leak alarm from the gas sampling type as correct (an LCO occurrence of an LCO
sodium leak detector sodium leak detectors (SID, DPD, and RID), it was defined in the procedures that though the secondary system and the EVST system are deviation), were clarified. deviation in the safety
type and for all operated by operators, the filters in the primary system should be removed by the maintenance section with consideration of the recovery preservation rules and related
installation locations, operation. These procedures were revised so that the filters in the primary system were also removed and analyzed by operators. The #$It is assessed that the documents.

239
etc? operators are now taking training to handle these filters. The time required to judge by filter analysis if an alarm is issued incorrectly was notification and
shortened from approximately 4 hours to 2 hours and 30 minutes. announcement standards
(3) In the procedures, it was defined that when an alarm is issued from an induction type fixed point liquid-level gauge, which is one of the related to sodium leaks were
sodium leak detectors around the reactor vessel, and if the shift chief cannot judge if this alarm is issued incorrectly, the integrity of the clarified and reflected in the
detector should be verified by the maintenance section to check for incorrect alarm issuance. However, as a result of the re-verification of relevant manuals.
the installation status of the SID and DPD in the same area, it was found that whether or not an alarm was issued incorrectly can be judged
by checking if the indicated values of the SID and DPD in the same area have risen. Therefore, the procedures were revised accordingly.
Since whether or not an alarm is issued incorrectly can now be judged by the shift chief only, the time required for the judgment is
shortened from approximately 5 hours and 20 minutes to 20 minutes.
(4) Because some of the equipment and valves where the CLD is installed are not filled with sodium in normal operation after the sodium was
filled up, a leak alarm from those areas can be automatically judged as incorrect issuance. Therefore, each CLD detector was checked to see
if the sodium was filled up, and the results were summarized. There is a plan to reflect these results in the procedures in future.

2. Review of the “Action Guidelines for Sodium Leak Detector Alarms”


The following were reviewed in the “Action Guidelines for Sodium Leak Detector Alarms”:
(1) Though action flows for the SID, DPD, and RID used to verify if an alarm was issued incorrectly were already prepared, the corresponding
flows for issuance of an alarm from the CLD, the air atmosphere cell monitor, the induction type fixed point liquid-level gauge, and the
temperature gauge for sodium leak detection from the auxiliary cooling equipment air cooler did not exist, so they were newly added.
(2) Actions to be taken by the operators and the maintenance section to check if a leak alarm was issued incorrectly were verified and the action
details and time required to judge whether or not the leak alarm was issued incorrectly were added to the summary table.

3. Preparation of the action manuals for the maintenance section, to be followed at issuance of a sodium leak alarm
Because there were no inspection procedures for the integrity check of leak detectors to be followed by the maintenance section when the shift
chief could not judge whether a sodium leak alarm was issued incorrectly from the CLD or the induction type fixed point liquid-level gauge, the
inspection procedures were newly defined as the “Action Manual for Issuance of a Leak Alarm from the Contact Sodium Leak Detectors (CLD)
or the Induction Type Fixed Point Sodium Leak Detectors.”



The procedures to be conducted by the shift chief and the maintenance section to check whether or not a leak alarm is issued incorrectly and
the actions to be taken after that are now clarified for all the sodium leak detector types and installation locations. By reviewing these check
procedures, the time required to check if an alarm is issued incorrectly has been shortened, and procedures that allow for quick checking of
incorrect alarm issuance have been established.
• Operation time required for primary system filter analysis was shortened from approximately 4 hours to 2 hours and 30 minutes.
• The time required to judge an alarm issued from the induction type fixed point liquid-level gauge was also shortened from
approximately 5 hours 20 minutes to 20 minutes.

#$Are proper procedures The following were verified.


defined so that 1. Consideration on revision of Article 34 (Sodium Leak Monitoring) of the safety preservation rules
decisions on securing To precisely judge an LCO deviation at issuance of a leak alarm, it was determined to revise the descriptions regarding issuance of sodium leak
safety and operations alarms in Article 24 of the safety preservation rules as follows:
can be made (1) Positioning of the check tasks to be conducted by the shift chief to judge whether or not LCO is satisfied when a leak alarm is issued should
immediately, whether be clearly described.
or not an issued alarm (2) As a measure to be taken when the LCO is not satisfied, the actions to be taken when a leak alarm is issued during the cold shutdown of the
can be immediately reactor and during fuel replacement should be added.
judged to be correct or (3) It should be clearly described that the actions to be taken when an LCO is not satisfied should be implemented promptly within the range of
incorrect, or when a the completion time (24 hours) after a leak alarm is issued.
leak is found?
2. Review of the “Action Guidelines for Sodium Leak Detector Alarms”
The following were reviewed to clarify the judgment criteria for an LCO deviation at issuance of a sodium leak alarm and the plant operations
to be conducted after that.
(1) The judgment criteria for an LCO deviation and recovery when a leak alarm is issued, if existence of leak is found, or it is not certain if the
alarm has been issued incorrectly were clarified.
(2) It was clarified that the shift chief should declare an LCO deviation and then move to the reactor manual trip and emergency drain
operations (normal drain operation for the primary system) when a leak alarm is issued and the existence of leak is found, and that when it is
not certain that the alarm has been issued incorrectly, the shift chief should declare an LCO deviation and the maintenance section should
perform the integrity check of the detector within 24 hours. If, after this, it is still not certain that the alarm had been issued incorrectly, they
should promptly move to normal shutdown and normal drain operations.
(3) As a result of the verification of the actions to be taken by the operators and the maintenance section to check if a leak alarm is issued

240
incorrectly, as well as the addition of the action details and required times in the summary table, the times required to judge an LCO
deviation and to take actions after that were clarified. As a result, though the time spent to judge an LCO deviation when a leak alarm was
issued from the CLD in the primary maintenance cooling system was approximately 1 hour and 40 minutes in March 2008, it is now
estimated that the time required for CLDs in future should be shortened to approximately 20 to 30 minutes.

2. Review of the Abnormal Situation Operation Procedures regarding sodium leaks


To quickly judge if a leak actually occurred when multiple leak alarms are issued from CLDs, it is planned to review the following:
It is defined in the Abnormal Situation Operation Procedures that it should be judged that a sodium leak has occurred when multiple alarms
are issued from the leak detectors (e.g. alarms from two or more leak detectors of different types) or when a leak is found by ITV, on-site
verification, or filter analysis. As a result of re-verification of the installation statuses of the equipment and the CLDs with piping, it was verified
that there was a possibility where multiple alarms had been issued from only the adjacent CLDs that are installed in the same equipment or pipe.
Therefore, the safety procedures were revised in such a way that it should be judged that a sodium leak has occurred even when alarms are
issued from two or more CLDs that are installed adjacent in the same equipment or pipe.

This clarified the judgment criteria for LCO deviation, the required time, and the actions to be taken by the shift chief when a sodium leak
alarm is issued. As a result, the procedures to promptly declare an LCO deviation and then properly take subsequent actions when it cannot be
judged if the alarms were issued incorrectly, or when existence of a leak is found, were established. Though the time spent to judge an LCO
deviation when a leak alarm was issued from the CLD in the primary maintenance cooling system was approximately 1 hour and 40 minutes in
March 2008, it is now estimated that the time required for CLDs in future should be shortened to approximately 20 to 30 minutes.
#$Is it clearly The following were verified.
determined that 1. The “Guidelines for Accident/Trouble Reporting” was defined as a QMS document to clarify the relationship with the safety preservation rules
information regarding and the duties of the personnel responsible for reporting. The “Action Guidelines for Sodium Leak Alarms” was also reviewed to clarify how
sodium leaks should to report to the fire department when it is obvious that an alarm was issued incorrectly and also to clarify a rule that the alarms issued during
be announced timely maintenance should be treated as items not to be reported. In addition, efforts for prompt reporting, such as writing down necessary sentences in
and in an easily the report sheet in advance, are continuously being made.
comprehensible 2. The public announcement standards for failures and troubles, including sodium leaks, were discussed repeatedly within the plant and then
manner, depending on defined after inquiries at neighboring plants. The standards were explained to municipal governments as well, and coordination with the press
the contents of the was also made, prior to official announcement of the standards. Furthermore, based on the public announcement standards, the
information? Also, are “Announcement Guidelines for Accident/Trouble” were established to clarify the standards regarding announcement to the press and posting on
activities to promote the web site.
understanding of [Effects]
sodium leaks 1. The “Guidelines for Accident/Trouble Reporting” and the “Action Guidelines for Sodium Leak Alarms” were prepared and they helped the
performed on a personnel responsible for reporting to make proper judgments. The speed of reporting has also gradually increased through daily reporting
regular basis and in a training.
popular way? 2. By utilizing the public announcement standards, the transparency of operations, swiftness of public announcements, and overall accuracy
should be further improved. The press agreed that regular communication on work that may cause issuance of sodium leak alarms was not
required.

[Activities to Promote Understanding]


1. Activities to promote the understanding of sodium leaks have been conducted at the Tsuruga Head Office.
(1) To promote understanding using case examples related to sodium, leaflets, and presentation materials, activities such as the Cycle Meeting
are conducted continuously to provide local residents with various kinds of information. In addition, since the plant has participated in a
wide range of events held locally as PR activities, it is considered that information regarding the sodium and the leak measures is provided
sufficiently.
(2) Approximately 40 thousand people have visited the sodium learning wing, which was designed for visitors at Monju to closely look at
sodium itself and understand its properties, since its opening in 2000. In addition, personnel who took training are now able to explain about
sodium in their communication with the general community.
(3) When a media representative is newly assigned to the press club in Fukui prefecture, the plant proactively invites him/her to the on-site
tours to have him/her learn about sodium, as people are not very familiar with this substance in normal life.

241


Check Item Observation Point Description Evaluation Future tasks
4. Reliable
implementation of
maintenance
management based on
the maintenance
program
(1) Preparation of #$Is a system that The following were verified.
maintenance allows the latest A maintenance program was introduced for maintenance management based on the reactor facility safety regulations, which became effective on #$It is assessed that the #$Continuous verification of
programs knowledge on January 1, 2009. The maintenance program provides the following as a system that allows the latest knowledge on maintenance to be collected and maintenance program at the the system’s functioning and
maintenance to be reflected in the maintenance program. construction stage defines effectiveness is required.
continually collected (1) Collection of the latest knowledge on maintenance appropriate maintenance
and reflected in the 1) Information on the latest accidents and failures, etc., at domestic nuclear power generation plants is obtained from NUCIA, etc., and whether methods and maintenance
maintenance program this information should be fed back to Monju and its reflection method are reviewed at the “Reliability improvement measure review frequencies based on the
prepared? meeting,” comprising the Director of the Safety Quality Control Office as the chairperson, the chief reactor engineers, and management from latest knowledge, and thus it
• Importance of each section. If any item that should be reflected in Monju is found, feedback activities are conducted. Examples of these activities include is assessed that the
facilities those taken for the failure in the control air compressor A (Ikata Power Plant Unit 3: February 2007) and those taken for manual reactor maintenance program is
• Records of past shutdown due to an activation failure of the diesel power generator (Tomari Power Plant Unit 1: September 2007). organized properly.
inspections and
repairs that were 2) As for fast reactors such as Joyo, information on overseas reactors and on Joyo itself are obtained from the resident officers at the Phoenix
conducted at Monju reactor in France and from daily communications, respectively.
• Knowledge
regarding (2) Reflection in maintenance programs
deterioration at 1) In the effectiveness assessment of maintenance that should be conducted at the end of the maintenance cycle, and when the inspection plan is
domestic and changed (e.g. the maintenance method is changed), the latest knowledge, such as any experiences in operations (including troubles), data
overseas fast regarding troubles and deterioration trends at other plants, risk information, and scientific knowledge, should be used to assess the
reactors and PWRs, effectiveness of the maintenance and to reflect the results in the maintenance plan. [Outline of the maintenance effectiveness assessment]
such as Joyo, as 2) During the verification and assessment of the results of the inspections and repairs, which should be conducted after an inspection is
well as in general conducted, any experiences in operations, such as troubles, as well as the proposals, recommendations, and items to be improved upon
industries provided by the manufacturers, should be reflected in the maintenance plan.
• Results of 3) The Maintenance Management Procedure states that the results of the validity assessment of the facility integrity check should be reflected
inspections in the inspection plan.

242
conducted based on 4) The NUCIA data and all other latest information collected at the reliability improvement measure review meeting, etc., is reflected in
the Equipment the inspection procedures, prepared before the inspection was conducted.
Integrity
Confirmation Plan (3) In addition, to effectively conduct maintenance, the importance of each building, system, and equipment for which maintenance should be
for Long-Term conducted was set when the maintenance program was defined. When the maintenance plan was defined (during inspection of the inspection
Nonoperating plan and reflection on the experiences in repair, etc.), the following knowledge was reflected:
Plants 1) When the maintenance plan was defined in January 2009
• “Maintenance Management Importance Control Procedure at Construction Stage”
• Recommendations from manufacturers
• Experiences in inspections and repairs at Monju, including the results of the inspections that were conducted based on the Equipment
Integrity Verification Plan
The “Maintenance Management Importance Control Procedure at Construction Stage” defines the inspection frequency of each facility by
considering the importance of maintenance, replacement timings of major parts, and use environment at Monju. The Procedure is based
upon the experiences in operations and maintenance at Joyo, the results of various researches and developments conducted by related
departments in the Japan Atomic Energy Agency and the experiences in operations and knowledge at trouble events in overseas FBRs and
PWRs.
2) When the plan was revised in February 2009
• Measures that were taken for the failures in the outdoor duct and sodium leak detectors
3) Being implemented as of the end of June 2009
• Results of the effectiveness assessment of the facility integrity check

(4) Reflection of the results of the effectiveness assessment of the facility integrity check
During the facility integrity check, failures and deterioration events were extracted, and the results of the effectiveness assessment of the
inspections on the facility integrity were reflected in the maintenance plan. (Being implemented as of the end of June 2009)
During extraction of failures and deterioration events, the following information was collected based on the “Equipment Integrity
Confirmation Plan for Long-Term Nonoperating Plants” (2006) to extract deterioration events:
1) Events at the FBR
• Aging assessment results at Joyo and failure events at overseas FBRs
2) Events at the PWRs
• Trouble events at domestic PWRs
In addition, during the effectiveness assessment in 2009, the failures and deterioration events that occurred in the Monju-specific facilities
during the period from completion of construction to the present were extracted from the inspection reports, repair tickets, and so on. The
deterioration events that were based on the aging assessment of the PWR (Japan Atomic Energy Agency's Standards, “Nuclear Power Plant
Aging Measure Implementation Standards”: 2008) were also taken into consideration.
By comparing the maintenance plan with the inspection results at Monju, based on the effectiveness assessment results of the facility
integrity checks that had been conducted before and at the end of April, there was a view that the inspection frequencies defined in the
maintenance plan were conservative. For the effectiveness assessment results of those facility integrity checks, re-assessments are currently
being conducted to scrutinize the assessment results to obtain premises, etc. Since there are some facilities that do not have a unified concept
of the inspection frequencies, the effectiveness assessment of the maintenance should be conducted based on the results of the re-assessments,
to reflect the results in the maintenance plan.
#$Is maintenance The following were verified.
conducted based on • Based on 6. “Defining a maintenance plan” in Article 103 (Maintenance Management Plan at Construction Stage) of the safety preservation
preventive rules, the maintenance methods were set up based on preventive maintenance (time-based maintenance) and the inspection plans were defined
maintenance (Are the according to the importance of each facility, except for (1) the on-site indicators that are not required for operation management (status
maintenance methods monitoring), (2) the facilities used in inspections, (3) the small diameter valves excluding those within the boundary, and (4) the facilities that do
set according to the not directly affect the operations at the plant and employ corrective maintenance measures, such as the fresh water and discharged water
importance of each facilities. Specific selection methods are defined in Article 14 (Defining an inspection plan) of the Maintenance Management Procedure as well
facility?) as the Maintenance Plan Review Procedure.
• As for the importance of facilities in maintenance, the flow for setting the importance in maintenance was reviewed so that the facilities were
categorized by taking into account the functions of Monju-specific systems. Based on the reviewed flow, “Time-based maintenance + status
monitoring” and “Time-based maintenance” are applied to the equipment categorized as importance A in maintenance and the equipment
categorized as importance B in maintenance, respectively.
#$Are the inspection The following were verified.
methods and The inspection plan, etc., are defined based on 6. “Defining a maintenance plan” in Article 103 (Maintenance Management Plan at
inspection frequencies Construction Stage) of the safety preservation rules. Specific definition methods are defined in Article 13 (Defining and revising a maintenance
assessed plan) of the Maintenance Management Procedure and the Maintenance Plan Review Procedure. It is also defined in Article 20 (Verification and
appropriately? assessment of the results of the inspections and repairs) of the Maintenance Management Procedure that verifications and assessments should be
conducted and in Article 22 (Effectiveness assessment of the maintenance) of the regulations that the effectiveness of such verifications and
assessments should be assessed.
1) When the maintenance program was defined in January 2009, because it was assessed that conventional inspection frequencies were not
always periodical, the inspection plan was set up based on the estimates of the inspection frequencies that were made from the inspection and

243
repair results of facilities that had undergone inspections before, while the recommendations by manufacturers, “Maintenance Management
Importance Control Procedure at Construction Stage,” and operations were continuously employed.
2) In the effectiveness assessment of the facility integrity check, the inspection details (including inspection methods), and inspection
frequencies required to maintain the integrity of the facilities were assessed, while past inspection results were also taken into account. These
assessment results were reflected in the maintenance plan. (Being implemented)
3) In the review of the causes and countermeasures for the trouble events in the outdoor exhaust ducts and the CLDs, past inspection
results and trouble events were investigated to assess the effectiveness of countermeasures and review the inspection details and
inspection frequencies to be employed in future (improvements of the frequencies and addition of inspection tours).
4) Also, based on the verification and assessment of the results of the inspections and repairs, a system that allows the inspection details and
inspection frequencies to be verified and assessed was built, in order to improve the maintenance plan.
By comparing the maintenance plan with the inspection results at Monju, based on the effectiveness assessment results of the facility integrity
checks that had been conducted before and at the end of April, there was a view that the inspection frequencies defined in the maintenance plan
were conservative. For example:
(1) Though the nuclear instrumentation facility is capable of maintaining accuracy even if inspections are conducted once every two years, the
frequency was set to once a year, as recommended by the manufacturer.
(2) Though it is estimated, as a result of sampling the operation data for a long period, that the process monitoring pump can operate for
approximately three years, its inspection frequency was set to once a year.
#$Is the maintenance The following were verified.
program based on past The results of the effectiveness assessment of the facility integrity checks (i.e. that the inspection and repair results in the past, and the inspection
inspection and repair details and frequencies required to realize and maintain the facility integrity, were reflected in the maintenance plan) were reflected in the
results, etc? maintenance plan. (Being implemented) Also, based on the verification and assessment of the results of the inspections and repairs, a system that
allows the inspection details and inspection frequencies to be verified, assessed, and then reflected in the maintenance plan was built.
The following describes the items in the inspection plan that have been defined or revised based on past inspection and repair results.
1) When the maintenance program was defined in January 2009, the inspection plan was set up based on the recommendations by the
manufacturer (“Maintenance Management Importance Control Procedure at Construction Stage”), and the inspection and repair results of the
facilities that had undergone inspections before, including the inspections conducted during the facility integrity checks.
The specific events that were revised from the recommendations by the manufacturer, based on the inspection and repair results, etc.
(1) Frequency of the primary argon gas system compressor disassembly inspections
Since no failures were found during the two years of inspections conducted after the equivalent operation times, the inspection frequency
(rough indication) was revised from once a year to once every two years.



(2) Frequency of the secondary main circulation pump mechanical seal disassembly inspections
The mechanical seal (rotary ring) was changed to non-impregnated carbon with high blistering resistance, a demonstrative test simulating
the operation status of the real equipment was conducted, and based on the results of this test, the inspection frequency (rough
indication) was revised from once a year to once every two years.
(3) Frequency of replacement of the pressure release boards for steam generators and containers
Since no problems were found in the boards during the material test that was conducted after five years of maintenance at Monju, the
replacement frequency (rough indication) of the pressure release board for steam generators was revised from once a year to once every
four years and that of the board for containers was revised from once a year to once every eight years, considering that the board is not
within the sodium boundary and is used in a nitrogen atmosphere.
(4) Frequency of the ventilation air conditioning fan disassembly inspections
Based on the maintenance results at Monju, the inspection frequency (rough indication) of the centrifugal direct-connected and
direct-operated fans was revised from once every four years to once every six years and that of the axial-flow fans was revised from once a
year to once every four years.

2) Revision in February 2009


(1) In the review of the causes and countermeasures for the trouble events in the outdoor exhaust ducts and the CLDs, past inspection results
and trouble events were investigated to assess the effectiveness of countermeasures and review the inspection details and inspection
frequencies to be employed in future (improvements of the frequencies and addition of inspection tours).
• Understanding of the deterioration events found in regular isolation resistance measurements relating to the CLDs
• Regular wall thickness measurements of the outdoor exhaust ducts (to be conducted every month in the initial period), and coating check
to be conducted every year
As for the DPD detector output signal check (once a month), regular DPD replacement (once every two years), DPD setting value check and
alarm test (once every two years), RID detector continuity check (once every two years), regular RID detector replacement (once every 10
years) and so on, proposals for their maintenance plans had already been created and there are plans to revise these maintenance plans in
future.

3) Reflection of the results of the effectiveness assessment of the facility integrity check
The results of the effectiveness assessment of the facility integrity checks (i.e. that the inspection and repair results in the past, and the
inspection details and frequencies required to realize and maintain the facility integrity, were reflected in the maintenance plan) were reflected
in the maintenance plan. (Being implemented as of the end of June 2009)

244
By comparing the maintenance plan with the inspection results at Monju, based on the effectiveness assessment results of the facility integrity
checks that had been conducted before and at the end of April, there was a view that the inspection frequencies defined in the maintenance plan
were conservative. For the effectiveness assessment results of those facility integrity checks, re-assessments are currently being conducted to
scrutinize the assessment results to obtain premises, etc. Since there are some facilities that do not have a unified concept of the inspection
frequencies, the effectiveness assessment of the maintenance should be conducted based on the results of the re-assessments, to reflect the results
in the maintenance plan.
(2) Implementation of #$Are inspections The following were verified. #$It is assessed that inspections #$As for the reliable
maintenance conducted in In accordance with the maintenance plan that was defined based on 6. “Defining a maintenance plan” in Article 103 (Maintenance are conducted based on the implementation of
management accordance with the Management Plan at Construction Stage) of the safety preservation rules, inspections are conducted based on Section 7 of those regulations. maintenance program and maintenance management
maintenance Specific implementation methods are defined in Article 19 (Implementing the maintenance) of the Maintenance Management Procedure. also reviewed according to based on the maintenance
program? Currently, information regarding the safety activity control indexes is collected and monitored based on the maintenance plan up to the the maintenance status. program, it was verified that
completion of the critical test, in order to monitor and verify that the implemented maintenance is appropriate. the “Guidelines for
verification and assessment
The plant maintenance department prepared the “Work plan management manual for the year” for the management, to be conducted from of the results of inspections,
FY2009, and is preparing a work plan for the year, which defines the responsible persons and work periods, etc., for the inspections, repairs, repairs, and so on” was
replacements, modifications, and so on to be conducted in that year, in order to ensure the implementation the maintenance plan. The defined and implemented
implementation status is reviewed every month to manage the progress of this activity. from June this year. As a
For FY2008, after January 2009, when the maintenance program was implemented, it was verified that the maintenance program matched with result of the analysis of
the maintenance plan for the year that had been defined earlier (inspections, etc. should be conducted every month) and that the inspections were evidence samples, it was
conducted based on the maintenance program as a result of verification of the implementation of the maintenance plan for the year. verified that five years is
As for verification and assessment of inspections, repairs, and so on; recommended by the
1) Before the maintenance plan was defined in January 2009, though the results of inspections and repairs, etc., were verified and assessed, the
manufacturer as the
processes used in them were not clear.
inspection period of the tanks
2) When the maintenance plan was defined in January 2009, the process to verify and assess the results of inspections and repairs, etc., (the
process in which inspections, repairs, and so on were verified by using the inspection reports, and then assessed along with proposals and in the waste treatment
improvements for them) were integrated in the maintenance management processes. (Article 20 of the Maintenance Management Procedure) system, because corrosion
3) Since June 2009, in the verification and assessment of the results of the inspections, repairs, etc., that were integrated in January 2009, the was found on the manhole.
contents have been improved to include the results of the operation and inspection statuses of equipment, etc., the deterioration trend In the section for comments
monitoring due to aging, etc., and so on, and then standardized so that these assessments can lead to improvement of the maintenance activities on this matter from JAEA, it
(the effectiveness assessment of maintenance). was stated that since the tank
itself had no problems, the
#$Are countermeasures The following were verified. inspection period would be
for failures executed It was defined that measures should be taken appropriately based on 9. “Nonconformance management, corrective measures, and preventive set to 10 years, considering
appropriately, and is measures of inspections and repairs, etc.” in Article 103 (Maintenance Management Plan at Construction Stage) of the safety preservation rules. the inspection results in the
sufficient Specific implementation methods were defined in Article 21 (Nonconformance management, corrective measures, and preventive measures of past. It was verified that no
consideration given inspections and repairs, etc.) of the Maintenance Management Procedure as well as the Monju Nonconformance Management Procedure. If a comments from JAEA were
regarding the failure is found or has occurred, the section that found the failure should issue a repair ticket (nonconformance category D) and seek the judgment found regarding the
of the nonconformance management committee, comprising the Director of the Safety Quality Control Office as the chairperson, the chief
feedback activities for corrosion pointed out by the
reactor engineers, and the management of each section, which is held every morning. This committee should take up as nonconformance
failures, etc., by the category C or higher all equipment and facilities that are important in safety, the sodium leak detectors, and the equipment and facilities that are manufacturer on the
nonconformance considered to require corrective measures or preventive measures for recurrence prevention, and then determine implementation of corrective or manhole, and that the
management preventive measures for them. The manager of the section responsible for these measures should verify the matters thoroughly from the inspection period was set to
committee, etc? Are professional standpoint of the Director of the Safety Quality Control Office and the chief reactor engineers (other chiefs may be added depending 10 years, which was longer
the results then on the facility), and obtain approval from the competent authorities (confirmation by the head of the division and approval from the President than the period
reflected in the for nonconformance categories A and B), and then plan, implement, and report the corrective measures (preventive measures). This series of recommended by the
maintenance program processes following the “Monju Nonconformance Management Procedure” ensure that considerations regarding the cause investigation, measures, manufacturer. It is important
when a failure is and feedback activities are performed thoroughly and that corrective or preventive measures are reliably conducted. to clarify the comments of
found to have As nonconformance events that fall under Article 21 of the Maintenance Management Procedure, it was determined that improvement activities the licensee when an
occurred? should be conducted for matters whose past isolation resistance value was lower than the judgment criteria, even if the current value satisfies the inspection period is set to a
judgment criteria. length shorter than that
Also, to recognize the trend of decreasing isolation resistance as a matter to be managed at an early stage, the “Isolation resistance management recommended by the
manual for electric and instrumentation equipment” was prepared to define rules in which values (with some allowance) are added to the judgment
manufacturer.
criteria. These were defined as the “Maintenance plan reference values,” and if the isolation resistance falls below these values, management and
assessment of age deterioration should be conducted and appropriate inspection periods and replacement activities, etc., should be reflected in the
maintenance plan, so that the value does not fall below the maintenance plan reference value. #$Continuous verification of
the system’s functioning and
Though this was not a nonconformance event as defined in Article 21 of the Maintenance Management Procedure, it was verified as a specific effectiveness is required.
event found. The effectiveness of the considerations on and the implementation status of the feedback activities for the failures and deterioration
events found in the inspections during the facility integrity check for long-term nonoperating plants was assessed by the personnel in charge of
maintenance and then confirmed by the section manager in charge of the facility, considering the installation environment, experience of operation, #$For commissioning
and design of the facility. For the Monju-specific facilities, it was also verified that failures and deterioration events that may occur in each facility resumption in future, it is
were reliably identified by verifying that the inspection method used could identify the failures and deterioration events that were found in that necessary to conduct
facility in the past. inspections based on the
The inspection plan, based on the feedback activities, which was confirmed as mentioned above, was reflected in the maintenance program. maintenance program, and

245
(Being implemented as of the end of June 2009) review the maintenance
In addition, as one of the nonconformance events that have been found since January 2009, and whose maintenance management was improved, program by reflecting on the
it was determined in response to an operation failure of the primary main cooling system extension valve that feedback activities should be results of the inspections as
conducted for the same type of valves in FY2009. required.
#$Is the effectiveness The following were verified.
assessment of It was decided that an assessment should be conducted based on 10. “Effectiveness assessment of the maintenance” in Article 103 (Maintenance
maintenance methods, Management Plan at Construction Stage) of the safety preservation rules. Specific implementation methods are defined in Article 22 (Effectiveness
etc., conducted based assessment of the maintenance) of the Maintenance Management Procedure as well as the Guidelines for Effectiveness Assessment of
on the maintenance Maintenance.
results, in accordance It was determined that the effectiveness assessment of maintenance should be conducted (1) at completion of the maintenance activities in each
maintenance cycle, (2) when the target values of the maintenance activity control indexes are exceeded, and (3) when the inspection plan is revised
with the maintenance
(e.g. when a maintenance method is changed). Currently, maintenance activities are being implemented based on the maintenance plan up to the
program, and are the critical test and no events that require the effectiveness assessment have been found.
results of this The following are matters that were reflected in the maintenance program (maintenance plan) based on past maintenance results.
assessment reflected 1) When the maintenance plan was defined in January 2009
in the maintenance The maintenance results regarding the frequency of the ventilation air conditioning fan disassembly inspections, the compressed air
program? facilities, the uninterrupted power sources, and inspection details of mechanical facilities, etc., were reflected in the maintenance
program.
2) When the maintenance plan was revised in February 2009
Trouble events were reflected; e.g., isolation measurement of the contact sodium leak detectors and addition of an inspection tour of the
outdoor duct.
3) Being implemented as of the end of June 2009
As for the DPD detector output signal check (once a month), regular DPD replacement (once every two years), DPD setting value
check and alarm test (once every two years), RID detector continuity check (once every two years), regular RID detector
replacement (once every 10 years) and so on, their information was already reflected in the maintenance plan based on the
“Guidance to deal with the equipment in the sodium leak detectors.”
Though this was not the effectiveness assessment of maintenance as defined in the Maintenance Management Procedure, it was verified that
failures and deterioration events were assessed based on the results of inspections that were conducted as part of the facility integrity check for
long-term nonoperating plants, the effectiveness assessment of those inspections, and the investigation of past experiences in operations. The
results were then reflected in the maintenance program (being implemented as of the end of June 2009). When the maintenance plan (inspection
plan) is revised, an effectiveness assessment of the revision should be conducted.



Attachment

Outline of the Results of the FY2009 Safety Inspection No. 2 of


Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Monju

October 15, 2009


Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency

Safety inspections were conducted to verify the important items in safety management and other items
required for safety, all of which should be accomplished before commissioning resumption, in order to
verify the status of efforts aiming for commissioning resumption. The major items to be verified were as
follows:

1. Status of quality assurance activities


#$
It was verified that in order to conduct provisional management reviews and then summarize the
additional comprehensive safety inspection reports, policies were defined and roles were assigned to
conduct activities according to the plan.

2. Status of preparation and implementation of related manuals, such as the operational management
manual
#$It was verified that the following points were reflected properly in the manuals due to the revision of
the Action Guidelines for Sodium Leak Detector Alarms and the defining of the Sodium Leak Monitor
Management Procedure, along with the revision of the safety preservation rules related to procedures
for when a sodium leak alarm is issued. (Effective September 18, 2009.)
- As predefined procedures to be followed when a sodium leak alarm is issued and the shift chief can
be absolutely certain that the alarm was issued incorrectly, the operators’ procedures to check for
the existence of sodium leaks by using the time required as a rough indication were concretely
defined.
- “Predefined equipment that targets the same part and can detect equivalent or higher levels of
leakage” was concretely defined. With use of this equipment, LCO can be considered satisfied,
under certain conditions, even when one of the sodium leak monitors malfunctions.

3. Status of maintenance management


#$It was verified that the maintenance plan was revised based on the results of past maintenance
inspections, etc. The inspection frequency of the SID in the primary cooling system was revised to
once a month, in consideration of the case of incorrect alarm issuance from a sodium leak detector,
and the frequency of visual inspections were made uniform, in consideration of the case of the
corroded outside surfaces.

#$
In regard to the statuses of nonconformance management and repair ticket processing, it was verified
that a plan was formed and managed to ensure to complete the repair of all items that need to be
repaired before commissioning resumption.

Since it was determined that from now on, the JAEA should submit reports of the results of the
additional comprehensive safety inspections after conducting provisional management reviews, the NISA
has decided to assess the effectiveness of commissioning resumption after those reports from the JAEA
have been received.

246
Outline of the Results of the FY2009 Safety Inspection No. 2 of
Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Monju (September 14 to 30, 2009)

October 15, 2009


Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency

(1) Comprehensive evaluation


Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of preparation for commissioning
resumption. More specifically, in addition to the important items in safety management that should
be accomplished before commissioning resumption, other items required for safety, such as core
management, fuel control, and internal audits, were selected as basic inspection items. The statuses
of actions to be taken for items that had been verified before the start of the safety inspection were
also verified.
As a result of these basic inspections on important items in safety management to be
accomplished before commissioning resumption, it was verified that related manuals were prepared
and complied with satisfactorily, and that continuous improvements were being made.
In regard to other items required for safety, such as the core management and fuel control
required for commissioning resumption, each safety preservation activity was conducted based on
the safety preservation rules, and there were no items that violate the safety preservation rules. In
regard to radiation management, the JAEA has begun consideration of whether they can properly
migrate to management of a high dosage environment after commissioning resumption, with
awareness that they are too used to the current management of a low dosage environment, during
cold shutdown of the reactor. This is considered to be an example of good management activity.
The status of daily operational management activities during the safety inspection period was
also examined by questioning the licensee about the management of facility operations, reviewing
operation records, making inspection tours of nuclear facilities, and so forth. As a result, no
particular problems were found.
In consideration of the above, it is judged that the safety preservation activities selected for
examination in this inspection were conducted properly.

(2) Inspection results


1) Basic inspection results
(i) Status of quality assurance activities
a) Progress of priority items for safety management, to be accomplished before commissioning
resumption (interviews with the Chief and General Manager of the plant)
Direct interviews were held with the General Manager of the plant, who was in charge of
the site, and the Chief, who was in charge of business operations, to verify if they were
exercising leadership. As a result, it was verified that the General Manager of the plant and
the Chief displayed his exercise of leadership by expressing his own thoughts in his own
words.
The major statements of the General Manager of the plant, as things he takes into account
when exercising leadership, included the following:
- He is to express messages directly and responsibly.
- He is to understand the status of Monju, to give instructions in a timely manner, and to
clarify that responsibility lies with him.
The Chief stated the following as the ideal business situation at Monju:
- The technical requirements to secure commissioning resumption and subsequent safety
and stability operations are to be organized satisfactorily.


247
- Each and every employee is to reaffirm his/her positioning, role, and importance in
energy policy and environment policy.
- Trust is to be earned from the local and national community as a direct condition for
commissioning resumption.
- The top management and the management at Monju are to be more actively involved
in the operations on-site and are to exercise strong leadership.

It was also verified that, in order to conduct provisional management reviews and then
summarize the additional comprehensive safety inspection reports, policies were defined
and roles were assigned under the leadership of the Chief and General Manager of the plant
to conduct activities according to the plan.
In consideration of the above, it was judged that these inspection items are in proper
conformance with the safety preservation rules.

b) Status of the action plan


Safety inspections were conducted to verify the implementation method of the activities
for “Establishment of an autonomous quality assurance system,” which was listed as one of
the important items in safety management, to be conducted in and after July, when special
safety inspections were complete. The involvement status of those activities was also
examined by checking the Action Plan Implementation Program and the Individual
Evaluation Table in that program.
As a result of the inspections on the “21 items that should be continuously promoted”
(evaluated as Grade A) as well as “11 items that should be improved continuously”
(evaluated as Grade B) at completion of the special safety inspections, it was verified that
the two items that were evaluated as Grade B were changed to Grade A (“to be promoted
continuously”); that the action plan for those items that “should be promoted continuously”
and “should be improved continuously” was prepared up to March next year; and that a
provisional management review would be held in October to summarize the action plan and
verify if an autonomous quality assurance system had been established. If such a system
was verified, all the items would be moved to the management system using the quality
objectives of a standard organization.
In consideration of the above, it was judged that these inspection items are in proper
conformance with the safety preservation rules.

c) Status of flow creation by identifying operational items


As part of the commissioning resumption goal, to identify whether there were any
missing operations or any duplicate operations between sections, as well as what operations
needed improvement, a process flow of operations was created. Inspections were conducted
to verify the status of the process chart creation, the isolation process chart (for the power
generation section), and the QMS review process, etc.
As a result of the inspection, it was verified that 392 flow charts out of 393 charts were
complete and the following should be verified in future:
- Consider what needs improvement based on the flow charts.
- Give priority to completion of operations related to operation management (such as
isolation) until commission is resumed.
- Have the evaluation of isolation, etc., reviewed by personnel transferred from
commercial reactors.
In consideration of the above, it was judged that these inspection items are in proper
conformance with the safety preservation rules.

(ii) Status of preparation and implementation of related manuals, such as the operational
management manual
a) Status of preparation of manuals related to issuance of sodium leak alarms

248
To “Ensure implementation of sodium leak measures,” which was listed as one of the
important items in safety management, safety inspections were conducted to verify the
Action Guidelines for Sodium Leak Detector Alarms and the Sodium Leak Monitor
Management Procedure, etc.
As a result of these inspections, it was verified that the following were reflected properly
in the manuals due to the revision of the Action Guidelines for Sodium Leak Detector
Alarms and the defining of the Sodium Leak Monitor Management Procedure, along with
revision of the safety preservation rules (Effective September 18, 2009).
- As predefined procedures to be followed when a sodium leak alarm is issued and the
shift Chief can be absolutely certain that the alarm was issued incorrectly, the
operators’ procedures to check for the existence of sodium leaks by using the time
required as a rough indication, and then treat the event as an LCO deviation if he/she
cannot judge it as an incorrect issuance, were concretely defined.
- “Predefined equipment that targets the same part and can detect equivalent or higher
levels of leakage” was concretely defined. With use of this equipment, LCO can be
considered satisfied, under certain conditions, even when one of the sodium leak
monitors malfunctions.

However, on September 22, soon after the revised safety preservation rules became
effective, alarms were issued incorrectly from the cell monitor and fire-alarm device in the
C loop auxiliary cooling facility air cooler room. It was clear that this event was an
incorrect alarm issuance because the alarm was issued from a part that was not filled with
sodium, so the event was not considered an item that needed reporting to the government.
However, since an alarm was also issued from the fire-alarm device at the same time, the
personnel responsible for reporting hesitated to make a judgment and thus, submitted the
report to the government, following the principle of “When in doubt, report.”
In addition, on September 24, a DPD alarm was issued incorrectly when the power supply
to the alarm setting device was turned off during inspection of the SID detection amplifier.
This event had been planned by the JAEA in advance as one of the “Tasks, etc., that may
cause issuance of a sodium leak alarm,” and it was verified that the reporting was conducted
appropriately, in accordance with the newly defined procedures, etc. The Power-Off/On
operation was not described in the procedures and it was necessary to “Stop to think” before
conducting such an operation. However, because there were various ways to revise the
safety preservation rules regarding the sodium leak and to report the revisions, depending
on the specific situation of the case, it was verified that related parties should be thoroughly
notified of all information regarding the case, including lessons learned (e.g. “Stop to think”
before conducting operations that are not described in the procedures, such as Power-Off).
It was also verified that neither of these cases were to be announced to public.
In consideration of the above, it was judged that these inspection items are in proper
conformance with the safety preservation rules.

b) Status of manual revision activities related to operational management, exposure


management, radiation management, procurement management, fuel management, core
management, and education and training
Safety inspections were conducted to verify the contents revised and the tasks performed
during the period when they could not be verified due to the special safety inspections.
These inspections covered the items required for safety for commissioning resumption, that
is, the second and third documents for operation management (Operation Management
Guidelines, Operation Guidelines for Nonoperating Reactors), exposure control (Exposure
Control Procedures), radiation control (Radiation Control Procedures, Area Control
Procedures), procurement management (Procurement Management Procedure), fuel control
(Guidelines for Fuel Procurement Management, Fuel Procurement Management
Procedures), core management (Guidelines for Core Management, Guidelines for Core
Component Management), and education and training (Guidelines for Education and
Training, Implementation Guidelines for Education and Training).
As a result of these inspections, it was verified that the contents had been revised 参
appropriately during this period and activities were conducted properly by using the
management check sheet of the fuel manufacturer, etc.

249
In regard to radiation management, the JAEA has begun consideration of whether they
can properly migrate to management of a high dosage environment after commissioning
resumption, with awareness that they are too used to the current management of a low
dosage environment, during cold shutdown of the reactor. This is considered to be an
example of good management activity.
In consideration of the above, it was judged that these inspection items are in proper
conformance with the safety preservation rules.

c) Status of internal audits


Safety inspections were conducted to verify whether internal audits, which would be used
as input in management reviews, were conducted properly, by checking the Nuclear Safety
Audit Procedure.
As a result of these inspections, it was verified from the summary of the audit results
(regular nuclear safety audits in FY2008) and the audit reports (nuclear safety audits in
FY2009—special audits), etc., that the audits were conducted properly in accordance with
the procedures, etc. It was also verified that audits which had started as item-by-item audits
in FY2004 had begun changing to process audits in FY2007, and both item-by-item and
process audits were conducted in FY2008. As a result of this, it had been proven that only
process audits were effective, and thus, the process approach was planned to be employed
in 2009.
In regard to the capacities of the auditors, the plant was concerned that the personnel who
know the operations well were not in charge of the audits, and so tried to boost up the
capabilities of the auditors. This was considered a good example of action. In consideration
of the above, it was judged that these inspection items are in proper conformance with the
safety preservation rules.

(iii)Status of maintenance management


a) Status of the maintenance plan
Inspections were conducted to verify one of the important items in safety management,
“Inspections shall be conducted based on the maintenance program, and the maintenance
program shall be reviewed by reflecting on the results of the inspections as required,” by
checking the Maintenance Management Procedure (maintenance implementation flow),
Maintenance Plan Review Procedure, and Guidelines for Effectiveness Assessment of
Maintenance, etc.
As a result of these inspections, it was verified for each of the repair, replacement, and
modification plans and for the inspection tasks, that, in regard to “Whether inspections were
conducted based on the maintenance program,” inspections were conducted properly in
accordance with the maintenance implementation flow, by checking the construction plans
and construction reports, etc. It was also verified that the range and details of replacement
were described on the sheet, for verification and assessment of the results of the inspections
and repairs (inspections of reactor trip breakers, etc.) for future maintenance, with the
recommendations by the manufacturers taken into consideration.
As for “Whether or not the maintenance program was reviewed by reflecting on the
results as required,” it was verified from the results of the effectiveness assessment of
maintenance and the maintenance plan, etc., that the maintenance plan was revised based on
the results of past maintenance inspections. The inspection frequency of the SID in the
primary cooling system was revised to once a month, in consideration of the case of
incorrect alarm issuance from a sodium leak detector; the frequency of visual inspections
were unified in consideration of the case of the corroded outside surfaces; and the
inspection frequency of the sealed portion on the circulation pump shaft in the primary main
cooling system was revised from once every two years to once every four years, in
consideration of the experience in operations at the previous plant.
In consideration of the above, it was judged that these inspection items are in proper
conformance with the safety preservation rules.

b) Status of nonconformance management


Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of nonconformance management,
by checking the Nonconformance Management Guidelines, etc.

250
As a result of these inspections, it was verified by checking the nonconformance
management ledger that the completion date of processing was written in it to ensure
completion of the matters to be processed before commissioning resumption. It was also
verified by checking the Nonconformance Management Procedure that a system that allows
feedback of findings and the latest technical information from NUCIA, etc., was
established.
Though many of the corrective action plans for the electric and repair section were not
prepared, it was verified from hearings that an immediate support system was established to
take actions systematically, so as not to interfere with commissioning resumption.
In consideration of the above, it was judged that these inspection items are in proper
conformance with the safety preservation rules.

c) Status of repair ticket processing


Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of repair ticket processing by
checking the progress of nonconformance management and repair ticket management, etc.
As a result of these inspections, it was verified by checking the repair ticket management
reports that the completion date of the repair work was written in them to ensure completion
of the matters to be repaired before commissioning resumption. It was also determined that
the budget to conduct repairs for the entire plant in FY2009 should be used for the matters
to be processed before commissioning resumption.
It was also verified from hearings that the repair tickets were processed systematically, so
as not to interfere with commissioning resumption.
In consideration of the above, it was judged that these inspection items are in proper
conformance with the safety preservation rules.


251
ϭ STATUS OF APPROVALS AND
INSPECTIONS FOR CONSTRUCTION
PLANS AND FUEL ASSEMBLY DESIGNS
OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS


253
ϭ-1 Status of Approvals and Inspections for Construction Plans and Fuel
Assembly Designs of Nuclear Power Plants

With respect to installation or modification work for commercial electrical structures that are
of particular importance in ensuring public safety, the plans require approval under the provisions
of Article 47-1 of the Electricity Utilities Industry Law.
Designs of nuclear fuel materials (nuclear fuel assemblies), which are used as fuel for nuclear
power reactors, also require approval under the provisions of Article 51-2 of the Electricity
Utilities Industry Law.
By the end of March 31, 2010, 76 construction plans and 9 fuel assembly designs had been
approved.
The purpose of a pre-operation inspection is to ensure that the work has been carried out in
accordance with the regulations in the planning stages regarding permission and notification of
construction plans under the provisions of Article 49-1 of the Electricity Utilities Industry Law.
The fuel assembly inspection is conducted to verify whether each stage of the fuel assembly
process is performed in accordance with the design approved by the minister, pursuant to Article
51-1 of the Electricity Utilities Industry Law.
By the end of March 31, 2010, certificates of 116 pre-operation inspections and those of 53
fuel assembly inspections had been issued.





255
ϭ-2 Approval of Construction Plans for Commercial Power Reactors

(1) Tokai Daini Power Station (2) Tokai Daini Power Station
1. Application date Mar. 2, 2009 1. Application date Mar. 3, 2009
2. Approval date Apr. 3, 2009 2. Approval date Apr. 15, 2009
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment (1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment
Fuel facility Reactor cooling system facility
(2) Details of (1) Application grounds and details Attached equipment
approval In order to increase the storage capacity of spent fuel, it is Emergency power generation equipment
planned to install 24 spent fuel dry pools separately in 5 (2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
times. This time, 4 pools will be installed as the forth
construction. To improve preservability, the layout of part of the pipes
in the residual heat removal system sea water system and
the emergency diesel power generator sea water system,
which is an emergency standby power generation device,
are changed from the current buried layout to an aerial

256
layout. Along with the replacement of the pipes, the
(2) Decision criteria specifications for the main pipes and the emergency
Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 9 (materials and diesel power generator sea water system pumps are
structures) and Article 25 (fuel pool) of the Ordinance of changed.
Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power
Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965) (2) Decision criteria
Article 5 (earthquake resistance) and Article 9 (materials
and structures) of the Ordinance of Establishing Technical
Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Equipment
(MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965)
4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards met the technological standards
5. Related permission Approval for installation changes 5. Related permission -
items Mar. 10, 1999 items
Heisei 09.09.18 Shi No. 5
6. Other remarks None 6. Other remarks None
(3) Tokai Daini Power Station (4) Tokai Daini Power Station
1. Application date Jun. 19, 2009 1. Application date Sep. 7, 2009 (amended on October 2)
2. Approval date Aug. 24, 2009 2. Approval date Oct. 22, 2009
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment (1) Approval subject Attached equipment
Reactor cooling system facility Emergency power generation equipment
(2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details (2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
To improve reliability of the residual heat removal system Since the current emergency batteries (DC 125 V A
sea water system against tsunami (undertow), the overall system and HPCS system) need to be replaced soon due
length of the pump is extended to make the position of the to age deterioration, they are replaced to new batteries,
pump suction port down. which have superior life and preservability. In line with
this, the major dimensions of the batteries will be altered.

(2) Decision criteria (2) Decision criteria

257
Article 5 (earthquake resistance) and Article 9 (materials Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 8-2 (safety
and structures) of the Ordinance of Establishing Technical equipment), and Article 33 (protection power supply
Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Equipment facility) of the Ordinance of Establishing Technical
(MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965) Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Equipment
(MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965) and Ordinance of
Establishing Technical Standards for Electric Equipment
(MITI Ordinance No. 52, 1997)

4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards met the technological standards
5. Related permission - 5. Related permission -
items items

6. Other remarks None 6. Other remarks None



(5) Tokai Daini Power Station (6) Tsuruga Power Station Unit 2
1. Application date Nov. 6, 2009 1. Application date Sep. 14, 2009
2. Approval date Dec. 1, 2009 2. Approval date Oct. 28, 2009
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Approval subject Attached equipment (1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment
Emergency power generation equipment Instrumentation and control system facility
(2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details (2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
Since the current emergency batteries (DC 24 V for the The digital control device is employed as the logic circuit
neutron monitors) need to be replaced soon due to age in the protective system for preservability to maintain the
deterioration, they are replaced to new batteries, which function of the equipment. In relation to this, part of the
have superior life and preservability. In line with this, the operation logics of the reactor emergency stop signals and
major dimensions of the batteries will be altered. the engineering safety feature start-up signals are changed
from “2 out of 3” to “2 out of 4” by considering
preservability, etc.

(2) Decision criteria (2) Decision criteria

258
Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 8-2 (safety Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 8-2 (safety
equipment), and Article 33 (protection power supply equipment) and Article 22 (safety protection equipment)
facility) of the Ordinance of Establishing Technical of the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for
Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Equipment Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance
(MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965) and Ordinance of No. 62, 1965)
Establishing Technical Standards for Electric Equipment
(MITI Ordinance No. 52, 1997)

4. Result Approval was granted because it was not considered to 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
have not met the technological standards met the technological standards
5. Related permission - 5. Related permission -
items items

6. Other remarks None 6. Other remarks None


(7) Tsuruga Power Station Unit 2 (8) Tsuruga Power Station Unit 2
1. Application date Nov. 13, 2009 1. Application date Jan. 12, 2010
2. Approval date Dec. 8, 2009 2. Approval date Jan. 27, 2010
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment (1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment
Reactor cooling system facility Reactor cooling system facility
(2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details (2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
In order to reduce the maintenance loads and the exposure Since “Performance Evaluation, etc. of the Filters in the
during maintenance, part of the filing lines are removed Emergency Core Cooling System Facility or Containment
and changed to one filling line system. In relation to this, Heat Removal System (internal regulations)” was
since bent pipes with a hardened layer are partially used established in February 2008, the performance evaluation
in the piping such as the filling line, the bent pipes are method of the containment recirculation sump screens
replaced with the ones that do not cause formation of a (hereinafter, “screens”) has been clarified. In response to
hardened layer as preventive maintenance. Also, the this, the existing screens are removed and new screens
major dimensions of the main piping and main valve will that aim to improve performance (expand the area) to
be altered. meet the internal regulations are installed.

259
(2) Decision criteria (2) Decision criteria
Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 6 (preventing Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 8-2 (safety
damage by fluid vibrations), Article 8-2 (safety equipment), Article 9 (materials and structures) and
equipment), Article 9 (materials and structures), and Article 17 (emergency core cooling system facility) of the
Article 16-2 (reactor coolant pressure boundaries) of the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for
Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance
Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965)
No. 62, 1965)

4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards met the technological standards
5. Related permission - 5. Related permission -
items items

6. Other remarks None 6. Other remarks None



(9) Tsuruga Power Station Unit 2 (10) Tsuruga Power Station Unit 2
1. Application date Dec. 25, 2009 1. Application date Feb. 1, 2010
2. Approval date Feb. 23, 2010 2. Approval date Feb. 23, 2010
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment (1) Approval subject Attached equipment
Instrumentation and control system facility Emergency power generation equipment
(2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details (2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
Since approx. 20 years has passed since installation of the Because of increased power capacity that is required for
control rod driver motors, they are replaced with new the replacement work of the reactor protection control
ones In order to maintain functionality of the equipment. panels, etc. due to replacement with digital safety
In line with this, the capacity of the motors will be protection systems, the inverters and batteries are
altered. replaced with the equipment with more capacity.

(2) Decision criteria (2) Decision criteria

260
Article 5 (earthquake resistance) and Article 24 (control Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 8-2 (safety
rod drive mechanism) of the Ordinance Establishing equipment), and Article 33 (protection power supply
Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation facility) of the Ordinance of Establishing Technical
Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965) Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Equipment
(MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965) and Ordinance of
Establishing Technical Standards for Electric Equipment
(MITI Ordinance No. 52, 1997)

4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards met the technological standards
5. Related permission - 5. Related permission -
items items

6. Other remarks None 6. Other remarks None


(11) Tomari Power Station Unit 1 (12) Tomari Power Station Unit 1
1. Application date Aug. 27, 2009 1. Application date Oct. 20, 2009
2. Approval date Sep. 28, 2009 2. Approval date Nov. 17, 2009
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment (1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment
Reactor cooling system facility Reactor cooling system facility
(2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details (2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
In order to improve the reliability of the equipment, the Since “Performance Evaluation, etc. of the Filters in the
accumulator safety valves in the emergency core cooling Emergency Core Cooling System Facility or Containment
system facility are replaced with valves having high-level Heat Removal System (internal regulations)” was
leak-tightness of the valve seat. In line with this, the established in February 2008, the performance evaluation
major dimensions and materials of the safety valves will method of the containment recirculation sump screens
be altered. (hereinafter, “screens”) has been clarified. In response to
this, the existing screens are removed and new screens
that aim to improve performance (expand the area) to
(2) Decision criteria meet the internal regulations are installed.

261
Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 8-2-2 (safety (2) Decision criteria
equipment), and Article 10-1 (safety valve, etc.) of the Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 8-2 (safety
Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for equipment), Article 9 (materials and structures) and
Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance Article 17 (emergency core cooling system facility) of the
No. 62, 1965) Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for
Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance
No. 62, 1965)

4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards met the technological standards
5. Related permission - 5. Related permission -
items items

6. Other remarks None 6. Other remarks None



(13) Tomari Power Station Unit 2 (14) Tomari Power Station Unit 2
1. Application date Jan. 23, 2009 1. Application date Mar. 12, 2009
2. Approval date Apr. 17, 2009 2. Approval date Apr. 17, 2009
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment (1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment
Reactor cooling system facility Reactor cooling system facility
(2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details (2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
Since bent pipes with a hardened layer are partially used In order to improve the reliability of the equipment, the
in the pressurizer spray pipes and pressurizer relief valve accumulator safety valves in the emergency core cooling
pipes, the bent pipes are replaced with the ones that do system facility are replaced with valves having high-level
not cause formation of a hardened layer as preventive leak-tightness of the valve seat. In line with this, the
maintenance. Also, the major dimensions of the main major dimensions and materials of the safety valves will
piping and main valve will be altered. be altered.

(2) Decision criteria (2) Decision criteria

262
Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 6 (preventing Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 8-2-2 (safety
damage by fluid vibrations), Article 8-2 (safety equipment), and Article 10-1 (safety valve, etc.) of the
equipment), Article 9 (materials and structures), Article Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for
16 (circulation equipment, etc.), and Article 16-2 (reactor Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance
coolant pressure boundaries) of the Ordinance of No. 62, 1965)
Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power
Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965)

4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards met the technological standards
5. Related permission - 5. Related permission -
items items

6. Other remarks None 6. Other remarks None


(15) Tomari Power Station Unit 2 (16) Tomari Power Station Unit 2
1. Application date Feb. 2, 2009 1. Application date Jan. 27, 2010
2. Approval date Apr. 21, 2009 2. Approval date Feb. 24, 2010
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment (1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment
Exhaust pipe Reactor cooling system facility
(2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details (2) Details of (1) Application grounds and details
In order to improve reliability for fatigue cracks, the approval Since “Performance Evaluation, etc. of the Filters in the
emergency exhaust pipes are replaced with the ones that Emergency Core Cooling System Facility or
have improved stiffness. In line with this, the major Containment Heat Removal System (internal
dimensions will be altered. regulations)” was established in February 2008, the
performance evaluation method of the containment
recirculation sump screens (hereinafter, “screens”) has
been clarified. In response to this, the existing screens are
removed and new screens that aim to improve
performance (expand the area) to meet the internal
regulations are installed.

263
(2) Decision criteria
Article 30 (waste processing facility, etc.) of the (2) Decision criteria
Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for
Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 8-2 (safety
Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance
equipment), Article 9 (materials and structures) and
No. 62, 1965)
Article 17 (emergency core cooling system facility) of
the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for
Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance
No. 62, 1965)

4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards met the technological standards
5. Related permission - 5. Related permission -
items items

6. Other remarks None 6. Other remarks None



(17) Higashidori Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 (18) Higashidori Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
1. Application date Jun. 18, 2009 1. Application date Aug. 10, 2009
2. Approval date Aug. 25, 2009 2. Approval date Sep. 15, 2009
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment (1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment
Fuel facility Exhaust pipe
(2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details (2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
The spent fuel pool was designed to store approx. 430% In order to further improve seismic safety margin of the
of total reactor fuel (new fuel and spent fuel) (3300 exhaust pipes, they are altered into the self-contained
assemblies) and had the spent fuel storage racks for structure integrated with the steel tower.
approx. 270% of the spent fuel (2079 assemblies)
installed at start of the operation. This time, the spent fuel
storage racks for the remaining approx. 160% (1221
assemblies) are installed.

(2) Decision criteria (2) Decision criteria

264
Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 9 (materials and Article 5 (earthquake resistance) of the Ordinance of
structures) and Article 25 (fuel pool) of the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power
Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965)
Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965)

4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards met the technological standards
5. Related permission Date of issue of the reactor 5. Related permission -
items installation permission items
Aug. 31, 1998
8 ShiCho No. 9793
6. Other remarks None 6. Other remarks None
(19) Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 (20) Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 4
1. Application date Nov. 9, 2009 1. Application date Jul. 13, 2009
2. Approval date Dec. 17, 2009 2. Approval date Jul. 23, 2009
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment (1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment
Reactor containment facility Reactor cooling system facility
(2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details (2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
Since approx. 38 years has passed since installation of the To install the bent pipe, which is used to continuously
reactor containment electric wiring penetrations, it is exhaust mixed gas (hydrogen, oxygen), in the reactor
planned to replace them as preventive maintenance. residual heat removal system, additional T-pipes are
However, production of the existing canister-type electric installed in the system. Accordingly, part of the piping is
wiring penetrations has been discontinued, so they will be replaced.
replaced with the module-type electric wiring
penetrations, which have superior preservability. In line
with this, the major dimensions and materials, etc. of the
piping will be altered.

265
(2) Decision criteria (2) Decision criteria
Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 8-2 (safety Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 6 (preventing
equipment), Article 9 (materials and structures) and damage by fluid vibrations), Article 8-2 (safety
Article 32 (reactor containment facility) of the Ordinance equipment), Article 9 (materials and structures), and
of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Article 16-2 (reactor coolant pressure boundaries) of the
Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965) Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for
Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance
No. 62, 1965)

4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards met the technological standards
5. Related permission - 5. Related permission -
items items

6. Other remarks None 6. Other remarks None



(21) Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 5 (22) Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
1. Application date Jun. 26, 2009 1. Application date Mar. 4, 2010
2. Approval date Jul. 13, 2009 2. Approval date Mar. 26, 2010
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment (1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment
Reactor cooling system facility Reactors
(2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details (2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
To install the bent pipe, which is used to continuously In addition to the 9 × 9 (A-type) and 9 × 9 (B-type) fuel
exhaust mixed gas (hydrogen, oxygen), in the reactor assemblies, the 9 × 9 (A-type) and 9 × 9 (B-type) fuel
residual heat removal system, additional T-pipes are assemblies with different gadolinia concentration are
installed in the system. Accordingly, part of the piping is employed. In line with this, the maximum temperature of
replaced. the fuel will be altered.

(2) Decision criteria (2) Decision criteria

266
Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 6 (preventing Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 6 (prevention of
damage by fluid vibrations), Article 8-2 (safety damage from fluid vibrations), Article 8 (reactor facility),
equipment), Article 9 (materials and structures), and Article 13 (reactor core, etc.), Article 23 (reaction rate
Article 16-2 (reactor coolant pressure boundaries) of the control system and reactor shutdown system) and Article
Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for 24 (control rod drive mechanism) of the Ordinance of
Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power
No. 62, 1965) Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62 of 1965)

4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have


4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards
met the technological standards
5. Related permission Date of issue of the reactor
5. Related permission -
items installation change permission
items
Jul. 1, 1998
Heisei 09.02.28 Shi No. 90
6. Other remarks None 6. Other remarks None
(23) Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 (24) Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station Unit 2
1. Application date Dec. 25, 2009 1. Application date Feb. 1, 2010
2. Approval date Jan. 27, 2010 2. Approval date Feb. 19, 2010
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment (1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment
Reactors Reactor cooling system facility
(2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details (2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
In addition to the 9 × 9 (A-type) and 9 × 9 (B-type) fuel To install the bent pipe, which is used to continuously
assemblies, the 9 × 9 (A-type) fuel assemblies with exhaust mixed gas (hydrogen, oxygen), in the reactor
different gadolinia concentration are employed. In line isolation cooling system, additional T-pipes are installed
with this, the maximum temperature of the fuel will be in the system. Accordingly, part of the piping is replaced.
altered.

(2) Decision criteria (2) Decision criteria

267
Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 6 (prevention of Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 6 (preventing
damage from fluid vibrations), Article 8 (reactor facility), damage by fluid vibrations), Article 8-2 (safety
Article 13 (reactor core, etc.), Article 23 (reaction rate equipment), Article 9 (materials and structures), Article
control system and reactor shutdown system) and Article 16 (circulation equipment, etc.), and Article 16-2 (reactor
24 (control rod drive mechanism) of the Ordinance of coolant pressure boundaries) of the Ordinance of
Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power
Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62 of 1965) Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965)

4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards met the technological standards
5. Related permission Date of issue of the reactor 5. Related permission -
items installation change permission items
Jul. 1, 1998
Heisei 09.02.28 Shi No. 90
6. Other remarks None 6. Other remarks None



(25) Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station Unit 4 (26) Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
1. Application date Apr. 28, 2009 1. Application date Dec. 4, 2009
2. Approval date Jun. 17, 2009 2. Approval date Dec. 15, 2009
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment (1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment
Reactor cooling system facility Reactor cooling system facility
(2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details (2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
To install the bent pipe, which is used to continuously Since corrosion and leakage were found on some of the
exhaust mixed gas (hydrogen, oxygen), in the reactor main pipes in the residual heat removal sea water system
isolation cooling system, part of the pipes in this system during the periodical inspection, the pipes are replaced
are replaced. In line with this, the major dimensions of the with the new pipes, which have the lining for corrosion
piping will be altered. prevention. In line with this, the pipe material is changed.

(2) Decision criteria (2) Decision criteria

268
Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 6 (preventing Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 6 (preventing
damage by fluid vibrations), Article 8-2 (safety damage by fluid vibrations), Article 9 (materials and
equipment), Article 9 (materials and structures), and structures) and Article 16 (circulation systems, etc.) of the
Article 16-2 (reactor coolant pressure boundaries) of the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for
Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance
Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965)
No. 62, 1965)

4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards met the technological standards
5. Related permission - 5. Related permission
items items

6. Other remarks None 6. Other remarks None


(27) Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 (28) Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 2
1. Application date Nov. 4, 2009 1. Application date Oct. 19, 2009
2. Approval date Jan. 12, 2010 2. Approval date Nov. 6, 2009
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment (1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment
Disposal facility Instrumentation and control system facility
(2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details (2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
As a pre-process before filtering of washing waste liquid, Since the hydrogen gas concentration detector in the
the test operation was conducted by using the method that reactor containment need to be replaced soon due to age
decomposes organic elements by ozone. However, deterioration, it is replaced with the new detector. In line
corrosion was found mainly in the systems through which with this, the measurement range will be altered.
washing waste liquid containing ozone flows, the method
is changed to the conventionally proven activated carbon
absorption method. Accordingly, the activated carbon
absorption tower and the prefilter are installed.
* This is an application for the construction plan revision (2) Decision criteria

269
approval. Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 8-2 (safety
(2) Decision criteria equipment), Article 20 (instrumentation equipment) and
Article 21 (alarm devices, etc.) of the Ordinance of
Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 9 (materials and Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power
structures) and Article 30 (waste processing facility, etc.) Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965)
of the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for
Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance
No. 62, 1965)
4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards met the technological standards
5. Related permission - 5. Related permission -
items items

6. Other remarks Approval for specially * The design and 6. Other remarks None
designed facility construction standards
(JSME 2005) is used,
Jan. 12, 2010 not according to
Heisei 21.11.04 Gen No. 44 Notification No. 501



(29) Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 (30) Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 3
1. Application date Dec. 28, 2009 1. Application date Oct. 19, 2009
2. Approval date Jan. 18, 2010 2. Approval date Nov. 6, 2009
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Approval subject Attached equipment (1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment
Emergency power generation equipment Instrumentation and control system facility
(2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details (2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
Since approx. 20 years has passed since production of the Since the hydrogen gas concentration detector in the
uninterrupted power source (plant vital AC power supply) reactor containment need to be replaced soon due to age
and the production of the major parts (thyristor elements) deterioration, it is replaced with the new detector. In line
has been discontinued, the power source is changed from with this, the measurement range will be altered.
the type using thyristor elements to that using IGBT
elements in order to improve preservability. In line with
this, the major dimensions will be altered.

(2) Decision criteria (2) Decision criteria

270
Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 8-2 (safety Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 8-2 (safety
equipment), and Article 33 (protection power supply equipment), Article 20 (instrumentation equipment) and
facility) of the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Article 21 (alarm devices, etc.) of the Ordinance of
Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Equipment Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power
(MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965) and Ordinance of Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965)
Establishing Technical Standards for Electric Equipment
(MITI Ordinance No. 52, 1997)

4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards met the technological standards
5. Related permission - 5. Related permission -
items items

6. Other remarks None 6. Other remarks None


(31) Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 5 (32) Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit 5
1. Application date Mar. 16, 2009 1. Application date May 22, 2009
2. Approval date Apr. 21, 2009 2. Approval date Jan. 27, 2010
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Approval subject Attached equipment (1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment
Emergency power generation equipment Fuel facility
(2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details (2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
The uninterrupted power source (plant vital AC power The spent fuel transportation containers are installed to
supply) is changed from the type using thyristor elements transport the spent fuel at Unit 1 to the spent fuel pool at
to those using IGBT elements in order to improve Unit 5.
preservability. In line with this, the major dimensions will
be altered.

(2) Decision criteria (2) Decision criteria


Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 8-2 (safety Article 9 (materials and structures)*, Article 11 (pressure
equipment) and Article 33 (protection power supply test, etc.)* and Article 26 (fuel handling facility) of the

271
facility) of the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for
Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Equipment Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance
(MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965) No. 62, 1965)
Article 4 (prevention of electric shock and fire from * Item for approval for specially designed facility
electrical equipment), Article 5 (insulation of electrical
circuits), and Article 6 (prevention of broken wires) and
other articles of the Ordinance of Establishing Technical
4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
Standards for Electric Equipment (MITI Ordinance No.
met the technological standards
52, 1997)
5. Related permission Date of issue of the reactor
4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have items installation change permission
met the technological standards
Dec. 15, 2005
5. Related permission Heisei 17.06.03 Gen No. 29
items * According to the rules for
6. Other remarks Approval for specially
designed facility transport away from
places of business and the
6. Other remarks None Jan. 27, 2010 notification of the Science
Heisei 21.05.22 Gen No. 16 and Technology Agency



(33) Shika Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 (34) Shika Nuclear Power Station Unit 2
1. Application date Jan. 20, 2009 1. Application date Jan. 20, 2009
2. Approval date Apr. 1, 2009 2. Approval date Apr. 1, 2009
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment (1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment
Reactor cooling system facility Instrumentation and control system facility
(2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details (2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
To allow the reserved reactor coolant recirculation pumps, To allow the reserved control rod drive mechanisms, the
the number of the pumps is altered. number of the mechanisms is altered.

(2) Decision criteria


(2) Decision criteria

272
Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 8-2 (safety
Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 8-2 (safety
equipment), Article 9 (materials and structures), and
equipment), Article 9 (materials and structures), and
Article 16-2 (reactor coolant pressure boundary) of the
Article 16-2 (reactor coolant pressure boundary) of the
Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for
Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for
Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance
Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance
No. 62, 1965)
No. 62, 1965)

4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards met the technological standards
5. Related permission - 5. Related permission -
items items

6. Other remarks None 6. Other remarks None


(35) Shika Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 (36) Mihama Power Station Unit 1
1. Application date May 8, 2009 1. Application date Feb. 8, 2010
2. Approval date Jul. 1, 2009 2. Approval date Mar. 1, 2010
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment (1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment
Reactors Reactor cooling system facility
(2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details (2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
The fuel currently used as the initial load fuel, which has In order to reduce the maintenance loads and the exposure
average fuel assembly concentrations of approx. 1.5 wt% during maintenance, part of the filing lines are removed
and approx. 4.1 wt%, will be replaced with the fuel which and changed to one filling line system.
has an average fuel assembly concentration of approx. 3.8
wt% in the second periodical inspection onwards.

(2) Decision criteria (2) Decision criteria

273
Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 6 (damage Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 9 (materials and
prevention by fluid vibrations, etc.), Article 8-1 (nuclear structures) and Article 16-2 (reactor coolant pressure
facility) and Article 13 (core, etc.) of the Ordinance of boundaries) of the Ordinance of Establishing Technical
Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Equipment
Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965) (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965)

4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards met the technological standards
5. Related permission Approval for installation changes 5. Related permission -
items Apr. 14, 1999 items
Heisei 09.05.20 Shi No. 1
6. Other remarks None 6. Other remarks None



(37) Mihama Power Station Unit 2 (38) Mihama Power Station Unit 3
1. Application date Feb. 8, 2010 1. Application date Oct. 16, 2009
2. Approval date Mar. 1, 2010 2. Approval date Oct. 28, 2009
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment (1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment
Reactor cooling system facility Reactor cooling system facility
(2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details (2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
In order to reduce the maintenance loads and the exposure Since “Performance Evaluation, etc. of the Filters in the
during maintenance, part of the filing lines are removed Emergency Core Cooling System Facility or Containment
and changed to one filling line system. Heat Removal System (internal regulations)” was
established in February 2008, the performance evaluation
method of the containment recirculation sump screens
(hereinafter, “screens”) has been clarified. In response to
this, the existing screens are removed and new screens
that aim to improve performance (expand the area) to
(2) Decision criteria meet the internal regulations are installed.

274
Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 9 (materials and (2) Decision criteria
structures) and Article 16-2 (reactor coolant pressure Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 8-2 (safety
boundaries) of the Ordinance of Establishing Technical equipment), Article 9 (materials and structures) and
Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Equipment Article 17 (emergency core cooling system facility) of the
(MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965) Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for
Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance
No. 62, 1965)

4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards met the technological standards
5. Related permission - 5. Related permission -
items items

6. Other remarks None 6. Other remarks None


(39) Takahama Power Station Unit 3 (40) Takahama Power Station Unit 3
1. Application date Mar. 11, 2009 1. Application date Sep. 3, 2009
2. Approval date May 25, 2009 2. Approval date Oct. 8, 2009
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment (1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment
Reactor cooling system facility Instrumentation and control system facility
(2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details (2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
In order to reduce the maintenance loads and the exposure The digital control device is employed as the logic circuit
during maintenance, part of the filing lines are removed in the protective system for preservability to maintain the
and changed to one filling line system. function of the equipment. Also, in order to keep
consistent with the concept of instrument error in the
latest plants, the setting values, etc. of the reactor
emergency stop signals and the engineering safety feature
start-up signals are altered.

(2) Decision criteria (2) Decision criteria

275
Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 9 (materials and Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 8-2 (safety
structures) and Article 16-2 (reactor coolant pressure equipment) and Article 22 (safety protection equipment)
boundaries) of the Ordinance of Establishing Technical of the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for
Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Equipment Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance
(MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965) No. 62, 1965)

4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards met the technological standards
5. Related permission - 5. Related permission -
items items

6. Other remarks None 6. Other remarks None



(41) Takahama Power Station Unit 4 (42) Takahama Power Station Unit 4
1. Application date Sep. 3, 2009 1. Application date Dec. 8, 2009
2. Approval date Oct. 8, 2009 2. Approval date Dec. 25, 2009
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment (1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment
Instrumentation and control system facility Reactor cooling system facility
(2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details (2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
The digital control device is employed as the logic circuit Since “Performance Evaluation, etc. of the Filters in the
in the protective system for preservability to maintain the Emergency Core Cooling System Facility or Containment
function of the equipment. Also, in order to keep Heat Removal System (internal regulations)” was
consistent with the concept of instrument error in the established in February 2008, the performance evaluation
latest plants, the setting values, etc. of the reactor method of the containment recirculation sump screens
emergency stop signals and the engineering safety feature (hereinafter, “screens”) has been clarified. In response to
start-up signals are altered. this, the existing screens are removed and new screens
that aim to improve performance (expand the area) to
(2) Decision criteria meet the internal regulations are installed.

276
Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 8-2 (safety (2) Decision criteria
equipment) and Article 22 (safety protection equipment) Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 8-2 (safety
of the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for equipment), Article 9 (materials and structures) and
Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance Article 17 (emergency core cooling system facility) of the
No. 62, 1965) Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for
Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance
No. 62, 1965)

4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards met the technological standards
5. Related permission - 5. Related permission -
items items

6. Other remarks None 6. Other remarks None


(43) Ohi Power Station Unit 1 (44) Ohi Power Station Unit 1
1. Application date Mar. 4, 2009 1. Application date Apr. 3, 2009
2. Approval date May 27, 2009 2. Approval date May 27, 2009
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment (1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment
Instrumentation and control system facility Reactor cooling system facility
(2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details (2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
In relation to replacement of the reactor protection system In order to improve preservability, the main valve of the
instrument rack, the digital safety protection systems are residual heat removal system is replaced with a Japanese
applied. In line with this, the setting values, etc. of the valve. In addition, in order to improve reliability against
reactor emergency stop signals and the engineering safety the high frequency metal fatigue, the routes and materials,
feature start-up signals are altered. etc. of the main piping in the primary coolant circulation
system, residual heat removal system, and emergency
core cooling system facility are altered.

(2) Decision criteria (2) Decision criteria

277
Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 8-2 (safety Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 6 (preventing
equipment), Article 20 (instrumentation equipment) and damage by fluid vibrations), Article 9 (materials and
Article 22 (safety protection equipment) of the Ordinance structures) and Article 16-2 (reactor coolant pressure
of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power boundaries) of the Ordinance of Establishing Technical
Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965) Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Equipment
(MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965)

4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards met the technological standards
5. Related permission - 5. Related permission -
items items

6. Other remarks None 6. Other remarks None



(45) Ohi Power Station Unit 1 (46) Ohi Power Station Unit 2
1. Application date May 21, 2009 1. Application date Oct. 30, 2009
2. Approval date Jul. 1, 2009 2. Approval date Dec. 18, 2009
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment (1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment
Reactor cooling system facility Reactor cooling system facility
(2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details (2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
The material for the pressurizer surge pipes and safe end In order to improve the reliability of the equipment
welded portions is changed from the nickel-based alloy against the bent section thinning of the piping at the
(600 series) to the nickel-based alloy (690 series), which downstream from the main feed water isolation valve,
has superior stress corrosion crack resistance as which were found in the 21st periodical inspection, part
preventive maintenance. In line with this, the materials of of the piping is replaced with the pipes made of
the pressurizer surge pipes will be altered. corrosion-resistant low-alloy steel.

(2) Decision criteria (2) Decision criteria

278
Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 6 (preventing Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 8-2 (safety
damage by fluid vibrations), Article 8-2 (safety equipment), and Article 9 (materials and structures) of the
equipment), Article 9 (materials and structures), Article Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for
16 (circulation equipment, etc.), and Article 16-2 (reactor Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance
coolant pressure boundaries) of the Ordinance of No. 62, 1965)
Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power
Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965)

4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards met the technological standards
5. Related permission - 5. Related permission -
items items

6. Other remarks None 6. Other remarks None


(47) Ohi Power Station Unit 3 (48) Ohi Power Station Unit 4
1. Application date Jul. 30, 2009 1. Application date Nov. 20, 2009
2. Approval date Aug. 17, 2009 2. Approval date Dec. 25, 2009
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment (1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment
Reactor cooling system facility Reactor cooling system facility
(2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details (2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
In order to reduce the maintenance loads and the exposure In order to reduce the maintenance loads and the exposure
during maintenance, part of the filing lines are removed during maintenance, part of the filing lines are removed
and changed to one filling line system. In relation to this, and changed to one filling line system. In relation to this,
since bent pipes with a hardened layer are partially used since bent pipes with a hardened layer are partially used
in the piping such as the filling line, the bent pipes are in the piping such as the filling line, the bent pipes are
replaced with the ones that do not cause formation of a replaced with the ones that do not cause formation of a
hardened layer as preventive maintenance. And the hardened layer as preventive maintenance. Also, the
welding between the T-pipe and the valve is changed major dimensions of the main piping and main valve will
from socket welding to butt welding in order to ease be altered.
stress. Also, the major dimensions of the main piping and

279
main valve will be altered.
(2) Decision criteria
(2) Decision criteria
Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 6 (preventing
Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 6 (preventing damage by fluid vibrations), Article 8-2 (safety
damage by fluid vibrations), Article 8-2 (safety equipment), Article 9 (materials and structures), and
equipment), Article 9 (materials and structures), and Article 16-2 (reactor coolant pressure boundaries) of the
Article 16-2 (reactor coolant pressure boundaries) of the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for
Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance
Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965)
No. 62, 1965)
4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards met the technological standards
5. Related permission - 5. Related permission -
items items

6. Other remarks None 6. Other remarks None



(49) Ohi Power Station Unit 4 (50) Shimane Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
1. Application date Dec. 8, 2009 1. Application date Aug. 19, 2009
2. Approval date Dec. 25, 2009 2. Approval date Sep. 15, 2009
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment (1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment
Reactor cooling system facility Reactor cooling system facility
(2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details (2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
Since “Performance Evaluation, etc. of the Filters in the To improve the stress corrosion crack resistance, the
Emergency Core Cooling System Facility or Containment material of the regenerative heat exchanger in the reactor
Heat Removal System (internal regulations)” was coolant purification system is changed from the stainless
established in February 2008, the performance evaluation steel to the carbon steel. Accordingly, part of the non-
method of the containment recirculation sump screens regenerative heat exchanger and pipes are replaced in
(hereinafter, “screens”) has been clarified. In response to order to improve work efficiency.
this, the existing screens are removed and new screens
that aim to improve performance (expand the area) to
meet the internal regulations are installed.

280
(2) Decision criteria (2) Decision criteria
Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 8-2 (safety Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 6 (damage
equipment), Article 9 (materials and structures) and prevention by fluid vibrations, etc.), and Article 9
Article 17 (emergency core cooling system facility) of the (materials and structures) of the Ordinance of
Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power
Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965)
No. 62, 1965)

4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards met the technological standards
5. Related permission - 5. Related permission -
items items

6. Other remarks None 6. Other remarks None


(51) Shimane Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 (52) Shimane Nuclear Power Station Unit 3
1. Application date Feb. 1, 2010 1. Application date Jul. 24, 2009
2. Approval date Feb. 24, 2010 2. Approval date Oct. 14, 2009
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment (1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment
Reactor cooling system facility Disposal facility
(2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details (2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
In order to prevent stress corrosion cracking of the reactor As a pre-process before filtering of washing waste liquid,
recirculation system piping, an improved welding method it was planned to use the method that decomposes organic
is employed and the pipes are replaced with those having elements by ozone. However, corrosion was found in the
reduced weld line. similar equipment in the other plants and thus, the method
is changed to the conventionally proven activated carbon
absorption method. Accordingly, the activated carbon
absorption tower and the prefilter are installed.
* This is an application for the construction plan revision
(2) Decision criteria approval.

281
Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 6 (preventing (2) Decision criteria
damage by fluid vibrations), Article 8-2 (safety
equipment), Article 9 (materials and structures), and Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 9 (materials and
Article 16-2 (reactor coolant pressure boundaries) of the structures)*, Article 21 (alarm devices, etc.) and Article
Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for 30 (waste processing facility, etc.) and other articles of the
Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for
No. 62, 1965) Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance
No. 62, 1965)
*Item for approval for specially designed facility

4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards met the technological standards

5. Related permission - 5. Related permission Approval for installation changes


items items Apr. 26, 2005
Heisei 15.12.18 Gen No. 3
6. Other remarks Approval for specially designed * The design and
6. Other remarks None facility construction standards
(JSME 2001) is used,
Oct. 14, 2009 not according to
Heisei 21.07.24 Gen No. 2 Notification No. 501



(53) Shimane Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 (54) Ikata Power Station Unit 1
1. Application date Oct. 15, 2009 1. Application date Jan. 26, 2010
2. Approval date Nov. 9, 2009 2. Approval date Feb. 8, 2010
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment (1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment
Disposal facility Reactor cooling system facility
(2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details (2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
As one of the measures for the declined performance Since “Performance Evaluation, etc. of the Filters in the
event of the exhaust gas recombinator in the gaseous Emergency Core Cooling System Facility or Containment
waste treatment system, which was caused by the catalyst Heat Removal System (internal regulations)” was
poison flowing into the similar equipment in the other established in February 2008, the performance evaluation
plants, the number of the recombinators is increased to method of the containment recirculation sump screens
improve the margin of the catalyst capacity. (hereinafter, “screens”) has been clarified. In response to
* This is an application for the construction plan revision this, the existing screens are removed and new screens
approval. that aim to improve performance (expand the area) to
meet the internal regulations are installed.
(2) Decision criteria

282
(2) Decision criteria
Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 9 (materials and
structures)* and Article 30 (waste processing facility, etc.) Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 8-2 (safety
of the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for equipment), Article 9 (materials and structures) and
Nuclear Power Generation Equipment Article 17 (emergency core cooling system facility) of the
Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for
(MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965) Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance
* Item for approval for specially designed facility No. 62, 1965)
4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards met the technological standards
5. Related permission Approval for installation changes 5. Related permission
items Apr. 26, 2005 items
Heisei 15.12.18 Gen No. 3
6. Other remarks Approval for specially designed * The design and 6. Other remarks None
facility construction standards
(JSME 2001) is used,
Oct. 5, 2006 not according to
Heisei 18.02.28 Gen No. 1 Notification No. 501
(55) Ikata Power Station Unit 2 (56) Ikata Power Station Unit 3
1. Application date Feb. 5, 2010 1. Application date May 12, 2009
2. Approval date Mar. 31, 2010 2. Approval date Jul. 15, 2009
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment (1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment
Reactor containment facility Reactor, and instrumentation and control system facility
(2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details (2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
To improve reliability against pipe thinning, the steam In relation to loading of 40 fuel assemblies at the
generator blowdown line is changed to a stainless steel maximum as the replacement uranium and plutonium
pipe. In line with this, the major dimensions and materials mixed oxide fuel, the descriptions in the construction plan
of this line on the piping penetration of the reactor relating to the reactor type, fuel type, fuel concentration
containment vessel will be altered. or enrichment, maximum fuel assembly burnup,
maximum loaded fuel, fuel maximum temperature,
reactivity control with boron, and storage volume of boric
acid, etc. are altered.
(2) Decision criteria (2) Decision criteria

283
Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 8-2 (safety Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 6 (prevention of
equipment), Article 9 (materials and structures) and damage from fluid vibrations), Article 8-1 (reactor
Article 32 (reactor containment facility) of the Ordinance facility), Article 13 (reactor core, etc.), Article 22 (safety
of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power protection equipment), Article 23 (reaction rate control
Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965) system and reactor shutdown system) and other articles of
the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for
Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance
No. 62 of 1965)
4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards met the technological standards
5. Related permission - 5. Related permission Approval for installation changes
items items Mar. 28, 2006
Heisei 16-11-01 Gen No. 10
6. Other remarks None 6. Other remarks None



(57) Ikata Power Station Unit 3 (58) Genkai Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
1. Application date Sep. 2, 2009 1. Application date Jan. 8, 2009
2. Approval date Oct. 15, 2009 2. Approval date Apr. 3, 2009
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment (1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment
Reactor cooling system facility Reactor cooling system facility
(2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details (2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
Since “Performance Evaluation, etc. of the Filters in the The welded portions of the piping and valves in the
Emergency Core Cooling System Facility or Containment pressurizer auxiliary spray lines are changed from the
Heat Removal System (internal regulations)” was socket welding joints to the butt welding joints in order to
established in February 2008, the performance evaluation control stress concentration and improve reliability. In
method of the containment recirculation sump screens line with this, the major dimensions and materials of the
(hereinafter, “screens”) has been clarified. In response to piping will be altered.
this, the existing screens are removed and new screens
that aim to improve performance (expand the area) to
meet the internal regulations are installed. (2) Decision criteria

284
(2) Decision criteria Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 6 (preventing
Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 8-2 (safety damage by fluid vibrations), Article 8-2 (safety
equipment), Article 9 (materials and structures) and equipment), Article 9 (materials and structures), and
Article 17 (emergency core cooling system facility) of the Article 16-2 (reactor coolant pressure boundaries) of the
Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for
Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance
No. 62, 1965) No. 62, 1965)

4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards met the technological standards
5. Related permission - 5. Related permission -
items items

6. Other remarks None 6. Other remarks None


(59) Genkai Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 (60) Genkai Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
1. Application date Jan. 23, 2009 1. Application date Feb. 20, 2009
2. Approval date Apr. 3, 2009 2. Approval date Apr. 3, 2009
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment (1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment
Reactor cooling system facility Disposal facility
(2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details (2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
Since the cold bent pipes, which are considered to have It is hard to procure the parts of the gas compression
relatively larger residual stress, are partially used in the equipment in Unit 1 because it is an import product.
pressurizer relief lines, the bent pipes are replaced with Therefore, the gas compression equipment in Unit 2,
the hot bent pipes as preventive maintenance. In line with which was already updated to a Japanese product, is
this, the major dimensions and materials of the piping and shared with Unit 1 and the gas compression equipment in
valves will be altered. Unit 1 is removed. In addition, in order to optimize
operation of the gaseous waste treatment system, the gas
decay tanks in Units 1 and 2 are used as shared facilities.
(2) Decision criteria

285
Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 6 (preventing (2) Decision criteria
damage by fluid vibrations), Article 8-2 (safety
equipment), Article 9 (materials and structures), and Article 8 (nuclear facility) and Article 30 (waste
Article 16-2 (reactor coolant pressure boundaries) of the processing facility, etc.) of the Ordinance of Establishing
Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation
Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965)
No. 62, 1965)

4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards met the technological standards
5. Related permission - 5. Related permission Approval for installation changes
items items Jun. 4, 2003
Heisei 14.10.30 Gen No. 2
6. Other remarks None 6. Other remarks None



(61) Genkai Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 (62) Genkai Nuclear Power Station Unit 2
1. Application date Jan. 8, 2009 1. Application date May 28, 2009
2. Approval date Apr. 6, 2009 2. Approval date Jul. 24, 2009
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment (1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment
Reactor cooling system facility Reactor cooling system facility
(2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details (2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
In order to reduce the maintenance loads and the exposure Since the cold bent pipes, which are considered to have
during maintenance, part of the filing lines are removed relatively larger residual stress, are partially used in the
and changed to one filling line system. pressurizer relief lines, the bent pipes are replaced with
the hot bent pipes as preventive maintenance. In addition,
SUS304 pipe material will be changed to SUS316 with
superior stress corrosion crack resistance. In line with
this, the major dimensions and materials, etc. of the
piping and valves will be altered.
(2) Decision criteria (2) Decision criteria

286
Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 9 (materials and Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 6 (preventing
structures) and Article 16-2 (reactor coolant pressure damage by fluid vibrations), Article 8-2 (safety
boundaries) of the Ordinance of Establishing Technical equipment), Article 9 (materials and structures), and
Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Equipment Article 16-2 (reactor coolant pressure boundaries) of the
(MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965) Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for
Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance
No. 62, 1965)

4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards met the technological standards
5. Related permission - 5. Related permission -
items items

6. Other remarks None 6. Other remarks None


(63) Genkai Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 (64) Genkai Nuclear Power Station Unit 2
1. Application date Jun. 24, 2009 1. Application date Jun. 24, 2009
2. Approval date Aug. 24, 2009 2. Approval date Aug. 24, 2009
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment (1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment
Reactor cooling system facility Reactor cooling system facility
(2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details (2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
In order to reduce the maintenance loads and the exposure Since the cold bent pipes, which are considered to have
during maintenance, part of the filing lines are removed relatively larger residual stress, are partially used in the
and changed to one filling line system. In addition, the pressurizer spray lines, the bent pipes are replaced with
pipe material in the remaining filling lines and the the hot bent pipes as preventive maintenance. In addition,
pressurizer auxiliary spray lines will be changed from SUS304 pipe material will be changed to SUS316 with
SUS304 to SUS316 with superior stress corrosion crack superior stress corrosion crack resistance. In line with
resistance. In line with this, the major dimensions and this, the major dimensions and materials, etc. of the
materials, etc. of the piping and valves will be altered. piping and valves will be altered.
(2) Decision criteria (2) Decision criteria

287
Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 6 (preventing Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 6 (preventing
damage by fluid vibrations), Article 8-2 (safety damage by fluid vibrations), Article 8-2 (safety
equipment), Article 9 (materials and structures), and equipment), Article 9 (materials and structures), and
Article 16-2 (reactor coolant pressure boundaries) of the Article 16-2 (reactor coolant pressure boundaries) of the
Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for
Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance
No. 62, 1965) No. 62, 1965)

4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards met the technological standards
5. Related permission - 5. Related permission -
items items

6. Other remarks None 6. Other remarks None



(65) Genkai Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 (66) Sendai Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
1. Application date Apr. 21, 2009 1. Application date Aug. 28, 2009
2. Approval date Jul. 15, 2009 2. Approval date Oct. 6, 2009
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment (1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment
Reactor, and instrumentation and control system facility Reactor cooling system facility
(2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details (2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
In relation to loading of 48 fuel assemblies at the The welded portions of the piping and valves in the
maximum as the replacement uranium and plutonium pressurizer auxiliary spray lines are changed from the
mixed oxide fuel, the descriptions in the construction plan socket welding joints to the butt welding joints in order to
relating to the reactor type, fuel type, fuel concentration give them a welding joint structure with which stress
or enrichment, maximum fuel assembly burnup, concentration is less likely to occur. In line with this, the
maximum loaded fuel, fuel maximum temperature, major dimensions of the valves will be altered.
reactivity control with control rod, and reactivity control Also, to improve work efficiency, the connection at the
with boron, etc. are altered. meeting point with the pressurizer spray line is changed
(2) Decision criteria from the pipe connection to the T-joint and reducer

288
connection.
Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 6 (prevention of
damage from fluid vibrations), Article 8-1 (reactor (2) Decision criteria
facility), Article 13 (reactor core, etc.), Article 22 (safety Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 6 (preventing
protection equipment), Article 23 (reaction rate control damage by fluid vibrations), Article 8-2 (safety
system and reactor shutdown system) and other articles of equipment), Article 9 (materials and structures), and
the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Article 16-2 (reactor coolant pressure boundaries) of the
Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for
No. 62 of 1965) Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance
No. 62, 1965)
4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards
5. Related permission Approval for installation changes
items 5. Related permission -
Sep. 7, 2005 items
Heisei 16.05.28 Gen No. 13
6. Other remarks None 6. Other remarks None
(67) Sendai Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 (68) Sendai Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
1. Application date Oct. 16, 2009 1. Application date Oct. 13, 2009
2. Approval date Oct. 28, 2009 2. Approval date Oct. 29, 2009
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment (1) Approval subject Attached equipment
Reactor cooling system facility Emergency power generation equipment
(2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details (2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
Since “Performance Evaluation, etc. of the Filters in the Since approx. 30 years has passed since production of the
Emergency Core Cooling System Facility or Containment emergency uninterrupted power source used with the
Heat Removal System (internal regulations)” was instrumentation and the production of the major parts has
established in February 2008, the performance evaluation been discontinued, it is replaced with new one
method of the containment recirculation sump screens considering reliability and preservability. In line with this,
(hereinafter, “screens”) has been clarified. In response to the capacity and major dimensions will be altered.
this, the existing screens are removed and new screens
that aim to improve performance (expand the area) to
meet the internal regulations are installed. (2) Decision criteria

289
(2) Decision criteria Article 4-2 (preventing damage by fire), Article 5
Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 8-2 (safety (earthquake resistance), Article 8-2 (safety equipment),
equipment), Article 9 (materials and structures) and and Article 33 (protection power supply facility) of the
Article 17 (emergency core cooling system facility) of the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for
Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance
Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965) and Ordinance of Establishing Technical
No. 62, 1965) Standards for Electric Equipment (MITI Ordinance No.
52, 1997)

4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards met the technological standards
5. Related permission - 5. Related permission -
items items

6. Other remarks None 6. Other remarks None



(69) Sendai Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 (70) Sendai Nuclear Power Station Unit 2
1. Application date Oct. 16, 2009 1. Application date Oct. 13, 2009
2. Approval date Oct. 28, 2009 2. Approval date Oct. 29, 2009
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment (1) Approval subject Attached equipment
Reactor cooling system facility Emergency power generation equipment
(2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details (2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
Since “Performance Evaluation, etc. of the Filters in the Since approx. 30 years has passed since production of the
Emergency Core Cooling System Facility or Containment emergency uninterrupted power source used with the
Heat Removal System (internal regulations)” was instrumentation and the production of the major parts has
established in February 2008, the performance evaluation been discontinued, it is replaced with new one
method of the containment recirculation sump screens considering reliability and preservability. In line with this,
(hereinafter, “screens”) has been clarified. In response to the capacity and major dimensions will be altered.
this, the existing screens are removed and new screens
that aim to improve performance (expand the area) to
meet the internal regulations are installed. (2) Decision criteria

290
(2) Decision criteria Article 4-2 (preventing damage by fire), Article 5
Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 8-2 (safety (earthquake resistance), Article 8-2 (safety equipment),
equipment), Article 9 (materials and structures) and and Article 33 (protection power supply facility) of the
Article 17 (emergency core cooling system facility) of the Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for
Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance
Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965) and Ordinance of Establishing Technical
No. 62, 1965) Standards for Electric Equipment (MITI Ordinance No.
52, 1997)

4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards met the technological standards
5. Related permission - 5. Related permission -
items items

6. Other remarks None 6. Other remarks None


(71) Sendai Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 (72) Sendai Nuclear Power Station Unit 2
1. Application date Nov. 30, 2009 1. Application date Jan. 19, 2010
2. Approval date Dec. 18, 2009 2. Approval date Feb. 24, 2010
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment (1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment
Reactor cooling system facility Instrumentation and control system facility
(2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details (2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
The welded portions of the piping and valves in the In relation to update of the nuclear instrumentation
pressurizer auxiliary spray lines are changed from the outside the core, the alarm operation range is altered to
socket welding joints to the butt welding joints in order to match the measurement range and alarm operation range
give them a welding joint structure with which stress for the central area measuring equipment.
concentration is less likely to occur. In line with this, the
major dimensions of the valves will be altered.
In addition, in order to ease stress for improved strength,
The T joint is replaced and additional reducer is installed
at the meeting of the pressurizer spray lines.

291
(2) Decision criteria
(2) Decision criteria
Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 8-2 (safety
Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 6 (preventing equipment), Article 20 (instrumentation equipment) and
damage by fluid vibrations), Article 8-2 (safety Article 21 (alarm devices, etc.) of the Ordinance of
equipment), Article 9 (materials and structures), and Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power
Article 16-2 (reactor coolant pressure boundaries) of the Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965)
Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for
Nuclear Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance
No. 62, 1965)

4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards met the technological standards
5. Related permission - 5. Related permission -
items items

6. Other remarks None 6. Other remarks None



(73) Ohma Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 (74) Ohma Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
1. Application date Feb. 17, 2009 1. Application date Nov. 16, 2009
(amended on Jun. 12, and Jul. 13) 2. Approval date Dec. 25, 2009
2. Approval date Aug. 4, 2009 3. Outline of approval
3. Outline of approval (1) Approval subject Electrical equipment
(1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment Generator, transformer, breaker, and power line
Reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation (2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
and control system equipment, radiation management
equipment, disposal equipment, steam turbine The fifth of a series of applications concerning the
installation of Ohma Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 (total
(2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details 6 times planned) (Generator, transformer, breaker, and
The third of a series of applications concerning the power line in the electrical equipment)
installation of Ohma Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 (total
6 times planned) (Reactor cooling system equipment,
instrumentation and control system equipment, radiation
management equipment, disposal equipment, steam
turbine in the reactor facilities)

292
(2) Decision criteria
The Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for
(2) Decision criteria Electric Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 52, 1997)
Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for
Thermal Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance
No. 51, 1997) and Ordinance of Establishing Technical
Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Equipment
(MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965)
4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards met the technological standards
5. Related permission Date of issue of the reactor installation permission 5. Related permission Date of issue of the reactor installation permission
items Apr. 23, 2008 items Apr. 23, 2008
Heisei 16.03.18 Gen No. 13 Heisei 16.03.18 Gen No. 13
6. Other remarks None 6. Other remarks None
(75) Ohma Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 (76) Ohma Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
1. Application date Aug. 10, 2009 1. Application date Mar. 10, 2010
2. Approval date Mar. 26, 2010 2. Approval date Mar. 30, 2010
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment (1) Approval subject Nuclear equipment
Reactor itself, reactor cooling system equipment, Reactor cooling system facility
instrumentation and control system equipment, fuel
equipment, radiation management equipment, reactor (2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
containment facility, steam turbine, and auxiliary In order to install the ultrasonic flowmeter in the main
boiler pipe of the feed water system, specifications for part of
the main pipe (thickness) is altered.
(2) Details of approval (1) Application grounds and details
* This is an application for the construction plan revision
The forth of a series of applications concerning the approval.
installation of Ohma Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 (total
6 times planned)

293
(2) Decision criteria
(2) Decision criteria
Article 5 (earthquake resistance), Article 6 (damage
Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for prevention by fluid vibrations, etc.), and Article 9
Thermal Power Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance (materials and structures) of the Ordinance of
No. 51, 1997),Ordinance of Establishing Technical Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power
Standards for Electric Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965)
52, 1997), and Ordinance of Establishing Technical
Standards on Nuclear Power Generation Equipment
(MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965),
4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards met the technological standards
5. Related permission Date of issue of the reactor installation permission 5. Related permission Date of issue of the reactor installation permission
items Apr. 23, 2008 items Apr. 23, 2008
Heisei 16.03.18 Gen No. 13 Heisei 16.03.18 Gen No. 13
6. Other remarks None 6. Other remarks None



ϭ-3 Approvals for Fuel Assembly Designs Concerning Commercial Reactors

(1) Global Nuclear Fuel-Japan Co., Ltd. (2) Global Nuclear Fuel-Japan Co., Ltd.
1. Application date Apr. 16, 2009 1. Application date Jul. 6, 2009
2. Approval date May 11, 2009 2. Approval date Jul. 23, 2009
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Power plants that The Chugoku Electric Power Co., Inc. Shimane Nuclear (1) Power plants that Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc. Higashidori Nuclear
will use the Power Station Unit 1 will use the Power Station Unit 1
assemblies assemblies
(2) Details of ! Fuel subject of approval (2) Details of ! Fuel subject of approval
approval 9 ! 9 (A-type) fuel assembly approval 9 ! 9 (A-type) fuel assembly
" Application details " Application details
The 9 ! 9 (A-type) fuel assemblies (change of the The 9 ! 9 (A-type) fuel assemblies (change of the
water rod shape, etc.) will be adopted as the gadolinia concentration of an element of the gadolinia
replacement fuel assemblies for Unit 1 at Chugoku blended fuel, etc.) will be adopted as the replacement

294
Electric Power Co., Inc.’s Shimane Nuclear Power fuel assemblies for Unit 1 at Tohoku Electric Power
Station. Co., Inc.’s Higashidori Nuclear Power Station.
% Decision criteria % Decision criteria
Article 13 (core, etc.) of the Ordinance of Article 13 (core, etc.) of the Ordinance of
Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power
Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62,
1965) 1965)
4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards. met the technological standards.
5. Related permission Approval for the installation changes related to the 5. Related permission Approval for the installation related to the newly-
items employment of the 9 ! 9 fuel assemblies for Unit 1 at items establishing the Higashidori Unit 1
Shimane Nuclear Power Station (Applicant: Chugoku (including the employment of the 9 ! 9 fuel
Electric Power Co., Inc.) assemblies) (Applicant: Tohoku Electric Power Co.,
Mar. 31, 1999 Inc.)
Heisei 09.11.25 Shi No. 6 Aug. 31, 1998
8 ShiCho No. 9793
6. Other remarks None 6. Other remarks None
(3) Global Nuclear Fuel-Japan Co., Ltd. (4) Global Nuclear Fuel-Japan Co., Ltd.
1. Application date Sept. 8, 2009 1. Application date Oct. 15, 2009
2. Approval date Oct. 16, 2009 2. Approval date Nov. 5, 2009
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Power plants that Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc. Onagawa Nuclear (1) Power plants that Japan Atomic Power Company Tokai Daini Power
will use the Power Station Unit 2 will use the Station
assemblies assemblies
(2) Details of ! Fuel subject of approval (2) Details of ! Fuel subject of approval
approval 9 ! 9 (A-type) fuel assembly approval 9 ! 9 (A-type) fuel assembly
" Application details " Application details
The 9 ! 9 (A-type) fuel assemblies (change of the The 9 ! 9 (A-type) fuel assemblies (change of the
gadolinia concentration, which is an element of the water rod shape) will be adopted as the replacement
gadolinia blended fuel, and change of the water rod fuel assemblies for Japan Atomic Power Company’s
shape, etc.) will be adopted as the replacement fuel Tokai Daini Power Station.
assemblies for Unit 2 at Tohoku Electric Power Co.,
Inc.’s Onagawa Nuclear Power Station.

295
% Decision criteria % Decision criteria
Article 13 (core, etc.) of the Ordinance of Article 13 (core, etc.) of the Ordinance of
Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power
Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62,
1965) 1965)
4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards. met the technological standards.
5. Related permission Approval for the installation changes related to the 5. Related permission Approval for the installation changes related to the
items employment of the 9 ! 9 fuel assemblies for Onagawa items employment of the 9 ! 9 fuel assemblies for Tokai
Unit 1 (Applicant: Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.) Daini Power Station
Apr. 14, 1999 (Applicant: Japan Atomic Power Company)
Heisei 10.05.29 Gen No. 8 Aug. 6, 2001
Heisei 13.04.02 Gen No. 1

6. Other remarks None 6. Other remarks None



(5) Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd. (6) Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd.
1. Application date Jan. 28, 2010 1. Application date Feb. 5, 2010
2. Approval date Mar. 1, 2010 2. Approval date Mar. 1, 2010
3. Outline of approval 3. Outline of approval
(1) Power plants that Units 1 and 2 of the Tomari Power Station of Hokkaido (1) Power plants that Unit 3 of the Tomari Power Station of Hokkaido Electric
will use the Electric Power Co. will use the Power Co.
assemblies assemblies
(2) Details of ! Fuel subject of approval (2) Details of ! Fuel subject of approval
approval 14 ! 14 (A-type) fuel assembly approval 17 ! 17 (A-type) fuel assembly
" Application details " Application details
Fuel assemblies with a maximum burn-up rate of The 17 ! 17 (A-type) fuel assemblies (change of the
55,000 MWd/t will be used as replacement fuel uranium dioxide fuel concentration and employment
assemblies in Units 1 and 2 at Hokkaido Electric of the uranium dioxide sintered pellet with 6wt%
Power Co.’s Tomari Power Station. gadolinia, etc.) will be adopted as the replacement
fuel assemblies for Unit 3 at Hokkaido Electric Power
Co., Inc.’s Tomari Power Station.

296
% Decision criteria
Article 13 (core, etc.) of the Ordinance of % Decision criteria
Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Article 13 (core, etc.) of the Ordinance of
Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power
1965) Generation Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62,
1965)
4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards. 4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards.
5. Related permission Approval for the installation changes related to the
items employment of the 14 ! 14 fuel assemblies for Tomari 5. Related permission Approval for the installation changes related to the
Units 1 and 2 items employment of the 17 ! 17 fuel assemblies for Tomari
(Applicant: Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Inc.) Unit 3 (Applicant: Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Inc.)
Jun. 21, 2007 Jun. 21, 2007
Heisei 17.12.01 Gen No. 3 Heisei 17.12.01 Gen No. 3

6. Other remarks Special Processing Approval * “MDA” and “ZIRLO” 6. Other remarks Special Processing Approval * “MDA” and “ZIRLO”
Mar. 1, 2010 are used as fuel Mar. 1, 2010 are used as fuel
Heisei 22.01.28 Gen No. 23 covering materials. Heisei 22.02.05 Gen No. 27 covering materials.
(7) Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd. (8) Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd.
1. Application date Jun. 4, 2009 1. Application date Nov. 27, 2009

2. Approval date Jul. 29, 2009 2. Approval date Dec. 15, 2009

3. Outline of approval Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. Fukushima Daiichi 3. Outline of approval
(1) Power plants that Nuclear Power Station (1) Power plants that The Chugoku Electric Power Co., Inc. Shimane Nuclear
will use the Unit 6 will use the Power Station Unit 1
assemblies Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station Units 1 and 2 assemblies

(2) Details of ! Fuel subject of approval (2) Details of ! Fuel subject of approval
approval 9 ! 9 (B-type) fuel assembly approval 9 ! 9 (B-type) fuel assembly
" Application details " Application details
The 9 ! 9 (B-type) (change of the gadolinia The 9 ! 9 (B-type) (removal of the expansion springs,
concentration, which is an element of the gadolinia which is removal of the expansion springs, which are
blended fuel, and removal of the expansion springs, elements of tie rod) fuel assemblies are used as
which is removal of the expansion springs, which are
elements of tie rod) fuel assemblies are used as replacement fuel assemblies for Unit 1 at Chugoku
replacement fuel assemblies for Unit 6 at Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.’s Shimane Nuclear Power
Electric Power Co., Inc.’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station
Power Station and Units 1 and 2 at Fukushima Daini

297
Nuclear Power Station
% Decision criteria
% Decision criteria
Article 13 (core, etc.) of the Ordinance of Establishing
Article 13 (core, etc.) of the Ordinance of Establishing
Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation
Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation
Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965)
Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965)
4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards.
met the technological standards.
5. Related permission Approval for installation changes related to the
5. Related permission Approval for the installation changes related to the
items employment of the 9 ! 9 fuel assemblies for items employment of the 9 ! 9 fuel assemblies for Unit 1 at
Fukushima Units 1-6, 2-1, and 2
Shimane Nuclear Power Station (Applicant: Chugoku
(Applicant: Tokyo Electric Power Co., Ltd.)
Electric Power Co., Inc.)
Oct. 26, 1998 (Fukushima Unit 1-6)
Mar. 31, 1999
Jul. 1, 1998 (Fukushima Units 2-1 and 2)
Heisei 09.11.25 Shi No. 6
Heisei 09-12-18 Shi No. 22 (Fukushima Unit 1-6)
Heisei 09-02-28 Shi No. 90 (Fukushima Units 2-1 and 2)
6. Other remarks None 6. Other remarks None



(9) Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd.
1. Application date Oct. 30, 2009
2. Approval date Jan. 1, 2010
1. Outline of approval
(1) Power plants that Unit 3 of the Tomari Power Station of Hokkaido Electric
will use the Power Co.
assemblies
(2) Details of ! Fuel subject of approval
approval 17 ! 17 (B-type) fuel assembly
" Application details
The fuel assemblies with a maximum burn-up rate of
55,000 MWd/t will be used as replacement fuel
assemblies in Unit 3 at Hokkaido Electric Power Co.,
Inc.’s Tomari Power Station.
% Decision criteria

298
Article 13 (core, etc.) of the Ordinance of Establishing
Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation
Equipment (MITI Ordinance No. 62, 1965)
4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered to have
met the technological standards.
5. Related permission Approval for the installation changes related to the
items employment of the 17 ! 17 fuel assemblies for Tomari
Unit 3 (Applicant: Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Inc.)
Jun. 21, 2007
Heisei 17.12.01 Gen No. 3

6. Other remarks Special Processing Approval * “NDA” is used as


Jan. 8, 2010 fuel covering
Heisei 21.10.30 Gen No. 28 materials.
Ϯ OPERATIONAL PLANS FOR NUCLEAR
POWER PLANTS


299
㼀㼍㼎㼘㼑㻌䊦㻙㻝㻌㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻜㻌㻻㼜㼑㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㼍㼘㻌㻼㼘㼍㼚
$VRI0DU
)<
(VWDEOLVKHU 8QLW /LFHQVHG 1XPEHURI 1XPEHURI (OHFWULF &DSDFLW\
2XWSXW 6KXWGRZQ 'D\VRI (QHUJ\ )DFWRU
0: 'D\V 2SHUDWLRQ *HQHUDWHG  
 N:K
+RNNDLGR(OHFWULF 7RPDUL      
3RZHU&R,QF      
     
7RKRNX(OHFWULF 2QDJDZD      
3RZHU&R,QF      
     
+LJDVKLGRUL      
7RN\R(OHFWULF )XNXVKLPD      
3RZHU&R,QF 'DLLFKL      
     
     
     
     
)XNXVKLPD'DLQL      
     
     
     
.DVKLZD]DNL      
.DULZD      
     
     
     
     
     
&KXEX(OHFWULF +DPDRND      
     
     
+RNXULNX(OHFWULF 6KLND      
3RZHU&R      
.DQVDL(OHFWULF 0LKDPD      
3RZHU&R,QF      
     
7DNDKDPD      
     
     
     
2KL      
     
     
     
&KXJRNX(OHFWULF 6KLPDQH      
3RZHU&R,QF      
6KLNRNX(OHFWULF ,NDWD      
3RZHU&R,QF      
     
.\XVKX(OHFWULF *HQNDL      
3RZHU&R,QF      
     
     
6HQGDL      
     
-DSDQ$WRPLF3RZHU 7RNDL'DLQL     
&RPSDQ\ 7VXUXJD      
      参
7RWDO     


301
㻲㼕㼓㼡㼞㼑㻌䊦㻙㻝㻌㻰㼕㼍㼓㼞㼍㼙㻌㼛㼒㻌㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻜㻌㻾㼑㼍㼏㼠㼛㼞㻌㻿㼔㼡㼠㼐㼛㼣㼚㻌㻿㼏㼔㼑㼐㼡㼘㼑
$VRI0DU
/LFHQVHG2XWSXW )< )< )<
(VWDEOLVKHU 8QLW
0: 'DWHRI3DUDOOHOLQJ2II $SU 0D\ -XQ -XO $XJ 6HS 2FW 1RY 'HF -DQ )HE 0DU 'DWHRI3DUDOOHOLQJ,Q
+RNNDLGR(OHFWULF 7RPDUL 8QLW 
3RZHU&R,QF
7RPDUL 8QLW   

7RPDUL 8QLW   


7RKRNX(OHFWULF 2QDJDZD 8QLW   
3RZHU&R,QF
2QDJDZD 8QLW   

2QDJDZD 8QLW   

+LJDVKLGRUL 8QLW   


7RN\R(OHFWULF )XNXVKLPD 
'DLLFKL
8QLW  
3RZHU&R,QF
)XNXVKLPD  
'DLLFKL
8QLW 
)XNXVKLPD  
'DLLFKL
8QLW 
)XNXVKLPD 
'DLLFKL
8QLW  
)XNXVKLPD  
'DLLFKL
8QLW 
)XNXVKLPD

302
8QLW   
'DLLFKL
)XNXVKLPD  
'DLQL
8QLW 
)XNXVKLPD 
'DLQL
8QLW  
)XNXVKLPD
'DLQL
8QLW 
)XNXVKLPD  
'DLQL
8QLW 
.DVKLZD]DNL
.DULZD
8QLW   6XVSHQVLRQ
.DVKLZD]DNL
.DULZD
8QLW   6XVSHQVLRQ
.DVKLZD]DNL
.DULZD
8QLW   6XVSHQVLRQ
.DVKLZD]DNL
.DULZD
8QLW   6XVSHQVLRQ
.DVKLZD]DNL
.DULZD
8QLW   6XVSHQVLRQ
.DVKLZD]DNL  
.DULZD
8QLW 
.DVKLZD]DNL  
.DULZD
8QLW 
&KXEX(OHFWULF +DPDRND 8QLW   
3RZHU&R,QF
+DPDRND 8QLW   

+DPDRND 8QLW   


㻲㼕㼓㼡㼞㼑㻌䊦㻙㻝㻌㻰㼕㼍㼓㼞㼍㼙㻌㼛㼒㻌㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻜㻌㻾㼑㼍㼏㼠㼛㼞㻌㻿㼔㼡㼠㼐㼛㼣㼚㻌㻿㼏㼔㼑㼐㼡㼘㼑
$VRI0DU
/LFHQVHG2XWSXW )< )< )<
(VWDEOLVKHU 8QLW
0: 'DWHRI3DUDOOHOLQJ2II $SU 0D\ -XQ -XO $XJ 6HS 2FW 1RY 'HF -DQ )HE 0DU 'DWHRI3DUDOOHOLQJ,Q
+RNXULNX(OHFWULF 6KLND 8QLW   
3RZHU&R
6KLND 8QLW   
.DQVDL(OHFWULF 0LKDPD 8QLW   
3RZHU&R,QF
0LKDPD 8QLW   

0LKDPD 8QLW 


7DNDKDPD 8QLW   
7DNDKDPD 8QLW   

7DNDKDPD 8QLW   

7DNDKDPD 8QLW   

2KL 8QLW     

2KL 8QLW   

2KL 8QLW   

303
2KL 8QLW   
&KXJRNX(OHFWULF 6KLPDQH 8QLW   
3RZHU&R,QF
6KLPDQH 8QLW   
6KLNRNX(OHFWULF ,NDWD 8QLW   
3RZHU&R,QF
,NDWD 8QLW   

,NDWD 8QLW 


.\XVKX(OHFWULF *HQNDL 8QLW   
3RZHU&R,QF
*HQNDL 8QLW   

*HQNDL 8QLW   


*HQNDL 8QLW   

6HQGDL 8QLW   

6HQGDL 8QLW   


-DSDQ$WRPLF 7RNDL'DLQL   
3RZHU&RPSDQ\
7VXUXJD 8QLW   
7VXUXJD 8QLW   



ϯ STATUS OF OPERATIONAL
MANAGEMENT OF NUCLEAR POWER
PLANTS


305
ϯ-1 Operational Management at Nuclear Power Plants
For the operational management of nuclear power plants, basic concepts include: ! making certain of all possible
measures to ensure safety and stable operation, " gaining the trust of local residents and the community, and %
promoting plant efficiency. And in order to more effectively implement these values in striving for operational
management system preparedness and enrichment, various measures have been taken such as those outlined below.
(1) Safety and reliability improvement measures
1) Accident prevention measures
(i) Age deterioration preventative measures
(ii) Equipment improvements based on the lessons of accidents in Japan and other countries
(iii) Survey and review of accident information in Japan and other countries
2) Planned development of operation and maintenance staff
(i) Securing and fostering of human resources based on long-term development plan
(ii) Enhancement of training facilities and enrichment of training content
3) Improvement of security management systems
4) Quality management systems
(i) The president establishes the principle of quality as top management, and the general managers of power
plants and headquarter divisions develop this quality objective. In order to accomplish this, the nuclear
power division implements quality assurance activities.
(ii) The nuclear quality audit division, independent of the nuclear power division, performs audits and follow-ups.
(iii) The president conducts management reviews based on the quality assurance activities of the nuclear power
division and audit reports by the nuclear power audit division and conducts reviews of quality policies and
continuous improvements.
5) Measures for emergencies
(i) Establishment of communication network among the national and local governments, power plants and others
(ii) Enhancement of monitoring facilities
(2) Exposure reduction measures
1) Establishment of a contractors' center
2) Radiation management education
(i) Implementation of simulation drills of work under radiation
(ii) Outfitting of teaching aids and learning materials and the utilization of external training institutions
3) Automation of inspection instruments
4) Environmental radioactivity reduction measures


307
ϯ-2 Education and Training of Operation Staff
(1) Organization of a nuclear power plant
An organization related to the safety of reactor facilities in a nuclear power plant and its major tasks are outlined
below as an example.

Manager, Nuclear Power Nuclear Power Quality Quality Auditing Division at


Quality Auditing Division Auditing Division Each Nuclear Power Plant
[Headquarters]

President
Concerned with quality Performs audits of quality assurance
As top management, it assurance activities. activities.
exerts control over Administers audits
security activities
concerning the
establishment,
Materials Division
implementation,
maintenance and Performs tasks related to the assessment and
improvement of a General Manager, Nuclear selection of procurement sources.
quality management Power Division
system.
Nuclear Power Planning Division
Administers the safety activities Performs tasks related to the planning,
performed by the materials division, management and training of staff.
nuclear planning division, nuclear
management division, nuclear
technology division, nuclear fuel Nuclear Power Management Division
division and power plant general Performs tasks related to the operation and
managers. maintenance of the nuclear power plant.

Nuclear Power engineering Division


Performs tasks related to the basic design of
nuclear power facilities.

Nuclear Fuel Division


Performs tasks related to the procurement of
Nuclear Power Generation Safety nuclear fuels.
Committee

Deliberates on matters related to the safety of nuclear facilities (changes to license


applications for the establishment of reactors and changes to safety regulations).

Representative example taken from the safety regulations


for boiling water reactors

308
[Nuclear Power Plant]

General Manager of the Plant Exerts control over tasks related to security at power plants.

Chief Engineer of Nuclear Reactor Supervision of security related to the operation of nuclear
reactor facilities

Deliberative body for matters related to security


Nuclear Power Plant Safety Management
management at nuclear reactor facilities at power plants
Committee

Clerical Tasks related to general affairs, procurement, occupational safety,


Section training and public relations

Quality and Safety Tasks related to quality control, security education, quality management
Section and to nuclear power safety

Tasks related to operational standards, operational plans, fuel


management and so forth
Technology
Section Tasks related to radiation management, chemical management and
environmental radioactivity measurement
Tasks related to emergency measures

Operations Tasks related to service operation and so forth (see attached chart)
Section

Maintenance Implementation of checks of periodical inspections, periodical


Section inspection staff and so on, and tasks related to the design and
implementation of maintenance, repair and other work

Representative example taken from the safety regulations for


boiling water reactors


309
Breakdown of operating staff

Operations Section

Person Responsible
for Operation (shift chief) (1 person) Monitors overall operation and directs and supervises
operators.

Assistant Shift Chief Assists the person responsible for operation and instructs and
(1 person)
helps operators.

Operator Supervises and operates the reactor, turbine and generator.


(multiple)

Assistant Operator (multiple) Conducts site inspections and operates auxiliaries.

(2) Education and training of operating staff


In Japan, education and training to maintain and improve operating staff capabilities is conducted by the dispatch of
staff to training facilities and in-house education at each electricity utility.
Concerning training facilities, operating staff were dispatched to the training facilities of US manufacturers between
1967 and 1973 to receive necessary training. However, due to the domestic founding of the Nuclear Power Training
Center Ltd. (NTC) and BWR Operator Training Center (BTC), it became possible from 1974 to receive more
comprehensive education and training in Japan. These operational training centers offer primary training,
retrainining, team work training and other training courses according to the skill level of the operators and had
administered training to a total of 35,795 persons and 12,284 teams as of the end of FY2009.
To gain basic knowledge about nuclear power, the training course at the Japan Atomic Energy Agency is also
available.
Moreover, each electric utility performs an in-house accident simulation operational drill, a case study of Japanese
and foreign accidents and other OJT (on-the-job training) in a planned manner in an effort to maintain and improve
the capability of its operating staff.
Operation of a nuclear power plant is achieved through shifts consisting of these trained operators and the members
of a shift generally comprise a person responsible for operation (shift chief), shift sub-chiefs, operators and assistant
operators.
Operators first receive introductory education about nuclear power through in-house training by the electricity utility
and are dispatched to the field as trainees where they learn field knowledge through inspections and other practices
under the direction and leadership of experienced personnel. They are then assigned to the field where they learn
basic knowledge and techniques about electricity, turbine and nuclear reactors while receiving leadership and
supervision. They are dispatched to primary training or other courses at an operational training center where they
attend lectures and simulator-aided training about the basic principles and techniques necessary for reactor operation.
After they have gained practical experience as assistant operators, they are assigned as operators of electricity, turbine
and nuclear reactors. After being assigned as operators, they are each dispatched to an operation training center to
attend a retraining course consisting mainly of simulator-aided training. The members of a shift are dispatched to an
operation training center as a unit to receive simulator-aided training in the teamwork training course to check their
teamwork as a shift and to improve their skills.
In the field, the members of a shift not only receive education in technology, safety and management, but also
participate in an accident simulation operation drill.
The electricity utility appoints, as staff responsible for operation, individuals who have been through the
abovementioned education and training, who have practical expertise in unit operation and who have cultivated their
superior work management, personnel and labor management abilities through a wealth of experience.

310
Table !-2-1 Examples of Long-term Operator Development Plans
Induction Auxiliary equipment operator Main equipment operator
Category Manager and supervisor education
education education education
Development New employee Auxiliary equipment operators Main equipment operators Assistant shift Shift supervisor Shift chief Shift chief
pattern In-shift courses supervisor assistant
1 year 5 to 6 years 4 to 6 years It is difficult to show the number of years because operators have different practical
experience, capabilities and qualifications.

Training New employee Introductory level operator Intermediate level operator training Advanced level operator training

Teamwork training
Simulat
or training Introductory level
training courses I and II Intermediate level training courses I, II and III Advanced level training
Training courses courses I and II

Repetitive Operational management training (safety regulations, related laws, nuclear


Initial training training Initial power disaster prevention and so on) Initial training Repetitive training
course training Repetitive training course
Repetitive course

311
Initial training training Plant system training Instructor
course Initial
Initial Initial
Initial training training training
course training Accident operation training (EOP, AOP, SOP, AMG) Repetitive training
Power course
course course
generation (by simulator exercises) Repetitive training
Technical
staff (by simulator exercises)
training

Curriculum
Training Equipment training (reactor physics, thermal hydraulics)
Training

Initial training Equipment training


course

Initial training
course For the same repetitive training, the extent of knowledge and skills
widens and deepens trough the accumulation of operational experience.

! ! !
Test Introductory level participant qualification Intermediate level participant qualification Advanced level participant qualification
Others Confirmation Confirmation Confirmation

Source: Japan Electric Association "Guidelines for Education and Training of Nuclear Power Plant Operators (JEAG4802-2002)



(3) Outline of operational training centers
The operational training centers aim to develop operators at nuclear power plants. In Japan, the BWR Operator
Training Center (Okuma Town, Futaba County, Fukushima Prefecture) and the Nuclear Power Training Center Ltd.
(Tsuruga City, Fukushima Prefecture) have both been conducting operator training since 1974. In June, 1993, the
BWR Operator Training Center opened its Niigata Center (Kariwa Village, Niigata Prefecture), which commenced
operator training in October of the same year.
The distinctive feature of the operational training centers is that they possess operation training simulation equipment
which simulates the central control panel of a nuclear power plant. The simulators consist of a simulation control
panel and a computer. The computer calculates the actions of the power plant from shutdown to full output status in
real time and displays the results on the simulation control panel. The operations performed by the operator on the
control panel are read in the computer and the equipment actions in response to these operations are displayed on the
control panel. Operators can therefore train themselves in the very same way as operating actual equipment.
Besides normal operations such as the startup and shutdown of a plant, operators can repeatedly train themselves in
measures to be taken in various emergencies.

312
Table !-2-2 Outline of Operator Training Centers in Japan (BTC)
(As of June 1, 2010)
Training center
BTC
Item
Name BWR Operator Training Center
Location 651 Chuodai, Ottozawa, Okuma Town, Futaba County, Fukushima
Prefecture
(Niigata Center: 4161-8 Aza-Nishiura, Oaza-Kariwa, Kariwa Village,
Kariwa County, Niigata Prefecture)
Establishment April, 1971
Number of instructors 38 persons
1. Start of training April, 1974
2. Model plant Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc., Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
Installation 1

Station Unit 3 (784,000 kW)


3. Control panel Main control panel in Nuclear reactor and turbine power generator
central control room Emergency core cooling system and others
Instructor console
EWS type
4. Computer TOSBAC G-8065 (1 set), G-8045 (1 set)
1. Start of training October, 1983
2. Model plant Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc., Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station
Installation 2

Unit 3 (1.10 million kilowatts)


3. Control panel Main control panel in Nuclear reactor and turbine power generator
central control room Emergency core cooling system and others
Instructor console
PC type
4. Computer AS7000 (1 set), S2000-S (2 sets)
Outline of installations

1. Start of training October, 1989


2. Model plant Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc., Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
Installation 3

Station Unit 4 (784,000 kW)


3. Control panel Main control panel in Nuclear reactor and turbine power generator
central control room Emergency core cooling system and others
Instructor console
PC type
4. Computer H-7780 (1 set), H-7765 (1 set)
1. Start of training October, 1993
2. Model plant Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc., Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power
Installation 4

Station Unit 4 (1.10 million kilowatts)


3. Control panel Main control panel in Nuclear reactor and turbine power generator
central control room Emergency core cooling system and others
Instructor console
PC type
4. Computer RS90-150 (2 sets)
1. Start of training August 1994
2. Model plant Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc., Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power
Installation 5

Station Unit 6 (1.356 million kilowatts)


3. Control panel Main control panel in Nuclear reactor and turbine power generator
central control room Emergency core cooling system and others
Instructor console
PC type
4. Computer UX7000 (1 set)


313
Table !-2-3 Outline of Operator Training Centers in Japan (NTC)"

(As of June 1, 2010)

Training center
NTC
Item

Name Nuclear Power Training Center Ltd.

Location 129-1-1 Kutsumi, Tsuruga City, Fukui Prefecture

Establishment June 1972

Number of instructors 31

1. Start of training March 1997

2. Model plant Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Inc., Tomari Power Station Unit 1 (579,000 kW, 2 Loops)
Installation 1

3. Control panel Main control panel in central control room


Main panel, turbine power generator
With touch panel VDU
auxiliary panel, reactor auxiliary panel
(including emergency core cooling
Instructor console
With touch panel VDU

1. Start of training March 1984


Installation 2

2. Model plant Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc., Takahama Power Station Unit 3 (870,000 kW, 3 Loops)

3. Control panel Main control panel in central control room Reactor panel (including emergency core
With touch panel VDU cooling system), turbine power generator
Outline of installations

Instructor console panel and others


With touch panel VDU

1. Start of training March 1990

2. Model plant Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc., Ohi Power Station Unit 3 (1.18 million kW, 4 Loops)
Installation 3

3. Control panel Main control panel in central control room


Main panel, turbine power generator
With touch panel VDU
auxiliary panel, reactor auxiliary panel
(including emergency core cooling
Instructor console
With touch panel VDU

1. Start of training November 2008

2. Model plant Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Inc., Tomari Power Station Unit 3 (912,000 kW, 3 Loops)
Switching
Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc., Ikata Power Station Unit 2 (566,000 kW, 2 Loops)
Installation 4

3. Control panel Main control panel in central control room Operation console, power transmission
With touch panel VDU console, supplementary console, large
Instructor console display and others
With touch panel VDU

4. Remarks Advanced central control panel

314
Table ϯ-2-4 Outline of Training Courses at BWR Operator Training Center

Ϩ. Standard training course


Course name Course objectives/outline Training period Capacity
Master the outline of a BWR plant and basic 8 persons
15 days
theories of nuclear engineering, thermal (minimum of 2
(3 weeks)
engineering, control engineering and safety persons)
Introductory training engineering.
course I The admission level criterion is mastery of the 8 persons
outline of nuclear plant equipment and 10 days
(minimum of 2
operation (Operational experience of about 2 (2 weeks)
persons)
Introductory level

years).
Acquire comprehensive skills necessary for
operating in the central control room.
Having acquired knowledge of plant equipment
and operational methods, training is conducted
in normal operations and actions to be taken in 4 persons
Introductory training 40 days
abnormal circumstances. (minimum of 3
course II (8 weeks)
The admission level criteria are completion of persons)
the Introductory training course I or possession
of equivalent knowledge of basic theory, as well
as mastery of the outline of plant equipment and
operation.
Be familiarized with abnormal operating
procedures (AOP) and understand EOP entry
conditions (RC Scram ! Procedure guidelines). 4 persons
Intermediate training 10 days
The admission level criterion is completion of (minimum of 3
course I (2 weeks)
the Introductory training course II or possession persons)
of equivalent or higher knowledge and technical
skill.
Improve knowledge and skills relating to
emergency operating procedures (EOP) and
acquire comprehensive competence in
knowledge and technical skill necessary for a
central control room operator.
4 persons
Intermediate training The admission level criteria are being a member 10 days
Intermediate level

(minimum of 3
course II of the central control room operation staff or (2 weeks)
persons)
involvement in relevant operations, as well as
completion of the Intermediate training course I
or possession of equivalent or higher knowledge
and technical skill relating to emergency
operating procedures (AOP).
As a superior to central control room operation
staff, enhance broad operation management
knowledge concerning laws, safety regulations
and so forth, and acquire comprehensive
abnormal situation handling abilities (AOP, EOP
Intermediate training and SOP). 4 persons
10 days
course III The admission level criteria are possession of (minimum of 3
(2 weeks)
sufficient experience as a member of the central persons)
control room operation staff, as well as
completion of the Intermediate training course
II or possession of equivalent or higher
knowledge and technical skill.


315
Ϩ. Standard training course (continued)
Course name Course objectives/outline Training period Capacity
Master the structure of nuclear facilities
including knowledge of nuclear engineering and
thermal engineering, and managerial knowledge
including nuclear facility capabilities, legislation
and safety regulations, and case studies, while
acquiring the ability to respond (EOP, SOP) to
4 persons
Advanced Introductory abnormal circumstances as a director. 9 days
Positioned as a gateway course consistent with (minimum of 3
training course (2 weeks)
JEAG4802 for advanced-level operators. persons)
The admission level criteria are planned
assignment as an assistant to the person
responsible for operation, as well as completion
of the Intermediate training course III or
possession of equivalent or higher knowledge
and technical skill.
A course corresponding to Education and
training for advanced-level operators as
specified in JEAC4804.
This course aims at an all-inclusive mastering of
the skills necessary to be a person responsible
for operation and is targeted at the following
persons.
1. Persons who will take an operation skill test
as specified in JEAC4804. 4 persons
Advanced training 11 days
2. Persons who will renew their operator's (minimum of 3
course I (2 weeks)
qualification. persons)
3. Persons who are not qualified operators, but
who intend to take the test in the future.
* When someone applies for the test, it will be
Advanced level

performed as a qualified-operator practical


skills test.
If the quota is not reached, the electric company
may be asked to bring along operators from the
site.
A course corresponding to Education and
training for advanced-level operators as
specified in JEAC4804.
The lectures and operational practical tests are
the same as in the Advanced training course I,
however, because the period is shorter, training
in operational accidents is only provided in
representative cases.
The following persons are targeted.
1. Persons who will renew their operator's 4 persons
Advanced training
qualification. 6 days (minimum of 3
course II
2. Persons who are not qualified operators, but persons)
who intend to take the test in the future.
* When someone applies for the test, it can be
performed as a qualified-operator practical
skills test.
If the quota is not reached, the electric company
may be asked to bring along operators from the
site.
Excluding one part, Advanced II and Advanced
A may be administered in parallel.
A course to be provided as an operation skill test
as specified in JEAC4804. It consists of a half
Skill test preparatory
day of exercise for mastering the control panel 4 persons
course for persons
and 1.5 days of testing. 2 days (minimum of 1
responsible for
If the quota is not reached, the electric company person)
operation
may be asked to bring along operators from the
site.

316
ϩ. Continuing training course (part 1)
Course name Course objectives/outline Training period Capacity
Uses the training content of the standard course as
a benchmark and gives priority to training in
abnormal operating procedures (AOP).
Exchanges information and broadens perspectives
Intermediate 4 persons
about procedures, attitude, experience and so forth
IIA/Exchange I 5 days (minimum of 3
through exchange with operators of other electric
training course persons)
power companies.
The admission level criterion is completion of the
Introductory training course II or possession of
equivalent or higher knowledge and technical skill.
Uses the training content of the standard course as
a benchmark and gives priority to familiarization
with abnormal operating procedures (AOP) and the
basics of emergency operating procedures (EOP).
Intermediate Exchanges information and broadens perspectives 4 persons
IIB/Exchange II about procedures, attitude, experience and so forth 5 days (minimum of 3
training course through exchange with operators of other electric persons)
power companies.
The admission level criterion is completion of the
Intermediate training course II or possession of
equivalent or higher knowledge and technical skill.
Uses the training content of the standard course as
a benchmark and mainly provides practical training
4 persons
Intermediate training in emergency operating procedures (EOP).
5 days (minimum of 3
course IIC The admission level criterion is completion of the
persons)
Intermediate training course II or possession of
equivalent or higher knowledge and technical skill.
Intermediate level

Uses the training content of the standard course as


a benchmark and mainly provides practical training
in emergency operating procedure (EOP). The
course also covers abnormal situation handling
(EOP/SOP and related matters) and includes the
Special Law on Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures
and communication training.
Some of the content is carried out flexibly in
4 persons
Intermediate training consideration of the trainees’ course attendance
5 days (minimum of 3
course IIIB/C histories and requests.
persons)
Intermediate IIIB/C and Advanced C training may
be administered in teams.
The admission level criteria are possession of
sufficient experience as a member of the central
control room operation staff, as well as completion
of the Intermediate training course III or
possession of equivalent or higher knowledge and
technical skill.
The objective is to intensively refresh knowledge 4 persons
about the behavioral characteristics of nuclear 5 days (minimum of 3
reactors in a short amount of time, through persons)
theoretical reviews and incident confirmation using
a simulator.
During the two-day course, the main activity is
Reactor behavioral confirmation with a simulator.
characteristics course During the five-day course, theoretical reviews of 4 persons
nuclear engineering, thermal engineering, and 2 days (minimum of 3
safety engineering as well as behavior
confirmation with a simulator are performed.
persons) 参
The admission level criterion is completion of the
Intermediate training course I or possession of
equivalent or higher knowledge and technical skill. 付
317
ϩ. Continuing training course (part 1) (cont.)
Course name Course objectives/outline Training period Capacity
Contains all of the lecture material of the
standard courses and provides comprehensive
operation skill training.
Positioned as an advanced preparatory course for
Advanced training I for being newly certified as
a person responsible for operation.
4 persons
Advanced training Excluding one part, Advanced II and Advanced
5 days (minimum of 3
course A A may be administered in parallel.
persons)
The admission level criteria are being an
assistant of the person responsible for operation
or a person at a higher position, as well as
completion of the Intermediate training course
III or possession of equivalent or higher
knowledge and technical skill.
Uses the training content of the standard course
as a benchmark and gives priority to
familiarization with abnormal operating
procedures (AOP) and the basics of emergency
operating procedures (EOP). It also aims for
understanding of how to deal with abnormalities 4 persons
Advanced training
by training how to evaluate the situation. 5 days (minimum of 3
course B
The admission level criteria are being an persons)
assistant of the person responsible for operation
Advanced level

or a person at a higher position, as well as


completion of the Advanced course I or
possession of equivalent or higher knowledge
and technical skill.
Uses the training content of the standard course
as a benchmark and mainly provides practical
training in emergency operating procedure
(EOP). The course also covers abnormal
situation handling (EOP/SOP and related
matters) and includes the Special Law on
Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures and 4 persons
Advanced training
communication training. 5 days (minimum of 3
course C
Intermediate IIIB/C and Advanced C training persons)
may be administered in teams.
The admission level criteria are possession of
experience as an advanced-level operator, as
well as completion of the Advanced training
course or possession of equivalent or higher
knowledge and technical skill.
Comprehensively summarizes desk-top
operational theories about nuclear, thermal and
safety engineering, as well as legislation and
safety regulations. 8 persons
Advanced training
The admission level criteria are being an 5 days (minimum of 3
course D
advanced-level operator, as well as completion persons)
of the Advanced introductory course or
possession of equivalent or higher knowledge
and technical skill.

318
ϩ. Continuing training course (part 2)
This is a training course to make up for technical deficiencies or weak points of individuals or teams and is given on a
continuing basis according to the requests of the dispatching company.
The courses currently being administered are outlined below.
Course name Course objectives/outline Training period Capacity
Deepens understanding of plant operation 4 persons
management and equipment management 5 days (minimum of 3
during periodical inspections, understands the persons)
safety regulations applicable during periodical
inspections and shutdowns, and masters the
techniques to be able to perform operational
management appropriately during periodical
inspections.
Intermediate

Operational The admission level criterion for the five-day


management during course is being an onsite operator, a central
periodical inspections control room operator, or a person at a higher 4 persons
training course position who is actually involved in 2 days (minimum of 3
management of operational isolation and persons)
management of the system and equipment
operations.
The admission level criterion for the two-day
course is being an operator who already took the
five-day course or a person at a chief or
assistant manager level with extensive
experience of periodical inspections.
Refreshes the basic items of operational training
of the standard courses.
Consists mainly of operation skill training. 3 days 4 persons
Intermediate refresher
The admission level criterion is being a central (In response to (minimum of 3
training course
control room operator at a nuclear power station requests) persons)
who has already taken the Intermediate II or
higher.
Refreshes the basic items of operational training
Refresher training

of the standard courses.


Consists mainly of operation skill training.
3 days 4 persons
Advanced refresher The admission level criteria are possession of
(In response to (minimum of 3
training course experience as an advanced-level operator, as
requests) persons)
well as completion of the Advanced training
course or possession of equivalent or higher
knowledge and technical skill.
Supplemental training In response to requests from dispatch
1 person or
course companies, strengthens knowledge deficiencies 2 days
more
(knowledge) and conducts reassessments.
Supplemental training In response to requests from dispatch
course companies, strengthens knowledge deficiencies 1 day 1 person
(skill) and conducts reassessments.


319
Ϫ. Team training course
Course name Course objectives/outline Training period Capacity
For a shift team at a power plant as a unit, the
aim is to enhance the collective strength of the
team.
2 days (per team)
Judges the strength of the team by team
characteristic assessment and team diagnosis.
Team assessment course For the one day course, only team characteristic
assessment will be used.
The curriculum will be prepared by BTC,
however, it may be adapted in response to the 1 day (per team)
requests of the dispatching company, except for
team characteristic assessment.
A number of shift teams gather in one place to
improve and upgrade their operational
techniques and team strength. The strength of the 4 teams
Team exchange event team is evaluated by team characteristic 1 day (minimum of 2
assessment and the teams observe each other teams)
through mutual review.

With a shift team at a power plant, training is


Family training course administered according to the family training 1 day (per team)
program prepared by the dispatcher.

ϫ. Reactor type changeover training course


This is a training course provided for a specific purpose. The training period, content and so forth will be individually
established after meetings with the dispatching company.
The courses currently being administered are outlined below.
Course name Course objectives/outline Training period Capacity
Aims at quickly and intensively familiarizing
persons who have experience in operating a
800 MWe type reactor
second- or third-generation control panel with 5 days (per team)
changeover training course
the manual system typical of first-generation
plants.
Aims at using a processing computer to quickly
and intensively familiarize persons who have
experience in operation of first- or
1,100 MWe type reactor third-generation control panels with
5 days (per team)
changeover training course man-machine interfaces and control systems
typical of second-generation plants, such as CRT
screen display systems and automated operating
systems.
Aims at quickly and intensively familiarizing 15 days
persons who have experience in operating first- (per team)
(3 weeks)
or second-generation control panels with
ABWR type reactor man-machine interfaces and control systems
changeover training course typical of third-generation plants, such a large 5 days
display panels, touch operation panels, (In response to (per team)
centralized alarm systems and integrated digital requests)
control systems.

320
Ϭ. Lecture courses
Course name Course objectives/outline Training period Capacity
Aims at helping persons earn qualifications equivalent to
instructor qualification L (B-1 area) and the BTC instructor
qualification simulator training qualification S(B) by
Instructor (qualification) lecture 30 days 1 person
implementing an instructor qualification test, a simulator
course I (6 weeks) (up to 2 persons)
operation skill confirmation test and an interview at each site,
in compliance with the BTC instructor qualification rule for
instructors.
For persons who have finished the “Instructor (qualification)
lecture course I” and have provided guidance at each site
Instructor (qualification) lecture simulator about for 3 months. This course aims at helping 1 person
5 days
course II persons earn qualifications equivalent to the BTC instructor (up to 2 persons)
qualification S(A) (requirement to be a person in charge of the
course) after checking their ability to train.
5 persons
Administers training for persons engaged in shift member 10 days
(minimum of 2
(2 weeks)
Instructor training

development training. Trainees personally participate in the persons)


Instructor lecture course preparation of training materials, simulation training,
evaluation of the effects of training and other tasks necessary 5 persons
for improvement of skill, in an intensive and effective manner. 5 days (minimum of 2
Training details and duration are set in response to requests. persons)
The refresh course is targeted for the persons who have already 5 persons
Instructor lecture refresh
taken the instructor lecture course. 3 days (minimum of 2
course
persons)
Intermediate 8 persons
15 days
conservation/maintenance (minimum of 3
(3 weeks)
lecture course I persons)
Intermediate For engineers who are involved in maintenance or repair tasks 8 persons
conservation/maintenance at nuclear power plants, this course aims at developing a 3 days (minimum of 3
lecture (reactor) course I mastery of knowledge of facilities and operations useful for the persons)
Intermediate maintenance of plants. 8 persons
conservation/maintenance Trainees also study the basic knowledge required to understand 3 days (minimum of 3
lecture (turbine) course I a maintenance program (laws, regulations, safety assessments, persons)
etc).
Intermediate In this course, knowledge of each system facility and its 8 persons
conservation/maintenance operations is provided in a classroom, and startup and 3 days (minimum of 3
lecture (electric/instrument) shutdown of plants and abnormal situations are learned through persons)
course I use of a simulator.
Intermediate The course is provided as a “15-day course,” during which 8 persons
conservation/maintenance comprehensive learning can be achieved, and as a “3-day 3 days (minimum of 3
lecture (safety facility) course I course × 5 times,” provided separately by each system facility. persons)
Intermediate 8 persons
conservation/maintenance 3 days (minimum of 3
lecture (operation) course I persons)
In this course, trainees learn the laws applicable to the tasks
performed in periodical inspections, the regulations for
maintaining safety during periodical inspections and their
background, process management, which is a major task during
periodical inspections (focusing on critical processes),
“knowledge and laws relating to the safety maintenance
systems” during review of system isolation, and “other broad
knowledge.” The purpose of the training is for trainees to gain
knowledge required for the tasks performed in periodical
Intermediate 8 persons
inspections and to perform periodical inspections with the
conservation/maintenance 5 days (minimum of 3
plants' safety ensured.
lecture course II persons)
This course is targeted at the following persons who have
completed the Intermediate conservation/maintenance lecture
course I or are in possession of equivalent knowledge on plant
facilities.
(1) Persons at electric companies who are in charge of
construction management during periodical inspections
(maintenance staff, repair staff)
(2) Persons at manufacturers who are in charge of construction
management during periodical inspections, and supervisors
Understand the function of a nuclear power plant and other
basic knowledge necessary for public relations activities related
to nuclear power. The following persons are targeted.
12 persons 参
Public relations lecture course 1 day (minimum of 2
(1) Persons engaged in the public relations of the nuclear
persons)
power industry
(2) Persons indirectly related to nuclear power departments 付
321
Ϭ. Lecture courses (cont.)
Course name Course objectives/outline Training period Capacity
4 persons
20 days
(minimum of 3
Master knowledge about nuclear plant facilities and operation (4 weeks)
persons)
useful for the tasks of commissioning and design of plants.
Execute the startup and abnormal response procedures based on 4 persons
10 days
the knowledge, explanations of operational knowledge and (minimum of 3
(2 weeks)
procedures of each system facility. persons)
Nuclear engineer lecture course Performance of a completion confirmation test on request of 8 persons
the dispatching company. 5 days (minimum of 3
Persons being targeted are those in charge of commissioning persons)
and design, examiners and inspectors, persons in charge of 8 persons
periodical inspections, affiliated companies and others. 3 days (minimum of 3
Training details and duration are in response to requests. persons)
1 day (per team)
This course is provided to officials of national and municipal (per team)
5 days
governments, independent administrative agencies and the like (up to 5 persons)
Administration official training
to master knowledge about nuclear power plants and their 3 days 4 persons
course
operation necessary for nuclear power administration and (Will respond to (minimum of 3
inspection. requests) persons)

322
Table ϯ-2-5 Outline of Training Courses at The Nuclear Power Training Center
Training
No. Summary of the analysis Period Personnel
courses
1 Initial training Development of nuclear reactor control operators. 20 weeks -
course Phase I Basic lecture: Mastering the basic 6 weeks Up to 16
theories concerning the reactor core of a persons
PWR plant.
Phase II System lecture: Mastering basic 6 weeks Up to 16
knowledge concerning the system, persons
control and safety of a PWR plant.
Phase III Simulator training: Mastering 8 weeks
operational techniques during normal, Simulator training 3 persons/
abnormal and emergency phases in a 148 hours team
shift system.
2 Retraining Training according to operators' practical experience
courses and training purpose.
Retraining Mastering knowledge and skills concerning normal, 10 days
3 persons/
standard abnormal and emergency operation procedures. Simulator training
team
courses Simulator for 4 hrs/day 36 hours
Retraining Mastering, maintaining and improving knowledge 5 days
advanced and skills about abnormal and emergency operation Simulator training 3 to 4 persons/
courses procedures. 20 hours team
Simulator for 4 hrs/day
Retraining Maintenance and improvement of status I 5 days
supervisor determination and supervisory competence during Simulator training for
courses abnormal and emergency phases. 20 hours
I: Simulator for 4 hrs/day II 5 days
No joint lectures Simulator training for
II: Simulator for 4 hrs/day 16 hours 3 to 4 persons/
A one-day joint lecture on the 5th day III 5 days team
III: Simulator for 4 hrs/day Simulator training for
A half-day joint lecture on the 5th day 20 hours
IV: Simulator for 4 hrs/day IV 5 days
Qualification renewal courses Simulator training for
20 hours
Retraining Preparation for the operation practical skill test 9 days
3 persons/
practical skill concerned with the determination of the nuclear Simulator training
team
test course power plant operator qualification. 35 hours
3 Operating shift Administers simulator training in units of operating 1 day
cooperative shifts, focusing on abnormal plant situations in order Simulator training for 8
training to enhance organic cooperative operational hours
courses procedures in the shift. 2 days
Simulator training for 16 By shifts
hours
3 days
Simulator training for 24
hours
4 Special Training adapted to the purposes of those concerned with nuclear power
training course • Main equipment operator course Number of training days: 3 days
• Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry's specialized skills acquisition course
Number of training days: 3 days
• Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization's RWR operation training course
Number of training days: 3 days
• Short-term simulator training course Number of training days: 10 days
• Nuclear engineer introduction course Number of training days: 3 days
• Instructor development course Number of training days: 5 days
• Plant behavior understanding enhancement course
Number of training days: 1 to 2 days
• Other courses established in response to requests


323
Table ϯ-2-6 Training Results at the BWR Operator Training Center
(Unit: Persons)
Fiscal Year
Training 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 Grand total
㻌 course
Introductory-leve
l training 29 31 35 53 40 39 38 36 32 29 28 20 18 20 20 15 14 20 17 11 1,261
Intermediate-leve
l training 63 87 80 89 92 129 126 130 120 97 103 97 99 65 87 89 91 78 70 76 2,698
Advanced
-level training 58 78 55 70 35 54 51 59 58 68 69 58 65 53 44 46 54 42 48 47 1,372
Refresher

First
training and 123 138 146 122 159 189 213 178 162 175 162 183 174 19 20 20 47 32 29 24 3,010
others
Family 110 110 110 112 129 164 169 186 176 140 140 140 140 93 74 79 75 78 96 94 3,550
training (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams)
Introductory-leve
39 41 36 46 42 43 30 32 29 31 27 23 18 17 19 14 16 15 18 7 800

C
l training
Intermediate-leve
l training 71 59 66 71 86 112 128 106 109 109 133 109 179 101 116 106 98 103 102 88 2,228
Advanced
-level training 48 33 43 56 74 50 81 60 68 65 76 72 74 72 83 73 72 59 80 86 1,396
Refresher
training and

Second
33 56 66 81 94 130 165 129 128 136 133 190 83 64 47 49 41 45 53 14 2,011
others
Family 89 91 109 116 181 227 204 232 225 195 200 171 175 144 150 135 130 129 111 117 3,412
training (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams)

T
Introductory-leve

324
l training 㻌 㻌 㻌 8 16 4 6 9 6 5 6 6 5 7 9 3 3 9 102
Intermediate-leve
l training 㻌 㻌 㻌 32 15 17 15 24 16 28 16 43 57 43 35 48 46 49 484
Advanced
-level training 㻌 㻌 㻌 8 12 6 9 4 10 4 5 18 25 12 21 20 16 20 190
Refresher

Third
training and 㻌 㻌 㻌 28 55 28 52 38 31 33 32 90 111 119 53 48 43 53 54 868
others

㻌 㻌 㻌

B
Family 43 34 31 31 49 50 49 48 48 107 143 124 63 79 96 995
training 㻌 㻌 㻌 (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams)
Nuclear
engineer
㻌 㻌 㻌 9 10 19 15 12 28 56 130 71 350
Subjects 32 45 42 51 37 84 61 72 66 72 70 80 60 102 77 109 161 137 98 119 1,918
Maintenance 23 10 15 48
496 568 569 639 695 941 952 883 843 847 865 911 891 710 734 648 735 724 773 690 18,736
Total 199 201 219 228 310 434 407 449 432 384 390 360 363 285 331 357 329 270 286 307 7,957
(teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams)
Note: The grand total is the total since the start of operational training. So it may not be consistent with thetotal by summing the number of each year
Table ϯ-2-7 Training Results at the Nuclear Power Training Center Ltd.

(Unit: Persons)
FY, training
course 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 Grand total

Initial
㻌 training 45 36 51 51 50 50 50 47 38 38 36 30 30 27 33 27 30 27 24 30 1,352
course
General 105 95 87 89 108 117 100 107 97 87 88 76 45 45 43 49 55 37 35 41 3,006

Advanced 189 212 227 220 226 210 216 241 216 233 264 236 245 231 259 258 251 264 240 229 5,510

Supervisor 112 110 123 134 138 144 163 151 180 171 169 175 165 159 180 184 172 187 212 224 4,083

C
Practical skill
㻌 㻌 㻌 45 60 27 30 27 30 45 45 309
test

Retraining
T
EOP-II 㻌 3 3 107 191 188 203 㻌 695

325
Shift
110 110 104 110 115 110 161 276 258 252 252 252 254 246 244 247 222 138 143 140 4,327
members

N
Teamwork (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams (teams)

Special training 44 73 56 51 58 53 44 44 42 38 43 75 58 45 59 76 139 216 187 327 2,104

495 529 547 545 580 574 680 781 761 770 600 592 588 567 601 624 674 761 743 896 17,059
Total 110 110 104 110 115 110 161 276 258 252 252 252 254 246 244 247 222 138 143 140 4,327
(teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams) (teams (teams)

Note: The grand total is the total since the start of operational training. So it may not be consistent with the total by summing the number of each year



㻲㼕㼓㼡㼞㼑㻌䊧䠉䠎䠉䠍䚷㼀㼞㼍㼕㼚㼕㼚㼓㻌㻾㼑㼟㼡㼘㼠㼟㻌㼍㼠㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌䠞䠳䠮㻌㻻㼜㼑㼞㼍㼠㼛㼞㻌㼀㼞㼍㼕㼚㼕㼚㼓㻌㻯㼑㼚㼠㼑㼞

㻝㻜㻜㻜

㻥㻡㻞 㻹㼍㼕㼚㼠㼑㼚㼍㼚㼏㼑㻌㼠㼞㼍㼕㼚㼕㼚㼓
㻥㻠㻝
㻺㼡㼏㼘㼑㼍㼞㻌㼑㼚㼓㼕㼚㼑㼑㼞㼟㻘㻌㼟㼡㼎㼖㼑㼏㼠㼟
㻢㻝 㻥㻝㻝
㻾㼑㼒㼞㼑㼟㼔㼑㼞㻌㼠㼞㼍㼕㼚㼕㼚㼓㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼛㼠㼔㼑㼞㼟
㻥㻜㻜 㻤㻠 㻤㻥㻝
㻤㻤㻟
㻭㼐㼢㼍㼚㼏㼑㼐㻙㼘㼑㼢㼑㼘㻌㼠㼞㼍㼕㼚㼕㼚㼓
㻤㻢㻡
㻤㻠㻣 㻤㻥 㻵㼚㼠㼑㼞㼙㼑㼐㼕㼍㼠㼑㻙㼘㼑㼢㼑㼘㻌㼠㼞㼍㼕㼚㼕㼚㼓
㻤㻠㻟 㻣㻜
㻣㻞
㻣㻜 㻵㼚㼠㼞㼛㼐㼡㼏㼠㼛㼞㼥㻙㼘㼑㼢㼑㼘㻌㼠㼞㼍㼕㼚㼕㼚㼓
㻢㻢 㻣㻞
㻤㻜㻜
㻣㻣㻟
㻝㻜

㻣㻟㻠 㻣㻟㻡
㻣㻞㻠
㻣㻝㻜
㻢㻥㻡 㻞㻟
㻣㻜㻜 㻢㻥㻜
㻠㻜㻢 㻥㻞 㻝㻡
㻟㻣 㻟㻣㻠
㻢㻠㻤
㻢㻟㻥 㻟㻠㻣 㻝㻞㻝 㻞㻞㻤
㻝㻤㻥
㻟㻡㻥 㻟㻞㻤
㻡㻝 㻟㻞㻤 㻠㻜㻡
㻢㻜㻜 㻟㻠㻞 㻝㻥㻟
㻡㻢㻤 㻡㻢㻥 㻝㻞㻝
㻝㻥㻜
㻺㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㼜㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚㼟

㻠㻡 㻠㻞 㻝㻤㻢

㻞㻤㻝
㻠㻥㻢
㻡㻜㻜
㻞㻜㻟 㻝㻥㻠
㻟㻞 㻝㻟㻢
㻝㻞㻞 㻝㻟㻡
㻝㻞㻜
㻥㻞
㻝㻥㻠 㻞㻝㻞 㻝㻝㻞
㻝㻠㻠
㻠㻜㻜 㻝㻠㻠
㻝㻡㻢 㻝㻞㻡 㻝㻡㻡
㻝㻟㻡 㻝㻡㻞
㻝㻟㻣
㻝㻟㻠
㻝㻟㻝 㻝㻠㻣
㻝㻞㻢 㻝㻜㻥 㻝㻠㻟 㻝㻞㻝 㻝㻠㻠
㻝㻡㻟
㻟㻜㻜
㻝㻝㻝
㻥㻤
㻝㻜㻢
㻞㻣㻟

㻞㻢㻥 㻞㻡㻟
㻞㻜㻜
㻞㻠㻠 㻞㻡㻞
㻝㻢㻜 㻝㻣㻤 㻞㻟㻜 㻞㻥㻠
㻞㻢㻜
㻞㻟㻠
㻞㻟㻤 㻞㻞㻠 㻞㻞㻥
㻝㻠㻢 㻝㻠㻢 㻞㻜㻥 㻞㻝㻤
㻝㻟㻠 㻞㻝㻟

㻝㻜㻜
㻲㼕㼟㼏㼍㼘㻌㼅㼑㼍㼞

㻥㻥 㻥㻜 㻥㻤
㻢㻤 㻣㻞 㻣㻝 㻣㻞 㻣㻠 㻣㻜 㻢㻢 㻢㻜 㻠㻥 㻟㻢 㻠㻟 㻠㻠 㻟㻢 㻟㻥 㻟㻤 㻟㻤 㻞㻣

㻥㻜 㻥㻝 㻥㻞 㻥㻟 㻥㻠 㻥㻡 㻥㻢 㻥㻣 㻥㻤 㻥㻥 㻜㻜 㻜㻝 㻜㻞 㻜㻟 㻜㻠 㻜㻡 㻜㻢 㻜㻣 㻜㻤 㻜㻥

)DPLO\ 㻝㻥㻥 㻞㻜㻝 㻞㻝㻥 㻞㻞㻤 㻟㻝㻜 㻠㻟㻠 㻠㻜㻣 㻠㻠㻥 㻠㻟㻞 㻟㻤㻠 㻟㻥㻜 㻟㻢㻜 㻟㻢㻟 㻞㻤㻡 㻟㻟㻝 㻟㻡㻣 㻟㻞㻤 㻞㻣㻜 㻞㻤㻢 㻟㻜㻣
WUDLQLQJ
1XPEHURI
WHDPV

326
㻲㼕㼓㼡㼞㼑㻌䊧䠉䠎㻙䠎䚷㼀㼞㼍㼕㼚㼕㼚㼓㻌㻾㼑㼟㼡㼘㼠㼟㻌㼍㼠㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻺㼡㼏㼘㼑㼍㼞㻌㻼㼛㼣㼑㼞㻌㼀㼞㼍㼕㼚㼕㼚㼓㻌㻯㼑㼚㼠㼑㼞㻌㻸㼠㼐㻚

㻤㻥㻢
㻥㻜㻜 㻿㼜㼑㼏㼕㼍㼘㻌㼠㼞㼍㼕㼚㼕㼚㼓㻌㼏㼛㼡㼞㼟㼑
㻾㼑㼠㼞㼍㼕㼚㼕㼚㼓㻌㻱㻻㻼䠉䊡㼏㼛㼡㼞㼟㼑
㻾㼑㼠㼞㼍㼕㼚㼕㼚㼓㻌㼟㼗㼕㼘㼘㻌㼠㼑㼟㼠㻌㼏㼛㼡㼞㼟㼑
㻾㼑㼠㼞㼍㼕㼚㼕㼚㼓㻌㼟㼡㼜㼑㼞㼢㼕㼟㼛㼞㻌㼏㼛㼡㼞㼟㼑
㻤㻜㻜 㻣㻤㻝
㻾㼑㼠㼞㼍㼕㼚㼕㼚㼓㻌㼍㼐㼢㼍㼚㼏㼑㼐㻌㼏㼛㼡㼞㼟㼑 㻣㻣㻜
㻣㻢㻝 㻣㻢㻝
㻾㼑㼠㼞㼍㼕㼚㼕㼚㼓㻌㼓㼑㼚㼑㼞㼍㼘㻌㼏㼛㼡㼞㼟㼑 
 㻣㻠㻟


㻵㼚㼕㼠㼕㼍㼘㻌㼠㼞㼍㼕㼚㼕㼚㼓㻌㼏㼛㼡㼞㼟㼑
㻣㻜㻜 㻢㻤㻜 㻢㻣㻠
  
㻝㻥㻝 㻢㻞㻠
㻝㻤㻤 㻞㻜㻟
㻢㻜㻜 㻡㻥㻞 㻢㻜㻝
㻢㻜㻜 㻡㻤㻤 
㻡㻤㻜 㻡㻣㻠 
㻝㻜㻣  㻡㻢㻣

㻡㻠㻣 㻡㻠㻡  
  
㻡㻞㻥 
   
  
㻠㻥㻡 㻠㻡
㻺㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㼜㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚㼟

㻡㻜㻜  

 㻝㻡㻝 㻝㻢㻥
㻟 㻝㻟㻤 㻝㻠㻠 㻝㻢㻟 㻝㻤㻜 㻝㻣㻝
㻝㻞㻟 㻝㻟㻠 㻝㻣㻡 㻝㻤㻜 㻝㻤㻠 㻝㻣㻞 㻝㻤㻣
㻞㻞㻠
㻠㻜㻜 㻝㻢㻡 㻞㻝㻞
㻝㻝㻞 㻝㻝㻜
㻝㻡㻥

㻟㻜㻜
㻞㻞㻢 㻞㻝㻜 㻞㻠㻝
㻞㻞㻣 㻞㻝㻢 㻞㻢㻠
㻝㻤㻥 㻞㻞㻜
㻞㻝㻞 㻞㻝㻢 㻞㻟㻟
㻞㻟㻢
㻞㻡㻥 㻞㻡㻤 㻞㻡㻝
㻞㻜㻜 㻞㻠㻡 㻞㻢㻠
㻞㻟㻝 㻞㻞㻥
㻞㻠㻜

㻝㻜㻤 㻝㻝㻣
㻝㻜㻜 㻝㻜㻡 㻤㻣 㻤㻥 㻝㻜㻜 㻝㻜㻣
㻥㻡 㻥㻣 㻤㻣 㻤㻤
㻣㻢
㻠㻡 㻠㻟 㻠㻥 㻡㻡
㻠㻡 㻟㻣 㻠㻝
㻲㼕㼟㼏㼍㼘㻌㼅㼑㼍㼞

㻟㻡
㻠㻡 㻡㻝 㻡㻝 㻡㻜 㻡㻜 㻡㻜 㻠㻣 㻟㻤 㻟㻤
㻟㻢 㻟㻢 㻟㻜 㻟㻜 㻞㻣 㻟㻟 㻞㻣 㻟㻜 㻞㻣 㻞㻠 㻟㻜

㻥㻜 㻥㻝 㻥㻞 㻥㻟 㻥㻠 㻥㻡 㻥㻢 㻥㻣 㻥㻤 㻥㻥 㻜㻜 㻜㻝 㻜㻞 㻜㻟 㻜㻠 㻜㻡 㻜㻢 㻜㻣 㻜㻤 㻜㻥
7HDPZRUN
WUDLQLQJFRXUVH 㻝㻝㻜 㻌㻝㻝㻜 㻌㻝㻜㻠 㻌㻝㻝㻜 㻌㻝㻝㻡 㻌㻝㻝㻜 㻌㻝㻢㻝 㻞㻣㻢 㻌㻞㻡㻤 㻌㻞㻡㻞 㻞㻡㻞 㻞㻡㻞 㻌㻞㻡㻠 㻞㻠㻢 㻞㻠㻠 㻞㻠㻣 㻞㻞㻞 㻝㻟㻤 㻝㻠㻟 㻝㻠㻜
1XPEHURIWHDPV㸧

㸦1RWH㸧7DEOHVWRDQGDQGZHUHSUHSDUHGEDVHGRQGDWDREWDLQHGIURPWKH%:5 参
2SHUDWLQJ7UDLQLQJ&HQWHU&RUSRUDWLRQDQGWKH1XFOHDU3RZHU7UDLQLQJ&HQWHU/WG


327
ϯ-3 Education and Training for Maintenance Staff
Education and training for maintenance staff are administered in a structured manner by preparing training
implementation procedures and other programs. Implementation consists of classroom education, practical
education in daily work and periodical inspections, as shown in Tables VIII-3-1 and VIII-3-2.
As shown in Table VIII-3-3, companies with established in-house maintenance training facilities are teaching the
necessary skills and techniques, via instructors and leaders possessing specialized knowledge and skills at those or
other companies.

328
Table ϯ-3-1 Maintenance Staff Development Pattern (Example 1)

Classification of
New employee Entry to intermediate level staff Senior staff Managerial staff
training
(It is difficult to give a specific number of years because
Within about 10 years after entering
Intended position Within 1 year after entering the company maintenance staff differ in practical experience, ability
the company
and qualifications.)

Basic training㻌

Ethical education㻌

General Business rule (manual) education㻌


education㻌
Developing problem solving and
interpersonal skills㻌
Management training GM training

329
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3

Nuclear power
generation introductory In-shift courses
Common training

technical Quality assurance education㻌


education㻌
Safety preservation education (safety regulations, safety preservation rules), nuclear power disaster prevention education

Technical and skill training (mechanical,


electricity, and instrumentation courses)㻌
C class 㻌
B class A class
Technical
qualification qualification
㻌 qualification
maintenance training training training
education㻌
Technical maintenance training

OJT



Table ϯ-3-2 Maintenance Staff Development Pattern (Example 2)
Application stage Managerial and supervisory
Classification Induction stage Basic stage
stage
Power plant work Subsection
Development In charge of maintenance Foreman
trainee chief
pattern It is difficult to give a specific number of years because there are variations in
About 1 year About 6 years
experience, ability and qualifications between maintenance staff.
Family training
Nuclear power design, assessment and technological
Nuclear
maintenance Nuclear maintenance basic training
training
(rookie (electricity, instrumentation, and mechanical
course) Nuclear maintenance equipment
training

training
(electricity, instrumentation, and
h i l )
Nuclear maintenance general technique

Nuclear maintenance
training

Nuclear power maintenance work training (electricity, instrumentation and

330
Power generation

Nuclear disaster prevention training


Safety regulations training

Curriculum
New employee
Rookie Nuclear
follow-up power

Technical training
training basic
training

QA basic Safe QA intermediate training QA advanced training QA application


work
training training training
Nuclear New director training
power
legislation
basic ISO 9000 examiner course
training
Human ISO 9000 internal quality auditor development training
factor (H/E

Common training
prevention)
Human factor
training (safety awareness and moral) training
Table ϯ-3-3 Outline of Maintenance Training Facilities
Company
Japan Atomic Power Hokkaido Tohoku
name
Nuclear Technical Training
Name Comprehensive Training Center Nuclear power training center
Center
Tokai Village, Naka County, On the premises of Tomari Power On the premises of Onagawa
Location
Ibaraki Prefecture Station Nuclear Power Station
Reinforced concrete construction Reinforced concrete construction Reinforced concrete construction
Two-storey training building 3 storeys above ground and 1 Two storeys
3,300 square meters floor underground Total of 1,138 square meters
Buildings Three-storey accommodation About 3,020 square meters Three-storey steel framed
building building
1,800 square meters Total of 1,948 square meters
Total: 3,086 square meters
Established December, 1988 October, 1993 December, 1984
(1) Loop facility consisting of (1) Steam generator water chamber, (1) Training equipment for lower
pumps, valves, tanks, steam generator tube inspection part of nuclear reactor, control
instruments and so on equipment rod driving mechanism
(2) Metal-clad switchgears, large (2) RCP shaft seal RCP internal replacing machine, control rod
electric motors, model driving mechanism disassembly
electrically-powered valves, (3) Test loop facility consisting of training equipment, main steam
sequencing equipment for pumps, valves, measuring relief safety valve training
protective relay board training, instruments, etc. equipment, reactor recirculation
electricity and instrumentation (4) Nondestructive examination pump mechanical seal
training equipment such as a facilities simulation training equipment,
nuclear instrument panel and (5) Reactor control protection main steam isolation valve
radiation monitor equipment, Reactor control operator simulation equipment,
(3) Equipment for training with protection system instrument feed water regulator valve
instrumentation characteristic of rack reactor safety protection training equipment
nuclear power generation, such equipment, control rod (2) Control rod driving water pump
as a water pressure control management device, control rod and electric motor
device for driving the control position indicator, nuclear (3) Digital electro hydraulic turbine
rods, relief and safety valves, instruments outside the core, control simulation panel,
primary coolant pump EH governor control device, radiation monitor panel, digital
mechanical seals and rotary turbine monitoring instruments, control device simulation panel,
machine vibration measurement control panel for training, power range monitor panel,
practice equipment radiation monitoring Generator Transformer
Equipment
(4) Practice equipment for instruments Protection Relay Panel
understanding the behavior (6) Instrument power source, onsite (4) Water pressure control unit
(water flow, boiling, phase flow, power switchgear, generator (5) Test loop equipment, various
heat conduction) of water and transformer protection relay, valves, pumps and electric
steam (heat) auxiliary motor facilities, upper motors
(5) Circulation loop corrosion bearing of RCP motor, (6) Generator brush mock-up
practice equipment automatic generator voltage device
(6) Various instruments for facility regulator for motor (7) Power distribution devices such
diagnosis such as inspection (7) Field instruments (transmitters, as distribution switchgear,
equipment for eddy current regulators, control valves, etc.) charging equipment
testing, ultrasonic and other (8) Sensory experience training (8) Nondestructive examination
nondestructive testing equipment facilities,
(7) Arc and TIG welders, (9) Pipe coupling training
post-welding heat treatment ͤThe installation of training equipment, scaffold assembly
equipment facilities for comprehensive training equipment
(8) Small simulators for training at digital facilities, onsite power (10) Compressor training equipment
Units 1 and 2 at Tokai Daini and switchgear, and control valves (11) Physical Feeling Equipment,
Tsuruga Power Stations for Tomari Unit 3 is planned for Sensory experience equipment
(9) Interactive learning devices 2010. for tightening of manually
(CAI) operated valve handles
(12) Interactive learning aids
(CAI)
Instructor
Full-time and part-time Full-time and part-time Full-time and part-time
status
Intended Employees and affiliate Employees and affiliate Employees and affiliate
persons companies companies companies


331
Company
Tokyo Chubu
name
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear
Fukushima Nuclear Skill Training
Name Skill Training Center Nuclear Power Training Center
Center
Training center
On the premises of
On the premises of Fukushima On the premises of the Hamaoka
Location Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear
Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Plant
Power Station
Reinforced concrete construction Skill training facilities Maintenance training building
Two-storey steel-frame reinforced Two-storey steel framed structure
Two storey building concrete structure Total of 1,530 square meters
2,570 square meters 2,499 square meters
Reactor maintenance training
Buildings Training building expansion facility
730 square meters Reinforced concrete structure
(partly steel framed)
Two storeys aboveground, six
storeys underground
4,600 square meters
Established June, 1981 April, 1988 April, 1984
(1) Training facilities for various types (1) Training facilities for various types (1) Reactor recirculation pump
of pumps, valves, electric motors, of pumps, valves, electric motors, mechanical seal replacement
etc. etc. training facility
(2) Training facilities for mechanical (2) Reactor recirculation pump (2) Lower part of reactor simulation
equipment such as a reactor mechanical seal replacement facility
recirculation pump mechanical training facility, pump trouble (3) Control rod driving mechanism
seal replacement training facility training equipment and other attaching/detaching training
and pump malfunction training mechanical training facilities facility and disassembly training
equipment (3) Pipe support devices, facility
(3) Pipe support devices, nondestructive examination (4) Reactor core simulation facility
nondestructive examination equipment (5) Main steam isolation valve
equipment (4) Training facilities for instruments operator simulation training
(4) Training facilities for instruments such as feed water and facility
such as feed water and recirculation control devices, (6) Training facilities for mechanical
recirculation control devices, neutron counting instruments equipment such as pumps, valves,
neutron counting instruments (5) Training facilities for electric pipe supporting devices,
(5) Training facilities for electric equipment such as circuit compressors, welders,
equipment such as circuit breakers, uninterruptible power nondestructive examination
breakers, uninterruptible power supplies, transmission lines and a equipment and rotary machine
supplies, transmission lines and a generator protective relay panel diagnosis equipment
Equipment generator protective relay panel (6) Training facilities for radiation (7) Training facilities for electrical
(6) Training facilities for radiation control equipment such as equipment such as circuit
control equipment such as radiation measurement breakers, motors, insulation
radiation measurement instruments diagnosis equipment, sequencing
instruments (7) Training facilities for fuel controllers and digital control
(7) Training facilities for fuel inspection facilities equipment
inspection facilities (8) Control rod driven mechanism (8) Training facilities for
(8) Air-tightness and a leakage test repair training equipment instrumentation, such as an
facility for spent fuel transport (9) BWR see-through model instrument-controlled model plant,
containers (10) Reactor pressure vessel and neutron counting panel TIP
(9) Model of nuclear power plant shroud simulator (consisting of driving equipment, EHC
(10) Reactor simulator (shroud upper half ABWR and half BWR-5), simulator, regulator valves and
grid plate, core support plate, RIP-FMCRD handling training CRD water pressure control unit
feed water sparger and so forth), equipment and other reactor (9) Pump malfunction response
various kinds of periodical maintenance training facilities training equipment, belt
inspection and other reactor (11) Various pieces of replacement training facility, pipe
work training equipment digitally-controlled training and flange sealing training facility
(11) Turbine monitoring instrument equipment and electronically-powered valve
panel training equipment (12) Intra-core shipping training failure diagnosis training facility
(12) Intra-core shipping training equipment
equipment
Instructor
Full-time and part-time Full-time and part-time Full-time and part-time
status
Intended Employees and affiliate Employees and affiliate Employees and affiliate
persons companies companies companies

332
Company
Hokuriku Kansai Chugoku
name
Shimane Nuclear Power Station
Nuclear Technical Training Nuclear Power Maintenance
Name Nuclear Power Maintenance
Center Training Center
Training Center
On the premises of Shika Nuclear Takahama-cho, Ohi County, On the premises of Shimane
Location
Power Station Fukui Prefecture Nuclear Power Station
Reinforced concrete structure Reinforced concrete structure Technical training building
Two-storey building Two-storey lecture building Two-storey steel framed structure
2,550 square meters About 1,700 square meters Building 1
Three-storey training building Total of 783 square meters
About 2,200 square meters Building 2
Buildings
Three-storey accommodation Total of 638 square meters
building
About 1,400 square meters
Tour reception wing: three stories
About 430 square meters
Established July, 1993 October, 1983 February, 1989
(1) Reactor recirculation pump (1) Reactor vessel shell and top lid (1) Lower part of reactor simulation
mechanical seal simulation (2) Steam generator primary water equipment Lower reactor training
equipment chamber, heat transfer pipe test equipment (including neutron
(2) Main steam isolation valve driving equipment, manipulation counting instrumentation), control
simulator equipment, manhole handling rod driving mechanism and
(3) Processed radiation monitor model equipment, Nozzle cap replacing equipment, control rod
control panel, processing (3) Primary coolant pump shaft seal driving mechanism leak test
instrumentation and control circuit (4) Fuel handling facility equipment
test equipment (5) System facilities for training (2) Control rod driving mechanism
(4) Test loop equipment (consisting of (various types of pumps, valves, replacement training facility and
pumps, valves, tanks, measuring pipes, instruments, support disassembly training facility
instruments, etc.) structures) (3) Reactor pressure vessel cut model
(5) Meal-clad and power center (6) Switchgears (metal-clad, power (4) Fuel handling equipment
switchgear and protective relay center, control center) (5) Reactor recirculation pump
facility (7) Primary coolant pump motor mechanical seal facility
(6) Various types of valves, pumps and (motor flywheel, oil cooler heat (6) Main steam isolation valve driving
motors transfer tube, upper bearing) devices
(7) Nondestructive examination (8) Panels in central control room (7) Disassembly training equipment for
equipment (control rod management various types of pumps, valves and
(8) Control rod driving mechanism equipment, control rod position couplings, valve gland packing
disassembly training facility indicator, reactor protection control tightening devices
(9) Water pressure control unit equipment, reactor panel, nuclear (8) Nondestructive examination
(10) Nuclear instrumentation and instrumentation outside the core, equipment
movable in-core instrumentation instrumentation power supply, (9) Training facilities for electrical
Equipment driving mechanism automatic voltage regulator , equipment such as various types of
(11) Electro hydraulic control protective relay, safety protection circuit breakers, motors, protective
equipment relay rack, Duplex digital control relays, sequencers
(12) Lower reactor simulation facility equipment) (10) Training facilities for instruments
(9) Field instruments (pump vibration such as feed water controllers,
monitor, Flow rate control neutron counting monitors,
simulator equipment, Water level radiation monitors
control simulator equipment liquid (11) Automatic voltage regulation
level gauge, transmitter, regulator, facility
solenoid-operated valves, etc.) (12) Pressure transmitters, flow rate
(10) Automatic electrically-powered transmitters, E/P transducers and
valve diagnosis equipment other instruments
(11) Rotary machine vibration (13) Analog trip setting panel
diagnosis equipment (14) Air compressor
(12) Nondestructive examination (15) Sensory experience equipment
equipment (16) Rotary machine vibration
(13) Environmental simulation diagnosis equipment
equipment
(14) Nuclear power generation
see-through plant model (PWR
type)
(15) Sensory experience training
equipment
(16) Engineering Model
㸦Ohi-3 Model㸧
Instructor
Full-time and part-time Full-time Full-time and part-time
status
Intended Employees and affiliate Employees and affiliate Employees and affiliate
persons companies companies companies


333
Company
Shikoku Kyushu
name
Genkai Nuclear Power Station Sendai Nuclear Power Station
Name Nuclear Safety Training Institute
Nuclear Training Center Nuclear Training Center
Matsuyama City, Ehime On the premises of Genkai On the premises of Sendai
Location
Prefecture Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station
Steel framed reinforced concrete Two-storey steel framed structure Two-storey steel framed structure

structure Total of 5,300 square meters Total of 4,800 square meters


Buildings
6 storeys aboveground and 1 floor
underground
Total of 8,300 square meters
Established November, 1986 July, 1997 November, 1996
(1) Reactor vessel top lid (1) Reactor vessel top lid (1) Reactor vessel top lid
(2) Fuel handling facility, fuel (2) Steam generator water chamber (2) Steam generator water chamber
replacement crane operation (3) Primary coolant pump shaft seal (3) Primary coolant pump shaft seal
simulator (4) Fuel handling facility (4) Fuel replacement crane
(3) Primary coolant pump shaft seal (5) Steam turbine simulator
(4) Steam generator water chamber, (6) Various types of pumps, valves (5) Various types of pumps, valves
steam generator heat transer (7) Loop facility (sensory (6) Loop facility
tube test equipment, steam experience training facilities) (7) Nondestructive examination
generator heat transfer tube (8) Nondestructive examination equipment
repair tools equipment (8) Nuclear instrumentation ouside
(5) Valves, pumps, blowers (9) Nuclear instrumentation outside the core, control rod controller,
(6) Training system equipment of the core, control rod reactor safety protective
(7) Rotary machine vibration controller, reactor safety devices, radiation monitoring
diagnosis equipment protective devices, radiation facility, turbine control devices,
(8) Welding facility, machining monitoring facility, turbine turbine monitoring instruments,
facility control devices, turbine automatic generator voltage
(9) Nondestructive examination monitoring instruments, controller, reactor control
equipment, destructive automatic generator voltage protective devices, protective
examination equipment controller, reactor control relays
(10) Generator training equipment protective devices, protective (9) Switchgears (M/C, P/C, C/C)
(11) Electrical wiring facility relays, instrumentation power (10) Various types of motors
(12) Electric motors, supply (11) Measuring instruments
electrically-powered valves, (10) Switchgears (M/C, P/C, C/C) (12) Radiation measuring facility
switchgears (M/C, P/C, C/C), (11) Various types of motors (13)Training facilities for putting-on
Equipment
protective relays, sequencers (12) Measuring instruments and taking-off protective
(13) Automatic generator voltage (13) Radiation measuring facility cloths, decontamination
regulator, instrumentation (14) Training facilities for training equipment
power supply putting-on and taking-off (14) sensory experience training
(14) Ordinary measuring protective cloths, facilities
instruments, transmitters, decontamination training
recording instruments, equipment
indicator instruments, (15) DC power supply
controllers, analyzers, control
valves
(15) Reactor control protective
devices, radiation monitors,
nuclear instrumentation
outside the core, nuclear
instrumentation inside the
core, control rod controller,
control rod position indicators,
turbine monitoring
instruments, turbine protective
devices, turbine control
devices, digital control devices
(16) Sensory experience training
equipment

Instructor
Full-time and part-time Full-time and part-time Full-time and part-time
status
Intended Employees and affiliate Employees and affiliate Employees and affiliate
persons companies companies companies

(Note) Tables ϯ-3-1 to -3 were prepared based on materials obtained from the Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.,
the Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc., and the Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan.

334
REFINING, NUCLEAR FUEL FABRICATION,
SPENT FUEL STORAGE, REPROCESSING AND
RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL FACILITIES

ϰ LISTS OF REFINING, NUCLEAR FUEL


FABRICATION, SPENT FUEL
STORAGE, REPROCESSING AND
RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL
FACILITIES


335
䊨㻙㻝㻌 㻻㼜㼑㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌 㼍㼚㼐㻌 㻯㼛㼚㼟㼠㼞㼡㼏㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌 㻿㼠㼍㼠㼡㼟㻌 㼛㼒㻌 㻾㼑㼒㼕㼚㼕㼚㼓㻘㻌 㻺㼡㼏㼘㼑㼍㼞㻌 㻲㼡㼑㼘㻌
㻲㼍㼎㼞㼕㼏㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻘㻌 㻿㼜㼑㼚㼠㻌 㻲㼡㼑㼘㻌 㻿㼠㼛㼞㼍㼓㼑㻘㻌 㻾㼑㼜㼞㼛㼏㼑㼟㼟㼕㼚㼓㻌 㼍㼚㼐㻌 㻾㼍㼐㼕㼛㼍㼏㼠㼕㼢㼑㻌
㼃㼍㼟㼠㼑㻌㻰㼕㼟㼜㼛㼟㼍㼘㻌㻲㼍㼏㼕㼘㼕㼠㼕㼑㼟㻌

% & The facilities in operation at the end of FY2009 were 6 fabrication facilities,
1 reprocessing facility and 4 radioactive waste disposal facilities (2 waste
management facilities and 2 waste disposal facilities).
% & One reprocessing facility is under construction.
% & There are no facilities that have received a business designation for refining or a
business license for spent fuel storage.

As of the end of FY2009


Radioactive Waste Disposal
Nuclear
facility
Fuel Reprocessing
Fabrication facility Waste
Waste disposal
facility management
facility
facility

In operation 6 1 2 2

Under
0 1 0 0
construction

Being prepared
0 0 0 0
for construction

Total 6 2 2 2


337

ϰ-2 List of Operation and Construction Status of Fabrication Facilities As of the End of FY2009
Licensee Facility Location Capacity Degree of Processing Date of fuel Date construction Date Remarks
enrichment method fabrication started operation
license started
In Global Nuclear Global Nuclear Uchikawa, 750 t-U / year 5% or less Rod-shaped 1968-8-30 1969-1-27 1970-8-29
operation Fuel Japan Co., Fuel Japan Co., Yokosuka City, (As of 2010-3-31) processing
Ltd. Ltd. Kanagawa (For BWR)
Prefecture
In Mitsubishi Mitsubishi Tokai Village, 475 t-U / year (conversion) Conversion 1972-1-11 1972-1 1972-7-29
operation Nuclear Fuel Nuclear Fuel Naka County, (As of 2010-3-31) processing
Co., Ltd. Co., Ltd. Ibaraki (For PWR)
5% or less
Prefecture 440 t-U / year (mold) Rod-shaped
(As of 2010-3-31) processing
(For PWR)
In Nuclear Fuel Kumatori Kumatori Town, 383 t-U / year 5% or less Rod-shaped 1972-9-1 㸫 1972-9-1
operation Industries, Ltd. Works Sen-nan County, (As of 2010-3-31) processing
This processing
Osaka Prefecture (For PWR) facility was first put
into operation by
Sumitomo Electric
Industries, Ltd. on
August 1, 1969,
and then was

338
transferred to the
present owner.
Tokai Works Muramatsu, 250 t-U / year 5% or less Rod-shaped 1978-9-29 1978-11 1980-1-4
Tokai Village, (As of 2010-3-31) processing
Naka County, (For BWR)
Ibaraki
Prefecture
In Japan Atomic Ningyo-toge Kamisaibara,, 200 t-U / year 5% or less Uranium 1985-10-18 1985-11 1988-4-25 Service,
(As of 2010-3-31) enrichment production
operation Energy Agency Environmental Kagamino-cho, and operation
Engineering Okayama (centrifugal
terminated in
Center Prefecture separation March, 2001.
method)
In Japan Nuclear Uranium Rokkasho First 1150 5% or less Uranium 1988-8-10 1988-10 1992-3-27
1890
operation Fuel Ltd. enrichment Village, term t-U / year enrichment
t-U/year
facility Kamikita (centrifugal
or less
County, Aomori separation
(as of
Prefecture First half 740 method) 1993-7-12 1993-9 1997-10-17
2010-3-
of t-U / year 31)
second
term

ϰ-3 List of Operation and Construction Status of Reprocessing Facilities As of the End of FY2009
Licensee Facility Location Capacity Processing Date of Date Date service Date Remarks
method designation construction started operation
started started
Japan Atomic Tokai Tokai Village, 210 t-uranium Wet method 1980-2-23 1971-6 1981-1-17 Hot test:
In
Energy Research and Naka County, (Maximum of 0.7 t-uranium PUREX process (Note 1) September
operation Ibaraki (metallic uranium equivalent) / (1971-6-5) 1977
Agency Development
Prefecture day) Full-scale
Center
operation:
January 1981

Under Japan Nuclear Reprocessing Rokkasho 800 t-U Wet method 1992-12-24 1993-4 1999-12-3 2010-10
construction Fuel Limited facility Village, (Pre-irradiated metallic uranium PUREX process (planned)
Kamikita weight equivalent)
(Note 2) County, Aomori
Prefecture

(Note 1) With the partial amendments (June 1979) to the Law for the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors, this is the day deemed to be when
approval was granted. The date in parentheses is the date when approval was given to the design and construction methods.
(Note 2) Use of the facilities related to receiving and storing spent fuel was commenced prior to the start of operation of the reprocessing facilities now under construction.

339





ϰ-4 List of Operation and Construction Status of Disposal Facilities As of the End of FY2009
Date of
Radioactive
Type of intended waste and business Burial or Storage business Date business
Licensee Facility Location Facility type material
details Capacity (change) started
concentration
license
Unit 1 Rokkasho A burial facility Disposal of radioactive waste liquids, used Low-level Equivalent to
Disposa Village, closed off by resins etc. produced in nuclear power radioactive 204,800 200-liter 1990.11.15 1992.12.8
Japan Nuclear Enrichment l facility Kamikita artificial structures plants after solidification with cement in a waste drums
Fuel Ltd. and Burial County, (concrete pits) container
Division Unit 2 Aomori from surrounding Disposal of radioactive solid waste Low-level Equivalent to 1998.10.8 2000.10.10
Disposa Prefecture soil produced in nuclear power plants after radioactive 207,360 200-liter (Date of start
l facility solidification with cement in a container waste drums of reception)
Japan Atomic Tokai Waste Tokai A burial facility Disposal of contaminated concrete and Very low-level
Energy Research and disposal Village, (unlined trench) other waste produced by the dismantling of radioactive 2,520 m3 1995.6.22 1995.11.27
Agency Development facility Naka with no artificial JPDR not solidified in a container waste
Center County, structures
Ibaraki installed
Prefecture
Japan Nuclear Reprocessing Waste Rokkasho Designated waste Storage of returned vitrified waste from oversea's reprocessing
Fuel Ltd. division manage Village, management of spent fuel 1,440 vitrified 1992.4.3 1995.4.26
-ment Kamikita facility 1) canisters

340
facility County,

In operation
Aomori
Prefecture
Chemical treatment or evaporation
treatment of liquid waste and the
compression, grinding and incineration Low-level Equivalent to 1992.3.30 1996.3.29
treatment of solid waste, produced from radioactive 42,795 200-liter
Oarai town,
the operation of nuclear reactors and the waste and drums
O-arai Waste Higashi-
Japan Atomic Designated waste use of nuclear fuel material at O-arai Relatively low
Research and manage ibaraki
Energy management Research and Development Center, Japan concentration of
Development -ment County,
Agency facility 1) Atomic Energy Agency, the Material Test low-level
Center facility Ibaraki
Furnace Utilization Facility attached to the radioactive
Prefecture
Institute for Materials Research, Tohoku waste
University, and Nippon Nuclear Fuel
Development Co., Ltd. as well as the
storage of treated waste in a solid state.
Note 1) Designated waste management facility: Waste management facility for nuclear fuel material of 3.7 terabecquerel or over or material contaminated with nuclear fuel material
Note 2) Radioactive material concentration level of intended waste: Classification by concentration level for the sake of convenience based on the upper legal concentration limits applied
to the burial of radioactive waste.

ϰ-5 Location Map of Nuclear Fuel Fabrication, Reprocessing and Radioactive
Waste Disposal Facilities
As of the End of FY2009
Nuclear fuel fabrication facility
#In operation: 6
$Under construction: 0
Total: 6
Reprocessing facility
%In operation: 1
&Under construction: 1
Total: 2
Disposal facility
'In operation: 4
Under construction: 0
Total: 4

<Rokkasho>
‫ۑ‬Reprocessing Division, Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. (reprocessing facility)
‫ڸ‬Reprocessing Division, Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. (waste management facility)
‫ڦ‬Enrichment and Disposal Division, Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd.
(uranium enrichment facility)
‫ڸ‬Enrichment and Disposal Division, Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. (disposal facility)

<Kumatori>
‫ڦ‬Kumatori Works, Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd.
<Tokai>
(fuel fabrication facility)
‫ە‬Japan Atomic Energy Agency
Tokai Research and Development
<Ningyo-toge> Center (reprocessing facility)
‫ڦ‬Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd.
‫ڦ‬Japan Atomic Energy Agency
(fuel fabrication and reconversion
Ningyo-toge Environmental Engineering facility)
Center (uranium enrichment facility) ‫ڦ‬Tokai Works, Nuclear Fuel
Industries, Ltd.
(fuel fabrication)
‫ڸ‬Japan Atomic Energy Agency
Tokai Research and Development
Center (waste disposal facility)

<Oarai>
‫ ڸ‬Oarai Research and Development Center,
Japan Atomic Energy Agency
(waste management facility)

<Yokosuka>
‫ڦ‬Global Nuclear Fuel Japan (fuel fabrication)


(Note) Currently there are no refining or spent fuel storage facilities

341
ϱ STATUS OF OPERATION OF REFINING,
NUCLEAR FUEL FABRICATION,
SPENT FUEL STORAGE,
REPROCESSING AND
RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL
FACILITIES, AND TRANSPORT
CONFIRMATION RESULTS OF
NUCLEAR FUEL MATERIAL


343
ϱ-1 Status of Operation of Refining, Nuclear Fuel Fabrication, Spent Fuel
Storage, Reprocessing and Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities

(1) Nuclear fuel fabrication for light water reactors of electric utilities is being performed at four sites
belonging to the three companies of Global Nuclear Fuel-Japan Co., Ltd., Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel
Co., Ltd. and Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd., and they now have fabrication facilities with a total
maximum throughput of 1,823 t-U per year.

(2) Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd. performs conversion for light water reactors belonging to
electric utilities and it now has a fabrication facility with a maximum throughput of 475 t-U per
year.

(3) Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited performs conversion at its enrichment facility at up to 5% for light
water reactors belonging to electric utilities. It now has uranium enrichment equipment with a
maximum throughput of 1,890 t-U per year. The Japan Atomic Energy Agency had an enrichment
facility at its Ningyo-toge Environmental Engineering Center. The facility had uranium
enrichment equipment with a maximum throughput of 200 t-U per year, however its service,
production and operation were terminated in March 2001.

(4) As for nuclear fuel reprocessing, the Japan Atomic Energy Agency has a reprocessing facility at
its Tokai Research and Development Center and this facility now has processing equipment with a
maximum throughput of 210 t-U per year. It performed no reprocessing in FY2009 and the
cumulative amount processed is about 1,140 t-U.

(5) At Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited’s burial facility, a burial facility with a capacity of roughly
200,000 200-liter drums was newly installed in FY2000, increasing the burial capacity to some
400,000 drums. In FY2009, a total of 9,136 200-liter drums were received at the two facilities,
and a cumulative total of 218,707 drums have been buried.
At the waste burial facility at the Japan Atomic Energy Agency’s Tokai Research and
Development Center, waste to the order of 1,670 tons was buried in a 2,520-ton capacity facility
in FY1995, though its burial business has now been terminated.

(6) At the waste management facility of Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited, 28 wastes were received in
FY2009, while a cumulative total of 1,338 canisters of vitrified waste are stored and managed
there.
At the waste management facility of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency’s O-arai Research and
Development Center, waste equivalent to 343 200-liter drums was received in FY2009 and a
cumulative total equivalent to 28,836 drums are stored and managed there.

(7) At the reprocessing facility at Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited’s reprocessing plant, the facility itself is
now under construction. However, facility related to receiving and storing spent nuclear fuel has
begun to be utilized.
239 tons of spent fuel received in FY2009, a cumulative total of 3,165 tons of spent fuel has been
received.

(8) There are no facilities that have been designated as a refining business or that have received a
business license for spent fuel storage.


345
Table ϱ-1 Trends in Maximum Nuclear Fuel Material Capacity at Fabrication Facilities at the End of Fiscal Years
(Unit: t-U / year)
Fiscal Year
Licensee Plant or site name
         
Global Nuclear Fuel Japan Co., Ltd. Global Nuclear Fuel Japan Co., Ltd.          
Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd 㸫 㸫        
Kumatori Works 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫     
Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd.
Tokai Works 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 
Total          

Fiscal Year
Licensee Plant or site name
         
Global Nuclear Fuel Japan Co., Ltd. Global Nuclear Fuel Japan Co., Ltd.          
Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd          
Kumatori Works          
Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd.
Tokai Works          
Total         


346
Fiscal Year
Licensee Plant or site name
         
Global Nuclear Fuel Japan Co., Ltd. Global Nuclear Fuel Japan Co., Ltd.          
Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd          
Kumatori Works          
Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd.
Tokai Works          
Total         

Fiscal Year
Licensee Plant or site name
         
Global Nuclear Fuel Japan Co., Ltd. Global Nuclear Fuel Japan Co., Ltd.          
Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd          
Kumatori Works          
Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd.
Tokai Works          
Total         
(Note) The throughput capacity is for light water reactor fuel.
Table ϱ-2 Trends in Maximum Nuclear Fuel Material Capacity at Fabrication Facilities (Conversion Processing) at the End of Fiscal Years
(Unit: t-U / year㸧
Fiscal Year
Licensee Plant or site name
         
W W W W W W W W W
Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd 
82GD\ 82GD\ 82GD\ 82GD\ 82GD\ 82GD\ 82GD\ 82GD\ 82GD\

Fiscal Year
Licensee Plant or site name
         
Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd          

Fiscal Year
Licensee Plant or site name
         
Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd
Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd
. (Conversion processing)
         

Fiscal Year
Licensee Plant or site name
       

347
Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd
Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd
. (Conversion processing)
       

Table ϱ-3 Trends in Maximum Nuclear Fuel Material Capacity at Fabrication Facilities (Uranium Enrichment) at the End of Fiscal Years (Unit: t-U /
year㸧
Fiscal Year
Licensee Plant or site name
         
Japan Atomic Energy Ningyo-toge Environmental
         
Agency Engineering Center
Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited Uranium Enrichment Facility 㸫 㸫        
Total          

Fiscal Year
Licensee Plant or site name
         
-DSDQ $WRPLF (QHUJ\ Ningyo-toge Environmental
         
$JHQF\ Engineering Center
Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited Uranium Enrichment Facility          
Total          



Table ϱ-4 Trends of Reprocessing Amounts by Fiscal Year
Unit: t-U
Plant or Fiscal Year
Licensee
site name          
-DSDQ $WRPLF (QHUJ\ Reprocessing
         
$JHQF\ facility

Plant or Fiscal Year
Licensee
site name          
-DSDQ $WRPLF (QHUJ\ Reprocessing
         
$JHQF\ facility

Plant or Fiscal Year
Licensee Total
site name         
-DSDQ $WRPLF (QHUJ\ Reprocessing
         
$JHQF\ facility

348
Notes: 1. Because of the rounding off of fractions, the sum of throughput for each fiscal year may not correspond with the total.
2. The total includes the 79.1 t-U throughput from the hot test.


Table ϱ-5 Trends in the Amount of Radioactive Waste Buried and Managed at Waste Disposal Facilities
(1) Enrichment and Disposal Division, Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd.: Waste burial facilities
Burial capacity
           (drum equivalent)

Unit 1 Received          
disposal Buried           
facility No. of drums buried          
Unit 2 Received          
disposal Buried           
facility No. of drums buried          
Received          
Total Buried           
No. of drums buried          
Note: The burial capacity indicates the maximum burial capacity of the waste site.

(2) Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Tokai Research and Development Center
Fiscal Year    Burial capacity

349
Waste disposal facility Buried (tons)   
(Non-solidified concrete and Cumulative amount 
other waste)   
buried (tons)
Note: Burial was terminated in 1995 and shifted to the burial site maintenance level in October 1997.

(3) Reprocessing Division, Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd.: Waste management facility
Storage
Fiscal Year           
capacity
No. of received
          
Waste management facility canisters

(Returned vitrified waste) Cumulative no. of
          
received canisters

(4) Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Oarai Research and Development Center
Storage
Fiscal Year          capacity
Received
Waste management facility (200-liter drum equivalent)         
(Liquid waste, solid waste 
and Solidified waste from these) Amount in storage
(200-liter drum equivalent)         




ϱ7UDQVSRUW&RQILUPDWLRQ5HVXOWVRI1XFOHDU)XHO0DWHULDO


 (Number of authorizations)
Calendar year          
Transported material 

UF6 *1          


UO2 *2          
Fuel assembly         

1HZ )XHO
 
New fuel total          
Spent fuel          
High-level       
UDGLRDFWLYHZDVWH   
Others *4          

350
Total          
Transport authorizations
(included in numbers)
by the Nuclear and Industrial        㸵 㸯 
Safety Agency


Notes: After 1999, only transportation under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry is included. 
࣭*1㸸Uranium hexafluoride
࣭*2㸸Uranium dioxide
࣭*3㸸UO2 and MOX new fuel assemblies
࣭*4㸸Irradiation test pieces and others


Ϩ STATUS OF PERIODICAL FACILITY
ϱ
INSPECTIONS AT NUCLEAR FUEL
FABRICATION, SPENT FUEL STORAGE,
REPROCESSING AND RADIOACTIVE
WASTE DISPOSAL FACILITIES


351

Ϩ -1 Outline of Periodical Facility Inspections at Nuclear Fuel
ϱ
Fabrication, Spent Fuel Storage, Reprocessing and
Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities

At nuclear fuel fabrication, spent fuel storage, reprocessing and radioactive waste
disposal facilities (designated waste management facilities), periodical facility
inspections take place once a year by the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry to
verify that the performance of each facility and of the equipment conforms to the
technical standards stipulated in ministerial ordinances.
In FY2009, 9 periodical facility inspections took place at a total of 9 sites; 6
fabrication sites, 1 reprocessing site and 2 waste disposal sites.
No facilities have received business licenses for spent fuel storage.





353
(2) Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd.
ϱ
Ϩ-2 Status of Periodical Facility Inspections by Plant The number of this
inspection 10th inspection
Inspection periods
1. Outline of plant and - Fabrication process: Reconversion and molding (for PWR)
(1) Global Nuclear Fuel-Japan, Co., Ltd.
facilities - Maximum throughput: 475 t-U per year
The number of this (5% enrichment or less) (conversion)
inspection 10th inspection 440 t-U per year
Inspection periods (5% enrichment or less) (molding)
1. Outline of plant and - Fabrication method: Molding (for BWR) - Operations began: January, 1972
facilities - Maximum throughput: 750 t-U per year (enrichment 5% or less) 2. Inspection August 11, 2009
- Operations began: August, 1970 application date
2. Inspection October 28, 2009 3. Inspection December 11, 2009 to December 18, 2009
application date implementation period
3. Inspection January 12, 2010 to January 29, 2010 4. Date of certificate January 26, 2010
implementation period issuance
4. Date of certificate February 12, 2010 5. Outline of (1) Facilities subject to inspection
issuance inspection - Fabrication facility itself

354
5. Outline of (1) Facilities subject to inspection - Nuclear fuel material storage facility
inspection - Fabrication facility itself - Radioactive waste disposal facility
- Nuclear fuel material storage facility - Radiological control facility
- Other facilities attached to the fabrication facility
- Radioactive waste disposal facility
- Radiological control facility 6. Result - It is approved since it was found that it meets Article 3-18
of the Rules for Nuclear Fuel Material Fabricating Business
- Other facilities attached to the fabrication facility
defined based on the definitions of Article 16-5-2 of the
6. Result - It is approved since it was found that it meets Article 3-18 Law for the Regulations of Nuclear Source Material,
of the Rules for Nuclear Fuel Material Fabricating Business Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors.
defined based on the definitions of Article 16-5-2 of the
7. Others 1. Radiation worker dose during periodical licensee facility
Law for the Regulations of Nuclear Source Material,
inspection period
Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors.
Number of workers: 84
7. Others 1. Radiation worker dose during periodical licensee facility Average dose: 0.1 mSv
inspection period Maximum dose: 0.7 mSv
Number of workers: 100 Internal exposure: none
Average dose: 0.0 mSv 2. Major modification work performed during periodical
Maximum dose: 0.0 mSv facility inspection period
Internal exposure: none - Update of, and associated work on the continuous
2. Major modification work performed during periodical sintering furnace (1 unit)
facility inspection period - Partial modification of, and associated work on the pellet
None aligner (1 unit)
(3) Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd., Tokai Works (4) Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd., Kumatori Works
The number of this The number of this
inspection 10th inspection inspection 10th inspection
Inspection periods Inspection periods
1. Outline of plant and - Fabrication method: Molding (for BWR) 1. Outline of plant and - Fabrication method: Molding (for PWR)
facilities - Maximum throughput: 250 t-U per year (enrichment 5% or facilities - Maximum throughput: 383 t-U per year (enrichment 5% or
less) less)
- Operations began: January, 1980 - Operations began: September, 1972
2. Inspection September 28, 2009 2. Inspection August 3, 2009
application date application date
3. Inspection December 17, 2009 to December 24, 2009 3. Inspection November 24, 2009 to November 27, 2009
implementation period implementation period
4. Date of certificate January 26, 2010 4. Date of certificate January 13, 2010
issuance issuance
5. Outline of (1) Facilities subject to inspection 5. Outline of inspection (1) Facilities subject to inspection
inspection - Fabrication facility itself - Fabrication facility itself
- Nuclear fuel material storage facility - Nuclear fuel material storage facility

355
- Radioactive waste disposal facility - Radioactive waste disposal facility
- Radiological control facility - Radiological control facility
- Other facilities attached to the fabrication facility - Other facilities attached to the fabrication facility
6. Result - It is approved since it was found that it meets Article 3-18 6. Result - It is approved since it was found that it meets Article 3-18
of the Rules for Nuclear Fuel Material Fabricating Business of the Rules for Nuclear Fuel Material Fabricating
defined based on the definitions of Article 16-5-2 of the Business defined based on the definitions of Article 16-5-2
Law for the Regulations of Nuclear Source Material, of the Law for the Regulations of Nuclear Source Material,
Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors. Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors.
7. Others 1. Radiation worker dose during periodical licensee facility 7. Others 1. Radiation worker dose during periodical licensee facility
inspection period inspection period
Number of workers: 41 Number of workers: 56
Average dose: Less than 0.1 mSv Average dose: 0.1 mSv
Maximum dose: 0.3 mSv Maximum dose: 0.5 mSv
Internal exposure: none Internal exposure: none
2. Major modification work performed during periodical 2. Major modification work performed during periodical
facility inspection period facility inspection period
None - Modification of, and associated work on the roaster
No. 1



(5) Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited, Enrichment and Burial Plant (6) Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Ningyo-toge Environmental Engineering Center
The number of this The number of this
inspection 10th inspection inspection 10th inspection
Inspection periods Inspection periods
1. Outline of plant and - Fabrication method: uranium enrichment 1. Outline of plant and - Fabrication method: uranium enrichment
facilities - Maximum throughput: 1,890 t-U per year (enrichment 5% facilities - Maximum throughput: 200 t-U per year (enrichment 5% or
or less) less)
- Operations began: September 1991 - Operations began: March, 1988
2. Inspection July 31, 2009 (revised on August 19, 2009 and September 11, 2. Inspection October 14, 2009
application date 2009) application date
3. Inspection November 18, 2009 to December 18, 2009 3. Inspection January 13, 2010 to January 19, 2010
implementation period implementation period
4. Date of certificate January 21, 2010 4. Date of certificate February 8, 2010
issuance issuance
5. Outline of (1) Facilities subject to inspection 5. Outline of (1) Facilities subject to inspection
inspection - Enrichment facility inspection - Fabrication facility itself
- Nuclear fuel material storage facility - Nuclear fuel material storage facility

356
- Radioactive waste disposal facility - Radioactive waste disposal facility
- Radiological control facility - Radiological control facility
- Other facilities attached to the fabrication facility - Emergency equipment
6. Result - It is approved since it was found that it meets Article 3-18 6. Result - It is approved since it was found that it meets Article 3-18
of the Rules for Nuclear Fuel Material Fabricating Business of the Rules for Nuclear Fuel Material Fabricating Business
defined based on the definitions of Article 16-5-2 of the defined based on the definitions of Article 16-5-2 of the
Law for the Regulations of Nuclear Source Material, Law for the Regulations of Nuclear Source Material,
Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors. Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors.
7. Others 1. Radiation worker dose during periodical licensee facility 7. Others 1. Radiation worker dose during periodical licensee facility
inspection period inspection period
Number of workers: 34 Number of workers: 154
Average dose: 0.0 mSv Average dose: 0.0 mSv
Maximum dose: 0.3 mSv Maximum dose: 0.2 mSv
Internal exposure: none Internal exposure: none
2. Major modification work performed during periodical 2. Major modification work performed during periodical
facility inspection period facility inspection period
None None
(7) Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited, Reprocessing Plant, Reprocessing Facility (8) Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited, Reprocessing Plant, Designated Waste
The number of this Management Facility
inspection 9th inspection The number of this
Inspection periods inspection 14th inspection
1. Outline of plant and - Reprocessing method: wet method (PUREX method) Inspection periods
facilities - Maximum throughput: 800 t-Upr per year (4.8 t-Upr per day) 1. Outline of plant and - Facility type: waste management facility (for managing the high-
facilities level radioactive waste (vitrified waste canisters) returned from the
- Operations began: December 1999 U.K. and France)
(Facilities related to the reception and storage of spent fuel) - Month and year of start of business: April, 1995
2. Inspection August 3, 2009 - Maximum management capacity: vitrified waste canisters 2,880 (A
facility for 1,440 canisters is under construction)
application date
- Storage method: Indirect natural cooling storage
3. Inspection August 24, 2009 to October 23, 2009 August 28, 2009
2. Inspection
implementation period
application date
4. Date of certificate October 30, 2009 September 28, 2009 to December 21, 2009
3. Inspection
issuance
implementation period
5. Outline of Facilities subject to inspection December 21, 2009
4. Date of certificate
inspection - Spent fuel reception and storage facilities issuance
- Instrumentation and control system facility

357
5. Outline of - Facilities subject to periodical inspection (14th)
- Radioactive waste disposal facility inspection (1) Waste receiving facility
- Radiological control facility (2) Waste management facility itself
- Other facilities attached to the reprocessing equipment (3) Instrumentation and control system facility
(4) Radiological control facility
6. Result Pass (5) Facility attached to the waste management equipment
7. Others (Reference) (disposal facility)
1. Major modification work performed during periodical 6. Result At the facilities subject to the periodical inspection, an examination
was made of the operation of alarm devices, radioactive waste
facility inspection period treatment capacity and the performance of major radiological control
Replacement of the spent fuel insertion guide in the facilities, etc. As a result, conformance to the technical standards
primary step measurement device A in the burn-up stipulated in Article 22 of the Rules for Waste Management Business
instrumentation equipment for Nuclear Fuel Materials or Materials Contaminated by Nuclear
Fuel Material was verified and a periodical facility inspection
2. Radiation worker dose during periodical facility inspection certificate was accordingly issued on December 21, 2009.
period 1. Major work carried out during periodical facility inspection period
(Reference)
(Measurement period: August 24, 2009 to October 30, Partial replacement of the inspection room air supply unit
2009) 2. Radiation worker dose during periodical facility inspection period
Number of workers: 303 (102 employees and 201 outside Measurement period: September 28, 2009 to December 21, 2009
workers) Number of workers: 96 (35 employees and 61 outside workers)
Measuring instrument: Pocket dosimeter with alarm
Average dose: 0.07 mSv
Average dose: 0.00 mSv
Maximum dose: 1.71 mSv Maximum dose: 0.00 mSv
Internal exposure: none Internal exposure: none



(9) Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Oarai R&D Center
The number of this
inspection 14th inspection
Inspection periods
1. Outline of plant and - Facility type: Waste management facility
facilities - Month and year of start of business: March, 1996
- Maximum reception capacity: liquid waste 9,400 m3 per year
Solid waste: 850 m3 per year
Maximum management capacity: 8,559 m3
(200-liter drum equivalent: 42,795 drums)
2. Inspection October 1, 2009
application date
3. Inspection November 2, 2009 to February 5, 2010
implementation period
4. Date of certificate February 5, 2010
issuance
5. Outline of Facilities subject to periodical inspection
inspection (1) Waste receiving facility
(2) Waste management facility itself

358
(3) Instrumentation and control system facility
(4) Radiological control facility
(5) Facility attached to the waste management facility (disposal facility)
6. Result It was confirmed that the facilities subject to periodical inspection
conform to the technical standards stipulated in Article 22 of the
Rules for Waste Management Business for Nuclear Fuel Materials or
Materials Contaminated by Nuclear Fuel Material in accordance with
Article 51-10-2 of Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material,
Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors, as a result of an examination of
the operation of alarm devices and the function test of confining
nuclear fuel materials in a certain area, etc. which were performed at
the facilities subject to periodical inspection. Thus a periodical
facility inspection certificate was accordingly issued.
(Reference) 1. Major work carried out during periodical facility inspection period
(1) Partial alteration of the chemical treatment equipment
(2) Partial update of the beta/gamma solid waste treatment wing I
exhaust facility
2. Radiation worker dose during periodical facility inspection period
Measurement period: November 2, 2009 to February 5, 2010
Number of workers: 58 (23 employees and 35 outside workers)
Measuring instrument: Personal electronic dosimeter
Average dose: 0.007 mSv
Maximum dose: 0.070 mSv
Internal exposure: none
ϱϩSTATUS OF NUCLEAR FUEL SAFETY
INSPECTIONS AT REFINING, NUCLEAR
FUEL FABRICATION, SPENT FUEL
STORAGE, REPROCESSING AND
RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL
FACILITIES


359
ϱϩ-1 Status of Nuclear Fuel Safety Inspections at Refining,
Nuclear Fuel Fabrication, Spent Fuel Storage, Reprocessing
and Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities

The refining, nuclear fuel fabrication, spent fuel storage, reprocessing and
radioactive waste disposal facilities are subject to safety inspections by the Minister
of Economy, Trade and Industry. These inspections are performed four times a year
to verify each licensee's observance of the safety regulations concerning work
management, operational management and other matters to be complied with.
In FY2009, a total of 48 safety inspections took place at a total of 12 sites - 6
fabrication sites, 2 reprocessing sites and 4 waste disposal sites.
No facilities are designated as a refining business nor have any received licenses
for spent fuel business.


361
ϱϩ-2 Status of Safety Inspections by Plant
(1) Global Nuclear Fuel-Japan, Co., Ltd.
1st inspection 2nd inspection 3rd inspection 4th inspection
Period of May 18, 2009 to Aug. 3, 2009 to Nov. 30, 2009 to Feb. 22, 2010 to
inspection May 21, 2009 Aug. 6, 2009 Dec. 3, 2009 Feb. 25, 2010
Inspection (Safety inspection items) (Safety inspection items) (Safety inspection items) (1) Inspection items
items (1) Implementation status of system maintenance (1) Status of nonconformance management, (1) Implementation status of activities to make sure - Status of activities for compliance with laws and
associated with revisions in the ordinance that corrective measures, and preventive measures on the safety of the licensee (inspection tours and building safety assurance culture, and sharing
came into operation on April 1, 2009 (2) Status of management activities related to inspections, etc.) (partially, surprise inspection) technical information, etc.
(2) Implementation status of maintenance activities recording and reporting (2) Implementation status of activities for education - Status of management review and internal audits
based on the quality assurance plan (3) Status of routine tests (attending them to verify and training - Implementation status of nonconformity
(3) Status of routine tests (attending them to verify the operations of the emergency generator and (3) Status of routine tests (attending them to verify management, corrective measures, and
the water level alarm operation in the liquid uninterrupted power source) the alarm operation of the flammable gas leak preventive measures
radioactive waste facility) (4) Status of compliance with the changed and detection facilities) - Status of routine tests (attending them to verify
approved safety preservation rules
(4) Status of compliance with the changed and (4) Status of compliance with the changed and the alarm operation of the exhaust/air circulation
approved safety preservation rules (excluding (Priority inspection items) approved safety preservation rules monitors)
the changes by the revision of the ministerial Implementation status of nonconformity management, (Priority inspection items) (2) Priority inspection items
ordinance) corrective measures, and preventive measures
(1) Implementation status of activities to make sure - Status of activities for compliance with laws and
(Priority inspection items) (Other inspection items) on the safety of the licensee (inspection tours building safety assurance culture, and sharing
(1) Implementation status of system maintenance Status of compliance with the changed and and inspections, etc.) (partially, surprise technical information, etc.
associated with revisions in the ordinance that approved safety preservation rules inspection) - Status of management review and internal audits
came into operation on April 1, 2009 - Article 16: Organizations that perform safety (2) Implementation status of activities for education
(Other inspection items) preservation activities and training
(1) Status of compliance with the changed and - Article 17: Duties (Other inspection items)
approved safety preservation rules (excluding - Article 40: Controlled areas (1) Status of compliance with the changed and
the changes by the revision of the ministerial - Article 61: Periodical self-inspection items of approved safety preservation rules
ordinance) the facility - Article 16: Organizations that perform safety
- Article 70: Storage of nuclear fuel materials preservation activities
- Article 73: Radioactive solid waste - Article 17: Duties

362
Outline of Safety inspections were conducted to verify the Safety inspections were conducted to verify the Safety inspections were conducted to verify the Safety inspections were conducted to verify the
inspection implementation status of system maintenance implementation status of nonconformity implementation status of activities to make sure on status of activities for compliance with laws and
results associated with revisions in the ordinance that came management, corrective measures, and preventive the safety of the licensee (inspection tours and building safety assurance culture, and sharing
into operation on April 1, 2009 and the measures and the status of management activities inspections, etc.) and the implementation status of technical information, etc. and the status of
implementation status of maintenance activities related to recording and reporting, etc. activities for education and training, etc. The format management review and internal audits, etc.
based on the quality assurance plan, etc. It was verified from the results of safety inspections inspection item was verified as a surprise inspection It was verified from the results of safety inspections
It was verified from the results of safety inspections that that with regard to each inspection item, safety and the site attendance was also conducted for the that with regard to each inspection item, safety
with regard to each inspection item, safety preservation preservation activities are conducted properly based daily inspection tours by the licensee. preservation activities are conducted properly based
activities are conducted properly based on the safety on the safety preservation rules and that there are no It was verified from the results of safety inspections on the safety preservation rules and that there are no
preservation rules and that there are no matters that matters that violate the safety preservation rules. that with regard to each inspection item, safety matters that violate the safety preservation rules.
violate the safety preservation rules. As for the The status of daily operational management preservation activities are conducted properly based The status of daily operational management
implementation status of maintenance activities based on activities during the safety inspection period was on the safety preservation rules and that there are no activities during the safety inspection period was
the quality assurance plan, though the detailed also examined by questioning the fabricating matters that violate the safety preservation rules. also examined by questioning the fabricating
procedures for the case when an alarm with high safety licensee about the management of facility The status of daily operational management licensee about the management of facility
significance was issued were not defined because there operations, reviewing records, making inspection activities during the safety inspection period was operations, reviewing records, making inspection
were alarms and alerts with different significances tours of facilities, attending routine tests (the also examined by questioning the fabricating tours of facilities, attending routine tests (alarm
mixed, the licensee states that they will revise the operation test of the emergency generator and licensee about the management of facility operation test of the exhaust/air circulation
procedures at an early date. Therefore, the status of uninterrupted power source), and so forth. As a operations, reviewing records, making inspection monitors), and so forth. As a result, no particular
improvements made to rectify these matters should be result, no particular problems were found. tours of facilities, attending routine tests (alarm problems were found.
verified continuously at future daily inspection tours, etc. operation test of the flammable gas leak detection
In consideration of the above, it was concluded that In consideration of the above, it was concluded that
The status of daily operational management activities the safety preservation activities examined with facilities), and so forth. As a result, no particular the safety preservation activities examined with
during the safety inspection period was also examined respect to the inspection items selected for the safety problems were found. respect to the inspection items selected for the safety
by questioning the fabricating licensee about the inspections are, on the whole, conducted properly. In consideration of the above, it was concluded that inspections are, on the whole, conducted properly.
management of facility operations, reviewing records, the safety preservation activities examined with
making inspection tours of facilities, attending routine respect to the inspection items selected for the safety
tests (water level alarm operation test in the liquid inspections are, on the whole, conducted properly.
radioactive waste facility), and so forth. As a result,
no particular problems were found.
In consideration of the above, it was concluded that
the safety preservation activities examined with
respect to the inspection items selected for the safety
inspections are, on the whole, conducted properly.
(2) Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd.
1st inspection 2nd inspection 3rd inspection 4th inspection
Period of Jun. 8, 2009 to Aug. 25, 2009 to Dec. 15, 2009 to Feb. 23, 2010 to
inspection Jun. 12, 2009 Aug. 28, 2009 Dec. 18, 2009 Feb. 26, 2010
Inspection (Safety inspection items) (Safety inspection items) (Safety inspection items) (1) Inspection items
items (1) Status of compliance with the changed and (1) Status of nonconformance management, (1) Status of the change and approval of the safety - Status of operation of the fabrication facilities
approved safety preservation rules (the changes to corrective measures, and preventive measures preservation rules (the changes to the safety
the safety regulations by the revision of the - Status of radiation control activities
(2) Implementation status of activities to make sure regulations by the revision of the ministerial
ministerial ordinance) ordinance) - Status of nuclear fuel material management
on the safety of the licensee (inspection tours
(2) Status of compliance with the changed and approved - Implementation status of activities to make sure
safety preservation rules (the changes to the safety
and inspections, etc.) (2) Status of compliance with the changed and
approved safety preservation rules (the changes on the safety of the licensee
regulations by the change of the equipment) (3) Status of emergency measures (inspection tours and inspections, etc.)
to the safety regulations by the change of the
(3) Status of management review (4) Status of the periodical self-inspections of the equipment) - Status of compliance with the changed and
(4) Status of the measures concerning the fire that facility (alarm operation test of the dust approved safety preservation rules (the changes
occurred in the conversion plant monitor) (3) Status of management review and internal audits
to the safety regulations by the change of the
(5) Status of periodical self-inspections of the facility (Priority inspection items) (4) Implementation status of maintenance activities equipment)
(operation test of the emergency generator and based on the quality assurance plan
uninterrupted power source) (1) Status of nonconformance management, (2) Priority inspection items
corrective measures, and preventive measures (5) Status of nonconformance management,
(Priority inspection items) corrective measures, and preventive measures - Status of operation of the fabrication facilities
(2) Implementation status of activities to make sure - Status of radiation control activities
(1) Status of compliance with the changed and approved (Priority inspection items)
safety preservation rules (the changes to the safety
on the safety of the licensee (inspection tours
regulations by the revision of the ministerial ordinance) and inspections, etc.) (1) Status of the change and approval of the safety
(Other inspection items) preservation rules (the changes to the safety
(Other inspection items) regulations by the revision of the ministerial
(1) Status of compliance with the changed and None ordinance)
approved safety preservation rules (the changes to (2) Implementation status of maintenance activities
the safety regulations by the revision of the
ministerial ordinance)
based on the quality assurance plan
(2) Status of compliance with the changed and approved (Other inspection items)
safety preservation rules (the changes to the safety None
regulations by the change of the equipment)
Outline of Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of Safety inspections were conducted to verify the Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status Safety inspections were conducted to verify the
inspection the change and approval of the safety preservation rules status of nonconformance management, corrective of compliance with the changed and approved safety status of operation of the fabrication facilities, the

363
results (the changes to the safety regulations by the revision of measures, and preventive measures, the preservation rules (the changes to the safety status of radiation management, the status of nuclear
the ministerial ordinance), the status of compliance with implementation status of activities to make sure on regulations by the revision of the ministerial fuel material management, the implementation
the changed and approved safety preservation rules (the the safety of the licensee (inspection tours and ordinance), the status of compliance with the changed status of activities to make sure on the safety of the
changes to the safety regulations by the change of the inspections, etc.), the status of emergency measures, and approved safety preservation rules (the changes to licensee (inspection tours and inspections, etc.), and
equipment), the status of management review, the status and the status of the periodical self-inspections of the safety regulations by the change of the the status of compliance with the changed and
of the measures concerning the fire that occurred in the
conversion plant, and the status of periodical self-
the facility (alarm operation test of the dust equipment), the status of management review and approved safety preservation rules, etc. The status of
inspections of the facility (operation test of the emergency monitor), etc. The status of nonconformance internal audits, the implementation status of operation of the fabrication facilities and the status
generator and uninterrupted power source) etc. The status management, corrective measures, and preventive maintenance activities based on the quality assurance of radiation management were considered as priority
of compliance with the changed and approved safety measures and the implementation status of activities plan, and the status of nonconformance management, inspection items.
preservation rules (the changes to the safety regulations to make sure on the safety of the licensee corrective measures, and preventive measures, etc. It was verified from the results of safety inspections
by the revision of the ministerial ordinance) was (inspection tours and inspections, etc.) were The status of the change and approval of the safety that with regard to each inspection item, safety
considered as a priority inspection item. considered as priority inspection items. preservation rules (the changes to the safety preservation activities are conducted properly based
The status of compliance with the changed and In addition, inspection of the implementation status regulations by the revision of the ministerial on the safety preservation rules and that there are no
approved safety preservation rules (the changes to the of activities to make sure on the safety of the ordinance) and the implementation status of matters that violate the safety preservation rules.
safety regulations by the change of the equipment) was licensee (inspection tours and inspections, etc.) was maintenance activities based on the quality assurance
verified because the change to the safety regulations by plan were considered as priority inspection items. In addition, the status of daily operational
conducted as a surprise inspection. management activities during the safety inspection
the change of the equipment was approved on May 28. It was verified from the results of safety inspections
It was verified from the results of safety inspections period was examined by questioning the fabricating
It was verified from the results of safety inspections that that with regard to each inspection item, safety that with regard to each inspection item, safety licensee about the management of facility operations
with regard to each inspection item, safety preservation preservation activities are conducted properly based preservation activities are conducted properly based and making inspection tours of facilities. As a result,
activities are conducted properly based on the safety on the safety preservation rules and that there are no on the safety preservation rules and that there are no no particular problems were found.
preservation rules and that there are no matters that matters that violate the safety preservation rules.
violate the safety preservation rules.
matters that violate the safety preservation rules. In consideration of the above, it was concluded that
In addition, the status of daily operational In addition, the status of daily operational the safety preservation activities examined with
In addition, the status of daily operational management management activities during the safety inspection
activities during the safety inspection period was management activities during the safety inspection respect to the inspection items selected for the safety
period was examined by questioning the fabricating period was examined by questioning the fabricating inspections are, on the whole, conducted properly.
examined by questioning the fabricating licensee about licensee about the management of facility operations
the management of facility operations and making licensee about the management of facility operations
and making inspection tours of facilities. As a result, and making inspection tours of facilities. As a result,
inspection tours of facilities. As a result, no particular
problems were found. no particular problems were found. no particular problems were found.
In consideration of the above, it was concluded that the In consideration of the above, it was concluded that In consideration of the above, it was concluded that
safety preservation activities examined with respect to the safety preservation activities examined with the safety preservation activities examined with
the inspection items selected for the safety inspections respect to the inspection items selected for the safety respect to the inspection items selected for the safety
are, on the whole, conducted properly. inspections are, on the whole, conducted properly. inspections are, on the whole, conducted properly.



(3) Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd., Kumatori Works
1st inspection 2nd inspection 3rd inspection 4th inspection
Period of Jun. 1, 2009 to Sep. 1, 2009 to Dec. 8, 2009 to Mar. 9, 2010 to
inspection Jun. 4, 2009 Sep. 4, 2009 Dec. 11, 2009 Mar. 12, 2010
Inspection (Safety inspection items) (Safety inspection items) (Safety inspection items) (1) Inspection items
items (1) Implementation status of system maintenance (1) Status of management review (1) Status of preparation and safety preservation - Implementation status of system maintenance
associated with revisions in the ordinance (2) Implementation status of system maintenance activities for the second fabrication wing K5 associated with revisions in the ordinance
(2) Implementation status of nonconformance associated with revisions in the ordinance line operation (safety culture creation)
management, corrective measures, and (3) Status of emergency action procedures, and (2) Status of operation and maintenance of the - Implementation status of nonconformity
preventive measures education and training specific fabrication facilities at FY2009 management, corrective measures, and
(3) Status of radioactive solid waste treatment (3) Implementation status of nonconformity preventive measures
(4) Implementation status of nonconformity
(4) Status of measures to be taken in an emergency management, corrective measures, and management, corrective measures, and - Status of the surprise inspection tours in the
(blower anchor bolt break) preventive measures preventive measures facility and attending of the surprise routine
(4) Status of safety management systems tests
(Priority inspection items) (Priority inspection items)
(5) Status of the surprise inspection tours in the - Status of maintenance management planning
(1) Implementation status of system maintenance (1) Status of management review and implementation
associated with revisions in the ordinance facility and attending of the surprise routine
(2) Implementation status of system maintenance tests (2) Priority inspection items
(2) Implementation status of nonconformance associated with revisions in the ordinance
management, corrective measures, and (Priority inspection items) - Implementation status of system maintenance
(3) Status of emergency action procedures, and associated with revisions in the ordinance
preventive measures education and training (1) Status of preparation and safety preservation
activities for the second fabrication wing K5 (safety culture creation)
(Other inspection items) (Other inspection items) line operation - Implementation status of nonconformity
- Article 3, Article 3-2, Article 4, Article 6 None management, corrective measures, and
(2) Status of operation and maintenance of the
- Articles 8, 11, 12, and 15 specific fabrication facilities at FY2009 preventive measures
- Articles 15-2 and 18 (3) Implementation status of nonconformity - Status of the surprise inspection tours in the
- Articles 19 and 20 management, corrective measures, and facility and attending of the surprise routine
preventive measures tests
- Articles 21, 24, 25, and 58
- Articles 61, 66, 71, 97, and 98 (Other inspection items)
None
Outline of Safety inspections were conducted to verify the Safety inspections were conducted to verify the Safety inspections were conducted to verify the Safety inspections were conducted as process
inspection implementation status of system maintenance status of management review, the implementation status of preparation and safety preservation inspections to verify the implementation status of

364
results associated with revisions in the ordinance, the status of system maintenance associated with activities for the second fabrication wing K5 line system maintenance associated with revisions in the
implementation status of nonconformity revisions in the ordinance, the status of emergency operation, the status of operation and maintenance ordinance, the implementation status of
management, corrective measures, and preventive action procedures, and education and training, and of the specific fabrication facilities at FY2009, the nonconformity management, corrective measures,
measures, the status of radioactive solid waste the implementation status of nonconformity implementation status of nonconformity and preventive measures, the status of the surprise
treatment, the status of measures to be taken in an management, corrective measures, and preventive management, corrective measures, and preventive inspection tours in the facility and attending of the
emergency (blower anchor bolt break), and the measures, etc. measures, and the status of safety management surprise routine tests, and the status of maintenance
status of compliance with the changed and approved It was verified from the results of safety inspections systems, etc. management planning and implementation, etc.
safety preservation rules (dated March 30, 2009), that with regard to each inspection item, safety It was verified from the results of safety inspections It was verified from the results of safety inspections
etc. Though the attendance of the surprise routine preservation activities are conducted properly based that the safety preservation activity is conducted that with regard to each inspection item, safety
test was planned in the inspection plan, it was not on the safety preservation rules and that there are no properly based on the safety preservation rules and preservation activities are conducted properly based
conducted because the routine test was not matters that violate the safety preservation rules. that there are no matters that violate the safety on the safety preservation rules and that there are no
conducted. preservation rules. matters that violate the safety preservation rules.
The status of daily operational management
It was verified from the results of safety inspections activities during the safety inspection period was The status of daily operational management The status of daily operational management
that with regard to each inspection item, safety also examined by questioning the fabricating activities during the safety inspection period was activities during the safety inspection period was
preservation activities are conducted properly based licensee about the management of facility also examined by questioning the fabricating also examined by questioning the fabricating
on the safety preservation rules and that there are no operations, reviewing operation records, and making licensee about the management of facility licensee about the management of facility
matters that violate the safety preservation rules. inspection tours of facilities. As a result, no operations, reviewing operation records, and making operations, reviewing operation records, and making
The status of daily operational management particular problems were found. inspection tours of facilities. As a result, no inspection tours of facilities. As a result, no
activities during the safety inspection period was particular problems were found. The periodical particular problems were found. Some of the
also examined by questioning the fabricating In consideration of the above, it was concluded that
the safety preservation activities examined with licensee inspections conducted by the licensee were periodical facility inspections conducted during the
licensee about the management of facility attended by extracting some of the periodical facility inspection period were attended as surprise
operations, reviewing operation records, and making respect to the inspection items selected for the safety
inspections are, on the whole, conducted properly. inspections conducted during the inspection period. inspections. As a result, no problems were found.
inspection tours of facilities. As a result, no As a result, no problems were found.
particular problems were found. In consideration of the above, it was concluded that
In consideration of the above, it was concluded that the safety preservation activities examined with
In consideration of the above, it was concluded that the safety preservation activities examined with respect to the inspection items selected for the safety
the safety preservation activities examined with respect to the inspection items selected for the safety inspections are, on the whole, conducted properly.
respect to the inspection items selected for the safety inspections are, on the whole, conducted properly.
inspections are, on the whole, conducted properly.
(4) Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd., Tokai Works
1st inspection 2nd inspection 3rd inspection 4th inspection
Period of May 11, 2009 to Jul. 27, 2009 to Nov. 16, 2009 to Jan. 26, 2010 to
inspection May 14, 2009 Jul. 30, 2009 Nov. 19, 2009 Jan. 29, 2010
Inspection (Safety inspection items) (Safety inspection items) (Safety inspection items) (1) Inspection items
items (1) Status of compliance with the changed and (1) Status of nonconformance management, (1) Status of the change and approval of the safety - Implementation status of activities to make sure
approved safety preservation rules corrective measures, and preventive measures preservation rules on the safety of the licensee (inspection tours
(2) Status of actions for water leak (2) Implementation status of activities to make sure (2) Implementation status of maintenance activities and inspections, etc.)
(3) Status of actions for pellet dropping case on the safety of the licensee (inspection tours based on the quality assurance plan - Status of radiation control activities
and inspections, etc.) (3) Status of actions related to nitrogen gas - Status of nuclear fuel material control
(4) Implementation status of actions for the
nonconforming event concerning correction of (3) Status of preventive actions related to switching mechanism operation due to dropped - Status of radioactive waste management
the thermocouple prevention of the pellet from dropping reactor internal pressure difference in the
furnace R II - Status of emergency measures
(5) Status of periodical self-inspections of the (4) Status of compliance with the changed and
approved safety preservation rules (4) Status of management review and internal audits (2) Priority inspection items
facility (alarm operation test for flammable gas
leak detector) (Priority inspection items) (5) Status of periodical self-inspections of the - Implementation status of activities to make sure
facility (performance test of the alarm device on the safety of the licensee (inspection tours
(Priority inspection items) (1) Status of nonconformance management, and inspections, etc.)
corrective measures, and preventive measures (negative pressure alarm equipment))
(1) Status of compliance with the changed and
approved rules (2) Implementation status of activities to make sure (Priority inspection items)
(Other inspection items) on the safety of the licensee (inspection tours (1) Status of the change and approval of the safety
and inspections, etc.) preservation rules
(1) Status of compliance with the changed and
approved safety preservation rules (Other inspection items) (2) Implementation status of maintenance activities
Status of compliance with the changed and based on the quality assurance plan
approved safety preservation rules (Other inspection items)
None
Outline of Safety inspections were conducted to verify the Safety inspections were conducted to verify the Safety inspections were conducted to verify the Safety inspections were conducted to verify the
inspection status of compliance with the changed and approved status of nonconformance management, corrective status of the change and approval of the safety implementation status of activities to make sure on
results safety preservation rules, the status of actions for measures, and preventive measures, the preservation rules, the implementation status of the safety of the licensee (inspection tours and
water leak, the status of actions for pellet dropping implementation status of activities to make sure on maintenance activities based on the quality inspections, etc.), the status of radiation control
case, the implementation status of actions for the the safety of the licensee (inspection tours and assurance plan, the status of actions related to activities, the status of nuclear fuel material control,
nonconforming event concerning correction of the inspections, etc.), the status of preventive actions nitrogen gas switching mechanism operation due to the status of radioactive waste management, and the

365
thermocouple, and the status of periodical self- related to prevention of the pellet from dropping, dropped reactor internal pressure difference in the status of emergency measures, etc. The
inspections of the facility (alarm operation test for and the status of compliance with the changed and furnace R II, the status of management review and implementation status of activities to make sure on
flammable gas leak detector), etc. approved safety preservation rules, etc. internal audits, and the status of periodical self- the safety of the licensee (inspection tours and
It was verified from the results of safety inspections The status of nonconformance management, inspections of the facility (performance test of the inspections, etc.) was considered as a priority
that with regard to each inspection item, safety corrective measures, and preventive measures and alarm device (negative pressure alarm equipment)). inspection item.
preservation activities are conducted properly based the implementation status of activities to make sure The status of the change and approval of the safety It was verified from the results of safety inspections
on the safety preservation rules and that there are no on the safety of the licensee (inspection tours and preservation rules and the implementation status of that with regard to each inspection item, safety
matters that violate the safety preservation rules. inspections, etc.) were considered as priority maintenance activities based on the quality preservation activities are conducted properly based
inspection items. assurance plan were considered as priority on the safety preservation rules and that there are no
The status of daily operational management inspection items.
activities during the safety inspection period was In addition, inspection of the implementation status matters that violate the safety preservation rules.
examined by questioning the fabricating licensee of activities to make sure on the safety of the It was verified from the results of safety inspections In addition, the status of daily operational
about the management of facility operations and licensee (inspection tours and inspections, etc.) was that with regard to each inspection item, safety management activities during the safety inspection
making inspection tours of facilities. As a result, no conducted as a surprise inspection. preservation activities are conducted properly based period was examined by questioning the fabricating
particular problems were found. on the safety preservation rules and that there are no licensee about the management of facility operations
It was verified from the results of safety inspections matters that violate the safety preservation rules.
In consideration of the above, it was concluded that that with regard to each inspection item, safety and making inspection tours of facilities. As a result,
the safety preservation activities examined with preservation activities are conducted properly based In addition, the status of daily operational no particular problems were found.
respect to the inspection items selected for the safety on the safety preservation rules and that there are no management activities during the safety inspection In consideration of the above, it was concluded that
inspections are, on the whole, conducted properly. matters that violate the safety preservation rules. period was examined by questioning the fabricating the safety preservation activities examined with
licensee about the management of facility operations respect to the inspection items selected for the safety
In addition, the status of daily operational and making inspection tours of facilities. As a result,
management activities during the safety inspection inspections are, on the whole, conducted properly.
no particular problems were found.
period was examined by questioning the fabricating
licensee about the management of facility operations In consideration of the above, it was concluded that
and making inspection tours of facilities. As a result, the safety preservation activities examined with
no particular problems were found. respect to the inspection items selected for the safety
inspections are, on the whole, conducted properly.
In consideration of the above, it was concluded that
the safety preservation activities examined with
respect to the inspection items selected for the safety
inspections are, on the whole, conducted properly.



(5) Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Ningyo-toge Environmental Engineering Center
1st inspection 2nd inspection 3rd inspection 4th inspection
Period of Jun. 15, 2009 to Sep. 2, 2009 to Dec. 9, 2009 to Mar. 3, 2010 to
inspection Jun. 17, 2009 Sep. 4, 2009 Dec. 11, 2009 Mar. 5, 2010
Inspection (Safety inspection items) (Safety inspection items) (Safety inspection items) (1) Inspection items
items (1) Implementation status of system maintenance (1) Status of facility maintenance (status of the (1) Implementation status of system maintenance - Status of quality management system
associated with revisions in the ordinance solidified equipment) associated with revisions in the ordinance - Status of nonconformance management,
(2) Status of the quality management system (2) Status of safety preservation education and (2) Status of facility maintenance (status of the corrective measures, and preventive measures
(quality policy, quality goal, and business plan) training (including the training of the initial fire solidified equipment) - Status of the measures concerning procurement
(3) Status of actions related to control of nuclear fighting) (3) Status of radioactive waste management management activities
fuel materials, etc. (3) Status of radiation control (exposure (4) Status of the periodical self-inspections of the - Status of periodical self-inspection of the facility
(4) Status of periodical self-inspections of the management) facility (alarm operation test of the process (2) Priority inspection items
facility (operation test of the emergency (4) Status of the periodical self-inspections of the monitor)
generator) facility (alarm operation test for the solidified - Status of quality management system
(Priority inspection items)
(5) Status of competence evaluation of the equipment’s abnormal temperature or pressure - Status of nonconformance management,
and the function test of the alarm device of the (1) Implementation status of system maintenance corrective measures, and preventive measures
personnel engaged in inspection tours and associated with revisions in the ordinance
inspections automatic fire alarm equipment)
(Priority inspection items) (2) Status of facility maintenance (status of the
(Priority inspection items) solidified equipment)
(1) Implementation status of system maintenance (1) Status of facility maintenance (status of the
solidified equipment) (Other inspection items)
associated with revisions in the ordinance
(2) Status of safety preservation education and (1) Status of radioactive waste management
(2) Status of the quality management system
(quality policy, quality goal, and business plan) training (including the training of the initial fire
fighting)
(Other inspection items)
(Other inspection items)
(1) Status of actions related to control of nuclear
fuel materials, etc. Status of radiation control (exposure management)
Outline of Safety inspections were conducted to verify the Safety inspections were conducted to verify the Safety inspections were conducted to verify the Safety inspections were conducted to verify the
inspection implementation status of system maintenance status of facility maintenance (status of the implementation status of system maintenance status of quality management system, the status of
results associated with revisions in the ordinance, the status solidified equipment), the status of safety associated with revisions in the ordinance, the status nonconformance management, corrective measures,
of the quality management system (quality policy, preservation education and training (including the of facility maintenance (status of the solidified and preventive measures, the status of the measures
quality goal, and business plan), the status of actions training of the initial fire fighting), the status of equipment), the status of radioactive waste concerning procurement management activities, and

366
related to control of nuclear fuel materials, etc., the radiation control (exposure management), and the management, and the status of the periodical self- the status of periodical self-inspection of the facility,
status of periodical self-inspections of the facility status of the periodical self-inspections of the inspections of the facility (alarm operation test of etc.
(operation test of the emergency generator), and the facility (alarm operation test for the solidified the process monitor), etc. It was verified from the results of safety inspections
status of competence evaluation of the personnel equipment’s abnormal temperature or pressure and It was verified from the results of safety inspections that with regard to each inspection item, safety
engaged in inspection tours and inspections, etc. the function test of the alarm device of the automatic that with regard to each inspection item, safety preservation activities are conducted properly based
The inspection of the status of competence fire alarm equipment), etc. preservation activities are conducted properly based on the safety preservation rules and that there are no
evaluation of the personnel engaged in inspection It was verified from the results of safety inspections on the safety preservation rules and that there are no matters that violate the safety preservation rules.
tours and inspections was conducted as a surprise that with regard to each inspection item, safety matters that violate the safety preservation rules. The status of daily operational management
inspection without prior notification in the safety preservation activities are conducted properly based The status of daily operational management activities during the safety inspection period was
inspection plan. on the safety preservation rules and that there are no activities during the safety inspection period was examined by questioning about the management of
It was verified from the results of safety inspections matters that violate the safety preservation rules. examined by questioning about the management of facility operations, reviewing operation records, and
that with regard to each inspection item, safety The status of daily operational management facility operations, reviewing operation records, and making inspection tours of facilities. As a result, no
preservation activities are conducted properly based activities during the safety inspection period was making inspection tours of facilities. As a result, no particular problems were found.
on the safety preservation rules and that there are no examined by questioning about the management of particular problems were found. In consideration of the above, it was concluded that
matters that violate the safety preservation rules. facility operations, reviewing operation records, and In consideration of the above, it was concluded that the safety preservation activities examined with
The status of daily operational management making inspection tours of facilities. As a result, no the safety preservation activities examined with respect to the inspection items selected for the safety
activities during the safety inspection period was particular problems were found. respect to the inspection items selected for the safety inspections are, on the whole, conducted properly.
examined by questioning about the management of In consideration of the above, it was concluded that inspections are, on the whole, conducted properly.
facility operations, reviewing operation records, and the safety preservation activities examined with
making inspection tours of facilities. As a result, no respect to the inspection items selected for the safety
particular problems were found. inspections are, on the whole, conducted properly.
In consideration of the above, it was concluded that
the safety preservation activities examined with
respect to the inspection items selected for the safety
inspections are, on the whole, conducted properly.
(6) Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited, Enrichment and Burial Plant
1st inspection 2nd inspection 3rd inspection 4th inspection
Period of Jan. 22, 2009 to Aug. 31, 2009 to Nov. 19, 2009 and Nov. 30, 2009 to Feb. 22, 2010 to
inspection Jan. 26, 2009 Sept. 4, 2009 Dec. 4, 2009 Feb. 26, 2010
Inspection (Safety inspection items) (Safety inspection items) (Safety inspection items) (1) Inspection items
items (1) Status of management review (1) Status of management review (1) Status of management review - Status of nuclear fuel material control
(2) Status of compliance with the changed (2) Status of compliance with the changed (2) Status of compliance with the changed - Status of maintenance management
conditions in the safety preservation rules conditions in the safety preservation rules conditions in the safety preservation rules - Status of safety preservation activities related to
(3) Status of education and training (3) Status of action at the occurrence of trouble (3) Status of the adhered uranium collection work the can wash
(Priority inspection items) (4) Status of the instruments used in the periodical (4) Implementation status of the items that require - Implementation status of nonconformance
Same as (1) to (3) above self-inspection of the facility improvement indicated in the 2nd safety management
(Priority inspection items) inspection conducted in FY2009 (2) Priority inspection items
(Other inspection items)
Same as (1) to (4) above (Priority inspection items) - Status of nuclear fuel material control
Same as (2) above
(Other inspection items) (1) Status of management review - Status of maintenance management
Same as (2) above (2) Status of compliance with the changed - Status of safety preservation activities related to
conditions in the safety preservation rules the can wash
(3) Status of the adhered uranium collection work - Implementation status of nonconformance
(Other inspection items) management
(1) Status of compliance with the changed
conditions in the safety preservation rules
Outline of Safety inspections were conducted to verify the Safety inspections were conducted to verify the Safety inspections were conducted to verify the Safety inspections were conducted to verify the
inspection status of management review, the status of status of management review, the status of status of management review, the status of status of nuclear fuel material control, the status of
results compliance with the changed conditions in the compliance with the changed conditions in the compliance with the changed conditions in the maintenance management, the status of safety
safety preservation rules, and the status of education safety preservation rules, the status of action at the safety preservation rules, the status of the adhered preservation activities related to the can wash, and
and training, etc. occurrence of trouble, and the status of the uranium collection work, and the implementation the implementation status of nonconformance
It was verified from the results of safety inspections instruments used in the periodical self-inspection of status of the items that require improvement management, etc.
that with regard to each inspection item, safety the facility, etc. indicated in the 2nd safety inspection conducted in It was verified from the results of safety inspections
preservation activities were conducted according to It was verified from the results of safety inspections FY2009, etc. that with regard to each inspection item, safety
the safety preservation rules, and there were no that with regard to each inspection item, safety It was verified from the results of safety inspections preservation activities were conducted according to
items that violate the safety preservation rules. preservation activities were conducted according to that with regard to each inspection item, safety the safety preservation rules, and there were no

367
The status of daily operational management during the safety preservation rules, and there were no preservation activities were conducted according to items that violate the safety preservation rules.
the safety inspection period was also examined by items that violate the safety preservation rules. the safety preservation rules, and there were no The status of daily operational management during
questioning the licensee, reviewing records, making The status of daily operational management items that violate the safety preservation rules. the safety inspection period was also examined by
inspection tours of facilities, and attending the activities during the safety inspection period was The status of daily operational management questioning the licensee, reviewing records, making
periodical self-inspections of the facility. As a result, also examined by questioning the company, activities during the safety inspection period was inspection tours of facilities, and attending the
there were no items that violate the safety reviewing records, and making inspection tours of also examined by questioning the company, periodical self-inspections of the facility. As a result,
preservation rules. facilities. As a result, there were no items that reviewing records, and making inspection tours of there were no items that violate the safety
In consideration of the above, it was concluded that violate the safety preservation rules. facilities. As a result, there were no items that preservation rules.
the safety preservation activities examined with In consideration of the above, it was concluded that violate the safety preservation rules. In consideration of the above, it was concluded that
respect to the inspection items selected for the safety the safety preservation activities examined with In consideration of the above, it was concluded that the safety preservation activities examined with
inspections were conducted according to the safety respect to the inspection items selected for the safety the safety preservation activities examined with respect to inspection items selected for the safety
preservation rules. inspections were conducted according to the safety respect to the inspection items selected for the safety inspections are conducted properly.
preservation rules. inspections were conducted according to the safety
preservation rules.



(7) Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Tokai R&D Center, Nuclear Fuel Cycle Engineering Laboratories
1st inspection 2nd inspection 3rd inspection 4th inspection
Period of May 18, 2009 to Aug. 31, 2009 to Nov. 30, 2009 to Jan. 29, 2010 to
inspection May 29, 2009 Sep. 11, 2009 Dec. 11, 2009 Feb. 12, 2010
Inspection (Safety inspection items) (Safety inspection items) (Safety inspection items) (1) Safety inspection items
items (1) Implementation status of system maintenance (1) Status of the maintenance management activities (1) Status of the safety preservation activities - Status of internal audits
associated with revisions in the ordinance related to the static equipment related to the revision of the safety preservation - Status of utility assurance
(2) Status of the actions related to the leakage from (2) Status of procurement management activities rules by the revision of the ministerial ordinance
- Status of preparation relating to measures that
the ocean release tube related to the earthquake security improvement (2) Status of control of radioactive liquid waste should be taken in an emergency
(3) Status of management review measures discharge into the ocean
- Status of management of the radiation control
(4) Status of low-level radioactive liquid waste (3) Status of planning, implementation, and (3) Status of operational management of the devices, etc.
treatment and storage management improvements of the ecological monitoring incineration facility
- Status of transportation of nuclear fuel materials,
(5) Status of the processes related to the waste (4) Status of measures against incorrect calculation (4) Status of control over the comings and goings etc.
solvent treatment technology development of the effective dose of radioactive liquid waste from/to controlled areas and the exposure
(6) Status of the processes related to the Krypton management - Implementation status of inspection tours and
(5) Status of the investigations related to the leakage inspections (using surprise methods)
collection technology development event from the ocean release tube (5) Status of the negative pressure alarm equipment
(7) Implementation status of inspection tours and handling - Implementation status of nonconformance
(6) Status of periodical self-inspection of the facility management
inspections (using surprise methods) (6) Implementation status of inspection tours and
(7) Implementation status of nonconformity (2) Priority inspection items
(8) Status of discharge management of radioactive management inspections (using surprise methods)
waste, etc. (7) Status of periodical self-inspection of the facility - Status of internal audits
(9) Implementation status of nonconformance (Priority inspection items)
(8) Implementation status of nonconformity - Status of utility assurance
management (1) Status of the maintenance management activities
related to the static equipment management
(Priority inspection items)
(2) Status of procurement management activities (Priority inspection items)
(1) Implementation status of system maintenance
associated with revisions in the ordinance related to the earthquake security improvement (1) Status of the safety preservation activities
measures related to the revision of the safety preservation
(2) Status of the actions related to the leakage from rules by the revision of the ministerial ordinance
the ocean release tube (Other inspection items)
None (2) Status of control of radioactive liquid waste
(Other inspection items) discharge into the ocean
Implementation status of system maintenance (Other inspection items)
associated with revisions in the ordinance

368
None
Outline of Safety inspections were conducted to verify the Safety inspections were conducted to verify the Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status of
inspection implementation status of system maintenance status of the maintenance management activities the safety preservation activities related to the revision of internal audits, the status of utility assurance, the status
results associated with revisions in the ordinance, the status related to the static equipment, the status of the safety preservation rules by the revision of the of preparation relating to measures that should be taken
of the actions related to the leakage from the ocean procurement management activities related to the ministerial ordinance, the status of control of radioactive in an emergency, the status of management of the
release tube, the status of management review, the earthquake security improvement measures, the liquid waste discharge into the ocean, the status of radiation control devices, etc., the status of transportation
status of low-level radioactive liquid waste status of planning, implementation, and operational management of the incineration facility, the of nuclear fuel materials, etc., the implementation status
treatment and storage management, the status of the improvements of the ecological monitoring, the status of control over the comings and goings from/to of inspection tours and inspections (using surprise
processes related to the waste solvent treatment status of measures against incorrect calculation of controlled areas and the exposure management, the status methods), and the implementation status of
technology development, the status of the processes the effective dose of radioactive liquid waste, the of the negative pressure alarm equipment handling, the nonconformance management, etc.
related to the Krypton collection technology status of the investigations related to the leakage implementation status of inspection tours and inspections It was verified from the results of safety inspections
development, the implementation status of event from the ocean release tube, the status of (using surprise methods), the status of periodical self- that with regard to each inspection item, safety
inspection tours and inspections, the status of periodical self-inspection of the facility, and the inspection of the facility, and the implementation status of preservation activities are conducted properly based
discharge management of radioactive waste, etc., implementation status of nonconformity nonconformity management, etc. on the safety preservation rules and that there are no
and the implementation status of nonconformance management, etc. It was verified from the results of safety inspections matters that violate the safety preservation rules. It
management, etc. It was verified from the results of safety inspections that with regard to each inspection item, safety was also verified from the results of on-site
It was verified from the results of safety inspections that with regard to each inspection item, safety preservation activities are conducted properly based inspections, inspection tours, and inspections related
that with regard to each inspection item, safety preservation activities are conducted properly based on the safety preservation rules and that there are no to each inspection item that maintenance management
preservation activities are conducted properly based on the safety preservation rules and that there are no matters that violate the safety preservation rules. was conducted appropriately, and there were no items
on the safety preservation rules and that there are no matters that violate the safety preservation rules. The status of daily operational management during that violate the safety preservation rules.
matters that violate the safety preservation rules. The status of daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also examined by In addition, the status of daily operational management
The status of daily operational management during the safety inspection period was also examined by questioning Nuclear Fuel Cycle Engineering during the safety inspection period and the status of the
the safety inspection period was also examined by questioning Nuclear Fuel Cycle Engineering Laboratories about the management of facility maintenance records were also examined by
questioning Nuclear Fuel Cycle Engineering Laboratories about the management of facility operations, making inspection tours of facilities, and questioning Nuclear Fuel Cycle Engineering
Laboratories about the management of facility operations and attending the periodical self- attending the periodical self-inspections of the Laboratories about the management of facility
operations and attending inspection tours of facilities. inspection of the facility. As a result, no particular facility, inspection tours, and inspections. As a operations and reviewing the maintenance records. As a
As a result, no particular problems were found. problems were found. result, no particular problems were found. result, no particular problems were found.
In consideration of the above, it was concluded that In consideration of the above, it was concluded that In consideration of the above, it was concluded that In consideration of the above, it was concluded that
the safety preservation activities examined with the safety preservation activities examined with the safety preservation activities examined with the safety preservation activities examined with
respect to the inspection items selected for the safety respect to the inspection items selected for the safety respect to the inspection items selected for the safety respect to the inspection items selected for the safety
inspections are, on the whole, conducted properly. inspections are, on the whole, conducted properly. inspections are, on the whole, conducted properly. inspections are, on the whole, conducted properly.
(8) Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited, Reprocessing Plant
1st inspection 2nd inspection 3rd inspection 4th inspection
Period of Jun. 1, 2009 to Sep. 7, 2009 to Nov. 19, 2009 and Dec. 7, 2009 to Mar. 1, 2010 to
inspection Jun. 19, 2009 Sep. 18, 2009 Dec. 18, 2009 Mar. 12, 2010
Inspection (Safety inspection items) (Safety inspection items) (Safety inspection items) (1) Safety inspection items
items (1) Status of cause investigation and recurrence (1) Implementation status of the action plan on the (1) Implementation status of the action plan on the - Status of 3rd management review in FY2009
preventive measures for violation of the safety measures for the high-level waste water leakage, etc. measures for the high-level waste water leakage, etc.
preservation rules concerning the maintenance (2) Implementation status of the requests for (2) Implementation status of improvement measures - Implementation status of the action plan on the
work, etc. for high-level waste water leakage improvements indicated in the 1st safety inspection for the violations of the safety preservation rules measures for the high-level waste water leakage,
conducted in FY2009 indicated in the 2nd safety inspection conducted in etc.
(2) Status of compliance with the changed conditions
in the safety preservation rules (3) Status of management review FY2009 and later inspections - Status of safety culture creation activities
(3) Status of setting of quality policies and quality (4) Status of autonomous activities to correct (3) Implementation status of the measures for the - Implementation status of the measures to be taken
goals nonconformities related to the direct factors personnel not wearing an electronic personal until the improvement measures such as the storage
including human error dosimeter in a radiation control area, etc. and discard performance improvement are ensured
(4) Status of maintenance management in the spent fuel receiving and storage facility
(5) Status of storage and discard of miscellaneous solid (4) Implementation status of the measures to be taken
(Priority inspection items) waste occurred during reception and storage of until the improvement measures such as the storage - Status of the safety preservation activities with
(1) Status of cause investigation and recurrence spent fuel and discard performance improvement are ensured nonconformance found
preventive measures for violation of the safety in the spent fuel receiving and storage facility
(6) Status of radiation control activities conducted as - Status of maintenance management and radiation
preservation rules concerning the maintenance part of maintenance work, etc. (5) Status of actions taken for the requests for control in the high-level liquid-waste vitrification
work, etc. for high-level waste water leakage improvements indicated in the 1st and 2nd safety facility
In addition to (1) to (6) above, the status of compliance inspections conducted in FY2009
(2) Status of setting of quality policies and quality with the safety preservation rules was also examined by (2) Priority inspection items
goals questioning about the management of facility (6) Status of management review
operations, reviewing the operation report and other (7) Status of autonomous activities to correct nonconformities - All the items listed above
(3) Status of maintenance management
records, making inspection tours of facilities, and related to the direct factors including human error
(Other inspection items) attending the periodical self-inspections of the facility.
Status of compliance with the changed conditions in (8) Status of periodical evaluation of reprocessing facilities
the safety preservation rules (Priority inspection items) (Priority inspection items)
Same as the inspection items (1) to (6) listed above All the inspection items listed above
(Follow-up inspection items)
Status of cause investigation and recurrence (Other inspection items) (Other inspection items)
preventive measures for violation of the safety None None
preservation rules concerning the maintenance work, (Follow-up inspection items) (Follow-up inspection items)
etc. for high-level waste water leakage Same as (1) above Inspection items (1) and (2) above
Outline of (Comprehensive evaluation) Safety inspections were conducted to verify the Safety inspections were conducted to verify (1) the Safety inspections were conducted to verify (1) the status of 3rd
inspection Safety inspections were conducted to verify the status implementation status of the action plan on the measures for implementation status of the action plan on the management review in FY2009, (2) the implementation status
results of cause investigation and recurrence preventive the high-level waste water leakage, etc., the implementation measures for the high-level waste water leakage, etc., of the action plan on the measures for the high-level waste
status of the requests for improvements indicated in the 1st (2) the implementation status of improvement measures water leakage, etc., (3) the status of safety culture creation

369
measures for violation of the safety preservation rules
concerning the maintenance work, etc. for high-level safety inspection conducted in FY2009, the status of for the violations of the safety preservation rules activities, (4) the implementation status of the measures to be
waste water leakage, the status of compliance with the management review, the status of autonomous activities to indicated in the 2nd safety inspection conducted in taken until the improvement measures such as the storage and
changed conditions in the safety preservation rules, the correct nonconformities related to the direct factors FY2009 and later inspections, (3) the implementation discard performance improvement are ensured in the spent fuel
status of setting of quality policies and quality goals, including human error, the status of storage and discard of status of the measures for the personnel not wearing an receiving and storage facility, (5) the status of the safety
and the status of maintenance management, etc. miscellaneous solid waste occurred during reception and electronic personal dosimeter in a radiation control area, preservation activities with nonconformance found, and (6) the
storage of spent fuel, and the status of radiation control etc., (4) the implementation status of the measures to be status of maintenance management and radiation control in the
It was verified from the results of safety inspections that activities conducted as part of maintenance work, etc. taken until the improvement measures such as the high-level liquid-waste vitrification facility, etc. In addition, the
with regard to each inspection item, there were no items storage and discard performance improvement are status of daily operational management during the safety
that violate the safety preservation rules. In addition, the status of daily operational management
during the safety inspection period was examined by ensured in the spent fuel receiving and storage facility, inspection period was examined by questioning the licensee,
The status of daily operational management during the questioning the licensee, reviewing records, making (5) the status of actions taken for the requests for reviewing records, making inspection tours of facilities, and
safety inspection period was also examined by questioning inspection tours of facilities, and attending the improvements indicated in the 1st and 2nd safety attending the periodical self-inspections of the facility.
the licensee, reviewing records, making inspection tours of periodical self-inspections of the facility. inspections conducted in FY2009, (6) the status of As a result, the following three items that violated
facilities, and attending the periodical self-inspections of the management review, (7) the status of autonomous safety preservation rules (items that require surveillance
facility, etc. As a result, there were no items that violate the As a result, the following three items that violated activities to correct nonconformities related to the direct are two: the following (1) and (2)) were discovered:
safety preservation rules. safety preservation rules (items that require factors including human error, and (8) the status of
surveillance) were discovered: (1) Safety education for the personnel of
periodical evaluation of reprocessing facilities, etc. subcontractors, etc. that is required for entering the
In consideration of the above, it was concluded that the (1) The actions required when the exhaust gas cleaning
safety preservation activities examined with respect to the wing high inlet pressure alarm for the analysis It was verified from the results of safety inspections that controlled areas was not conducted.
inspection items selected for the safety inspections were building tower and vessel exhaust gas processing with regard to each inspection item, there were no items (2) Reporting and notification to the chief engineer of
conducted according to the safety preservation rules. equipment is transited to a condition other than “the that violate the safety preservation rules, and nuclear fuel, etc. on the work forms and preparation
conditions required for the facility” were not taken. improvement actions were taken, on the whole, for the of the repair work reports were delayed.
(Violations found in the past) items that violated the safety preservation rules (items (3) Actions for the temporary placement of miscellaneous
(2) The shift supervisor did not check and instruct on the
It was verified that urgent measures such as revision of the transport of very low-level saliferous waste water of that require surveillance) found in the previous safety solid waste in the sludge pump room in the spent fuel
in-house rules, etc. were taken based on the cause the high-level liquid-waste vitrification facility inspection or later inspections. receiving and storage building were taken inappropriately.
investigation and recurrence preventive measures for (3) Requests to provide technical information was not The status of daily operational management during the In consideration of the above, it was concluded that except
violation of the safety preservation rules concerning the described in the common procurement specifications. safety inspection period was also examined by three items that violated safety preservation rules (including
maintenance work, etc. for high-level waste water leakage, In consideration of the above, it was concluded that questioning the licensee, reviewing records, making two items that require surveillance), the safety preservation
which was reported by the licensee in April, 2009. except three items that violated safety preservation rules inspection tours of facilities, and attending the activities examined with respect to the inspection items
However, because concrete implementation methods for (items that require surveillance), the safety preservation periodical self-inspections of the facility, etc. As a selected for the safety inspections were conducted
most of the middle- and long-term reoccurrence activities examined with respect to the inspection items result, there were no items that violate the safety according to the safety preservation rules. In addition, we
preventive measures related to the direct factors and the selected for the safety inspections were conducted preservation rules. instructed that the status of the improvement measures
organizational factors are still under review, we will according to the safety preservation rules. taken by the licensee for the above items (1) and (2) that
In consideration of the above, it was concluded that the violated the safety preservation rules should be verified
continue to verify the implementation statuses of those The status of the improvement measures taken by the safety preservation activities examined with respect to the
measures in safety inspections or investigations of continuously and that the Director General of the Nuclear
licensee for the three items that violated the safety inspection items selected for the safety inspections were and Industrial Safety Agency should report the corrective
compliance with the safety preservation rules. preservation rules (items that require surveillance) conducted according to the safety preservation rules. measures taken for the item (3) to the licensee.
should be verified continuously in future.



(9) Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited, Enrichment and Burial Plant, Waste Burial Facility
1st inspection 2nd inspection 3rd inspection 4th inspection
Period of May 20, 2009 to Sep. 24, 2009 to Nov. 19, 2009 and Nov. 25, 2009 to Feb. 17, 2010 to
inspection May 22, 2009 Sep. 30, 2009 Nov. 27, 2009 Feb. 19, 2010
Outline of The nuclear safety inspector conducted the The nuclear safety inspector conducted the The nuclear safety inspector conducted the The nuclear safety inspector conducted the
inspection inspection by entering the facility, examining certain inspection by entering the facility, examining certain inspection by entering the facility, examining certain inspection by entering the facility, examining certain
objects such as records, and questioning concerned objects such as records, and questioning concerned objects such as records, and questioning concerned objects such as records, and questioning concerned
parties with regard to the status of safety parties with regard to the status of safety parties with regard to the status of safety parties with regard to the status of safety
preservation activities based on the safety preservation activities based on the safety preservation activities based on the safety preservation activities based on the safety
preservation rules. preservation rules. preservation rules. preservation rules.
(Inspection Items) (Inspection Items) (Inspection Items) (Inspection Items)
- Status of management review 1) Status of management review (1) Status of management review - Status of the horizontal development regarding
- Status of compliance with the changed 2) Implementation status of nonconformity (2) Implementation status of the actions for the the floating case of the waste and status of the
conditions in the safety preservation rules management, corrective measures, and matters that were requested for improvement in actions for the matters that were requested for
preventive measures the previous safety inspection improvement in the second safety inspection in
- Implementation status of nonconformity 2009
management and corrective action - Floating of the waste (drum can) at the 6-C (3) Status of fixing of the waste and filling of the
burial facility in the Unit 1 burial site that has filler - Status of compliance with the safety
been found on June 24, 2009 preservation rules related to the conformance
verified during the inspection period
- Personnel not wearing an electronic personal
dosimeter in the controlled area of the waste
burial facility, occurred on July 16, 2009
- Damage of the floating waste (drum can) at the
6-C burial facility in the Unit 1 burial site that
occurred on September 26, 2009
Outline of Safety inspections were conducted by entering the Safety inspections were conducted to verify the Safety inspections were conducted to verify the Safety inspections were conducted to verify the
inspection facility, examining certain objects and questioning status of management reviews and the status of management reviews, the implementation status of the horizontal development regarding the
results concerned parties with regard to the status of implementation status of nonconformity status of the actions for the matters that were floating case of the waste, the status of the actions
management review, the status of compliance with management, corrective measures, and preventive requested for improvement in the previous safety for the matters that were requested for improvement
the changed conditions in the safety preservation measures, etc. All the inspection items were inspection, and the status of fixing of the waste and in the 2nd safety inspection in 2009, and the
rules, and the implementation status of considered as priority inspection items. filling of the filler, etc. All the inspection items were status of compliance with the safety preservation
nonconformance management and corrective It was verified from the results of safety inspections considered as priority inspection items. rules related to the conformance verified during the

370
measures, and so forth. As a result, no violations of that with regard to each inspection item, safety It was verified from the results of safety inspections inspection period.
the safety preservation rules were discovered as far preservation activities were conducted according to that with regard to each inspection item, safety
as the items for the safety inspections were As a result of the inspection on the status of
the safety preservation rules, and there were no preservation activities were conducted according to compliance with the safety preservation rules related
concerned. items that violate the safety preservation rules. the safety preservation rules, and there were no to the conformance verified during the inspection
The status of daily operational management during However, requests for improvement were issued: (1) items that violate the safety preservation rules. period, the following item that violated safety
the safety inspection period was examined by actions should be taken appropriately if any The status of daily operational management preservation rules (item that requires surveillance)
questioning the licensee item, safety preservation nonconformance is found regarding the requests activities during the safety inspection period was was discovered: radiation workers who had expired
activities about the management of facility defined in the manuals, detailed regulations, or also examined by questioning the company, safety education validity period and radiation
operations and reviewing records. As a result, no procedures, (2) it is necessary to quickly conduct reviewing records, and making inspection tours of workers who had not taken part of the safety
problems were found. horizontal developments to/from the other facilities. As a result, there were no items that education worked in the controlled areas.
In consideration of the above, it was concluded that departments according to the details of the violate the safety preservation rules.
nonconformance, (3) appropriate radiation The status of daily operational management during
the safety preservation activities examined with In consideration of the above, it was concluded that the safety inspection period was also examined by
respect to inspection items selected for the safety protective actions should be taken according to the
work conditions, (4) the “abnormality” defined in the safety preservation activities examined with questioning the licensee and reviewing records. As a
inspections are conducted properly. respect to the inspection items selected for the safety result, no problems were found.
Article 45-1 in the safety preservation rules should
be interpreted appropriately, and (5) all the abnormal inspections were conducted according to the safety In consideration of the above, it was concluded that
cases should be reported quickly to the Ministry of preservation rules. except the above item that violated safety
Economy, Trade and Industry. preservation rules (item that requires surveillance),
The status of daily operational management the safety preservation activities examined with
activities during the safety inspection period was respect to the inspection items selected for the safety
also examined by questioning the company, inspections were conducted according to the safety
reviewing records, and making inspection tours of preservation rules.
facilities. As a result, there were no items that For the items that violated the safety preservation
violate the safety preservation rules. rules (items that require surveillance), the status of
In consideration of the above, it was concluded that the improvement measures taken by the licensee
the safety preservation activities examined with should be verified continuously in future.
respect to the inspection items selected for the safety
inspections were conducted according to the safety
preservation rules.
(10) Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Tokai R&D Center, Nuclear Science Institute, Waste Burial Facility
1st inspection 2nd inspection 3rd inspection 4th inspection
Period of Jun. 1, 2009 to
Aug. 17, 2009 Dec. 24, 2009 Mar. 4, 2010
inspection Jun. 2, 2009
Outline of The nuclear safety inspector conducted the The nuclear safety inspector conducted the The nuclear safety inspector conducted the The nuclear safety inspector conducted the
inspection inspection by entering the facility, examining certain inspection by entering the facility, examining certain inspection by entering the facility, examining certain inspection by entering the facility, examining certain
objects such as records, and questioning concerned objects such as records, and questioning concerned objects such as records, and questioning concerned objects such as records, and questioning concerned
parties with regard to the status of safety parties with regard to the status of safety parties with regard to the status of safety parties with regard to the status of safety
preservation activities based on the safety preservation activities based on the safety preservation activities based on the safety preservation activities based on the safety
preservation rules. preservation rules. preservation rules. preservation rules.
(Inspection Items) (Inspection Items) (Inspection Items) (Inspection Items)
- Implementation status of system maintenance - Status of organizations and duties in regard to - Status of quality assurance activities - Status of management of the burial conservation
associated with revisions in the ordinance the safety control systems - Status of management of the burial conservation areas
- Status of the safety activities, evaluation, and - Status of management of the burial conservation areas - Status of safety preservation education and
plans for quality assurance areas - Status of the systems in regard to abnormal training
- Status of management of the burial conservation procedures - Status of recording and reporting
areas
- Status of compliance with the changed
conditions in the safety preservation rules
Outline of Safety inspections were conducted by entering the Safety inspections were conducted by questioning Safety inspections were conducted to verify the Safety inspections were conducted to verify the
inspection facility, examining certain objects and questioning concerned parties, reviewing records, and status of quality assurance activities, the status of status of management of the burial conservation
results concerned parties with regard to the implementation conducting on-site inspection tours in burial management of the burial conservation areas, and areas, the status of safety preservation education and
status of system maintenance associated with conservation areas with regard to the status of the status of the systems in regard to abnormal training, and the status of recording and reporting,
revisions in the ordinance, the status of the safety organizations and duties in regard to the safety procedures, etc. The status of the safety activities, etc.
activities, evaluation, and plans for quality control systems and status of management of the evaluation, and plans for quality assurance and the It was verified from the results of safety inspections
assurance, the status of management of the burial burial conservation areas, and so forth. Among status of the systems in regard to abnormal that with regard to the inspection items related to
conservation areas, and the status of compliance them, the status of organizations and duties in regard procedures were considered as priority inspection this inspection, safety preservation activities are
with the changed conditions in the safety to the safety control systems was considered as a items. conducted based on the safety preservation rules and
preservation rules, and so forth. As a result, no priority inspection item. It was verified from the results of safety inspections that there are no matters that violate the safety
violations of the safety preservation rules were It was verified from the results of safety inspections that with regard to the inspection items related to preservation rules.
discovered as far as the items for the safety that with regard to the inspection items related to this inspection, safety preservation activities are
inspections were concerned. Furthermore, an on-site inspection tour of the burial

371
this inspection, safety preservation activities are conducted based on the safety preservation rules and conservation areas also found that no problems were
The status of facility management during the safety conducted based on the safety preservation rules and that there are no matters that violate the safety found and the areas were managed properly.
inspection period was examined by questioning the that there are no matters that violate the safety preservation rules.
licensee item, safety preservation activities about the preservation rules. In consideration of the above, it was concluded that
As a result of questioning each company about the the safety preservation activities examined with
status of inspection tours and conducting on-site As a result of questioning each company about the status of organizations and duties in regard to the
check of the burial conservation areas. As a result, respect to the inspection items selected for the safety
status of organizations and duties in regard to the safety control systems and about the status of inspections were conducted according to the safety
no problems were found. safety control systems and about the status of management regarding inspection tours of the waste preservation rules.
In consideration of the above, it was concluded that management regarding inspection tours of the waste burial facility, etc., reviewing operation records, and
the safety preservation activities examined with burial facility, etc., reviewing operation records, and making on-site inspection tours in burial
respect to inspection items selected for the safety making on-site inspection tours in burial conservation areas, and so forth, it was verified that
inspections are conducted properly. conservation areas, and so forth, it was verified that no problems were found and safety preservation
no problems were found and safety preservation activities were conducted properly.
activities were conducted properly. In consideration of the above, it was concluded that
In consideration of the above, it was concluded that the safety preservation activities examined with
the safety preservation activities examined with respect to inspection items selected for the safety
respect to inspection items selected for the safety inspections are conducted properly.
inspections are conducted properly.



(11) Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited, Reprocessing Plant - Designated Waste Management Facility
1st inspection 2nd inspection 3rd inspection 4th inspection
Period of Jun. 26, 2009 to Aug. 26, 2009 to Nov. 18, 2009 to Mar. 15, 2010 to
inspection Jun. 30, 2009 (excluding the non-business days) Aug. 28, 2009 Nov. 20, 2009 Mar. 17, 2010
Outline of The nuclear safety inspector conducted the The nuclear safety inspector conducted the The nuclear safety inspector conducted the The nuclear safety inspector conducted the
inspection inspection by entering the facility, examining certain inspection by entering the facility, examining certain inspection by entering the facility, examining certain inspection by entering the facility, examining certain
objects such as records, and questioning concerned objects such as records, and questioning concerned objects such as records, and questioning concerned objects such as records, and questioning concerned
parties with regard to the status of safety parties with regard to the status of safety parties with regard to the status of safety parties with regard to the status of safety
preservation activities based on the safety preservation activities based on the safety preservation activities based on the safety preservation activities based on the safety
preservation rules. preservation rules. preservation rules. preservation rules.
(Inspection Items) (Inspection Items) (Inspection Items) (Inspection Items)
- Status of management review - Status of management review (1) Status of management review - Status of maintenance management
- Status of compliance with the changed - Status of education and training for the (2) Status of maintenance management - Status of reception of returned vitrified waste
conditions in the safety preservation rules personnel involved in the reception and storage (3) Implementation status of nonconformity - Implementation status of nonconformity
- Status of education and training for the management of returned vitrified waste management, corrective measures, and management, corrective measures, and
personnel involved in the reception and storage - Implementation status of nonconformity preventive measures preventive measures
management of returned vitrified waste management
Outline of Safety inspections were conducted by entering the Safety inspections were conducted to verify the Safety inspections were conducted to verify the Safety inspections were conducted to verify the
inspection facility, examining certain objects and questioning status of management reviews, the status of status of management reviews, the status of status of maintenance management, the status of
results concerned parties with regard to the status of education and training for the personnel involved in maintenance management, and the implementation reception of returned vitrified waste, and the
management review, the status of compliance with the reception and storage management of returned status of nonconformity management, corrective implementation status of nonconformity
the changed conditions in the safety preservation vitrified waste, and the implementation status of measures, and preventive measures, etc. All the management, corrective measures, and preventive
rules, and the status of education and training for the nonconformity management, etc. All the inspection inspection items were considered as priority measures, etc.
personnel involved in the reception and storage items were considered as priority inspection items. inspection items. As a result of the inspection on the implementation
management of returned vitrified waste, and so As a results, the following item that violated the It was verified from the results of safety inspections status of nonconformity management, corrective
forth. As a result, no violations of the safety safety preservation rules (item that requires that with regard to each inspection item, each safety measures, and preventive measures, the following
preservation rules were discovered as far as the surveillance) was discovered: Technical information preservation activity is conducted based on the item that violated safety preservation rules (item that
items for the safety inspections were concerned. required for maintenance and operation of the safety preservation rules and that there are no requires surveillance) was discovered: radiation
The status of daily management during the safety products or services after they had been procured as matters that violate the safety preservation rules. workers who had not taken part of the safety
inspection period was also examined by questioning the procurement requests (limited to the safety- It was also verified that corrective measures were education for the workers involved in waste control
the licensee and reviewing records. As a result, no related matters) was not requested though they taken for the items that violated the safety worked in the controlled areas.
problems were found. should be requested.

372
preservation rules (items that require surveillance) The status of daily operational management during
In consideration of the above, it was concluded that Also, it was verified that in regard to the inspection pointed out in the previous safety inspection. the safety inspection period was also examined by
the safety preservation activities examined with items to verify the status of management reviews The status of daily operational management during questioning the licensee, reviewing records, making
respect to inspection items selected for the safety and the status of education and training for the the safety inspection period was also examined by inspection tours of facilities, and attending the
inspections are conducted properly. personnel involved in the reception and storage questioning the licensee and reviewing records. As a periodical self-inspections of the facility. As a result,
management of returned vitrified waste that safety result, no problems were found. there were no items that violate the safety
preservation activities were conducted based on the preservation rules.
safety preservation rules and there were no items In consideration of the above, it was concluded that
the safety preservation activities examined with In consideration of the above, it was concluded that
that violate the safety preservation rules. except the above item that violated safety
respect to the inspection items selected for the safety
The status of daily operational management during inspections were conducted according to the safety preservation rules (item that requires surveillance),
the safety inspection period was also examined by preservation rules. the safety preservation activities examined with
questioning the licensee and reviewing records. As a respect to the inspection items selected for the safety
result, no problems were found. inspections were conducted according to the safety
In consideration of the above, it was concluded that preservation rules.
the safety preservation activities examined with For the items that violated the safety preservation
respect to the inspection items selected for the safety rules (items that require surveillance), the status of
inspections were conducted according to the safety the improvement measures taken by the licensee
preservation rules, except the item that violated the should be verified continuously in future.
safety preservation rules that was identified in the
inspection of the implementation status of
nonconformity management. For the item that
violated the safety preservation rules, corrective
measures taken by the licensee should be monitored
in future.
(12) Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Oarai Research and Development Center, Designated Waste Management Facility
1st inspection 2nd inspection 3rd inspection 4th inspection
Period of Jun. 17, 2009 to Aug. 19, 2009 to Nov. 4, 2009 to Mar. 1, 2010 to
inspection Jun. 19, 2009 Aug. 21, 2009 Nov. 6, 2009 Mar. 3, 2010
Outline of The nuclear safety inspector conducted the The nuclear safety inspector conducted the The nuclear safety inspector conducted the The nuclear safety inspector conducted the
inspection inspection by entering the facility, examining certain inspection by entering the facility, examining certain inspection by entering the facility, examining certain inspection by entering the facility, examining certain
objects such as records, and questioning concerned objects such as records, and questioning concerned objects such as records, and questioning concerned objects such as records, and questioning concerned
parties with regard to the status of safety parties with regard to the status of safety parties with regard to the status of safety parties with regard to the status of safety
preservation activities based on the safety preservation activities based on the safety preservation activities based on the safety preservation activities based on the safety
preservation rules. preservation rules. preservation rules. preservation rules.
(Inspection Items) (Inspection Items) (Inspection Items) (Inspection Items)
- Status of solid waste management in regard to - Status of liquid waste management in regard to - Status of operational management - Status of maintenance management (status of
the radioactive waste management (reception, the radioactive waste management - Status of the safety preservation activities periodical self-inspections of the facilities)
treatment, and storage of the beta, gamma, and - Status of radiation control activities related to the revision of the safety preservation - Status of safety measures and radiation
alpha solid waste) rules by the revision of the ministerial ordinance management for persons other than employees,
- Status of quality assurance activities related to
- Status of compliance with the changed the maintenance management (Status of safety regulation observance that became etc.
conditions related to changed safety effective on April 1) - Status of safety preservation education and
preservation rules training
- Status of reporting at abnormal status times and
- Status of transportation of nuclear fuel materials, emergency procedures - Status of safety management system
etc.
- Status of quality assurance activities related to
- Implementation status of nonconformity the maintenance management (status of
management maintenance management actions related to the
corroded hole case of the exhaust duct in the
beta and gamma solid waste treatment wing I)
Outline of Safety inspections were conducted by entering the Safety inspections were conducted to verify the Safety inspections were conducted to verify the Safety inspections were conducted to verify the
inspection facility, examining certain objects and questioning status of liquid waste management in regard to the status of operational management, the status of the status of maintenance management (status of
results concerned parties with regard to the status of solid radioactive waste management, the status of safety preservation activities related to the revision periodical self-inspections of the facilities), the
waste management in regard to the radioactive radiation control activities, and the status of quality of the safety preservation rules by the revision of the status of safety measures and radiation management
waste management, the status of compliance with assurance activities related to the maintenance ministerial ordinance (status of safety regulation for persons other than employees, the status of
the changed conditions related to changed safety management, etc. The status of liquid waste observance that became effective on April 1), and safety preservation education and training, the status
preservation rules, the status of transportation of management in regard to the radioactive waste the status of reporting at abnormal status times and of safety management system, etc., and the status of

373
nuclear fuel materials, etc., and the implementation management was considered as a priority inspection emergency procedures, etc. The status of operational quality assurance activities related to the
status of nonconformity management, and so forth. item. management and the status of the safety maintenance management (status of maintenance
As a result, no violations of the safety preservation It was verified from the results of safety inspections preservation activities related to the revision of the management actions related to the corroded hole
rules were discovered as far as the items for the that with regard to the inspection items related to safety preservation rules by the revision of the case of the exhaust duct in the beta and gamma solid
safety inspections were concerned. this inspection, safety preservation activities are ministerial ordinance (status of safety regulation waste treatment wing I), etc. The status of
The status of daily management during the safety conducted based on the safety preservation rules and observance that became effective on April 1) were maintenance management (status of periodical self-
inspection period was also examined by questioning that there are no matters that violate the safety considered as priority inspection items. inspections of the facilities) and the status of safety
the licensee, reviewing records, and making preservation rules. It was verified from the results of safety inspections preservation education and training were considered
inspection tours of the waste burial facilities. As a that with regard to the inspection items related to as priority inspection items.
The status of daily management during the safety
result, no problems were found. inspection period was also examined by questioning this inspection, safety preservation activities are It was verified from the results of safety inspections
In consideration of the above, it was concluded that the licensee, reviewing records, and making conducted based on the safety preservation rules and that with regard to the inspection items related to
the safety preservation activities examined with inspection tours of the waste management facilities. that there are no matters that violate the safety this inspection, safety preservation activities are
respect to inspection items selected for the safety As a result, it was verified that no problems were preservation rules. conducted based on the safety preservation rules and
inspections are conducted properly. found and the safety preservation activities were The status of daily management during the safety that there are no matters that violate the safety
conducted properly. inspection period was also examined by questioning preservation rules.
In consideration of the above, it was concluded that the licensee, reviewing records, and making The status of daily management during the safety
the safety preservation activities examined with inspection tours of the waste management facilities. inspection period was also examined by questioning
respect to inspection items selected for the safety As a result, it was verified that no problems were the licensee, reviewing records, and making
inspections are conducted properly. found and the safety preservation activities were inspection tours of the waste management facilities.
conducted properly. As a result, it was verified that no problems were
In consideration of the above, it was concluded that found and the safety preservation activities were
the safety preservation activities examined with conducted properly.
respect to inspection items selected for the safety In consideration of the above, it was concluded that
inspections are conducted properly. the safety preservation activities examined with
respect to the inspection items selected for the safety
inspections were conducted according to the safety
preservation rules.



ϱϪ STATUS OF APPROVAL AND
INSPECTION OF DESIGN AND
CONSTRUCTION METHODS AT
NUCLEAR FUEL FABRICATION, SPENT
FUEL STORAGE, REPROCESSING AND
RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL
FACILITIES


375
ϱϪ -1 Status of Approval and Inspection of Design and
Construction Methods at Nuclear Fuel Fabrication, Spent Fuel
Storage, Reprocessing and Radioactive Waste Disposal
Facilities

The design and construction methods of Nuclear Fuel fabrication, Spent Fuel
storage, Reprocessing and Radioactive Waste disposal facilities are subject to
approval by the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the construction and
performance of these facilities are subject to inspection by the Minister of Economy,
Trade and Industry according to the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law.
In FY2009, 24 approvals for design and construction methods were granted to 4
fabrication facilities, 2 reprocessing facilities and 2 disposal facilities. As for
inspections, 31 pre-operation inspections had been completed as of March 31, 2010.
No facilities have received a license for storage business.


377
ϱϪ-2 Approval of Design and Construction Methods

(1) Global Nuclear Fuel-Japan, Co., Ltd. (2) Global Nuclear Fuel-Japan, Co., Ltd.

1. Approval Apr. 10, 2009 1. Revision approval Jul. 31, 2009


application date application date

2. Approval date Apr. 28, 2009 2. Revision approval Aug. 31, 2009
date
3. Outline of ! Details
approval 3. Outline of revision ! Details of alteration
Update of the overheated temperature setting
approval Modification of removal of the fuel rod dryer,
device, update of the fuel rod tray, and change of
the maximum capacities of the second shipment change of the nuclear limit values of the fuel
repository on the first basement and the second assembly equipment, and change of the storage
shipment repository on the third floor and disposal capacities of the waste storehouse
" Decision criteria
" Decision criteria - Compliance with Article 3 (Criticality Prevention
of Nuclear Fuel Materials), Article 7 (Containment
- Compliance with Article 3 (Criticality Prevention
Function), Article 8 (Shielding), Article 10

378
of Nuclear Fuel Materials) and Article 13 (Alarm
(Prevention of Contamination by Nuclear Fuel
Equipment, etc.) of the Regulations for Technical
Materials, etc.), and Article 13 (Alarm Equipment,
Standards of Design and Construction Methods of
etc.) of the Regulations for the Technical
Fuel Fabrication Facilities (Ordinance of Prime
Standards of Design and Construction Methods of
Minister's Office No. 10, 1987)
Fabrication Facilities (Prime Minister's Office
- Subject to the approvals in the “Related Ordinance No. 10, 1987)
permission items”
- Subject to the approvals in the “Related
4. Result Approval was granted because the business is permission items”
approved and it is considered to meet the technical
standards 4. Result Approval was granted because the business is
approved and it is considered to meet the technical
5. Related The fabrication business whose modifications were standards
permission items licensed on October 6, 1982; May 31, 1990; February
21, 1992; October 13, 1998, April 21, 2003, and on 5. Related The fabrication business whose alteration was
March 18, 2009 permission items licensed on March 18, 2009
6. Remarks on the None 6. Remarks on the None
approval approval
(3) Global Nuclear Fuel-Japan, Co., Ltd. (4) Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited, Reprocessing Plant
1. Application date Nov. 9, 2009 1. Revision approval Mar. 27, 2009 (amended on Apr. 17 and May 21,
(amended on Dec. 2, 2009) application date 2009)

2. Approval date Dec. 4, 2009 2. Revision approval May 28, 2009


date
3. Outline of ! Application details
application 3. Outline of revision ! Details
Update of the compression and granulation approval
equipment and the furnace, remove and addition Addition of the maintenance jig entry shutter,
of the sumps and flushing tanks, and partial which is installed in place of the raw material
removal of the sprinklers supply equipment, and the brick collection jig,
which is installed on the top of the maintenance
jig entry shutter, to the facility when the glass
" Decision criteria melter is operated with the raw material supply
- Compliance with Article 3 (Criticality Prevention equipment removed temporarily for maintenance
of Nuclear Fuel Materials), Article 5 (Earthquake work
Resistance), Article 7 (Containment Function),
and Article 13 (Alarm Equipment, etc.) and other

379
" Decision criteria
articles of the Regulations for Technical Standards
of Design and Construction Methods of Fuel - Compliance with Article 5 (Earthquake
Fabrication Facilities Resistance), Article 6 (Materials and Structure)
and other articles of the Regulations for the
- Subject to the approvals in the “Related Technical Standards of Design and Construction
permission items” Methods of Reprocessing Facilities (Prime
Minister's Office Ordinance No. 12, 1987)
- Subject to the approvals in the “Related
permission items”
4. Review results Approval was granted because the business is
approved and it is considered to meet the technical 4. Result Approval was granted because the business is
standards approved and it is considered to meet the technical
standards
5. Related The fabrication business whose modifications were
permission items licensed on April 10, 1972, October 6, 1982, April 21, 5. Related The reprocessing business whose establishment and
2003, and February 16, 2007 permission items modifications were approved on December 24, 1992
6. Remarks on the None 6. Remarks on the None
approval approval



(5) Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited, Reprocessing Plant (6) Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited, Reprocessing Plant
1. Approval Sep. 1, 2009 1. Approval Mar. 10, 2010
application date application date (amended on Mar. 16, 2010)
2. Approval date Sep. 16, 2009 2. Approval date Mar. 23, 2010
3. Outline of ! Details 3. Outline of ! Details of revision approval
approval Replacement of the spent fuel insertion guide in approval - Addition of the negative pressure maintenance jig,
the burn-up instrumentation equipment which is used for maintenance work on the glass
melter, to the facility
" Decision criteria " Decision criteria
- Compliance with Article 4 (Preventing Damage - Compliance with Article 4 (Preventing Damage
by Fire) and Article 5 (Earthquake Resistance) by Fire) and Article 5 (Earthquake Resistance)
and other articles of the Regulations for Technical and other articles of the Regulations for Technical
Standards for Design and Construction Methods Standards for Design and Construction Methods
of Reprocessing Facilities (Prime Minister's of Reprocessing Facilities
Office Ordinance No. 12, 1987) - Subject to the approvals in the “Related

380
- Subject to the approvals in the “Related permission items”
permission items”

4. Result - Approval was granted because the business is


4. Result Approval was granted because the business is approved and it is considered to meet the technical
approved and it is considered to meet the technical standards
standards
5. Related - The reprocessing business whose establishment and
5. Related The reprocessing business whose establishment and permission items modifications were approved on December 24,
permission items modifications were approved on December 24, 1992 1992
6. Remarks on the None 6. Remarks on the None
approval approval
(7) Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited, Enrichment and Burial Plant (8) Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited, Enrichment and Burial Plant
1. Approval 1. Approval
May 13, 2009 Aug. 27, 2009
application date application date
2. Approval date Jun. 5, 2009 2. Approval date Set. 16, 2009
3. Outline of ! Details 3. Outline of ! Details
approval - Movement of some of the outdoor fire hydrants approval Installation of the opening door to the south wall
(two units out of 22 units that were already of the cascade room in the uranium enrichment
approved) in the emergency equipment and fire building
fighting equipment
" Decision criteria
" Decision criteria - Compliance with Article 5 (Earthquake
- Compliance with Article 4 (Preventing Damage Resistance) and Article 7 (Containment Function)
by Fire) of the Regulations for Technical of the Rules for Technical Standards for Design
Standards for Design and Construction Methods and Construction Methods of Fuel Fabrication
of Fuel Fabrication Facilities Facilities (Prime Minister's Office Ordinance No.

381
- Subject to the approvals in the “Related 10, 1987)
permission items” - Subject to the approvals in the “Related
permission items”

4. Result Approval was granted because the business is 4. Result Approval was granted because the business is
approved and it is considered to meet the technical approved and it is considered to meet the technical
standards standards
5. Related The fabrication business whose alteration was 5. Related The fabrication business whose alteration was
permission items licensed on May 7, 2002 permission items licensed on July 12, 1993
6. Remarks on the None 6. Remarks on the None
approval approval



(9) Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited, Enrichment and Burial Plant (10) Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited, Enrichment and Burial Plant
1. Approval 1. Approval
Dec. 9, 2009 Jan. 29, 2010
application date application date
2. Approval date Jan. 7, 2010 2. Approval date Feb. 26, 2010
3. Outline of ! Details of approval 3. Outline of ! Details of approval
approval - Addition of the product cylinders (24 cylinders) as approval - Increase of the solid waste storage and disposal
the nuclear fuel storage facilities capacities
- Creation of the storage and disposal area for the
" Decision criteria used centrifuges
- Compliance with Article 3 (Criticality Prevention
of Nuclear Fuel Materials) and Article 6 " Decision criteria
(Materials and Structure) of the Regulations for - Compliance with Article 3 (Criticality Prevention
the Technical Standards of Design and of Nuclear Fuel Materials) and Article 8
Construction Methods of Fabrication Facilities (Shielding) of the Regulations for the Technical
- Subject to the approvals in the “Related Standards of Design and Construction Methods of

382
permission items” Fabrication Facilities
- Subject to the approvals in the “Related
permission items”

4. Review results - Approval was granted because the business is 4. Review results - Approval was granted because the business is
approved and it is considered to meet the technical approved and it is considered to meet the technical
standards standards
5. Related - The fabrication business whose alteration was 5. Related - The fabrication business whose alteration was
permission items licensed on March 26, 2008 permission items licensed on January 21, 2010
6. Remarks on the None 6. Remarks on the None
approval approval
(11) Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited, Reprocessing Plant (12) Japan Atomic Energy Agency
Designated Waste Management Facility Tokai Research and Development Center, Nuclear Fuel Cycle Engineering Laboratories
1. Approval 1. Approval Mar. 5, 2008
Sep. 4, 2009
application date application date (amended on Feb. 12, May 13,
Jun. 9, and Jun. 29, 2009)
2. Approval date Oct. 26, 2009
2. Approval date Jul. 7, 2009
3. Outline of ! Application details
approval The following design and construction methods of 3. Outline of ! Details
application the designated waste management facilities were approval Addition of the members for the crane hall steel
approved: framed roof in the separation and refining plant
- Replacement of some of the inspection room air
supply units of the inspection room air supply " Decision criteria
system in the ventilation facility with similar
- Compliance with Article 5 (Earthquake
products for maintenance
Resistance), Article 6 (Materials and Structure)
" Decision criteria and other articles of the Regulations for the
- Subject to the approvals in Article 51-2-1 or 51-5- Technical Standards of Design and Construction
1 of the Law for the Regulation of Nuclear Source Methods of Reprocessing Facilities (Prime

383
Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors Minister's Office Ordinance No. 12, 1987)
- Compliance with the technical standards defined - Subject to the approvals in the “Related
by the Regulations for Technical Standards for permission items”
Designated Waste Management Facilities or
Design and Construction Methods of Designated
Waste Management Facilities
4. Result Approval was granted because it was considered that
the above-mentioned design and construction
methods in ! complied with the above-mentioned 4. Result Approval was granted because the business is
decision criteria in ". approved and it is considered to meet the technical
5. Related - Approval for waste management business, dated standards
permission items April 3, 1992 5. Related Reprocessing business that was submitted based on
- Revision approval for waste management business permission items the Supplementary Article 18-1&2 of the Japan
for extension of the vitrified waste storage building Atomic Energy Agency Law (2004 Law No. 155) and
B, dated December 8, 2003 regarded as designated on October 1, 2005
6. Remarks on the None 6. Remarks on the None
approval approval



(13) Japan Atomic Energy Agency (14) Japan Atomic Energy Agency
Tokai Research and Development Center, Nuclear Fuel Cycle Engineering Laboratories Tokai Research and Development Center, Nuclear Fuel Cycle Engineering Laboratories
1. Approval Jul. 17, 2009 (amended on Aug. 6 and Sep. 1, 2009) 1. Approval Set. 17, 2009
application date application date (amended on Oct. 14, 2009)
2. Approval date Sep. 14, 2009 2. Approval date Oct. 30, 2009
3. Outline of ! Details 3. Outline of ! Details
approval - Modification of the wiring methods for the utility application - Update of the supports and other parts for the
equipment and the emergency power generators in exhaust ducts of the cell exhaust system in the
the second intermediate switchyard. Update of the separation and refining plant, etc.
cooling tower in the vitrification technology
development building.
" Decision criteria
- Compliance with Article 5 (Earthquake
" Decision criteria Resistance), Article 6 (Materials and Structure)
- Compliance with Article 5 (Earthquake and other articles of the Regulations for the
Resistance), Article 6 (Materials and Structure) Technical Standards of Design and Construction
and other articles of the Regulations for the Methods of Reprocessing Facilities

384
Technical Standards of Design and Construction - Subject to the approvals in the “Related
Methods of Reprocessing Facilities (Prime permission items”
Minister's Office Ordinance No. 12, 1987)
- Subject to the approvals in the “Related
permission items”

4. Review results Approval was granted because the business is


4. Result Approval was granted because the business is approved and it is considered to meet the technical
approved and it is considered to meet the technical standards
standards
5. Related Reprocessing business that was submitted based on
5. Related Reprocessing business that was submitted based on permission items the Supplementary Article 18-1&2 of the
permission items the Supplementary Article 18-1&2 of the Japan Supplementary Provisions of the Japan Atomic
Atomic Energy Agency Law (2004 Law No. 155) and Energy Agency Law and regarded as designated on
regarded as designated on October 1, 2005 October 1, 2005
6. Remarks on the None 6. Remarks on the None
approval approval
(15) Japan Atomic Energy Agency (16) Japan Atomic Energy Agency
Tokai Research and Development Center, Nuclear Fuel Cycle Engineering Laboratories Tokai Research and Development Center, Nuclear Fuel Cycle Engineering Laboratories
1. Application date Nov. 5, 2009 1. Approval Dec. 4, 2009
(amended on Dec. 17, 2009) application date (amended on Dec. 22, 2009)
2. Approval date Dec. 25, 2009 2. Approval date Jan. 4, 2010
3. Outline of ! Details 3. Outline of ! Details of revision approval
application Change of the material of the filter casing to approval - Update of the dryer, which is used to dry and
stainless steel, which is installed in the tank solidify the low-level radioactive waste liquid, by
exhaust system for the high-level radioactive applying a corrosion-resistant lining onto the
waste liquid storage process in the separation and inside of the dryer
refining plant, etc.
" Decision criteria
" Decision criteria - Compliance with Article 5 (Earthquake
- Compliance with Article 5 (Earthquake Resistance), Article 6 (Materials and Structure)
Resistance), Article 6 (Materials and Structure) and other articles of the Regulations for the
and other articles of the Regulations for the Technical Standards of Design and Construction

385
Technical Standards of Design and Construction Methods of Reprocessing Facilities
Methods of Reprocessing Facilities - Subject to the approvals in the “Related
- Subject to the approvals in the “Related permission items”
permission items”

4. Review results Approval was granted because the business is


approved and it is considered to meet the technical 4. Result Approval was granted because the business is
standards approved and it is considered to meet the technical
standards
5. Related Reprocessing business that was submitted based on
permission items the Supplementary Article 18-1&2 of the 5. Related - Reprocessing business that was submitted based on
Supplementary Provisions of the Japan Atomic permission items the Supplementary Article 18-1&2 of the Japan
Energy Agency Law and regarded as designated on Atomic Energy Agency Law (2004 Law No. 155)
October 1, 2005 and regarded as designated on October 1, 2005
6. Remarks on the None 6. Remarks on the None
approval approval



(17) Japan Atomic Energy Agency (18) Japan Atomic Energy Agency
Tokai Research and Development Center, Nuclear Fuel Cycle Engineering Laboratories Oarai R&D Center, Waste Management Facility
1. Approval Jan. 12, 2010 1. Approval Set. 11, 2009
application date (amended on Jan. 21, 2010) application date
2. Approval date Feb. 5, 2010 2. Approval date Set. 15, 2009
3. Outline of ! Details of revision approval 3. Outline of ! Objects of approval application
approval - Partial modification related to the modification approval Disposal equipment in the beta and gamma solid
work on the fuel supply pipes in the emergency waste treatment wing I
power generators " Details of approval application
Update for corrosion prevention of the outdoor
" Decision criteria exhaust ducts of the disposal equipment in the
- Compliance with Article 5 (Earthquake beta and gamma solid waste treatment wing I in
Resistance), Article 6 (Materials and Structure) the facilities attached to the other waste
and other articles of the Regulations for the management facilities related to the designated
Technical Standards of Design and Construction waste management facilities
Methods of Reprocessing Facilities

386
- Subject to the approvals in the “Related
permission items”

4. Result Approval was granted because a business license for


4. Result Approval was granted because the business is the design and work method submitted for this
approved and it is considered to meet the technical application was considered as conformable to Article
standards 51-7 paragraph 3 of the Act on Control of Nuclear
Source Materials, Nuclear Fuel Materials and
5. Related - Reprocessing business that was submitted based on
Reactors
permission items the Supplementary Article 18-1&2 of the Japan
Atomic Energy Agency Law (2004 Law No. 155) 5. Related - Approval for waste management business, dated
and regarded as designated on October 1, 2005 permission items March 30, 1992
6. Remarks on the None 6. Remarks on the None
approval approval
(19) Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd., Kumatori Works (20) Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd., Kumatori Works
1. Approval May 12, 2009 1. Application date Set. 18, 2009
application date
2. Approval date Oct. 6, 2009
2. Approval date May 20, 2009
3. Outline of ! Details
3. Outline of ! Details application - Replacement of the overheat preventive
approval - Modification of the blower of the gas disposal thermometer and modification of the shape of the
equipment No. 1 in the radioactive waste disposal hood of the roaster No. 1 in the molding facility
facility " Decision criteria
- Compliance with Article 5 (Earthquake
" Decision criteria Resistance) and other articles of the Rules for
- Compliance with Article 5 (Earthquake Technical Standards for Design and Construction
Resistance) and other articles of the Rules for Methods of Fuel Fabrication Facilities
Technical Standards for Design and Construction - Subject to the approvals in the “Related
Methods of Fuel Fabrication Facilities permission items”
- Subject to the approvals in the “Related

387
permission items”

4. Result Approval was granted because the business is 4. Review results Approval was granted because the business is
approved and it is considered to meet the technical approved and it is considered to meet the technical
standards standards
5. Related The fabrication business which was licensed on July 5. Related The fabrication business whose alteration was
permission items 14, 1982 permission items licensed on March 20, 1987
6. Remarks on the None 6. Remarks on the None
approval approval



(21) Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd., Kumatori Works (22) Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd.
1. Approval Nov. 6, 2009 1. Approval May 15, 2009
application date (amended on Jan. 18, 2010) application date
2. Approval date Feb. 4, 2010 2. Approval date Jun. 3, 2009
3. Outline of ! Details of approval 3. Outline of ! Details
approval - Modification of the molding facilities (press, approval - Update of the cold trap, which is an attached
pellet conveyance equipment, and grounding equipment to the evaporator in the UF6
device, etc.) in the second fabrication wing evaporated hydrolysis facility
- Addition of the SUS container as the attached
" Decision criteria equipment to the partly-finished product storage
rack, scrap storage rack, and raw powder storage
- Compliance with Article 3 (Criticality Prevention rack in the powder storage facility
of Nuclear Fuel Materials), Article 5 (Earthquake
Resistance), Article 7 (Containment Function),
and Article 8 (Shielding) of the Regulations for " Decision criteria
Technical Standards of Design and Construction - Compliance with Article 3 (Criticality

388
Methods of Fuel Fabrication Facilities Prevention), Article 5 (Earthquake Resistance),
- Subject to the approvals in the “Related Article 6 (Materials and Structure), Article 7
permission items” (Shielding), and other articles of the Regulations
for the Technical Standards of Design and
Construction Methods of Fuel Fabrication
Facilities
- Subject to the approvals in the “Related
permission items”
4. Review results - Approval was granted because the business is
approved and it is considered to meet the technical 4. Result Approval was granted because the business is
standards approved and it is considered to meet the technical
standards
5. Related The fabrication business whose modifications were
permission items licensed on November 19, 1992 and on December 26, 5. Related The fabrication business whose alteration was
2003, etc. permission items licensed on August 29, 2008
6. Remarks on the None 6. Remarks on the None
approval approval
(23) Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd. (24) Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd.
1. Approval Jul. 9, 2009 1. Application date Nov. 17, 2009
application date
2. Approval date Dec. 14, 2009
2. Approval date Aug. 11, 2009
3. Outline of ! Application details
3. Outline of ! Details of alteration application Movement of the centrifugal filter in the chemical
approval - Update of the continuous sintering furnace and processing facility
modification of the pellet aligner Addition of the pellet storage racks (9 racks) in
- Replacement of the ceiling running crane hoist set, the nuclear fuel material storage facility
and removal and movement of the devices in the
decontamination room, etc.
" Decision criteria
" Decision criteria
- Compliance with Article 3 (Criticality Prevention),
- Compliance with Article 3 (Criticality Prevention), Article 5 (Earthquake Resistance), Article 8
Article 4 (Preventing Damage by Fire), Article 5 (Shielding), Article 10 (Prevention of
(Earthquake Resistance), Article 7 (Shielding), Contamination) of the Regulations for the
Article 12 (Transportation Equipment), Article 13 Technical Standards of Design and Construction

389
(Alarm Devices, etc.) of the Regulations for the Methods of Fuel Fabrication Facilities
Technical Standards of Design and Construction
Methods of Fuel Fabrication Facilities (Prime - Subject to the approvals in the “Related
Minister's Office Ordinance No. 10, 1987) permission items”
- Subject to the approvals in the “Related
permission items”
4. Result Approval was granted because the business is
approved and it is considered to meet the technical
standards 4. Review results Approval was granted because the business is
approved and it is considered to meet the technical
5. Related The fabrication business whose modifications were standards
permission items licensed on July 20, 1987; February 28, 1985; and
August 30, 1983, and the fabrication business whose 5. Related The fabrication business whose alteration was
modifications were licensed on January 11, 1972 permission items licensed on July 20, 1987
6. Remarks on the None 6. Remarks on the None
approval approval



ACCIDENT

ϱϫ STATUS OF ACCIDENT


391
!" -1-1 Overview of Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants in FY2009 (Excluding
Power Reactors in the Research and Development Stage)

!" In FY2009, a total of 15* accidents were reported to the Minister of Economy,
Trade and Industry by electric utilities under the Law for the Regulation of
Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors and other laws.
The number of reported accidents per reactor unit was 0.3.
*:The accident that occurred at the Sendai Nuclear Power Plant of Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc. on
January 29, 2010, which was reported in accordance with the Electric ity Utilities Industry Law, was
not included in the number of accidents because it was an electric accident that occurred in a general
electric facility.

#" The 15 accidents consisted of 0 that caused automatic shutdowns during operation,
including trial and adjustment operation, 3 that caused manual shutdowns, 2 that
resulted in an output fluctuation, 1 in which damage to equipment was found
during operation, 7 in which damage to equipment was found while a nuclear
reactor was not in operation and 2 for other categories.

$" None of these accidents had any radioactive effect on the environment.


393

 7DEOHϱϫ7UHQGVLQWKH1XPEHURI5HSRUWHG$FFLGHQWV
 )LVFDO<HDU
                     
7\SH

$XWRPDWLF
 VKXWGRZQ                      


'XULQJRSHUDWLRQ

0DQXDO
                     
 VKXWGRZQ
 2XWSXW
               
 IOXFWXDWLRQ
 &RPSRQHQW
GDPDJH

1RWLQRSHUDWLRQ

6*
 GDPDJH                  
 &RPSRQHQW
 GDPDJHRWKHU
WKDQ6*
                     



2WKHUV                      

 7RWDO
                     

2QHIDWDODFFLGHQWLQDXWRPDWLFVKXWGRZQ


 㻲㼕㼓㼡㼞㼑㻌䊩䊣㻙㻝㻙㻝㻌㼀㼞㼑㼚㼐㼟㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻺㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㻾㼑㼜㼛㼞㼠㼑㼐㻌㻭㼏㼏㼕㼐㼑㼚㼠㼟㻌㼍㼠㻌㻺㼡㼏㼘㼑㼍㼞㻌㻼㼛㼣㼑㼞
 㻼㼘㼍㼚㼠㼟㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻭㼢㼑㼞㼍㼓㼑㻌㻺㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㻭㼏㼏㼕㼐㼑㼚㼠㼟㻌㼜㼑㼞㻌㻾㼑㼍㼏㼠㼛㼞㻌㼁㼚㼕㼠
㻠㻜 㻠



㻟㻜 㻟
 㻭㼢㼑㼞㼍㼓㼑㻌㼚㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㼍㼏㼏㼕㼐㼑㼚㼠㼟㻌㼜㼑㼞
㻾㼑㼜㼛㼞㼠㼑㼐㻌㼚㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㼍㼏㼏㼕㼐㼑㼚㼠㼟


㻞㻟 㻞㻟
㼞㼑㼍㼏㼠㼛㼞㻌㼡㼚㼕㼠

 㻞㻜
㻝㻥
 㻞㻜 㻝㻣

 㻝㻡 㻝㻡 㻝㻡
㻝㻠 㻝㻠 㻝㻠 㻝㻠
 㻝㻝 㻝㻝
 㻝㻜 㻤 㻝

 㻜㻚㻟 㻜㻚㻠 㻜㻚㻠 㻜㻚㻠 㻜㻚㻠


㻜㻚㻟 㻜㻚㻟 㻜㻚㻟 㻜㻚㻟 㻜㻚㻟 㻜㻚㻟 㻜㻚㻟
㻜㻚㻞 㻜㻚㻞
 㻜㻚㻞

 㻜 㻜
㻥㻡 㻥㻢 㻥㻣 㻥㻤 㻥㻥 㻜㻜 㻜㻝 㻜㻞 㻜㻟 㻜㻠 㻜㻡 㻜㻢 㻜㻣 㻜㻤 㻜㻥

㻲㼕㼟㼏㼍㼘㻌㼅㼑㼍㼞

1RWH :LWKWKHDPHQGPHQWWRWKH1XFOHDU5HDFWRU5HJXODWLRQ/DZRQ2FWREHU
 UHSRUWLQJFULWHULDIRUDFFLGHQWVDUHFODULILHGDQGTXDQWLILHGDQG
 UHSRUWLQJEDVHGRQPLQLVWHULDOQRWLILFDWLRQVZDVXQLILHGLQWRUHSRUWLQJ
EDVHGRQWKHODZ


394

DW1XFOHDU3RZHU3ODQWV

                      7RWDO

                      


                       


       

        

                      

                      


                       

                      



 㻲㼕㼓㼡㼞㼑㻌䊩䊣㻙㻝㻙㻞㻌㼀㼞㼑㼚㼐㼟㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻺㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㻾㼑㼜㼛㼞㼠㼑㼐㻌㻭㼏㼏㼕㼐㼑㼚㼠㼟㻌㼍㼠㻌㻺㼡㼏㼘㼑㼍㼞㻌㻼㼛㼣㼑㼞
 㻼㼘㼍㼚㼠㼟㻌㼎㼥㻌㻭㼏㼏㼕㼐㼑㼚㼠㻌㼀㼥㼜㼑
 㻠㻜
$ XWRPDWLFVKXWGRZQV GXULQJRSHUDWLRQ 
 0DQXDOVKXWGRZQV GXULQJRSHUDWLRQ 
2XWSXWI O X F W X D W L R Q  GXULQJRSHUDWLRQ 

&RPSRQHQWGDPDJH GXULQJRSHUDWLRQ 
㻾㼑㼜㼛㼞㼠㼑㼐㻌㼚㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㼍㼏㼏㼕㼐㼑㼚㼠㼟

 㻟㻜 6*7XEHVGDPDJH QRWLQRSHUDWLRQ 
&RPSRQHQWGDPDJHRWKHUWKDQ6*7XEHV QRWLQRSHUDWLRQ

2WKHUV 㻞㻟 㻞㻟

㻞㻜
㻝㻥
 㻞㻜
㻝㻣
 㻝㻠 㻝㻠 㻝㻠 㻝㻠
㻝㻡 㻝㻡 㻝㻡

 㻝㻝 㻝㻝
 㻝㻜 㻤


 㻜
 㻥㻡 㻥㻢 㻥㻣 㻥㻤 㻥㻥 㻜㻜 㻜㻝 㻜㻞 㻜㻟 㻜㻠 㻜㻡 㻜㻢 㻜㻣 㻜㻤 㻜㻥
㻲㼕㼟㼏㼍㼘㻌㼅㼑㼍㼞





395
ϱϫ-1-2 Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants to be Reported
When an accident specified in the related rules of the laws (the Law for the Regulation of Nuclear
Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors (Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law), and the
Electric Utility Industry Law) occurs at nuclear facilities, the licensee or other concerned party
reports it to the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency. The reporting criteria are as follows
(excerpt):

Article 62-3 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Law

Article 106 of the Electric Utility Industry Law


Law
Ordinance

Article 19-17 of the Rules for Construction, Article 3 of the Electricity-related Reporting
Operation, etc. of a Commercial Power Reactor Regulations

1) When nuclear fuel materials have been stolen 1) An accident in which an electric shock,
or their location is unknown. damage to a nuclear power generation
2) When a reactor in operation has been shut workpiece, wrong or no operation of a
down or needed to be shut down due to a nuclear power generation workpiece has
failure of the nuclear power reactor facilities, caused injury or death.
or when a power generation change of over 2) An electrical fire accident has occurred.
5% has occurred or been needed. 3) An accident in which damage to a nuclear
3) When it has been verified at inspection power generation workpiece, wrong or no
conducted by a licensee on equipment, etc. operation of a nuclear power generation
important for safety that the equipment, etc. workpiece has caused damage to public
important for safety did not meet Article 9 of properties, made public facilities, such as
the Ordinance of Establishing Technical roads, parks and schools, unusable, or had
Standards for Nuclear Power Generation social impacts.
Equipment or the standards specified in 4) Damage to major electric workpieces has
Article 9-2 of the ordinance, or when it has occurred.
Reporting Criteria

been verified that the equipment, etc.


5) An accident in which damage to a nuclear
important for safety did not have functions
power generation workpiece, wrong or no
necessary to ensure the safety of the nuclear
operation of a nuclear power generation
power reactor facilities.
workpiece has caused other licensees a
4) When a fire has caused a failure of power supply trouble of more than 7,000 kW
equipment, etc. important for safety. and less than 70,000 kW for longer than one
5) In addition to the above Item 3, when limiting hour, or a power supply trouble of more than
conditions for operation have been deviated 70,000 kW for longer than 10 minutes.
from due to a failure of nuclear power reactor
facilities, or when measures specified in
safety regulations have not been taken for the
deviation of limiting conditions for operation.
6) When a malfunction has been found in the
state of exhaust from gaseous radioactive
waste exhaust equipment or in the state of
discharge from liquid radioactive waste
discharge equipment, due to a failure of
nuclear power reactor facilities or other
unexpected situations.

(Excerpt)

396

7) When exhaust from gaseous radioactive
waste exhaust equipment has caused the
concentration of radioactive materials in air
outside an environmental monitoring area to
exceed the concentration limit stipulated in
Article 15-4.
8) When discharge from liquid radioactive waste
discharge equipment has caused the
concentration of radioactive materials in the
water outside an environmental monitoring
area to exceed the concentration limit
stipulated in Article 15-7.
9) When nuclear fuel materials or those
contaminated with nuclear fuel materials have
leaked outside a controlled area.
10) When a failure or other unexpected situation
of nuclear power reactor facilities has caused
nuclear fuel materials or others to leak in a
Reporting Criteria

controlled area.
11) When a failure or other unexpected situations
of nuclear power reactor facilities has caused
those in a controlled area to be exposed to
radiation; effective dose from this exposure
has exceeded or may have exceeded 5 mSv
for radiation workers and 0.5 mSv for those
other than radiation workers.
12) When a radiation worker has been exposed to
radiation that exceeded or may have exceeded
the dose limit stipulated in Section 1-1 of
Article 9.
13) When a control rod that was not inserted or
drawn out has actually moved from the
original control point to or past another
control point, or when a control rod at the full
insertion position that was not inserted or
drawn out has actually moved in the direction
of insertion beyond the full insertion position.
14) In addition to the above Items, when a failure
of nuclear power reactor facilities has
inflicted or may have inflicted injury on a
person.

(Excerpt)
Note 1㸸In October 2003, these rules were quantified and defined as much as possible so that a licensee can
determine properly whether a trouble is an event to be reported, and the contents of the notification criteria
issued before October were included in the laws to make their position clear.

Note 2㸸In June 2007, part of Article 19-17 of the Rules for Construction, Operation, etc. of a Commercial
Power Reactor was amended. This is because as a result of full inspection of power generating equipment
conducted by electric power companies according to the instruction of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry on November 30, 2006, it was revealed that events like an unexpected control rod drop occurred
during the shutdown of a reactor. Since events like an unexpected control rod drop may affect the safety of a
reactor, it is appropriate to cause licensees to discover these events as preliminary signs of accidents and take
measures for them. To cause licensees to report on events in which control rods moved while they were not

operated, therefore, Section 13 was added.

397
ϱϫ-1-3 Analysis of Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants

1. The analysis of accidents trends in Japan shows that plants constructed in the early stage have
many initial failures with a peak of the number of accidents in the third year after the start of
operation, and then the number of accidents decreases. (See Table XIV-1-2 and Figure
XIV-1-3.)

The main accidents encountered in the past are as follows:

In the case of BWR plants, they include stress corrosion cracking of stainless steel pipes, etc.
and thermal fatigue cracking of nozzles of reactor pressure vessels in 1976 to 1978, damage to
reactor recirculation pumps in 1989, and pipe rupture of residual heat removal systems in 2001.

In case of PWR plants, they include stress corrosion cracking of support pins and flexible
pins of control rod guide pipes and damage to heat transfer tubes of steam generators in 1978 to
1979, pipe rupture of heat transfer tubes of steam generators in 1991, damage to connecting
pipes of regenerative heat exchangers of chemical and volume control systems in 1999, damage
to secondary system pipes in 2004, and flaws on welded spots of primary coolant inlet stubs of
steam generators in 2007 to 2008.

Common accidents include cracking, etc. of nozzles of small pipes due to vibration. They
also include accidents due to the Niigataken Chuetsu-Oki earthquake, which occurred in July
2007.

Since recurrence prevention measures, etc. have been taken or considered for each accident,
it is considered that there are few possibilities of recurrence of similar accidents in plants that
will be operated in future.

398
7DEOHϱϫ7UHQGVLQWKH1XPEHURI$FFLGHQWVDW1XFOHDU3RZHU3ODQWV
E\WKH1XPEHURI<HDUV(ODSVHGDIWHUWKH6WDUWRI2SHUDWLRQ
1XPEHURI\HDUVHODSVHG          
1XPEHURIDFFLGHQWV          
1XPEHURIUHDFWRUXQLWV          
$YHUDJHQXPEHURIDFFLGHQWV
SHUUHDFWRUXQLW          

1XPEHURI\HDUVHODSVHG          
1XPEHURIDFFLGHQWV          
1XPEHURIUHDFWRUXQLWV          
$YHUDJHQXPEHURIDFFLGHQWV
SHUUHDFWRUXQLW          

1XPEHURI\HDUVHODSVHG          
1XPEHURIDFFLGHQWV          
1XPEHURIUHDFWRUXQLWV          
$YHUDJHQXPEHURIDFFLGHQWV
SHUUHDFWRUXQLW          

1XPEHURI\HDUVHODSVHG          
1XPEHURIDFFLGHQWV          
1XPEHURIUHDFWRUXQLWV          
$YHUDJHQXPEHURIDFFLGHQWV
SHUUHDFWRUXQLW          

1XPEHURI\HDUVHODSVHG 
1XPEHURIDFFLGHQWV 
1XPEHURIUHDFWRUXQLWV 
$YHUDJHQXPEHURIDFFLGHQWV
SHUUHDFWRUXQLW 

㸦1RWH㸧
㸯㸬$YHUDJHQXPEHURIDFFLGHQWVSHUUHDFWRUXQLW  1XPEHURIUHSRUWHGDFFLGHQWV1XPEHURIUHDFWRUXQLWV
DWWKHHQGRIWKHILVFDO\HDU
㸰㸬7KHQXPEHURI\HDUVHODSVHGDIWHUWKHVWDUWRIRSHUDWLRQDVVXPHVWKDWWKHSHULRGIURPWKHGD\
RQZKLFKWKHVWDWLRQZDVEURXJKWLQWRFRPPHUFLDORSHUDWLRQWRWKHHQGRIWKHILVFDO\HDUFRQVWLWXWHV
WKHILUVW\HDU7KHQXPEHUVXEVHTXHQWO\LQFUHDVHVE\HDFKILVFDO\HDU
㸱㸬7KHQXPEHUVRIUHDFWRUXQLWVDUHWKHQXPEHUVRIWKRVHDWWKHHQGRIHDFKILVFDO\HDU
IROORZLQJWKHVWDUWRIRSHUDWLRQ

㻲㼕㼓㼡㼞㼑㻌䊩䊣㻙㻝㻙㻟㻌㼀㼞㼑㼚㼐㼟㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻺㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㻭㼏㼏㼕㼐㼑㼚㼠㼟㻌㼍㼠㻌㻺㼡㼏㼘㼑㼍㼞㻌㻼㼛㼣㼑㼞
㻼㼘㼍㼚㼠㼟㻌㼎㼥㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻺㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㼅㼑㼍㼞㼟㻌㻱㼘㼍㼜㼟㼑㼐㻌㼍㼒㼠㼑㼞㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻿㼠㼍㼞㼠㻌㼛㼒㻌㻻㼜㼑㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚
㻝㻚㻡
㻺㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㼥㼑㼍㼞㼟㻌㼑㼘㼍㼜㼟㼑㼐㻌㼍㼒㼠㼑㼞㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼟㼠㼍㼞㼠㻌㼛㼒㻌㼛㼜㼑㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚

㻝㻚㻜


㻜㻚㻡

㻜㻚㻜
㻜 㻝㻜 㻞㻜 㻟㻜 㻠㻜
㻭㼢㼑㼞㼍㼓㼑㻌㼚㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㼍㼏㼏㼕㼐㼑㼚㼠㼟㻌㼜㼑㼞㻌㼞㼑㼍㼏㼠㼛㼞㻌㼡㼚㼕㼠 参
㸨 ,QRUGHUWRDFFXUDWHO\UHIOHFWWKHILJXUHVGDWDZKHQWKHQXPEHURI
UHDFWRUXQLWVZDVRUDERYHKDVEHHQJUDSKHG
 付
399
2. In Japan, a total of 728 accidents have been reported to date and they can
be classified by their effect on plant operation as shown in Tables XIV-1-3
to XIV-1-7.
% & Accidents that resulted in an automatic shutdown
during operation:152
% & Accidents that resulted in a manual shutdown
during operation:263
% & Accidents that resulted in an output fluctuation
during operation:26
% & Accidents in which damage to equipment was found:8
% & Accidents during a periodical inspection or when a reactor
was not in operation for another reason:240
% & Other accidents: 39

(1) Accidents that resulted in an automatic shutdown during operation


(See Table XIV-1-3. BWR: 101, PWR: 45, GCR: 6, Total: 152)
After the peak in FY1981, the number of accidents that caused
automatic shutdowns while a reactor was in operation has decreased.
In the past several years especially, the annual average number of such
accidents per reactor has been between 0.0 and 0.1. This means cases
of automatic shutdown are few.
Major systems to which equipment that caused automatic shutdowns
belong include the following:
1) Instrumentation and control system equipment:52
2) Steam turbine equipment:36
3) Electrical equipment:34
Major causes of automatic shutdowns in 1) instrumentation and control
system equipment include malfunctions of sensors, malfunctions of
control circuits caused by a failed electronic circuit in BWR plants, and
trouble with control circuits and valves for instrumentation and control
systems in PWR plants.
Major causes of automatic shutdowns in 2) electrical equipment include
generator field failures. Major causes of automatic shutdowns in 3)
steam turbine equipment include malfunctions of moisture separators
and pressure control systems which are often found in BWR plants.
Recently, however, there has been a downward trend in the number of
these malfunctions.
Recently, there has been a downward trend in the number of accidents
that cause an automatic shutdown of a reactor due to the adoption of
more effective preventative measures appropriate to these systems.

(2) Accidents that resulted in a manual shutdown during operation (See


Table XIV-1-4. BWR: 167, PWR: 77, GCR: 19, total: 263)
Accidents that have caused a manual shutdown while a reactor was in
operation are reported in small numbers each year. In most of these
incidents, reactors have been manually shut down for inspection or
repair work following significant changes in the parameters of the
monitoring equipment caused by a leakage in a component of the

400
reactor cooling system equipment or for another reason. To prevent
leaks and ruptures of steam generator heat transfer tubes, eddy
current tests are conducted in periodical inspections. To prevent
fatigue and stress corrosion cracks in pipes, materials and construction
processes have been improved and pipes are replaced more often.
These preventative measures will reduce the chances of recurrence of
similar incidents. To prevent leaks and ruptures of steam generator
heat transfer tubes, eddy current tests are conducted in periodical
inspections. To prevent fatigue and stress corrosion cracks in pipes,
materials and construction processes have been improved and pipes are
replaced more often. These preventative measures will reduce the
chances of recurrence of similar incidents.

(3) Damage to equipment found in a periodical inspection or when a reactor


was not in operation for another reason (See Table XIV-1-5. BWR: 55,
PWR: 182, GCR: 3, Total: 240)
The annual number of irregularities found in periodical inspections or
when a reactor was not in operation for another reason has stayed at
around 10 since FY1976. Between FY1976 and FY1978, thermal
fatigue cracks in reactor pressure vessel nozzles and stress corrosion
cracks in pipes were found in periodical inspections in BWR plants.
Between FY1978 and FY1979, damage to control rod guide tube hinge
pins or flexible pins were found in periodical inspections in PWR plants.
However, appropriate measures against these and other accidents in
BWR or PWR plants have been adopted. In FY1989, damage to a
reactor recirculation pump was found and appropriate measures such
as replacement of submerged bearing rings, have been adopted.
In some PWR plants, eddy current tests conducted periodically on
steam generator tubes sometimes result in significant signal
indications. Recently, however, the replacement of steam generators,
complete water quality control and other appropriate measures have
been adopted.

(4) Other accidents (See Table XIV-1-8)


Other accidents included incidents that did not directly affect the
operation of plants, incidents that involved death or injury, radiation
exposure and leakage of radioactive material. Incidents reported so far
include two cases in which workers were exposed to radiation at a level
exceeding that specified by law (four workers were exposed), 10 cases in
which radioactive materials leaked outside a control zone or access to a
certain area was limited due to leakage within a control zone, and 15
incidents resulting in death or injury (fatalities: 11, injuries: 22; those
poisoned by gas: 2; oxygen deficiency: 2; fatal accident accompanied by
an automatic shutdown: 2).



401

Classification of accidents

The classification of accidents here is based on the 728 accidents (BWR:


367, PWR: 315, GCR: 46) reported under the Law for the Regulation of
Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors to March 31,
2010, since the Japan Atomic Power Company Co., Ltd.'s Tokai Power
Station began commercial operation on July 25, 1966.



402


403
7DEOHϱϫ$FFLGHQWVDW1XFOHDU3RZHU3ODQWVE\)LVFDO<HDU
)LVFDO<HDUࠉ
                    
)DFLOLW\
Reactor cooling system                  
Emergency core cooling
                 
system
Instrumentation and 
                
control system 

ࠉ Radiation control facility                  


㹕 Steam turbine system                 


ࠉ Condensation and 
                
㹐 feedwater system 
Electrical system                  

Plant common system                  



Total                 

Reactor cooling system                 
Instrumentation and   
㹎              
control system   

ࠉ Steam turbine system                 

ࠉ Condensation and
                
ࠉ feedwater system
㹐 Electrical system                 
  
Total              
  
Reactor cooling system                     
㹅 Instrumentation and
ࠉ                     
control system

㹁 Electrical system                     

ࠉ Others                     

Total                     

Total    
                
   
Number of reactor units                     
Average number of accidents
                    
(per reactor)

404
$XWRPDWLF6KXWGRZQ

                       7RWDO

                       

                       
 
                     
 
                       

                      


                      

                       

                       
 
                     
 
                       

                      

                       

                       

                       

                      

           

           

           

           

           
 
                     
 
                       

                       

)LJXUHVLQSDUHQWKHVHVDUHWKHQXPEHUVRIDFFLGHQWVLQWULDORSHUDWLRQDQGDUHLQFOXGHGLQWKH
DERYHILJXUHV
7KHQXPEHUVRIUHDFWRUXQLWVDUHWKHQXPEHURIWKRVHLQFRPPHUFLDORSHUDWLRQDWWKHHQGRIHDFK
ILVFDO\HDU
7KHDYHUDJHQXPEHUVRIDFFLGHQWVZHUHFDOFXODWHGIURPWKHQXPEHURIUHDFWRUXQLWVLQFRPPHUFLDO
RSHUDWLRQDQGWKHQXPEHURIDFFLGHQWVUHSRUWHGDWWKHVHIDFLOLWLHV


405
7DEOHϱϫ$FFLGHQWVDW1XFOHDU3RZHU3ODQWVE\)LVFDO<HDU
)LVFDO<HDU
                    
)DFLOLW\
Reactor body                  

Reactor cooling system                  


Emergency core cooling
                 
system
㹀 Reactor auxiliary system                  
Instrumentation and
                 
control system
Disposal system                  

㹕 Reactor containment                  

Steam turbine system                 

Condensation and
                 
feedwater system
㹐 Electrical system                  

Plant Common system                  

Ventilation system                  

Total                 


Reactor cooling system                

Emergency core cooling
                
system
㹎 Reactor auxiliary system                 
Instrumentation and
                
control system
㹕 Steam turbine system                 
Condensation and 
               
feedwater system 
㹐 Electrical system                 

Plant common system                 

Disposal system                 
 
Total               
 
Reactor body                     

㹅 Reactor cooling system                     


Instrumentation and
㹁                     
control system
㹐 Fuel handling system                     

Total                     

Total   
                 
  
Number of reactor units                     
Average number of accidents
                    
(per reactor)

406
0DQXDO6KXWGRZQ
7RWD
                      
O
 
                     
 
                       
 
                     
 
                       
 
                     
 
                       

                       
 
                     
 
                       

                       

                       

                       
    
                  
    

                      

                       

                       

                       
 
                     
 

                      

                       

                       

                       
 
                     
 
           

           

           

           

           
     
                 
     
                       

                       
)LJXUHVLQSDUHQWKHVHVDUHWKHQXPEHUVRIDFFLGHQWVLQWULDORSHUDWLRQDQGDUHLQFOXGHGLQWKHDERYHILJXUHV
7KHQXPEHUVRIUHDFWRUXQLWVDUHWKHQXPEHURIWKRVHLQFRPPHUFLDORSHUDWLRQDWWKHHQGRIHDFKILVFDO\HDU

7KHDYHUDJHQXPEHUVRIDFFLGHQWVZHUHFDOFXODWHGIURPWKHQXPEHURIUHDFWRUXQLWVLQFRPPHUFLDORSHUDWLRQDQGWKHQXPEHU
RIDFFLGHQWVUHSRUWHGDWWKHVHIDFLOLWLHV

407
7DEOHϱϫ$FFLGHQWVDW1XFOHDU3RZHU3ODQWVE\)LVFDO<HDU
)LVFDO<HDUࠉ
                    
)DFLOLW\
Reactor body                  

Reactor cooling system                  


Emergency core cooling
㹀                  
system
Reactor auxiliary system                  
Instrumentation and
                 
control system
㹕 Fuel handling facility                  

Reactor containment                  

Electrical system                  
Condensation and
㹐                  
feedwater system
Ventilation system                  

Exhaust stack facility                  

Total                  

Reactor body                 

Reactor cooling system                

Emergency core cooling
㹎                 
system
Reactor auxiliary system                 
Instrumentation and
                
control system
㹕 Steam turbine system                 

Fuel handling facility                 


Reactor containment
                
facility
Condensation and
㹐                 
feedwater system
Electrical facility                 

Exhaust stack facility                 



Total                

㹅 Reactor body                     

㹁 Steam turbine facility                     

㹐 Total                     

Total 
                   

Number of reactor units                     
Average number of accidents
                    
(per reactor)

408
'XULQJ6KXWGRZQVVXFKDV3HULRGLFDO,QVSHFWLRQV

                       7RWDO

                       

                       

                       

                       

                       

                       

                       

                       

                       

                       

                       

                       

                       

                      

                       

                       

                       

                       

                       

                       

                       

                       

                       

                      

               

               

               

                      

                       

                       
)LJXUHVLQSDUHQWKHVHVDUHWKHQXPEHUVRIDFFLGHQWVLQWULDORSHUDWLRQDQGDUHLQFOXGHGLQWKHDERYHILJXUHV 参
7KHQXPEHUVRIUHDFWRUXQLWVDUHWKHQXPEHURIWKRVHLQFRPPHUFLDORSHUDWLRQDWWKHHQGRIHDFKILVFDO\HDU
7KHDYHUDJHQXPEHUVRIDFFLGHQWVZHUHFDOFXODWHGIURPWKHQXPEHURIUHDFWRUXQLWVLQFRPPHUFLDORSHUDWLRQDQG


WKHQXPEHURIDFFLGHQWVUHSRUWHGDWWKHVHIDFLOLWLHV

409
7DEOHϱϫ$FFLGHQWVDW1XFOHDU3RZHU3ODQWVE\)LVFDO<HDU 2XWSXW)OXFWXDWLRQ
)LVFDO<HDUࠉ
                       7RWDO
)DFLOLW\
Instrumentation and
control system                     
Steam turbine
system                     

㹀 Electrical system                     

㹐 Ventilation system                     

Others                     

Total                     
Instrumentation and
control system                    

Steam turbine
㹕 system                    

Total                    
Reactor cooling
control system                 
Steam turbine
system                 

Condensation and
㹁 feedwater system                 

Electrical system                 

Total                 

7RWDO                        

)URPDFFLGHQWVWKDWFDXVHGDQRXWSXWUHGXFWLRQZHUHH[FOXGHGIURPDFFLGHQWVVXEMHFWWRODZ
+RZHYHUWKHVHDFFLGHQWVZHUHPDGHVXEMHFWWRODZDJDLQLQWKHDPHQGPHQWWRWKH1XFOHDU5HDFWRU
5HJXODWLRQ/DZRQ2FWREHU

7DEOHϱϫ$FFLGHQWVDW1XFOHDU3RZHU3ODQWVE\)LVFDO<HDU
 &RPSRQHQW'DPDJHGXULQJ2SHUDWLRQ
)LVFDO<HDUࠉ
       ィ
)DFLOLW\
Fuel handling facility        

㹕 Electrical system        

Total        
Emergency core
       
cooling system
Reactor auxiliary system        

 
㹕 Electrical system      
 

Ventilation system        
 
Total      
 
7RWDO  
     
 
 'XHWRWKHDPHQGPHQWWRWKH1XFOHDU5HDFWRU5HJXODWLRQ/DZRQ2FWREHU
GDPDJHWRHTXLSPHQWLVQRZVXEMHFWWRODZ
 )LJXUHVLQSDUHQWKHVHVDUHWKHQXPEHUVRIDFFLGHQWVLQWULDORSHUDWLRQRU
ZKHQDUHDFWRUZDVEHLQJFRQVWUXFWHGDQGDUHLQFOXGHGLQWKHDERYHILJXUHV

410
7DEOHϱϫ$FFLGHQWVDW1XFOHDU3RZHU3ODQWVE\)LVFDO<HDU 2WKHUV

)LVFDO<HDU
                      
$FFLGHQWW\SH
Accident resulting in
                      
death or injury
Radiation exposure                       
Leak of radioactive
                      
materials
Boiler facility                       

Others                       

Total                       

)LVFDO<HDU
                     7RWDO
$FFLGHQWW\SH
Accident resulting in
                     
death or injury
Radiation exposure                      
Leak of radioactive
                     
materials
Boiler facility                      

Others                      

Total                      
)LJXUHVLQSDUHQWKHVHVUHSUHVHQWWKHQXPEHUVRIIDWDODFFLGHQWVWKDWUHVXOWHGLQDQDXWRPDWLF
VKXWGRZQEXWZHUHFRXQWHGDVDQDFFLGHQWWKDWUHVXOWHGLQDQDXWRPDWLFVKXWGRZQ


411
7DEOHϱϫ6\VWHPVRI&RPSRQHQWLQYROYHGLQ$FFLGHQWLQ1XFOHDU3RZHU3ODQWV

Classification 㹀㹕㹐 㹎㹕㹐 㹅㹁㹐 Subtotal


Reactor body ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
Reactor cooling system ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
Emergency core cooling system ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
Reactor auxiliary system ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
Instrumentation and control system ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
Fuel handling system ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
Radiation control facility ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
Disposal system ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
Reactor containment ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
Steam turbine system ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
Condensation and feedwater system ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
Electrical system ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
Plant common system ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
Ventilation system ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
Exhaust stack ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
Auxiliary boiler ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
Incidental facility ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
Others ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
Total ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ

7DEOHϱϫ&RPSRQHQWVLQYROYHGLQ$FFLGHQWLQ1XFOHDU3RZHU3ODQWV

Classification 㹀㹕㹐 㹎㹕㹐 㹅㹁㹐 Subtotal


Pressure vessel    ࠉ
Fuel assembly    ࠉ
Reactor core internal    ࠉ
Steam generator (including boilers)    ࠉ
Pump    ࠉ
Motor    ࠉ
Valve    ࠉ
Pipe    ࠉ
Heat exchanger    ࠉ
Turbine    ࠉ
Condenser    ࠉ
Power generator    ࠉ
Transformer    ࠉ
Breaker    ࠉ
Control system    ࠉ
Power supply equipment    ࠉ
Converter    ࠉ
Relay    ࠉ
Sensor    ࠉ
Penetration    ࠉ
Recorder    ࠉ
Others    ࠉ
No damage to equipment    ࠉ
Total    ࠉ

412
7DEOHϱϫ&DXVHVRI$FFLGHQWLQ1XFOHDU3RZHU3ODQWV
Classification 㹀㹕㹐 㹎㹕㹐 㹅㹁㹐 Subtotal
Improper design    
Improper manufacturing    
Improper construction    
Improper maintenance    
Improper operation    
Improper control    
External factors    
Natural deterioration    
Others    
Causes unknown. Under investigation.    
Total    

7DEOHϱϫ2SHUDWLRQDO6WDWXV:KHQ$FFLGHQW2FFXUUHG
ࠉࠉࠉࠉࠉࠉࠉLQ1XFOHDU3RZHU3ODQWV 䚷䚷䚷䚷䚷䚷䚷䚷
Classification 㹀㹕㹐 㹎㹕㹐 㹅㹁㹐 Subtotal
During normal operation    
During operation for adjustment    
During a periodical inspection    
During planned shutdown    
During shutdown because of an accident    
During construction or Commissioning
   
Test
Others    
Total    

7DEOHϱϫ+RZ$FFLGHQWGHWHFWHGLQ1XFOHDU3RZHU3ODQWV
Classification 㹀㹕㹐 㹎㹕㹐 㹅㹁㹐 Subtotal
Activation of an alarm or
   
a protection system
Central/field monitoring    

Inspection patrol    

Periodical testing    
Periodical inspection or other
   
inspections conducted during a reactor
During operation    

Others    

Total    



413
ϱϫ1XPEHUVRI5HSRUWHG$FFLGHQWVLQ1XFOHDU3RZHU3ODQWV 㻭㼟㻌㼛㼒㻌㻹㼍㼞㼏㼔㻌㻟㻝㻘㻌㻞㻜㻝㻜
Output Date of the start
Name of Power plant name 㻲㼕㼟㼏㼍㼘㻌㼅㼑㼍㼞
(10,000 of commercial
founder (facility number)
kW) operation 㻝㻥㻢㻢 㻢㻣 㻢㻤 㻢㻥 㻣㻜 㻣㻝 㻣㻞 㻣㻟 㻣㻠 㻣㻡 㻣㻢 㻣㻣 㻣㻤 㻣㻥 㻤㻜 㻤㻝 㻤㻞 㻤㻟 㻤㻠 㻤㻡 㻤㻢 㻤㻣
Japan Atomic Tokai 㻝㻢㻚㻢 㻝㻥㻢㻢㻚㻣㻚㻞㻡 㻝㻟 㻢 㻠 㻞 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻞 㻝 㻟 㻝
Power
Company Tokai Daini 㻝㻝㻜㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻣㻤㻚㻝㻝㻚㻞㻤 㻞 㻝 㻟 㻠 㻟 㻝 㻞 㻝 㻜 㻜
Tsuruga Unit 1 㻟㻡㻚㻣 㻝㻥㻣㻜㻚㻟㻚㻝㻠 㻝 㻞 㻤 㻞 㻜 㻟 㻞 㻞 㻠 㻟 㻞 㻞 㻞 㻝 㻟 㻜 㻞 㻜 㻞
Tsuruga Unit 2 㻝㻝㻢㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻤㻣㻚㻞㻚㻝㻣 㻝㻔㻝㻕 㻝
Hokkaido
Tomari Unit 1 㻡㻣㻚㻥 㻝㻥㻤㻥㻚㻢㻚㻞㻞
Electric Power
Co., Inc. Tomari Unit 2 㻡㻣㻚㻥 㻝㻥㻥㻝㻚㻠㻚㻝㻞
Tohoku Onagawa Unit 1 㻡㻞㻚㻠 㻝㻥㻤㻠㻚㻢㻚㻝 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻝
Electric Power
Co., Inc. Onagawa Unit 2 㻤㻞㻚㻡 㻝㻥㻥㻡㻚㻣㻚㻞㻤
Onagawa Unit 3 㻤㻞㻚㻡 㻞㻜㻜㻞㻚㻝㻚㻟㻜
Higashidori Unit 1 㻝㻝㻜㻚㻜 㻞㻜㻜㻡㻚㻝㻞㻚㻤
Tokyo Electric Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1 㻠㻢㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻣㻝㻚㻟㻚㻞㻢 㻜 㻝 㻠 㻝 㻝 㻝 㻡 㻞 㻞 㻟 㻝 㻞 㻞 㻞 㻜 㻞 㻜 㻜
Power Co., Inc.
Fukushima Daiichi Unit 2 㻣㻤㻚㻠 㻝㻥㻣㻠㻚㻣㻚㻝㻤 㻞 㻞 㻡 㻞 㻝 㻝 㻞 㻞 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻜
Fukushima Daiichi Unit 3 㻣㻤㻚㻠 㻝㻥㻣㻢㻚㻟㻚㻞㻣 㻜 㻡 㻞 㻝 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜
Fukushima Daiichi Unit 4 㻣㻤㻚㻠 㻝㻥㻣㻤㻚㻝㻜㻚㻝㻞 㻝 㻝 㻞 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜
Fukushima Daiichi Unit 5 㻣㻤㻚㻠 㻝㻥㻣㻤㻚㻠㻚㻝㻤 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻞 㻟 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻞 㻝

414
Fukushima Daiichi Unit 6 㻝㻝㻜㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻣㻥㻚㻝㻜㻚㻞㻠 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻟 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜
Fukushima Daini Unit 1 㻝㻝㻜㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻤㻞㻚㻠㻚㻞㻜 㻢㻔㻢㻕 㻜 㻜 㻞 㻜 㻝 㻝
Fukushima Daini Unit 2 㻝㻝㻜㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻤㻠㻚㻞㻚㻟 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜
Fukushima Daini Unit 3 㻝㻝㻜㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻤㻡㻚㻢㻚㻞㻝 㻝 㻜 㻜
Fukushima Daini Unit 4 㻝㻝㻜㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻤㻣㻚㻤㻚㻞㻡 㻜
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 1 㻝㻝㻜㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻤㻡㻚㻥㻚㻝㻤 㻜 㻜 㻜
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 2 㻝㻝㻜㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻥㻜㻚㻥㻚㻞㻤
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 3 㻝㻝㻜㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻥㻟㻚㻤㻚㻝㻝
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 4 㻝㻝㻜㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻥㻠㻚㻤㻚㻝㻝
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 5 㻝㻝㻜㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻥㻜㻚㻠㻚㻝㻜
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 6 㻝㻟㻡㻚㻢 㻝㻥㻥㻢㻚㻝㻝㻚㻣
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 7 㻝㻟㻡㻚㻢 㻝㻥㻥㻣㻚㻣㻚㻞
Chubu Electric Hamaoka Unit 1 㻡㻠㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻣㻢㻚㻟㻚㻝㻣 㻝 㻝 㻟 㻝 㻞 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻞
Power Co., Inc.
Hamaoka Unit 2 㻤㻠㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻣㻤㻚㻝㻝㻚㻞㻥 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝
Hamaoka Unit 3 㻝㻝㻜㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻤㻣㻚㻤㻚㻞㻤 㻜
Hamaoka Unit 4 㻝㻝㻟㻚㻣 㻝㻥㻥㻟㻚㻥㻚㻟
Hamaoka Unit 5 㻝㻞㻢㻚㻣 㻞㻜㻜㻡㻚㻝㻚㻝㻤
Hokuriku
Shika Unit 1 㻡㻠㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻥㻟㻚㻣㻚㻟㻜
Electric Power
Co. Shika Unit 2 㻝㻞㻜㻚㻢 㻞㻜㻜㻢㻚㻟㻚㻝㻡
Kansai Electric Mihama Unit 1 㻟㻠㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻣㻜㻚㻝㻝㻚㻞㻤 㻝 㻟 㻝 㻞 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻠 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜
Power Co., Inc.
Mihama Unit 2 㻡㻜㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻣㻞㻚㻣㻚㻞㻡 㻞 㻞 㻟 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻟 㻜 㻜 㻞 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻝
Mihama Unit 3 㻤㻞㻚㻢 㻝㻥㻣㻢㻚㻝㻞㻚㻝 㻜 㻝 㻞 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻟 㻝 㻞 㻝 㻝
Takahama Unit 1 㻤㻞㻚㻢 㻝㻥㻣㻠㻚㻝㻝㻚㻝㻠 㻟 㻝 㻟 㻜 㻞 㻞 㻞 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻝 㻞 㻝 㻝
Takahama Unit 2 㻤㻞㻚㻢 㻝㻥㻣㻡㻚㻝㻝㻚㻝㻠 㻜 㻜 㻞 㻟 㻞 㻜 㻞 㻞 㻞 㻞 㻜 㻞 㻝
Takahama Unit 3 㻤㻣㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻤㻡㻚㻝㻚㻝㻣 㻝㻔㻝㻕 㻜 㻜 㻝
Takahama Unit 4 㻤㻣㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻤㻡㻚㻢㻚㻡 㻜 㻜 㻜
Ohi Unit 1 㻝㻝㻣㻚㻡 㻝㻥㻣㻥㻚㻟㻚㻞㻣 㻝㻔㻝㻕 㻡 㻠 㻡 㻞 㻟 㻜 㻝 㻞 㻞
Ohi Unit 2 㻝㻝㻣㻚㻡 㻝㻥㻣㻥㻚㻝㻞㻚㻡 㻜 㻞 㻞 㻠 㻝 㻠 㻝 㻜 㻝
Ohi Unit 3 㻝㻝㻤㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻥㻝㻚㻝㻞㻚㻝㻤
Ohi Unit 4 㻝㻝㻤㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻥㻟㻚㻞㻚㻞
Chugoku
Shimane Unit 1 㻠㻢㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻣㻠㻚㻟㻚㻞㻥 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻞 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜
Electric Power
Co., Inc. Shimane Unit 2 㻤㻞㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻤㻥㻚㻞㻚㻝㻜
Shikoku Ikata Unit 1 㻡㻢㻚㻢 㻝㻥㻣㻣㻚㻥㻚㻟㻜 㻜 㻞 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻜
Electric Power
Co., Inc. Ikata Unit 2 㻡㻢㻚㻢 㻝㻥㻤㻞㻚㻟㻚㻝㻥 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜
Ikata Unit 3 㻤㻥㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻥㻠㻚㻝㻞㻚㻝㻡
Kyushu

415
Genkai Unit 1 㻡㻡㻚㻥 㻝㻥㻣㻡㻚㻝㻜㻚㻝㻡 㻝㻔㻝㻕 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻞 㻝 㻝 㻞 㻝
Electric Power
Co., Inc. Genkai Unit 2 㻡㻡㻚㻥 㻝㻥㻤㻝㻚㻟㻚㻟㻜 㻝㻔㻝㻕 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜
Genkai Unit 3 㻝㻝㻤㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻥㻠㻚㻟㻚㻝㻤
Genkai Unit 4 㻝㻝㻤㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻥㻣㻚㻣㻚㻞㻡
Sendai Unit 1 㻤㻥㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻤㻠㻚㻣㻚㻠 㻝㻔㻝㻕 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜
Sendai Unit 2 㻤㻥㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻤㻡㻚㻝㻝㻚㻞㻤 㻜 㻜 㻜
Total 㻝㻟 㻢 㻠 㻟 㻟 㻝㻟 㻥 㻡 㻝㻟 㻤㻔㻝㻕 㻞㻠 㻝㻣 㻞㻞㻔㻝㻕 㻞㻢 㻞㻡㻔㻝㻕 㻟㻢㻔㻢㻕 㻞㻢 㻞㻣㻔㻝㻕 㻝㻤㻔㻝㻕 㻝㻥 㻝㻥㻔㻝㻕 㻝㻥
Number of reactor units 㻝 㻝 㻝 㻞 㻠 㻠 㻡 㻢 㻤 㻝㻞 㻝㻟 㻝㻠 㻝㻥 㻞㻝 㻞㻞 㻞㻟 㻞㻠 㻞㻡 㻞㻤 㻟㻞 㻟㻟 㻟㻡
Average number of accidents (per reactor) 㻝㻟 㻢 㻠 㻝㻚㻡 㻜㻚㻤 㻟㻚㻟 㻝㻚㻤 㻜㻚㻤 㻝㻚㻢 㻜㻚㻢 㻝㻚㻤 㻝㻚㻞 㻝㻚㻝 㻝㻚㻞 㻝㻚㻝 㻝㻚㻟 㻝㻚㻝 㻝㻚㻜 㻜㻚㻢 㻜㻚㻢 㻜㻚㻡 㻜㻚㻡
䚷䚷Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are the numbers of accidents in trial operation or when a reactor was being constructed and are included in the above figures.
2. The numbers of reactor units are the number of those in commercial operation at the end of each fiscal year.
3. The number of accidents per reactor was calculated from the number of reactor units in commercial operation and the number of accidents reported at these facilities.
4. The licensed output of Unit-5 at the Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station of the Chubu Electric Power Co., was changed from 1,380 MW to 1,267 MW on March 13, 2007.
5. The licensed output of Unit-2 at the Shika Nuclear Power Station of the Hokuriku Electric Power Co. was changed from 1,358 MW to 1,206 MW on June 5, 2008.



㻭㼟㻌㼛㼒㻌㻹㼍㼞㼏㼔㻌㻟㻝㻘㻌㻞㻜㻝㻜
㻻㼡㼠㼜㼡㼠 㻰㼍㼠㼑㻌㼛㼒㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼟㼠㼍㼞㼠
㻺㼍㼙㼑㻌㼛㼒 㻌㻼㼛㼣㼑㼞㻌㼜㼘㼍㼚㼠㻌㼚㼍㼙㼑 㻲㼕㼟㼏㼍㼘㻌㼅㼑㼍㼞
㻔㻝㻜㻘㻜㻜㻜 㼛㼒㻌㼏㼛㼙㼙㼑㼞㼏㼕㼍㼘
㼒㼛㼡㼚㼐㼑㼞 㻔㼒㼍㼏㼕㼘㼕㼠㼥㻌㼚㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻕 㼗㼃㻕 㼛㼜㼑㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚 㻤㻤 㻤㻥 㻥㻜 㻥㻝 㻥㻞 㻥㻟 㻥㻠 㻥㻡 㻥㻢 㻥㻣 㻥㻤 㻥㻥 㻜㻜 㻜㻝 㻜㻞 㻜㻟 㻜㻠 㻜㻡 㻜㻢 㻜㻣 㻜㻤 㻜㻥 㼀㼛㼠㼍㼘
㻶㼍㼜㼍㼚 Tokai 㻝㻢㻚㻢 㻝㻥㻢㻢㻚㻣㻚㻞㻡 㻟 㻝 㻝 㻝 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻠㻢
㻭㼠㼛㼙㼕㼏
㻼㼛㼣㼑㼞 Tokai Daini 㻝㻝㻜㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻣㻤㻚㻝㻝㻚㻞㻤 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻟 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻞 㻟㻝
㻯㼛㼙㼜㼍㼚㼥 Tsuruga Unit 1 㻟㻡㻚㻣 㻝㻥㻣㻜㻚㻟㻚㻝㻠 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻟 㻝 㻜 㻟 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻞 㻡㻥
Tsuruga Unit 2 㻝㻝㻢㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻤㻣㻚㻞㻚㻝㻣 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻞 㻜 㻝㻟㻔㻝㻕
㻴㼛㼗㼗㼍㼕㼐㼛 Tomari Unit 1 㻡㻣㻚㻥 㻝㻥㻤㻥㻚㻢㻚㻞㻞 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻞 㻜 㻣
㻱㼘㼑㼏㼠㼞㼕㼏
㻼㼛㼣㼑㼞㻌㻯㼛㻚㻘 Tomari Unit 2 㻡㻣㻚㻥 㻝㻥㻥㻝㻚㻠㻚㻝㻞 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻟
㻵㼚㼏㻚 Tomari Unit 3 㻥㻝㻚㻞 㻞㻜㻜㻥㻚㻝㻞㻚㻞㻞 㻝㻔㻝㻕 㻝㻔㻝㻕
㼀㼛㼔㼛㼗㼡 Onagawa Unit 1 㻡㻞㻚㻠 㻝㻥㻤㻠㻚㻢㻚㻝 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻝㻜
㻱㼘㼑㼏㼠㼞㼕㼏
㻼㼛㼣㼑㼞㻌㻯㼛㻚㻘 Onagawa Unit 2 㻤㻞㻚㻡 㻝㻥㻥㻡㻚㻣㻚㻞㻤 㻝㻔㻝㻕 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻞 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻣㻔㻝㻕
㻵㼚㼏㻚 Onagawa Unit 3 㻤㻞㻚㻡 㻞㻜㻜㻞㻚㻝㻚㻟㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻞
Higashidori Unit 1 㻝㻝㻜㻚㻜 㻞㻜㻜㻡㻚㻝㻞㻚㻤 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜
㼀㼛㼗㼥㼛 Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1 㻠㻢㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻣㻝㻚㻟㻚㻞㻢 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻞 㻜 㻟㻣
㻱㼘㼑㼏㼠㼞㼕㼏
㻼㼛㼣㼑㼞㻌㻯㼛㻚㻘 Fukushima Daiichi Unit 2 㻣㻤㻚㻠 㻝㻥㻣㻠㻚㻣㻚㻝㻤 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻞 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻞 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻞㻥
㻵㼚㼏㻚 Fukushima Daiichi Unit 3 㻣㻤㻚㻠 㻝㻥㻣㻢㻚㻟㻚㻞㻣 㻝 㻜 㻞 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻝㻥
Fukushima Daiichi Unit 4 㻣㻤㻚㻠 㻝㻥㻣㻤㻚㻝㻜㻚㻝㻞 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻞 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻥
Fukushima Daiichi Unit 5 㻣㻤㻚㻠 㻝㻥㻣㻤㻚㻠㻚㻝㻤 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻝㻠

416
Fukushima Daiichi Unit 6 㻝㻝㻜㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻣㻥㻚㻝㻜㻚㻞㻠 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻞 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝㻟
Fukushima Daini Unit 1 㻝㻝㻜㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻤㻞㻚㻠㻚㻞㻜 㻜 㻞 㻝 㻝 㻞 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝㻥㻔㻢㻕
Fukushima Daini Unit 2 㻝㻝㻜㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻤㻠㻚㻞㻚㻟 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻞 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻥
Fukushima Daini Unit 3 㻝㻝㻜㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻤㻡㻚㻢㻚㻞㻝 㻟 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻤
Fukushima Daini Unit 4 㻝㻝㻜㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻤㻣㻚㻤㻚㻞㻡 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻢
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 1 㻝㻝㻜㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻤㻡㻚㻥㻚㻝㻤 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻞 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻞 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻣
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 2 㻝㻝㻜㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻥㻜㻚㻥㻚㻞㻤 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻠
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 3 㻝㻝㻜㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻥㻟㻚㻤㻚㻝㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻞
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 4 㻝㻝㻜㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻥㻠㻚㻤㻚㻝㻝 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻞 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻠
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 5 㻝㻝㻜㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻥㻜㻚㻠㻚㻝㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻟
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 6 㻝㻟㻡㻚㻢 㻝㻥㻥㻢㻚㻝㻝㻚㻣 㻝㻔㻝㻕 㻝㻔㻝㻕 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻞 㻝 㻜 㻥㻔㻞㻕
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 7 㻝㻟㻡㻚㻢 㻝㻥㻥㻣㻚㻣㻚㻞 㻝㻔㻝㻕 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻟㻔㻝㻕
㻯㼔㼡㼎㼡 Hamaoka Unit 1 㻡㻠㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻣㻢㻚㻟㻚㻝㻣 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻞 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻞 㻜 㻜 㻞㻝
㻱㼘㼑㼏㼠㼞㼕㼏
㻼㼛㼣㼑㼞㻌㻯㼛㻚㻘 Hamaoka Unit 2 㻤㻠㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻣㻤㻚㻝㻝㻚㻞㻥 㻞 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻣
㻵㼚㼏㻚 Hamaoka Unit 3 㻝㻝㻜㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻤㻣㻚㻤㻚㻞㻤 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻡
Hamaoka Unit 4 㻝㻝㻟㻚㻣 㻝㻥㻥㻟㻚㻥㻚㻟 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻞 㻟
Hamaoka Unit 5 㻝㻞㻢㻚㻣 㻞㻜㻜㻡㻚㻝㻚㻝㻤 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻞 㻜 㻠
㻴㼛㼗㼡㼞㼕㼗㼡 Shika Unit 1 㻡㻠㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻥㻟㻚㻣㻚㻟㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻠
㻱㼘㼑㼏㼠㼞㼕㼏
㻼㼛㼣㼑㼞㻌㻯㼛㻚 Shika Unit 2 㻝㻞㻜㻚㻢 㻞㻜㻜㻢㻚㻟㻚㻝㻡 㻝㻔㻝㻕 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻞㻔㻝㻕
㻷㼍㼚㼟㼍㼕 Mihama Unit 1 㻟㻠㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻣㻜㻚㻝㻝㻚㻞㻤 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻟 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻞 㻞 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻞㻡
㻱㼘㼑㼏㼠㼞㼕㼏
㻼㼛㼣㼑㼞㻌㻯㼛㻚㻘 Mihama Unit 2 㻡㻜㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻣㻞㻚㻣㻚㻞㻡 㻜 㻜 㻞 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻞 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻞㻡
㻵㼚㼏㻚 Mihama Unit 3 㻤㻞㻚㻢 㻝㻥㻣㻢㻚㻝㻞㻚㻝 㻝 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻝 㻞 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻞 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻞㻡
Takahama Unit 1 㻤㻞㻚㻢 㻝㻥㻣㻠㻚㻝㻝㻚㻝㻠 㻝 㻝 㻝 㻝 㻝 㻟 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻟㻜
Takahama Unit 2 㻤㻞㻚㻢 㻝㻥㻣㻡㻚㻝㻝㻚㻝㻠 㻞 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻞 㻜 㻜 㻞㻤
Takahama Unit 3 㻤㻣㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻤㻡㻚㻝㻚㻝㻣 㻝 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻝㻜㻔㻝㻕
Takahama Unit 4 㻤㻣㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻤㻡㻚㻢㻚㻡 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻞 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻞 㻝 㻝㻜
Ohi Unit 1 㻝㻝㻣㻚㻡 㻝㻥㻣㻥㻚㻟㻚㻞㻣 㻞 㻞 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻟 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻟㻤㻔㻝㻕
Ohi Unit 2 㻝㻝㻣㻚㻡 㻝㻥㻣㻥㻚㻝㻞㻚㻡 㻞 㻝 㻜 㻞 㻝 㻜 㻞 㻞 㻝 㻜 㻞 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻞 㻜 㻜 㻟㻝
Ohi Unit 3 㻝㻝㻤㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻥㻝㻚㻝㻞㻚㻝㻤 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻞
Ohi Unit 4 㻝㻝㻤㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻥㻟㻚㻞㻚㻞 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝
㻯㼔㼡㼓㼛㼗㼡 Shimane Unit 1 㻠㻢㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻣㻠㻚㻟㻚㻞㻥 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻞 㻝 㻞 㻜 㻝㻝
㻱㼘㼑㼏㼠㼞㼕㼏
㻼㼛㼣㼑㼞㻌㻯㼛㻚㻘 Shimane Unit 2 㻤㻞㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻤㻥㻚㻞㻚㻝㻜 㻜 㻝 㻞 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻢
㻿㼔㼕㼗㼛㼗㼡 Ikata Unit 1 㻡㻢㻚㻢 㻝㻥㻣㻣㻚㻥㻚㻟㻜 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻞 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝㻤
㻱㼘㼑㼏㼠㼞㼕㼏
㻼㼛㼣㼑㼞㻌㻯㼛㻚㻘 Ikata Unit 2 㻡㻢㻚㻢 㻝㻥㻤㻞㻚㻟㻚㻝㻥 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻢
㻵㼚㼏㻚 Ikata Unit 3 㻤㻥㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻥㻠㻚㻝㻞㻚㻝㻡 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻟
㻷㼥㼡㼟㼔㼡 Genkai Unit 1 㻡㻡㻚㻥 㻝㻥㻣㻡㻚㻝㻜㻚㻝㻡 㻝 㻝 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝㻣㻔㻝㻕

417
㻱㼘㼑㼏㼠㼞㼕㼏
㻼㼛㼣㼑㼞㻌㻯㼛㻚㻘 Genkai Unit 2 㻡㻡㻚㻥 㻝㻥㻤㻝㻚㻟㻚㻟㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻢㻔㻝㻕
㻵㼚㼏㻚 Genkai Unit 3 㻝㻝㻤㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻥㻠㻚㻟㻚㻝㻤 㻝㻔㻝㻕 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝㻔㻝㻕
Genkai Unit 4 㻝㻝㻤㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻥㻣㻚㻣㻚㻞㻡 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜
Sendai Unit 1 㻤㻥㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻤㻠㻚㻣㻚㻠 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻞 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻝 㻝 㻜 㻝㻝㻔㻝㻕
Sendai Unit 2 㻤㻥㻚㻜 㻝㻥㻤㻡㻚㻝㻝㻚㻞㻤 㻞 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻝 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻜 㻠
㼀㼛㼠㼍㼘 㻞㻟 㻞㻞 㻞㻠 㻞㻜 㻞㻜 㻝㻣㻔㻝㻕 㻝㻠㻔㻝㻕 㻝㻠㻔㻝㻕 㻝㻠㻔㻝㻕 㻝㻠㻔㻝㻕 㻝㻠 㻝㻣 㻝㻥 㻝㻝 㻤 㻝㻝 㻞㻜 㻝㻡㻔㻝㻕 㻝㻡 㻞㻟 㻞㻟 㻝㻡㻔㻝㻕 㻣㻞㻤㻔㻝㻥㻕
㻺㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㼞㼑㼍㼏㼠㼛㼞㻌㼡㼚㼕㼠㼟 㻟㻢 㻟㻣 㻟㻥 㻠㻝 㻠㻞 㻠㻢 㻠㻤 㻠㻥 㻡㻜 㻡㻞 㻡㻝 㻡㻝 㻡㻝 㻡㻞 㻡㻞 㻡㻞 㻡㻟 㻡㻡 㻡㻡 㻡㻡 㻡㻟 㻡㻠 㻝㻠㻜㻣
㻭㼢㼑㼞㼍㼓㼑㻌㼚㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㼍㼏㼏㼕㼐㼑㼚㼠㼟㻌㻔㼜㼑㼞㻌㼞㼑㼍㼏㼠㼛㼞㻕 㻜㻚㻢 㻜㻚㻢 㻜㻚㻢 㻜㻚㻡 㻜㻚㻡 㻜㻚㻟 㻜㻚㻟 㻜㻚㻟 㻜㻚㻟 㻜㻚㻟 㻜㻚㻟 㻜㻚㻟 㻜㻚㻠 㻜㻚㻞 㻜㻚㻞 㻜㻚㻞 㻜㻚㻠 㻜㻚㻟 㻜㻚㻟 㻜㻚㻠 㻜㻚㻠 㻜㻚㻟 㻜㻚㻡
䚷䚷Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are the numbers of accidents in trial operation or when a reactor was being constructed and are included in the above figures.
2. The numbers of reactor units are the number of those in commercial operation at the end of each fiscal year.
3. The number of accidents per reactor was calculated from the number of reactor units in commercial operation and the number of accidents reported at these facilities.
4. The licensed output of Unit-5 at the Hamaoka Power Station of the Chubu Electric Power Co., was changed from 1,380 MW to 1,267 MW on March 13, 2007.
5. Accident (the event of tritium release outside the controlled area in the Fukushima-Daiichi on August 11,2006) in Fukushima-Daiichi Unit-4.
6. Accident (the event of overflow of water to the operating floors of the reactor building in the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa on July 25,2007) in Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 1.
7. Accident (the event of cracks found in the pass-through section of the common exhaust stack of Unit 1 and 2 in the Hamaoka on November 27,2007) in Hamaoka Unit 1.
8. The licensed output of Unit-2 at the Shika Nuclear Power Station of the Hokuriku Electric Power Co. was changed from 1,358 MW to 1,206 MW on June 5, 2008.



!"-1-5 Overview of Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants
Page on which related
Date of
Power station Summary of the analysis press announcement
occurrence appears
2009.4.6 Tokyo Electric On April 6, during a periodical inspection, when the main valve for drive water was
Power Co., Inc., opened in the recovery operation after the inspection of the hydraulic control unit in
Fukushima Daiichi the control rod drive hydraulic system, the operation alarm for the control rod
Nuclear Power (46-19) sounded, and it was evaluated that the control rod moved further to the
Station Unit 3 insertion side from the full insertion position (excessive insertion).
Investigation was conducted to determine the cause, and the results are as follows:
! The operation alarm of the control rod (46-19) sounded because there was leakage
from the scram entrance valve seat area in the recovery operation after the
inspection of the hydraulic control unit in the control rod drive hydraulic system,
which applied water pressure to the control rod in the insertion direction and thus,
moved the control rod to the insertion side.
! As a result of disassembly investigation of that valve, it was verified that the
1 Teflon seat of the valve seat area was lost. It was also verified that new and old 427-433
types of bolts, etc., which were used for assembly of the valve seat area,
coexisted.
! An impact investigation was conducted concerning the coexistence of the bolts,
etc. As a result, it was verified that when the seat area was assembled using
different types of bolts, different axial forces were applied to each of the bolts,
etc., which pushed out them unevenly to the bore side of the Teflon seat.
! In the review of the assembly records, etc., of that valve, it was found that
measures to address the excessive-insertion event, which occurred on March 26,
had been taken, but the valve element was adjusted to a higher position than
normal when the valve was re-assembled because the inner side of the Teflon seat
was pushed out unevenly, and this reduced adhesion between the valve element
and the valve seat area, making the Teflon seat absent.
2009.4.22 Chubu Electric On April 22, during a periodical inspection, a member of personnel who was
Power Co., Inc., working near the steam turbine on the third floor of the turbine building (controlled
Hamaoka Nuclear area) was injured because his left instep was pinched between the driving parts of
Power Station Unit the valve, which was being driven for testing, and he needed to be hospitalized.
4 Investigation was conducted to determine the cause, and the results are as follows:
! The entry regulations, which were applied to conduct a remote test after the steam
turbine control device had been replaced, were not thoroughly notified to the
personnel who worked there, and measures to prohibit entry, such as clear
partitioning on the site by using barriers and placement of guards, were not taken
sufficiently. In addition, the “AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY” sign was
2 misunderstood, and the injured member of personnel was thought to be authorized 434-438
and thus allowed to enter.
! The member of personnel did not set up appropriate stages except near the driving
parts of that valve when attaching lagging materials and used the neighboring
areas of that valve as steps.
! Because the Overall Process Sheet for Periodical Inspections did not describe the
lagging material attachment procedures and a work schedule was not created
appropriately, potential disturbances to the work could not be grasped at daily
process meetings, etc.
! As a result, his left instep was pinched between the driving parts of the valve,
which was being driven for a remotely controlled test.
2009.5.5 Chubu Electric On May 5, when the reactor was being activated for an adjustment run during a
Power Co., Inc., periodical inspection, an increase of the hydrogen concentration in the gaseous
Hamaoka Nuclear waste disposal system was identified, and because of this, the reactor was manually
Power Station Unit shut down at 17:49 on the same day.
4 Investigation was conducted to determine the cause, and the results are as follows:
! By performing hot-water washing in the catalyst production process in the
exhaust gas recombiner of the gaseous waste disposal system, boehmite was
found contained in the catalyst.
! With more boehmite in the catalyst, the catalyst deteriorates when it is used and is
susceptible to catalytic poisoning.
3 ! Also, in the catalyst sampled from the actually operating equipment, an 439-445
organosilicon compound (siloxane), which is a catalytic poison, was detected.
! Siloxane volatilized from the liquid packing (liquid sealant), which was used as a
sealant (sealing material) in the low-pressure turbine packing case (sealed
container), intruded into the gaseous waste disposal system and gradually
accumulated on the catalyst surface.
! Because of this, it was assumed that the catalyst in the exhaust gas recombiner
deteriorated with use and the catalyst performance declined due to the effect of
catalytic poisoning, which reduced the function of combining the hydrogen in the
exhaust gas recombiner with oxygen, resulting in an increase in the hydrogen
concentration in the system.

418
Page on which related
Date of
Power station Summary of the analysis press announcement
occurrence appears
2009.5.13 Japan Atomic Power On May 13, during a periodical inspection, part of the control rod drive hydraulic
Company Co., Ltd., system was replaced as part of construction work on the seismic safety margin
Tsuruga Power improvement of that system, and for this reason, preparation for a pressure test was
Station Unit 1 being conducted. During this preparation, when the vent valve used to remove air
from the system was inspected, scarring across the valve seat surface was found.
Investigation was conducted to determine the cause, and the results are as follows:
! Considering the fact that the vent valves in the control rod drive hydraulic system
(hereafter called the “valve”) were damaged after they had been installed during
construction of the power plant, only the valve bodies of the valves (all 146
valves) were replaced in the 13th periodical inspection (in FY1982).
! Normally, the angle between the valve seat and the valve element was adjusted
precisely at the assembly stage at the factory. However, this replacement was
carried out on-site because only the valve element was replaced. Because the
angle adjustment between the valve seat and the valve element required technical
skill, there were some valves with large angle differences between the valve seat
and the valve element.
! It was presumed that when the valve was closed in that situation, a local tension
stress occurred at the bottom of the valve seat, which mainly damaged the parts
with inherent failures (hollow).
! The fractured surfaces were investigated and it was found that the damage was not
fractured surfaces due to fatigue, but fractured surfaces found when too much
stress is applied.
! As a result of the stress analysis, it was also verified that when the angle
difference is large, stress higher than the tensile strength of Stellite (strength of
the material) may occur locally at the bottom of the valve seat area.
4 ! The integrity of the valve was verified in the leak test conducted in each 446-451
periodical inspection. If a leak was found in the test, it was determined that
disassembly inspection should be conducted for that valve to inspect the details.
! In the 25th periodical inspection (in FY1998), disassembly inspection was
conducted for 18 valves, where leaks were found from the seats (leaks inside of
the valves). As a result, damage was found in 13 valves. After the damage was
removed and the valves were washed, etc., a leak test was conducted for all the
valves, including the five valves where no damage was found, to see that no leak
occurred. Use of the valves continued. As for the 13 damaged valves, they were
replaced with new valves shipped from the factory, in which the angle between
the valve seat and the valve element was adjusted precisely (hereinafter, called
the “factory-shipped products”), in the 26th periodical inspection (in FY2000).
However, considerations on the cause of the damage and the necessity of the
feedback activities on the other valves were not specially conducted.
! The actions that were taken for the damage at that time were considered to be
insufficient when compared with current nonconformance management
(self-improvement activities), in regard to measures for feedback activities
(reflection in the other facilities), etc.
! To conduct a pressure test for replacement of the piping, etc., in relation to the
construction work on seismic safety margin improvement of the control rod drive
hydraulic system in the 32nd periodical inspection (this inspection), a
disassembly inspection of the valves was conducted for the first time since the
26th periodical inspection (13th periodical inspection for the valves where no
damage was found). As a result of a penetration test, etc., damage was found in 13
valves. Also, scratching across the valve seat area was found in one of those
valves, details of which are to be included in this report.
2009.5.28 Tohoku Electric On May 28, during a periodical inspection, in the recovery operation after the
Power Co., Inc., inspection of the hydraulic control unit in the control rod drive hydraulic system, the
Onagawa Nuclear operation alarm for the control rod (42-39) sounded, and it was evaluated that the
Power Station Unit control rod moved further to the insertion side from the full insertion position
3 (excessive insertion).
Investigation was conducted to determine the cause, and the results are as follows:
! When a leak test was conducted for the hydraulic control unit of the control rod
drive hydraulic system, a small seat leak (leak from the holding surfaces) was
found in the direction control valves (123 valves).
! As a result of the disassembly inspection that was conducted for those direction
control valves (123 valves), small scratches were found on the seat area (holding
surfaces) of the valves. Therefore, it was presumed that the small seat leak was
due to abrasion by a foreign substance.
! In addition, as a result of a mock-up test (verification test), it was verified that the
control rod was inserted excessively when a foreign substance of about 0.26 mm
5 got into the seat area. 452-460
! As a result of the investigations regarding interfusion of foreign substances, the
filter (P1) used at the control rod drive water entrance side of those direction
control valves (123 valves) was not like the other filters (P2, P3, and P4), which
were reused in rotation, and a process was applied to assemble a new filter. Since
there were a lot of steps in this work, from ultrasonic washing of the filter to its
assembly on the site, it was presumed that foreign substances had gotten into the
area sometime during the inspection and assembly tasks of that period.
! In conclusion, it was presumed that foreign substances got into the direction


control valves (123 valves) at the time when the valves were opened (and then
closed) during a scram function test, etc., and the drive water used to push up the
control rod flowed temporarily during recovery operation of that system, which
caused excessive insertion of the control rod (insertion beyond the normal
position), and then the foreign substances were discharged with the drive water,


which returned the control rod to the full insertion position (original position) by
its own weight.

419
Page on which related
Date of
Power station Summary of the analysis press announcement
occurrence appears
2009.7.17 Japan Atomic Power At Tokai Daini Power Station, which was being operated with constant rated heat
Company Co., Ltd., outputs, continuous increase of the differential pressure of the control oil filter was
Tokai Daini Power found in the control oil system for the turbine-driven reactor feedwater pump (A).
Station On July 12, an inspection was conducted for the pump by switching to a spare
motor-driven reactor feedwater pump and the cause for the increase of the
differential pressure of that filter was investigated. Since fluctuation of the oil level
in the main oil tank of the turbine oil system, which was connected to that control
oil system, and other problems were found, it was decided to shut down the reactor
to conduct inspections.
Investigation was conducted to determine the cause, and the results are as follows:
(1) Increase of differential pressure of the oil filter
! The main turbine oil that was used when this event occurred was fully replaced
in 2002 and was then used continuously for seven years. Because of this,
foreign substances (sludge) had gradually increased and the oil had
deteriorated.
! In addition, because excessive leaks had occurred from the through-hole on the
heat transfer tube of the main oil cooler (B) since July 2009, the turbine
cooling water (TCW) was mixed into the main turbine oil and a chemical
reaction between the multifunctional additive in the main turbine oil and the
6 461-470
TCW was brought about. As a result, formation of the sludge was accelerated
and noticeable increase of the differential pressure of the oil filter occurred.
! As for the leak of cooling water from the heat transfer tube in the main oil
cooler (B), since that cooler has a structure where lube oil flows into the
U-shaped area under it, flow of the lube oil generated minimal vibration of the
heat transfer tube in the U-shaped area. Since the cooler had been used for a
long time, contact wear between the heat transfer tube and the baffle (tube
supporting plate) had thinned the wall and finally created a through-hole.
(2) Fluctuation of the oil level in the main oil tank
! Due to the mixed TCW, the extremely deteriorated main turbine oil got air into
the turbine bearing room, which generated a large amount of foam. The foam
flowed into the main oil tank and accumulated there, which caused dropping or
fluctuation of the oil level value indicated by the float oil level gauge on the
site. No oil leakage to the outside of the system was found in this event.
Considering the above, it was presumed that deterioration of the oil had been
accelerated by mixed TCW in the main turbine oil, the generated sludge had
increased the differential pressure of the filter to an extreme degree, and
accumulation of the foam generated by the deterioration of the oil caused the
fluctuation of the oil level.
2009.8.21 Hokkaido At Tomari Power Station Unit 3, during a test operation with constant rated
Electric Power electrical outputs, a malfunction in the turbocharger was found at 15:13 on August
Co., Inc., 19 during the surveillance test of the emergency diesel generator. Therefore, the
Tomari Power emergency diesel generator was shut down and a deviation from operational limits
Station Unit 3 was declared based on the safety preservation rules at 15:14 on the same day.
As a result of a disassembly inspection conducted for the emergency diesel
generator (B) from that day until August 21, it was verified that damage was found
in the turbocharger and the power generator did not deliver the required function.
(It was already confirmed that the emergency diesel generator (A) was available for
activation.)
There were no external effects of radioactive materials from this incident.
In addition, to conduct a scheduled inspection of all the facilities and equipment
with the plant shut down, the output of Unit 3 was reduced in order to stop power
generation, starting from 16:00 on the 21st.
Investigation was conducted to determine the cause, and the results are as follows:
! In regard to the production stage of the turbocharger at the factory, since the
procedures defined the tightening torques (tightening force) according to the
7 471-476
specifications of the bolts but did not clearly describe a concrete tightening
method, some of the fixing bolts were tightened without a predefined
tightening torque being applied.
! Because a test operation and load test were conducted with insufficient
tightening torque applied to those bolts at the factory, fitting and vibration,
etc., of the B2 turbocharger bolt tightening surface loosened the bolts and
gradually caused them to fall out.
! As a result, the heads of the bolts that had fallen out made contact with the
other parts in the turbocharger, which generated heat, resulting in damage to
the turbine blades.
! The damage to the turbine blades created eccentricity of the rotation shaft,
which created damage on various parts in the turbocharger and stopped the B2
turbocharger.
! It was presumed that due to stoppage of the B2 turbocharger, the output of the
emergency diesel generator (B) was decreased, the decreased air supply
generated unburned gas and soot, and smoke was discharged from the exhaust
pipes, etc.

420
Date of Page on which related
Power press announcement
occurre Summary of the analysis
station appears
nce
2009.10.14 Japan Atomic Power At Tsuruga Power Station Unit 1, during a periodical inspection, a wall thickness
Company Co., Ltd., measurement was carried out for the diesel cooling sea water piping in the
Tsuruga Power high-pressure injection system. As a result, it was found that one part of the piping
Station Unit 1 at the entrance of the cooler had a minimum wall thickness of 2.8 mm, which was
lower than the required minimum wall thickness (3.4 mm) that was calculated
based on the technical standards.
Excluding this, there was no discovery of parts that had lower wall thickness than
the required minimum wall thickness.
Investigation was conducted to determine the cause, and the results are as follows:
! As a result of investigation, it was verified that marine organisms had adhered
to the inside of the sea water piping and the tar epoxy resin lining inside of the
piping was damaged.
! No leak from this sea water piping had been verified in periodical inspections
since operation was started. In addition, in order to understand the status of
corrosion in the entire sea water piping system as part of daily maintenance, the
joint part (connected part) between the purified water cooler and the piping was
8 selected as a representative part and was visually inspected to see if the lining 477-482
was peeled off, when the regular disassembly inspection of the equipment was
conducted, etc.
! On the other hand, in regard to this target part for the visual inspection,
selection of the representative part of the sea water piping was inappropriate.
The lining of that part was coated for maintenance on the site during a
disassembly inspection to maintain the soundness of the equipment and there
were other parts that had environmental conditions more likely to cause
corrosion. Furthermore, the concrete inspection implementation details and
period were not clarified.
! As a result, it was presumed that the lining in the part where the event occurred
was damaged due to the adherence and falling-off, etc., of marine organisms in
the sea, which made the base material inside the piping make contact with the
sea water and cause the gradual growth of corrosion in that part. The
inspections and repairs of the inner sides of the piping were not conducted
thoroughly, which reduced the wall thickness to a value lower than the required
thickness.
2009.10.15 Tokyo Electric At Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station Unit 4, which was being operated with
Power Co., Inc., constant rated heat outputs, the reactor recirculation pump (A) was stopped at
Fukushima Daini 14:08 on October 15 and some of the control rods were inserted automatically. As a
Nuclear Power result, the electrical output was reduced from approx. 1100 MWe to approx. 360
Station Unit 4 MWe.
Investigation was conducted to determine the cause, and the results are as follows:
! As a result of investigation, evidence of a short-circuit caused by the contact
between the brush lead wire terminal (positive) and the brush holder support
(negative), which occurred when the brush of the variable frequency power
supply (recirculation MG set) (A) for the reactor recirculation system pumps
was replaced on October 15, as well as damage to the internal parts of the
automatic voltage adjustment device, was found.
! It was verified that though an insulating plate was installed between the
positive and negative sides to prevent a short-circuit, the protection was not
sufficient, and that the brush access hole was too narrow to secure an
9 483-488
environment where personnel can check the work area at hand and maintain a
posture sufficient to conduct the work. It was also verified that the work was
conducted in accordance with procedures that may cause a short-circuit.
! Until this time, when the brush was being replaced, because adjustment of the
contact surface between the brush and the collector ring (rotation shaft) was
required, electricity was supplied to the reactor recirculation pump while the
plant was being operated by rotating the rotation shaft. This was considered to
be a situation that may affect the plant.
! Considering the above, it was presumed that a short-circuit occurred due to
contact between the lead wire terminal and the brush holder support when the
brush was being replaced, which caused loss of function of the automatic
voltage adjustment device and automatically stopped the recirculation MG set,
all of which led to stoppage of the reactor recirculation pump. After this,
because of the stoppage of the pump, some of the control rods were inserted
(normal operation), which reduced the electrical output.


421
Page on which related
Date of
Power station Summary of the analysis press announcement
occurrence appears
2009.11.13 Hokuriku Electric On November 12, during a routine test of the emergency diesel generator A at
Power Co. Inc., Shika Nuclear Power Station Unit 2, where adjustment operation with constant
Shika Nuclear rated electrical outputs was being conducted, it was verified that lube oil had
Power Station Unit leaked (approx. 100 cc) from the valve used to check if water or oil had gotten
2 into the cylinder of the diesel engine. As a result, it was considered that that diesel
generator had malfunctioned, and a deviation from operational limits was declared
based on the safety preservation rules at 16:43 on the same day.
After that, when it was checked if the remaining two emergency diesel
generators were operable or not (a countermeasure for the deviation from
operational limits required by the safety preservation rules), it was found that lube
oil (approx. 2 cc) had also leaked from the same location in the emergency diesel
generator B. Because it could not be verified that two out of three emergency
diesel generators were operable, it was decided that the reactor should be
manually shut down in accordance with the safety preservation rules.
Investigation was conducted to determine the cause, and the results are as follows:
! As a result of the operation check of the pressure control check valve, a seat
failure due to reduction of the rescating pressure of the valve element was
found. Also, a disassembly inspection of that check valve found a sliding trace
inside the valve. The sliding trace was found in the area that makes contact
10 when the valve element tilts. 489-496
! It was also verified that the lube oil for the emergency diesel generators
contained metal powder of a fine size that can be generated from the sliding
part of the diesel engine bearing, etc., in normal situations.
! In a test that simulated the opening and closing of a new pressure control check
valve by using the lube oil used in the actual equipment, it was verified that the
sliding resistance generated by operating the valve element at a tilt angle had
increased.
! Considering the above, it was presumed that wear had occurred on the sliding
surface over time due to the design structure in which the valve element of the
pressure control check valve can easily tilt when operated, in addition to the
fine metal powder included in the lube oil, which increased the sliding
resistance and reduced the opening and closing performance of the valve.
! In addition, there were neither inspection and replacement plans for the
pressure control check valve nor regular replacement plans for the lube oil.
! Under these circumstances, it was presumed that the lube oil had leaked from
the indicator valve, as the piston had risen because the turning operation was
implemented, with the lube oil that had leaked from the pressure control check
valve flowing into the cylinder when the diesel engine for the emergency diesel
generators was in a waiting state.
2009.11.13 Kansai Electric In an adjustment operation of the Mihama Power Station Unit 1, which was
Power Co., Inc., conducted during a periodical inspection, a rapid upward trend in the power
Mihama Power generator outputs was indicated when the load limiter switch was operated to
Station Unit 1 increase the electrical output, at 19:40 on November 12.
In response to this, the load limiter switch and the control circuit of the valve,
etc., were inspected but no failures were found. Therefore, power reduction was
conducted at 7:00 on November 13, and then power generation was stopped at
7:08 of the same day. Due to this event, the reactor output dropped from 179 MWe
(17.4% of the rated heat output) to 63 MWe (6.1% of that).
Investigation was conducted to determine the cause, and the results are as follows:
! As a result of the cause analysis, it was evaluated that it was highly possible
that foreign substances had gotten into the sliding area in the load limiter body.
! It was predefined that speed regulators including the load limiter should be
11 removed on-site in each periodical inspection, and then re-assembled after 497-504
removing foreign substances from the oil system. When the speed regulator was
removed, flakes of the liquid silicon gasket that was applied to the matching
surface between the speed regulator and the control block had been mixed in, as
foreign substances. (A disassembly inspection of the speed regulators should be
conducted at the factory once every four periodical inspections.)
! The mixed-in flakes of the silicon gasket were pinched into the gap between the
load limiter body and the piston when the load limiter was being operated.
! The foreign substances there slowed down the piston operation, which rapidly
altered the hydraulic pressure in the load limiter. In accordance with that
hydraulic pressure, the steam adjustment valve was operated, resulting in a
rapid change in the power generator output.
! During that time, the volume of steam that flowed into the turbine had changed,
and the reactor output also changed accordingly.

422
Page on which
Date of related press
occurrence
Power station Summary of the analysis announcement
appears
2009.12.1 Chubu Electric At the Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit 3, which was being operated with
Power Co., Inc., constant rated heat outputs, the “Floor leak detection system panel failure” alarm
Hamaoka Nuclear lit up when radioactive liquid waste was being discharged into the
Power Station Unit high-conductivity liquid waste sump (liquid waste collection tank) to inspect the
3 concentrated liquid waste storage tank (C) in the concentrated liquid waste storage
tank (C) room (controlled area) in the second basement of the auxiliary building.
As a result of on-site verification, it was verified that radioactive liquid waste had
leaked around the drain pit in another concentrated liquid waste storage tank (B)
room. Because of this, water drain from the concentrated liquid waste storage tank
(C) was stopped immediately, to stop back-flow from the drain pit.
After this, rooms other than the concentrated liquid waste storage tank (B) room
were checked and leakage of radioactive liquid waste was found at one location in
the concentrated liquid waste pump (B) room and at two locations in the
concentrated liquid waste pump (C) room. By measuring the amount of the
radioactivity of the leaked liquid waste, it was verified that the total amount
leaked at the four locations was approx. 1.2 × 10 9 Bq.
There were no external effects from radioactive material from this incident.
Though a maximum radioactive dose of 0.05 millisievert was measured for 23
personnel during the on-site inspection and the measurement process after this
event had occurred, this was almost the same as the exposure dose during regular
inspection tours and inspections, and sufficiently lower than the annual dose limit
defined by law. Therefore, it was considered that this exposure should not affect
the health of the personnel.
12 Investigation was conducted to determine the cause, and the results are as follows: 505-513
! As a result of the observation of the water drain system piping using a camera,
it was verified that suspended solids had accumulated throughout a large part of
the concentrated liquid waste. It was also verified from the observation in the
high-conductivity liquid waste sump tank (B) that suspended solids in the
concentrated liquid waste had blocked the exit of the water drain system piping.
! Since a failure had occurred in the plastic solidification equipment in March
2005, it was expected that the amount of the concentrated liquid waste in the
concentrated liquid waste storage tank would have increased. Therefore, in
November 2006, it was determined internally in the plant that a measure that
allows drain of the relevant liquid waste through the water drain system piping
could be taken, but technical verification on the properties of the concentrated
liquid waste that would be drained was not conducted before starting the
operation. Also, the liquid drained from the water drain system piping was not
verified in regard to its compliance with the technical standards.
! Though the personnel who worked there understood that the suspended solids in
the concentrated liquid waste could block the water drain system piping, clear
standards for cases when the color and fluidity of the liquid waste had changed
were not defined.
! Considering these circumstances, it was presumed that because the concentrated
liquid waste containing large amounts of suspended solids was drained through
the water drain system piping, the suspended solids in that liquid waste had
accumulated, blocked the water drain system piping, and this resulted in the
leak.
2010.1.13 Japan Atomic At Tokai Daini Power Station, during the 24th periodical inspection, when repair
Power Company construction was conducted for the lining (inner surface processing) of the
Co., Ltd., residual heat removal system sea water system (A) piping, evidence of corrosion
Tokai Daini Power was found on a part of the outer surface of the piping at the entrance of the heat
Station exchanger, near the building penetration. In response to this, when the wall
thickness measurement of that part was conducted, one part with 6.7 mm thickness
was found, which was lower than the required minimum wall thickness (7.08 mm)
that was calculated based on the technical standards.
Excluding this, there was no discovery of parts that had lower wall thickness than
the required minimum wall thickness.
Investigation was conducted to determine the cause, and the results are as follows:
! In the trench (a space made of reinforced concrete) where the building
penetration piping was installed (at which the thinning of the wall was found),
traces of rain water were found on the inner wall of the ceiling hatch (opening),
and rust and traces of rain water were found on the anchor support (supporting
frame) that was right below the hatch. Also, in the trench of another system, it
was found that the mortar that had been stuffed up between the building
13 penetration and the piping had protruded, creating a gap. 514-520
! Though the surface of the piping in the trench was finished by applying a
coating on-site during installation, the anchor support was not finished with
coating because it was difficult to coat it on-site, which created a situation
allowing easy corrosion.
! On the other hand, because the trench did not have a ventilation facility, which
may cause lack of oxygen, it was not included in the targets of daily inspection
tours, so the status inside the trench (status of intrusion of rain water and
rusting, etc.) was not fully understood. Because the environment of the building
penetration and of other parts where visual inspection was difficult were
considered the same as the parts that can be visually inspected, inspections
considering the possibility of parts in a humid environment for a long period of
time had not been conducted.
! Under these circumstances, it was presumed that rain water that intruded from
the hatch opening and got into the gap in the mortar of the building penetration
had been in a humid environment for a long time, and as a result, the outer


surface of the piping was corroded and the wall thickness decreased to less than
the required minimum.


423
Page on which related
Date of Power
Summary of the analysis press announcement
occurrence station appears
2010.3.16 Kansai At Takahama Power Station Unit 4, during a shut down for a periodical inspection, an
Electric Power eddy-current test (ECT) was performed to check the integrity of the heat transfer tubes
Co., Inc., (9,757 tubes excluding the plugged tubes) of its three steam generators. As a result, a
significant signal was observed in one of the C-steam generator heat transfer tubes
Takahama (3,261 tubes excluding the plugged tubes). The significant signal indications were
Power Station identified in the tubesheet portion in the hot-leg side (entrance side). Also, no
Unit 4 significant signals were observed anywhere other than the C-steam generator heat
transfer tubes.
Investigation was conducted to determine the cause, and the results are as follows:
! During the 11th periodical inspection (in 1999) of the Takahama Unit 4, a
significant signal was observed by the ECT in the tubesheet portion in the hot-leg
side of the steam generator heat transfer piping. As a result of the sampling
investigation, a crack running in the axial direction was found inside the heat
transfer tube, which was near the top of the expanded section.
! As for the cause of this crack, it was presumed that when the heat transfer tube
(made of nickel based alloy 600) was expanded during the manufacturing of the
steam generator, a local residual stress was generated internally, which was then
combined with the internal pressure generated during operation using the primary
coolant, resulting in stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC). As a measure against this,
it was determined that the relevant heat transfer tube should be plugged and an ECT
should be conducted for all the heat transfer tubes in each periodical inspection.
! After this, in each periodical inspection from the 12th (in 2000) to the 14th (in
14 2003) as well as the 18th periodical inspection (in 2008), incidences of PWSCC 521-528
similar to that found in the 11th periodical inspection were also found in the
tubesheet portion in the hot-leg side of the heat transfer tubes, and these tubes were
plugged.
! In addition, as a measure against the stress corrosion cracking, stress improvement
was conducted by applying shot-peening treatment to the inner sides of the heat
transfer tubes in the tubesheet portion in the hot-leg side during the 13th periodical
inspection. However, it was known that the shot-peening treatment would not have
enough effect on cracks deeper than a certain depth (approx. 0.2 mm). Therefore, it
was presumed that even if the cracks were shallower than the detection limit of the
ECT (approx. 0.5 mm), they may develop as time passes and be identified again
later.
! As a result of the detailed analysis of the significant signal indication that was
observed at this time, the crack was evaluated as a crack that ran in the axial
direction but did not go through the wall on the inner surface of the heat transfer
tube at the top of the expanded section in the tubesheet portion in the hot-leg side.
This bore the same characteristics as incidences of PWSCC for which technical
knowledge had been already obtained.
! It was therefore presumed that the significant signal indication observed at this time
was detected because an incidence of PWSCC had been generated and developed
over time, in the same fashion as the other cracks that had been found since the 11th
periodical inspection.
2010.3.23 Kansai At Mihama Power Station Unit 2, which was being operated with constant rated heat
Electric Power outputs, water dripping in the regenerative heat exchanger room inside the
Co., Inc., containment vessel was observed through the camera in the central control room at
about 12:00 on March 19. Therefore, the reactor was shut down at 21:55 on the same
Mihama day to identify the location of the dripping and conduct detailed inspections and
Power Station investigations.
Unit 2 Until today (March 23), visual verifications and penetration tests have been conducted
for the leak location. As a result, it was verified that an indication of a scratch approx.
26 mm in length (in a circumferential direction) was observed on the welded portion of
the bent piping, which branched before the charging water for the reactor cooling
system flowed into the regenerative heat exchanger, and this equipment, which was
important for safety, did not comply with the technical standards for nuclear power
generation equipment. The dripping water stayed in the containment vessel and there
were no external effects from radioactive material from this incident.
Investigation was conducted to determine the cause, and the results are as follows:
! As a result of the penetration test on the piping where scratching was found,
indications of approx. 26 mm and 15 mm in length were observed at the center of the
welded portion, on the outer surface and near the border between the welded portion
of the inner surface and the base material of the nozzle stub, respectively.
! As a result of the magnified view of the fracture surfaces, beach marks and systemic
patterns, which were characteristic of cracking due to fatigue, were observed.
Therefore, it was presumed that cracking had occurred on the inner surface of the
piping and had progressed to the outer surface.
! As a result of the investigation on how this piping was influenced by the vibrations
15 generated during operation of the charging pump, it was verified that the natural 529-537
frequency of this piping (22.0 Hz) was within the resonance range of the vibration
frequency generated when the charging pump was operated with 100% output during
periodical inspections (21.8 Hz). This generated stress higher than the fatigue
strength during operation times.
! It was also verified that once a crack was generated, the crack would develop even
under the pressure generated when the charging pump was operating normally
(approx. 80% output).
! Since 1999, management to reduce vibrations, such as vibration measurement tests
to be conducted when specifications are changed, has been conducted for
small-diameter branched piping including this piping, in accordance with the
management manual that was prepared in response to the trouble that occurred in the
small-diameter branched piping at the Ohi Power Station Unit 2 in 1998.
! However, when the inspection records of this piping were reviewed, it was verified
in the 22nd periodical inspection (in 2005) that the valve handle of this piping was
replaced with a heavier one and the effects of that replacement were not evaluated
by conducting a vibration measurement test. (It was confirmed that the handle of
this piping before the replacement had no problems.)
! Considering the above, it was presumed that the natural frequency had changed
when the valve handle of this piping was replaced during the 22nd periodical
inspection (in 2005), that during the subsequent periodical inspections, this piping
resonated when the charging pump was operated with 100% output, that this
repeated stress generated the cracking due to high-frequency fatigue on the inner
surface of the piping, and that after this, the cracking had developed when the
charging pump was operating normally, resulting in a through-hole.

424
ϱϫ-1-6ࠉPress Releases on Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants
List of press releases in FY 2009

Date of release 7LWOH 3DJH


Excessive Insertion of the Control Rod during the Periodic Inspection at
 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit-3, Tokyo Electric Power 
Company

Causes of and Countermeasures against Excessive Insertion of the
 Control Rod during the Periodic Inspection at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear 
Power Station Unit-3, Tokyo Electric Power Company
Occurrence of the Injury of a Worker in the Turbine Building at Hamaoka
 
Nuclear Power Station Unit-4, Chubu Electric Power Company
 Causes of and countermeasures against the occurrence of the injury of a
 worker in the turbine building at Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit- 
4, Chubu Electric Power Company
Reactor Manual Shutdown at Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit-4,
 
Chubu Electric Power Company
 Causes of and countermeasures against the reactor manual shutdown at
 Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Units-4 and -5, Chubu Electric Power 
Company
A flaw in the seat portion of the vent valve for the control rod drive
 
hydraulic system at the Tsuruga Power Station Unit-1
 Causes of and countermeasures against the flaw in the seat portion of the
 vent valve for the control rod drive hydraulic system at the Tsuruga 
Power Station Unit-1,Japan Atomic Power Co.
Excessive insertion of the control rod during the periodic inspection at
 
Onagawa Nuclear Power Station Unit-3, Tohoku Electric Power Company
 Causes of and countermeasures against the excessive insertion of the
 control rod during the periodic inspection at Onagawa Nuclear Power 
Station Unit-3, Tohoku Electric Power Company
Reactor manual shutdown of Tokai Daini Power Station, Japan Atomic
 
Power Company

Causes of and countermeasures against the reactor manual shutdown of
 
Tokai Daini Power Station, Japan Atomic Power Company
Damage of the emergency diesel generator at Tomari Power Station Unit-
 
3, Hokkaido Electric Power Company
 Causes of and countermeasures against the damage of the emergency
 diesel generator at Tomari Power Station Unit-3, Hokkaido Electric 
Power Company
Thinning of the sea water piping for cooling the high pressure core
 injection system diesel engine found during the periodic inspection of the 
Tsuruga Power Station Unit-1, Japan Atomic Power Company
 Causes of and countermeasures against the thinning of the sea water
piping for cooling the high pressure core injection system diesel engine
 
found during the periodic inspection of the Tsuruga Power Station Unit-
1,Japan Atomic Power Company
Power Reduction of the Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station Unit-4,
 
Tokyo Electric Power Company
 Causes of and countermeasures against the power reduction of the
 Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station Unit-4, the Tokyo Electric 
Power Company
Reactor manual shutdown of the Shika Nuclear Power Station Unit-2,

Hokuriku Electric Power Company
 参
 Causes of and countermeasures against the reactor manual shutdown of
the Shika Nuclear Power Station Unit-2, Hokuriku Electric Power

Company


425
Date of release 7LWOH 3DJH
Unexpectedly power change during the generator power increase
 operation at Mihama Power Station Unit-1, Kansai Electric Power 
Company

Causes of and countermeasures against the unexpectedly power change
 during the generator power increase operation at Mihama Power Station 
Unit-1, Kansai Electric Power Company
Leakage of liquid radioactive waste in the radiation controlled area of the
 
Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit-3, Chubu Electric Power Company
 Causes of and countermeasures against the leakage of liquid radioactive
 waste in the radiation controlled area of the Hamaoka Nuclear Power 
Station Unit-3, Chubu Electric Power Company
Thinning of the residual heat removal sea water system piping, which
 was found in the periodic inspection, at the Tokai Daini Power Station, 
Japan Atomic Power Company
 Causes of and countermeasures against thinning of the residual heat
removal sea water system piping, which was found in the periodic
 
inspection, at the Tokai Daini Power Station, Japan Atomic Power
Company
Significant signal indications of flaw on the Steam Generator tube found
 during the periodic inspection of Takahama Power Station Unit-4, Kansai 
Electric Power Company

Causes of and countermeasures against the significant signal indications
 of flaw on the steam generator tube found during the periodic inspection 
of Takahama Power Station Unit-4, Kansai Electric Power Company
Flaw on the weld of the air vent piping in the chemical and volume control
 system found at Mihama Power Station Unit-2, Kansai Electric Power 
Company

Causes of and countermeasures against the flaw on the weld of the air
 vent piping in the chemical and volume control system found at Mihama 
Power Station Unit-2, Kansai Electric Power Company

426
Excessive Insertion of the Control Rod during the Periodic
Inspection at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit-3,
Tokyo Electric Power Company

April 6, 2009
NISA㸭METI

Today (on April 6, 2009), the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) received a report from
Tokyo Electric Power Company on the excessive insertion of the control rod at Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Station Unit-3 (BWR, rated electric power: 784 MWe) during its periodic inspection,
as follows.

1. The Report from Tokyo Electric Power Company


Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit-3 had been under its periodic inspection.
Today (on April 6, 2009), when the stop valve for the driving water was opened in the restoration
work (*2) after the inspection of a hydraulic control unit (*1) for the control rod drive hydraulic
system, a control rod movement alarm sounded for the control rod (46-19) and it was judged that
the control rod moved further toward the insertion direction than the normal full inserted position
(i.e. excessive insertion of the rod).
In addition, this event had no impact of radioactive material on the environment.

(*1) Equipment to control the driving water in order to insert and withdraw a control rod.
(*2) For the control rod (46-19), the excessive insertion also occurred on March 26, and the
causes and the countermeasures were reported to NISA on April 3. The restoration work has
been conducted and the countermeasures against recurrence were being carried out.

2. Actions of NISA
NISA received the report of this event pursuant to article 19-17 of “the rule for installation,
operation, etc. of commercial power reactors.”
Afterwards, NISA will continue the rigorous checking of the investigation of causes and
countermeasures against recurrence, which will be carried out by the company pursuant to the law.

– Results of Provisional Evaluation by INES –


Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Level

- - 0+ 0+


427
(Attachment 1Უ

Control Rod

To Scram Discharge
 Volume
Reactor

Containment
Vessel
Control Rod
  Drive Hydraulic
Reactor  ᳀Ჽ᳐ Pump
Pressure
Vessel
Rod 
Control Withdrawal Slightly Open
Rods Core Piping

Control Rod Drive  


Mechanism


Hydraulic
Control Unit

428

Control Rod Drive
Mechanism 


Accumulator

Rod Insertion
Piping Control Rod Drive
Hydraulic Pump Nitrogen

Illustration of the positions of the valve when the restoration


work

: The stop valve of the driving water which was


operated at the restoration work (101 valve).
Schematic Diagram of the Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System
(Attachment 2㸧
••
Control Rod Arrangement Plan

ไ䚷䚷ᚚ䚷䚷Წ䚷䚷఩䚷䚷⨨
䠄䚷᳨䚷ᰝ䚷㛤䚷ጞ䚷᫬䚷䠅

㻡㻝

㻠㻣

㻠㻟

㻟㻥

㻟㻡

㻟㻝

㻞㻣

㻞㻟

㻝㻥

㻝㻡

㻝㻝

㻞 㻢 㻝㻜 㻝㻠 㻝㻤 㻞㻞 㻞㻢 㻟㻜 㻟㻠 㻟㻤 㻠㻞 㻠㻢 㻡㻜

Control rod (46-19) which was excessively inserted (one of 137 rods)


••
429
Causes of and Countermeasures against Excessive Insertion of the
Control Rod during the Periodic Inspection at Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Station Unit-3, Tokyo Electric Power Company

May 15, 2009


NISA㸭METI

Today (on May 15, 2009), Tokyo Electric Power Company submitted a report to the Nuclear and
Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) on causes of and countermeasures against excessive insertion of the
control rod during the periodic inspection, which had been confirmed on April 6, 2009, at Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit-3 (BWR, rated electric power: 784MWe).
NISA judged that estimated causes and corresponding countermeasures are appropriate.

1. Main points of the report from Tokyo Electric Power Company


(1) Estimated causes
࣭The cause of the control rod movement alarm sounded for the control rod (46-19) was as
follows. During the restoration work after the inspection of the hydraulic control unit (*1) for
the control rod drive hydraulic system, there was leakage from the scram inlet valve seat (*2)
and thus the concerned control rod moved towards insertion direction.
࣭As a result of the overhaul investigation of the concerned valve, damage was found on the
Teflon seat of the valve seat area. Moreover, it was revealed that the bolts (*3) used for
assembling of the valve seat area were a mixture of old-type and new-type ones.
࣭The investigation on the effect of a mixture of different type of bolts showed that when the seat
area was assembled with a mixture of different kinds of bolts, axial force (*4) of each bolt
became different and it therefore led to uneven deformation of the Teflon seat towards inside
diameter direction.
࣭The record of assembling of the concerned valve was checked and it was confirmed that
countermeasures against excessive insertion event occurred on March 26 had been carried out.
However, when the concerned valve was re-assembled, inside of the Teflon seat was unevenly
deformed and the position of the valve disk was adjusted at higher position than normal. Thus,
the adhesion between the valve disk and the valve seat area decreased and damage to the
Teflon seat occurred.

(2) Countermeasures
࣭For the valves using both old and new type bolts, all the bolts will be replaced with new- type
ones.
࣭Regarding adjustment of the valve disk position at the assembling of the valve, the method of
ensuring safety margin by rotating valve stem after the connection of the valve stem will be
revised, while the application of the adjustment method where the valve driver will be pushed
down in advance of connecting valve stem to ensure adhesion between the valve disk and the
valve seat will be considered.

2. Actions of NISA
NISA received the report from Tokyo Electric Power Company on the investigation result of
causes and countermeasures. NISA judged that estimated causes and corresponding
countermeasures are appropriate.
Afterwards, NISA will continue the rigorous checking of the countermeasures against
recurrence, which will be carried out by the company through operational safety inspection.

430
(Reference)
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit-3 had been under its periodic inspection.
On April 6, 2009, when the stop valve for the driving water was opened in the restoration work after
the inspection of the hydraulic control unit for the control rod drive hydraulic system, a control rod
movement alarm sounded for the control rod (46-19) and it was reported that the control rod moved
further toward the insertion direction than the normal full inserted position (i.e. excessive insertion
of the rod).
This event had no impact of radioactive material on the environment.
Regarding the concerned control rod, excessive insertion occurred on March 26. The cause was
estimated that when the valve was assembled at the overhaul inspection during the periodic
inspection, because adjustment of the length of the valve stem was not carried out properly, the
valve disk did not seat to the valve seat properly even when the valve was fully closed and thus
leakage occurred from the valve seat area.

(*1) Equipment to control the driving water in order to insert and withdraw a control rod.
(*2) Portion to stop the fluid at the open or close of the valve. At the scram inlet valve, the valve
disk, valve seat and the Teflon valve seat are assembled.
(*3) A set of bolt, nut and washer
(*4) Tensile force affects axis of the bolt when clamped with bolt

– Results of Provisional Evaluation by INES –


Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Level

- - 0+ 0+


431
(Attachment 1)

Reactor Containment Vessel


- Situation at the occurrence of this event
Control Rod (April 6)
The event occurred when 101 valve was
To Scram Discharge opened during the restoration work (*).
Reactor Volume
Pressure
Vessel
(*) Restoration Work
Control After the completion of the assembling
Control Rod
Rods Core Rod Withdrawal Piping and the test of 126 valve, valves are
Drive Hydraulic
Pump opened by the following order: 102 valve
– 101 valve – 103 valve – 104 valve – 105
Control Rod valve
Slight ly
Drive
Hydraulic Open
Mechanism
Control
Unit

Due to the leakage at the valve seat of


the valve for the operating a control rod
Control Rod Drive (126 valve), the accumulator pressure
Mechanism was applied, and the insertion direction
Rod Insertion Piping pressure increased.
Control Rod Drive
Hydraulic Pump
Accumulator

432
Valve Drive

Nitrogen

Valve Stem Connection

Valve Stem
Teflon Seat
Valve Disk
Damaged Part
Leakage from
Valve Seat Area

Condition of Damage of the Concerned Teflon Seat


Control Rod Arrangement Plan * One of 137 rods Valve Seat

Schematic Diagram of the Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System and the Valve for the Operating a Control Rod
(Attachment 2)
Old-Type Bolt Clamping force is different
Old-Type Bolt The area where the valve disk came
Star Washer between new and old type of
Star Washer
bolt, nut and washer. into contact with the Teflon seat

Approx. 27mm
Driver
Approx. 60cm New-Type Bolt
New-Type Bolt Spring Washer
Spring Washer
Spring Washer
Part Approx. 4.1 m m
Connection in thickness
Bolt, Nut, New-Type Old-Type
Washer
Bolt and Nut Bolt and Nut
Approx. 27mm Approx. 27mm The hole became oval and
the area of smaller inside
Star Washer diameter occurred
Spring Washer Approx. 1.3 mm Approx. 1.2 mm
in thickness in thickness
Valve Seat Area Part of the Teflon seat was strongly pressed,
and the deformation towards inside of the
Approx. 10cm Star Washer seat became uneven.
The valve for the
Status of use of the new and old bolt, nut and washer of Estimated Image of the condition of
operating a control rod
the concerned valve Teflon Seat of the Concerned Valve
(126 valve)

433
Valve Stem Approximately 10 times
Open and Close Test

Valve Disk Adhesion


decreased
Teflon Seat

Valve Disk Crack occurred


Valve Seat interfered

90 degree, 270 degree side 0 degree, 180 degree side 90 degree, 270 degree side 0 degree, 180 degree side 90 degree, 270 degree side 0 degree, 180 degree side

- The valve disk interfered with the area of narrow inside - Though adjustment of the length of valve stem was - As a result of the open and close test, the crack occurred at the
diameter where the concerned seat largely deformed. carried out, because the valve disk seat position was bump of the concerned Teflon seat.
- Thus, valve disk seat position during adjustment of the higher than the normal position, adhesion of the - As a result of water pressure during operation test, water filling or
length of the valve stem was higher than normal. valve disk and the valve seat decreased. restoration of the hydraulic control unit, the concerned Teflon seat
was damaged, and the leakage occurred from the gap generated at
the valve seat area.
Mechanism of Leakage at the Valve Seat Area

Estimated Cause of Leakage at the valve (126 valve) for the operating a control rod



Occurrence of the Injury of a Worker in the Turbine Building at
Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit-4, Chubu Electric Power
Company

April 23, 2009


NISA㸭METI

On April 22, 2009, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) received a report from Chubu
Electric Power Company on the occurrence of the injury of a worker in the turbine building at
Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit-4 (BWR, rated electric power: 1,137MWe), as follows.

1. The Report from Chubu Electric Power Company


Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit-4 had been under its periodic inspection. On April 22,
2009, a worker, who was working in the vicinity of the steam turbine in the 3rd floor (control area) of
the turbine building, was injured in his left instep by being stuck in the driver of a valve(*) during its
test operation. He needed to receive a hospital treatment.
Therefore, this event was judged to be corresponding to the reportable event pursuant to article
19-17 of “the rule for installation, operation, etc. of commercial power reactors.”

* This is a combined intermediate valve installed in the middle of the piping connecting the
high pressure turbine and the low pressure turbine.

2. Actions of NISA
NISA received the report of this event pursuant to article 19-17 of “the rule for installation,
operation, etc. of commercial power reactors.”
Afterwards, NISA will continue the rigorous checking of the investigation of causes and
countermeasures against recurrence, which will be carried out by the company pursuant to the law.

– Results of Provisional Evaluation by INES –


Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Level

- - - Out of Scale

434
Occurrence Situation of the Injury of a Worker in the Turbine Building
at Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit-4

Location of the Occurrence: the combined intermediate valve(-A) room

High
Pressure Low Pressure Turbine Generator
Turbine

The 3rd Floor of the Turbine Building at


Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit-4

Approx. 2.3m

Approx. 2.9m

Combined Intermediate Valve


An image of the occurrence of the injury reproduced by a
hearing from concerned persons
(a boot is placed in order to re-create the injury scene) 付
435
Causes of and countermeasures against the occurrence of the injury
of a worker in the turbine building at Hamaoka Nuclear Power
Station Unit-4, Chubu Electric Power Company

June 3, 2009
NISA㸭METI

On June 3, 2009, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) received a report on causes of
and countermeasures against the occurrence of the injury of a worker in the turbine building, which
was reported on April 22, 2009, at Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit-4 (BWR, rated electric
power; 1,137MWe) which had been under its periodic inspection.
NISA judged that the estimated causes and corresponding countermeasures against the recurrence is
appropriate.

1. Main Points of the Report from Chubu Electric Power Company


(1) Estimated Causes
- As a result of the investigation, it was confirmed that the access control established when the
remotely operated test will be conducted after the replacement of the steam turbine control unit
was not well known to the concerned workers and that countermeasures of the off-limit, such as
establishment of the distinct off-limit zone and assignment of a watcher, were not appropriately
taken. As for the sign of “No Visitors Allowed,” the concerned workers took it for granted that
they were accessible to the area because they were involved in related parties.
- As an appropriate scaffold was not established except besides the vicinity of the driver of the
activated valve (*) when the concerned worker installed the thermal insulation material, the
concerned worker carried out the installation work standing in the vicinity of the concerned
valve.
- As the thermal insulation installation work was not marked down in the general periodic
inspection schedule and the work schedules were not appropriately prepared, any interference of
works could not identified at the daily process meeting.
- As a result, the left instep of the concerned worker was stuck in the driver of the activated valve by
the remotely-operated test.

* This is an combined intermediate valve installed in the middle of the piping connecting the high
pressure turbine and the low pressure turbine.

(2) Countermeasures
- Contents of the access control should be clarified, and both the establishment of the distinct
off-limit zone and assignment of a watcher should be thoroughly carried out.
In addition, the safety precaution measure applicable when equipment is remotely operated
should be surely described during the pre-award meeting with a subcontractor.
- As a part of countermeasures in terms of the equipment for improving the work environment, a
protective wire mesh and makeshift scaffold should be established in order to prevent workers
from entering into the area in the vicinity of the driver of the concerned valve.
- The thermal insulation installation work should be marked down in the general periodic inspection
schedule and the modification procedure of the work schedule should be improved. Any
interference of works should be recognized by preparation of the work instructions based on the
work schedule mentioned above.

436
2. Actions of NISA
NISA received the report from Chubu Electric Power Company on the investigation result of causes
and countermeasures. NISA judged that estimated causes and corresponding countermeasures are
appropriate.
Afterwards, NISA will continue the rigorous checking of the countermeasures against recurrence,
which will be carried out by the company through operational safety inspection.

(Reference)
Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit-4 had been under its periodic inspection. On April 22, 2009, a
worker, who was installing the thermal insulation material in the vicinity of the steam turbine in the
3rd floor (control area) of the turbine building, was injured in his left instep by being stuck in the
driver of a activated valve by the remotely-operated test. He needed to receive a hospital treatment.
Therefore, this event was judged to be corresponding to the reportable event pursuant to article 19-17
of “the rule for installation, operation, etc. of commercial power reactors.” There was no radiation
exposure and radioactive contamination to the worker.

– Results of Provisional Evaluation by INES –


Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Level

- - - Out of Scale


437
Attachment 1
Occurrence of the Injury of a Worker

Location of the Occurrence:


the combined intermediate valve(-A) room

High
Pressure Low Pressure Generator
Turbine Turbine

The 3rd Floor of the Turbine Building at Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit-4

Status at the Occurrence


of the Injury

Location
where
another
worker
was Combined
working. Intermediate Approx. 2.3m
Valve
Entrance Step

Victim Approx. 2.9m

Combined
Intermediate Valve

Combined Intermediate
Valve-A Room An image of the Occurrence of the Injury
Access Control Sign [Countermeasure against the Equipment]

Makeshift Scaffold

Protective Wire-mesh

438
Reactor Manual Shutdown at Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station
Unit-4, Chubu Electric Power Company

May 7, 2009
NISA㸭METI

On May 5, 2009, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) received a report from Chubu
Electric Power Company on the reactor manual shutdown at Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit-4
(BWR, rated electric power: 1,137 MWe), as follows.

1. The Report from Chubu Electric Power Company


Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit-4 had been in the reactor start-up operation for the
adjustment operation (*1) during its periodic inspection. On May 5, 2009, the reactor was manually
shut down at 5:49 p.m. on that day, because the hydrogen concentration of the off-gas treatment
system increased.
This event had no impact of radioactive material on the environment.

(*1) Adjustment operation is the checking operation before the restart commercial operation.

2. Actions of NISA
NISA received the report of this event pursuant to article 19-17 of “the rule for installation,
operation, etc. of commercial power reactors”.
NISA dispatched a local safety inspector to confirm the on the spot situation immediately after
this event occurred.
Afterwards, NISA will continue the rigorous checking of the investigation of causes and
countermeasures against recurrence, which will be carried out by the company pursuant to the law.
In addition, the reactor shutdown normally completed at 5:00 a.m. on May 6, 2009.

– Results of Provisional Evaluation by INES –


Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Level

- - 0- 0-


439
Attachment
Schematic Diagram of the Off-gas Treatment System at Hamaoka
Nuclear Power Station Unit-4㻌㻌

Exhaust Stack

Turbine
Off-gas
Treatment
Condenser System
Reactor

440
Dehumidification
Off-gas Recombiner Cooler
Activated Charcoal
Off-gas
Pre-heater H/U Towers
Off-gas
Steam Filter
Separator
Air
Ejector Tower Tower
Catalyst -B -D
Tower Off-gas
-C Blower
Tower
From Condenser Off-gas Mesh -A
Condenser Filter
Station Compressed Air To Exhaust Stack
Hydrogen Dehumidification
Concentration Meter Tower
Causes of and countermeasures against the reactor manual shutdown
at Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Units-4 and -5, Chubu Electric
Power Company

June 23, 2009


NISA㸭METI

Today (on June 23, 2009), the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) received a report from
Chubu Electric Power Company on the causes of and countermeasures against the reactor manual
shutdown due to the increase of the hydrogen concentration in the off-gas treatment system at
Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station -5 (BWR, rated electric power: 1,267 MWe), which was reported on
December 30, 2008, and at Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit-4 (BWR, rated electric power: 1,137
MWe), which was reported on May 5, 2009.
Chubu Electric Power Co. estimated the causes as the combined effects of following two elements;
1) During the manufacturing process of the catalyst (platinum), a substance (boehmite) which
causes a degradation of the catalyst generated.
2) A substance (siloxane) which causes a performance deterioration of the catalyst is used as a
sealing material for the low pressure turbine and it flowed into the off-gas treatment system.
NISA judged that corresponding countermeasures (improve of the manufacturing process of the
catalyst, change of the sealing material) to be taken based on the estimated causes are appropriate.

1. Main Points of the Report from Chubu Electric Power Company


Chubu Electric Power Company has been investigating the causes based on the mock
examination on the performance of a recombiner (*1) and catalyst (*2) and the data analysis
conducted in the past. As a result, the estimated causes are as follows;

(1) Estimated Causes


- As a result of the investigation, it was confirmed that boehmite (*3) could be contained in the
catalyst when warm water cleaning was conducted during the manufacturing process of the
catalyst for the off-gas recombiner in the off-gas treatment system.
- It was confirmed that the more catalyst contains boehmite, the more catalyst was prone to
degradation due to its usage and is susceptible to effects of the catalyst poison (*4).
- It was confirmed that organosilicon compound (siloxane) as a catalyst poison was detected in the
catalyst taken from the actual equipment.
- Siloxane (*5) volatilized from the liquid packing (liquid sealing material) used as a sealing
material for the packing case (sealed container) of the low pressure turbine. It flowed into the
off-gas treatment system and accumulated on the surface of the catalyst.
- Therefore, performance of the catalyst degraded by the effects of both the degradation of the
catalyst in the off-gas recombiner due to its usage and the catalyst poison, and thus the
performance of the catalyst to recombine hydrogen and oxygen, which existed in the off-gas
recombiner, was deteriorated. Resultantly, hydrogen concentration in the concerned system
increased.

*1 Recominer is an apparatus that forms water vapor by catalytically recombining hydrogen and
oxygen gas, which generated due to the radiolysis of water, during the treatment process in the
off-gas treatment system. 参
*2 Catalyst is a substance that makes a chemical reaction and the reaction rate faster although
itself does not change.

441
*3 Boehmite is a raw material of gamma-alumina used as a base material for fixing a catalyst on
it. When it is cleaned by warm water, a crystalline form of alumina (aluminium oxide) as a
base material for fixing a catalyst changes from gamma-alumina to boehmite (hydrated
aluminium oxide).
*4 Catalyst poison is a substance that degrades or terminates function of the catalyst even in the
presence of a slight amount of it.
*5 Siloxane is a kind of an organosilicon compound which is a catalyst poison and is contained in
a silicon resin as a principal component of a liquid packing.

(2) Countermeasures
- Based on this event, a catalyst to be improved, in terms of the re-heating treatment temperature,
such that an amount of boehmite decreases even if warm water cleaning is employed will be
used.
- In order to remove the catalyst poison, liquid packing which was used a sealing material for the
packing case of the low pressure turbine, will be removed. And flaxseed oil (*6) which was
used in the past and does not contain siloxane, will be used.
- Systematic inspection will be conducted in order to understand the long term ageing effect of
the catalyst performance.

*6 Flaxseed oil is derived from the ripened seeds of the flax plant and is yellowish. It has a
characteristic to get hard under air.

(3)Others
- As hydrogen burned during the event at the Unit-5 due to the delay of the detection time of the
hydrogen concentration meter, measurement instruments will be improved.
- Whenever the hydrogen concentration exceeds and continues over the combustion limit of 4%
in the off-gas treatment system, the reactor will be immediately shut down according to the
operation manual.
- Afterwards, related data will be extensively collected and accumulated and catalyst
characteristics will be known well, and they will be shared and analyzed among related electric
power companies.

2. Actions of NISA
NISA received the report from Chubu Electric Power Company on the causes of this event
investigated based on the scientific basis which can obtain right now. NISA judged that estimated
causes and corresponding countermeasures are appropriate.
Afterwards, NISA will continue the rigorous checking of the countermeasures which will be
carried out by the company, according to the operational safety inspection and maintenance plan.
And NISA will confirm the company’s correspond through witnessed inspection by a safety
inspector at the start-up operation.
Based on the lessons learnt from the causes of and countermeasures against this event, NISA
ordered the reactor licensees owning boiling water reactors (BWRs) to extend knowledge such as
getting a clear understanding of the long term catalyst performance under the cooperation with the
related companies and to study the adequacy of the delay of the detection time of the hydrogen
concentration meter.

(References)
(Status when the event occurred at Hamaoka Unit-5)
Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit-5 had been in the adjustment operation (*7) during its
periodic inspection after taking a countermeasure (*8) based on the report dated December 26, 2008.

442
On December 30, 2008, it was confirmed that the hydrogen concentration of the off-gas treatment
system increased, and the reactor was manually shut down at 0:39 a.m. on that day.

(Status when the event occurred at Hamaoka Unit-4)


Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit-4 had been in the reactor start-up operation for the adjustment
operation (*7) during its periodic inspection. On May 5, 2009, as the hydrogen concentration of the
off-gas treatment system increased, the reactor was manually shut down at 5:49 p.m. on that day.

*7 Adjustment operation is the checking operation before the restart commercial operation.
*8 The reactor operation will be conducted under the condition that [O]/[H] concentration ratio
exceeds the threshold by increasing air supply in the off-gas treatment system. A threshold is a
certain [O]/[H] concentration ratio at which a reaction rate of oxygen and hydrogen quickly
decreases. Measurement data of the concerned system will be collected and accumulated.
Additionally, in the case where hydrogen concentration in the off-gas treatment system will
exceed the combustion limit (4%) and will continue, the reactor will be quickly shut down.

– Results of Provisional Evaluation by INES –


Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Level

- - 0- 0-


443
Attachment 1
Schematic Diagram of the Off-gas Treatment System at Hamaoka Unit-5

Schematic Diagram of the Hamaoka Unit-5


Exhaust Stack
Reactor Pressure Vessel
Reactor Building
Off-gas Treatment System
Turbine Building
Low Pressure Turbine
Generator

High
Pressure
Turbine

Condenser
* Hydrogen, oxygen and noble-gas (off-gas radioactive waste) generate in the reactor pressure
vessel. Off-gas treatment system treats hydrogen, oxygen and noble-gas which flow into the
condenser.

Off-gas Filter
Off-gas Recombiner
H/U Towers
Catalyst Dehumidification
Off-gas Preheater Cooler

Air Ejector Tower-A


Off-gas
Tower-C
Activated Blower
Tower-B
Gas te mperat ure Off-gas Charcoal Tower-D
From Condenser detect or at the Condenser
outlet of th e To Exhaust Stack
recomb iner Hydrogen T T T T : Valve (open)
Concentration
Air to stimulate : Valve (closed)
Meter F
the recombination T Temperature
:
Detector
Schematic Diagram of the Off-gas Treatment System at Hamaoka Unit-5 F : Flow Meter

* The off-gas recombiner restores hydrogen and oxygen contained in the off-gas to water
(vapor) by using catalyst.
H2 O2
From Off-gas Preheater
<Off-gas Rec ombiner>
Hight : approx. 2.5m
Cataly st

Width (shell) : approx. 1.3m


Maximum Allowable Working Pressure :
2.45MPa (inter nal pr essure )
Catalyst - 0.10MPa (exter nal pr essure )
Maximum Allowable Working Temperature
: 425Υ
<Catal yst>
40 Type : Platinum supported metal catalyst
Binding layers Dimens ion :
Hydrogen Diamet er : approx. 1m
Oxygen ™ Thickness : approx. 1cm
Noble-gas Number of layers : 40(in pile s)
Steam
Exothermic Reaction
H2 O
Chemical Reaction Formula : 2H2 + O2 2H2 O
To Off-gas Condenser Catalyst
Schematic of the Off-gas Recombiner at Hamaoka Unit-5
* Although there are some differences between locations of the off-gas recombiner and the hydrogen
concentration meter in the off-gas treatment system for Unit-4 and Unit-5, the components and
functions of the off-gas treatment system at Hamaoka Unit-4 and Unit-5 are almost same.

444
Attachment 2
Performance Deterioration of the Catalyst in the Off-gas Recombiner

Manufacturing Process (Outline) Nuclear Specification (for SCC prevention)


Manufacturing
of the Catalysis Impregnation Heating Warm Water Reheating Fabrication
Base Material of Platinum Treatment Cleaning Treatment
Platinum Compound Solution

Alumina (oxidized aluminum) Platinum Impregnated Alumina Catalyst (Photo)


Base Material Base Material

Performance Degradation Due to the Usage


of Catalyst Containing Boehmite

Amount of Boehmit e
Plant
Operation

Alumina Alumina
Sample A Sample B Sample C
: Pt As hydroxyl (OH) combined each other
Comparison of an Amount of Boehmite for each Alumina Base Material
and a small po re is blocke d by i t, Sample A: The manufacturing process of catalyst
: Entombed Pt platin um is entomb ed. [Warm water cleaning time is approx. 30 hours] (used at Unit-4)
Sample B: The manufacturing process of catalyst
Decrease of the active surface area of Pt in the catalyst [Warm water cleaning time is more than 38 hours] (used at Unit-5)
containing rich boehmite (AlOOH) Sample C: Manufacturing after improving the reheating treatment temperature
(improved catalyst)

Effects of Catalyst Containing Boehmite and Catalyst Poison (Siloxane)


Siloxane

Polymerization Oxidation

Siloxane Polymer

Alumina Alumina Alumina


Pt: Platinum, OH: Hydroxyl O2: Oxygen. H2: Hydrogen
A part of film where there is no binding
As siloxane is polymerized and a with boehmite is broken due to the
Boehmite hydroxyl (OH) strongly
thin film of siloxane polymer is oxidation of the siloxane polymer, and
combines with Siloxane.
created on the alumina, the surface thus platinum is exposed and catalyst
of platinum is covered with it. performance is restored.

Liquid Packing (Siloxane)


Low Pressure
High Pressure Turbine
Generator
Turbine

Packing Case

Liquid Packing
Low Pressure Turbine Volatilization of Siloxane
(the r eal th ing is white )

Casing -side
Air Ejector

Protrude to Volatilization

the casing-side

Coating Status After tighte ning u p


Condenser
Liquid Packing

445
A flaw in the seat portion of the vent valve for the control rod drive
hydraulic system at the Tsuruga Power Station Unit-1

May 13, 2009


NISA㸭METI

Today (May 13, 2009), the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) received a report from
Japan Atomic Power Company on a flaw in the seat portion of the vent valve for the control rod drive
hydraulic system at the Tsuruga Power Station Unit 1 (BWR, rated electric power: 357MWe), as
follows.

1. The Report from Japan Atomic Power Company


Tsuruga Power Station Unit-1 had been under its periodic inspection. As a part of the control rod
drive hydraulic system was replaced in order to improve its seismic safety margin, a pressure test
has been prepared. When checking a vent valve (*1) for venting air in the concerned system as a
part of this preparatory work, a flaw across the seat surface of the concerned valve was identified.
Therefore, it was judged that the important safety related equipment did not have necessary
functions.
In addition, this event had no impact of radioactive material on the environment.

(*1) The concerned valve was a part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and then it is
corresponding to the important safety related equipment.

2. Actions of NISA
NISA received the report of this event pursuant to article 19-17 of “the rule for installation,
operation, etc. of commercial power reactors.”
Afterwards, NISA will continue the rigorous checking of the investigation of causes and
countermeasures against recurrence, which will be carried out by the company pursuant to the law.

– Results of Provisional Evaluation by INES –


Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Level

- - 0- 0-

446
Attachment
Inspection of the Vent Valve for the Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System
at Tsuruga Power Station Unit-1

Schematic of the Systems Sectional View of the Vent Valve


Reactor Containment Vessel Specification
Diameter : 20A (OD is approx. 38mm)
Type : gate valve
Reactor Pressure Vessel Material : stainless steal
Seat : stellite
Steam to Turbine
Feedwa ter
Pump Turbine Generator

䡼䡬䝡
Gland Packing
Valve Stem
Sea
Water Photographing
Reactor Condenser Direction
Recirculation
Pump Control Rod Hydrau lic
Drive Contro l
Mechanism Valve Disc
Unit
Seat-portion
Flow D irection (outlet side)

Suppression Pool Seat-portion


(inlet side)
Valve Seat
Schematic of the Control Rod
Drive Hydraulic System Penetrant Testing Indication Marks

Control Rod
Flaw
Reactor Building
Reactor
Pressure
Vessel
Vent valve on the withdrawal side Outlet-side
Reactor (9 valves have flaws or indication
Inlet-side
Containment marks)
Vessel Valve Seat
Withdraw
Vent valve on the insertion side
(4 valves have flaws or Visual Inspection
indication marks)
Insert ion

Control Rod Drive


Mechanism Hydraulic
Control
Unit

Control Rod Driving Water Pump (73 units in all)

Valve Seat
Indication Flaw
Marks

A flaw approx. 2mm long across the Back-side Front-side


seat surface was identified at the
vent valve on the withdraw-side by
the penetrant testing and visual

inspection. Approx. 2mm Seat Surface

Outlet-side of the Valve Seat Seat Surface 付


447
Causes of and countermeasures against the flaw in the seat portion of
the vent valve for the control rod drive hydraulic system at the
Tsuruga Power Station Unit-1, Japan Atomic Power Co.

July 13, 2009


NISA㸭METI

Today (July 13, 2009), the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) received a report from
Japan Atomic Power Company on the causes of and the countermeasures against the flaw in the seat
portion of the vent valve for the control rod drive hydraulic system at the Tsuruga Power Station Unit
1 (BWR, rated electric power: 357MWe), as follows.
The report submitted by JAPC is summarized as follows;
1. [Causes] It was estimated that, as the results of microscopic observation of the flaws, the
investigation of the maintenance history and the stress evaluations, as several valves had a larger
angular difference between a valve disc and a valve seat, a local tensile stress generated at the lower
part of the valve seat when the valve was closed and then flaws generated.
2. [Countermeasures] For valves where some flaws were found in the present periodic inspection,
they will be replaced with the factory shipment product which an accurate angular alignment of a
valve seat and a valve disc was conducted. For valves where no flaw was found in the present periodic
inspection, they will continue to be used after confirming no seat leak (leak inside the valve) by the
leak test and they will be replaced with the factory shipment product during the next periodic
inspection.
NISA concluded that the estimated causes and the corresponding countermeasure are appropriate.

1. Main points of the report from the Japan Atomic Power Company
(1) Estimated Causes
- Valve discs of all (146) vent valves (*1) (hereinafter referred to as the “the valve”) in the control
rod drive hydraulic system were replaced during the 13th periodic inspection (in FY1982) based
on the event that a valve disc was damaged after its installation in the construction of the unit.
- Usually, an accurate angular alignment of a valve seat and a valve disc is carried out in the
assembling process in the factory. However, the concerned replacement was carried out in the
power station because only a valve disc was replaced. As an angular alignment of a valve disc
and a valve seat needs skills, a part of valves had a larger angular difference between a valve disc
and a valve seat.
- It was estimated that a local tensile stress generated at the lower part of the valve seat when the
valve was closed under this condition (larger angular difference between a valve disc and a valve
seat) and then flaws generated around the portion where the internal defects (voids) exist.
- It was confirmed by the fracture surface observation that these flaws do not have the fracture
surface due to a fatigue but the one generated when an excessive stress was applied.
- In addition, it was confirmed by the stress analysis results that a larger stress could locally
generate at the lower part of the valve seat than the tensile strength (material strength) of stellite
(*2) when the angular difference is large.
- On the other hand, the integrity of the valve was confirmed by the leak test every periodic
inspection and an overhaul of the valve was carried out as a detailed check when the leak was
found.
- 18 valves in which the seat leak (leak inside the valve) was identified were overhauled during the
25th periodic inspection (in FY1998). As a result, flaws were found in 13 valves. After removing

448
flaws and making washing treatment, all 18 valves were confirmed to have no leakage by the leak
test and continued to be used. Afterwards, 13 valves with flaws were replaced with new ones
(hereinafter referred to as the “factory shipment product“), which an accurate angular alignment
of a valve seat and a valve disc was conducted in and shipped from the factory, during the 26th
periodic inspection (in FY2000). However, the causes that the flaws occurred were not
investigated and the necessity of the feedback of this event to other valves was not considered.
- As to the response to the identification of the flaws in this period, the feedback of this experience
to other components was insufficient according to the present practice of the nonconformity
management (or the voluntary improvement activity).
- In connection with the improvement of the seismic safety margin of the control rod drive hydraulic
system, the valves were overhauled for the first time since the 26th periodic inspection (since the
13th periodic inspection for the valves with no flaw) in order to conduct a pressure test
accompanied with the piping replacement during the 32nd periodic inspection (present inspection).
As a result of the penetrant test (*3), flaws were found in 13 valves and a flaw across the seat
surface was identified in one of them, which is reportable by the law.

(2) Countermeasures against the Recurrence


- All valves will be replaced with the factory shipment product based on the following guides.
ձ13 valves with flaws will be replaced with the factory shipment product during the present
periodic inspection.
ղ120 valves with no flaw (other than 13 valves which were replaced with the factory shipment
product during the 26th periodic inspection) will continue to be used after confirming no seat
leak (leak inside the valve) by the leak test and they will be replaced with the factory shipment
product during the next periodic inspection.
- As a part of the improvement of the maintenance management, past inspection records will be
studied and its result will be reflected into the maintenance plan whenever the components
inspection plan will be prepared.

2. Actions of NISA
The valves where this event occurred will continue to be used after confirming no seat leak (leak
inside the valve) by the leak test implemented during the periodic inspection, and this event will not
immediately become the safety issue. On the other hand, Japan Atomic Power Co. reported to NISA
that a important safety related equipment could not have a necessary function as the possibility of the
leak can not denied if a flaw exists across the surface of the valve seat.
The report submitted by JAPC is summarized as follows;
1. [Causes] It was estimated that, as the results of microscopic observation of the flaws, the
investigation of the maintenance history and the stress evaluations, as several valves had a larger
angular difference between a valve disc and a valve seat, a local tensile stress generated at the
lower part of the valve seat when the valve was closed and then flaws generated.
2. [Countermeasures] For valves where some flaws were found in the present periodic inspection,
they will be replaced with the factory shipment product which an accurate angular alignment of a
valve seat and a valve disc was conducted. For valves where no flaw was found in the present
periodic inspection, they will continue to be used after confirming no seat leak (leak inside the
valve) by the leak test and they will be replaced with the factory shipment product during the next
periodic inspection.
NISA concluded that the estimated causes and the corresponding countermeasure are appropriate.
As to other plants where the similar valves are used, NISA confirmed that there was no valve whose

disc was only replaced in the power station, which became the cause of this event. NISA will continue
to confirm the countermeasure against the recurrence, information sharing among licensees and status 付
449
of the feedback of this experience, which will be implemented by JAPC, through the operational
safety inspection.

*1 Vent valve in the control rod drive hydraulic system


The concerned valve consists of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and then it is
corresponding to the important safety related equipment. The reactor coolant pressure
boundary is the general term showing the area of facilities or components that include the
reactor coolant and are under the reactor pressure condition during the normal operation of the
rector, and constitute the pressure barrier under the abnormal transient during operation and the
accident.

*2 Stellite
This is a hard metal to be welded on a surface of the valve disc and valve seat to ensure their
leak and wear resistance performances. The major components are chrome, cobalt, tungsten
etc.

*3 Penetrant test
This is a kind of non-destructive inspection to visually detect a flaw in the surface by spraying
special liquid such as a red dye penetrant.

(Reference)
1. Summary of the Event
Tsuruga Power Station Unit-1 had been under its periodic inspection. As a part of the control rod
drive hydraulic system was replaced in order to improve its seismic safety margin, a pressure test has
been prepared. When checking a vent valve for venting air in the concerned system as a part of this
preparatory work, a flaw across the seat surface of the concerned valve was identified. Therefore, it
was judged that important safety related equipment had not a necessary function.
Japan Atomic Power Co. judged that a important safety related equipment could not have a
necessary function as the possibility of the leak could not be denied if a flaw exists across the seat
surface of the valve seat, and then submitted to NISA the report pursuant to article 19-17 of “the rule
for installation, operation, etc. of commercial power reactors”

2. Results of Provisional Evaluation by INES –


Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Level

- - 0- 0-

450
Attachment

Investigation Result of the flaw in the Seat Portion of the Vent Valve for the Control
Rod Drive Hydraulic System at Tsuruga Power Station Unit-1
Schematic of the Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System Sectional View of the Vent Valve
Control Rod Reactor Specification
Reactor Diameter: 20A (OD is approx. 38mm)
Building
Pressure Type : gate valve
Vent valve on the withdrawal side
Vessel (9 of 73 valves have flaws or
Material: stainless steel Valve
Eat : stellite
Reacto r indication marks) Stem
Contai nment
Vessel
Vent valve on the insertion side Seat-portion
Withdrawal
(4 of 73 valves have flaws or
Valve Disc (outlet side)
indication marks)

Insertion

Flow Direction
Hydraulic
Control Rod Drive
Mechanism Control Unit
(73 units in all)
Control Rod Driving Water Pump Seat-portion
(inlet side)
Detailed Observation Result of the Valve Seat Valve
Enforced Fracture Surface Stellite Overlay Seat
Fracture Surface Observation (2mm at valve disc and 1mm at valve seat)
0㼻 Valve Seat
Portion SEM: Scanning Electron Microscopy
Stellite Overlay Portion
Fracture Valve Seat Portion
Fracture
Observation Enforced Fracture Surface Surface
270㼻 90㼻 Surface Surface

Outer surface- side


Stainless- Steel Valve

Inne r surface- side


Valve Seat Seat Portion
Portio n 180㼻 Valve Seat 1mm Void
Void
Cutting Enforced
Fracture SEM Observation Surface Enforced Fracture
Surface
Surface

Cross-sectional Observation Surface


Observation
There are voids
in the stellite
Portion which Fracture
overlay.
was opened at Surface
the opening of
the fracture
surface
Sound Stellite
Valve
Overlay Portion.
Seat
Portion Relatively even Void in the metal
fracture surface structure

Estimated Mechanism
[Present Event
>Valve Disc Replacement During
During Valve Manufacturing] (the 32nd Periodic Inspection)]
>D the 13th Periodic Inspection@
@
●Alterna te val ve dis c was widely ●When the angular difference between a valve
●Angular difference does not occur by manufa ctured taking into accou nt disc surface and a valve seat surface becomes
imposing a valve seat on a valve disc the lap ping m argin. large, stron g cont act occurr ed at the lower
for se curing them. ●The va lve di sc was grind ed as far as end of the valve seat due to the press force by
the co ntact with t he sea t was the valve closing operation.
confirmed. ●At this time, a local tensile stress generated
on the valve seat portio n.

High Hardness Press Force Valve Disc Replacement Strong contact occurred Press Force
Material (an example of valves in at the lower end of the
which a crack was found) valve seat
r Altern ate
r Valve
Valve Disc
Disc Altern ate
Valve Crack
Disc
Valve Seat Angular Difference Valve Seat Valve Seat
Uniform contacts are achieved
due to no angular difference.
(approx. 1.3r) Cracks generated due to a
local tensile stress applied on

● As a stress corrosion cracking was found at a valve disc during the
the valve seat portion.
12th periodic inspection, it was replaced with the one which has
low susceptibility to a crack, duri ng the 13th per iodic inspec tion.

451
Excessive insertion of the control rod during the periodic inspection
at Onagawa Nuclear Power Station Unit-3, Tohoku Electric Power
Company

May 28, 2009


NISA㸭METI

Today (on May 28, 2009), the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) received a report from
Tohoku Electric Power Company on the excessive insertion of the control rod at Onagawa Nuclear
Power Station Unit-3 (BWR, rated electric power: 825 MWe) during its periodic inspection, as
follows.

1. The Report from Tohoku Electric Power Company


Onagawa Nuclear Power Station Unit-3 had been under its periodic inspection. Today (on May 28,
2009), during the restoration work after the inspection of the hydraulic control unit (*) for the control
rod drive hydraulic system, a control rod movement alarm sounded for the control rod (42-39) and it
was judged that the control rod moved further toward the insertion direction than the normal full
inserted position (i.e. excessive insertion of the rod).
In addition, this event had no impact of radioactive material on the environment.

(*) This is an equipment to control the driving water for inserting or withdrawing a control rod.

2. Actions of NISA
NISA received the report of this event pursuant to article 19-17 of “the rule for installation,
operation, etc. of commercial power reactors.”
Afterwards, NISA will continue the rigorous checking of the investigation of causes and
countermeasures against recurrence, which will be carried out by the company pursuant to the law.

– Results of Provisional Evaluation by INES –


Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Level

- - 0+ 0+

452
453
All control rods are at their fully
inserted positions.
Attachment 1

Control Rod Arrangement Plan at Onagawa Unit-3



Control Rod
Withdrawal-side
㹔㸫㸯㸮㸰
to Water Discharge Header
㹔㸫㸯㸰㸰 㹔㸫㸯㸰㸯
Insertion
㹔㸫㸯㸮㸳
㹔㸫㸯㸮㸱
㹔㸫㸯㸰㸱 㹔㸫㸯㸰㸮 from Driving Water Header

㹔㸫㸯㸮㸯 㹔㸫㸯㸰㸴
Insertion-side
㹔㸫㸯㸮㸲 㹔㸫㸯㸯㸱

454
from Charging Water Header
from Cooling Water Header
Water
This event occurred during the
Nitrogen open-operation of valves such as
Nitrogen V-101, 102, 103, 104 and 105
Accumulator Tank carried out as the restoration work
after the inspection.

Schematic Diagram of the Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System


Attachment 2
Causes of and countermeasures against the excessive insertion of the
control rod during the periodic inspection at Onagawa Nuclear Power
Station Unit-3, Tohoku Electric Power Company

June 25, 2009


NISA㸭METI

Today (on June 25, 2009), the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) received a report from
Tohoku Electric Power Company on the causes of and countermeasures against the excessive insertion
(insertion beyond the normal full inserted position) of the control rod, which was reported on May 28,
2009, at Onagawa Nuclear Power Station Unit-3 (BWR, rated electric power: 825 MWe).
The company analyzed the potential causal elements of this event and carried out various
investigations including the overhauling and mock-up test of the valve based on them, and finally
estimated the causes of this event as follows; A foreign material attached to the filter installed in the
up-stream side of the directional control valve (V-123) was mixed in the vicinity of the concerned
directional control valve and intruded into the seat surface of the valve, which caused the seat leak and
excessive insertion of the control rod. After that, as the foreign material was flowed out with the
driving water, the control rod returned to the normal full inserted position under its own weight.
NISA judged that estimated causes and corresponding countermeasures (prevention measure against
the foreign material intrusion by the ultrasonic cleaning of the filter etc.) are appropriate.

1. Main Point of the Report from Tohoku Electric Power Company


(1) Estimated causes
- When a leak test was conducted at the hydraulic control unit (*1) of the control rod driving
hydraulic system, a slight amount of seat leak was confirmed at a directional control valve
(V-123).
- As a tiny flaw was confirmed on the seat surface of the valve by the overhauling of the concerned
directional control valve (V-123), it was estimated that a slight amount of leak is due to the
intrusion of a foreign material.
- As a result of a mock-up test (a demonstration test), it was confirmed that a control rod could be
excessively inserted when a foreign material with a dimension of 0.26mm was intruded in the
seat surface.
- As a result of the investigation on the intrusion of a foreign material, causes of the intrusion was
estimated as follows; a filter (P1) in the inlet side of the control rod driving water of the
concerned directional control valve (V-123) has been assembled by a new filter, unlike other
filters (P2, P3 and P4) which have been recycled after their rotations. As there are many work
steps from the ultrasonic cleaning in the factory to the assembling at the power station, it was
estimated that a foreign material intruded into the valve during the checking and assembling of
filters which were carried out in these work steps.
- When the concerned directional control valve (V-123) was opened (and then closed) due to the
scram function test (*2), a foreign material just intruded in the concerned valve.
After that, during the restoration work of the concerned system, the driving water, which is used
for pushing up a control rod, temporarily flowed. Resultantly, a control rod was excessively
inserted (or inserted beyond the normal full inserted position) and a control rod returned to the
normal full inserted position under its own weight because a foreign material was flowed out with 参
the driving water.

455
*1 This is an equipment to control the driving water for inserting or withdrawing a control rod.
*2 This is a test to confirm the function of the emergency shutdown of the reactor by inserting
control rods.

(2) Countermeasures
- The directional control valve (V-123) was replaced and the inside of the concerned system and
filters were cleaned. After the control rod driving mechanism was operated, its function was
confirmed to be normal.
- As a prevention measure against the foreign material intrusion, the ultrasonic cleaning of a new
filter (P1) as well as recycled filters (P2, P3 and P4) should be carried out.

2. Actions of NISA
Tohoku Electric Power Company analyzed the potential causal elements of this event and carried
out various investigations including the overhauling and mock-up test of the valve based on them.
From these investigation results, NISA estimated the causes of this event as follows; A foreign
material attached to the filter installed in the up-stream side of the directional control valve (V-123)
was mixed in the vicinity of the concerned directional control valve and intruded into the seat surface
of the valve, which caused the seat leak and excessive insertion of the control rod. After that, as the
foreign material was flowed out with the driving water, the control rod returned to the normal full
inserted position under its own weight. NISA judged that estimated causes and corresponding
countermeasures (prevention measure against the foreign material intrusion etc.) are appropriate.
Afterwards, NISA will continue the rigorous checking of the countermeasures against recurrence,
which will be carried out by the company, through operational safety inspection.
In addition, as the application of countermeasures to other plant (or reflecting them to other
facilities), NISA will also check the preventive measures to be conducted according to the safety
regulation of each electric power company through operational safety inspection.

(Reference: Summary of the Event)


Onagawa Nuclear Power Station Unit-3 had been under its periodic inspection. On May 28, 2009,
during the restoration work after the inspection of the hydraulic control unit for a control rod driving
hydraulic system, the movement alarm for one of the 137 control rods (42-39) sounded and it was
judged that the control rod moved further toward insertion direction than the normal full inserted
position (i.e. excessive insertion of the rod). And it was confirmed that the control rod immediately
returned to the normal full inserted position.
In addition, this event had no impact of radioactive material on the environment.

– Results of Provisional Evaluation by INES –


Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Level

- - 0+ 0+

456
: The control rod which was moved
further toward insertion direction
(by less than 1 notch) than the
normal full inserted position
(42-39).

457
All control rods are at their full inserted positions.
Attachment 1

Control Rod Arrangement Plan at Onagawa Unit-3



B21-AO-F052A(B)
From Reactor Feedwater Pump Reactor
V-112 Pressure
To Scram Discharge Header Vessel
Control Rod Vent
(42-39) V-127 G31-F054
F502
Withdrawal-side CRD
P4 Return Line
C12-F016
V-102 V-122 V-121 V-105
P2
Insertion Vent Leakage due to the foreign
material intrusion
Cooling Water *2
V-137 P1 V-103 To #
F501 V-123 V-120 Pressure Regulation
Valve
A foreign material Driving Water *2
Insertion-side V-101 P3 intruded during its
V-126 replacement
V-104 Flow Regulation Valve
V-113 Charging Water *2

458
Control Rod
Driving Hydraulic
# (Cooling Water)*2 System Pump
Pressure V-107
Water
Legend Gage
Nitrogen
: Full Open Control Rod Driving Water
Accumulator Nitrogen Tank Waste Pan Filter (Hollow Fiber Filter)
: Full Closed (0.1"m)
: Valve which is estimated to
be leaked *1 This event occurred during the open-operation of valves such as V-112, 102,
: Check Valve
101, 103, 104 and 105 in order as the restoration work after the inspection.
: Check Valve (with orifice) *2 There is no possibility of the foreign material intrusion because cooling
: Filter in the HCU water, driving water and charging water are supplied through hollow fiber.
(manifold filter) (40"m)
Attachment 2

Schematic Diagram of the Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System (at the Event Occurrence)
Schematic Diagram of the Inspection and Assembling Work of Filters

Working Process for the Existing Filters (to be recycled)

V-121 V-122 Curing Plastic Assembling after the Rotation


P4 Filter Container Container Curing Plastic Bag
Bag
( to be dispos ed ) Filter Ultrasonic Cleaning Filter
P2 Filter P2 Filter P4 Filter

Approx. Approx.
110mm 150mm
V-120 V-123

P1 Filter Approx. 200mm P3 Filter Aqueous Paper Sheet Aqueous Paper Sheet
(side view) P3 Filter
(side view) (side view) (old P2 filter)
Work Area (near the hydraulic control unit area)

A few working steps are needed after the ultrasonic cleaning.

459
Working Process for the New Filter

Ultrasonic Shipping after the Container


Cleaning Curing Plastic Bag
Bagging Operation Visual Filter
Unpacking Checking

Aqueous Paper Sheet P1 Filter


* Blow Air as Appropriate
(side view)
New filters are used every
periodic inspection
Factory Work Area (near the hydraulic control unit area)

* There are many working steps, in the working process for the new filter, such as Many working steps are needed
after the ultrasonic cleaning. There is a high possibility
bagging operation after ultrasonic cleaning in the factory, unpacking, visual
of the foreign material intrusion
checking, storage in a container and assembling at the locale. comparing with P2, P3 and P4
 In theses working steps, it cannot be denied that a foreign material is attached filters.
Attachment 3

due to the static electricity when unpacking a plastic bag to pick a filter, the foreign
material attached on the filter is overlooked at the visual checking and it is not
removed by the air blower.



Estimated Mechanism of the Excessive Insertion of the Control Rod
Excessive
Insertion
To scram [At the Scram Function Test on May 12 ]
Discharge
Control Rod Header During the scram function test (including the preparation
work), a foreign material intruded into the seat surface of
the V-123 when it opened (then closed).
Diameter of the main valve seat surface

To Discharge of the foreign material intruded


Discharge in the seat surface of the V-123
Header
From
Driving
Water
Header
A small flaw on
the seat surface

When a foreign material was

460
discharged, the driving water
flowed.
From
From
Cooling
Charging
Water
Water
Header [At the restoration work of the HCU on May 28]
Header
Water During the restoration work of the concerned HCU, the
Red line ̿̿̿ shows the driving water pressure (approx. 1.15MPa) applied on the
driving water flow when a Nitrogen
foreign material intruded in V-123 when the V-103 was fully open and a foreign material,
the seat surface of the V-123 Nitrogen Tank which intruded in the seat surface, was discharged and the
Accumulator driving water flowed in a moment. Resultantly, the pressure
(approx. 0.5MPa), which is possible to push up the control
rod, was applied and then the control rod was push up.
Legend

: Full Open : Valve which is estimated to be [Immediate after the excessive insertion of the CR on May 28]
leaked As the V-123 returned to the full close position because a foreign material was
discharged and then the driving water to push up the control rod stopped
: Full Closed : Manifold Filter (40μm) flowing, the control rod returned to the normal full inserted position under its
Attachment 4

own weight without any operations.


Reactor manual shutdown of Tokai Daini Power Station,
Japan Atomic Power Company.

July 21, 2009


NISA㸭METI

On July 17, 2009, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) received a report from Japan
Atomic Power Company on the reactor manual shutdown of Tokai Daini Power Station (BWR, rated
electric power: 1,100MWe) , as follows.

1. The Report from Japan Atomic Power Company


Tokai Daini Power Station had been under its constant rated thermal power operation. It was
confirmed that a differential pressure at the control oil filter in the control oil system for the turbine
driven reactor feedwater pump (A) continued to increase. Therefore, on July 12, after switching to the
auxiliary motor driven reactor feedwater pump, the inspection was carried out in order to investigate
the causes of the increased differential pressure at the concerned filter. As the oil level of the main oil
tank of the turbine oil system connected with the concerned control oil system fluctuated, it was
determined that the reactor would be manually shut down for the inspection.
In addition, this event had no impact of radioactive material on the environment.

2. Actions of NISA
NISA received the report of this event pursuant to article 19-17 of “the rule for installation,
operation, etc. of commercial power reactors.”
After the occurrence of this event, local operational safety inspectors were dispatched to the power
station and the plant status was confirmed by them.
Afterwards, NISA will continue the rigorous checking of the investigation of causes and the
corresponding countermeasures against recurrence, which will be carried out by the company pursuant
to the law.
In addition, the reactor was normally shut down at 2:07 P.M., on July 18, 2009.

– Results of Provisional Evaluation by INES –


Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Level

- - 0- 0-


461
Schematic Diagram of the Main System at Tokai Daini Power Station

Electric Power
Transmission

Reactor Containment Vessel


Reactor Pressure Vessel
Transformer
Steam
Turbine
Fuel
Generator

462
Water Condenser

Water Cleanup
System
To Discharge Canal
Control Rod Recirculation Pump
Cooling Water (sea water)
Circulation Water Pump

Water Concerned Pump


Suppression Pool *1 Turbine Driven Reactor Feedwater Pump(A/B) (50% x 2)
Attachment-1

*2 Motor Driven Reactor Feedwater Pump(A/B) (25% x 2)


Schematic Diagram of the Control Oil System for the Turbine Driven Reactor Feedwater Pump(A)

Driving
㥑ື⏝⵨Ẽ Steam
㹒㹂㹐㹄㹎㸦㸿㸧 Line
ࣛ࢖ࣥ
Control Valve

Turbine
ࢱ࣮ࣅࣥ
Feedwater
⤥Ỉ࣏ࣥࣉ
Pump

⤥Ỉ࣏ࣥࣉ
Feedwater Pump Turbine Shaft
Shaft
㍈ཷἜ Bearing Oil Bearing Oil

463
㸿㸯

㸿㸰

㹒㹂㹐㹄㹎㸦㸿㸧
Ἔࢱࣥࢡ
Oil Tank ୺Ἔ࣏ࣥࣉ
Main Oil Pump ไᚚἜࣇ࢕ࣝࢱ࣮
Control Oil Filter
Attachment-2



Schematic Diagram of the Turbine Oil System

LIS (for alarm)

),6
Main Oil Tank Sedimentation
Compartment

For MCR Indicators

464
/7
Cartridge
Bag /*
Filter
Filter
3

3

Pump

Part in question about


the oil level fluctuation
Auxiliary Oil Tank

3
MCR: Main Control Room
Attachment-3

Pump LT: Level Transmitter


LIS: Level Indicator Switch
LG: Level Gauge
FIS: Flow Indicator Switch
Causes of and countermeasures against the reactor manual shutdown
of Tokai Daini Power Station, Japan Atomic Power Company.

August 18, 2009


NISA㸭METI

Today (on August 18, 2009), the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) received a report
from Japan Atomic Power Company (JAPC) on the causes of and countermeasures against the reactor
manual shutdown due to the oil level fluctuation of the main oil tank at Tokai Daini Power Station
(BWR, rated electric power: 1,100MWe), which was reported on July 17, 2009.
The report submitted by JAPC is summarized as follows;
[Causes] It was estimated that, as the results of adequate analysis based on the causal element
analysis after implementing many kinds of investigations, the oil was deteriorated and cooling
water leaked from the main oil cooler tubes, and the differential pressure increased at the oil filter
and thus the level of the main oil tank fluctuated.
[Countermeasures] Plugging of the main oil cooler tubes and the replacement of all oil will be
implemented as the short term countermeasures, and systematic replacement of coolers and
adequate oil property management will be implemented as the intermediate and long term
countermeasures.
NISA concluded that the estimated causes and the corresponding countermeasure are appropriate.

1. Main points of the report from Japan Atomic Power Co.


(1) Estimated causes
1) Increase of the differential pressure at the oil filter
- At the occurrence of this event, the main turbine oil had been used for 7 years since its full
replacement in 2002 and the main turbine oil has been deteriorated due to the gradual increase
of impurities (*1)(sludge).
- In addition, after July 2009, a significant leakage from a through-wall hole at the tube of the
main oil cooler㸦B㸧occurred and the turbine cooling water (hereinafter referred to as the
“TCW”) mixed in the main turbine oil. Thus, the production of sludge was accelerated due to
the chemical reaction of TCW and multi-purpose additive (*2) which was included in the main
turbine oil. Resultantly, the differential pressure at the oil filter significantly increased.
- The main oil cooler(B) has a structure that the oil flows into the U-bent portion located in its
lower part. Slight vibration of tubes installed in the U-bent portion occurred due to the oil flow
and the tube contacted with the baffle (tube support plate) for a long time, which led to wear
and denting of the tube followed by making the through-wall hole at the tube. As a result,
cooling water leaked from the tube of the concerned cooler.
2) Fluctuation of the oil surface of the main oil tank
- The main turbine oil, which was significantly deteriorated due to the mixing of TCW, involved
air in the turbine bearing room and foams generated. A large amount of foams flowed into and
accumulated in the main oil tank. Resultantly, the indication of the float- type oil level gauge,
installed in the main oil tank, lowered and fluctuated. In addition, there was no oil leakage
outside the concerned system in this event.

Based on these facts, the causes are estimated as follows; As TCW commingled in the main turbine
oil, the deterioration of the oil was accelerated. Resultantly, the differential pressure of the filter 参
significantly increased due to the produced sludge, and foams continuously produced due to the
deterioration of the oil accumulated in the main oil tank, and thus the oil level fluctuated.

465
(2) Countermeasures
1) Short term countermeasures
- The leaked tube of the main oil cooler (B) and tubes of which outer surface faults were detected
by the eddy current test (ECT) (*3) will be plugged.
- All deteriorated oil will be replaced and the concerned oil filter will be replaced as well.
- Indication of the float- type oil level gauge will be able to be monitored in the main control
room.
- Company’s regulation will be improved to implement an inspection taking into account the
failure of a component when an abnormal malfunction, whose causes could not be identified,
occurred.
2) Intermediate and long term countermeasure
- Oil cooler tubes will be periodically inspected by ECT and necessary countermeasures will be
implemented. In addition, the scheduled replacement of main oil coolers (A) and (B) will be
implemented after the next periodic inspection.
- Tiny materials will be removed after implementing the measurement using the high-speed
centrifugation precipitation method (*4) and oil property management applicable in the reactor
operation will be made appropriate by establishing the voluntary control standard.

*1 Tiny deteriorated product (a kind of impurity: including materials within 0.1(m)


*2 Agent to be used for making the chemical stability of a base oil effective.
*3 A kind of inspection to identify a flaw and its depth by detecting a change in electro
magnetic induction by flowing an eddy current in the surface of a material.
*4 A kind of method to extract a tiny deposit (les than 0.1(m) including sludge by means of
centrifugation and to measure its accumulation.

2. Actions of NISA
This event is that the oil level of the main oil tank fluctuated and then the reactor was manually shut
down because of its inspection, and this event does not immediately become the safety issue.
The report submitted by JAPC is summarized as follows;
[Causes] It was estimated that, as the results of adequate analysis based on the causal element
analysis after implementing many kinds of investigations, the oil was deteriorated and cooling
water leaked from the main oil cooler tubes, and the differential pressure increased at the oil filter
and thus the level of the main oil tank fluctuated.
[Countermeasures] Plugging of the main oil cooler tubes and the replacement of all oil will be
implemented as the short term countermeasures, and systematic replacement of coolers and
adequate oil property management will be implemented as the intermediate and long term
countermeasures.
NISA concluded that the estimated causes and the corresponding countermeasure are appropriate.
Afterwards, NISA will continue to confirm the countermeasure against the recurrence, information
sharing among licensees and status of the feedback of this experience, which will be implemented by
JAPC, through the operational safety inspection.

(Reference)
1. Summary of the event
Tokai Daini Power Station had been under its constant rated thermal power operation. It was
confirmed that a differential pressure at the control oil filter in the control oil system for the turbine
driven reactor feedwater pump (A) continued to increase. Therefore, on July 12, after switching to the
auxiliary motor driven reactor feedwater pump, the inspection was carried out in order to investigate
the causes of the increased differential pressure at the concerned filter. As the oil level of the main oil

466
tank of the turbine oil system connected with the concerned control oil system fluctuated, it was
determined that the reactor would be manually shut down for the inspection.
In addition, this event had no impact of radioactive material on the environment.

2. Results of Provisional Evaluation by INES –


Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Level

- - 0- 0-


467
Attachment 1
Schematics of the Turbine Oil System and Development of the Event at Tokai Daini Power Station
Turbine cooling system
P hoto A: Control oil filter of the
*Turbine oil Vent
turbine driven reactor feedwater
pump(A ) Turbine driven reactor Shared oil for the main turbine, the turbine driven
feedwater pumps (A) and (B) reactor feedwater pump and the turbine generator Surge tank
Control valve Pump or Servo Make-up
actuator turbine valve water
bearing Photo A Deteriorated main turbine oil involved air in
㸦A㸧 Control oil the turbine bearing room and foams generated.
filter Turbine
㸦B㸧
sea water
Lubricant
system
oil filter
Main turbine Generator
Turbin e driv en Emergency Low-speed Each Thrust
reacto r feedwater governor Bearin g Bearin g
pump oil coolers (A) detect or bearin g bearin g
P hoto B: Surface of the and (B )
main oil tank (foams)
Other loads

(Refer to Attachment 5)
Air

Turbin e driv en rea ctor


feedwater pump oil Outsid e the
tanks (A) an d (B) to the air buildi ng
Vacuum tank
Gas
Oil ballast
Vent f an coolers valve

468
Cartri dge fi lter (A)
Main oil tank and
(B) Vacuum
Foams were identified on July 17. pump A
(photographed on July 18)
Photo B Drain

P hoto C: Leakage hole at one tube Photo C Vacuum


Generator sealing oil
of the main oil cooler(B). pump B
Auxiliary oil tank system Drain
(Refer to Attachment 2)
Oil cleaner Development of the event

Leakage hole was identified on July 22.


Attachment 2
Inspection results of the main oil cooler (B)
Tube plate side
Water room (carbon steel)
Cross-sectional
observation position Approx. 900mm
- A tube vibrated due to the oil flow in the cooler.
(Lower part has a U bent structure which is Outlet/inlet of the turbine
susceptible to the oil flow.) cooling water
Leakage hole - The tube contacted the baffle (tube support
Wore portion plate) due to its vibration.
(No.6 baffle - Contacted portion of the tube wore out and
portion) eventually a through-wall hole was made due
to the inner pressure of the tube. Shell (carbon steel)
(width: approx. 1.3mm, length: approx. 2.7mm)

Outlet of
the oil
U-bent tube side
Inlet of
the oil

469
Thickness of the tube
support plate

Tube plate side


Leng th of the tube bundle: appro x. 3200mm

Blue line: flow of the cooling water


Orange line: flow of the oil
Leakage hole Wore portion width Tube support plate (carbon steel) Tube (copper alloy)
(approx. 9.3mm) Outer Diameter: 15.6mm
[ Mechanism that the tube leakage occurred ] Thickness : 1.8mm
Diamet er of the
Fin wa s wore Fin wa s attrited.
cooling piping (pipin g vibr ations) (increased piping vibrations) Horizontal section of the
leakage hole portion

U-bent tube side

Macro photography
at P-P cross-section Fin: 1.26mm Breaking and opening
Piping was d ented. due to the inner pressure
(more increased piping vib ration s)



Attachment 3
Mechanism that the event occurred
Mechanism that the differential pressure and the oil level increased Mechanism of the sludge production
Precursor
[Main turbine oil]
Turbine oil
Main turbine oil
Base oil Additive
Base oil Additive When the oil is affected by
the external factors such as
Main turbine oil consists of
heating, oxidation etc.
the base oil and additives
during the long term Though the multi-purpose
such as the multi-purpose
additive prevents the
Long term use of Turbine cooling water additive.
deterioration of the oil,
the turbine oil was mixed in. Sludge precursors are released into
the oil.
When the oil flowed Precursors relesed.
Sludge An amount of the down from the main It was captured at the filter
(viscous solid mixed-in water turbine bearing to the and the differential pressure
material) increased and the Precursors are polymerized in the Its viscosity increased.
bearing case or to the increases.
multi-purpose additive oil and become a vanish like
main oil tank, the air
was decomposed. material(high viscosity material)
was involved in it and
foams were produced.
Sludge production confirmation test

470
Oil cleaner cartridge
Confirmation test was implemented if sludge was produced
filter was clogged.
when water was mixed in the main turbine oil.
Sludge was produced. Defoaming
function was When the turbine cooling water
Oil cleaner cartridge lowered. (TCW) was added to the new oil
filter relief valve including the multi-purpose
operated. An oil cleaner cartridge Foams were not additive, white sludge was
filter was clogged. dissolved and were produced as shown in Fig.1.
continuously produced.
Each filter for the
turbine oil system Sludge was captured at Produced foams
Fig.1 New oil 150ml+TCW 150ml
was gradually each filter of the accumulated in the main
clogged by sludge. turbine oil system. oil tank etc.
In addition, even when TCW was
added to the main turbine oil
sampled on July 17, it was
Differential pressure Differential pressure at The oil level of the main confirmed that milky sludge was
at the filter the filter significantly oil tank lowered. produced as shown in Fig.2.
increased. increased. (mid-July 2009)
(prior to February 2009) (early to mid July 2009)

Fig.2 Sampled oil 100ml+TCW 100ml


Damage of the emergency diesel generator at Tomari Power Station
Unit-3, Hokkaido Electric Power Company

August 21, 2009


NISA㸭METI

On August 21, 2009, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) received a report from
Hokkaido Electric Power Company on the damage of the emergency diesel generator at Tomari Power
Station Unit-3 (PWR, rated electric power: 912 MWe), as follows.

1. The Report from Hokkaido Electric Power Company


Tomari Power Station Unit-3 had been under its commissioning operation at constant rated electric
power. When the surveillance test of the emergency diesel generator (hereinafter referred to as the
“EDG”) B was implemented, malfunction of the turbocharger (*) was found at 3:13 pm, on August 19.
Therefore, EDG-B was shut down and “the deviation from the limiting conditions for operation”
specified in its safety regulation was declared at 3:14 pm, on the same day.
After that, the EDG-B was overhauled till today (on August 21, 2009). As a result, some damages
inside the turbocharger were identified and it was confirmed that the concerned EDG-B dos not have
necessary functions. EDG-A was confirmed to be operable.
In addition, this event had no impact of radioactive material on the environment.
In order to implement the scheduled overall inspections of the facilities and equipments at Unit-3,
the reactor power will be decreased from 4:00 pm, today and the main generator will be shut down.

* An equipment to supply an engine with combustion air which is compressed by a turbine driven
by energy of the exhaust gases of the engine (turbocharger).

2. Actions of NISA
NISA received the report of this event pursuant to article 19-17 of “the rule for installation,
operation, etc. of commercial power reactors.”
After the occurrence of this event, local operational safety inspectors were dispatched to the power
station and the plant status was confirmed by them.
Afterwards, NISA will continue the rigorous checking of the investigation of causes and the
corresponding countermeasures against recurrence, which will be carried out by the company pursuant
to the law.

– Results of Provisional Evaluation by INES –


Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Level

- - 0+ 0+


471
Layout Plan and Schematics of the Emergency Diesel Generator at the Tomari Power Station Unit-3 Attachment
Turbocharger

Occurrence point
Reactor
auxiliary
building Diesel
: Flow of the
Reactor generator intake air
building building

Turbine : Flow of the


exhaust gas
building

472
View-A Turbocharger
Specifications of the emergency diesel generator
Number of engines 2 units Dimension of the turbocharger
Engine’s rotating speed 750rpm (portion surrounded by a dashed line)
Output power (engine) 5,800kW/unit Hight Approx. 1m
Output power (generator) 5,600kW/unit Width Approx. 2m
Output voltage (generator) 6,900V

Turbocharger
View-A

Generator

Layout plan of the Tomari Power Station

Diesel engine outline


Causes of and countermeasures against the damage of the emergency
diesel generator at Tomari Power Station Unit-3, Hokkaido Electric
Power Company

September 15, 2009


NISA㸭METI

Today (on September 15, 2009), the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) received a report
from Hokkaido Electric Power Company on the causes of and countermeasures against the damage of
the emergency diesel generator (EDG) B at Tomari Power Station Unit-3 (PWR, rated electric power:
912 MWe) , which was reported on August 21, 2009.
The report submitted by Hokkaido Electric Power Company is summarized as follows;
[Causes] It was estimated that, as the results of adequate analysis after implementing many kinds
of investigations, some bolts used in the turbocharger were loosened due to the insufficient
tightening torque at the manufacture phase and then many inner parts of the turbocharger were
damaged.
[Countermeasures] The damaged turbocharger will be replaced with the new one whose bolts are
tightened up at the adequate tightening torque, and thorough torque management will be
specified as a procurement requirement. Compliance with the requirement will be confirmed
by the audit.
NISA concluded that the estimated causes and the corresponding countermeasure are appropriate.

1. Summary of the report from Hokkaido Electric Power Company


(1) Estimated causes
-During the manufacturing of the turbocharger (*), some fixation bolts were not tightened up at the
prescribed tightening torque because the concrete tightening method was not clearly described in
the work procedure manual although the tightening torques (tightening force) corresponding to
the specification of the bolts were provided.
-As the test operation and the load test of the turbocharger were carried out under the condition that
the tightening torque of the concerned bolts were insufficient, the bolts were loosened and
gradually fell out due to the fit of bolt tightening surface of the turbocharger-B2 and vibrations
etc.
-Therefore, heads of bolts fallen out in the turbocharger contacted with other parts and heat
generated, and eventually the turbine blade was damaged.
-Many inner parts of the turbocharger were damaged because the rotating shaft became eccentric
due to the damaged turbine blade, and the turbocharger-B2 stopped.
-The output power of the EDG-B decreased due to the shutdown of the turbocharger and unburned
gas and soot generated due to the decreased air supply, which were discharged to the atmosphere
through the exhaust gas piping etc.
(2) Countermeasures
-The turbocharger-B2 where this event occurred will be replaced with the new turbocharger whose
bolts are tightened up at the adequate tightening torque.
-Regarding another turbocharger (one turbocharger-B1) of the EDG-B and 2 turbochargers of the
EDG-A, it will be confirmed that bolts are tightened up at the adequate tightening torque.
-Torque management will be specified as a requirement to the supplier and it should be described in
the procedure manual and instructions that bolts should be tightened up at the necessary 参
tightening torque. Compliance with them will be confirmed by the audit.

473
2. Actions of NISA
This event was reported to NISA because the turbocharger of the EDG, which is a important safety
related equipment, was found to be damaged and the concerned component did not have necessary
functions. This event does not immediately become the safety problem as another EDG-A was
confirmed to be operable when this event occurred.
The report submitted by Hokkaido Electric Power Company is summarized as follows;
[Causes] It was estimated that, as the results of adequate analysis based on the factor analysis after
implementing many kinds of investigations, some bolts used in the turbocharger were loosened
due to the insufficient tightening torque and then many inner parts of the turbocharger were
damaged.
[Countermeasures] The damaged turbocharger will be replaced with the new one whose bolts are
tightened up at the adequate tightening torque and thorough torque management will be specified
as a procurement requirement. Compliance with the requirement will be confirmed by the audit.
NISA concluded that the estimated causes and the corresponding countermeasure are appropriate.
Afterwards, NISA will continue to confirm the countermeasure against the recurrence, information
sharing among licensees and status of the feedback of this experience, which will be implemented by
Hokkaido Electric Power Company, through the operational safety inspection.

* Turbocharger
An equipment to supply an engine with combustion air which is compressed by a turbine
driven by energy of the exhaust gases of the engine.

(Reference)
1. Summary of this event
Tomari Power Station Unit-3 had been under its commissioning operation at constant rated electric
power. When the surveillance test of the emergency diesel generator (B) was implemented,
malfunction of the turbocharger was found at 3:13 pm, on August 19. Therefore, the EDG-B was shut
down and “the deviation from the limiting conditions for operation” specified in its safety regulation
was declared at 3:14 pm, on the same day.
After that, the EDG-B has been overhauled till August 21, 2009. As a result, some damages inside
the turbocharger were identified and it was confirmed that the EDG-B does not have necessary
functions. Therefore, Hokkaido Electric Power Company concluded that the important safety related
equipment does not have necessary functions and reported this event pursuant to article 19-17 of “the
rule for installation, operation, etc. of commercial power reactors.”

2. Results of provisional evaluation by INES


Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Level

- - 0+ 0+

474
Overview of the Causes and Countermeasures <Attachment>
Location of Occurrence
Exhaust gas
Damaged turbocharger Turbocharger

Specifications of the emergency diesel generator


Compressed
: Comp ressed air air Number of installations 2 units
(to an engine cylinder) Engine rotating speed 750rpm
: Exhaust gas Output power (engine) 5,800kW/unit
(from an engine cylinder)
Output power (generator) 5,600kW/unit
Output voltage (generator) 6,900V
Compressor
Turbine Specifications of the turbocharger
Engine cylinder Number of installations 2 /unit
Height approx. 1m
Turbocharger is an equipment to supply an engine
Width approx. 2m
with combustion air which is compressed by a
turbine driven by energy of the exhaust gases of the Outlet pressure 240kPa
EDG-B engine. Rotating speed 20,900rpm

Investigation Results of the Turbocharger (turbine-side)


Shroud ring Nozzle retainer plate Shroud ring
Circular component which Rotor shaft disc
surrounds an outer Nozzle fitting plate
circumference of a turbine
blade in order to create a
passage for exhaust gas Nozzle ring
flowing through a turbine Component to
blade increase the kinetic
energy by
narrowing the
exhaust gas flow
passage just before
a turbine blade
Rotor shaft
Eccentricity measurement approx. 0.4m
Eccentr icity around the turbine
blade is as large as approx. 300ȣ
m (nor mally within 20ȣm) Flanges of the shroud were deficient.
Turbine blade Nozzle retainer plate fixation
A turbine blade was withdrawn bolt (6 bolts)
for the investigation. Damaged portion by this event

Bolt

Bolt
Hole

Circumferential sliding flaws on the


rotor shaft disc (nozzle ring-side).

Periphery of the rotor shaft disc 6 bolt heads were worn and the bolts
Nozzle ring was cut at the inner periphery. were loosened. One of them was
broken. Although the thread at the
inlet portion of the bolt hole was
Parts of the periphery stripped, the thread in the bolt hole
were cut for the Turbine
blade Rough shape of was normal.
investigation.
the blade before
it was damaged
Surface observation Observation
direction Fractured surface
observation
Discolored
portion


Discolored All 45 turbine blades were
portion damaged more or less and 11 of
Change of color in the nozzle ring side which them were damaged at the root
of the blade.
Fractured surface damaged by the strong
external force (พฝ is significant).

was assumed to be due to thermal effects.
475
Estimated causes
a. As the tightening method was not clearly described in the work procedure manual for manufacturing turbochargers in the factory, the concerned bolts
were n ot tightened up at the prescribed tightening force.
b. As the tightening of the concerned bolts during manufacturing of them in the factory was insufficient, the concerned bolts gradually fell out due to the
effect s of v ibrations et c. dur ing its subsequent operation. As the results, the concerned bolts contacted with the rotor shaft disc and produced heat in the
turboc harger, and then the rotor shaft disc became deformed due to the its lowered material strength and the turbine blade was lifted . Turbine blade was
damaged due to the contact between the lifted turbine blade and the shroud ring and was fallen away. As a consequence, it was scattered in the
turbocharger. Therefore, the eccentricity of th e roto r shaf t occurred and it was follow ed by subseq uent c ontacts at many parts, and eventually the
turboc harger was d amaged .

Insufficient tightening force

During the tightening work of the concerned bolts in the


manufacturing phase, they were tightened using a T-wrench
with an auxiliary tool in the past. The concerned bolts may
have been tightened using only a T-wrench and they may
have not been tightened at the prescribed tightening force.
Tightening using only a T-wrench Tightening using a T-wrench with
(tightening force is approx. 40-60Nm) . a auxili ary tool (tightening force is
approx . 75-95Nm) .

Estimated damage mechanism


Prior to occurrence Step 1: Looseness Step 2: Lifting of Step 3: Contacts with
of the damage of the bolt the turbine blade the shroud ring
A bolt was loosened and a bolt head
Bolt d oes no t cont act wi th the p eriphery As the material strength of the The lifted turbine bla de
contacted with the periphery of the
of the rotor shaft disc. rotor shaft disc. Temperature of the periphery of the rotor shaft contac ted wi th the shrou d ring
Turbine blade periphery of the rotor shaft disc disc w as low ered, the tu rbine and wa s dama ged.
increased and metal was softened, blade was lifted.
Shroud ring
and then material strength was
lowered.

Centrifugal
force
Nozzle
Rotor shaft retaine r plate Hydrodynamics
disc force
Nozzle
fitting plat e

Bolt

Step 4: Fallen-away Step 5: Scattering of Step 6: Shut-down of the turbocharger


of the blade the blade etc. Balance of the rotor shaft went out of order due to the damaged turbine
Damage d turb ine bl ade blade etc. and eccent ricity occurred. Then the b earing was damaged
Contac ts with the shroud ring
and shroud ring etc. were and eventually the turbocharger stopped. Output power of the EDG
caused the b lade to be fallen away.
scattered. decreased due to the shut-down of the turbocharger, and soot etc.
generated due to the decreased air supply and was di scharged throug h
the ex haust gas pi ping e tc.
Damage d bear ing

Many damaged parts

Flaws on the periphe ry


of the impel ler Eccentr icity of th e roto r shaf t

Countermeasures against the recurrence


(1) Countermeasures for the turbocharger
a. Although the concerned turbocharger will be manufa cture as a new product in the factory, it was confirmed that bolts were tightened at the prescribed
tightening force.
b. Another turbocharger of the EDG-B was inspected in the factory and it was confirmed that bolts were not loosened. Incidentally, it was confirmed that
bolts were tightened at the prescribed tightening force as well as the concerned turbocharger.
c. Regarding the turbochargers of the EDG-A, the similar cou ntermeasu res will be taken in the facto ry after restor ation of the EDG-B.
In relation to the above mentioned countermeasures, EDG manufacturing company will improve the work management and describe the bolt
tighte ning method in the work procedure manual after clarifying that bolts can be surely tightened at the prescribed tightening force by the method.
(2) Improvement of the procurement management
Follow ing sh ould b e spec ified in the company’s procurement management manual: the company should require suppliers such as makers that the
adequate procedure should be defined according to the importance of the tightening portion after clarifying the tightening standards for the tightening
works of bolts, which may be loosened due to the vibration etc. like this event, used inside rotating machines. In addition, the status of the complia nce
with t he re quire ments mentioned above by the suppliers will be confirmed by the audit.

476
Thinning of the sea water piping for cooling the high pressure core
injection system diesel engine found during the periodic inspection
of the Tsuruga Power Station Unit-1, Japan Atomic Power Company

October 14, 2009


NISA㸭METI

Today (on October 14, 2009), the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) received a report
from Japan Atomic Power Company(JAPC) on the thinning of the sea water piping for cooling the
high pressure core injection system diesel engine found during the periodic inspection of the Tsuruga
Power Station Unit-1 (BWR, rated electric power: 357MWe), as follows.

1. The Report from Japan Atomic Power Company


Tsuruga Power Station Unit-1 had been under its periodic inspection. As a wall thickness of the sea
water piping(*) for cooling the high pressure core injection system (HPCI) diesel engine has been
measured, one location where minimum wall thickness of the inlet piping of the cooler is 2.8mm was
found. This thickness was confirmed to be less than the required minimum wall thickness (3.4mm)
calculated based on the technical standards.
In addition, no location where a thickness is less than the required minimum wall thickness was
found other than the concerned location.
This event had no impact of radioactive material on the environment.

* “HPCI” is the system to inject cooling water into the reactor core when the reactor water level
lowered and an injection pump of the cooling water is driven by a diesel engine. “Sea water
piping” is installed for sea water cooling of a cooler which cools the cooling water for the
diesel engine.

2. Actions of NISA
NISA received the report of this event pursuant to article 19-17 of “the rule for the installation,
operation, etc. of commercial power reactors.”
Afterwards, NISA will continue the rigorous checking of the investigation of causes and the
corresponding countermeasures against recurrence, which will be carried out by the company pursuant
to the law.

– Results of Provisional Evaluation by INES –


Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Level

- - 0- 0-

* INES (International Nuclear Event Scale) is the indicator rating the safety significance of the event occurred
at nuclear power station etc. Events are evaluated based on 3 criteria (such as criteria 1; off-site impact,
criteria 2; on-site impact, and criteria 3; degradation of the defence-in-depth) and the highest level among 3
evaluations is adopted as the INES evaluation level for the event. INES level is ranging from Level 0 (no
safety significance) to Level 7(major accident) and Level 0 is classified into Level 0- (event having no
possibility to challenge the safety requirement) and Level 0+ (event having a possibility to challenge the
safety requirement).


477
Attachment
Overview of the Sea Water Piping System for Cooling the High Pressure
Core Injection System (HPCI) Diesel Engine
Schematic Diagram of the HPCI

From the reactor


feedwater system
Legend
㸸Flow of sea water Condensate
Reactor
storage tank
 Flow of cooling water

02
The 1st floor of the turbine building

To discharge canal
Diesel engine

Sea water piping for cooling


Cooler
the HPCI diesel engine
HPCI pump

To containment cooling system

Reactor containment Location of the thinning pipe


cooling seawater
system pump A-D
Specification of the sea water piping
for cooling the HPCI diesel engine
From sea water intake Outer diameter : 114.3mm
Nominal wall thickness: 6.0mm
Required minimum wall thickness : 3.4mm
Material : Carbon steel
Piping’s inner surface : Epoxy resin lining

Investigation results
of the inner surface
<Observation results of the inner surface>

<Appearance of the concerned piping>

Cuttin g Cuttin g

Flow Flow

Observation direction

Cuttin g Assumed deposition


Location of of the corrosive
the thinning sediments was
identified.
Unit: mm

Flow

  

<Cross-sectional observation results>

478
Causes of and countermeasures against the thinning of the sea water
piping for cooling the high pressure core injection system diesel
engine found during the periodic inspection of the Tsuruga Power
Station Unit-1, Japan Atomic Power Company

November 26, 2009


NISA㸭METI

Today (on November 26, 2009), the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) received a report
from Japan Atomic Power Company (JAPC) on the causes of and countermeasures against the
thinning of the sea water piping for cooling the high pressure core injection system diesel engine
found during the periodic inspection of the Tsuruga Power Station Unit-1, which was reported on
October 14, 2009.
The report submitted by the JAPC is summarized as follows;
1. [Causes] As a result of investigations, it was estimated that the lining was damaged due to the
insufficient inspection and repair of the inner surface of the concerned piping and then corrosion
gradually developed due to sea water.
2. [Countermeasures] The concerned piping will be replaced with the new one.
Afterwards, the inner surface of the piping will be systematically inspected.
NISA concluded that the estimated causes and the corresponding countermeasures mentioned above
were appropriate.

1. Main point of the report from JAPC


(1) Background
- Based on the findings (including that existing inspection point is not adequate as the representative
inspection point for the concerned sea water piping and contents and frequency of the piping
inspection were not clear) pointed out by NISA in the 40th year aging technology review, JAPC
added the planned visual inspection of the portions, where the drift occurs, such as an elbow of
the piping, in the long term maintenance management policy.
- Based on this long term maintenance management policy, the visual inspection was implemented
at portions where the drift occurs in the sea water piping (*1) for cooling the high pressure core
injection system (HPCI) diesel engine, of which inspection was available in this periodic
inspection. As a result, a swelling and a peeling at a part of the lining (inner surface treatment)
were observed.
- Therefore, the straight piping in the same system was planned to be replaced at the next periodic
inspection. When the wall thickness measurement by the nondestructive inspection at the outer
surface of the piping was implemented to be sure, the thinning was observed at the concerned
portion.

(*1) “HPCI” is the system to inject the cooling water into the reactor core when the reactor water
level lowered and a pump to inject the cooling water is driven by a diesel engine. “Sea water
piping” is installed for sea water cooling of a cooler which cools the cooling water for the
diesel engine.

(2) Estimated causes 参


- As a result of the investigations, it was confirmed that marine life adhered to the inner surface of
the concerned sea water piping and the tar-epoxy-resin lining (*2) on the inner surface of the

479
piping was damaged.
- The concerned sea water piping had been inspected every periodic inspection since the
commencement of the plant operation and leakage had not been found. In addition, connecting
portion of the pure water cooler (*3) and the piping was selected as a representative inspection
point in order to recognize the status of corrosion in the whole sea water piping, and a visual
inspection of the representative inspection point was implemented, as a part of the daily
maintenance activity, for identifying the generation of the peeling etc. of the lining at the time of
the regular overhauling of the equipments.
- On the other hand, the concerned visual inspection point was not adequate as a representative of
the concerned sea water piping in terms of the following reasons;
1) The lining had been painted on site during the overhauling in order to maintain the integrity
of the equipments.
2) There are other portions under severe environmental conditions other than the concerned
portion in terms of generation of the corrosion.
In addition, specific contents and frequency of the piping inspection were not clear.
- Therefore, the lining was damaged due to the adherence and removal of the marine life in the sea
water, and the base metal of the inner surface of the piping was in contact with sea water,
followed by gradual development of the corrosion at the concerned portion. As the inner surface
of the piping was not sufficiently inspected and repaired, wall thickness of the piping is estimated
to be less than the required minimum wall thickness.

(*2) Surface treatment by using the tar-epoxy-resin in order to prevent corrosion at the inner
surface of the piping

(*3) Device to cool the cooling water for the HPCI diesel engine

(3) Countermeasures
- The piping of the concerned system, excluding some portions, will be replaced in this periodic
inspection with the new one with a polyethylene lining which is superior to the peeling resistance
performance. Reusable piping will be repaired by using a tar-epoxy-resin and will be replaced
with the new one with a polyethylene lining in the next periodic inspection.
- The inspection plan of the concerned piping will be improved based on the findings pointed out by
NISA in the 40th year aging technology review. Afterwards, the inspection will be implemented
according to the specific inspection plan.

2. Actions of NISA
This event is that, as to the sea water piping which cools the cooling water for the HPCI diesel
engine which could be operated in the incident status such as loss of coolant in the reactor, its wall
thickness at one location was confirmed to be less than the required minimum wall thickness based on
the technical standards. As to the concerned piping, it was evaluated that no leakage was found in the
periodic inspection and it will not be immediately broken even in this usage status. Therefore, this
event indicates no safety issue at present time.
The report submitted by JAPC is summarized as follows;
1. [Causes] As the result of investigations, it was estimated that the lining was damaged due to the
insufficient inspection and repair of the inner surface of the concerned piping and then corrosion
gradually developed due to sea water.
2. [Countermeasures] The concerned piping will be replaced with the new one with the better
performance. The inner surface of the piping will be systematically inspected based on the
inspection plan to be improved based on the findings pointed out by NISA in the 40th year aging
technology review.

480
NISA concluded that the estimated causes and the corresponding countermeasures mentioned above
were appropriate.
Afterward, NISA will continue to confirm, through the operational safety inspection etc., the
implementation status of the countermeasure against the recurrence by JAPC and the experience
feedback in other plants.

(Reference)
1. Summary of this event
Tsuruga Power Station Unit-1 had been under its periodic inspection. As a wall thickness of the sea
water piping for cooling the high pressure core injection system (HPCI) diesel engine has been
measured, one location where minimum wall thickness of the inlet piping of the cooler is 2.8mm was
found. This thickness was confirmed to be less than the required minimum wall thickness (3.4mm)
calculated based on the technical standards.
In addition, no location where a thickness is less than the required minimum wall thickness was
found other than the concerned location.
This event had no impact of radioactive material on the environment.

2. Results of Provisional Evaluation by INES


Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Level

- - 0- 0-

* INES (International Nuclear Event Scale) is the indicator rating the safety significance of the
event occurred at nuclear power station etc. Events are evaluated based on 3 criteria (such as
criteria 1; off-site impact, criteria 2; on-site impact, and criteria 3; degradation of the
defense-in-depth) and the highest level among 3 evaluations is adopted as the INES evaluation
level for the event. INES level is ranging from Level 0 (no safety significance) to Level 7(major
accident) and Level 0 is classified into Level 0- (event having no possibility to challenge the
safety requirement) and Level 0+ (event having a possibility to challenge the safety requirement)
for a nuclear power station.


481
Attachment
Overview of the Investigation Results at the Sea Water Piping for Cooling
the High Pressure Core Injection System (HPCI) Diesel Engine
Schematic Diagram of the HPCI
Condensate From the reacto r
Legend feedwater system
Storage
: Flow of sea water tank
: Flow of cooling water The 1st floor of the turbine building
To dis charge canal Connecting piping Reactor
Sea water piping for with the cooler
Sea water piping for
cooling the HPCI diesel cooling the HPCI diesel
engine engine
To the emergency Cooler
diesel generator
To the
contai nment HPCI pump
coolin g system
Diesel engine

Specification of the sea water piping


Reacto r cont ainmen t
coolin g seaw ater for cooling the HPCI diesel engine
pump Outer diamet er : 114.3mm
Nomina l wall thickness : 6.0m m
From s ea wat er int ake
Requir ed min imum w all
thickn ess : 3.4mm
Materi al : Carb on ste el
Location of Piping’s inner surface : Epox y resi n lining
the thinning (appro x. 0.5mm thick)

Investigation results
of the inner surface < Observation results of the inner < Observation result of
<Appearance of the concerned piping> surface (after cutting in a half) > the inside of the piping >
Cuttin g Cuttin g

Flow
Observati on dir ection

Cuttin g

Marine biofouling on the


Location of inner surface of the piping
the thinning
<Cross-sectional observation
results of the thinned portion> 2 < Cross-sectional observation results of the sound portion >
Flow Inner surfac e
Inner surfac e

Approx.
2.8 mm

1 Outer surfac e Outer surfac e

Lining in the sound


Adhesion of the sea
Image of the cross-section Adhesion of the sea portion
of the thinned portion water components
water components
Inner surfac e Inner surfac e
Oxidized iron
products
Base metal of Lining in the sound portion
the piping Thickness: approx. 0.2mm
Outer surfac e Outer surfac e
Lining in the thinne d porti on

1. Enlarged observation
Lining in the
thinned portion Base metal of the piping
2. Enlarged observation

Adhesion of
the sea water Base metal of
the piping Lining in the thinned portion
components
Thickness: approx. 0.1mm

Oxidized iron
products

482
Power Reduction of the Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station
Unit-4, Tokyo Electric Power Company

October 15, 2009


NISA㸭METI

Today (on October 15, 2009), the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) received a report
from Tokyo Electric Power Company on the power reduction of the Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power
Station Unit-4 (BWR, rated electric power 1100MWe) which was in the constant rated thermal power
operation, as follows.

1. The Report from Tokyo Electric Power Company


Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station Unit-4 had been in the constant rated thermal power
operation. At 14:08 on October 15, 2009, the reactor recirculation pump-A (*) shut down and some
control rods were inserted into the reactor core. Then the electric power decreased from approximately
1100MWe to 360MWe.
This event had no impact of radioactive material on the environment.

* Reactor recirculation pump: This is a pump to circulate water (reactor coolant) in the reactor
pressure vessel for controlling the reactor power. 2 pumps are installed.

2. Actions of NISA
NISA received the report of this event pursuant to article 19-17 of “the rule for the installation,
operation, etc. of commercial power reactors.”
After immediately this event occurred, the NISA dispatched a local operation safety inspector and it
was confirmed that the power plant was stable operation by using one reactor re-circulation pump.
Afterwards, NISA will continue the rigorous checking of the investigation of causes and the
corresponding countermeasures against recurrence, which will be carried out by the company pursuant
to the law.

– Results of Provisional Evaluation by INES –


Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Level

- - 0- 0-

* INES (International Nuclear Event Scale) is the indicator rating the safety significance of the event occurred
at nuclear power station etc. Events are evaluated based on 3 criteria (such as criteria 1; off-site impact,
criteria 2; on-site impact, and criteria 3; degradation of the defence-in-depth) and the highest level among 3
evaluations is adopted as the INES evaluation level for the event. INES level is ranging from Level 0 (no
safety significance) to Level 7(major accident) and Level 0 is classified into Level 0- (event having no
possibility to challenge the safety requirement) and Level 0+ (event having a possibility to challenge the
safety requirement).


483
Attachment

< Reactor building > < Turbine building >

Reactor containment vessel

Turbine Generator
Reactor
pressure
vessel

Condenser

㹀 㸿

484
Reactor
Feedwater pump and
condensate water pump

Reactor recirculation pump-A


which automatically shut down.

Schematic Diagram of the Systems of the Fukushima Daini Unit-4


Causes of and countermeasures against the power reduction of the
Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station Unit-4, the Tokyo Electric
Power Company

October 22, 2009


NISA㸭METI

Today (on October 22, 2009), the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) received a report
from the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) on the causes of and countermeasures against the
power reduction of the Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station Unit-4 (BWR, rated electric power
1100MWe) which was reported on October 15, 2009.
The report submitted by the TEPCO is summarized as follows;
1. [Causes] As a result of the investigation, it was estimated that, when the blush of the power
supply of the reactor recirculation pump was replaced during the plant operation, the preventive
measure against the short circuit by using the insulating plate was not sufficient and then the
short circuit occurred, which eventually led to the power reduction.
2. [Countermeasures] Preventive measures against the short circuit will be taken to related
equipments and, in principle, the concerned blush replacement work will be performed at the test
operation in the periodic inspection.
NISA concluded that the estimated causes and the corresponding countermeasures mentioned above
were appropriate.

1. Summary of the report from the Tokyo Electric Power Company


(1) Estimated causes
- As a result of the investigation, the trace of a short circuit due to a contact between a terminal
(+side) of a blush lead wire and a blush holder support (-side) (*4) during a replacement work,
performed on October 15, 2009, of a blush (*3) of the valuable frequency power supply-A
(recirculation MG set-A) (*2) for the reactor recirculation pump-A (*1) was found and the
damage of the inner component in the automatic voltage regulator (*5) was also found.
-It was confirmed that the short circuit preventive measures was not sufficient though an insulating
plate was installed for preventing a short circuit between + side and - side, an inspection hole for
the blush was narrow so that it was difficult to confirm a hand during a work and to secure a work
posture in this work environment, and the work was performed based on the procedure which
could cause a short circuit.
-As a contact surface between a blush and a collector ring (rotating shaft) has to be adjusted when a
blush is replaced, the replacement of a blush used to be performed when a rotating shaft is
rotating under the plant operation condition that the power is supplied to the reactor recirculation
pump and this practice may have an impact on the plant.
-Therefore, causes of this event were estimated as follows; a short circuit due to a contact between
the terminal of a blush lead wire and the blush holder support occurred during the replacement of
the blush followed by a loss of function of the automatic voltage regulator and then automatic 参
shutdown of the recirculation MG set, which eventually led to the shutdown of the reactor
recirculation pump. Afterward, some control rods were inserted into the reactor core (which is a

485
normal movement) due to the shutdown of the concerned pump, and then the electric power
decreased.

*1. This is a pump to circulate water (reactor coolant) in the reactor pressure vessel and 2 pumps
are installed. The reactor power is controlled by controlling the pump speed during the plant
operation.
*2. This is an equipment to supply electric power to the reactor recirculation pump and controls
the pump speed (the pump speed is linked to the reactor power).
*3. This is a carbon terminal which supplies electric current to the exciter (where this event
occurred) of the recirculation MG set and the rotor of the generator.
*4. This is a support to fix a blush holder inserting a blush.
*5. This is an equipment to regulate the voltage of the generator of the recirculation MG set.

(2) Countermeasures
-The inner component, which was damaged by the short current, of the automatic voltage regulator
will be replaced with a spare part.
-From the standpoint of the prevention of the short circuit, the equipment such as insulating plate
and the work environment for the replacement of the blush will be improved by the completion of
the next periodic inspection.
-From the standpoint of the reduction of the risk impact on the plant, an amount of the blush
consumption during the next operation cycle is estimated in the periodic inspection.
As for a blush which should be replaced, it will be replaced, in principle, at the test operation of
the recirculation MG set which will be carried out in the periodic inspection.

2. Actions of NISA
The report submitted by the TEPCO is summarized as follows;
1) [Causes] As a result of the investigation, it was estimated that, when the blush of the power
supply of the reactor recirculation pump was replaced during the plant operation, the preventive
measure against the short circuit by using the insulating plate was not sufficient and then the short
circuit occurred.
2) [Countermeasures] Preventive measures against the short circuit will be taken to related
equipments and, in principle, the concerned blush replacement work will be performed at the test
operation in the periodic inspection.
NISA concluded that the estimated causes and the corresponding countermeasures mentioned above
were appropriate.
Afterward, NISA will continue to confirm, through the operational safety inspection etc., the
implementation status of the countermeasure against the recurrence by the TEPCO and the experience
feedback in other plants.

486
(Reference)
The Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station Unit-4 had been in the constant rated thermal power
operation. At 14:08 on October 15, 2009, the reactor recirculation pump-A (*) shut down and some
control rods were inserted into the reactor core. Then the electric power decreased from approximately
1100MWe to 360MWe.
This event had no impact of radioactive material on the environment.

– Results of Provisional Evaluation by INES –


Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Level

- - 0- 0-

* INES (International Nuclear Event Scale) is the indicator rating the safety significance of the
event occurred at nuclear power station etc. Events are evaluated based on 3 criteria (such as
criteria 1; off-site impact, criteria 2; on-site impact, and criteria 3; degradation of the
defense-in-depth) and the highest level among 3 evaluations is adopted as the INES evaluation
level for the event. INES level is ranging from Level 0 (no safety significance) to Level 7(major
accident) and Level 0 is classified into Level 0- (event having no possibility to challenge the
safety requirement) and Level 0+ (event having a possibility to challenge the safety requirement).


487
Reactor containment vessel
Reactor pressure Attachment
vessel
Turbine Generator
Automatic
voltage
regulator
Condenser
Recirculation MG set-A
㸿 Generator Equipment

where this
Feedwater and
Fluid Motor Exciter event occurred
condensate pump
coupling
Circuit breaker

Blush holder support (+ side) Blush holder support (- side)


Reactor recirculation pump-A

㻵㼚㼟㼡㼘㼍㼠㼕㼚㼓㻌㼜㼘㼍㼠㼑

488
Trace of the short circuit on the blush holder support

Blush holder
Inside view of the inspection hole for exciter

Inspection hole for exciter

Lead wire Blush Schematic Diagram of the Recirculation MG Set System


Reactor manual shutdown of the Shika Nuclear Power Station Unit-2,
Hokuriku Electric Power Company

November 13, 2009


NISA㸭METI

Today (on November 13, 2009), the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) received a report
from Hokuriku Electric Power Company on the reactor manual shutdown of the Shika Nuclear Power
Station Unit-2 (ABWR, rated electric power 1206MWe) which was in the adjustment operation (*1),
as follows.

1. The Report from Hokuriku Electric Power Company


Shika Nuclear Power Station Unit-2 had been in the adjustment operation (*1) at the rated electric
power during its periodic inspection. When the surveillance test of the emergency diesel generator
(EDG*2)-A was carried out on November 12, 2009, it was found that the lubricant oil leaked
approximately 100cc from the valve which was used for checking the presence of water or oil in a
cylinder of the diesel engine. Therefore, it was concluded that the concerned EDG was not operable
and “the deviation from the limit of operation” was declared based on the safety regulation at 16:43 on
the same day.
After that, when the operability of the remained 2 EDGs was checked as an action required by the
safety regulation in the case of “the deviation from the limit of operation”, it was found that the
lubricant oil leaked approximately 2cc from the similar location of the EDG-B. As the operability of 2
of 3 EDGs was not confirmed, the reactor was manually shut down according to the safety regulation.
This event had no impact of radioactive material on the environment.

(*1) Adjustment operation is the checking operation before the restart commercial operation.
(*2) Emergency generator driven by a diesel engine for supplying power in the case of the loss of
unit power.

2. Actions of NISA
NISA received the report of this event pursuant to article 19-17 of “the rule for the installation,
operation, etc. of commercial power reactors.”
After this event occurred, NISA dispatched a local operation safety inspector and it was confirmed
the plant status.
Afterwards, NISA will continue the rigorous checking of the investigation of causes and the
corresponding countermeasures against recurrence, which will be carried out by the company pursuant
to the law.

– Results of Provisional Evaluation by INES –


Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Level

- - 1 1

* INES (International Nuclear Event Scale) is the indicator rating the safety significance of the 参
event occurred at nuclear power station etc. Events are evaluated based on 3 criteria (such as
criteria 1; off-site impact, criteria 2; on-site impact, and criteria 3; degradation of the

489
defense-in-depth) and the highest level among 3 evaluations is adopted as the INES evaluation
level for the event. INES level is ranging from Level 0 (no safety significance) to Level 7(major
accident) and Level 0 is classified into Level 0- (event having no possibility to challenge the
safety requirement) and Level 0+ (event having a possibility to challenge the safety requirement).
* “The anomaly beyond the authorized operating regime” is evaluated as a Level 1.

490
Attachment

Diesel engine

Check valve Cylinder

Indicator valve
to other cylinders

Piston

Filter to other cylinders

Generator
to crank shaft

491
Lubricant oil pump in the engine

Oil pan

Lubricant oil priming pump 

Schematic Diagram of the Lubricant Oil System of the Emergency Diesel Generator



Causes of and countermeasures against the reactor manual shutdown
of the Shika Nuclear Power Station Unit-2, Hokuriku Electric Power
Company

December 4, 2009
NISA㸭METI

Today (on December 4, 2009), the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) received a report
from Hokuriku Electric Power Company on the causes of and the countermeasures against the reactor
manual shutdown of the Shika Nuclear Power Station Unit-2 (ABWR, rated electric power 1206MWe)
which was in the adjustment operation, as follows.
The report submitted by the Hokuriku Electric Power Co. is summarized as follows;
1. [Causes] As a result of the investigations, it was estimated that the lubricant oil flowed into the
cylinder and leaked out because the performance of the pressure control check valve for the
emergency diesel generator decreased due to the metallic powder contained in the lubricant oil.
2. [Countermeasures] The pressure control check valve will be replaced with the one having such a
structure as its performance is hard to decrease due to the fine metallic powder.
The NISA concluded that the estimated causes and the corresponding countermeasures mentioned
above were appropriate.

1. The main points of the report from Hokuriku Electric Power Company
(1) Investigation result and the estimated causes
- As a result of the operation check of the pressure control check valve (*1), its improper seating
due to the decrease of the reclosing pressure (*2) was confirmed. When the concerned pressure
control check valve was overhauled, the sliding mark was observed inside the valve. The sliding
mark remained in parts where the valve disc could contact when it inclined in the valve body.
- In addition, fine metallic powder, whose size is as large as the one generated at the sliding portion
such as a bearing in the diesel engine under the normal condition, was found in the lubricant oil
of the emergency diesel generator.
- As a result of the simulation test of opening and closing operation of the new pressure control
check valve by using the lubricant oil used in the actual engine, the increase in the sliding
resistance due to the movement under the condition that the valve disc remains inclined was
confirmed.
- In addition to the structure that the valve disc of the pressure control check valve was easy to
move even it inclined, the sliding surface became worn with age due to the effect of the fine
metallic powder in the lubricant oil so that sliding resistance increased. Based on them, it was
estimated that the opening and closing performance of the valve was degraded.
- Furthermore, neither the regular inspection and replacement plans of the pressure control check
valve nor the regular replacement plan of the lubricant oil were prepared.
- The turning operation (*3) was implemented under the condition that lubricant oil which leaked
from the pressure control check valve flowed into the cylinder during the diesel engine of the
emergency diesel generator was on standby. Therefore, it was estimated that lubricant oil leaked
from the indicator valve (*4) when the piston rose.

(*1) A valve which stops the lubricant oil which tends to flow in opposite direction from the
cylinder and has a function to be opened at larger pressure than the designed opening
pressure.
(*2) The inlet pressure of the valve when it is closed and the flow of the liquid substantially
stops.

492
(*3) Operation to slowly turn the diesel engine by the motor in order to confirm that there is no
water, oil etc. in the cylinder prior to the operation of the diesel engine.
(*4) A valve which is opened in order to confirm the existence of water, oil etc. in the cylinder.

(2) Countermeasures
- In this periodic inspection, the pressure control check valve will be replaced with the one having a
structure that the sliding by the valve disc is hard to occur even under the existence of fine
metallic powder, whose size is as large as the one generated at the sliding portion such as a
bearing in the diesel engine under the normal condition.
Afterwards, the pressure control check valve will be regularly replaced.
- Lubricant oil priming pump (*5) is temporarily stopped during the shutdown of the diesel engine
of the emergency diesel generator for decreasing the lubricant oil pressure so that the pressure
control check valve is completely closed.
- In this periodic inspection, the lubricant oil will be replaced with the new one and lubricant oil
supply line to the pressure control check valve will be flushed (washed).
Afterwards, lubricant oil will be regularly replaced with the new one.

(*5) A pump which supplies with the lubricant oil in advance during the shutdown of the diesel
engine in order to ease the start-up of the diesel engine.

2. Actions of NISA
The report submitted by Hokuriku Electric Power Co. is summarized as follows;
1. [Causes] As a result of the investigations, it was estimated that the lubricant oil flowed into the
cylinder and leaked out because the performance of the pressure control check valve for the
emergency diesel generator decreased due to the metallic powder contained in the lubricant oil.
2. [Countermeasures] The pressure control check valve will be replaced with the one having such a
structure as its performance is hard to decrease due to the fine metallic powder.
NISA concluded that the estimated causes and the corresponding countermeasures mentioned above
were appropriate.
Afterward, NISA will continue to confirm, through the operational safety inspection etc., the
implementation status of the countermeasure against the recurrence by Hokuriku Electric Power Co.
and the experience feedback in other plants.

(Reference)
1. Summary of this event
The Shika Nuclear Power Station Unit-2 had been in the adjustment operation at the rated electric
power during its periodic inspection. When the surveillance test of the emergency diesel generator
(EDG)-A was carried out on November 12, 2009, it was found that the lubricant oil leaked
approximately 100cc from the valve which was used for checking the presence of water or oil in a
cylinder of the diesel engine. Therefore, it was concluded that the concerned EDG was not operable
and “the deviation from the limiting condition for operation” was declared based on the safety
regulation at 16:43 on the same day.
After that, when the operability of the remained 2 EDGs was checked as an action required by the
safety regulation in the case of “the deviation from the limiting condition for operation”, it was found
that the lubricant oil leaked approximately 4cc from the similar location of the EDG-B. As the
operability of 2 of 3 EDGs was not confirmed, the reactor was manually shut down according to the
safety regulation.
On November 14, 2009, the reactor was confirmed to be under shutdown.

This event had no impact of radioactive material on the environment.

493
2. Results of provisional evaluation by INES
Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Level

- - 1 1

* INES (International Nuclear Event Scale) is the indicator rating the safety significance of the event occurred
at nuclear power station etc. Events are evaluated based on 3 criteria (such as criteria 1; off-site impact,
criteria 2; on-site impact, and criteria 3; degradation of the defense-in-depth) and the highest level among 3
evaluations is adopted as the INES evaluation level for the event. INES level is ranging from Level 0 (no
safety significance) to Level 7(major accident) and Level 0 is classified into Level 0- (event having no
possibility to challenge the safety requirement) and Level 0+ (event having a possibility to challenge the
safety requirement).
* “The anomaly beyond the authorized operating regime” is evaluated as a Level 1.

494
Schematic Diagram of the Lubricant Oil System of the Emergency Diesel Generator
1. Flow of the lubricant oil Diesel engine Attachment-1
[1] Cylinder head
Diesel engine in operation
] Indicator valve
Diesel engine on standby
Pressure control [2]
check valve [3]
Filter
Piston

Generator

Lubricant oil pump


in the engine Crank shaft

Oil pan
2. Estimated causes and
the mechanism of
Lubricant oil priming pump
occurrence of this event
[1] Malfunction of the pressure control check valve [2] Flow of the lubricant oil into the cylinder [3] Leakage of the lubricant oil from the indicator
valve during the turning operation (*).

495
From the lubricant oil filter in the engine Pressure control check valve Lubricant oil is
supplied to the
rocker arm device. Valve pusher
Lubricant oil contained
Valve body fine metallic powder Rocker Valve guide bush
arm
Opening and closing operations device Air injection and exhaust valve Indicator valve
under the inclined status
Valve disc
Inside of the cylinder
Sliding resistance increased due
to the generation of the wear.
Lubricant oil flowed
Sliding resistance increased due into the cylinder.
to the generation of the wear. Ferrioxide encouraged
the wear. Leakage of oil from
the indicator valve
Spring
Ferrioxide encouraged
the wear. Cylinder The piston rises due to
㺃㺃㺃Flow of the lubricant oil
the turning operation.
From the pressure control check valve
To the rocker arm device and the rocker arm driving mechanism
࣭As the valve disc of the pressure control check valve was repeatedly opened and 㺃 Lubricant oil supplied to the rocker arm device flowed 㺃 Lubricant oil leaked from the indicator valve when the piston
closed under the condition that the valve disc inclined in the valve body, the
into the cylinder through a gap between a valve stem rose during the turning operation.
wear generated on the sliding surface and the valve disc becam e hard to move.
of the air injection and exhaust valve and a valve
࣭Ferrioxide which intruded in the valve body encouraged the wear of the sliding
surfac e. guide bush. 㺃 Turning operation(*)
↓ Operation to slowly turn the diesel generator by the motor in
࣭The concerned valve was not completely closed at the lubricant oil pressure for order to confirm in advance the existence of water, oil e tc. in
the va lve closing during the shutdown of the emergency diesel generator. the cylinder prior to the operation of the diesel generator.



Attachment-2

Countermeasures against the recurrence

<Countermeasure [1]>
࣭Pressure control check valve will be replaced with the one with a
structure that the wear is difficult to generate even under the Diesel engine
condition of the existence of the fine metallic powder. [1] Cylinder head
࣭Afterwards, the pressure control check valve will be regularly Indicator valve
replaced. Pressure control
check valve
Existing pressure control check Pressure control check valve
valve to be replaced Filter Piston
[3]
Generator
Valve Valve
seat disc Lubricant oil pump Crank shaft
in the engine

Oil pan

496
Long Short
[2]
Spring Lubricant oil priming pump

<Countermeasure [2]>
㺃 As a gap of 㺃 As a gap of ࣭Operation manual will be changed as follows; Lubricant oil priming
portion is narrow, the wear portion is wide, the wear pump is stopped during the shutdown of the diesel engine for
is easy to generate. is difficult to generate. decreasing the lubricant oil pressure. After the pressure control check
㺃 As the number of coil turns of 㺃 As the number of coil turns valve is completely closed, the oil priming pump is restarted.
the spring is small, the load of the spring is large, the
tends to be biased. load does not tend to be
㺃 As the length from the end of biased. <Countermeasure [3]>
the spring to the valve seat is 㺃 As the length from the end of
long, the valve body is not the spring to the valve seat is ࣭Lubricant oil was replaced with the new one and lubricant oil supply
stabilized. short, the valve body is line to the pressure control check valve was washed.
stabilized. ࣭Afterwards, lubricant oil will be regularly replaced with the new one.
Unexpectedly power change during the generator power increase
operation at Mihama Power Station Unit-1, Kansai Electric Power
Company

November 13, 2009


NISA㸭METI

On November 13, 2009, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) received a report from
Kansai Electric Power Company on the reactor power change at the Mihama Power Station Unit-1
(PWR, rated electric power 340MWe), as follows.

1. The Report from Kansai Electric Power Company


Mihama Power Station Unit-1, which had been under its periodic inspection, started the adjustment
operation (*1) at 19:10, November 12, 2009. In order to increase the electric power at 19:40, the
generator power tended to rapidly increase when a control switch (load limiter switch) of the valve
(steam control valve) which controls an amount of steam flowing into the turbine was operated.
Therefore, the load limiter switch and a control circuit of the concerned valve were inspected but no
malfunction was found. In order to carry out more detailed inspection, today (on November 13) the
reactor power started to be decreased from 7:00 and the power generation was stopped at 7:08 on the
same day.
The reactor thermal power changed from 179MW (17.4% of the rated thermal power) to 63MW
(6.1%) in the time period from the occurrence of this event to the present time. The reactor thermal
power is currently maintained stable at approximately 6%.
In addition, this event had no impact of radioactive material on the environment.

(*1) Adjustment operation is the checking operation before the restart commercial operation.

2. Actions of NISA
NISA received the report of this event pursuant to article 19-17 of “the rule for the installation,
operation, etc. of commercial power reactors.”
After this event occurred, a local operation safety inspector confirmed the stable operation of the
plant.
Afterwards, NISA will continue the rigorous checking of the investigation of causes and the
corresponding countermeasures against recurrence, which will be carried out by the company pursuant
to the law.

– Results of Provisional Evaluation by INES –


Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Level

- - 0- 0-


* INES (International Nuclear Event Scale) is the indicator rating the safety significance of the event occurred
at nuclear power station etc. Events are evaluated based on 3 criteria (such as criteria 1; off-site impact,

497
criteria 2; on-site impact, and criteria 3; degradation of the defense-in-depth) and the highest level among 3
evaluations is adopted as the INES evaluation level for the event. INES level is ranging from Level 0 (no
safety significance) to Level 7(major accident) and Level 0 is classified into Level 0- (event having no
possibility to challenge the safety requirement) and Level 0+ (event having a possibility to challenge the
safety requirement).

498
Attachment
Stop of the power generation at the Mihama Unit-1
(the malfunction during the power increase operation)
Electric power is
The 2nd power The 2nd power
stable at 6%.
increase operation decrease operation

The 1st power


increase operation
Electric power

Schematic Diagram The 1st power


of the Systems decrease operation

Steam Control Valve


This valve is opened or Reactor thermal power

Reacto r containment
closed by the operation of the
vessel load limiter switch and
controls an amount of steam
flowing into the turbine.
Steam
Pressurizer Main steam
genera tor Status of change in
the generator power
Feedwa ter
Turbine
Genera tor

Conden ser
Turbine bypass
valve
Discharge canal
Reacto r Reacto r
Intake canal
pressure coolant
vessel pump

Main feedwat er pump Feedwa ter he ater

Valve opening ratio is


controlled by the Main C ontrol Room 䛇
䛆M
hydraulic pressure Turbin e Buil ding 䛇
䛆T
Neutral position
Decrease Increase
Steam control valve Turbine

Electric After turning


circuit Load l imiter the lever
switch
Load limiter
(the lever automatically
䠄Hydraulic control
returns to the neutral position
mechanism䠅 after its turn)

Device to adjust the


opening ratio of the
governor valve according
As a result of the
䛆Legend䛇
Electric signal

inspection, no
to the turbine speed.
malfunction was
Hydraulic signal
found. 付
499
Causes of and countermeasures against the unexpectedly power
change during the generator power increase operation at Mihama
Power Station Unit-1, Kansai Electric Power Company

November 24, 2009


NISA㸭METI

Today (on November 24, 2009), the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) received a report
from Kansai Electric Power Company (KEPCO) on the causes of and the countermeasures against the
unexpectedly power change during the generator power increase operation at the Mihama Power
Station Unit-1 (PWR, rated electric power 340MWe), which was reported on November 13, 2009.
The report submitted by the KEPCO is summarized as follows;
1. [Causes] As the results of various investigations based on the factor analysis, it was estimated
thatࠊas foreign materials intruded in the governor, the hydraulic pressure changed and then the
reactor power changed.
2. [Countermeasures] Preventive measures against the foreign material intrusion will be taken.
The NISA concluded that the estimated causes and the corresponding countermeasures mentioned
above were appropriate.

1. The main point of the report from KEPCO


(1) Estimated causes
- As a result of the factor analysis, it was estimated to be highly possible that foreign materials
intruded in the sliding portion of the inside of the load limiter (*1) main body, as follows.
- The governor (*2) including the load limiter was dismounted at the station every periodic
inspection and it was mounted again after foreign materials in the hydraulic pressure system were
removed. When the governor was dismounted, fragments of the liquid silicone gasket (*3)
applied on the contact surface between the governor and the control hydraulic pressure equipment
intruded there as foreign materials (the governor was overhauled at the factory once 4 periodic
inspections).
- Intruded fragment of the silicon gasket was stuck in the clearance gap between the load limiter
main body and the piston during the operation of the load limiter.
- Movement of the piston became slow due to the stuck foreign material and the hydraulic pressure
inside the load limiter rapidly changed. As the steam control valve was operated by this hydraulic
pressure, the generator power also rapidly changed.
- In the meantime, the reactor thermal power changed following the change of an amount of the
steam flow into the turbine.

(*1) Device to adjust the opening ratio of the valve (steam control valve) in order to control an
amount of the steam flow into the turbine.
(*2) Device to convert signals such as load limiter switch and turbine speed into the hydraulic
pressure and to control the hydraulic pressure of the steam control valve.
(*3) Silicon sealant applied on the contact surface between parts for higher airtightness.

(2) Countermeasures
- During the maintenance work (to remove the liquid silicon gasket) of the contact surface
between the governor and the control hydraulic pressure equipment in the station, a special
closed plug will be installed for the prevention of the foreign material intrusion.

500
In addition, a maintenance work space will be designated as a clean area and it will be specified
in the maintenance work manual.
- The governor will be overhauled in the factory every periodic inspection and the possibility of the
intrusion of the foreign material during the maintenance work of the contact surface will be
eliminated.

2. Actions of NISA
The report submitted by the KEPCO is summarized as follows;
1. [Causes] As the results of various investigations based on the factor analysis, it was estimated
thatࠊas foreign materials intruded in the governor, the hydraulic pressure changed and then the
reactor power changed.
2. [Countermeasures] Preventive measures against the foreign material intrusion will be taken.
NISA concluded that the estimated causes and the corresponding countermeasures mentioned above
were appropriate.
Afterward, NISA will continue to confirm, through the operational safety inspection etc., the
implementation status of the countermeasure against the recurrence by KEPCO and the experience
feedback in other plants.

(Reference)
1. Summary of this event
Mihama Power Station Unit-1 had been under its adjustment operation during the periodic
inspection. When the load limiter switch was operated in order to increase the electric power at 19:40,
October 12, 2009, the generator output power rapidly increased.
Therefore, the load limiter switch and a control circuit of the concerned valve were inspected but no
malfunction was found. The reactor power was decreased from 7:00, on November 13, and the power
generation was stopped at 7:08 on the same day. The reactor thermal power changed from 179MW
(17.4% of the rated thermal power) to 63MW (6.1%) due to this event.
In addition, this event had no impact of radioactive material on the environment.

2. Results of Provisional Evaluation by INES


Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Level

- - 0- 0-

* INES (International Nuclear Event Scale) is the indicator rating the safety significance of the
event occurred at nuclear power station etc. Events are evaluated based on 3 criteria (such as
criteria 1; off-site impact, criteria 2; on-site impact, and criteria 3; degradation of the
defense-in-depth) and the highest level among 3 evaluations is adopted as the INES evaluation
level for the event. INES level is ranging from Level 0 (no safety significance) to Level 7(major
accident) and Level 0 is classified into Level 0- (event having no possibility to challenge the
safety requirement) and Level 0+ (event having a possibility to challenge the safety requirement)
for a nuclear power station.


501
Attachment(1/3)
Status of the Periodic Inspection at the Mihama Unit-1
(Causes of and countermesures against the stop of the power generation due to
the malfunction during the generator power increase operation)
Power increase operation Power decrease operation

Generator power (MW) Reactor thermal power (MWt)

2nd 1st
2nd
1st
Electric power

Schematic Diagram of the Systems


Maximum thermal power at 17.4%

Reactor thermal power


Steam control valve
This valve controls an
Reacto r cont ainmen t vessel amount of steam flow
into a turbine.
Pressu rizer Status of change
Steam genera tor
Main steam in the generator
power

Feedwa ter Turbin e Genera tor

Conden ser
Turbin e bypa ss valve

Discharge canal
Reacto r pres sure Reacto r
coolan t pump Intake canal
vessel

Main feedwater pump Feedwa ter he ater

[Main Control Room] <Photograph of


the load limiter> [Turbine Building]
Neutral position
Decrease Increase
Steam control valve

Lever
Electric operation
Load limiter
circuit
switch Turbine

(the lever automatically returns to


the neutral position after its turn)

Steam control valve is operated by


Load limiter changing the hydraulic pressure.
(Hydraulic control
[Legend] mechanism)
As a result of As a result of the
the inspection, Electric signal
Device to adjust the opening ratio of
no malfunction visual inspection, no
the steam control valve during the
was found. Hydraulic power increase operation etc.
malfunction was
signal found.

502
Attachment(2/3)
Results of the detailed inspection of the load limiter
Spindle
:Low hydraulic pressure Piston etc.
:High hydraulic pressure <Piston>
Spindl e

Spring

Piston Drain
<Inside of the load limiter main body >
Main b ody (sliding surfaces with the piston)

Contro l hydrau lic


Cup va lve pressu re equipm ent
(contr ol hydraulic
pressu re system-side)

Hydraul ic No damage in the


pressu re boost er sliding surface and
no abnormality at
Although slight sliding marks were found at the contact portion
surfaces and ditches, no damage was found. with the cup valve
was found.

Clearance gaps between the piston


Load limiter Cup valve and inside surface of the main body
Contact surfa ce
Outside
surface ditch
of the piston
To the steam contr ol val ve
Piston
Inside surface of
Cup valve the main body

Neither stuck foreign material Flow of oil


nor lost part was found.

Sampling result of the control oil


Close-up picture of the foreign material
Appearance of the recovered oil

Foreign materials were found.

Sketch of a foreign material found


in the control oil Scale unit is approx. 3mm

The foreign material is elastic and has a long and thin


Foreign material
shape (approx. 2mm in length and approx. 0.4mm in
Approx.2mm in length width). As a result of the componential analysis, it
Approx.0.4mm in width
White color (translucent)
has the same component with the liquid silicone
gasket which is applied on the contact surface for

mounting the hydraulic control equipment.


503
Attachment(3/3)
Estimated intrusion path of a foreign material
Photograph of the contact surface for mounting
(the liquid silicone gasket was applied on the surface other than oil holes)
Intrusion of the Load l imiter -side Control hydraulic pressure equipm ent-side
foreign materials
(an inlet of the oil
to the load limiter)

Control hydrau lic


pressur e equip ment
Dismount and mount of the load
Installation status of the load limiter
limiter during the periodic inspection

Control hydrau lic pressure


Load l imiter
equipm ent

Main
governor
Maintenance of the contact surface (every periodic inspection)

Remove the Maintenance


Auxilia ry Block oil holes by a Remove of a
old liquid of the contact
governor Hydraul ic pre ssure boost er waste cloth waste cloth
silicone gasket surface

Causes of malfunction of the load limiter

Normal case (an example of an open operation) This time (an example of an open operation)

Spindle
:Spring force

:Hydraulic
pressure
Discharge
of oil :Resistance
force due to
Hydraulic pressure is the foreign
adjusted by the material
Piston clearance gap
between the cup
valve and the piston.

Cup valve

1. Resistance force was 2. Forces balanced


produced due to the at position where
foreign material during clearance gap is
Transmit hydraulic the movement of the Transmit hydraulic smaller than
pressure to the steam piston. pressure to the steam normal.
control valve control valve

Causes
It is estimated as follows; During the dismount and mount works of the load limiter in this periodic inspection,
fragments of the liquid silicone gasket intruded into the hydraulic system in the load limiter. As it was stuck at
the outside of the piston during the power change operation, the hydraulic pressure to adjust the opening ratio of
the steam control valve was largely changed, and resultantly the generator power also largely changed.
Foreign materials were estimated to be released from the outside of the piston after the occurrence of this
event.

Countermeasures
○ After the load limiter which the malfunction was found at this time was inspected and adjusted at the factory, it was
mounted to the hydraulic pressure system in the station and the steam control valve was confirmed to be normally
operated.
○ Afterwards, the foreign material management will be strengthened by taking countermeasures of both installing a
special closed plug at the holes in the contact surface and designating a work space as the clean area (foreign material
intrusion prevention area) whenever the load limiter will be dismounted from the hydraulic pressure system during
the periodic inspection.

504
Leakage of liquid radioactive waste in the radiation controlled area
of the Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit-3, Chubu Electric Power
Company

December 2, 2009
NISA㸭METI

Yesterday (on December 1, 2009), the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) received a
report from Chubu Electric Power Company on the leakage of liquid radioactive waste in the radiation
controlled area of the Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit-3 (BWR, rated electric power 1100MWe),
as follows.

1. The Report from Chubu Electric Power Company


Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit-3 had been in the adjustment operation (*1) at the rated
thermal power constant operation. When the liquid waste had been drained into the high conductivity
liquid waste sump in order to inspect the concentrated liquid waste storage tank (C) (*2) installed in
the concentrated liquid waste storage tank (C) room (the radiation controlled area) on the 2nd
basement in the auxiliary building, the alarm of “Failure of the floor leakage detection system panel”
(*3) was found to be lighted up. When the site was inspected, leakage around the drain pit of the
concentrated liquid waste storage tank (B) room was found. As the drain from the concentrated liquid
waste storage tank (C) was immediately stopped, the backflow from the drain pit was stopped.
After that, when locations other than the concentrated liquid waste storage tank (B) room were
inspected, leakage of radioactive liquid waste was found at one location in the concentrated liquid
waste pump (B) room and at 2 locations in the concentrated liquid waste pump (C) room. Amount of
the radioactivity of the leaked liquid waste was measured to be a total of 1.2X109Bq at 4 locations.
This event had no impact of radioactive material to the environment.
In addition, 23 workers exposed in the process of the site inspection and the radiation measurement
after this event occurred, and the maximum exposure was measured to be 0.05mSv (*4). This
exposure level is as large as received radiation in the patrols and inspections and much smaller than
the statutory annual dose limit (*5), which means no impact on the health.

(*1) Adjustment operation is the checking operation before the restart commercial operation.
(*2) This is a tank to collect the concentrated liquid waste generated in the reactor facility and to
decay the radioactivity by storage for a certain period of time for the following treatment.
(*3) This alarm sounds when fault or leak is detected.
(*4) This is almost the same exposure level as that received radiation by one X-ray
mass-examination of the chest.
(*5) 50mSv in a year

2. Actions of NISA
NISA received the report of this event pursuant to article 19-17 of “the rule for the installation,
operation, etc. of commercial power reactors.”
After this event occurred, NISA dispatched a local operation safety inspector for confirming the
plant status.
Afterwards, NISA will continue the rigorous checking of the investigation of causes and the
corresponding countermeasures against recurrence, which will be carried out by the company pursuant 参
to the law.

505
– Results of Provisional Evaluation by INES –
Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Level

- - 0- 0-

* INES (International Nuclear Event Scale) is the indicator rating the safety significance of the event occurred
at nuclear power station etc. Events are evaluated based on 3 criteria (such as criteria 1; off-site impact,
criteria 2; on-site impact, and criteria 3; degradation of the defense-in-depth) and the highest level among 3
evaluations is adopted as the INES evaluation level for the event. INES level is ranging from Level 0 (no
safety significance) to Level 7(major accident) and Level 0 is classified into Level 0- (event having no
possibility to challenge the safety requirement) and Level 0+ (event having a possibility to challenge the
safety requirement) for a nuclear power station.

506
Status of the Leakage㻌

Concentrated liquid Concentrated liquid Concentrated liquid Concentrated liquid


waste storage tank waste pump waste storage tank waste pump
(C) room (C) room (B) room (B) room

Concentrated
liquid waste
storage tank
(C) Location-[3]
Concentrated
liquid waste
Location pump
-[4] (C) Location-[1] Location-[2]

507
Drain pit Drain pit Drain pit
䛆Specification of the tank䛇
Height : approx. 8m
Diameter : approx. 5m
Volume : approx. 120m3 (at the maximum)

䕺Status of the leakage at 4 locations


Location Dimension (length x width) Leakage level Amount of radioactivity
[1] Approx. 5m x 20cm Approx. 50 liters Approx. 1.2GBq High
[2] Approx. 1.5m x 14cm Approx. 0.4 liters Approx. 2.6MBq conductivity
[3] Approx. 0.5m x 12cm Approx. 0.2 liters Approx. 1.8MBq liquid waste
[4] Approx. 1m x 45cm Approx. 2.0 liters Approx. 18MBq sump
Total volume: approx. 53 liters Total radioactivity: approx. 1.2GBq



Causes of and countermeasures against the leakage of liquid
radioactive waste in the radiation controlled area of the Hamaoka
Nuclear Power Station Unit-3, Chubu Electric Power Company

February 25, 2010


NISA㸭METI

Today (on February 25, 2010), the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) received a report
from Chubu Electric Power Company on causes of and countermeasures against the leakage of liquid
radioactive waste in the radiation controlled area, which was reported on Dec.1, 2009, of the Hamaoka
Nuclear Power Station Unit-3 (BWR, rated electric power 1100MWe), which had been in the rated
thermal power constant operation.
Causes are estimated as follows; As concentrated liquid waste (*1) with high suspended material
(*2) concentration was drained through the drain system piping, suspended material blocked the drain
system piping. Resultantly, the leakage is estimated to occur.
And the countermeasures on the equipment and management will be taken in order to prevent from
draining the concentrated liquid waste in the concentrated liquid waste storage tank (*3) through the
drain system piping.
NISA concluded that the report submitted by the company is appropriate because the causes are
adequately estimated based on the various investigations and countermeasures are adequately based on
the estimated causes.
On the other hand, the safety regulation on the management of concentrated liquid waste was
violated and inadequate fact of neglecting the confirmation of the compliance with the technical
standard. Therefore, NISA gave the warning and ordered necessary actions to the company.
(*1) Concentrated liquid waste: Liquid waste generated by heating and distilling decontaminated
water used in the equipment inspection.
(*2) Suspended material; Undissolved material such as iron rust etc.
(*3) Concentrated liquid waste storage tank: A tank to collect the concentrated liquid waste
generated in the reactor facility and to decay the radioactivity by storage for a certain period of
time for the following treatment.

1. Main points of the report from Chubu Electric Power Co.


Main points of the report from Chubu Electric Power Co. are as follows;
(1) Investigation result of the causes and the estimated causes
- As a result of the inspection TV camera observation of the inside of the drain system piping, it was
confirmed that suspended material in the concentrated liquid waste was extensively deposited. In
addition, it was confirmed that suspended material in the concentrated liquid waste blocked the
outlet of the drain piping in the high conductivity liquid waste sump tank (B) (*4).
- Malfunction of the plastic solidification equipment (*5) occurred in March 2005, it was predicted
that an amount of concentrated liquid waste in the concentrated liquid waste storage tank
increased. Therefore, the company decided in Nov, 2006 that whole amount of the concerned
liquid waste could be drained through the drain piping, and drain operation was started without
technical verification of characteristics of the concentrated liquid waste which could be drained.
Besides, it was not confirmed that drain operation through drain system piping complied with the
technical standard.
- In addition, workers acknowledged that suspended material in the concentrated liquid waste could
block the drain system piping, but the drain operation was carried out without clear criterion for

508
judgment to stop the drain in cases where color or mobility of the liquid waste changed.
- As concentrated liquid waste with high suspended material concentration was drained through the
drain system piping under these circumstances mentioned above, suspended material in the
concerned liquid waste was deposited in the high conductivity liquid waste sump tank and
blocked the drain system piping. Resultantly, the leakage of liquid waste is estimated to occur.

(*4) High conductivity liquid waste sump tank: A tank to collect and transfer high conductivity
liquid waste among various liquid wastes generated by works in the radiation controlled
area.
(*5) Plastic solidification equipment: An equipment to dry concentrated liquid waste and solidify
it after mixing with a plastic as a solidification material.

(2) Countermeasures
Following countermeasures on the equipment and the management will be taken in order to prevent
from draining the concentrated liquid waste in the concentrated liquid waste storage tank through the
drain system piping.
- When the concentrated liquid waste storage tank was inspected, all concentrated liquid waste will
be transferred either to the concentrated liquid waste receiving tank (*6) for volume reduction
and solidification or to the other concentrated liquid waste storage tank by a temporally
transferable equipment. When a temporally equipment will be used, safety measures during
works will be fully considered and will be reflected into the work manuals.
- Drain line of the concentrated liquid waste storage tank and the drain pit will be separated.
- Caution mark will be put on the drain valve in the drain line and it is locked.
- As to the cleaning in the concentrated liquid waste storage tank after transferring all amount of
concentrated liquid waste, cleaning water with high suspended material concentration will be
fully diluted in order to prevent from draining to the drain system piping, and the safety measures
to be taken during work will be fully considered and will be reflected into the work manual.

In addition, as to the fact that the liquid waste was drained to the drain system piping without
technical verification, its root cause analysis will be implemented and corresponding countermeasures
will be taken.

(*6) A tank to receive the liquid waste which is solidified in a container such as a drum can by
using the plastic solidification equipment.

2. Actions of NISA
NISA concluded that the report submitted by the company is appropriate because the causes are
adequately estimated based on the various investigations and countermeasures are adequately based on
the estimated causes.
Afterward, NISA will continue to confirm, through the operational safety inspection etc., the
implementation status of the countermeasure against the recurrence by the company and the feedback
status of the concerned countermeasures in other plants.
On the other hand, the safety regulation on the management of concentrated liquid waste was
violated and inadequate fact of neglecting the confirmation of the compliance with the ordinance of
METI specifying the technical standard on the nuclear power facility in the light of the requirements
of duties “maintaining the compliance with the technical standard” specified in the article 39 of
Electricity Utilities Industry Law. Therefore, NISA gave the company warning and ordered to
investigate its root cause and to take corresponding countermeasures against recurrence.


509
(Reference)
1. Summary of this event
Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit-3 had been in the adjustment operation at the rated thermal
power constant operation. When the concentrated liquid waste had been drained into the high
conductivity liquid waste sump (B) in order to inspect the concentrated liquid waste storage tank (C)
installed in the concentrated liquid waste storage tank (C) room (designated as the radiation controlled
area) on the 2nd basement in the auxiliary building, the alarm of Failure of the floor leakage
detection system panel (*7)” was found to be lighted up. When the site was inspected, leakage of the
concentrated liquid waste around the drain pit of the concentrated liquid waste storage tank (B) room
was found. As the drain from the concentrated liquid waste storage tank (C) was immediately stopped,
the backflow from the drain pit was stopped.
After that, when locations other than the concentrated liquid waste storage tank (B) room were
inspected, leakage of radioactive liquid waste was found at one location in the concentrated liquid
waste pump (B) room and at 2 locations in the concentrated liquid waste pump (C) room. Amount of
the radioactivity of the leaked liquid waste was measured to be a total of 1.2x109Bq at 4 locations.
There was no unplanned occupational exposure associated with this event. And leaked liquid waste
remained in the radiation controlled area and this event had no impact of radioactive material to the
environment.

(*7) Floor leakage detection system panel failure; An alarm sounded by a detection of a leakage
other than malfunction.

2. Company’s correspondence after the occurrence of this event


After the occurrence of this event, temporally measures such as zoning and access control of the
leakage place were taken. And measures such as change of classification of controlled area for
decontamination work and contamination spread prevention were taken in accordance with the safety
preservation rule and based on results of the radiation measurement.
In addition, immediately after this event occurred, workers exposed in the process of the site
inspection and the radiation measurement and the maximum exposure was measured to be 0.05mSv
(*8). This exposure level is as large as received radiation in the ordinal patrols and inspections and is
much smaller than the statutory annual dose limit (*9), which means no impact on the health.
In addition, workers corresponding to this event entered into the controlled area wearing a personal
dose meter, whose preset dose level was established, in accordance with the entrance into the
controlled area,” with enough margin (below a half of the standard as depending on works) against the
daily dose control value (1mSv) pursuant to the notice of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare,
and timely confirmed the indicated value of the dose meter. They acted with cautions to prevent
contamination spread due to adhesion of contaminated material. Therefore, workers acted within the
planned radiation dose level which was previously specified.

3. Correspondence of NISA after the occurrence of this event


NISA dispatched local operational safety inspectors to the site after this event occurred in order to
confirm the site circumstances and it was confirmed that safety measures was adequately carried out
by the company in accordance with the safety preservation rule.

(*8) 0.05mSv: This exposure level is as large radiation exposure as that received by one health
check of chest X-ray
(*9) Statutory annual dose limit: 50mSv/year

510
4. Results of Provisional Evaluation by INES –
Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Level

- - 0- 0-

* INES (International Nuclear Event Scale) is the indicator rating the safety significance of the event occurred
at nuclear power station etc. Events are evaluated based on 3 criteria (such as criteria 1; off-site impact,
criteria 2; on-site impact, and criteria 3; degradation of the defense-in-depth) and the highest level among 3
evaluations is adopted as the INES evaluation level for the event. INES level is ranging from Level 0 (no
safety significance) to Level 7(major accident) and Level 0 is classified into Level 0- (event having no
possibility to challenge the safety requirement) and Level 0+ (event having a possibility to challenge the
safety requirement) for a nuclear power station.


511
Schematic diagram of the high conductivity liquid waste system and the concentrated liquid waste system
High conductivity liquid
waste collection pump
High conductivity High conductivity
(A)
liquid waste liquid waste
High conductivity High conductivity
collection tank demineralizer (A)
High conductivity liquid waste sample liquid waste sample
(A) liquid waste distilled High conductivity
tank (A) pump (A)
water tank (A) liquid waste distilled
High conductivity liquid
water pump (A)
waste collection pump
High conductivity
(B) Concentrating
liquid waste
collection tank equipment A High conductivity
liquid waste sample
(B)
tank (B)
High conductivity
liquid waste
High conductivity Concentrating
collection pump
liquid waste equipment B
(C) High conductivity High conductivity
collection tank
High conductivity liquid waste distilled High conductivity liquid waste sample
(C)
liquid waste distilled water pump (B) liquid waste pump (B)
High conductivity water tank (B) demineralizer (B)
liquid waste
collection tank
(D) Concentrated High conductivity
High conductivity
liquid waste liquid waste sample liquid waste sample
High conductivity

512
pump (A) tank (C) pump (C)
liquid waste Concentrated To discharge canal
From other sumps
collection pump liquid waste
(D) storage tank Concentrated
Concentrated
(A) liquid waste
liquid waste
receiving tank Plastic
pump (B)
for volume solidification
Concentrated reduction and equipment
liquid waste solidification
storage tank
(B)
Auxiliary building Auxiliary building
high conductivity
Concentrated liquid waste conductivity
highstorage pump Concentrated
liquid waste sump liquid waste sump Concentrated
<Drain system piping> liquid waste
tank (A) tank (B) liquid waste
Piping to drain liquid waste, ranging pump (C) Concentrated Drum
storage tank
from each drain pit to the sump tank (C) liquid waste
circulation pump

Drain pit Drain Valve : Solid waste treatment system


: Liquid waste treatment system
<Drain line>
Attachment 1

Piping to drain the cleaning water during the inspection of : Tank from which liquid waste was
the concentrated liquid waste storage tank, ranging from the drained this time
concentrated liquid waste storage tank to the drain pit
Attachment 2
Mechanism this event occurred

Circumstance at the drain of the liquid waste (prior this event occurred)
Concentrated liquid Concentrated liquid waste Concentrated Concentrated
waste storage tank (C) pump (C) room liquid waste pump liquid waste
room To concentrated liquid (B) room storage tank (B)
waste pump (C) room
To plastic solidification
Concentrated equipment of solid waste
liquid waste treatment system Floor leakage
storage tank (C) detector
Valve
Drain pit

Concentrated liquid waste


pump (C)
Drain pit Drain pit

Planned drain flow

(Status of drain)
Drain operation was carried out under the condition that liquid waste in the High conductivity
concentrated liquid waste storage tank (C) settled out and undissolved material liquid waste sump
was deposited in the bottom of the tank. tank (B)

Circumstance at the drain of the liquid waste


(at the time of leakage due to the drain of the undissolved material)
Concentrated liquid Concentrated liquid waste Concentrated
Concentrated liquid waste
waste storage tank (C) pump (C) room liquid waste
storage tank (B) room
room pump (B) room
To concentrated liquid 3) Liquid waste leaked from the drain pit which
waste pump (C) was connected with the drain piping
To plastic solidification
Concentrated
equipment of solid waste
liquid waste treatment system Floor leakage
storage tank (C)
detector
Valve Drain piping
Drain pit outlet was
buried
Concentrated liquid waste
Undissoved material pump (C) Drain pit Drain pit

Planned drain flow

2) Undissoved material such as iron rust was


extensively deposited in the piping.
1) Undissoved material was deposited High conductivity
liquid waste sump tank (B)
(Circumstance)
1) As the liquid waste remained in the bottom of the concentrated liquid waste storage tank (C) was
drained, undissolved material flowed into the high conductivity liquid waste sump tank (B)
through the drain piping and the outlet of the drain piping connecting with the high conductivity
liquid waste sump tank (B) was buried.
2) As the outlet of the drain piping connecting with the high conductivity liquid waste sump tank
(B) was buried and drain flow speed in the piping decreased, undissolved material was
sequentially deposited in the piping from downstream. 参
3) Liquid waste leaked on the building floor from the drain pit which was connected with the drain
piping.

513
Thinning of the residual heat removal sea water system piping, which
was found in the periodic inspection, at the Tokai Daini Power
Station, Japan Atomic Power Company

January 13, 2010


NISA㸭METI

Today (on January 13, 2010), the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) received a report
from Japan Atomic Power Company on the thinning of the residual heat removal sea water system
piping, which was found as a result of the inspection, at the Tokai Daini Power Station (BWR, rated
electric power 1100MWe) which was under shutdown for the periodic inspection, as follows.

1. The Report from Japan Atomic Power Company


Tokai Daini Power Station had been under the 24th periodic inspection. When the repair work (*1)
of the lining (inner surface treatment) of the piping in the residual heat removal sea water system (*2)
(A) was performed, marks of corrosion were found in a part of the outer surface of the inlet piping for
the heat exchanger installed in the vicinity of the building penetration. Therefore, a wall thickness of
the concerned portion has been measured and one location with 6.7mm thick wall was found. This
thickness was confirmed to be less than the required minimum wall thickness (7.08mm) calculated
based on the technical standards.
In addition, no location where a thickness is less than the required minimum wall thickness was
found other than the concerned location.
This event had no impact of radioactive material on the environment.

(*1) This means the replacement of the lining installed on the inner surface of piping.
Repair of lining of the residual heat removal sea water system piping has been carried out from
the 15th periodic inspection.
(*2)”Residual heat removal system” is the system for cooling the reactor, i.e. the decay heat
removal of the fuel, after its shutdown. “Residual heat removal sea water system piping” is the
piping installed for cooling the residual heat removal system by using sea water.

2. Actions of NISA
NISA received the report of this event pursuant to article 19-17 of “the rule for the installation,
operation, etc. of commercial power reactors.”
Afterwards, NISA will continue the rigorous checking of the investigation of causes and the
corresponding countermeasures against recurrence, which will be carried out by the company pursuant
to the law.

– Results of Provisional Evaluation by INES –


Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Level

- - 0- 0-

* INES (International Nuclear Event Scale) is the indicator rating the safety significance of the event occurred
at nuclear power station etc. Events are evaluated based on 3 criteria (such as criteria 1; off-site impact,
criteria 2; on-site impact, and criteria 3; degradation of the defense-in-depth) and the highest level among 3

514
evaluations is adopted as the INES evaluation level for the event. INES level is ranging from Level 0 (no
safety significance) to Level 7(major accident) and Level 0 is classified into Level 0- (event having no
possibility to challenge the safety requirement) and Level 0+ (event having a possibility to challenge the
safety requirement) for a nuclear power station.


515
Attachment

Schematic diagram of the residual heat removal sea water system piping

Tokai Daini Power Station

Turbine building Tokai


Radioactive port
waste
treatment Seawater
building intake

Reactor building
Location of Pacific ocean
the occurrence

Blue line: Piping

Schematic diagram of the Tokai Daini Power Station and


the location where this event occurred

Residual heat removal To the reactor


sea water pump recirculation line
Heat exchanger (A) for
the residual heat
removal system

Concerned piping
Trench structure (a building
penetration)

Residual heat From the reactor


removal pump recirculation line
To water
discharge Inside the
canal radioactive
Flow Outside waste
the building treatment Inside the reactor building
building

Schematic diagram of the residual heat removal system

516
Causes of and countermeasures against thinning of the residual heat
removal sea water system piping, which was found in the periodic
inspection, at the Tokai Daini Power Station, Japan Atomic Power
Company

February 24, 2010


NISA㸭METI

Today (on February 24, 2010), the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) received a report
from Japan Atomic Power Company (JAPC) on the causes of and countermeasures against thinning of
the sea water system piping (*1) for the residual heat removal system (*2), which was reported on
January 13, 2010, at the Tokai Daini Power Station (BWR, rated electric power 1100MWe) which had
been under its periodic inspection.
Causes are estimated as follows; outer surface of the piping was corroded and thickness of the
piping was less than the required minimum wall thickness because the inspection had never been
performed by taking into consideration the humid environment for a long time.
Countermeasures are repair of the concerned piping and improvement of the maintenance work
management.
NISA concludes that the report submitted by JAPC is appropriate because the causes are adequately
estimated based on the various investigations and countermeasures are adequately based on the
estimated causes.
(*1) Seawater system piping: the piping installed for cooling the residual heat removal system by
using sea water.
(*2) Residual heat removal system: the system for cooling the reactor (removing the residual heat of
the fuel) after its shutdown..

1. Main points of the report from Japan Atomic Power Company


Main points of the report from JAPC are as follows;
(1) Cause investigation results and estimated causes
- In the trench structure (reinforced concrete space) where piping in the building penetration, in
which thinning was found, was installed, mark of rainwater flow was found on the inner surface
of the ceiling hatch (an opening) and rust and the mark of rainwater flow were found on the
anchor support (support frame) of the concerned piping which was installed just below the
concerned hatch. In addition, in the different trench, mortar filled in the gap between the building
penetration and piping was stuck out and some gaps were found.
- In addition, although finish coating of the piping in the trench was carried out in the field during
its installation, finish coating of the anchor support was not carried out because its field work was
difficult to carry out and corrosion was likely to generate.
- On the other hand, as the trench has not ventilating equipment and a lack of oxygen is likely to
occur, it was not designated as a daily patrol check place. Therefore, conditions (such as intrusion
of rainwater, generation of rust etc.) of the inside of the trench were not recognized at all. In
addition, the environment of the portion whose visual inspection is hard to carry out was regarded
as the same with the portion whose visual inspection is possible, and thus the building penetration
had not been inspected taking into consideration the possibility that it would be under the humid
environment for a long time.
- Under these circumstances, rainwater which entered from the hatch opening intruded into the gap
between the piping and the mortar, and then the piping had been under the humid environment 参
for a long time. Resultantly, it was estimated that outer surface of the piping was corroded and its
wall thickness became the required minimum wall thickness.

517
(2) Countermeasures
1) Repair of the piping
- As to the portion where its wall thickness is less than the required minimum wall thickness,
thinned portion will be removed and restored.
- When the piping will be replaced, finish coating of the portion which is surrounded by the anchor
support will be performed. And the anchor support will be changed to enable the visual
inspection of the outer surface of the piping installed in the anchor support, whose visual
inspection had not been possible until now.

2) Improvement of the maintenance work management


- As to the piping whose daily patrol is not possible, integrity of its outer surface will be confirmed
during the equipment inspection such as the periodic inspection.
- As to the inspection of portions whose visual inspection is hard to perform, integrity of its outer
surface will be confirmed by partly removing interference material such as mortar with a
frequency that was set by taking into consideration the corrosion environment at the location
where piping is installed.
- Furthermore, whenever any changes of the local circumstances of the location where piping is
installed will be recognized during the equipment inspection, corrosion environment will be
improved such as taking a prevention measure against rainwater intrusion.

2. Actions of NISA
This event is that thickness of the piping, which was shipped to the factory for its inspection during
the periodic inspection, was confirmed to be less than the required minimum wall thickness calculated
based on the technical standards. However, based on the facts that the concerned piping was
confirmed to be no leakage in the periodic inspection and another residual heat removal system and its
sea water system piping are normal, this event does not immediately induce the safety issue at this
time.
NISA concludes that the report submitted by JAPC is appropriate because the causes are adequately
estimated based on the various investigations and countermeasures are adequately based on the
estimated causes.
Afterward, NISA will continue to confirm, through the operational safety inspection etc., the
implementation status of the countermeasure against the recurrence by JAPC and the experience
feedback status in other plants.

(Reference)
1. Summary of this event
Tokai Daini Power Station had been under the 24th periodic inspection. When the repair work (*3)
of the lining (inner surface treatment) of the piping in the residual heat removal sea water system (A)
was performed, marks of corrosion were found in a part of the outer surface of the inlet piping for the
heat exchanger installed in the vicinity of the building penetration.
Therefore, a wall thickness of the concerned portion has been measured and one location with 6.7mm
thick wall was found. This thickness was confirmed to be less than the required minimum wall
thickness (7.08mm) calculated based on the technical standards.
In addition, no location where a thickness is less than the required minimum wall thickness was
found other than the concerned location.
On the other hand, when this event occurred, the residual heat removal sea water system (A) and the
residual heat removal system (A) were isolated from the reactor and thus the residual heat from the

518
fuel was removed by the residual heat removal sea water system (B) and the residual heat removal
system (B).
This event had no impact of radioactive material on the environment.

(*3) This means the replacement of the lining installed on the inner surface of piping.
Repair of linings of the residual heat removal sea water system piping has been carried out
from the 15th periodic inspection.

2. Results of Provisional Evaluation by INES


Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Level

- - 0- 0-

* INES (International Nuclear Event Scale) is the indicator rating the safety significance of the event occurred
at nuclear power station etc. Events are evaluated based on 3 criteria (such as criteria 1; off-site impact,
criteria 2; on-site impact, and criteria 3; degradation of the defense-in-depth) and the highest level among 3
evaluations is adopted as the INES evaluation level for the event. INES level is ranging from Level 0 (no
safety significance) to Level 7(major accident) and Level 0 is classified into Level 0- (event having no
possibility to challenge the safety requirement) and Level 0+ (event having a possibility to challenge the
safety requirement) for a nuclear power station.


519
(Attachment)
Investigation results of causes for thinning of the residual heat removal sea water system piping
— causes and countermeasures —
Concrete hatch
Reactor building
(outdoor equipment) Mark of rainwater
drop
Reacto r cont ainmen t
Residu al hea t vessel
remova l system-A
heat exchanger

To discharge canal

Trench
Residual heat removal
sea water system
Residual heat
pump-A (2 units)
Radioactive waste removal sea water
treatment building Residual heat removal system-A piping
system pump-A
Upper anchor
support frame

Schematic diagram of the residual heat removal Inside of the trench structure of the residual
sea water system heat removal sea water system –A
Rainwater intrusion from a gap Drop and penetration Humid environment Status of corrosion and
of rainwater thinning at the piping
in the concrete hatch
Anchor support Mortar
Accumulated water Anticorrosive
frame
coating
Drainage hole
Accumulated water Degradation of the coating and Piping
Drainage hole occurrence of corrosion (rust)
Drainage hole
Thickn ess
Mortar
Sleeve
Humid environment

Accumulated water Sleeve


Development of corrosion
Water
Direction of evaporation
or Rainwater
seawater flow drop
Humid environment
Mortar Required
Iron elutes at the low
dissolved oxygen minimum
Results of inspection and wall
Further Less than the concentration
investigation(Estimated mechanism of development required minimum thickness:
(corrosion reaction)
thinning in the outer piping surface) of corrosion wall thickness 7.08mm

Countermeasures (repair of the piping) Countermeasures (change of the anchor support)


Inside the Inside the building
trench
Prior to taking countermeasures After taking countermeasures

Wall Anchor support Wall


frame
Anchor support frame Filling material
Filling material
Finishing (mortar)
Removal of the (mortar)
mortar evenly
thinning portion
Switch from right to left
Jointed as a flange construction

Make the gap


Piping penetration between the Piping
in the building support frame penetration in
wall (sleeve) and the wall to the building
enable the visual wall (sleeve)
Anticorrosive coating + Anticorrosive coating +
inspection
finish coating insulating material
(prior to construction) (inside the building)

520
Significant signal indications of flaw on the Steam Generator tube
found during the periodic inspection of Takahama Power Station
Unit-4, Kansai Electric Power Company

March 16, 2010


NISA㸭METI

Today (on March 16, 2010), the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) received a report
from Kansai Electric Power Company on significant signal indications of flaw on the Steam Generator
(SG) tube at Takahama Power Station Unit-4 (PWR, rated electric power: 870 MWe), which had been
under shutdown due to its periodic inspection, pursuant to the law, as follows.

1. The Report from Kansai Electric Power Company


Takahama Unit-4 had been under shutdown due to its periodic inspection. The Eddy Current Test
(ECT) (*1) was performed on all tubes (9,757 tubes in total except plugged ones) of 3 SGs to confirm
their integrity. Significant signal indications of flaw were recognized on one tube in the SG-C (3,261
tubes in total except plugged ones). Significant signal indications were recognized in the tubesheet
(*2) portion in the hot-leg side (or in the primary coolant inlet side).
No significant signal indication of flaw was recognized on 2 SGs other than the SG-C.
One SG tube where significant signal indications of flaw were recognized will be investigated to
find the causes.
In addition, there was no impact of radioactive materials to the environment.

*1: Eddy Current Test (ECT)


Eddy currents are induced on an object when moving a coil, in which high frequency current is
flowing, closer to a SG tube. The change of eddy currents due to a crack in the object can be
detected as the electrical signal. ECT is one of inspection methods to find a crack by using this
principle.
*2: Tubesheet
This is one of components, a thick sheet, of the SG used to install SG tubes. SG tubes and
tubesheet constitute pressure boundaries between the primary coolant and the feedwater or the
secondary cooling water.

2. Actions of NISA
NISA received the report of this event pursuant to article 19-17 of “the rule for the installation,
operation, etc. of commercial power reactors.”
Afterwards, NISA will continue the rigorous checking of the investigation of causes and the
corresponding countermeasures against recurrence, which will be carried out by the company pursuant
to the law.

– Results of Provisional Evaluation by INES –


Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Level

- - 0- 0-

* INES (International Nuclear Event Scale) is the indicator rating the safety significance of the

event occurred at nuclear power station etc. Events are evaluated based on 3 criteria (such as
criteria 1; off-site impact, criteria 2; on-site impact, and criteria 3; degradation of the 付
521
defense-in-depth) and the highest level among 3 evaluations is adopted as the INES evaluation
level for the event. INES level is ranging from Level 0 (no safety significance) to Level 7(major
accident) and Level 0 is classified into Level 0- (event having no possibility to challenge the
safety requirement) and Level 0+ (event having a possibility to challenge the safety requirement)
for a nuclear power station.

522
Status of the Periodic Inspection of the Takahama Power Station Unit-4

Location of Occurrence Schematic of the steam generator


Steam outlet
Schematic diagram
: Flow of the primary coolant
of the systems

Pressuriz Steam Generator -A, -B, -C

To Steam turbine

Feedwater

SG Tubes
Secondary cooling
Reactor vessel Primary Coolant pump water inlet

Approx. 21m
Reactor containment vessel
Tube support plate
Cross sectional view of the lower part of the SG
Secondary coolant

SG tubes SG tubes
(cold-leg side) (hot-leg side)
Tubesheet

Dividing plate Tubesheet


Primary coolant nozzles

Primary coolant inlet


Primary coolant outlet Primary coolant inlet Primary coolant outlet
(hot-leg side)
(cold-leg side) (hot-leg side) (cold-leg side)

Position Map of SG Tubes Viewed from the Top of SG (hot-leg side)


䖃: Tube with the significant signal indication (1 tube)
䖃: Plugged tubes (121 tubes)
Enlarged view of the
tubesheet portion
Tube with significant
SG tube Location of signal signal indication
indication

Approx. 550mm
Tubesheet

SG-Tube outer diameter: approx. 22.2mm


SG-Tube thickness: approx. 1.3mm
SG-Tube material: Inconel 600(special thermal treatment (*))

* This is a method used to enhance the corrosion resistance of a metal in a way
that it is highly heated and maintained for a certain time of period (for about 15
hours at approx. 700 degrees Celsius) and then is gradually cooled.

523
Causes of and countermeasures against the significant signal
indications of flaw on the steam generator tube found during the
periodic inspection of Takahama Power Station Unit-4, Kansai
Electric Power Company

March 23, 2010


NISA㸭METI

Today (on March 23, 2010), the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) received a report
from Kansai Electric Power Company (KEPCO) on causes of and countermeasures against the
significant signal indications of flaw on the SG tube, which was reported on March 16, 2010, at
Takahama Power Station Unit-4 (PWR, rated electric power: 870 MWe), which had been under
shutdown due to its periodic inspection.
Cause is estimated to be the primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC(*1)) specific to PWR
plants, whose technical findings are well known. As countermeasures, the concerned tube will be
plugged and Eddy Current Test (ECT(*2)) of all SG tubes will be implemented every periodic
inspection in future.
The report submitted by KEPCO is summarized as follows; causes are appropriately estimated
based on the various investigations and lessons learned, and countermeasures are appropriate based on
the estimated causes. Therefore, NISA concluded that the content of the concerned report is
appropriate.

(*1) PWSCC (Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking)


Stress corrosion crack specific to PWR plant, which is generated in the specific material
(Nickel-based Alloy 600) under the primary cooling water environment (the crack generated
due to the combined of the three factors: material, environment and stress)
(*2) Eddy Current Test (ECT)
Eddy currents are induced on an object when moving a coil, in which high frequency current is
flowing, closer to a SG tube. The change of eddy currents due to a crack in the object can be
detected as the electrical signal. ECT is one of inspection methods to find a crack by using this
principle.

1. Main points of the report from KEPCO


Main points of the report from KEPCO are as follows;

(1) Investigation result of the causes and the estimated causes


- During the 11th periodic inspection (in 1999) of Takahama Unit-4, significant signal indications of
flaw by the ECT were recognized on the SG tubes in the tubesheet portion (*3) in the hot-leg side.
As the investigation result of the tubes, an axial directional crack was recognized in the inner side
of the tube installed in the top end of the tube expansion region (*4).
- Causes were estimated as follows; Residual stress locally generated in its inner surface when
expanding Nickel-based Alloy 600 tube during manufacturing a steam generator.
Primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) generated as a result of the combined effects
of the residual stress and the pressure of the primary coolant in the reactor operation.
Countermeasures such as a plugging of the concerned tube and implementation of ECT of all SG
tubes every periodic inspection have been taken.
- Afterwards, PWSCC were recognized in the tubesheet portion in the hot-leg side, which were
similar to the one found in the 11th periodic inspection, at the 12th (in 2000), 13th (in 2001), 14th

524
(in 2002) and 18th (in 2008) periodic inspection, and concerned tubes were plugged.
- In addition, as a countermeasure against the stress corrosion cracking (SCC), shotpeening
treatment (*5) was implemented at the inner side of SG tubes in the tubesheet portion of the
hot-leg side for improving the residual stress during the 13th periodic inspection. On the other
hand, it is well known that shotpeening treatment has little effect on the flaw with a certain depth
(approx. 0.2mm). Therefore, even if the flaw depth is smaller than the detection limit of ECT
(approx. 0.5mm), it will develop over time and could be detected later.
- As a result of the detailed analysis of the significant signal indications recognized in this time, this
was evaluated as an axial directional non-through-wall crack in the inner surface of the tube. This
crack has the same characteristics with PWSCC whose technical findings are well known.
- Based on the facts mentioned above, the significant signal indications recognized in this time was
estimated that PWSCC generated and developed, as well as flaws found after the 11th periodic
inspection, and it was detected in this time.

(*3) Tubesheet portion


This is a portion of thick sheet where SG tubes are installed. SG tubes and tubesheet constitute
the pressure boundaries between the primary coolant and the feedwater or the secondary
cooling water.
(*4) Tube expansion region
This is a region where a tube and a tubesheet are firmly bonded by applying a high pressure on
the inner side of the tube after inserting a tube into a hole in the tubesheet. In the case of
Takahama Unit-4, a tube is hydraulically expanded and then is finished by pressure bonding.
(*5) Shotpeening
This is a method that the residual stress remained in an inner surface portion of the SG tube is
improved by impacting the inner surface with small metal balls.

(2) Countermeasures
- One tube where significant signal indications were recognized will be plugged at the tubesheet
portion in the hot-leg and the cold leg sides for no future usage.
- All SG tubes will be inspected by ECT for confirming their integrity every periodic inspection in
the future.

2. Actions of NISA
As a result of the periodic inspection of the SG tubes which is important safety related equipment,
significant signal indications implying the existence of flaws were recognized. At present, this event
could not immediately become a safety issue based on the facts that the flaw is non-through-wall and
there was no operational record of primary coolant leakage.
The report submitted by the company is summarized as follows; causes are appropriately estimated
based on the various investigations and lessons learned, and countermeasures are appropriate based on
the estimated causes. Therefore, NISA concluded that the content of the concerned report is
appropriate.
Afterward, NISA will continue to confirm the integrity of the SG tubes through the periodic
inspection etc.

(Reference)
1. Summary of this event
Takahama Unit-4 had been under shutdown due to its periodic inspection. The Eddy Current Test
(ECT) was performed on all tubes (9,757 tubes in total except plugged ones) of 3 SGs to confirm their

integrity. On March 16. 2010, significant signal indications of flaw were recognized on one tube in the
SG-C (3,261 tubes in total except plugged ones). 付
525
Significant signal indications were recognized in the tubesheet portion in the hot-leg side (or in the
primary coolant inlet side).
No significant signal indication of flaw was recognized on 2 SGs other than the SG-C.
One SG tube where significant signal indications of flaw were recognized will be investigated to
find the causes.
In addition, there was no impact of radioactive materials to the environment.

2. Results of provisional evaluation by INES(*) at the occurrence of this event


Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Level

- - 0- 0-

(*) INES (International Nuclear Event Scale) is the indicator rating the safety significance of the event
occurred at nuclear power station etc. Events are evaluated based on 3 criteria (such as criteria 1; off-site
impact, criteria 2; on-site impact, and criteria 3; degradation of the defense-in-depth) and the highest level
among 3 evaluations is adopted as the INES evaluation level for the event. INES level is ranging from
Level 0 (no safety significance) to Level 7(major accident) and Level 0 is classified into Level 0- (event
having no possibility to challenge the safety requirement) and Level 0+ (event having a possibility to
challenge the safety requirement) for a nuclear power station.

526
Significant signal indications of flaw on the Steam Generator tube found
during the periodic inspection of Takahama Power Station Unit-4
Location of Occurrence Schematic of the steam generator
Steam outlet
Schematic diagram
: Flow of the reactor coolant
of the systems
Pressurizer
Steam Generator -A, -B, -C

To Steam turbine

Feedwater

SG Tubes
Reactor vessel Secondary cooling
Primary Coolant pump
water inlet

Reactor containment vessel Approx. 21m

Tube support plate


Cross sectional view of the lower part of the SG
㻿㼑㼏㼛㼚㼐㼍㼞㼥㻌㼏㼛㼛㼘㼍㼚㼠

SG tubes SG tubes
(cold-leg side) (hot-leg side)
Tubesheet

Tubesheet
Dividing plate Primary coolant nozzles

Primary coolant inlet


Primary coolant outlet Primary coolant inlet Primary coolant outlet (hot-leg side)
(cold-leg side) (hot-leg side) (cold-leg side)

Position Map of SG Tubes Viewed from the Top of SG (hot-leg side)

Enlarged view of the


tubesheet portion
Tube with significant
SG tube Location of signal signal indication
indication

Approx. 550mm
䖃: Tube with the
Tubesheet significant signal
indication (1 tube)
䖃: Plugged tubes
(121 tubes)

SG-Tube outer diameter: approx. 22.2mm


SG-Tube thickness: approx. 1.3mm
SG-Tube material: Inconel 600(special thermal treatment (*))
* This is a method used to enhance the corrosion resistance of a metal in a way

that it is highly heated and maintained for a certain time of period (for about 15
hours at approx. 700 degrees Celsius) and then is gradually cooled.

527
ECT Inspection Results

Location where signal indications were recognized Roller tube expansion region (Illustrative)
Approx.22.2mm
Top end of the roller Hydraulic tube expansion
Tube tube expansion boundary
(22nd pitch)
Top end

Location where signal


Tubesheet indications were recognized
Hydraulic tube
expansion area 22nd pitch

Approx.550mm Roller tube


expansion area
21st pitch

Bottom end Location where signal indications were recognized is at


the top end of the 22nd pitch of a roller tube expansion
Method of tube expansion in the tubesheet portion
during manufacturing the SG

Tube
During a roller expansion
in the tubesheet region,
the residual tensile stress
locally generated on the
Tubesheet inner surface of the tube.

Hydraulic tube Mechanical roller


expansion jig Hydraulic tube Roller tube expansion
expansion (1-22 pitches)

Countermeasure
Effects of the Shotpeening and Detectable area by ECT
(Plugging method)
Mechanical plug
Schematic of Shotpeening Treatment
Core cylinder
Approx.22.2mm
Tube Screw a tip of
plugging
machine into a
core cylinder.

Tubesheet 䝅䝵䝑䝖 A tip of plugging


Approx.550mm
machine
✵Ẽ

The residual tensile stress generated in a metal surface layer is


changed to the residual compression stress by impacting the surface
with shots (metal ball with about 0.2mm in diameter) by air.
Mechanical plug

Tube Tube

Compression stress
generation region by Tubesheet
shotpeening
Detectable region by ECT
Tubesheet
When a tip of the flaw
exists in this region, it
develops and could
come to the surface.
Pulled down

By pulling down a tip of the plugging


Approx.0.2mm machine after inserting a mechanical plug
into the tube, a core cylinder is also pulled
Approx.0.5mm down and then the mechanical plug is
Approx.1.3mm expanded.

528
Flaw on the weld of the air vent piping in the chemical and volume
control system found at Mihama Power Station Unit-2, Kansai
Electric Power Company

March 23, 2010


NISA㸭METI

Today (on March 23, 2010), the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) received a report
from Kansai Electric Power Company on the flaw on the weld of the air vent piping (air extraction
piping) in the chemical and volume control system (*1) at Mihama Power Station Unit-2 (PWR, rated
electric power: 500 MWe), which had been under shutdown due to its detailed inspection, as follows.

1. The Report from Kansai Electric Power Company


Mihama Power Station Unit-2 had been in the rated thermal power constant operation.
Around 12:00, on March 19, 2010, an operator in the main control room found by TV camera that
water drops were falling in the regenerative heat exchanger (*2) room in the containment vessel.
Therefore, the reactor was shut down at 21:55 on the same day for identifying the location of the
leakage and implementing the detailed inspection and investigation.
As the results of the visual inspection and the penetrant test (*3) of the leakage point, which have
been performed till today (on March 23, 2010), an indication mark of flaw with 26mm in length
(circumferential) was found on the weld in the air vent piping which branches just before the point
where the charging water to the reactor coolant system flows into the regenerative heat exchanger. It
was confirmed that the concerned important safety related equipment, did not comply with “the
technical standards for Nuclear Power Generation Equipment.”
In addition, the water drops which fell remained in the containment vessel and there was no impact
of radioactive materials to the environment.

(*1) Chemical and volume control system


This is the system that the primary coolant is partly extracted from the reactor coolant system
and cleaned, and then charged into the reactor coolant system after adjusting the coolant
inventory and the boron concentration.
(*2) Regenerative heat exchanger
This is the equipment that extracts primary coolant for the heat exchange.
(*3) Penetrant test
This is the one of nondestructive inspections to visibly identify flaws in the surface by spraying
special liquid such as red dyeing penetrant to the surface of the item being tested.

2. Actions of NISA
NISA received the report of this event pursuant to article 19-17 of “the rule for the installation,
operation, etc. of commercial power reactors.”
After finding that water drops were falling, local operational safety inspectors confirmed the safe
shutdown of the plant and the on-site maintenance.
Afterwards, NISA will continue the rigorous checking of the investigation of causes and the
corresponding countermeasures against recurrence, which will be carried out by the company pursuant
to the law.


529
– Results of Provisional Evaluation by INES(*) –
Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Level

- - 0- 0-

* INES (International Nuclear Event Scale) is the indicator rating the safety significance of the
event occurred at nuclear power station etc. Events are evaluated based on 3 criteria (such as
criteria 1; off-site impact, criteria 2; on-site impact, and criteria 3; degradation of the
defense-in-depth) and the highest level among 3 evaluations is adopted as the INES evaluation
level for the event. INES level is ranging from Level 0 (no safety significance) to Level 7(major
accident) and Level 0 is classified into Level 0- (event having no possibility to challenge the
safety requirement) and Level 0+ (event having a possibility to challenge the safety requirement)
for a nuclear power station.

530
Location of
occurrence Location of occurrence
(the 1st basement of the
Reactor Pressurizer containment vessel)
vessel
Room inside viewed from
䛆Chemical and volume
control system䛇 the monitoring camera side
Steam Generator

Coolant Air vent piping is located approx. 2m above this point


demineralizer

Support
Primary Extraction
Volume
coolant pump piping control tank Regenerative
heat
Charging piping Charging pump
exchanger-C
Reactor containment vessel
Regene rative heat exchan ger Regenerative
Charging heat
piping exchanger-B
Investigation status of the regenerative heat exchanger room
䛆Legend䛇
Extraction piping Charging piping Location where boron attached
Region
To the coolant demineralizer where
(approx. 140䉝) camera
monitoring
Air ve nt val ve
is possible

Approx. Monitoring camera Location where water drops were observed to be


25cm falling by the monitoring camera

Regene rative
heat
From the charging
Approx. 150cm pump (approx. 40䉝)
exchan ger-A
To the reactor coolant
Regene rative
heat
system (approx. 240䉝) Status of the air vent piping
Approx. 5m
exchan ger-B
Regene rative
From the reactor
heat
coolant system
exchan ger-C
(approx. 290䉝)

Finding that water drops were


Approx.
falling (4 drops/ min)
90cm Approx. 15cm 䛆Specifications of the regenerative heat exchanger䛇
Type: vertical U-tube with 3 shells
䚷䚷 (Heat exchanger to exchange heat in 3 stages)
Water puddle Weight: approx. 1 ton
(depth: approx. 0.5cm)

Penetrant test results


Side view
䠖Indication mark Location
Air vent piping where
Indication mark Material: stainless boron
Outer diameter:
approx.2.7cm deposited
Approx. 2.6cm Approx. 2.7cm
Nozzle stab Approx. 9cm
(piping with different diameters)
Material: stainless
Approx. 7.6cm From the
Outer diameter: 㻯㼔㼍㼞㼓㼕㼚㼓㻌㼜㼕㼜㼕㼚㼓 charging
approx. 6cm to 2.7cm
pump
Regenerative heat Approx. 6cm From the
exchanger-C charging pump

Charging piping
Material: stainless Top view
Outer diameter: approx. 6cm To the regenerative heat exchanger-C
To the regenerative
heat exchanger-C
From the
charging pump

Approx. 2.6cm

531
Causes of and countermeasures against the flaw on the weld of the
air vent piping in the chemical and volume control system found at
Mihama Power Station Unit-2, Kansai Electric Power Company

April 2, 2010
NISA㸭METI

On March 23, 2010, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) received a report from
Kansai Electric Power Company (KEPCO) concerning the flaw on the weld of the air vent piping (air
extraction piping) in the chemical and volume control system (*1) at Mihama Power Station Unit-2
(PWR, rated electric power: 500 MWe) (reported on March 23, 2010).
There was no unplanned radiation exposure accompanied with this event. And there was no impact
of radioactive materials to the environment.
On April 2, 2010, NISA received a report from KEPCO concerning the causes of and
countermeasures against this event.
Causes are estimated as the concerned air vent piping resonated (*2) with the vibrations
accompanied with the operation of the charging pump (*3) and high cycle fatigue cracks (*4)
generated. Countermeasures are taken as the piping is replaced with the one with higher rigidity to
prevent the resonance and integrity evaluation against the resonance is thoroughly implemented
whenever the specification is changed.
NISA concluded that the report submitted by KEPCO is appropriate because the causes are
adequately estimated based on the various investigations and countermeasures are adequately based on
the causes.

(*1) Chemical and volume control system


This is the system that the primary coolant is partly extracted from the reactor coolant system
and cleaned, and then charged into the reactor coolant system after adjusting the coolant
inventory and the boron concentration.
(*2) Resonance
Resonance is a phenomenon which a system oscilates at larger amplitude at some frequencies
that its natural frequency or very close to a natural frequency.
(*3) Charging pump
Charging pump is a pump in order to charge primary coolant into the reactor coolant system.
(*4) High cycle fatigue crack
High cycle fatigue crack is the fracture phenomenon occurred when stress is repeatedly applied
on material. Typically, the number of repeat is more than 10000.

1. Impacts of this event on the plant safety


This event is the case that a through-wall crack was found in the system to charging the boric acid
solution. An amount of leaked water is as little as 4 drops/min (0.0015m3 in total volume) and this
event can be no problem in terms of the function of boric acid solution injection. And this amount of
leakage is much smaller than the operational limit (2.3m3/h) of the primary coolant leakage rate in the
reactor containment vessel. Therefore, this event does not impact to the plant safety.
In addition, as all amount of leaked water remained in the reactor containment vessel, there was no
unplanned radiation exposure accompanied with this event and no impact of radioactive material to the
environment.
After finding the falling of water drops, NISA dispatched local nuclear safety operation inspectors
to the site. They grasped this event situation and confirmed that the plant safety is maintained through

532
the following activities;
- Confirmation of the content of event, the corresponding actions taken by the company and the
future plan of works
- Confirmation of the operation parameters such as reactor power, pressurizer water level, primary
coolant pressure
- Confirmation of records of each stack monitor in the off-gas treatment system and monitoring
posts
- Confirmation of safe shutdown of the reactor
- Witness of the specific work at the leakage point

2. Main points of the report from KEPCO


Main points of the report from KEPCO are as follows;
(1) Investigation results of the causes and estimated causes
- As a result of the penetrant test (*5) of the piping where flaws were found, some indication marks
were confirmed, such as indication marks of approx.26mm at the center of weld on the outer
surface and approx.15mm near the boundary of weld in the inner surface and the base metal of
the nozzle stub.
- As a result of the expanded observation of the fracture surface, beach marks (*6) and structural
patterns (*7), which were characteristics of the fatigue crack, were observed.
Therefore, it was estimated that a crack generated in the inner surface of the piping and
developed toward the outer surface.
- As the investigation result of the influence of vibrations generated during the operation of the
charging pump on the concerned piping, it was confirmed during the periodic inspection that
natural frequency (*8) (22.0Hz) of the concerned piping is within the resonance range of the
frequency (21.8Hz) generated at the 100% flow operation of the charging pump, and then the
stress exceeding the fatigue strength (*9) corresponding to the operating hours generated.
- And, it was confirmed that, once a crack would generate, it could develop even at the stress
generated by the normal operation (at approx.80% flow) of the charging pump.
- On the other hand, after 1999, small bore branch piping including the concerned piping had been
managed in terms of vibration management such as vibration measurement at the specification
changes according to the management manual which was made by reflecting the event on the
small bore branch piping occurred at Ohi Power Station Unit-2 in 1998.
- However, when the inspection record of the concerned piping was checked this time, it was
confirmed that the valve handle of the concerned piping was replaced with a heavier one during
the 22nd periodic inspection (in 2005), but an influence of vibration was not evaluated by
vibration measurement. (It was confirmed that there was no problem on the concerned piping
prior to its replacement.)
- Based on these facts mentioned above, causes are estimated as follows; The natural frequency of
the concerned piping changed due to the replacement of its valve handle during the 22nd periodic
inspection. The concerned piping resonated when the charging pump was operated at 100% flow
in the subsequent periodic inspections and cracks due to high cycle fatigue generated in the inner
surface of the concerned piping by the repeated stress. Afterward, the crack developed during the
normal operation of the charging pump and eventually ran through the wall.

(*5) Penetrant test


Penetrant test is one of nondestructive inspections to visibly identify flaws in the surface by
spraying special liquid such as red dyeing penetrant to the surface of the item being tested.
(*6) Beach mark

Beach mark is one of characteristic fracture surface patterns observed in the fatigue fracture
surface and is the striped pattern which is similar to wave trace remaining in the sand beach. 付
533
(*7) Structural pattern
Structural pattern is one of characteristic fracture surface patterns observed in the fatigue
fracture surface. It is similar to the metal structural pattern observed in the surface treatment
process (etching) of metal using chemicals.
(*8) Natural frequency
Natural frequency is the specific frequency which it is most easy to vibrate. Natural frequency
of piping is based on its weight, length, etc.
(*9) Fatigue strength
Fatigue strength is the upper limit of the stress at which material can withstand when a
repeated stress is applied.

(2) Countermeasures
- In order to prevent the resonance in the concerned piping, the valve handle is replaced with a
lighter one and the piping is replaced with an improved one with higher rigidity. In addition,
regarding the small bore piping except the concerned piping which could be susceptive to
vibrations, it was confirmed that no construction with the specification changes was implemented
after most recent vibration measurement.
- Management manual is clarified to ensure that evaluation of influence of vibrations and
confirmation of integrity by the vibration measurement is thoroughly implemented in the
planning stage whenever construction with specification changes on small bore branch piping is
carried out.

2. Actions of NISA
NISA concluded that the report submitted by KEPCO is appropriate because the causes are
adequately estimated based on the various investigations and countermeasures are adequately based on
the causes.
Afterward, NISA will continue to confirm, through the operational safety inspection etc., the
implementation status of the countermeasure against the recurrence by the company and the feedback
status of the concerned countermeasures in other plants.

(Reference)
1. Summary of this event
Mihama Power Station Unit-2 had been in the rated thermal power constant operation.
Around 12:00, on March 19, 2010, an operator in the main control room found by TV camera that
water drops were falling in the regenerative heat exchanger (*10) room in the containment vessel.
Therefore, the reactor power was decreased from 14:00 and the reactor was shut down at 21:55 on the
same day for identifying the location of the leakage and implementing the detailed inspection and
investigation.
As the results of the visual inspection and the penetrant test of the leakage point, which have been
performed till March 23, 2010, an indication mark of flaw with 26mm in length (circumferential) was
found on the weld in the air vent piping which branches just before the point where the charging water
to the reactor coolant system flows into the regenerative heat exchanger. It was confirmed that the
concerned important safety related equipment, did not comply with “the technical standards for
Nuclear Power Generation Equipment.”

(*10) Regenerative heat exchanger


This is the equipment that extracts primary coolant for the heat exchange.

534
2. Results of Provisional Evaluation by INES (*11)
Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Level

- - 0- 0-

(*11) Evaluation by the INES User’s Manual 2001 Edition INES (International Nuclear Event Scale) is the
indicator rating the safety significance of the event occurred at nuclear power station etc. Events are
evaluated based on 3 criteria (such as criteria 1; off-site impact, criteria 2; on-site impact, and criteria 3;
degradation of the defense-in-depth) and the highest level among 3 evaluations is adopted as the INES
evaluation level for the event. INES level is ranging from Level 0 (no safety significance) to Level
7(major accident) and Level 0 is classified into Level 0- (event having no possibility to challenge the
safety requirement) and Level 0+ (event having a possibility to challenge the safety requirement) for a
nuclear power station.


535
Location of occurrence

Investigation status of the regenerative


heat exchanger room
Air vent
Location of occurrence To the coolant
valve
[Legend]
demineralizer
(the 1st basement of the (approx. 140Υ) Location where boron
Reactor containment vessel containment vessel) attached
Chargi ng pip ing
Regenerative heat Approx.
Regenerative
Steam heat Extrac tion pipi ng
Reactor
Pressurizer Generator exchanger room 25cm
exchanger-B
vessel
[Chemical and volume Regenerative
control system ] Approx. From the heat
exchanger-A
150cm charging pump To the reactor
(approx. 40Υ) coolant system
Coolant
demineralizer (approx. 240Υ)

Volume Regenerative From the


Primary Extrac tion control heat reactor coolant
coolant pump piping tank exchanger-C system
(approx. 290Υ)
Chargi ng pip ing Finding the falling water drops
Approx.
Charging pump 5m (4 drops/ min)
Regenerative Approx.
[Specifications of the regenerative
heat exchanger 90cm Approx. 15cm heat exchanger]
Type: vertical U-tube with 3 shells
(Heat exchanger to exchange heat
Water puddle in 3 stages)
(depth: approx. 0.5cm) Weight: approx. 1 ton
Inspection (observation results)
Penetrant test results of Side view of the air vent piping Photo of the nozzle stub
the outer surface (piping with different diameters)
: Indication mark
: Flow direction of Air ve nt pip ing Leakag e poin t
Wall of the
the charging water Material: stainless
Air ve nt pip ing regenerative
Outer diameter: heat
approx.2.7cm
Indica tion m ark exchanger
room Nozzle stub Cut line
(pipin g with
Approx. 9cm
differ ent
Approx. 2.6cm diamet ers)
Approx. 7.6cm

Approx. 6cm
From the
Material: stainless
Nozzle stub charging
Outer diamet er
(piping with different diameters) pump
: approx. 6cm to approx.2.7cm
To the regenerative heat exchanger-C

Penetrant test results of


[Top view of the [Top view at the line A-A’]
the inner surface air vent piping] Photo of the fracture surface
Wall surface Weld metal Air ve nt pip ing

Air vent piping


Weld Cut line
Circumferential
indication mark

Approx. 1.5cm
Nozzle stub
(piping with different diameters)

Results of the cross sectional observation Sketch of the fracture surface


(side view of line B-B’ from the direction of 135degree)
Piping Initiation Region of
Crack linearly developed promin ent
point of
in the weld metal severa l contac ts
cracks
Weld m etal Outer surface Inner surface
side side

Nozzle stub Weld metal Nozzle stub


(pipin g with (piping with
different different Beach mark
diameters) Wall thickness: 6.8mm
diamet ers)

536
Investigation of inspection and repair records and results of the vibration measurements

[the 22nd periodic inspection in 2005]


Replacement of the valve handle

[the 20th periodic


[Present (2010)]
inspection in 2002]
Natural frequency Natural frequency
23.5Hz 22.0Hz

Weight of the bar handle Weight of the round


Approx. 0.35kg handle
Approx. 2. 5kg

Estimated causes
During the 22nd, 23rd, 24th periodic
inspections
(test operations or inspection of the pump)
Natural frequency
Inside of the Resonance occurred
Air vent piping containment Inside of the reactor
vessel auxiliary building
Excessive load was applied
Wall of the
regenerative
heat exchanger
During the 25th periodic inspection
room
(test operations or inspection of the pump)
Weld
portion
Operation with Excessive stress was repeated
100% flow
Pressure
(test operations or Fatigue crack generated
Regenerative vibration
transmitted inspection during the
heat
exchanger-C in the periodic inspection)
charging 21.8Hz During plant operation
water (Pump operation with 80% flow)

The crack developed


Charging pump
Type: Reciprocating pump
Location of leakage Dimension: approx.5m long (including the
motor), approx.2m wide
Leakage occurred
Discharge rate: approx.15m3/h/unit
Discharge pressure: approx. 17MPa in normal
operation
Maximum operating pressure: approx. 21MPa
Number of units: 3 (one unit is usually operated)

Countermeasures

[Before construction] [After construction]

Approx. 70cm
Return to the bar handle Enhanc e the rigidi ty by
improving nozzle stub
25cm Approx. 40cm

Approx. 2.7cm 21cm

Weld m etal
Approx. 1.5cm
Approx. 6cm Approx. 4.5cm
To the regenerative Weld m etal
heat exchanger-C From the charging pump

Chargi ng pip ing 参


537
ϱϫ -2-1 Overview of Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors in the
Research and Development Stage in FY2009

In FY2009, 1 accident was reported by the Japan Atomic Energy Agency related to
the Law for the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and
Reactors and other laws.


539
!"#$%&ϱϫ'(')&&!*%+,-&.+&/0%&123#%*&45&6%74*/%,&899.,%+/-&"/&129$%"*&
!"#$%&'()%*
C- C, C+ C/ C. CK CL CM CC CJ J- J, J+ J/ J.
D2$":)24'4>3
I1*"20'83)*%4"82

E1486%4"$
+ , - - + + - - , , , - - , ,
#514:8F2

;%21%&
- + - - - , - - - - - - , - -
#514:8F2

I1*"20'#514:8F2 + - , - - , - , - - - , - - -

G45)*# - - - - - - - - - - - - - , -

H84%& . / , - + . - , , , , , , + ,

!"01*)#'"2'3%*)245)#)#'%*)'45)'2167)*#'89'"2$":)24#':1*"20'4*"%&'83)*%4"82'%4'45)';82<1
=*8484>3)'!%#4'?*)):)*'@)%$48*'%2:'%*)'"2$&1:):'"2'45)'%78A)'9"01*)#B

!"#$%&'ϱϫ()(*'+%&,-.'",'/0&'1$23&%'45'6&74%/&-'899"-&,/.':/'1$9;&:%'<4=&%
6&:9/4%.'",':'6&.&:%90':,-'>&?&;472&,/'@/:#&
=

B4+C2&D*4/4/E7%&F"-/&G*%%,%*&6%"9/4*
6&74%/&-',$23&%'45'",9"-&,/.

< 8,H"+9%,&!0%*3"$&6%"9/4*&F2I%+&D4J%*
K/"/.4+

:
>: >) >( >; >< >= >? >@ >> >A A: A) A( A; A< A= A? A@ A> AA :: :) :( :; :< := :? :@ :> :A
!".9:;'A&:%

540
D4J%*&6%"9/4*-&.+&/0%&6%-%"*90&"+,&L%H%$473%+/&K/"I%

JK JL JM JC JJ -- -, -+ -/ -. -K -L -M -C -J H84%&

,N,O - , , - - - - - - - - - - - ,K

,N,O - - - + , , , - - - - - - - ,-

- - - - , - - - - - - - - - - M

- - ,N,O - ,N,O - - - - - - - - ,N,O , K

+N+O - +N,O , .N,O , , , - - - - - ,N,O , /M

!"#$%&'ϱϫ()()'+%&,-.'",'/0&'1$23&%'45'6&74%/&-'899"-&,/.':/'1$9;&:%'<4=&%'6&:9/4%.
",'/0&'6&.&:%90':,-'>&?&;472&,/'@/:#&'3B'899"-&,/'+B7&
=

82/43"/.9 B"+2"$
-02/,4J+ -02/,4J+
<
L2*.+I M/0%*-
6%74*/%,&+23#%*&45&.+9.,%+/-

-02/,4J+

:
>: >) >( >; >< >= >? >@ >> >A A: A) A( A; A< A= A? A@ A> AA :: :) :( :; :< := :? :@ :> :A
!".9:;'A&:%


541
ϱϫ-2-2 Accidents Reported at Nuclear Power Reactors in the Research and
Development Stage
When an accident specified in the related rules of the laws (the Law for the Regulation of Nuclear
Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors (Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law), and the
Electric Utility Industry Law) occurs at nuclear facilities, the licensee or other concerned party
reports it to the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency. The reporting criteria are as follows
(excerpt):

Article 62-3 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Law

Article 106 of the Electric Utility Industry Law


Law
Ordinance

Article 43-14 of the Rules for Construction,


Article 3 of the Electricity-related Reporting
Operation, etc. of a Nuclear Reactors in Research
Regulations
and Development Stage

1) When nuclear fuel materials have been stolen 1) An accident in which an electric shock,
or their location is unknown. damage to a nuclear power generation
2) When a reactor in operation has been shut workpiece, wrong or no operation of a
down or needed to be shut down due to a nuclear power generation workpiece has
failure of the nuclear power reactor facilities, caused injury or death.
or when a power generation change of over 2) An electrical fire accident has occurred.
5% has occurred or been needed. 3) An accident in which damage to a nuclear
3) When it has been verified at inspection power generation workpiece, wrong or no
conducted by a licensee on equipment, etc. operation of a nuclear power generation
important for safety that the equipment, etc. workpiece has caused damage to public
important for safety did not meet Article 9 of properties, made public facilities, such as
the Ordinance of Establishing Technical roads, parks and schools, unusable, or had
Standards for Nuclear Power Generation social impacts.
Equipment or the standards specified in 4) Damage to major electric workpieces has
Article 9-2 of the ordinance, or when it has occurred.
Reporting Criteria

been verified that the equipment, etc.


5) An accident in which damage to a nuclear
important for safety did not have functions
power generation workpiece, wrong or no
necessary to ensure the safety of the nuclear
operation of a nuclear power generation
power reactor facilities.
workpiece has caused other licensees a
4) When a fire has caused a failure of power supply trouble of more than 7,000 kW
equipment, etc. important for safety. and less than 70,000 kW for longer than one
5) In addition to the above Item 3, when limiting hour, or a power supply trouble of more than
conditions for operation have been deviated 70,000 kW for longer than 10 minutes.
from due to a failure of nuclear power reactor
facilities, or when measures specified in
safety regulations have not been taken for the
deviation of limiting conditions for operation.
6) When a malfunction has been found in the
state of exhaust from gaseous radioactive
waste exhaust equipment or in the state of
discharge from liquid radioactive waste
discharge equipment, due to a failure of
nuclear power reactor facilities or other
unexpected situations.

(Excerpt)

542

7) When exhaust from gaseous radioactive
waste exhaust equipment has caused the
concentration of radioactive materials in air
outside an environmental monitoring area to
exceed the concentration limit stipulated in
Article 34-4.
8) When discharge from liquid radioactive waste
discharge equipment has caused the
concentration of radioactive materials in the
water outside an environmental monitoring
area to exceed the concentration limit
stipulated in Article 34-7.
9) When nuclear fuel materials or those
contaminated with nuclear fuel materials have
leaked outside a controlled area.
10) When a failure or other unexpected situation
of nuclear power reactor facilities has caused
nuclear fuel materials or others to leak in a
Reporting Criteria

controlled area.
11) When a failure or other unexpected situations
of nuclear power reactor facilities has caused
those in a controlled area to be exposed to
radiation; effective dose from this exposure
has exceeded or may have exceeded 5 mSv
for radiation workers and 0.5 mSv for those
other than radiation workers.
12) When a radiation worker has been exposed to
radiation that exceeded or may have exceeded
the dose limit stipulated in Section 1-1 of
Article 28.
13) When a control rod that was not inserted or
drawn out has actually moved from the
original control point to or past another
control point, or when a control rod at the full
insertion position that was not inserted or
drawn out has actually moved in the direction
of insertion beyond the full insertion position.
14) In addition to the above Items, when a failure
of nuclear power reactor facilities has
inflicted or may have inflicted injury on a
person.

(Excerpt)
Note 1㸸In October 2003, these rules were quantified and defined as much as possible so that a licensee can
determine properly whether a trouble is an event to be reported, and the contents of the notification criteria
issued before October were included in the laws to make their position clear.
Note 2㸸In June 2007, part of Article 43-14 of the Rules for Construction, Operation, etc. of a Nuclear Reactors in
Research and Development Stage was amended. This is because as a result of full inspection of power
generating equipment conducted by electric power companies according to the instruction of the Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry on November 30, 2006, it was revealed that events like an unexpected control rod
drop occurred during the shutdown of a reactor. Since events like an unexpected control rod drop may affect
the safety of a reactor, it is appropriate to cause licensees to discover these events as preliminary signs of
accidents and take measures for them. To cause licensees to report on events in which control rods moved while 参
they were not operated, therefore, Section 13 was added.


543
7DEOHϱϫ$FFLGHQWVLQ1XFOHDU3RZHU5HDFWRUVLQWKH5HVHDUFKDQG'HYHORSPHQW6WDJHE\)LVFDO<HDU $XWRPDWLF6KXWGRZQ
Fiscal Year
                              7RWDO
Facility

Reactor cooling system                               

Reactor auxiliary system                               

Instrumentation and
                              
control system

Steam turbine system                               

Fugen Power Station*


Advanced Thermal Reactor
Total                               

544
Instrumentation and  
             
control system  
 

Reactor
Total              

Fast Breeder
 

Monju Prototype
Figures in parentheses are the numbers of accidents during trial operation and are included in the above figures.
*䠖Currently, Fugen Decommissioning Engineering Center, JAEA
7DEOHϱϫ$FFLGHQWVLQ1XFOHDU3RZHU5HDFWRUVLQWKH5HVHDUFKDQG'HYHORSPHQW6WDJHE\)LVFDO<HDU 0DQXDO6KXWGRZQ
Fiscal Year
                              7RWDO
Facility

Reactor body                               

Reactor cooling system                               

Reactor auxiliary system                               

Instrumentation and
                              
control system

Steam turbine system                               

Fugen Power Station *


Advanced Thermal Reactor

545
Plant common system                               

Total                               

 
Reactor cooling system              
 

 
Total              

Breeder Reactor
Monju Prototype Fast
 

Figures in parentheses are the numbers of accidents during trial operation and are included in the above figures
*䠖Currently, Fugen Decommissioning Engineering Center, JAEA



7DEOHϱϫ$FFLGHQWVLQ1XFOHDU3RZHU5HDFWRUVLQWKH5HVHDUFKDQG'HYHORSPHQW6WDJHE\)LVFDO<HDU
 :KHQ1RWLQ2SHUDWLRQIRUDQ,QVSHFWLRQRU2WKHU5HDVRQ

Fiscal Year
                              7RWDO
Facility

Reactor body                               

Reactor cooling system                               

Fuel handling system                               

Fugen Power Station *


Advanced Thermal Reactor
Total                               

*䠖Currently, Fugen Decommissioning Engineering Center, JAEA

546
7DEOHϱϫ$FFLGHQWVLQ1XFOHDU3RZHU5HDFWRUVLQWKH5HVHDUFKDQG'HYHORSPHQW6WDJH
E\)LVFDO<HDU 2WKHUV

)LVFDO<HDU
               
$FFLGHQWW\SH
)DWDODFFLGHQW                
5DGLDWLRQH[SRVXUH                
5DGLRDFWLYHPDWHULDOV
OHDNDJH                
%RLOHUIDFLOLW\                
2WKHUV                
7RWDO                

)LVFDO<HDU
              7RWDO
$FFLGHQWW\SH
)DWDODFFLGHQW                  㸧
5DGLDWLRQH[SRVXUH               
5DGLRDFWLYHPDWHULDOV
OHDNDJH               
%RLOHUIDFLOLW\               
2WKHUV                 
7RWDO                   㸧
)LJXUHVLQSDUHQWKHVHVDUHWKHQXPEHUVRIDFFLGHQWVGXULQJWULDORSHUDWLRQDQGDUHLQFOXGHGLQWKH
DERYHILJXUHV

7DEOHϱϫ6\VWHPVRI&RPSRQHQW,QYROYHGLQ$FFLGHQWLQ1XFOHDU3RZHU
5HDFWRUV
&ODVVLILFDWLRQ $75 )%5 6XEWRWDO
5HDFWRUERG\ ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
5HDFWRUFRROLQJV\VWHP ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
5HDFWRUDX[LOLDU\V\VWHP ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
,QVWUXPHQWDWLRQDQG
FRQWUROV\VWHP
ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
)XHOKDQGOLQJV\VWHP ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
6WHDPWXUELQHV\VWHP ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
3ODQWFRPPRQV\VWHP ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
2WKHUV ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
7RWDO ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ


547
7DEOHϱϫ&RPSRQHQW,QYROYHGLQ$FFLGHQWLQ1XFOHDU3RZHU5HDFWRUV
LQWKH5HVHDUFKDQG'HYHORSPHQW6WDJH

&ODVVLILFDWLRQ $75 )%5 6XEWRWDO


3UHVVXUHYHVVHO   
)XHODVVHPEO\   
3XPS   
0RWRU   
9DOYH   
3LSH   
&RQWUROV\VWHP   
5HOD\   
6HQVRU   
2WKHUV   
1RGDPDJHWRHTXLSPHQW   
7RWDO   

7DEOHϱϫ&DXVHVRI$FFLGHQWLQ1XFOHDU3RZHU5HDFWRUV
LQWKH5HVHDUFKDQG'HYHORSPHQW6WDJH
&ODVVLILFDWLRQ $75 )%5 6XEWRWDO
,PSURSHUGHVLJQ ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
,PSURSHUPDQXIDFWXULQJ ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
,PSURSHUFRQVWUXFWLRQ ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
,PSURSHUPDLQWHQDQFH ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
,PSURSHURSHUDWLRQ ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
,PSURSHUFRQWURO ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
([WHUQDOIDFWRUV ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
1DWXUDOGHWHULRUDWLRQ ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
2WKHUV ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
&DXVHXQNQRZQ
ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
8QGHULQYHVWLJDWLRQ
7RWDO ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ

548
7DEOHϱϫ2SHUDWLRQDO6WDWXV:KHQ$FFLGHQWV2FFXUUHGLQ1XFOHDU3RZHU
5HDFWRUVLQWKH5HVHDUFKDQG'HYHORSPHQW6WDJH

&ODVVLILFDWLRQ $75 )%5 6XEWRWDO


1RUPDORSHUDWLRQ ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
$GMXVWPHQWRSHUDWLRQ ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
3HULRGLFDOLQVSHFWLRQ ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
3ODQQHGVKXWGRZQ ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
8QSODQQHGVKXWGRZQ ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
&RQVWUXFWLRQRU
ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ
&RPPLVVLRQLQJ7HVW
7RWDO ࠉ ࠉ ࠉ

7DEOHϱϫ+RZ$FFLGHQWV'HWHFWHGLQ1XFOHDU3RZHU5HDFWRUV
LQWKH5HVHDUFKDQG'HYHORSPHQW6WDJH

&ODVVLILFDWLRQ $75 )%5 6XEWRWDO


$FWLYDWLRQRIDQDODUP
  
RUDSURWHFWLRQV\VWHP

&HQWUDOILHOG
  
PRQLWRULQJ
,QVSHFWLRQSDWURO   
3HULRGLFDOWHVWLQJ   

3HULRGLFDOLQVSHFWLRQ
RURWKHULQVSHFWLRQV
  
FRQGXFWHGGXULQJD
UHDFWRUVKXWGRZQ

'XULQJRSHUDWLRQ   
2WKHUV   
7RWDO   


549
ϱϫ1XPEHUVRI5HSRUWHG$FFLGHQWVLQ1XFOHDU3RZHU5HDFWRUVLQWKH5HVHDUFKDQG'HYHORSPHQW6WDJH
&DSDFLW\ 6WDUWRI )LVFDO<HDU
3RZHUSODQWQDPH N: RSHUDWLRQ
                              7RWDO
$GYDQFHG7KHUPDO
5HDFWRU)XJHQ                                 
3RZHU6WDWLRQ
0RQMX3URWRW\SH
)DVW%UHHGHU                  
5HDFWRU

7RWDO                               

)LJXUHVLQSDUHQWKHVHVDUHWKHQXPEHUVRIDFFLGHQWVGXULQJWULDORSHUDWLRQ
*䠖Currently, Fugen Decommissioning Engineering Center, JAEA

550
䊩䊣-2-4 Overview of Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors in the Research and Development Stage

Fugen Power Station Advanced Thermal Reactor


(Currently, Fugen Decommissioning Engineering Center, Japan Atomic Energy Agency)
Page on which related
Date of
Summary of the analysis press announcement
occurrence appears
2009.10.8 Curing work was conducted from October 6 in preparation for the sampling of residual heavy
water in the hot column tester room (controlled area) on the third floor of the reactor
auxiliary building, and on October 8, leakage of heavy water, including radioactive material
(Tritium), was found. In response to this, measurement was made of the radioactivity level,
and the leaked amount was measured to be 3.2 × 109 Bq. This was then reported, based on
the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law.
The results of the cause investigation and the assumed causes are as follows:
When the event occurred, preparation work such as curing was being conducted in order to
remove pollution from the hot column tester (residual heavy water collection construction).
Before and after the event occurred, it was found that the electrode nozzle joint (connected
part of the piping) of the hot column tester where heavy water remained had moved in a
loosening direction. Considering this, it was presumed that a human or object had made
contact with that electrode nozzle in the narrow working area during curing work, and thus
the joint of the electrode nozzle was loosened, causing the leak.
1 Since the system was open during the pollution removal construction, servicing was 553-561
conducted while considering the possibility of heavy water leakage from the equipment, etc.
However, during the prior preparation, because the system had not yet been opened, the
situation of the equipment (e.g. there may have been a joint that could be loosened by
contact with a human or object, and the narrow working area may cause such contact)
was not fully grasped.
Therefore, it was presumed that the direct cause of this incident was that protective
measures for the locations where leakage may occur, such as measures to prevent contact
or rotation of a joint, had not been taken, and that a human or object had made contact
with the joint of the electrode nozzle in the hot column tester, within the narrow working
area, causing the leak of heavy water.
On the other hand, the fact that a sufficient amount of heavy water could not be sampled
with the installed sampling line of this tester, and thus the servicing completion activity was
finished with the heavy water remaining in the tester, was considered a background factor.

Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Monju


Page on which related
Date of
Summary of the analysis press announcement
occurrence appears

1 None 㸫


551
ϱϫ㸫㸰㸫㸳ࠉPress Releases on Accidents in Nuclear Power Reactors in the
Research and Development Stage
List of press releases in FY 2009
ᖺ᭶᪥⌧ᅾ

Date of release Title Page


Leakage of the radioactive material in the controlled area in the Fugen

Decommissioning Engineering Center, Japan Atomic Energy Agency

 Causes of and countermeasures against the leakage of the radioactive
 material in the controlled area in the Fugen Decommissioning 
Engineering Center, Japan Atomic Energy Agency

552
Leakage of the radioactive material in the controlled area in the
Fugen Decommissioning Engineering Center, Japan Atomic Energy
Agency

October 9, 2009
NISA㸭METI

Yesterday (on October 8, 2009), the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) received a report
from Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) on the leakage of the radioactive material in the controlled
area in the Fugen Decommissioning Engineering Center, as follows.

1. The Report from Japan Atomic Energy Agency


A curing work had been performed as a preparation work for the removal of the residual heavy
water since October 6, 2009 in the room (designated as a controlled area) for the hot column test
equipment (*1) on the 3rd floor of the reactor auxiliary building in the Fugen Decommissioning
Engineering Center. On October 8, 2009, the leakage of the heavy water including tritium was found
in the concerned room. Therefore, the amount of radioactive leakage was measured and was confirmed
to be 3.2x109Bq, and then this event was reported to the NISA pursuant to “the Law for the
Regulations of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors.”(*2)
This event had no impact of radioactive material on the environment.
In addition, the intake of tritium was evaluated for 14 persons who entered into the concerned room
after October 6 when the curing work started, and it was confirmed that the radiation exposure to one
person, which is 0.21 mSv, exceeded the screening level (*3) stipulated by the JAEA.

*1. This is a test equipment for improving the heavy water quality.
*2. The amount of radioactivity, reportable by the law, is 3.7x106Bq in the case of the leakage of the
liquid nuclear fuel material etc. in the controlled area. This amount is very low from the point
of view of the radiation control in the controlled area and is a level where a significant
radiation exposure could not be assumed under the condition of the usual work situation in the
controlled area. However, it is designated as the standard from the standpoint that it is
desirable for radiation exposure to be as low as possible even in the controlled area.
*3. Screening level (0.2mSv) is a management target of the internal exposure for the Fugen and it
was voluntarily stipulated by the JAEA. In addition, the statutory annual dose limit for
radiation worker is 50mSv.

2. Actions of the NISA


NISA received the report of this event pursuant to article 43-14 of “the rule for the installation,
operation, etc. of nuclear power reactors in the research and development stage.”
After the occurrence of this event, local operational safety inspectors were dispatched to the 参
decommissioning engineering center and the scene on the Fugen was confirmed by them.
Afterwards, NISA will continue the rigorous checking of the investigation of causes and the

553
corresponding countermeasures against recurrence, which will be carried out by the JAEA pursuant to
the law.

– Results of Provisional Evaluation by INES –


Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Level

- - 0- 0-

* INES (International Nuclear Event Scale) is the indicator rating the safety significance of the
event occurred at nuclear power station etc. Events are evaluated based on 3 criteria (such as
criteria 1; off-site impact, criteria 2; on-site impact, and criteria 3; degradation of the
defence-in-depth) and the highest level among 3 evaluations is adopted as the INES evaluation
level for the event. INES level is ranging from Level 0 (no safety significance) to Level 7(major
accident) and Level 0 is classified into Level 0- (event having no possibility to challenge the
safety requirement) and Level 0+ (event having a possibility to challenge the safety requirement).

554
Attachment

Hot column test equipment


To dump tank
䝎䞁䝥䝍䞁䜽䜈 Stainless piping with 21.7mm in outer diamet er
እᚄ㻞㻝㻚㻣㼙㼙䝇䝔䞁䝺䝇㓄⟶

Resin tower

Resin tower
ᶞ ᶞ

Corrosion potential
⬡ ⬡ ⭉

Catalytic tower
ሪ ሪ 㣗

test tank
ゐ 㟁
፹ ఩

Freezing
ሪ ヨ

machine

Heater
෾ ⇕ 㦂
ᶵ ჾ ᵴ

Calandria tank Heavy water


䜹䝷䞁䝗䝸䜰䝍䞁䜽
cleanup tower
㔜Ỉί໬ሪ
Cooler
෭༷ჾ
Stainless piping with 21.7mm
እᚄ㻞㻝㻚㻣㼙㼙䝇䝔䞁䝺䝇㓄⟶
in outer diamet er
Stainless piping with 21.7mm
in እᚄ㻞㻝㻚㻣㼙㼙䝇䝔䞁䝺䝇㓄⟶
outer diamet er

Dump tank
䝎䞁 䝥䝍䞁䜽
䝩䝑䝖䜹䝷䝮ヨ㦂⿦⨨
P
Heavy water cooler
㔜Ỉ෭༷ჾ
Heavy water circulation pump
㔜Ỉᚠ⎔䝫䞁䝥 Schematic Diagram of the Hot Column Test Equipment

䝩 䝑䝖䜹䝷䝮ヨ㦂⿦⨨ ᴫ␎ᅗ

Hot column test room

Diameter㻌
approx.15cm㻌

Corrosion potential Nut: approx. 3cm in diameter


Reactor test tank㻌
building ཎᏊ⅔⿵ຓᘓᒇ㻌
Reactor auxiliary
building
Height㻌
approx. 23cm㻌
Electrode
Leakage location

Plan view of the 3rd floor above the ground Electrode


Puddle

Paper towel㻌 Workbench㻌


Situation when the leakage occurred


555
Causes of and countermeasures against the leakage of the radioactive
material in the controlled area in the Fugen Decommissioning
Engineering Center, Japan Atomic Energy Agency

December 10, 2009


NISA㸭METI

Today (on December 10, 2009), the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) received a report
from the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) on causes of and countermeasures against the leakage
of the radioactive material in the controlled area, which was reported on October 8,2009, in the Fugen
Decommissioning Engineering Center, which has been under the decommissioning.
The report submitted by JAEA is summarized as follows;
1. [Causes] As a result of the investigations, it was estimated that the adequate preventive measures
against contacts or turning of a joint at potential leakage points were not taken and then workers
or things contacted the joint, which led to the leakage of heavy water.
2. [Countermeasures] The components which heavy water is possible to leak will be checked in
detail in the preparation stage for the actual work and adequate preventive measures will be
taken.
NISA concludes that the report submitted by JAEA is appropriate because the causes are adequately
estimated by the investigations and the countermeasures corresponding to the estimated causes are
adequate.

1. The main points of the report from Japan Atomic Energy Agency
(1) The investigation results and the estimated causes
- At the occurrence of this event, a curing work had been performed as a preparation work for the
removal of the contamination (the residual heavy water removal work) in the hot column test
equipment (*1).
- It was found that a joint (piping connection) for the electrode nozzle (*2) of the hot column test
equipment in which heavy water remained was turned toward the loose direction around the time
when this event occurred. Therefore, it was estimated that there was a possibility that workers or
things contacted the joint during the curing work in the narrow work space and then the joint for
the electrode nozzle was loosened, which led to the leakage.
- As the contamination removal work was carried out under the condition that related systems (*3)
were opened, it was carefully carried out by taking into consideration the leakage of heavy water
from equipments. However, as the preparation work was carried out under the condition that
related systems were not opened, the installation status of components, such as there exist joints
which could be loosened due to contacts of workers or things, or narrow work space could bring
contacts with joints, was not checked in detail.
- Therefore, preventive measures against contacts or turning of a joint at potential leakage points
were not taken and then workers or things contacted the joint for the electrode nozzle of the hot
column test equipment installed in the narrow work space, which led to the leakage of heavy
water. This was estimated as the direct cause of this event.
- On the other hand, an existing drain line of the concerned test equipment could not sufficiently
remove heavy water and thus the service termination measure (*4) was completed under the
condition that heavy water still remained in the test equipment.
This was judged to be considered as a background factor.

556
(*1) This is a test equipment for improving the heavy water quality.
(*2) An opening through which the electrode is inserted into the equipment.
(*3) Status that piping connection is opened or a component is bored, removed and cut.
(*4) This is a procedure that, as to a component which is not used any more, the related system is
isolated, closed by the time of its dismantling and removal, and radioactive materials which
remain in the system are removed as much as possible.

(2) Countermeasures
- In order to improve the prevention measures against the leakage in the preparation work, the
components which heavy water is possible to leak will be checked in detail and amount and
location of remained heavy water will be identified. In addition, preventive measures such as
installation of a baffle to the joint and a protective cover etc. will be taken.
- As the countermeasures of reduction of radiation exposure and prevention of radioactive materials
release in the preparation work, the tritium monitor which detects the radioactive material will be
installed and continuous monitoring will be implemented. To prepare for unexpected leakage, the
standby gas treatment system (*5) will be prepared for enabling the suction in advance.
- As to components which a service of the heavy water system or the helium system was terminated,
based on an amount of heavy water which remained in the system, heavy water will be removed
and collected after opening or boring not only the existing drain valves but also flanges, and then
the service termination measure will be completed. In addition, until the completion of the service
termination measure, maintenance management necessary for maintaining functions of
components as well as the confirmation by usual patrol will be implemented.
- Above mentioned measures will be taken to components other than the heavy water system or the
helium system.

(*5) Component which is used to remove tritium when tritium concentration in the work
environment is possible to increase, such as removal of heavy water

2. Actions of NISA
NISA concludes that the report submitted by JAEA is appropriate because the causes are adequately
estimated by the investigations and the countermeasures corresponding to the estimated causes are
adequate.
Afterward, NISA will continue to confirm, through the operational safety inspection etc., the
implementation status of the countermeasure against the recurrence by JAEA and the experience
feedback in other plants about the prevention measure against the leakage of radioactive material in
the preparation work stage.

(Reference)
1. Summary of this event
A curing work had been performed since October 5, 2009 as a preparation work for the removal of
residual heavy water in the hot column test equipment (*1) room (designated as a controlled area) on
the 3rd floor of the reactor auxiliary building in the Fugen Decommissioning Engineering Center.
Around 14:43, on October 8, 2009, a worker found that a paper towel was wetted due to water drops
falling from the threaded type joint of the electrode nozzle for the corrosion potential test tank of the
hot column test equipment in the concerned room. At the same time, the threaded type joint of the
electrode nozzle was wrenched so that the leakage stopped.
After all workers (four workers) immediately left the concerned room, atmospheric tritium
concentration in the room was measured and the atmospheric radioactive material concentration was

confirmed to exceed 10 times greater than the value stipulated by law for the controlled area.
Therefore, the classification of the controlled area was changed according to the safety regulation. 付
557
Tritium concentration in the concerned room was measured and monitored, and the entry control at the
concerned room entrance was implemented. In addition, air in the hot column test equipment room
was suctioned by the standby gas treatment system and the emergent measures (such as collection of
the paper towel and decontamination etc.) to prevent the expansion of contamination was carried out.
After that, the amount of radioactivity of heavy water including the leaked radioactive material
(tritium) was measured and was confirmed to be 3.2x109Bq. Therefore, this event was reported to
NISA pursuant to “the Law for the Regulations of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and
Reactors.”
In addition, on October 11, tritium concentration was confirmed to be decreased to the normal
value.
This event had no impact of radioactive material to the environment.
In addition, the intake of tritium was evaluated for 14 persons who entered into the concerned room
after October 6 when the curing work started, and it was confirmed that the radiation exposure (0.21
mSv) to one person exceeded the screening level (*6) stipulated by JAEA.
After this event occurred, NISA dispatched local operation safety inspectors. Status of the site was
confirmed and then measures to secure the plant safety by the company were confirmed to be
adequately taken according to the safety regulation.
Although the intake of radioactive material into workers was recognized, the amount of the intake is
very slight, comparing to the statutory annual does limit for radiation worker (50mSv/year), and is not
the level inducing any health effects.

(*6) Screening level is a management target (0.2mSv) of the internal exposure for the Fugen
which was voluntarily stipulated by JAEA.

2. Results of Provisional Evaluation by INES


Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Level

- - 0- 0-

* INES (International Nuclear Event Scale) is the indicator rating the safety significance of the event occurred
at nuclear power station etc. Events are evaluated based on 3 criteria (such as criteria 1; off-site impact,
criteria 2; on-site impact, and criteria 3; degradation of the defense-in-depth) and the highest level among 3
evaluations is adopted as the INES evaluation level for the event. INES level is ranging from Level 0 (no
safety significance) to Level 7(major accident) and Level 0 is classified into Level 0- (event having no
possibility to challenge the safety requirement) and Level 0+ (event having a possibility to challenge the
safety requirement) for a nuclear power station.

558
Attachment-1

To dump tank
Stainless piping with 21.7mm in outer diamet er

Resin tow er

Resin tow er

potential te st t ank
Cat alytic tow er

Corrosio n
Freezing
machine

Heater
Heavy water
Caland ria tank clean up tow er Cooler
Stainless piping with
Stainless piping with 21.7mm in outer diamet er
21.7mm in outer diamet er

Dump t ank Hot column test equipment


Heavy water
P cooler
Heavy water
circul ation pump

Hot column test equipment room

Corrosion potential
test tank
Diameter
approx.15cm

Screw portion of the electrode


(Nut: approx. 3cm in diameter)
Reactor building
Reactor auxiliary Leakage location
building

Height
approx. 23cm

Height
approx. 15cm
Plan view of the 3rd floor above the ground Electrode

Attachment portion of the test piece


Paper towel Leakage of water
Workbench

Height from the floor


approx. 70cm

Situation when the leakage occurred

Schematic Diagram of the Hot Column Test Equipment 参


559
Electrode was turned toward the loose direction.

560
Status prior to the work Status after the leakage
(Photo on May 22,2009) (Photo on October 8,2009)

Status of the corrosion potential test tank


Attachment-2
Attachment-3

The screw portion is concurrently


loosened when the electrode is
turned toward the loose direction.

Screw
portion Electrode

Status of the co-movement of the electrode with the screw portion

O-ring Insulation bush Under the condition that the screw


Electrode holder
portion is wrenched, the screw
Friction resistance portion contacts with the insulation
ring so that the friction resistance in
between the screw the concerned portion becomes large.
portion and the
insulation ring is Therefore, when the electrode was
turned toward the loose direction, the
large. turning force was transmitted to the
screw portion through the insulation
ring and then the screw portion was
Electrode concurrently loosened.
Screw portion O-ring Insulation ring
Electrode holder O-ring Insulation bush
As the screw portion of the
Gap electrode was loosened, gap
was made between the
electrode holder and the o-ring
so that the sealing function of
the o-ring was lost. Heavy
water in the corrosion potential
O-ring test tank fell down the screw
Screw portion Electrode portion on the workbench
Leakage path of heavy water (estimated) Insulation ring through the gap.

Structural drawing of the electrode and the loose mechanism 参


of the screw portion

561
ϱϫ -3-1 Overview of Accidents at Nuclear Fuel Fabrication,Reprocessing,
Radioactive Waste Disposal and Waste Management Facilities in
FY2009

1. In FY2009, 2 incidents were reported by an operator of a facility related to the


Law for the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and
Reactors and other laws.


563
Table ϱϫ-3-1 Trends in the Number of Reported Accidents at Nuclear Fuel Fabrication, Reprocessing, Radioactive
Waste Disposal and Waste Management Facilities.

Start of Fiscal Year


Licensee Facility Facility class Capacity
operation 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

Global Nuclear
Same as on the left Fuel fabrication 750 tU/year 1970. 8.29 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fuel-Japan Co., Ltd

Nuclear Fuel Tokai Works Fuel fabrication 250 tU/year 1980.1.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Industries, Ltd.
Kumatori Works Fuel fabrication 383 tU/year 1972.9.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Mitsubishi Nuclear
- Fuel fabrication 440 tU/year 1972.1.11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fuel Co., Ltd.

JCO Co., Ltd. Tokai Works Fuel fabrication 718 tU/year 1980.12.18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Tokai Research and Waste disposal


2,520 m3 1995.11.27

564
Development Center facility

O-arai Research and Waste management 42,795


1996.3.29
Development Center facility 200-liter drums
Japan Atomic Energy
Tokai Research and Reprocessing
Agency 210 tU/year 1981.1.17 (3) (1) (1) (3) (1) (2) 1 3 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 2
Development Center facility

Ningyo-toge
Enrichment
Environmental 200 tU/year 1988.4.25 0 0 0
facility
Engineering Center

Reprocessing Reprocessing
800 tU/year 1999.12.3
Division facility**

Reprocessing Waste management 1,440


1995.4.26
Japan Nuclear Fuel Division facility glass blocks
Limited Enrichment and
Enrichment facility 1,890 tU/year 1992.3.27
Disposal Division

Enrichment and Waste disposal 412,160


1992.12.8
Disposal Division facility 200-liter drums
Start of Fiscal Year
Licensee Facility Facility class Capacity
operation 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 Total

Global Nuclear
Same as on the left Fuel fabrication 750 tU/year 1970. 8.29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 5
Fuel-Japan Co., Ltd

Tokai Works Fuel fabrication 250 tU/year 1980.1.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1


Nuclear Fuel
Industries, Ltd.
Kumatori Works Fuel fabrication 383 tU/year 1972.9.1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

Mitsubishi Nuclear
- Fuel fabrication 440 tU/year 1972.1.11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fuel Co., Ltd.

JCO Co., Ltd. Tokai Works Fuel fabrication 718 tU/year 1980.12.18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

Tokai Research and Waste disposal


2,520 m3 1995.11.27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Development Center facility
O-arai Research and Waste disposal 42,795
1996.3.29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Development Center facility 200-liter drums

565
Japan Atomic Energy
Tokai Research and Reprocessing
Agency 210 tU/year 1981.1.17 1 1 1 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 30
Development Center facility
Ningyo-toge
Enrichment
Environmental 200 tU/year 1988.4.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
facility
Engineering Center
Reprocessing Reprocessing
800 tU/year 1999.12.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 5
Division facility**
Waste
Reprocessing 1,440
management 1995.4.26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Japan Nuclear Fuel Division glass blocks
facility
Limited
Enrichment and Enrichment
1,890 tU/year 1992.3.27 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Disposal Division facility
Enrichment and Waste disposal 412,160
1992.12.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disposal Division facility 200-liter drums

*: Figures in parentheses are the numbers of accidents reported before the start of operation.
**: Only facilities that accept and store spent fuel have commenced operation. The reprocessing facility itself is still under construction



ϱϫ -3-2 Accidents Reported at Nuclear Fuel Fabrication, Reprocessing,
Radioactive Waste Disposal and Waste Management Facilities

Regulations on nuclear fuel fabrication, reprocessing, radioactive waste disposal


and waste management facilities are based on the Law for the Regulation of Nuclear
Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors (Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Law) and other laws, and licensees of these facilities are required to promptly report
accidents to the government. In October 2003, the provisions of these laws were
quantified and made as clear as possible so that licensees of nuclear fuel fabrication
facilities, reprocessing facilities, radioactive waste disposal facilities and waste
management facilities can properly determine which incidents should be reported.
In addition, the former Ministrial Noticification before the amendment in October
were unified and their position made clear.
The following incidents must be reported:

% Nuclear fuel fabrication facilities


Article 62-3 of The Law on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material,
Law
Nuclear Fuel Material, and Nuclear Reactors
Regulation Article 9-16 of the Rules for Processing business for Nuclear Materials
1) Theft or loss of nuclear fuel material
2) Failure of a facility that disturb work as special measures are needed
for repair of the failure
3) Failure of a facility that disturb work as a result of loss or potential
loss of confinement function of nuclear fuel materials etc. in the
limited area, radiation shielding function to prevent radiation hazards
by external radiation, or fire or explosion protection function in a
facility
4) Abnormal condition of discharge of gaseous radioactive wasters at
ventilation facility or discharge of liquid radioactive wasters from a
discharge facility due to failures of a facility or other unexpected
events
Incident to report

5) Atmospheric radio-nuclides concentrations by radiation monitoring


outside peripheral monitoring area exceeding limits
6) Radio-nuclides concentrations in discharge by radiation monitoring at
the outer boundary of peripheral monitoring area exceeding limits
7) Leakage of nuclear fuel materials, etc. outside the controlled area
8) leakage of nuclear fuel materials, etc. inside the controlled area due to
a failure of a facility or other unexpected events excluding following
cases (excluding the case when the measures such as access control or
key control for the area related to the leakage or when the leaked
material spreads outside the controlled area);
(1) When the leaked liquid nuclear fuel materials etc. does not spread
outside the curb readily installed around the equipment for prevention
of spreading of leakage
(2) The function of ventilation related to the area of the leakage of
gaseous nuclear fuel materials etc. is maintained approximately
(3) The amount of radioactivity of leaked nuclear fuel materials etc. is
very small or the degree of leakage is minor
9) Nuclear fuel material being critical or likely to be critical

566
10) Effective does by radiation exposure of personnel in the controlled
area exceeding or likely to exceed dose limits of 5 mSv for radiation
Incident to workers and 0.5 mSv for non-radiation workers due to a failure of a
report facility or other unexpected events
11) Radiation exposures of radiation workers exceeding or likely to exceed
the dose limits
12) Any other hazards to personnel occurring or likely to occur at a
facility (excluding minor non-radiation hazards)

% Reprocessing facility
Article 62-3 of The Law on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material,
Law
Nuclear Fuel Material, and Nuclear Reactors
Regulation Article 19-16 of the Rules for Reprocessing business for Spent Fuels
1) Theft or loss of nuclear fuel material
2) Failure of a facility that disturb work as special measures are needed
for repair of the failure
3) Failure of a facility that disturb work as a result of loss or potential
loss of confinement function of nuclear fuel materials etc. in the
limited area, radiation shielding function to prevent radiation hazards
by external radiation, or fire or explosion protection function in a
facility
4) Abnormal condition of discharge of gaseous radioactive wasters at
ventilation facility or discharge of liquid radioactive wasters from a
discharge facility due to failures of a facility or other unexpected
events
5) Atmospheric radio-nuclides concentrations by radiation monitoring
outside peripheral monitoring area exceeding limits
6) Radio-nuclides concentrations in discharge by radiation monitoring at
the outer boundary of peripheral monitoring area exceeding limits
Incident to report

7) Leakage of spent fuel outside the controlled area


8) leakage of spent fuel, etc. inside the controlled area due to a failure of
a facility or other unexpected events excluding following cases
(excluding the case when the measures such as access control or key
control for the area related to the leakage or when the leaked material
spreads outside the controlled area);
(1) When the leaked liquid spent fuel etc. does not spread outside the
curb readily installed around the equipment for prevention of
spreading of leakage
(2) The function of ventilation related to the area of the leakage of
gaseous nuclear fuel materials etc. is maintained approximately
(3) The amount of radioactivity of leaked nuclear fuel materials etc. is
very small or the degree of leakage is minor
9) Nuclear fuel material being critical or likely to be critical
10) Effective does by radiation exposure of personnel in the controlled
area exceeding or likely to exceed dose limits of 5 mSv for radiation
workers and 0.5 mSv for non-radiation workers due to a failure of a
facility or other unexpected events
11) Radiation exposures of radiation workers exceeding or likely to
exceed the dose limits
12) Any other hazards to personnel occurring or likely to occur at a
facility (excluding minor non-radiation hazards)


567
& Radioactive waste disposal facility
Article 62-3 of The Law on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material,
Law
Nuclear Fuel Material, and Nuclear Reactors

Regulation Article 22-13 of the Rules for Waste Disposal business for Nuclear
Materials or Materials contaminated with Nuclear Materials
1) Theft or loss of nuclear fuel material
2) Failure of a facility that disturb work as special measures are needed
for repair of the failure
3) Failure of a facility that disturb work as a result of loss or potential
loss of confinement function of nuclear fuel materials etc. in the
limited area, radiation shielding function to prevent radiation hazards
by external radiation, or fire or explosion protection function in a
facility
4) Abnormal condition of discharge of gaseous radioactive wasters at
ventilation facility or discharge of liquid radioactive wasters from a
discharge facility due to failures of a facility or other unexpected
events
5) Atmospheric radio-nuclides concentrations by radiation monitoring
outside peripheral monitoring area exceeding limits
6) Radio-nuclides concentrations in discharge by radiation monitoring at
the outer boundary of peripheral monitoring area exceeding limits
Incident to report

7) Leakage of nuclear fuel materials, etc. outside the controlled area


8) leakage of nuclear fuel materials, etc. inside the controlled area due to
a failure of a facility or other unexpected events excluding following
cases (excluding the case when the measures such as access control or
key control for the area related to the leakage or when the leaked
material spreads outside the controlled area);
(1) When the leaked liquid nuclear fuel materials etc. does not spread
outside the curb readily installed around the equipment for prevention
of spreading of leakage
(2) The function of ventilation related to the area of the leakage of
gaseous nuclear fuel materials etc. is maintained approximately
(3) The amount of radioactivity of leaked nuclear fuel materials etc. is
very small or the degree of leakage is minor
9) Effective does by radiation exposure of personnel in the controlled
area exceeding or likely to exceed dose limits of 5 mSv for radiation
workers and 0.5 mSv for non-radiation workers due to a failure of a
facility or other unexpected events
10) Radiation exposures of radiation workers exceeding or likely to
exceed the dose limits
11) Any other hazards to personnel occurring or likely to occur at a
facility (excluding minor non-radiation hazards)

568


& Waste management facility


Article 62-3 of The Law on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material,
Law
Nuclear Fuel Material, and Nuclear Reactors

Regulation Article 35-16 of the Rules for Waste Management business for Nuclear
Materials or Materials contaminated with Nuclear Materials
1) Theft or loss of nuclear fuel material
2) Failure of a facility that disturb work as special measures are needed
for repair of the failure
3) Failure of a facility that disturb work as a result of loss or potential
loss of confinement function of nuclear fuel materials etc. in the
limited area, radiation shielding function to prevent radiation hazards
by external radiation, or fire or explosion protection function in a
facility
4) Abnormal condition of discharge of gaseous radioactive wasters at
ventilation facility or discharge of liquid radioactive wasters from a
discharge facility due to failures of a facility or other unexpected
events
5) Atmospheric radio-nuclides concentrations by radiation monitoring
outside peripheral monitoring area exceeding limits
6) Radio-nuclides concentrations in discharge by radiation monitoring at
the outer boundary of peripheral monitoring area exceeding limits
Incident to report

7) Leakage of nuclear fuel materials, etc. outside the controlled area


8) leakage of nuclear fuel materials, etc. inside the controlled area due to
a failure of a facility or other unexpected events excluding following
cases (excluding the case when the measures such as access control or
key control for the area related to the leakage or when the leaked
material spreads outside the controlled area);
(1) When the leaked liquid nuclear fuel materials etc. does not spread
outside the curb readily installed around the equipment for
prevention of spreading of leakage
(2) The function of ventilation related to the area of the leakage of
gaseous nuclear fuel materials etc. is maintained approximately
(3) The amount of radioactivity of leaked nuclear fuel materials etc. is
very small or the degree of leakage is minor
9) Nuclear fuel material being critical or likely to be critical
10) Effective does by radiation exposure of personnel in the controlled
area exceeding or likely to exceed dose limits of 5 mSv for radiation
workers and 0.5 mSv for non-radiation workers due to a failure of a
facility or other unexpected events
11) Radiation exposures of radiation workers exceeding or likely to
exceed the dose limits
12) Any other hazards to personnel occurring or likely to occur at a
facility (excluding minor non-radiation hazards)


569
䊩䊣-3-3 Overview of Accidents at Nuclear Fuel Fabrication, Reprocessing, Radioactive Waste Disposal and
Waste Management Facilities

Page on which related


Date of
Power station Summary of the analysis press announcement
occurrence appears

2009.4.6 Japan Atomic On April 6, when the reprocessing facility was shut down (during the periodical facility self-
Energy Agency inspection), when a leak test (pressure test using industrial water) was conducted for the ocean
discharge pipe of the reprocessing facility in Tokai Research and Development Center, Nuclear
Fuel Cycle Engineering Laboratories, it was verified that the pressure did not reach the test
pressure level (0.44 MPa) and thus, it was thought that there might be leak locations on the
ocean discharge pipe.
Investigation was conducted to determine the cause, and the results (intermediate reports) are
1 as follows: 572-579
An investigation was conducted on the ocean discharge pipe that was buried under the seabed.
As a result, a leak from a crack-like scratch approx. 200 mm in length and approx. 1 mm in
width, etc., was found at the location, approx. 760 m before the release opening (toward the
land). It was verified that there were no leaks from other locations.
Considering the above, it was presumed that the cause of this leak was external mechanical
damage to the discharge pipe. However, it was determined that cause investigations should be
continuously conducted.

2009.10.22 Japan Nuclear At around 1:55 on October 22, in the high-level liquid waste vitrification building in the
Fuel Limited reprocessing facility, during an inspection of the tray installed under the flange, which was
attached to the piping in which high-level liquid waste flows, residual liquid (approx. 20 mL)
was found. To check whether liquid waste was supplied from the high-level liquid waste
supply tank, the liquid level in the supply tank and the purge air flow rate from the air lift
pump were measured. As a result, it was verified that the liquid waste was not supplied. In
addition, when the status of servicing using the crane in the vitrification cell was checked by
reviewing recoded video, the chain of that crane was seen to have made contact with the flange
at 23:43 on the previous day, causing the liquid to drip into the tray. Responding to that, it was
verified that nothing was wrong with the status of the radioactivity inside and outside of the
reprocessing facility after the dripping, and it was determined that continuous surveillance
should be enhanced. After that, the liquid was sampled to check its nature, and
reporting was conducted based on the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law because it was
considered that the liquid had leaked from safety-significant equipment and the
function had been lost. There were no effects on the surrounding environment from this
incident and no exposure of the personnel.
It was also found from the radioactive material concentration level, etc., that the sampling
results of the dripped liquid were equivalent to the high-level liquid waste in the supply tank.
Investigation was conducted to determine the cause, and the results are as follows:
2 580-585
(1) Cause of the high-level liquid waste leak when the chain of the crane made contact with the
flange
The bolts of the flange were not tightened enough because they were tightened with an
impact wrench whose tightening performance had been lowered due to the steam and fog,
including nitric acid, which was generated by the large amount of high-level liquid waste that
had leaked in January this year.
Data regarding the tightening performance and use records of the impact wrench had not
been managed.
(2) Cause of the high-level liquid waste remaining in the flange
Foam of the liquid waste that had been generated by the purge air, which blew into the air
lift piping of the high-level liquid waste supply tank when the liquid waste was not supplied,
transferred to the flange and remained there.
Furthermore, since high-level liquid waste had leaked in January and February this year, part
of the liquid used to wash out the liquid waste in the piping was not discharged and had
remained.
(3) Cause of the chain of the crane making contact with the flange
Though narrow locations (caution points), where it was highly possible that the crane may
make contact with the equipment, were extracted during a review stage before servicing, its
contact with the flange was not considered thoroughly and not picked up as a
caution point.
The event occurred on the homeward movement of the crane while it was moving back and
forth. The crane should be stopped near the flange temporarily to check its position
relative to the surrounding equipment, considering that the chain may be shifted wrongly due
to rotation of the suspended equipment. However, the crane was moved continuously without
stopping because there were no problems during the outward movement.

570
ϱϫ㸫㸱㸫㸲ࠉࠉ:./((*@/0/1(/(*+2*K>>'A/2)(*1)*DE>0/1.*3E/0*31H.'>1)'+2I
****************************@/-.+>/(('2;I@1A'+1>)'B/*R1()/*8'(-+(10*12A*R1()/
****************************S121;/=/2)*31>'0')'/(
&'()*+,*-./((*./0/1(/(*'2*34*5667

81)/*+,*./0/1(/ 9')0/ :1;/


&/1<1;/*,.+=*8'(>?1.;/*:'-/*1)*9+<1'*@/-.+>/(('2;*:012)*+,*9+<1'
 @/(/1.>?*12A*8/B/0+-=/2)*C/2)/.*DE>0/1.*3E/0*CF>0/*G2;'2//.'2; 
&1H+.1)+.'/(I*J1-12*K)+='>*G2/.;F*K;/2>F
&/1<1;/*,.+=*)?/*A'(>?1.;/*-'-/*1)*)?/*9+<1'*@/-.+>/(('2;*:012)*+,*)?/
9+<1'*@/(/1.>?*12A*8/B/0+-=/2)*C/2)/.*DE>0/1.*3E/0*CF>0/
  
G2;'2//.'2;*&1H+.1)+.'/(I*J1-12*K)+='>*G2/.;F*K;/2>F
*LM2B/()';1)'+2*()1)E(*+,*)?/*0/1<1;/*12A*,E)E./*-012N

L:./((OE2122+E2>/A*'((E/(*>+2>/.2'2;*>1E(/*=/1(E./(N 㸫

&/1<1;/*'2*)?/*B').','>1)'+2*>/00*'2*)?/*?';?O0/B/0*0'PE'A*Q1()/
 B').','>1)'+2*HE'0A'2;*1)*)?/*./-.+>/(('2;*-012)*+,*)?/*J1-12*DE>0/1. 
3E/0*&'=')/A

C1E(/(*+,*12A*>+E2)/.=/1(E./(*1;1'2()*)?/*0/1<1;/*'2*)?/*B').','>1)'+2
 >/00*'2*)?/*?';?O0/B/0*0'PE'A*Q1()/*B').','>1)'+2*HE'0A'2;*1)*)?/ 
./-.+>/(('2;*-012)*+,*)?/*J1-12*DE>0/1.*3E/0*&'=')/A


571
Leakage from Discharge Pipe at Tokai Reprocessing Plant of Tokai
Research and Development Center Nuclear Fuel Cycle Engineering
Laboratories, Japan Atomic Energy Agency

April 7, 2009
NISA㸭METI

On April 6, 2009, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) received a report from Japan
Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) on leakage from the discharge pipe at Tokai Reprocessing Plant of
Tokai Research and Development Center Nuclear Fuel Cycle Engineering Laboratories, as follows.

1. The Report from Japan Atomic Energy Agency


On April 6, at Tokai reprocessing plant of Tokai Research and Development Center Nuclear Fuel
Cycle Engineering Laboratories which was shut down (the plant was under regular self-controlled
inspection), leakage test (pressure test using water) of the discharge pipe was carried out. As a result, it
was confirmed that the pressure did not reach the test pressure (0.44MPa) and it was thus judged that
there could be a leakage point on the discharge pipe (the latest discharge of liquid waste was carried
out on March 9, 2009).
The reprocessing plant has been under its shutdown since May 23, 2007. After the last leakage test
of discharge pipe (carried on August 28, 2007), it has been confirmed that radioactive material
concentration of the discharged water has been sufficiently lower than the control target stipulated in
the safety preservation rules. It has also been confirmed that the result of the latest environmental
monitoring (up to February 10, 2009) showed no significant level. However, for just in case,
additional environmental monitoring will be carried out soon and it will be checked that there is no
impact on the environment.

2. Actions of NISA
JAEA judged that this event is relevant to Article 19-16 of “the rule for the reprocessing business
for spent fuel (Leakage of the spent fuel outside the controlled area)”, NISA has received the report
pursuant to the law.
In addition, local safety inspectors are confirming the status on the site.
Afterwards, NISA will continue the rigorous checking of the investigation of causes and
countermeasures against recurrence, which will be carried out by the company pursuant to the law.

– Results of Provisional Evaluation by INES –


Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Level

- - 0 0

572
Outlet

Shutoff
Monitoring Room
Flange Shutoff Jig
Schematic Diagram
of Outlet
Land Area Sea Area
Pressure Gauge Approx. 3.7km

Shoreline
Approx. 24m
Common Pit 1 Pit 2
Industrial Water Ditch Valve Box Outlet

Oil Removal Facility for Liquid


Waste (Facility- C)
Legend : Valve
: Flange

Schematic Diagram of the Leakage Test

Shinkawa-river

Dike Outlet

Discharge Pipe
Shoreline

Approx.
4 Buoys
3.7km

Road
Hitachinaka Thermal Power Station

Monitoring
Room
Road [Legend]
Environmental
Oil Removal Facility for Discharge Pipe
Monitoring
Liquid Waste
Boundary Area Fence
of the Research
Center

Schematic Diagram of the Discharge Pipe Route 参


573
Leakage from the discharge pipe at the Tokai Reprocessing Plant of
the Tokai Research and Development Center Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Engineering Laboratories, Japan Atomic Energy Agency
(Investigation status of the leakage and future plan)

October 30, 2009


NISA㸭METI

Today (on October 30, 2009), the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) received a report
from the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) on the investigation status of the causes and the future
plan, regarding the leakage from the discharge pipe at the Tokai Reprocessing Plant of the Tokai
Research and Development Center Nuclear Fuel Cycle Engineering Laboratories, which had been
reported on April 6, 2009, as follows:
- The leakage point of the discharge pipe was identified.
- The concerned leakage point was temporarily restored.
- Afterwards, the leakage point will be cut off and collected for the detailed investigation of the
causes and the consideration of the countermeasures against recurrence, and the full-scale restoration
of the discharge pipe.
The NISA will continue to validate the cause investigation and the countermeasures against
recurrence which is now being carried out by the JAEA.

1. The report from the Japan Atomic Energy Agency


(1) Investigation status
1) Inspection and investigation of the discharge pipe
As a result of the investigation of the discharge pipe buried in the sea bottom, a leakage due to
a crack-like flaw approximately 200mm long and 1mm wide in the discharge pipe installed in the
sea area was found at the point approximately 760m land side from the outlet. And no leakage
other than the concerned point was also confirmed.
Therefore, it is estimated that the discharge pipe was mechanically damaged from the outside
and the damage caused the leakage, and the causes will be continuously investigated.
As to the concerned leakage point, the leakage was repaired by using a bag clamp (*) and
temporarily restored. And then, no leakage was confirmed by the leak test.

*Bag clamp: an equipment to repair a pipe by tightening up it from the outside.

2) Environmental impact of this event


As a result of the evaluation of the effective dose caused by the leakage from the discharge
pipe, the total annual dose caused by ocean release and atmospheric release is almost same as that
in fiscal year when there was no leakage. Therefore, the total dose is evaluated to be sufficiently
lower than the annual dose limit outside of the environmental monitoring area which is stipulated
in the law.
In addition, as a result of the environmental monitoring, a very slight amount of the radioactive

574
material concentration was measured in the sea bottom sediment near the leakage point. However,
its concentration falls within ranges of that measured in the domestic sea bottom sediment and
will not have an impact on the environment.

(2) Future plan


Afterwards, the leakage point will be cut off and collected for the detailed investigation of the
causes and the consideration of the countermeasures against recurrence, and then the full-scale
restoration of the discharge pipe. Until then, a bag clamp will be installed with a management taking
account the implementation of the leak test around the ocean release, approximately 6000m3 of low
level liquid waste will be released into the ocean during the time period of about 1.5 months.

2. Actions of NISA
According to the report submitted by JAEA, based on the investigation result in the past, JAEA
plans to implement the detailed investigation of the causes and the consideration of the
countermeasures against recurrence, and the full-scale restoration of the discharge pipe.
NISA will continue to validate the investigation of cause and the countermeasures against
recurrence which is now being implemented by JAEA.
It was confirmed that no safety issue was raised by the repair of leakage carried out by JAEA.
In addition, NISA will check the JAEA’s activity based on its future plan through the operational
safety inspection.

(Reference)
1. Summary of this Event
On April 6, at Tokai reprocessing plant of Tokai Research and Development Center Nuclear Fuel
Cycle Engineering Laboratories which was shut down (the plant was under regular self-controlled
inspection), leakage test (pressure test using water) of the discharge pipe was carried out. As a result, it
was confirmed that the pressure did not reach the test pressure (0.44MPa) and it was thus judged that
there could be a leakage point on the discharge pipe.

2. Results of Provisional Evaluation by INES -


Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Level

- - 0 0

* INES (International Nuclear Event Scale) is the indicator rating the safety significance of the event occurred
at nuclear power station etc. Events are evaluated based on 3 criteria (such as criteria 1; off-site impact,
criteria 2; on-site impact, and criteria 3; degradation of the defense-in-depth) and the highest level among 3
evaluations is adopted as the INES evaluation level for the event. INES level is ranging from Level 0 (no
safety significance) to Level 7(major accident).


575
Approx. 760m
Leakage point
Outlet
Discharge pipe

Land area Sea area


Buried flange

Approx. 3.7km
Shoreline

576
Hitachi-naka Thermal Power Station Pacific Ocean

Nuclear Fuel Cycle


Engineering Laboratories
Offshore breakwater

Schematic Diagram of the Discharge Pipe Route (Leakage Point)


Attachment 1
Specifications of the discharge pipe
Area Land area Sea area
Type of pipe carbon-steel pipe for pressure service (STPG370)
Outlet
Nominal diameter(A) 200(outer diameter:216.3mm)
8.2mm 12.7mm
Thickness
(inner diameter:199.9mm) (inner diameter:190.9mm)
Design pressure 0.3MPa
Double tube Polyethylene
Coating
(protection tube) (over 2.5mm)
Depth of burial Over 3m Top of the discharge pipe

Monitoring room

Land area Sea area


Approx. 3.7km

577
Shoreline

Pit-1 Pit-2 Outlet Approx. 24m


Common
ditch Protection tube is installed
Valve box
Liquid waste Discharge pipe
storage tank
Protection tube
Oil removal facility for liquid waste
(Facility-C)

Legend : Valve
Specification of the protection tube : Flange
Material : STPG370
Outer Diameter: 318.5mm : Pump
Thickness : 17.4mm
Attachment 2

Schematic Diagram of the Discharge System



Removed polyethylene
coating Section tape for
Sea surface Crack-like flaw the survey
side

South North
side side
Section number

Leakage point
Sea bottom was found at
side the lower side
of the north
side Photograph of the bag clamp (*)
Cross-sectional Diagram of the Pipe at the * Bag clamp: An equipment for repairing
Photograph of the leakage point as seen
Confirmed Leakage Point a water pipe leakage
from the north side

578
Removed polyethylene coating
Unit: mm
Bag clamp

Outer diameter
: 216mm Offing Land

Crack-like flaw (the dent Schematic of the temporary repair


Outline dimensions of the flaw approx.15-35mm deeper
than the circumference) (installation of the bag clamp)

Sketch of the leakage point as seen from


Attachment 3

the north side


Observation result of the leakage point and the schematic of the temporary repair
Attachment 4

Comparison between the annual dose caused by the environmental release from
the reprocessing plant and the annual dose limit
Fiscal Year Atmospheric Ocean Total *1 Ratio to the dose
Release(mSv) Release(mSv) (mSv) limit *2
2004 4.2x10-4 1.9x10-5 4.4x10-4 Approx. 1/2,000
2005 4.2x10-4 1.7x10-5 4.3x10-4 Approx. 1/2,000
2006 3.0x10-4 9.5x10-6 3.1x10-4 Approx. 1/3,000
Effective dose
2007 1.7x10-4 6.4x10-6 1.8x10-4 Approx. 1/6,000
2008 1.9x10-4 1.8x10-5 2.1x10-4 Approx. 1/5,000
2009 ------*3 6.4x10-8 ------*3 ------*3
2004 5.1x10-3 9.7x10-5 5.2x10-3 Approx. 1/10,000
2005 4.5x10-3 9.6x10-5 4.6x10-3 Approx. 1/11,000
2006 2.3x10-3 6.9x10-5 2.3x10-3 Approx. 1/22,000
Equivalent dose 2007 1.4x10-4 6.4x10-5 2.1x10-4 Approx.
1/240,000
2008 2.4x10-5 2.2x10-4 2.5x10-4 Approx.
1/200,000
2009 ------*3 8.2x10-7 ------*3 ------*3

*1:The facility had been shut down in July 2007 and its 20th periodic inspection had
been implemented. As an amount of the atmospheric release decreased, induced
annual doses in FY2007 and FY2008 decreased comparing with those in other FYs,
and then the total dose decreased.

*2:Dose limits are 1mSv for the effective dose and 50mSv for the equivalent dose.

*3:As the dose caused by the atmospheric release is estimated by using the amount of
atmospheric release and actual meteorological data in the concerned FY, the
estimation is not performed at this time.


579
Leakage in the vitrification cell in the high-level liquid waste
vitrification building at the reprocessing plant of the Japan Nuclear
Fuel Limited

October 22, 2009


NISA㸭METI

Today (on October 22, 2009), the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) received a report
from the Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited on the leakage of the vitrification cell (*1) in the high-level
liquid waste vitrification building at the reprocessing plant, as follows.

1. The Report from the Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited


Around 1:55 a.m. on October 22, 2009, during the preparation of a cleaning work of the inside of
the vitrification cell in the high-level liquid waste vitrification building, some liquid was found in a
tray installed under a flange (*2) when it was checked. Afterward, at 8:10 a.m., when a location where
the leakage occurred was investigated using a photographic image, a chain of a crane used for the
preparation of the cleaning work contacted the flange and the leakage occurred.
At present, the characteristic of the leaked liquid has been investigated.
This event had no impact on the environment and no occupational radiation exposure.

*1 Vitrification cell:
This is a facility containing the vitrification system, which has a function to confine radioactive
materials.
*2. Flange:
This is a equipment for connecting pipes.

2. Actions of the NISA


This event did not occur the release of radioactive materials to the non-controlled area. However,
NISA received it as a reportable event by the law because the leakage from the component installed in
the vitrification cell was found.
After immediately this event occurred, NISA dispatched a local operation safety inspector and it
was confirmed that the leakage seems to be stopped, the dose rate in the vitrification building did not
increase, and the readings of monitoring posts installed around the site boundary were normal.
Afterwards, NISA will continue the rigorous checking of the investigation of causes and
corresponding countermeasures against recurrence, which will be carried out by the company pursuant
to the law.

- Results of Provisional Evaluation by INES* -


Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Level

- - 0 0

* INES (International Nuclear Event Scale) is the indicator rating the safety significance of the event occurred
at nuclear power station etc. Events are evaluated based on 3 criteria (such as criteria 1; off-site impact,
criteria 2; on-site impact, and criteria 3; degradation of the defense-in-depth) and the highest level among 3
evaluations is adopted as the INES evaluation level for the event. INES level is ranging from Level 0 (no
safety significance) to Level 7(major accident).

580


581
Causes of and countermeasures against the leakage in the
vitrification cell in the high-level liquid waste vitrification building
at the reprocessing plant of the Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited

December 22, 2009


NISA㸭METI

Today (on December 22, 2009), the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) received a report
from the Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (JNFL) on causes of and countermeasures against the leakage of
the vitrification cell in the high-level liquid waste vitrification building at the reprocessing plant,
which was reported on October 22, 2009.
As to the causes, it was estimated that foams of the high level liquid waste produced in the piping
moved to the flange portion(*1), whose bolts were not sufficiently tightened due to the performance
degradation of the impact wrench(*2), and the crane chain contacted with the concerned flange
portion, which led to the leakage. As to the countermeasures, management of the impact wrench will
be strengthened and measures to prevent the high level liquid waste from moving in the piping will be
taken.
NISA concludes that the report submitted by JNFL is appropriate because the causes are adequately
estimated by the investigations and the countermeasures corresponding to the estimated causes are
adequate.
(*1) Flange portion: A portion where covering or closing the end of a pipe.
(*2) Impact wrench: An electric tool which is used for tightening and loosening a bolt.

1. The main points of the report from the Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited
The contents of the report submitted by JNFL are as follows;
(1) The investigation results and the estimated causes
1) Causes of the leakage of the high level radioactive liquid waste when the crane chain contacted
with the flange portion
- As the flange bolts were tightened by using an impact wrench whose tightening performance
was degraded due to the steam or mist including nitric acid resulting from a large amount of
high level radioactive liquid waste which leaked in January, 2009, the tightening was
insufficient.
- Data on the tightening performance and the number of usage of the impact wrench were not
well managed.

2) Causes of the accumulation of the high level radioactive liquid waste in the flange portion
- Purge-air was blown into the air-lift (*3) piping installed in the supply tank of the high level
liquid waste when the air-lift was not used. Foams of the liquid waste, produced by the
purge-air, moved to the flange portion and accumulated there.
- In addition, although the liquid waste remained in the piping was cleaned after the leakage of
high level liquid waste which occurred in January and February, 2009, a part of liquid waste
was not drained and remained there.

3) Causes of the contact of the crane chain with the flange portion
- During the prior deliberation of the work, although the narrow locations (hereinafter referred to
as the caution point 㸧where it was highly possible that the crane contacts with components
were identified in terms of the crane’s traveling route, the contact with the concerned flange
portion was not deliberated enough and thus was not identified as the caution point.

582
- This event occurred on the crane’s way back when it traveled back and forth. Although the
crane should be stopped once near the flange portion and the positional relationship with 
circumstances should be confirmed taking into consideration the departure of the crane’s
position due to turning of the hanged component, motion operation of the crane was proceeded
because nothing occurred on the crane’s way forward.

(*3) Air-lift: Equipment transferring the liquid by using the compressed air.

(2) Countermeasures
1) Countermeasures against the leakage of the high level liquid waste
- The impact wrench whose performance was degraded will be replaced with the new one.
And the performance of the tightening torque will be confirmed around the commencement of
the maintenance work.
- Data on the usage of the impact wrench will be managed and stored, and the adequate
replacement timing will be considered based on these data.
- Above-mentioned countermeasures will be specified in the remote maintenance manual.

2) Countermeasures against the accumulation of the high level radioactive liquid waste in the flange
portion
- When the system will be shut down for a long time due to the maintenance etc., liquid level of
the supply tank will be decreased for preventing the liquid from contacting with the inlet for
blowing the purge-air to the air-lift piping (refer to the attachment) and also a flow rate of the
purge-air will be decreased. These countermeasures will be specified in the operational
management manual.
- Taking into consideration the possibility that liquid could accumulate in the piping, a measure
will be taken to receive liquid under the flange whenever the flange will be removed. This
countermeasure will be specified in the remote maintenance manual.

3) Countermeasure against the contact with components during the crane operation
- During the prior deliberation of the work, the caution point will be adequately picked out for
locations where it will be highly possible that the crane could contact with components
including the case associated with the turning work of the crane.
- During the motion operation of the crane at the caution point, the work will be stopped once (i.e.
to set a hold point) prior to moving closer to components and circumstances will be
reconfirmed.
- Above-mentioned countermeasures will be specified in the remote maintenance manual.

2. Actions of NISA
NISA concludes that the report submitted by JNFL is appropriate because the causes are adequately
estimated by the investigations and the countermeasures corresponding to the estimated causes are
adequate.
Afterward, NISA will continue to confirm, through the operational safety inspection etc., the
implementation status of the countermeasure against the recurrence by JNFL and the experience
feedback in other plants.

(Reference)
1. Summary of This Event
Around 1:55 a.m. on October 22, 2009, during the preparation of a cleaning work of the inside of

the vitrification cell in the high-level liquid waste vitrification building at the reprocessing plant of
JNFL, when a tray, installed under a flange attached to the piping where the high level liquid waste 付
583
flows, was inspected, some liquid (20mL) was found in the tray.
In order to confirm the supply of the high level liquid waste from the supply tank, the liquid level of
the supply tank and the flow rate of the purge-air to the air-lift pump were checked and then the liquid
waste was confirmed no to be supplied.
In addition, based on the confirmation of the recorded image of the work scene using the crane in
the vitrification cell, it was confirmed that the concerned crane chain contacted with the flange at
23:43 on the previous day and the liquid dropped into the tray.
Therefore, it was determined that the radiological status inside and outside the reprocessing facility
after the drop of the liquid was confirmed to be normal and the continuous monitoring was
strengthened.
After that, the sampling work was performed to confirm the characteristics of the leaked liquid. This
event was reported to NISA pursuant to “the law for the regulation of nuclear source material, nuclear
fuel material and reactors” because the liquid waste leaked from the important safety related
equipment and thus this event was regarded as the loss of confinement function.
This event had no impact to the environment and no occupational radiation exposure.
In addition, as a result of the sampling of the dropped liquid, it was confirmed that this liquid was
corresponding to the high level liquid waste in the supply tank, based on the concentration of the
radioactive material.
After the occurrence of the event, NISA dispatched the local operational safety inspectors to the site
to confirm the reprocessing plant status. And it was confirmed that JNFL adequately took the safety
measures according to the safety regulation.

2. Results of the Provisional Evaluation by INES (*)


Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Level

- - 0 0

* INES (International Nuclear Event Scale) is the indicator rating the safety significance of the
event occurred at nuclear power station etc. Events are evaluated based on 3 criteria (such as
criteria 1; off-site impact, criteria 2; on-site impact, and criteria 3; degradation of the
defense-in-depth) and the highest level among 3 evaluations is adopted as the INES evaluation
level for the event. INES level is ranging from Level 0 (no safety significance) to Level 7(major
accident).

584
LK))1>?=/2)N*
*
C+2)1>)*+,*)?/*C?1'2*Q')?*)?/*3012;/*
*
*
9.1B/0'2;*.1'0* C.12/*
*
*
*
Chain
*
* ,012;/*
L9';?)/2'2;*+,*)?/*,012;/*Q1(*
* '2(E,,'>'/2)*AE/*)+*-/.,+.=12>/*
* A/;.1A1)'+2*+,*)?/*'=-1>)*Q./2>?N*
*
* :'-'2;*(E--0F'2;*)?/*?';?*0/B/0*
.1A'+1>)'B/*0'PE'A*Q1()/*
* 9.1F*
*
Location of contact of the flange
* with the chain
*
*
* T*&+>1)'+2*+,*0/1<1;/*
*
*
* UE)0'2/*+,*)?/*1>>E=E01)'+2*+,*)?/*0'PE'A*'2*)?/*,012;/*-+.)'+2*
* U,,O;1(*)./1)=/2)*
* (F()/=*
:E.;/O1'.*L56&V?N*
*
W*K*>/.)1'2*1=+E2)*+,*1'.*(?+E0A*
* H/*(E--0'/A*'2*+.A/.*)+*-./B/2)*
* )?/*H1><O,0+Q*+,*)?/*;1(*
'2>0EA'2;*)?/*?';?*0/B/0* [1(O0'PE'A*(/-1.1)+.*
* .1A'+1>)'B/*0'PE'A*Q1()/*/B/2*'2*
* )?/*(?E)A+Q2*+,*)?/*(F()/=X*
* K>>E=E01)'+2*+,*)?/*0'PE'A*
*
*
3+1=(*Q?'>?* ,012;/*
* -.+AE>/A*'2*
K'.O0',)* )?/*-'-'2;*
*
LGPE'-=/2)*).12(,/..'2;* .'(/*HF*)?/* 9.1F*
* )?/*0'PE'A*HF*E('2;*)?/* -E.;/O1'.* :'-'2;*(E--0F'2;*)?/*?';?*0/B/0*
* >+=-./((/A*1'.N* .1A'+1>)'B/*0'PE'A*Q1()/*
* M20/)*-+.)'+2*,+.*H0+Q'2;*)?/*-E.;/O1'.*
)+*)?/*1'.O0',)*-'-'2;*
*
*
Y';?*0/B/0*.1A'+1>)'B/*0'PE'A*Q1()/* ZE--0F*)12<* 参
*

585
ϱϬ EVALUATION OF EVENTS


587
ϱϬ-1 Outline of International Nuclear Event Scale (INES)

1. Outline of International Nuclear Event Scale (INES)


The International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) was prepared by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD/NEA) as an index capable of concisely expressing how
significant each event at a nuclear facility is for safety, and it was proposed to the member
countries in March, 1992. Japan had started using INES on August 1, 1992.
The INES classifies events into 8 levels from 0 to 7 as shown in Table XV-1-1. Level 0 is
classified as deviations, Levels 1 to 3 are classified as incidents and Levels 4 to 7 are classified
as accidents. Events are evaluated based on Criterion 1, Criterion 2 and Criterion 3, and the
highest level is taken as the rating result for that event.
Its operation takes place as follows. For those events occurring at nuclear facilities which
were reported to the Government based on the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law, their
tentative INES rating will be promptly made and published by the Nuclear and Industrial
Safety Agency as a general rule. After cause determination and the determination of
preventative measures and so forth against reoccurrence, the INES Evaluation Subcommittee,
consisting of persons of learning and experience and established in the Nuclear Safety and
Security Section of the Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy, will make the
final rating from a specialized and technical viewpoint and the rating results will be published
by the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency. The subcommittee will hold a meeting four
times a year or so.
For all events rated at Level 2 or above, and events that attract the attention of the general
public internationally, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency will aim to notify the IAEA
within 24 hours, and the IAEA will in turn immediately notify the INES participatory
countries.
For reference purposes, the process of establishing the INES is described below.


589
Table !"-1-1
!
The International Nuclear Event Scale
Criteria or Safety Attribute
Level Criterion-1 Criterion-2 Criterion-3
Off-site impact On-site impact Defence in depth
degradation
7 Major release :
(Major accident) External release of
fission products in
quantities radiologically
equivalent to more than
tens of thousands
terabecquerels of
iodine-131
6 Significant release :
(Serious accident) External release of
fission products in
quantities radiologically
equivalent to the order
of thousands to tens of
Accident

thousands of
terabecquerels of
iodine-131
5 Limited release : Severe damage to reactor
Accident with External release of core
off-site risk fission products in
quantities radiologically
equivalent to the order
of hundreds to
thousands of
terabecquerels of
iodine-131
4 Minor release : Significant damage to
Accident Public exposure of the reactor core/fatal exposure
without order of a few mSv of a worker
significant
off-site risk
3 Very small release : Severe spread of Near accident with no
(Serious Public exposure of the contamination/acute health safety layers remaining
incident) order of tenths of 1 mSv effects to a worker
2
Incident

Significant spread of Incidents with significant


(Incident) contamination/overexposure failures in safety
of a worker over legal provisions
annual Effective Dose
Equivalent Limit
1 Anomaly beyond the
(Anomaly) authorized operating
regime
0
Deviation

(Below scale) 0+ Events which could


affect safety
No safety significance
0- Events which could
not affect safety

Out of scale event No safety relevance

!(NOTE) Although the International Nuclear Event Scale mentioned above is applied events occurred before April 1, 2010, the
International Nuclear and Radioactive Event Scale 2008 Edition, which includes the rating of the significance of all events
associated with the transport of radioactive material and radiation sources, is applied to events that occurred on or after April 1,
2010. As the events that are started in this report occurred in or before fiscal year 2009, the International Nuclear Event Scale
mentioned above is applied to them.

590

ϱϬ-2 Outline of Event Rating in FY2009

In FY2009, the INES Evaluation Subcommittee of the Nuclear Safety and Security Section of the
Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy held two sessions and made evaluations on the 17
events occurring in FY2009 or before FY2009.
In addition, the first session of the INES Evaluation Subcommittee in FY2010 evaluated the 7 events
occurring in FY2009 (a total of 24 events) (See Tables XV-2-1 to 5).
The rating results of the 24 events were 0 case at Level 2, 3 cases at Level 1, 3 cases at Level 0+, 16 cases
at Level 0–, 1 case at Level 0 (reprocessing facilities) and 1 case at out of scale.
Of these, the number of evaluated events occurring in FY2009 was 15 cases, and their detail is 0 case at
Level 2, 2 cases at Level 1, 1 case at Level 0+, 10 cases at Level 0–, 1 case at Level 0 (reprocessing
facilities) and 1 case at out of scale.

The evaluation results are as follows:


#26th session of the INES Evaluation Subcommittee (held on June 4, 2009; 9 cases evaluated)
Of the nine events evaluated, eight cases are events occurring in FY 2008.
Of the nine events evaluated, one case is an event occurring in FY 2009.

#27th session of the INES Evaluation Subcommittee (held on December 11, 2009; 8 cases evaluated)
Of the eight events evaluated, one case is an event occurring in FY 2008.
Of the eight events evaluated, seven cases are events occurring in FY 2009.

#28th session of the INES Evaluation Subcommittee (held on June 4, 2010; 7 cases evaluated)
Of the seven events evaluated, seven cases are events occurring in FY 2009.


591
Table 䊩䊤-2-1 Events at Nuclear Power Plants Evaluated in FY2009㸦Events in FY2009㸧

INES Level
Occurrence
Nuclear Power Plant Event
date

Criterion

Criterion

Criterion
1

3
April 6, Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Excessive insertion of the control 䠉 䠉 0䇲 0䇲
2009 Power Station Unit-3, rod
Tokyo Electric Power Co.
April 22, Hamaoka Nuclear Power Injury of a worker in the turbine Out of Scale
2009 Station Unit-4, Chubu building
Electric Power Co.
May 5, Hamaoka Nuclear Power Reactor manual shutdown due to 䠉 䠉 0䇲 0䇲
2009 Station Unit-4, Chubu the increase of the hydrogen
Electric Power Co. concentration in the off-gas
treatment system
May 13, Tsuruga Power Station Unit Flaw in the seat of the vent valve 䠉 䠉 0䇲 0䇲
2009 1, Japan Atomic Power Co. for the control rod drive
hydraulic system
May 28, Onagawa Nuclear Power Excessive insertion of the control 䠉 䠉 0䇲 0䇲
2009 Station Unit-3, Tohoku rod
Electric Power Co.
July 17, Tokai Daini Power Station, Reactor manual shutdown for 䠉 䠉 0䇲 0䇲
2009 Japan Atomic Power Co. the components inspection
associated with the fluctuation of
the oil level of the main oil tank
August 21, Tomari Power Station Unit-3, Damage of one emergency diesel 䠉 䠉 0+ 0+
2009 Hokkaido Electric Power Co. generator
October 15, Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power reduction due to the shut 䠉 䠉 0䇲 0䇲
2009 Power Station Unit-4, Tokyo down of one reactor recirculation
Electric Power Co. pump

Table 䊩䊤-2-2 Events at Nuclear Power Plants Evaluated in FY2009㸦Events in FY2008㸧

INES Level
Occurrence
Nuclear Power Plant Event
date
Criterion

Criterion

Criterion
1

July 23, Tsuruga Power Station Malfunction of a starting steam 䠉 䠉 0䇲 0䇲


2008 Unit-2, Japan Atomic Power inlet valve for the turbine driven
Co. auxiliary feedwater pump
November Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear A small amount of water oozing 䠉 䠉 0䇲 0䇲
26, Power Station Unit-1, Tokyo from a valve in the control rod
2008 Electric Power Co. drive hydraulic control system
December Tsuruga Power Station Corroded pores in the air duct of 䠉 䠉 0䇲 0䇲
11, Unit-1, Japan Atomic Power the main control room HVAC
2008 Co. system
December Hamaoka Nuclear Power Inoperative of the emergency 䠉 䠉 0+ 0+
24, Station Unit-3, Chubu diesel generator-A
2008 Electric Power Co.
December Hamaoka Nuclear Power Reactor manual shutdown due to 䠉 䠉 0䇲 0䇲
30, Station Unit-5, Chubu the increase of the hydrogen
2008 Electric Power Co. concentration in the off-gas
treatment system
February Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Actuation of the safety relief 䠉 䠉 0+ 0+
25, Power Station Unit-1, Tokyo valve due to the failure of the
2009 Electric Power Co. turbine bypass valve

592
INES Level
Occurrence
Nuclear Power Plant Event
date

Criterion

Criterion

Criterion
1

3
March 23, Onagawa Nuclear Power One control rod insertion without 䠉 䠉 1 1
2009 Station Unit-1, Tohoku its any operation
Electric Power Co.
March 26, Shimane Nuclear Power Erroneous insertion of one control 䠉 䠉 0䇲 0䇲
2009 Station Unit-1, Chugoku rod
Electric Power Co.
March 26, Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Excessive insertion of the control 䠉 䠉 0䇲 0䇲
2009 Power Station Unit-3, Tokyo rod
Electric Power Co.

Table 䊩䊤-2-3 Events at Nuclear Power Plants Evaluated in FY2010㸦Events in FY2009㸧

INES Level
Occurrence
Nuclear Power Plant Event
date

Criterion

Criterion

Criterion
1

3
October 14, Tsuruga Power Station Thinning of the sea water piping 䠉 䠉 0䇲 0䇲
2009 Unit-1, Japan Atomic Power for cooling the high pressure core
Co. injection system diesel engine
November Shika Nuclear Power Station No standby condition of 2 䠉 䠉 1 1
13, Unit-2, Hokuriku Electric emergency diesel generators
2009 Power Co.
November Mihama Power Station Unexpectedly reactor power 䠉 䠉 0䇲 0䇲
13, Unit-1, Kansai Electric change during the generator
2009 Power Co. power increase operation
December Hamaoka Nuclear Power Leakage of liquid radioactive 䠉 䠉 1 1
1, Station Unit-3,Chubu waste in the radiation controlled
2009 Electric Power Co. area
January 13, Tokai Daini Power Station, Thinning of the residual heat 䠉 䠉 0䇲 0䇲
2010 Japan Atomic Power Co. removal sea water system piping

Table 䊩䊤-2-4 Events at Nuclear Power Plant in the Research and Development Stage
Evaluated in FY2010㸦Events in FY2009㸧

INES Level
Occurrence
Nuclear Facility Event
date
Criterion

Criterion

Criterion
1

October 8, Decommissioning Leakage of the radioactive 䠉 䠉 0䇲 0䇲


2009 Engineering Center (Fugen), material in the controlled area
Japan Atomic Energy Agency

Table 䊩䊤-2-5 Events at Reprocessing Facilities Evaluated in FY2010㸦Events in FY2009㸧

INES Level
Occurrence
Nuclear Facility Event
date
Criterion

Criterion

Criterion
1

October 22, Reprocessing plant of the Leakage in the vitrification cell 䠉 䠉 0 0 参


2009 Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited in the high-level liquid waste
vitrification building

593
ϱϬ-3 Press Release Documents Related to the International Nuclear
Event Scale (INES) for Events at Nuclear Facilities

Application of International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) to Events Occurred at


Nuclear Facilities

June 4, 2009

The result of the INES level rating at “the INES Evaluation Subcommittee” of the Nuclear
and Industrial Safety Subcommittee” of “the Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and
Energy” held on June 4, 2009 is as shown below.

June 4, 2009, “the INES Evaluation Subcommittee” (Chairman: Professor Haruki Madarame,
Graduate School of Engineering, University of Tokyo) of “the Nuclear and Industrial Safety
Subcommittee” of “the Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy” was held at the
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) to carry out the INES level rating of the
following events and failures which occurred at nuclear facilities.
The result of the INES level rating at the Subcommittee is as shown in the appendices.
The Subcommittee has been established to evaluate events and failures which occurred at
METI licensed nuclear facilities by using INES from professional and technical points of view.

594
(Attachment)
INES
Occurrence Date Nuclear Facility Event Basis of Rating
Level
July 23, 2008 Tsuruga Power Station Malfunction of a starting 0- The electromagnetic brake pad of the starting steam inlet
Unit-2, steam inlet valve for the valve for the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump
Japan Atomic Power turbine driven auxiliary detached from the rotating brake disk and it restrained the
Co. feedwater pump rotation of the motor, which resulted in the malfunction of the
starting steam inlet valve. This event had no possibility to
challenge the safety requirement of the reactor facility.
November 26ࠊ Fukushima Daiichi A small amount of water 0- A small amount of water oozing on the valve casing surface of
2008 Nuclear Power Station oozing from a valve in the the valve in the control rod drive hydraulic system occurred.
Unit-1, control rod drive hydraulic This event did not cause the malfunction of the movement of
Tokyo Electric Power control system the control rods and it had no possibility to challenge the
Co. safety requirement of the reactor facility.
December 11, Tsuruga Power Station Corroded pores in the air 0- The corroded pores generated due to the dew condensation
2008 Unit-1, duct of the main control water in the duct of the main control room HVAC system and
Japan Atomic Power room HVAC system it had no possibility to challenge the safety requirement of the
Co. reactor facility.

595
December 24, Hamaoka Nuclear Inoperative of the 0+ EDG became inoperative due to the bad conduction in the
2008 Power Station Unit-3, emergency diesel motor of the power control mechanism for EDG. This event
Chubu Electric Power generator-A had a possibility to challenge the safety requirement of the
Co. reactor facility.
February 25, Fukushima Daiichi Actuation of the safety 0+ As the screw part of the connection of the turbine bypass valve
2009 Nuclear Power Station relief valve due to the the driver has fallen off and the turbine bypass valve fully
Unit-1, failure of the turbine closed, the reactor pressure increased and the safety relief
Tokyo Electric Power bypass valve valve opened. This event had a possibility to challenge the
Co. safety requirement of the reactor facility.
March 23, Onagawa Nuclear One control rod insertion 1 The air vent work was conducted in the control rod
2009 Power Station Unit-1, without its any operation withdrawal side during the reactor start-up operation and one
Tohoku Electric Power control rod was fully inserted. This event had no possibility to
Co. challenge the safety requirement of the reactor facility.
Therefore, this rating is judged to be a level 0-. However, the
work was done without preparing for the work manual and
safety culture deficiencies were recognized; this rating is
raised by one level.



(Attachment)
INES
Occurrence Date Nuclear Facility Event Basis of Rating
Level
March 26, Shimane Nuclear Erroneous insertion of one 0- In one of the two scram pilot solenoid valves in the control rod
2009 Power Station Unit-1, control rod drive hydraulic control unit, bad electrical contact occurred at
Chugoku Electric the terminal portion and the concerned valve opened.
Power Co. Afterwards, during the regular test (half scram test), one
control rod was fully inserted. This event had no possibility to
challenge the safety requirement of the reactor facility.
March 26, Fukushima Daiichi Excessive insertion of the 0- When assembling the scram inlet valve in HCU after its
2009 Nuclear Power Station control rod overhaul during the periodic inspection, the valve disk did not
Unit-3, seat completely to full closed position due to the insufficient
Tokyo Electric Power stroke adjustment operation. Therefore, leakage occurred at
Co. the valve seat and then the control rod excessively moved.
This event had no possibility to challenge the safety
requirement of the reactor facility.
April 6, 2009 Fukushima Daiichi Excessive insertion of the 0- During assembling work after adjustment of the valve disk
Nuclear Power Station control rod stroke of the scram inlet valve in HCU, the adhesion between
Unit-3, the valve disk and the valve seat area decreased and damage

596
Tokyo Electric Power to the Teflon seat occurred. Leakage occurred at the scram
Co. inlet valve seat and thus the concerned control rod was
excessively inserted. This event had no possibility to
challenge the safety requirement of the reactor facility.
No. 1

1. Power Plant:
Tsuruga Power Station Unit-2 (PWR, rated electric power: 1,160MWe)

2. Date of Occurrence:
July 23, 2008

3. Event:
Malfunction of a starting steam inlet valve for the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump

4. Event Description:
Tsuruga Unit-2, had been under its periodic inspection. On July 21, 2008, the alarm of
overload occurred when the open operation of two starting steam inlet valves for the turbine
driven auxiliary feedwater pump. It was confirmed that the valve-A opened only 6% and that a
DC over-current relay, which was installed in the power panel for the motor, got burned. On July
22, as a result of the inspection of the motor for the concerned motor operated valve, it was
confirmed that a part of the sliding portion of the commutator was distorted. In addition the
valve-B was confirmed to normally operate.
As a result of the investigation, the causes of the malfunction of starting steam inlet valve for
turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump were estimated as follows:
- Dew condensation occurred in the electromagnetic brake used for the motor operated valve to
start up the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump. As the dew condensation water
penetrated into the glued surface of the electromagnetic brake pad and the rotating brake
disk, the adhesive property of the bonding adhesive gradually decreased and the
electromagnetic brake pad detached from the rotating brake disk.
- The electromagnetic brake pad, which detached during an opening operation of the concerned
valve, was caught between the rotating brake disk and the stationary brake disk. Therefore,
the motor was constrained so as not to rotate and then the concerned valve could not be
operated.
- The electromagnetic brake of the concerned valve had not been inspected for approximately
24 years since its installation.
- When the revision of the check and repair plan was considered, the judgment was made only
focusing on the wear of the electromagnetic brake pad. And the reason of the judgment and
the results of checking were not recorded at all.
This event was summarized as follows; The electromagnetic brake pad of the starting steam
inlet valve for the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump detached from the rotating brake disk
and it restrained the rotation of the motor, which resulted in the malfunction of the starting
steam inlet valve.
In addition, there was no radiological impact to the outside and the inside of the power plant.

5. Rating Results and their Basis:


(1) Criterion 1: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact to the outside of the power plant, this is out of
rating.)
(2) Criterion 2: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact on the inside of the power plant, this is out of
rating.)
(3) Criterion 3: Level 0-
(Basis: The electromagnetic brake pad of the starting steam inlet valve for the turbine
driven auxiliary feedwater pump detached from the rotating brake disk and it
restrained the rotation of the motor, which resulted in the malfunction of the
starting steam inlet valve. This event had no possibility to challenge the safety
requirement of the reactor facility. Therefore, this rating is judged to be a level 0-.)
(4) Final Rating Result:
Level 0- as a result of [Criterion 1: -, Criterion 2: -, Criterion 3: Level 0-]


597
No. 2

1. Power Plant:
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit-1 (BWR, rated electric power: 460MWe)

2. Date of Occurrence:
November 26ࠊ2008

3. Event:
A small amount of water oozing from a valve in the control rod drive hydraulic control
system

4. Event Description:
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit-1 had been under its periodic inspection. On
November 25, 2008, when a leakage test of the reactor coolant pressure boundary was carried out,
a small amount of water oozing on the valve casing surface of a stop valve in the insert line of the
control rod drive hydraulic system was discovered. In addition, during a preparation check for the
function test of the control rod drive hydraulic system, it was also found that there was a small
amount of water oozing on the valve casing surface of a stop valve in the insert line of another
control rod drive hydraulic system.
As a result of the investigation, the causes of a small amount of water oozing from a valve in
the control rod drive hydraulic system were estimated as follows:
ĆThe two valves, in which a small amount of water oozing occurred, had a wall-through flaw
going from the inner surface to the outer surface of the valve casing, which had been
generated during manufacturing process on the parting line. This flaw was bended near the
outer surface by a machining process during manufacture of the valve, and a part of the
surface was bonded by the compression.
ĆDuring the last but one periodic inspection, the outer surface of the valve casing was polished
using a nylon scrubber after the leak test of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, and the
condition of the outer surface of the flaw was changed such that the crimped surface was
tuned out.
ĆDuring the present periodic inspection, the leak test of the reactor coolant pressure boundary
was conducted under higher pressure than that applied in the last periodic inspection, and a
small amount of water oozing occurred in the two valves concerned.
This event was summarized as follows; The wall-through flaw in the valve of the control rod
drive hydraulic system, which had been generated during manufacturing process, was bonded by
the compression in the subsequent manufacturing process and also the outer surface of the valve
casing was polished during the periodic inspection. Resultantly, the crimped surface was tuned
out and a small amount of water oozing occurred.
In addition, there was no radiological impact to the outside and the inside of the power plant.

5. Rating Results and their Basis:


(1) Criterion 1: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact to the outside of the power plant, this is out of
rating.)
(2) Criterion 2: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact on the inside of the power plant, this is out of
rating.)
(3) Criterion 3: Level 0-
(Basis: A small amount of water oozing on the valve casing surface of the valve in the control
rod drive hydraulic system occurred. This event did not cause the malfunction of the
movement of the control rods and it had no possibility to challenge the safety
requirement of the reactor facility. Therefore, this rating is judged to be a level 0-.)
(4) Final Rating Result:
Level 0- as a result of [Criterion 1: -, Criterion 2: -, Criterion3: Level 0-]

598
No. 3

1. Power Plant:
Tsuruga Power Station Unit-1 (BWR, rated electric power: 357MWe)

2. Date of Occurrence:
December 11, 2008

3. Event:
Corroded pores in the air duct of the main control room HVAC system

4. Event Description:
Tsuruga Power Station Unit-1 had been under its periodic inspection. When the air ventilation
room was checked as a part of the test operation after inspection of the main control room HVAC
system, it was found that there are 2 corroded pores (the one was approximately 10cm long and
20cm wide, and the other approximately 10cm long and 10cm wide) in the ambient air intake duct.
Therefore this event was judged to be the malfunction of important safety related equipment.
As a result of the investigation, the causes of the corrosion in the air duct of the main control
room HVAC system were estimated as follows:
Ć The concerned duct is installed in the air ventilation room where the temperature is
controlled with the main control room HVAC unit at approximately 15 degrees Celsius. As
the ambient air directly flows into the duct, dew condensation occurred inside of the duct
when the temperature of the ambient air is higher. Inside of the duct, steel sheet was
oxidized due to dew condensation water and it caused the rust. It then developed corrosion
and resulted in penetration.
Ć About the maintenance and inspection for the main control room HVAC system, the plan
and the cycle of inspection of the fan have been set respectively in the inspection plan and
the inspection cycle table. However, they did not contain any information about the
inspection of duct. The standard instruction for the maintenance and inspection prescribed
that the inspection of the duct should be carried out at the time of the overhaul of the fan.
However, the scope of the inspection was uncertain and corrosion from inside of the duct was
not considered as an inspection item. In the daily patrol, the emphasis has been placed on
the inspection of the active equipment. While the rust and corrosion of the duct, which is a
static equipment, have not been paid much attention to and thus the check was insufficient.
Ć Although the concerned duct had been replaced due to significant corrosion, these
experiences have not been appropriately reflected in the maintenance and inspection plans,
and the maintenance and inspection have not been conducted properly in terms of the inside
corrosion.
This event was summarized as follows; The ambient air taking into the main control room
HVAC system was condensated in the duct, and it oxidized the steel sheet and generated the rust.
It then developed corrosion and resulted in penetration.
In addition, there was no radiological impact to the outside and the inside of the power plant.

5. Rating Results and their Basis:


(1) Criterion 1: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact to the outside of the power plant, this is out of
rating.)
(2) Criterion 2: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact on the inside of the power plant, this is out of
rating.)
(3) Criterion 3: Level 0-
(Basis: The corroded pores generated due to the dew condensation water in the duct of the
main control room HVAC system and it had no possibility to challenge the safety
requirement of the reactor facility. Therefore, this rating is judged to be a level 0-.)
(4) Final Rating Result:
Level 0- as a result of [Criterion 1: -, Criterion 2: -, Criterion 3: Level 0-]


599
No. 4

1. Power Plant:
Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit-3 (BWR, rated electric power: 1,100MWe)

2. Date of Occurrence:
December 24, 2008

3. Event:
Inoperative of the emergency diesel generator-A

4. Event Description:
Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit-3 had been under its constant operation at the rated
thermal power. On December 22, 2008, during a regular test of the emergency diesel generator-A
(EDG-A), when decreasing the output power by using a power control mechanism after the
EDG-A reached its rated power, power decreasing operation by a power control mechanism
became unavailable. Therefore, it was judged that the concerned EDG was not operable and “the
deviation from the limiting conditions for operation” specified in its safety regulation, was
declared. Afterward, as a result of the inspection of the concerned power control mechanism, it
turned out to require substantial time for investigating causes of this event. This event was
judged to be reportable pursuant to the law on December 24, 2008.
As a result of the investigation, the causes of the inoperative of the EDG -A were estimated as
follows:
- When overhauling the motor of the power control mechanism for EDG in the maintenance
company, irregular contact traces, which were estimated to be generated due to the intrusion
of the foreign material, were identified on the contacting face of the brush which contacts the
commutator in order to drive the concerned motor, and varnish film adhered to lead wires in
the concerned motor were about to be peeled.
- No foreign material such as varnish film was identified in the concerned motor. However, as a
result of the verification test, it was confirmed that a bad conduction between a brush and a
commutator could occur due to a location of a foreign material or the inclination of the brush
caused by the rotation of the commutator when an insulative foreign material could be caught
between a brush and a commutator during the assembling work of the concerned motor.
- Therefore, it was estimated that an insulative foreign material was intruded between a brush
and a commutator during the assembling work of the concerned motor in the maintenance
company, and a bad conduction occurred due to the inclination of the brush caused by the
rotation of the commutator.
This event was summarized as follows; As an insulative foreign material was intruded in the
motor of the power control mechanism for EDG during its maintenance work, a bad conduction
occurred between a brush and a commutator, and the EDG became inoperative.
In addition, there was no radiological impact to the outside and the inside of the power plant.

5. Rating Results and their Basis:


(1) Criterion 1: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact to the outside of the power plant, this is out of
rating.)
(2) Criterion 2: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact on the inside of the power plant, this is out of
rating.)
(3) Criterion 3: Level 0+
(Basis: EDG became inoperative due to the bad conduction in the motor of the power control
mechanism for EDG. This event had a possibility to challenge the safety
requirement of the reactor facility. Therefore, this rating is judged to be a level 0+.)
(4) Final Rating Result:
Level 0+ as a result of [Criterion 1: -, Criterion 2: -, Criterion 3: Level 0+]

600
No. 5

1. Power Plant:
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit-1 (BWR, rated electric power; 460MWe)

2. Date of Occurrence:
February 25, 2009

3. Event:
Actuation of the safety relief valve due to the failure of the turbine bypass valve

4. Event Description:
The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit-1 had been under its start-up operation.
The turbine bypass valve fully closed at approximately 13% reactor thermal power. Thus the
reactor pressure increased to approximately 7.1MPa (rated pressure: 6.86MPa) and the safety
relief valve opened. Consequently the reactor power was decreased by means of normal insertion
of the control rods. Afterwards, the turbine bypass valve was investigated, and it was found that a
bolt which connects the driver of the turbine bypass valve has been detached. Therefore the
reactor was manually shut down.
As a result of the investigation, the causes of the detachment of the bolt which connects the
driver of the turbine bypass valve were estimated as follows;
Ć As a result of the detailed investigation on the connection of the driver of the turbine bypass
valve , it was found that screw thread of the screw part has been stripped due to attrition,
and the screw part has been fell off from the receiving side.
Ć Even though the loosening prevention nut (locknut) has been fixed on the screw part, the
regular inspection on the concerned part has not been carried out. The simulation test
results showed that if the fastening of the locknut was insufficient, attrition would occur at
the screw part. It was therefore estimated that the locknut was not fastened sufficiently
when the concerned connection was replaced during the 2nd periodic inspection, and
afterwards the regular inspection of the concerned connection haven’t been carried out, and
thus insufficient fastening of the locknut was not found and the screw part fell off.
This event was summarized as follows; The screw part of the connection of the driver of the
turbine bypass valve has become worn and has fallen off. The turbine bypass valve fully closed
and thus the reactor pressure increased. Therefore the safety relief valve opened.
In addition, there was no radiological impact to the outside and the inside of the power plant.

5. Rating Results and their Basis:


(1) Criterion 1: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact to the outside of the power plant, this is out of
rating.)
(2) Criterion 2: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact on the inside of the power plant, this is out of
rating.)
(3) Criterion 3: Level 0+
(Basis: As the screw part of the connection of the turbine bypass valve the driver has fallen
off and the turbine bypass valve fully closed, the reactor pressure increased and the
safety relief valve opened. This event had a possibility to challenge the safety
requirement of the reactor facility. Therefore, this rating is judged to be a level 0+.)
(4) Final Rating Result:
Level 0+ as a result of [Criterion 1: -, Criterion 2: -, Criterion 3: Level 0+]


601
No. 6

1. Power Plant:
Onagawa Nuclear Power Station Unit-1, (BWR, rated electric power; 524MWe)

2. Date of Occurrence:
March 23, 2009

3. Event:
One control rod insertion without its any operation

4. Event Description:
Onagawa Nuclear Power Station Unit-1 has been in the reactor start-up operation for the
adjustment operation. One control rod, which had not been operated at all, moved from the full
withdrawal position to the full insertion position at the electric power of 105MWe. As a result, the
electric power decreased to 100MWe.
As a result of the investigation, the causes of this event that one control rod, which had not
been operated at all, moved from the full withdrawal position to the full insertion position were
estimated as follows;
Ć During the reactor start-up operation, air vent work was conducted by opening the air vent
valve in the withdrawal side of the concerned control rod. This resulted in decrease of the
pressure of the withdrawal side of the concerned control rod, and thus the differential
pressure between the withdrawal side and the insertion side became larger than the
differential pressure necessary for the movement of the control rod (approx. 0.49MPa) and
therefore the concerned control rod was fully inserted.
Ć The procedure, which should be used for the works carried out when the reactor is under the
atmospheric pressure, was partially used and the work manual specific for this situation has
not been prepared. In addition, when the concerned work was carried out, the impact of the
difference of the reactor operation condition (when the reactor pressure is high) was not
appropriately reviewed, approved and understood.
This event was summarized as follows; As the air vent work was conducted in the control rod
withdrawal side during the reactor start-up operation, the differential pressure between
withdrawal and insertion sides of the control rod is larger than the differential pressure
necessary for the movement of control rod and one control rod was fully inserted.
In addition, there was no radiological impact to the outside and the inside of the power station.

5. Rating Results and their Basis:


(1) Criterion 1: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact to the outside of the power plant, this is out of
rating.)
(2) Criterion 2: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact on the inside of the power plant, this is out of
rating.)
(3) Criterion 3: Level 1
(Basis: The air vent work was conducted in the control rod withdrawal side during the
reactor start-up operation and one control rod was fully inserted. This event had no
possibility to challenge the safety requirement of the reactor facility. Therefore, this
rating is judged to be a level 0-. However, the work was done without preparing for
the work manual and safety culture deficiencies were recognized; this rating is
raised by one level.)
(4) Final Rating Result:
Level 1 as a result of [Criterion 1: -, Criterion 2: -, Criterion 3: Level 1]

602
No. 7

1. Power Plant:
Shimane Nuclear Power Station Unit-1 (BWR, rated electric power: 460MWe)

2. Date of Occurrence:
March 26, 2009

3. Event:
Erroneous insertion of one control rod

4. Event Description:
Shimane Nuclear Power Station Unit-1 had been under its constant rated thermal power
operation. When the regular test (half scram test) was carried out during the normal operation,
one control rod moved from the full withdrawal position to the full insertion position. Thus, the
reactor power decreased from 469MWe to 464MWe.
As a result of the investigation, the causes of the erroneous insertion of one control rod were
estimated as follows:
Ć After the occurrence of the erroneous insertion of the control rod, it was confirmed that a coil
of one of the two scram pilot solenoid valvesĪhereinafter referred to as the “concerned valve”ī
in the concerned control rod drive hydraulic control unit was not excited.
Ć As a result of the investigation on inside of the terminal box of the concerned valve, it was
confirmed that two screws which is not conforming to the prescribed specification have been
used. It was also found that one of the wiring connecting the coil and the terminal portion was
cranky.
Ć It was therefore estimated that bad electrical contact occurred at the terminal portion and the
coil of the concerned valve became no excitation, which resulted in opening of the concerned
valve. Afterwards, another scram pilot solenoid valve opened during the regular test (half
scram test), and thus one control rod was fully inserted.
This event was summarized as follows; In one of the two scram pilot solenoid valves for each
control rod drive hydraulic control unit, bad electrical contact occurred at the terminal portion
and the concerned valve opened. Afterwards, another scram pilot solenoid valve opened during
the regular test (half scram test), and thus one control rod was fully inserted.
In addition, there was no radiological impact to the outside and the inside of the power station.

5. Rating Results and their Basis:


(1) Criterion 1: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact to the outside of the power plant, this is out of
rating.)
(2) Criterion 2: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact on the inside of the power plant, this is out of
rating.)
(3) Criterion 3: Level 0-
(Basis: In one of the two scram pilot solenoid valves in the control rod drive hydraulic control
unit, bad electrical contact occurred at the terminal portion and the concerned valve
opened. Afterwards, during the regular test (half scram test), one control rod was
fully inserted. This event had no possibility to challenge the safety requirement of
the reactor facility. Therefore, this rating is judged to be a level 0-.)
(4) Final Rating Result:
Level 0- as a result of [Criterion 1: -, Criterion 2: -, Criterion 3: Level 0-]


603
No. 8

1. Power Plant:
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit-3 (BWR, rated electric power: 784MWe)

2. Date of Occurrence:
March 26, 2009

3. Event:
Excessive insertion of the control rod

4. Event Description:
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit-3 had been under its periodic inspection.
When the stop valve for the driving water was opened in the restoration work after the inspection
of hydraulic control unit (HCU) for the control rod drive hydraulic system, a control rod
movement alarm sounded and the control rod moved further toward the insertion direction than
the normal full inserted position (i.e. excessive insertion of the rod).
As a result of the investigation, the causes of the excessive insertion of the control rod were
estimated as follows;
Ć The cause of the control rod movement alarm sounded for the control rod was as follows.
During the restoration work after the inspection of the hydraulic control unit (HCU) for the
control rod drive hydraulic system, there was leakage from the scram inlet valve seat and
thus the concerned control rod moved towards insertion direction.
Ć During the present periodic inspection, the overhaul was conducted on the concerned valve.
However, when the stroke adjustment was conducted on the valve disk during assembling,
the valve disk was adjusted to the open direction compared with the full closed position.
Therefore, the valve disk did not seat completely to the full closed position and leakage
occurred at the valve seat.
This event was estimated as follows; When assembling the scram inlet valve in HCU after its
overhaul, the valve disk was adjusted to the open direction compared with the full closed position.
Therefore, the valve disk did not seat completely to the full closed position and leakage occurred
at the valve seat. Thus the control rod moved toward the insertion direction.
In addition, there was no radiological impact to the outside and the inside of the power plant.

5. Rating Results and their Basis:


(1) Criterion 1: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact to the outside of the power plant, this is out of
rating.)
(2) Criterion 2: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact on the inside of the power plant, this is out of
rating.)
(3) Criterion 3: Level 0-
(Basis: When assembling the scram inlet valve in HCU after its overhaul during the periodic
inspection, the valve disk did not seat completely to full closed position due to the
insufficient stroke adjustment operation. Therefore, leakage occurred at the valve
seat and then the control rod excessively moved. This event had no possibility to
challenge the safety requirement of the reactor facility. Therefore, this rating is
judged to be a level 0-.)
(4) Final Rating Result:
Level 0- as a result of [Criterion 1: -, Criterion 2: -, Criterion 3: Level 0-]

604
No. 9

1. Power Plant:
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit-3 (BWR, rated electric power: 784MWe)

2. Date of Occurrence:
April 6, 2009

3. Event:
Excessive insertion of the control rod

4. Event Description:
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit-3 had been under its periodic inspection.
When the stop valve for the driving water was opened in the restoration work after the inspection
of the hydraulic control unit (HCU) for the control rod drive hydraulic system, a control rod
movement alarm sounded for the control rod and the control rod moved further toward the
insertion direction than the normal full inserted position (i.e. excessive insertion of the rod).
As a result of the investigation, the causes of the excessive insertion of the control rod were
estimated as follows;
Ć During the restoration work after the inspection of the HCU for the control rod drive
hydraulic system, there was leakage from the scram inlet valve seat and thus the concerned
control rod moved towards insertion direction. Therefore, the control rod movement alarm
sounded.
Ć As a result of the overhaul of the concerned valve, damage was found on the Teflon seat of the
valve seat area. Moreover, it was revealed that the bolts used for assembling of the valve seat
area were a mixture of old-type and new-type ones. The investigation on the effect of a
mixture of different type of bolts showed that when the seat area was assembled with a
mixture of different kinds of bolts, uneven deformation of the Teflon seat towards inside
diameter direction occurred.
Ć Inside of the Teflon seat was unevenly deformed and the position of the valve disk was
adjusted at higher position than normal. Thus, the adhesion between the valve disk and the
valve seat area decreased and damage to the Teflon seat occurred.
This event was estimated as follows; When assembling the scram inlet valve in the HCU after
adjustment of the valve disk stroke, the bolts with a mixture of old-type and new-type ones were
used for its assembling. Thus uneven deformation of the Teflon seat towards inside diameter
direction occurred. Thus the adhesion between the valve disk and the valve seat area decreased
and damage to the Teflon seat occurred. Leakage occurred at the scram inlet valve seat and thus
the concerned control rod moved towards insertion direction (i.e., excessive insertion).
In addition, there was no radiological impact to the outside and the inside of the power plant.

5. Rating Results and their Basis:


(1) Criterion 1: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact to the outside of the power plant, this is out of
rating.)
(2) Criterion 2: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact on the inside of the power plant, this is out of
rating.)
(3) Criterion 3: Level 0-
(Basis: During assembling work after adjustment of the valve disk stroke of the scram inlet
valve in HCU, the adhesion between the valve disk and the valve seat area decreased
and damage to the Teflon seat occurred. Leakage occurred at the scram inlet valve
seat and thus the concerned control rod was excessively inserted. This event had no
possibility to challenge the safety requirement of the reactor facility. Therefore, this
rating is judged to be a level 0-.)
(4) Final Rating Result:
Level 0- as a result of [Criterion 1: -, Criterion 2: -, Criterion 3: Level 0-]


605
Application of International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) to Events Occurred at
Nuclear Facilities

December 11, 2009

The result of the INES level rating at “the INES Evaluation Subcommittee” of“the Nuclear and
Industrial Safety Subcommittee” of “the Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy”
held today (on December 11, 2009) is as shown below.

December 11, 2009, “the INES Evaluation Subcommittee” (Chairman: Professor Haruki
Madarame, Graduate School of Engineering, University of Tokyo) of “the Nuclear and Industrial
Safety Subcommittee” of “the Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy” was held at
the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) to carry out the INES level rating of the
following events and failures which occurred at nuclear facilities.
The result of the INES level rating at the Subcommittee is as shown in the appendices.
The Subcommittee has been established to evaluate events and failures which occurred at
METI licensed nuclear facilities by using INES from professional and technical points of view.

606
(Attachment)
INES
Occurrence Date Nuclear Facility Event Basis of Rating
Level
December 30, Hamaoka Nuclear Reactor manual shutdown due 0- During the start-up operation in the adjustment operation,
2008 Power Station Unit-5, to the increase of the hydrogen the performance of the catalyst of the off-gas recombiner of
Chubu Electric Power concentration in the off-gas the off-gas treatment system was degraded and the
Co. treatment system hydrogen concentration increased. This event had no
possibility to challenge the safety requirement of the
reactor facility.
April 22, 2009 Hamaoka Nuclear Injury of a worker in the turbine Out A worker, who was working in the vicinity of the steam
Power Station Unit-4, building of turbine, was injured in his left instep by being stuck in the
Chubu Electric Power Scale driver of a activated valve in the test. This event had no
Co. related on the safety requirement of the reactor facility.
May 5, 2009 Hamaoka Nuclear Reactor manual shutdown due 0- During the start-up operation in the adjustment operation,
Power Station Unit-4, to the increase of the hydrogen the performance of the catalyst of the off-gas recombiner of
Chubu Electric Power concentration in the off-gas the off-gas treatment system was degraded and the
Co. treatment system hydrogen concentration increased. This event had no
possibility to challenge the safety requirement of the
reactor facility.

607
May 13, 2009 Tsuruga Power Station Flaw in the seat of the vent 0- Flaws were found in seat surfaces of vent valves in the
Unit 1, valve for the control rod drive control rod drive hydraulic system and flaw across the seat
Japan Atomic Power hydraulic system surface of valves were identified in a part of them. This
Co. event had no possibility to challenge the safety
requirement of the reactor facility.
May 28, 2009 Onagawa Nuclear Excessive insertion of the 0- A foreign material was intruded (which is an estimation)
Power Station Unit-3, control rod in the directional control valve in the hydraulic control
Tohoku Electric Power unit of the control rod driving hydraulic system during the
Co. periodic inspection and a slight seat leak from the valve
seat portion generated so that excessive insertion of the
concerned control rod occurred. This event had no
possibility to challenge the safety requirement of the
reactor facility.
July 17, 2009 Tokai Daini Power Reactor manual shutdown for 0- During the rated power operation, the differential
Station, the components inspection pressure of the oil filter increased and the oil level of the
Japan Atomic Power associated with the fluctuation main oil tank was fluctuated due to the deterioration of
Co. of the oil level of the main oil the main turbine oil of the turbine oil system, therefore the
tank reactor manually shut down was needed. This event had
no possibility to challenge the safety requirement of the
reactor facility.



INES
Occurrence Date Nuclear Facility Event Basis of Rating
Level
August 21, Tomari Power Station Damage of one emergency 0+ During the regular test in the normal power operation, the
2009 Unit-3, diesel generator turbocharger for the EDG was damaged due to the
Hokkaido Electric insufficient bolt tightening work. This event had a
Power Co. possibility to challenge the safety requirement of the
reactor facility.
October 15, Fukushima Daini Power reduction due to the shut 0- A short circuit occurred during a replacement work of a
2009 Nuclear Power Station down of one reactor recirculation blush of the recirculation MG set for the reactor
Unit-4, pump recirculation pump and one reactor recirculation pump
Tokyo Electric Power was automatically shut down. This event had no
Co. possibility to challenge the safety requirement of the
reactor facility.

608
No. 1

1. Power Plant:
Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station -Unit 5 (ABWR, rated electric power: 1,267 MWe)

2. Date of Occurrence:
December 30, 2008

3. Event:
Reactor manual shutdown due to the increase of the hydrogen concentration in the off-gas
treatment system

4. Event Description:
Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit-5 had been in the start-up operation for the adjustment
operation during its periodic inspection. On December 30, 2008, the performance of the off-gas
recombiner was judged to be degraded as the hydrogen concentration of the off-gas treatment
system increased and the outlet temperature of the off-gas recombiner tended to decrease. The
reactor was manually shut down at 0:39 a.m. on that day.
As a result of the investigation, the causes of increased hydrogen concentration in the off-gas
treatment system were estimated as follows;
- As a result of the investigation, it was confirmed that boehmite could be contained in the
catalyst when warm water cleaning was conducted during the manufacturing process of the
catalyst for the off-gas recombiner in the off-gas treatment system.
- It was confirmed that the more catalyst contains boehmite, the more catalyst was prone to
degradation due to its usage and is susceptible to effects of the catalyst poison.
- It was confirmed that organosilicon compound (siloxane) as a catalyst poison was detected in
the catalyst taken from the actual equipment.
- Siloxane volatilized from the liquid packing (liquid sealing material) used as a sealing
material for the packing case (sealed container) of the low pressure turbine. It flowed into
the off-gas treatment system and accumulated on the surface of the catalyst.
- Therefore, the performance of the catalyst was degraded by the effects of both the
degradation of the catalyst in the off-gas recombiner due to its usage and the catalyst poison,
and thus the performance of the catalyst to recombine hydrogen and oxygen, which existed
in the off-gas recombiner, was degraded. Resultantly, hydrogen concentration in the
concerned system increased.
This event was summarized as follows; The boehmite, which could cause a degradation of the
catalyst, generated due to the warm water cleaning during the manufacturing process of the
catalyst for the off-gas recombiner in the off-gas treatment system. As siloxane, which is a
catalyst poison, volatilized from the liquid packing used in the low pressure turbine and flowed
into the off-gas treatment system, the performance of the catalyst to recombine hydrogen and
oxygen was degraded, and the concentration of hydrogen increased.
In addition, there was no radiological impact to the outside and the inside of the power plant.

5. Rating Results and Their Basis:


(1) Criterion 1: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact to the outside of the power plant, this is out of
rating.)
(2) Criterion 2: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact on the inside of the power plant, this is out of
rating.)
(3) Criterion 3: Level 0-
(Basis: This event is that, during the start-up operation in the adjustment operation, the
performance of the catalyst of the off-gas recombiner of the off-gas treatment system
was degraded and the hydrogen concentration increased. This event had no
possibility to challenge the safety requirement of the reactor facility. Therefore, this
rating is judged to be a level 0-.)
(4) Final Rating Result:
Level 0- as a result of [Criterion 1: -, Criterion 2: -, Criterion 3: Level 0-]


609
No. 2

1. Power Plant:
Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit-4 (BWR, rated electric power; 1,137MWe)

2. Date of Occurrence:
April 22, 2009

3. Event:
Injury of a worker in the turbine building

4. Event Description:
Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit-4 had been under its periodic inspection. On April 22,
2009, a worker, who was working in the vicinity of the steam turbine in the 3rd floor (controlled
area) of the turbine building, was injured in his left instep by being stuck in the driver of a
activated valve in the test. He needed to receive a hospital treatment. Therefore, this event was
judged to be corresponding to the reportable event pursuant to article 19-17 of “the rule for the
installation, operation, etc. of commercial power reactors.”
As a result of the investigation, the causes of injury of a worker were estimated as follows;
- The access control established when the remotely operated test will be conducted after the
replacement of the steam turbine controller was not well known to the concerned workers
and that countermeasures of the off-limit, such as establishment of the distinct off-limit zone
and assignment of a watcher, were not appropriately taken. As for the sign of “No Visitors
Allowed,” the concerned workers took it for granted that they were accessible to the area
because they were involved in related parties.
- As an appropriate scaffold was not established except besides the vicinity of the driver of the
activated valve when the concerned worker installed the thermal insulation material, the
concerned worker carried out the installation work standing in the vicinity of the concerned
valve.
- As the thermal insulation installation work was not marked down in the general periodic
inspection schedule and the work schedules were not appropriately prepared, any
interference of works could not identified at the daily process meeting.
- As a result, the left instep of the concerned worker was stuck in the driver of the activated
valve by the remotely-operated test.
This event was summarized as follows; A worker, who was working in the vicinity of the steam
turbine, was injured in his left instep by being stuck in the driver of a activated valve in the test
due to problems etc, such as a field-work management, a work implementation method and a
schedule control.
In addition, there was no radiation exposure and radioactive contamination to the worker.

5. Rating Results and Their Basis:


This event is that a worker, who was working in the vicinity of the steam turbine, was injured
in his left instep by being stuck in the driver of a activated valve in the test. This event had no
related on the safety requirement of the reactor facility. Therefore, this rating is judged to be an
out of scale.

610
No. 3

1. Power Plant:
Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit-4 (BWR, rated electric power; 1,137MWe)

2. Date of Occurrence:
May 5, 2009

3. Event:
Reactor manual shutdown due to the increase of the hydrogen concentration in the off-gas
treatment system

4. Event Description:
Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit-4 had been in the start-up operation for the adjustment
operation during its periodic inspection. As the hydrogen concentration of the off-gas treatment
system increased on May 5, 2009, the reactor was manually shut down at 17:49 on that day.
As a result of the investigation, the causes of increased hydrogen concentration in the off-gas
treatment system were estimated as follows;
- As a result of the investigation, it was confirmed that boehmite could be contained in the
catalyst when warm water cleaning was conducted during the manufacturing process of the
catalyst for the off-gas recombiner in the off-gas treatment system.
- It was confirmed that the more catalyst contains boehmite, the more catalyst was prone to
degradation due to its usage and is susceptible to effects of the catalyst poison.
- It was confirmed that organosilicon compound (siloxane) as a catalyst poison was detected in
the catalyst taken from the actual equipment.
- Siloxane volatilized from the liquid packing (liquid sealing material) used as a sealing
material for the packing case (sealed container) of the low pressure turbine. It flowed into
the off-gas treatment system and accumulated on the surface of the catalyst.
- Therefore, the performance of the catalyst was degraded by the effects of both the
degradation of the catalyst in the off-gas recombiner due to its usage and the catalyst poison,
and thus the performance of the catalyst to recombine hydrogen and oxygen, which existed
in the off-gas recombiner, was degraded. Resultantly, hydrogen concentration in the
concerned system increased.
This event was summarized as follows; The boehmite, which could cause a degradation of the
catalyst, generated due to the warm water cleaning during the manufacturing process of the
catalyst for the off-gas recombiner in the off-gas treatment system. As siloxane, which is a
catalyst poison, volatilized from the liquid packing used in the low pressure turbine and flowed
into the off-gas treatment system, the performance of the catalyst to recombine hydrogen and
oxygen was degraded, and the concentration of hydrogen increased.
In addition, there was no radiological impact to the outside and the inside of the power plant.

5. Rating Results and Their Basis:


(1) Criterion 1: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact to the outside of the power plant, this is out of
rating.)
(2) Criterion 2: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact on the inside of the power plant, this is out of
rating.)
(3) Criterion 3: Level 0-
(Basis: This event is that, during the start-up operation in the adjustment operation, the
performance of the catalyst of the off-gas recombiner of the off-gas treatment
system was degraded and the hydrogen concentration increased. This event had no
possibility to challenge the safety requirement of the reactor facility. Therefore, this
rating is judged to be a level 0-.)
(4) Final Rating Result:
Level 0- as a result of [Criterion 1: -, Criterion 2: -, Criterion 3: Level 0-]


611
No. 4

1. Power Plant:
Tsuruga Power Station Unit 1 (BWR, rated electric power: 357MWe)

2. Date of Occurrence:
May 13, 2009

3. Event:
Flaw in the seat of the vent valve for the control rod drive hydraulic system

4. Event Description:
Tsuruga Power Station Unit-1 had been under its periodic inspection. As a part of the control
rod drive hydraulic system was replaced in order to improve its seismic safety margin, a pressure
test has been prepared. When checking a vent valve as a part of this preparatory work, flaws were
found in the seat surface of 13 valves. In addition, a flaw across the seat surface of the valve,
which consists of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, was identified in one of them. Therefore,
it was judged that important safety related equipment had not a necessary function.
As a result of the investigation, the causes of the generation of flaws in seat surfaces of vent
valves in the control rod drive hydraulic system were estimated as follows;
- Valve discs of all vent valves in the control rod drive hydraulic system were replaced during
the 13th periodic inspection based on the event that a valve disc was damaged after its
installation in the construction of the unit.
- Usually, an accurate angular alignment of a valve seat and a valve disc is carried out in the
assembling process in the factory. However, the concerned replacement was carried out in
the power station because only a valve disc was replaced. As an angular alignment of a valve
disc and a valve seat needs skills, a part of valves had a larger angular difference between a
valve disc and a valve seat. It was estimated that a local tensile stress generated at the lower
part of the valve seat when the valve was closed under this condition and then flaws
generated around the portion where the internal defects exist. In addition, it was confirmed,
based on the stress analysis results, that a larger stress than the tensile strength (material
strength) could locally generate when the angular difference is large.
This event was summarized as follows; As valve discs of vent valves in the control rod drive
hydraulic system were replaced in the power station, a part of valves had a larger angular
difference between a valve disc and a valve seat. A larger stress than the tensile strength
generated at the lower part of the valve seat when the valve was closed and then flaws generated.
In addition, there was no radiological impact to the outside and the inside of the power plant.

5. Rating Results and Their Basis:


(1) Criterion-1: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact to the outside of the power plant, this is out of
rating.)
(2) Criterion-2: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact on the inside of the power plant, this is out of
rating.)
(3) Criterion-3: Level 0-
(Basis: This event is that flaws were found in seat surfaces of vent valves in the control rod
drive hydraulic system and flaw across the seat surface of valves were identified in a
part of them. This event had no possibility to challenge the safety requirement of the
reactor facility. Therefore, this rating is judged to be a level 0-.)
(4) Final Rating Result:
Level 0- as a result of [Criterion 1: -, Criterion 2: -, Criterion 3: Level 0-]

612
No. 5

1. Power Plant:
Onagawa Nuclear Power Station Unit-3 (BWR, rated electric power: 825 MWe)

2. Date of Occurrence:
May 28, 2009

3. Event:
Excessive insertion of the control rod

4. Event Description:
Onagawa Nuclear Power Station Unit-3 had been under its periodic inspection. On May 28,
2009, during the restoration work after the inspection of the hydraulic control unit for a control
rod driving hydraulic system, the movement alarm for a control rod sounded and it was judged
that one control rod moved further toward insertion direction than the normal (specified) full
inserted position (i.e. excessive insertion of the rod).
As a result of the investigation, the causes of the excessive insertion of the control rod were
estimated as follows;
- When a leak test was conducted at the hydraulic control unit of the control rod driving
hydraulic system, a slight amount of seat leak was confirmed at a directional control valve.
As a tiny flaw was confirmed on the seat surface of the valve by the overhauling of the
concerned directional control valve, it was estimated that a slight amount of leak was due to
the intrusion of a foreign material. As a result of a mock-up test, it was also confirmed that a
control rod could be excessively inserted when a foreign material with a dimension of
0.26mm was intruded in the seat surface.
- As a result of the investigation on the intrusion of a foreign material, causes of the intrusion
was estimated as follows; a filter in the inlet side of the control rod driving water of the
concerned directional control valve has been assembled by a new filter, unlike other filters
which have been recycled after their rotations. As there are many work steps from the
ultrasonic cleaning in the factory to the assembling at the power station, it was estimated
that a foreign material intruded into the valve during the checking and assembling of filters
which were carried out in these work steps.
- When the concerned directional control valve was opened due to the scram function test, a
foreign material just intruded in the concerned valve. After that, during the restoration work
of the concerned system, the driving water, which was used for pushing up a control rod,
temporarily flowed. Resultantly, a control rod was excessively inserted and a control rod
returned to the normal full inserted position under its own weight because a foreign material
was flowed out with the driving water.
This event was summarized as follows; A foreign material which was included in the new
replaced filter was stuck in the directional control valve in the downstream of filters in the
hydraulic control unit of the control rod driving hydraulic system and a slight amount of seat leak
generated so that the concerned control rod moved toward insertion direction (excessive
insertion).
In addition, there was no radiological impact to the outside and the inside of the power plant.

5. Rating Results and Their Basis:


(1) Criterion 1: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact to the outside of the power plant, this is out of
rating.)
(2) Criterion 2: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact on the inside of the power plant, this is out of
rating.)
(3) Criterion 3: Level 0-
(Basis: This event is that a foreign material was intruded (which is an estimation) in he
directional control valve in the hydraulic control unit of the control rod driving
hydraulic system during the periodic inspection and a slight seat leak from the valve
seat portion generated so that excessive insertion of the concerned control rod
occurred. This event had no possibility to challenge the safety requirement of the
reactor facility. Therefore, this rating is judged to be a level 0-.)
(4) Final Rating Result:
Level 0- as a result of [Criterion 1: -, Criterion 2: -, Criterion 3: Level 0-]


613
No. 6

1. Power Plant:
Tokai Daini Power Station (BWR, rated electric power: 1,100MWe)

2. Date of Occurrence:
July 17, 2009

3. Event:
Reactor manual shutdown for the components inspection associated with the fluctuation of
the oil level of the main oil tank

4. Event Description:
Tokai Daini Power Station had been under its constant rated thermal power operation. It was
confirmed that a differential pressure at the control oil filter in the control oil system for the
turbine driven reactor feedwater pump (A) continued to increase. Therefore, on July 12, after
switching to the auxiliary motor driven reactor feedwater pump, the inspection was carried out in
order to investigate the causes of the increased differential pressure at the concerned filter. As
the oil level of the main oil tank of the turbine oil system connected with the concerned control oil
system fluctuated, it was determined that the reactor would be manually shut down for the
inspection.
As a result of the investigation, the causes of the increase of the differential pressure of the oil
filter and the oil level fluctuation of the oil tank were estimated as follows;
- The main turbine oil had been used for 7 years since its full replacement in 2002 and the
main turbine oil has been deteriorated due to the gradual increase of sludge. In addition,
after July 2009, a significant leakage from a through-wall hole at the tube of the main oil
cooler occurred and the turbine cooling water (TCW) mixed in the main turbine oil. Thus, the
production of sludge was accelerated due to the chemical reaction of TCW and multi-purpose
additive which was included in the main turbine oil. Resultantly, the differential pressure at
the oil filter significantly increased. Slight vibration of tubes located in the lower part of the
oil cooler occurred due to the oil flow and the tube contacted with the tube support plate for a
long time, which led to wear and denting of the tube followed by making the through-wall
hole at the tube.
- The main turbine oil, which was significantly deteriorated due to the mixing of TCW,
involved air in the turbine bearing room and foams generated. A large amount of foams
flowed into and accumulated in the main oil tank. Resultantly, the indication of the
float-type oil level gauge, installed in the main oil tank, lowered and fluctuated.
This event was summarized as follows; The main turbine oil of the turbine oil system has been
deteriorated due to the mixing of cooling water from the cooler, the differential pressure of the oil
filter increased and air was involved in the oil in the turbine bearing room so that the oil level of
the main oil tank was fluctuated.
In addition, there was no radiological impact to the outside and the inside of the power station.

5. Rating Results and Their Basis:


(1) Criterion 1: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact to the outside of the power plant, this is out of
rating.)
(2) Criterion 2: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact on the inside of the power plant, this is out of
rating.)
(3) Criterion 3: Level 0-
(Basis: This event is that, during the rated power operation, the differential pressure of the
oil filter increased and the oil level of the main oil tank was fluctuated due to the
deterioration of the main turbine oil of the turbine oil system, therefore the reactor
manually shut down was needed. This event had no possibility to challenge the
safety requirement of the reactor facility. Therefore, this rating is judged to be a
level 0-.)
(4) Final Rating Result: Level 0-
Level 0- as a result of [Criterion 1: -, Criterion 2: -, Criterion 3: Level 0-]

614
No. 7

1. Power Plant:
Tomari Power Station Unit-3 (PWR, rated electric power: 912 MWe)

2. Date of Occurrence:
August 21, 2009

3. Event:
Damage of one emergency diesel generator

4. Event Description:
Tomari Power Station Unit-3 had been under its commissioning operation at constant rated
electric power. When the surveillance test of the emergency diesel generator (B) was implemented,
malfunction of the turbocharger was found at 3:13 pm, on August 19. Therefore, the EDG-B was
shut down and “the deviation from the limiting conditions for operation” specified in its safety
regulation was declared at 3:14 pm, on the same day. After that, the EDG-B has been overhauled
till August 21, 2009, and it was confirmed that the concerned EDG-B did not have necessary
functions as there was the damage in the turbocharger-B2.
As a result of the investigation, the causes of the damage of EDG-B were estimated as follows:
- During the manufacturing of the turbocharger, some fixation bolts were not tightened up at
the prescribed tightening torque because the concrete tightening method was not clearly
described in the work procedure manual although the tightening torques corresponding to
the specification of the bolts were provided.
- As the test operation and the load test of the turbocharger-B2 were carried out under the
condition that the tightening torque of the concerned bolts were insufficient, the bolts were
loosened and gradually fell out due to the fit of bolt tightening surface of the turbocharger-B2
and vibrations etc.
- Therefore, heads of bolts fallen out in the turbocharger-B2 contacted with other parts and
heat generated, and eventually the turbine blade was damaged.
- Many inner parts of the turbocharger-B2 were damaged because the rotating shaft became
eccentric due to the damaged turbine blade, and the turbocharger-B2 stopped.
- The output power of the EDG-B decreased due to the shutdown of the turbocharger-B2 and
unburned gas and soot generated due to the decreased air supply, which were discharged to
the atmosphere through the exhaust gas piping etc.
This event was summarized as follows; Due to the insufficient tightening of the bolts during
the manufacturing of the turbocharger for the EDG, the turbine blade of the turbocharger-B2 was
damaged and then the rotating shaft became eccentric so that many inner parts of the
turbocharger-B2 of the EDG were damaged.
In addition, there was no radiological impact to the outside and the inside of the power station.

5. Rating Results and Their Basis:


(1) Criterion 1: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact to the outside of the power plant, this is out of
rating.)
(2) Criterion 2: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact on the inside of the power plant, this is out of
rating.)
(3) Criterion 3: Level 0+
(Basis: This event is that, during the regular test in the normal power operation, the
turbocharger for the EDG was damaged due to the insufficient bolt tightening work.
This event had a possibility to challenge the safety requirement of the reactor
facility. Therefore, this rating is judged to be a level 0+.)
(4) Final Rating Result:
Level 0+ as a result of [Criterion 1: -, Criterion 2: -, Criterion 3: Level 0+]


615
No. 8

1. Power Plant:
Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station Unit-4 (BWR, rated electric power 1100MWe)

2. Date of Occurrence:
October 15, 2009

3. Event:
Power reduction due to the shut down of one reactor recirculation pump

4. Event Description:
The Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station Unit-4 had been in the constant rated thermal
power operation. At 14:08, on October 15, 2009, the reactor recirculation pump-A shut down and
some control rods were inserted into the reactor core. Then the electric power decreased from
approximately 1100MWe to 360MWe.
As a result of the investigation, the causes of the automatic shut down of the reactor
recirculation pump-A were estimated as follows;
- The trace of a short circuit due to a contact between a terminal of a blush lead wire (+side)
and a blush holder support (-side) during a replacement work, performed on October 15,
2009, of a blush of the recirculation MG set-A for the reactor recirculation pump-A was found
and the damage of the inner component in the automatic voltage regulator was also found.
- It was confirmed that the short circuit preventive measures was not sufficient though an
insulating plate was installed for preventing a short circuit between + side and - side, an
inspection hole for the blush was narrow so that it was difficult to confirm a hand during a
work and to secure a work posture in this work environment, and the work was performed
based on the procedure which could cause a short circuit.
- As a contact surface between a blush and a collector ring has to be adjusted when a blush is
replaced, the replacement of a blush used to be performed when a rotating shaft is rotating
under the plant operation condition that the power is supplied to the reactor recirculation
pump and this practice may have an impact on the plant.
- Therefore, causes of this event were estimated as follows; a short circuit due to a contact
between the terminal of a blush lead wire and the blush holder support occurred during the
replacement of the blush followed by a loss of function of the automatic voltage regulator and
then automatic shutdown of the recirculation MG set, which eventually led to the shutdown
of the reactor recirculation pump.
This event was summarized as follows; As a short circuit occurred during a replacement work
of a blush of the recirculation MG set for the reactor recirculation pump, functions of the
automatic voltage regulator were lost and both the recirculation MG set and the reactor
recirculation pump were automatically shut down.
In addition, there was no radiological impact to the outside and the inside of the power plant.

5. Rating Results and Their Basis:


(1) Criterion 1: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact to the outside of the power plant, this is out of
rating.)
(2) Criterion 2: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact on the inside of the power plant, this is out of
rating.)
(3) Criterion 3: Level 0-
(Basis: This event is that a short circuit occurred during a replacement work of a blush of
the recirculation MG set for the reactor recirculation pump and one reactor
recirculation pump was automatically shut down. This event had no possibility to
challenge the safety requirement of the reactor facility. Therefore, this rating is
judged to be a level 0-.)
(4) Final Rating Result:
Level 0- as a result of [Criterion 1: -, Criterion 2: -, Criterion 3: Level 0-]

616
Application of International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) to Events Occurred at
Nuclear Facilities

June 4, 2010

The result of the INES level rating at “the INES Evaluation Subcommittee” of “the Nuclear
and Industrial Safety Subcommittee” of “the Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and
Energy” held today (on June 4, 2010) is as shown below.

June 4, 2010, “the INES Evaluation Subcommittee” (Chairman: Professor Naoto Sekimura,
Graduate School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo) of “the Nuclear and Industrial Safety
Subcommittee” of “the Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy” was held at the
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) to carry out the INES level rating of the
following events and failures which occurred at nuclear facilities.
The result of the INES level rating at the Subcommittee is as shown in the appendices. The
Subcommittee has been established to evaluate events and failures which occurred at METI
licensed nuclear facilities by using INES from professional and technical points of view.


617
(Attachment)
INES
Occurrence Date Nuclear Facility Event Basis of Rating
Level
October 8, Decommissioning Leakage of the radioactive 0- In the facility under decommissioning, workers or things
2009 Engineering Center material in the controlled area contacted with the electrode nozzle of the test equipment
(Fugen), in which heavy water remained and the heavy water
Japan Atomic Energy leaked from the joint of the electrode nozzle. This event
Agency had no possibility to challenge the safety requirement of
the reactor facility.
October 14, Tsuruga Power Station Thinning of the sea water piping 0- In the sea water piping for cooling the HPCI diesel engine,
2009 Unit-1, for cooling the high pressure the base metal of the inner surface of the piping was in
Japan Atomic Power core injection system diesel contact with sea water, followed by gradual development of
Co. engine the corrosion, and then the wall thickness of the piping
confirmed less than the required minimum wall thickness.
This event had no possibility to challenge the safety
requirement of the reactor facility.
October 22, Reprocessing plant of Leakage in the vitrification cell 0 Foams of the high level liquid waste moved to the blind
2009 the Japan Nuclear Fuel in the high-level liquid waste flange, whose tightening was insufficient due to the
Limited vitrification building degradation of the tightening performance of an impact

618
wrench, and the crane chain contacted with the concerned
flange, and then high level liquid waste leaked. However,
this event was no safety significance because an amount of
forms moved was little and the vitrification cell was
integrity.
November 13, Shika Nuclear Power No standby condition of 2 1 Operability of 2 EDGs was not confirmed and operation
2009 Station Unit-2, emergency diesel generators status became the one that continued power operation was
Hokuriku Electric not allowed. Therefore, this event was anomaly beyond the
Power Co. operating regime. However, the cooling function for the
core was maintained by the reactor isolation cooling
system etc.
November 13, Mihama Power Station Unexpectedly reactor power 0- During the load limiter operation for increasing the
2009 Unit-1, change during the generator electric power in the reactor startup operation, the
Kansai Electric Power power increase operation generator output power rapidly increased due to the
Co. foreign material which intruded into the load limiter. This
event had no possibility to challenge the safety
requirement of the reactor facility.
(Attachment)
INES
Occurrence Date Nuclear Facility Event Basis of Rating
Level
December 1, Hamaoka Nuclear Leakage of liquid 1 As concentrated liquid waste with high suspended material
2009 Power Station radioactive waste in the concentration was drained through the drain system piping,
Unit-3, radiation controlled area radioactive liquid leaked from the drain pit due to the block of
Chubu Electric the drain piping and others. This event had no possibility to
Power Co. challenge the safety requirement of the reactor facility and
this rating is judged to be a level 0-. However, the safety
culture deficiencies were recognized. Therefore, this rating is
raised by one level.
January 13, Tokai Daini Power Thinning of the residual 0- During the periodic inspection, the outside surface of the RHR
2010 Station, heat removal sea water sea water piping was corroded by rainwater which intruded
Japan Atomic Power system piping from the outside and the wall thickness of the piping
Co. confirmed less than the required minimum wall thickness.
This event had no possibility to challenge the safety
requirement of the reactor facility.

619


No. 1

1. Nuclear Facility:
Decommissioning Engineering Center (Fugen), Japan Atomic Energy Agency

2. Date of Occurrence:
October 8, 2009

3. Event:
Leakage of the radioactive material in the controlled area

4. Event Description:
Fugen has been under the decommissioning. A curing work had been performed as a
preparation work for the removal of residual heavy water in the hot column test equipment room
on the 3rd floor of the reactor auxiliary building. A worker found that a paper towel was wetted
due to water drops falling from the threaded type joint of the electrode nozzle for the corrosion
potential test tank of the hot column test equipment in the concerned room. At the same time, the
threaded type joint of the electrode nozzle was wrenched so that the leakage stopped. As an
amount of radioactivity of heavy water including the leaked radioactive material (tritium) was
measured and was confirmed to be 3.2x109Bq, this event was reported to NISA pursuant to “the
law on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors.” In
addition, the intake of tritium was evaluated for persons who entered into the concerned room
after the curing work started, and it was confirmed that the radiation exposure (0.21mSv) to one
person exceeded the screening level (0.20mSv) stipulated by Japan Atomic Energy Agency.
As a result of the investigation, the causes of the leakage of the radioactive material in the
controlled area were estimated as follows;
- A joint for the electrode nozzle of the corrosion potential test tank in which heavy water
remained was turned toward the loose direction around the time when this event occurred.
Therefore, it was estimated that there was a possibility that workers or things contacted the
joint during the curing work in the narrow work space and then the joint for the electrode
nozzle was loosened, which led to the leakage.
- As the contamination removal work was carried out under the condition that related systems
were opened, it was carefully carried out by taking into consideration the leakage of heavy
water from equipments. However, as the preparation work was carried out under the
condition that related systems were not opened, preventive measures against contacts or
turning of a joint at potential leakage points were not taken and then workers or things
contacted the joint for the electrode nozzle of the corrosion potential test tank installed in the
narrow work space, which led to the leakage of heavy water.
This event was summarized as follows; As a result of contacts of workers or things with the
electrode nozzle of the corrosion potential test tank in which heavy water remained, the joint of
the electrode nozzle was turned toward the loose direction and the heavy water leaked.
In addition, there was no radiological impact to the outside of the nuclear facility.

5. Rating Results and their Basis:


(1) Criterion 1: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact to the outside of the nuclear facility, this is out of
rating.)
(2) Criterion 2: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact on the inside of the nuclear facility, this is out of
rating.)
(3) Criterion 3: Level 0-
(Basis: This event is that, in the facility under decommissioning, workers or things
contacted with the electrode nozzle of the test equipment in which heavy water
remained and the heavy water leaked from the joint of the electrode nozzle. This
event had no possibility to challenge the safety requirement of the reactor facility.
Therefore, this rating is judged to be a level 0-.)
(4) Final Rating Result:
Level 0- as a result of [Criterion 1: -, Criterion 2: -, Criterion 3: Level 0-]

620
No. 2

1. Nuclear Facility:
Tsuruga Power Station Unit-1 (BWR, rated electric power: 357MWe)

2. Date of Occurrence:
October 14, 2009

3. Event:
Thinning of the sea water piping for cooling the high pressure core injection system diesel
engine

4. Event Description:
Tsuruga Power Station Unit-1 had been under its periodic inspection. As a wall thickness of
the sea water piping for cooling the high pressure core injection system (HPCI) diesel engine has
been measured, one location where minimum wall thickness of the inlet piping of the cooler is
2.8mm was found. This thickness was confirmed to be less than the required minimum wall
thickness (3.4mm) evaluated based on the technical standards. In addition, no location where a
thickness is less than the required minimum wall thickness was found other than the concerned
location.
As a result of the investigation, the causes why a wall thickness of the sea water piping for
cooling the HPCI diesel engine was confirmed to be less than the required minimum wall
thickness were estimated as follows;
- It was confirmed that marine life adhered to the inner surface of the concerned sea water
piping and the tar-epoxy-resin lining on the inner surface of the piping was damaged.
- The concerned sea water piping had been inspected every periodic inspection. In addition,
connecting portion of the pure water cooler and the piping was selected as a representative
inspection point in order to recognize the status of corrosion in the whole sea water piping,
and a visual inspection was implemented for identifying the generation of the peeling etc. of
the lining at the time of the regular overhauling of the equipments. However, the concerned
visual inspection point was not adequate as a representative of the concerned sea water
piping because there are other portions under severe environmental conditions other than
the concerned portion in terms of generation of the corrosion. In addition, specific contents
and frequency of the inspection were not clarified.
- Therefore, at the portion where this event occurred, the lining was damaged due to the
adherence and removal of the marine life in the sea, and the base metal of the inner surface
of the piping was in contact with sea water, followed by gradual development of the corrosion
at the concerned portion. As the inner surface of the piping was not sufficiently inspected
and repaired, wall thickness of the piping is estimated to be less than the required minimum
wall thickness.
This event was summarized as follows; The lining of the sea water piping for cooling the HPCI
diesel engine was damaged due to the adherence and removal of the marine life in the sea, and
the base metal of the inner surface of the piping was in contact with sea water, followed by
gradual development of the corrosion at the concerned portion. Then the wall thickness of the
piping was less than the required minimum wall thickness.
In addition, there was no radiological impact to the outside and the inside of the nuclear
facility.

5. Rating Results and their Basis:


(1) Criterion 1: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact to the outside of the nuclear facility, this is out of
rating.)
(2) Criterion 2: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact on the inside of the nuclear facility, this is out of
rating.)
(3) Criterion 3: Level 0-
(Basis: This event is that, in the sea water piping for cooling the HPCI diesel engine, the
base metal of the inner surface of the piping was in contact with sea water followed
by gradual development of the corrosion, and then the wall thickness of the piping
confirmed less than the required minimum wall thickness. This event had no
possibility to challenge the safety requirement of the reactor facility. Therefore, this
rating is judged to be a level 0-.)
(4) Final Rating Result:
Level 0- as a result of [Criterion 1: -, Criterion 2: -, Criterion 3: Level 0-] 参


621
No. 3

1. Nuclear Facility:
Reprocessing plant of the Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited

2. Date of Occurrence:
October 22, 2009

3. Event:
Leakage in the vitrification cell in the high-level liquid waste vitrification building

4. Event Description:
During the preparation of a cleaning work of the inside of the vitrification cell in the high-level
liquid waste vitrification building, when a tray installed under a blind flange was inspected, some
liquid was found in the tray. Based on the confirmation of the recorded image of the work scene, it
was confirmed that the crane chain, which was used for preparation of the cleaning work,
contacted with the blind flange and the liquid dropped into the tray.
As a result of the investigation, it was estimated that foams of the high level liquid waste,
generated in the piping installed in the high level liquid waste supply tank, moved to the blind
flange whose tightening was insufficient due to the degradation of the tightening performance of
an impact wrench, and the crane chain contacted with the concerned flange and then high level
liquid waste leaked.
This event was summarized as follows; Foams of the high level liquid waste moved to the blind
flange portion and the crane chain contacted with the concerned flange whose tightening was
insufficient, and then high level liquid waste leaked.
In addition, there was no radiological impact to the outside of the nuclear facility and no
exposure to workers.

5. Rating Results and their Basis:


(1) Criterion-1: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact to the outside of the nuclear facility, this is out of
rating.)
(2) Criterion-2: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact on the inside of the nuclear facility, this is out of
rating.)
(3) Criterion-3: Level 0
(Basis: This event is that, foams of the high level liquid waste moved to the blind flange,
whose tightening was insufficient due to the degradation of the tightening
performance of an impact wrench, and the crane chain contacted with the concerned
flange, and then high level liquid waste leaked. However, this event was no safety
significance because an amount of forms moved was little and the vitrification cell
was integrity. Therefore, this rating is judged to be a level 0.)
(4) Final Rating Result:
Level 0 as a result of [Criterion 1: -, Criterion 2: -, Criterion 3: Level 0]

622
No. 4

1. Nuclear facility:
Shika Nuclear Power Station Unit-2 (ABWR, rated electric power:1206MWe)

2. Date of Occurrence:
November 13, 2009

3. Event:
No standby condition of 2 emergency diesel generators

4. Event Description:
The Shika Nuclear Power Station Unit-2 had been in the adjustment operation at the rated
electric power during its periodic inspection. When the surveillance test of the emergency diesel
generator (EDG)-A was carried out, it was found that the lubricant oil leaked approximately
100cc from the valve which was used for checking the presence of water or oil in a cylinder of the
diesel engine. Therefore, it was concluded that the concerned EDG was not operable and “the
deviation from the limiting condition for operation” was declared based on the safety regulation at
16:43 on November 12, 2009. After that, when the operability of the remained 2 EDGs were
checked as an action required by the safety regulation in the case of “the deviation from the
limiting condition for operation”, it was found that the lubricant oil leaked approximately 4cc
from the similar location of the EDG-B. As the operability of 2 of 3 EDGs was not confirmed at
0:05 on November 13, 2009, the reactor was manually shut down according to the safety
regulation. At 4:20 on November 21, 2009, the operability of the EDG-A was restored.
As a result of the investigation, the causes of the leakage of lubricant oil from 2 EDGs were
estimated as follows:
- The improper seating due to the decrease of the reclosing pressure of the pressure control
check valve was confirmed, and thus lubricant oil flowed into the cylinder and it leaked out.
- Fine metallic powder, whose size is as large as the one generated at the sliding portion such
as a bearing in the diesel engine under the normal condition, was found in the lubricant oil of
the EDG. In addition to the structure that the valve disc of the pressure control check valve
was easy to move even it inclined, the sliding surface became worn with age due to the effect
of the fine metallic powder in the lubricant oil so that sliding resistance increased. Based on
them, it was estimated that the opening and closing performance of the valve was degraded.
This event was summarized as follows; The opening and closing performance of the pressure
control check valve was degraded due to the structure that the valve disc was easy to move even it
inclined and the effect of the fine metallic powder in the lubricant oil, and then the lubricant oil
flowed into the cylinder and leaked.
In addition, there was no radiological impact to the outside and the inside of the nuclear
facility.

5. Rating Results and their Basis:


(1) Criterion 1: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact to the outside of the nuclear facility, this is out of
rating.)
(2) Criterion 2: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact on the inside of the nuclear facility, this is out of
rating.)
(3) Criterion 3: Level 1
(Basis: This event is that, operability of 2 EDGs was not confirmed and operation status
became the one that continued power operation was not allowed. Therefore, this
event was anomaly beyond the operating regime. However, the cooling function of
the core was maintained by the reactor isolation cooling system etc. Therefore, this
rating is judged to be a level 1.)
(4) Final Rating Result:
Level 1 as a result of [Criterion 1: -, Criterion 2: -, Criterion 3: Level 1]


623
No. 5

1. Nuclear Facility:
Mihama Power Station Unit-1 (PWR, rated electric power:340MWe)

2. Date of Occurrence:
November 13, 2009

3. Event:
Unexpectedly power change during the generator power increase operation

4. Event Description:
The Mihama Power Station Unit-1 had been under its adjustment operation during the
periodic inspection. When the load limiter switch was operated in order to increase the electric
power on October 12, 2009, the generator output power rapidly increased.
Therefore, the load limiter switch and a control circuit of the valve were inspected but no
malfunction was found. In order to implement the detailed investigation, the reactor power was
decreased from November 13, and the power generation was stopped. The reactor thermal power
changed from 179MW to 63MW due to this event.
As a result of the investigation, the causes of the rapidly generator power change during the
load limiter operation were estimated as follows;
- The governor including the load limiter was dismounted at the station every periodic
inspection and it was mounted again after foreign materials in the hydraulic pressure
system were removed. When the governor was dismounted, fragments of the liquid silicone
gasket applied on the contact surface between the governor and the control hydraulic
pressure equipment intruded there as foreign materials. Intruded fragment of the silicon
gasket was stuck in the clearance gap between the load limiter main body and the piston
during the operation of the load limiter.
- Movement of the piston became slow due to the stuck foreign material and the hydraulic
pressure inside the load limiter rapidly changed. As the steam control valve was operated by
this hydraulic pressure, the generator power also rapidly changed. In the meantime, the
reactor thermal power changed following the change of an amount of the steam flow into the
turbine.
This event was summarized as follows; The foreign material which intruded into the load
limiter was stuck in the clearance gap between the load limiter main body and the piston.
Therefore, hydraulic pressure rapidly changed during the load limiter operation and thus the
steam control valve was operated by this hydraulic pressure. As a result, the generator power also
rapidly changed.
In addition, there was no radiological impact to the outside and the inside of the nuclear
facility.

5. Rating Results and their Basis:


(1) Criterion-1: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact to the outside of the nuclear facility, this is out of
rating.)
(2) Criterion-2: -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact on the inside of the nuclear facility, this is out of
rating.)
(3) Criterion-3: Level 0-
(Basis: This event is that, during the load limiter operation for increasing the electric power
in the reactor startup operation, the generator output power rapidly increased due
to the foreign material which intruded into the load limiter. This event had no
possibility to challenge the safety requirement of the reactor facility. Therefore, this
rating is judged to be a level 0-.)
(4) Final Rating Result:
Level 0- as a result of [Criterion 1: -, Criterion 2: -, Criterion 3: Level 0-]

624
No. 6

1. Nuclear Facility:
Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit-3 (BWR, rated electric power:1100MWe)

2. Date of Occurrence:
December 1, 2009

3. Event:
Leakage of liquid radioactive waste in the radiation controlled area

4. Event Description:
Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit-3 had been in the adjustment operation at the rated
thermal power constant operation. When the concentrated liquid waste had been drained into the
high conductivity liquid waste sump in order to inspect the concentrated liquid waste storage
tank (C) installed in the concentrated liquid waste storage tank (C) room on the 2nd basement in
the auxiliary building, the alarm of “Failure of the floor leakage detection system panel” was
found to be lighted up. Therefore, the drain from the concentrated liquid waste storage tank (C)
was immediately stopped, and then the site was inspected, a total amount of radioactivity of the
leaked liquid waste, around the drain pit of the concentrated liquid waste storage tank (B) room
and in the concentrated liquid waste pump room (B) and (C), was measured to be approximately
1.2x109Bq.
After the occurrence of this event, workers exposed in the process of the site inspection and the
radiation measurement and the maximum exposure was measured to be 0.05mSv. This exposure
level was within the planned radiation dose level which was previously specified.
As a result of the investigation, the causes of the Leakage of liquid radioactive waste were
estimated as follows;
- As a result of the observation of the inside of the drain system piping, suspended material in
the concentrated liquid waste was extensively deposited and suspended material in the
concentrated liquid waste blocked the outlet of the drain piping in the high conductivity
liquid waste sump tank (B).
- Regarding the malfunction of the plastic solidification equipment, the company decided in
November 2006 that whole amount of the concerned liquid waste could be drained through
the drain piping, and drain operation was started without technical verification of
characteristics of the concentrated liquid waste which could be drained. Besides, it was not
confirmed that drain operation through drain system piping complied with the technical
standard.
- Workers acknowledged that suspended material in the concentrated liquid waste could block
the drain system piping, but there were no clear criteria for judgment to stop the drain in
cases where color or mobility of the liquid waste changed.
This event was summarized as follows; As concentrated liquid waste with high suspended
material concentration was drained through the drain system piping, suspended material in the
high conductivity liquid waste sump tank deposited and blocked the drain system piping.
Resultantly, the radioactive liquid waste leaked.
In addition, there was no radiological impact to the outside of the nuclear facility.

5. Rating Results and their Basis:


(1) Criterion 1 -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact to the outside of the nuclear facility, this is out of
rating.)
(2) Criterion 2 -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact on the inside of the nuclear facility, this is out of
rating.)
(3) Criterion 3 Level 1
(Basis: This event is that, as concentrated liquid waste with high suspended material
concentration was drained through the drain system piping, radioactive liquid
leaked from the drain pit due to the block of the drain piping and others. This event
had no possibility to challenge the safety requirement of the reactor facility and this
rating is judged to be a level 0-. However, the safety culture deficiencies were
recognized. Therefore, this rating is judged to be a level 1.)
(4) Final Rating Result:
Level 1 as a result of [Criterion 1: -, Criterion 2: -, Criterion 3: Level 1]


625
No. 7

1. Nuclear Facility:
Tokai Daini Power Station (BWR, rated electric power:1100MWe)

2. Date of Occurrence:
January 13, 2010

3. Event:
Thinning of the residual heat removal sea water system piping

4. Event Description:
Tokai Daini Power Station had been under its periodic inspection. When the repair work of the
lining of the piping in the residual heat removal (RHR) sea water system (A) was performed,
marks of corrosion were found in a part of the outer surface of the inlet piping for the heat
exchanger installed in the vicinity of the building penetration. Therefore, a wall thickness of the
concerned portion has been measured and one location with 6.7mm thick wall was found. This
thickness was confirmed to be less than the required minimum wall thickness (7.08mm)
calculated based on the technical standards. In addition, no location where a thickness is less
than the required minimum wall thickness was found other than the concerned location.
As a result of the investigation, the causes why a wall thickness of the RHR sea water piping
was confirmed to be less than the required minimum wall thickness were estimated as follows;
- Mark of rainwater flow was found on the inner surface of the ceiling hatch in the trench
structure and rust and the mark of rainwater flow were found on the anchor support of the
piping which was installed just below the concerned hatch. In addition, mortar filled in the
gap between the building penetration and piping was stuck out and some gaps were found.
- In addition, finish coating of the anchor support was not carried out because its field work
was difficult to carry out and corrosion was likely to generate.
- As the trench has not ventilating equipment, it was not designated as a daily patrol check
place. The portion, such as the building penetration, whose visual inspection is hard to carry
out, was regarded as the same with the portion whose visual inspection is possible, and thus
the building penetration had not been inspected taking into consideration the possibility
that it would be under the humid environment for a long time.
- Under these circumstances, rainwater which entered from the hatch opening intruded into
the gap between the piping and the mortar, and then the piping had been under the humid
environment for a long time. Resultantly, it was estimated that outer surface of the piping
was corroded and its wall thickness became less than the required minimum wall thickness.
This event was summarized as follows; Outer surface of the RHR system sea water piping was
corroded and thickness of the piping was less than the required minimum wall thickness because
rainwater entered from the hatch opening intruded into the gap between piping and mortar,
where it had been under the humid environment for a long time. The wall thickness became less
than the required minimum wall thickness.
In addition, there was no radiological impact to the outside and the inside of the nuclear
facility.

5. Rating Results and their Basis:


(1) Criterion 1 -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact to the outside of the nuclear facility, this is out of
rating.)
(2) Criterion 2 -
(Basis: As there was no radiological impact on the inside of the nuclear facility, this is out of
rating.)
(3) Criterion 3 Level 0-
(Basis: This event is that, during the periodic inspection, the outer surface of the RHR sea
water piping was corroded by rainwater which intruded from the outside and the
wall thickness of the piping confirmed less than the required minimum wall
thickness. This event had no possibility to challenge the safety requirement of the
reactor facility. Therefore, this rating is judged to be a level 0-.)
(4) Final Rating Result:
Level 0- as a result of [Criterion 1: -, Criterion 2: -, Criterion 3: Level 0-]

626
RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT AND
OCCUPATIONAL RADIATION EXPOSURE
MANAGEMENT

ϱϭ STATUS OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE


MANAGEMENT AND OCCUPATIONAL
RADIATION EXPOSURE
MANAGEMENT


627
ϱϭ-1 Status of Radioactive Waste Management

(1) Status of Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Waste Discharge Management

(1) Commercial Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities


The release of gaseous and liquid radioactive waste is controlled at every nuclear power plant so that it does not exceed the
prescribed dose limit for the local community (i.e., 50 microsievert/year) in accordance with the Guideline concerning the
target dose level of the local residents of light water nuclear power reactor facilities. The annual release control target levels
are determined in the safety provisions, based on the values set during the safety assessment prior to establishment of the
facilities, and the emissions are controlled so that they do not exceed these target levels.
In FY2009, the emissions were lower than the target emission levels at all nuclear power plants. The results of the
evaluation, which was performed in accordance with the Guideline concerning the target dose level of the local residents of
light water nuclear power reactor facilities show that the equivalent dose of public exposure was less than 1 microsievert per
year.

(2) Power Reactor Facilities at the Research and Development Stage


The release of gaseous and liquid radioactive waste is controlled so that it does not exceed the annual emission control
levels, which were determined in the safety provisions and based on the emission level during the assessment for the
licensing of the construction of the reactor. In FY2009, the amount of released waste was lower than the target emission
control levels at both Fugen Decommissioning Engineering Center and Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Monju of Japan
Atomic Energy Agency. The results of the evaluation, which was performed in accordance with the Guideline concerning the
target dose level of the local residents of light water nuclear power reactor facilities show that the equivalent dose of public
exposure was less than 1 microsievert per year.

(3) Fabrication Facilities


The release of gaseous and liquid waste of fabrication facilities is controlled so that the three-month average concentrations
do not exceed the target concentration control limit levels, which were determined in the safety provisions not to exceed the
limit levels stipulated therein. In each quarter of FY2009, the amount of released waste satisfied the target concentration
control levels.

(4) Reprocessing Facilities


The release of gaseous and liquid radioactive waste is controlled so that it does not exceed the annual emission control
levels, which were determined in the safety provisions and based on the emission level during the assessment for business
licensing of the facilities (approval of construction). In FY2009, the amount of released waste satisfied the target control
limit levels at the Reprocessing Facility of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Tokai Research and Development Center,
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Engineering Laboratories (hereinafter, referred to as the Japan Atomic Energy Agency Reprocessing
Facility) and the Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited, Reprocessing Plant (reprocessing facility). The results of the evaluation, which
was performed based on the evaluation method used in the assessment for the business licensing of the facilities (approval of
construction) show that the equivalent dose of public exposure was less than 1 microsievert per year.

(5) Waste Burial Facilities, Waste Management Facilities


The release of gaseous and liquid waste of waste burial facilities and waste management facilities is controlled so that the
three-month average concentrations do not exceed the target concentration control limit levels, which were determined in the
safety provisions.
In each quarter of FY2009, the amount of released waste satisfied the target concentration control levels. In the Japan
Atomic Energy Agency, Oarai R&D Center, Waste Management Facility, to comply with the technical standards for the
waste management facilities, the release of gaseous and liquid radioactive waste is controlled so that it does not exceed the
annual emission control levels, which were determined in the safety provisions and based on the emission level used during
the assessment for business licensing of the facilities (approval). The amount of released waste in FY2009 was lower than
the target emission control level.
For reference purposes, the amount of released gaseous and liquid radioactive waste from power reactor facilities in a
commercial and research and development stage on an annual basis since FY2000, is shown in reference documents 1 to 4.
The radioactivity of released gaseous and liquid radioactive waste was measured in accordance with the Guideline for
Measurement of Released Radioactive Materials from Light Water Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities. Concentrations of
released radioactivity that are below the detection limit are indicated as N.D. in the tables.
[Note] The index numbers, a × 10+b, are expressed in the format of aE+b in this report.
Example) 5.1 × 10+12 = 5.1E+12 参


629
(1) Commercial Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities
Radioactive gaseous waste Radioactive liquid
waste
Noble gas Iodine (excluding H)
3

Power station [131I]


(Bq) (Bq) (Bq)
Nuclear reactor
Hokkaido Electric Power Co.,
facilities total 7.7E+09 8.7E+04 N.D.
Inc.
Annual release control
Tomari Power Station
target values 1.3E+15 1.2E+10 1.1E+11
Tohoku Electric Power Co., Nuclear reactor
Inc. facilities total N.D. N.D. N.D.
Onagawa Nuclear Power Annual release control
Station target values 3.8E+15 1.3E+11 1.1E+10
Tohoku Electric Power Co., Nuclear reactor
Inc. facilities total N.D. N.D. N.D.
Higashidori Nuclear Power Annual release control
Station target values 1.2E+15 2.0E+10 3.7E+09
Tokyo Electric Power Co., Nuclear reactor
Inc. facilities total N.D. 5.3E+05 N.D.
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Annual release control
Power Station target values 8.8E+15 4.8E+11 2.2E+11
Tokyo Electric Power Co., Nuclear reactor
Inc. facilities total N.D. N.D. N.D.
Fukushima Daini Nuclear Annual release control
Power Station target values 5.5E+15 2.3E+11 1.4E+11
Tokyo Electric Power Co., Nuclear reactor
Inc. facilities total N.D. N.D. N.D.
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Annual release control
Power Station target values 6.7E+15 2.3E+11 2.5E+11
Chubu Electric Power Co., Nuclear reactor
Inc. facilities total N.D. 3.0E+05 N.D.
Hamaoka Nuclear Power Annual release control *1 *1 *2
Station target values 3.6E+15 1.1E+11 1.3E+11
Nuclear reactor
Hokuriku Electric Power Co.,
facilities total N.D. N.D. N.D.
Inc.
Annual release control
Shika Nuclear Power Station
target values 2.3E+15 4.8E+10 7.4E+10
Nuclear reactor
Kansai Electric Power Co.,
facilities total 4.7E+09 8.4E+04 N.D.
Inc.
Annual release control
Mihama Power Station
target values 2.1E+15 7.3E+10 1.1E+11
Nuclear reactor
Kansai Electric Power Co.,
facilities total 3.3E+11 N.D. N.D.
Inc.
Annual release control
Takahama Power Station
target values 3.3E+15 6.2E+10 1.4E+11
Nuclear reactor
Kansai Electric Power Co.,
facilities total 5.0E+11 N.D. N.D.
Inc.
Annual release control
Ohi Power Station
target values 3.9E+15 1.0E+11 1.4E+11

*1: The release control target value is a total value of Units 3 to 5. Each value of Units 1 and 2 is less than the
measurement concentration lower limit.
*2: The release control target value is a total value of Units 1 to 5. The values of Units 1 and 2 are 9.2E+09 and the
values of Units 3 to 5 are 3.7E+10, respectively.

630
Radioactive gaseous waste Radioactive liquid
waste
Noble gas Iodine 3
(excluding H)
Power station [131I]
(Bq) (Bq) (Bq)
Chugoku Electric Power Co., Nuclear reactor
Inc. facilities total N.D. N.D. N.D.
Shimane Nuclear Power Annual release control
Station target values 8.4E+14 4.3E+10 7.4E+10
Nuclear reactor
Shikoku Electric Power Co.,
facilities total 2.6E+11 9.9E+04 N.D.
Inc.
Annual release control
Ikata Power Station
target values 1.5E+15 8.1E+10 1.1E+11
Nuclear reactor
Kyushu Electric Power Co.,
facilities total 2.5E+10 N.D. N.D.
Inc.
Annual release control
Genkai Nuclear Power Station
target values 2.2E+15 5.8E+10 1.4E+11
Nuclear reactor
Kyushu Electric Power Co.,
facilities total 9.4E+09 N.D. N.D.
Inc.
Annual release control
Sendai Nuclear Power Station
target values 1.7E+15 6.2E+10 7.4E+10
Nuclear reactor
Japan Atomic Power Co., Ltd. facilities total 㸫 㸫 9.3E+04
Tokai Power Station Annual release control *3
target values 㸫 㸫 2.9E+07
Nuclear reactor
Japan Atomic Power Co., Ltd. facilities total N.D. N.D. 1.3E+07
Tokai Daini Power Station Annual release control
target values 1.4E+15 5.9E+10 3.7E+10
Nuclear reactor
Japan Atomic Power Co., Ltd. facilities total 7.4E+08 N.D. N.D.
Tsuruga Power Station Annual release control
target values 1.7E+15 3.8E+10 7.4E+10

Notes: The radioactivity (Bq) of gaseous (or liquid) waste is obtained by multiplying the concentration of the radioactive
material (Bq/cm3) in the released gas (or liquid) by the amount of released gas (or liquid).
Values lower than the detection limit of radioactivity are indicated as N.D.
The detection limits are as follows. (Bq/cm3)
ࠉࠉࠉࠉ Radioactive noble gases : 2E-02 or less
ࠉࠉࠉࠉ Radioactive iodine : 7E-09 or less
Radioactive liquid waste (excluding 3H) : 2E-02 or less (60Co value was used)

ࠉࠉࠉ

*3: The release control target values are for 60Co, 137Cs, 152Eu and 154Eu.


631
(2) Power Reactor Facilities at the Research and Development Stage
Radioactive gaseous waste

Noble gases Iodine Tritium


Facility [131I] [3H]
(Bq) (Bq) (Bq)
Nuclear reactor
Japan Atomic Energy Agency
facilities total N.D. N.D. 1.0E+11
Fugen Decommissioning Engineering
Annual release control *4 *4 *5
Center
target values – – 1.4E+13
Nuclear reactor
Japan Atomic Energy Agency
facilities total N.D. N.D. 4.7E+08
Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor
Annual release control
Monju
target values 8.2E+13 1.5E+08 –

Radioactive liquid waste

Total radionuclides Tritium


3
Facility (excluding H) [3H]
(Bq) (Bq)
Nuclear reactor
Japan Atomic Energy Agency
facilities total N.D. 2.1E+12
Fugen Decommissioning Engineering
Annual release control *6 *7
Center 2.8E+08 8.5E+12
target values
Japan Atomic Energy Agency
Nuclear reactor *8
facilities total N.D. 2.7E+08
Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor
Annual release control
Monju 5.5E+09 9.2E+12
target values

Notes: The radioactivity (Bq) of gaseous (or liquid) waste is obtained by multiplying the concentration of the radioactive
material (Bq/cm3) in the released gas (or liquid) by the amount of released gas (or liquid).
Values lower than the detection limit of radioactivity are indicated as N.D.
The detection limits are as follows. (Bq/cm3)
ࠉࠉࠉࠉ Radioactive noble gases : 2E-02 or less
ࠉࠉࠉࠉ Radioactive iodine : 7E-09 or less
ࠉࠉࠉࠉ Radioactive liquid waste : 2E-02 or less (60Co value was used)

*4: After October 1, 2003, due to revision of the reactor facility safety regulations, the annual release control target values of
noble gases and iodine have been removed from the annual release control target values for radioactive gaseous waste.

*5: After February 12, 2008, due to revision of the safety regulations based on the approval of the decommissioning plan, the
annual release control target values for Tritium have been changed to 1.4E+13 (Bq/year).

*6: After October 1, 2003, due to revision of the reactor facility safety regulations, the annual release control target value of
radioactive liquid waste (excluding 3H) have been changed to 2.8E+08 (Bq/year).

*7: After February 12, 2008, due to revision of the safety regulations based on the approval of the decommissioning plan, the
annual release control target values for Tritium have been changed to 8.5E+12 (Bq/year).

*8: The value includes the water and steam derived tritium (N.D.).

632
(3) Fabrication Facility
Radioactive gaseous waste Radioactive liquid waste

Uranium Uranium
Facility [U] [U]
(Bq/cm3) (Bq/cm3)
Processing facilities
Global Nuclear Fuel-Japan Co., total N.D. N.D.
Ltd. Control concentration
targets 1.5E-09 8.00E-03
Processing facilities
Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd. total N.D. N.D.
Control concentration
targets 1.5E-09 8.00E-03
Processing facilities
Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd. total N.D. N.D.
Tokai Works Control concentration
targets 1.5E-09 8.00E-03
Processing facilities
Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd. total N.D. N.D.
Kumatori Works Control concentration
targets 1.5E-09 8.00E-03
*9 Processing facilities *10
Japan Atomic Energy Agency total N.D. N.D.
Ningyo-toge Environmental Engineering Center Control concentration
Uranium enrichment prototype plant targets 1.00E-08 5.00E-03
Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. Processing facilities
Uranium Enrichment Plant/Low- total N.D. N.D.
level Radioactive Waste Disposal Control concentration
(Fabrication facility) targets 2.00E-08 1.00E-03

Notes: Values lower than the detection limit of radioactivity are indicated as N.D.
The detection limits are as follows. (Bq/cm3)
Radioactive gaseous waste Radioactive liquid waste
Global Nuclear Fuel-Japan Co., Ltd. 3.1E-11 or less 3.0E-04 or less
Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd. 1.0E-10 or less 4.0E-04 or less
Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd., Tokai Works 1.3E-10 or less 3.4E-04 or less
Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd., Kumatori Works 6.3E-04 or less
*In line with the removal of the exhaust stack (1), the safety regulations were revised in FY2008.
Exhaust stack (1) Removed, Exhaust stack (2) Exhaust stack (1), Exhaust stack (3) Exhaust stack (2)
Exhaust stack (1) 7.1E-11 or less
Exhaust stack (2) 4.9E-11 or less
Japan Atomic Energy Agency
Ningyo-toge Environmental Engineering Center, Prototype Uranium Enrichment Plant 1.0E-10 or less 3.0E-04 or less
Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd., Enrichment and Burial Plant (fabrication facility) 2E-09 or less 1E-04 or less

*9 Hereinafter, it will be referred to as “Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Prototype Uranium Enrichment Plant.”

*10 Water discharge has not been conducted in the first, second, and fourth quarters.


633
(4) Reprocessing Facility (radioactive gaseous waste)

Krypton Iodine

Japan Atomic Energy Agency [85Kr] [129I]
Reprocessing facility (Bq) (Bq)
Reprocessing facility total –
7.2E+09 8.4E+06
Annual release control

target values 8.9E+16 1.7E+09

Radioactive argon Krypton Iodine


Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. [85Kr] [129I]
Reprocessing plant (Bq) (Bq) (Bq)
(Reprocessing facility)
Reprocessing facility total
N.D. N.D. 1.8E+06
Annual release control
target values – 3.3E+17 1.1E+10

Total radioactive particulate matter

Japan Atomic Energy Agency [total alpha] [total beta gamma]



Reprocessing facility (Bq) (Bq)
Reprocessing facility total
N.D. –
N.D.
Annual release control *11 *11
2.2E-08 –
target values 1.1E-04
Breakdown of the left
Other radionuclides column (by nuclide) Other radionuclides
(nuclides that do not emit alpha
(nuclides that emit alpha rays) Plutonium rays)
Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. [Pu ())]
Reprocessing plant (Bq) (Bq) (Bq)
(Reprocessing facility)
Reprocessing facility total
N.D. N.D. N.D.
Annual release control
target values –
3.3E+08 9.4E+10

Notes: The radioactivity (Bq) of radioactive gaseous waste is obtained by multiplying the concentration of the radioactive material
(Bq/cm3) in the released gas by the amount of released gas.
Values lower than the detection limit of radioactivity are indicated as N.D.
The detection limits are as follows. (Bq/cm3)

Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Reprocessing facility Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd., Reprocessing plant (Reprocessing facility)
131
I : 3.7E-08 or less
Radioactive argon : 1E-04 or less
14 85
C : 4.0E-05 or less
Kr : 2E-02 or less
131
Total radioactive particulate matter (Total alpha rays) : 1.5E-10 or less
I : 7E-09 or less
Total radioactive particulate matter 14
: 1.5E-09 or less
C : 4E-05 or less
(Total beta and gamma rays)
Other radionuclides (nuclides that emit alpha rays) : 4E-10 or less
(The value for all alpha values was used.)
Pu ()) : 4E-10 or less
Other radionuclides (nuclides that do not emit alpha rays) : 4E-9 or less
(The value for all beta (gamma) values was used.)
106 106
Ru- Rh : 4E-9 or less
(The values for particulate 106Ru and volatile 106Ru are indicated.)
137
Cs-137mBa : 4E-9 or less
90
Sr-90Y : 4E-10 or less
*11 Mean concentration control target values (Bq/cm3) for three months

634
(4) Reprocessing Facility (radioactive gaseous waste) (cont.)

Iodine Tritium Carbon


[131I] [3H] [14C]
(Bq) (Bq) (Bq)

N.D. 7.0E+11 N.D.

1.6E+10 5.6E+14 5.1E+12

Iodine Tritium Carbon


[131I] [3H] [14C]
(Bq) (Bq) (Bq)

N.D. 3.4E+11 N.D.

1.7E+10 1.9E+15 5.2E+13

– – –

– – –

– – –

– – –
Breakdown of the left column (by nuclide)
Strontium - Yttrium Ruthenium - Rhodium Cesium - Barium

106 106
[90Sr-90Y] [ Ru- Rh] [137Cs-137mBa]
(Bq) (Bq) (Bq)

N.D. N.D. N.D.


635
(4) Reprocessing Facility (radioactive liquid waste)

Tritium Iodine Iodine


Japan Atomic Energy Agency [3H] [129I] [131I]
Reprocessing facility (Bq) (Bq) (Bq)
Annual release
1.0E+12 6.5E+06 N.D.
Annual release control
target values 1.9E+15 2.7E+10 1.2E+11

Tritium Iodine Iodine


129
Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. [3H] [ I] [131I]
Reprocessing plant (Bq) (Bq) (Bq)
(Reprocessing facility)
Annual release
4.1E+12 1.2E+07 N.D.
Annual release control
target values 1.8E+16 4.3E+10 1.7E+11

Strontium Strontium
– 89
Japan Atomic Energy Agency [ Sr] [90Sr]
Reprocessing facility (Bq) (Bq)
Annual release –
N.D. N.D.
Annual release control

target values 1.6E+10 3.2E+10
Other nuclides (nuclides that do not emit alpha rays)/Breakdown (by nuclide)

Strontium - Yttrium
Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. Cobalt

Reprocessing plant [60Co] [90Sr-90Y]
(Reprocessing facility) (Bq) (Bq)
Annual release –
N.D. N.D.
Annual release control
target values –

Cerium -
Praseodymium
– –
Japan Atomic Energy Agency [144Ce-144Pr]
Reprocessing facility (Bq)

Annual release – –
N.D.
Annual release control
– –
target values 1.2E+11
Other nuclides (nuclides that do not emit alpha rays)/Breakdown (by nuclide)
Cerium -
Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. Praseodymium Europium Plutonium
Reprocessing plant [144Ce-144mPr, 144Pr] [154Eu] [241Pu]
(Reprocessing facility) (Bq) (Bq) (Bq)

Annual release
N.D. N.D. N.D.
Annual release control
target values –

636
(4) Reprocessing Facility (radioactive liquid waste) (cont.)
Total beta
Total alpha Plutonium radioactivity
radioactivity – –
[Pu ())] (excluding 3H)
(Bq) (Bq) (Bq)

– –
N.D. 2.0E+04 N.D.
– –
4.1E+09 2.3E+09 9.6E+11
Breakdown of the left column (by nuclide)
Other radionuclides Plutonium Americium Curium Other radionuclides
(nuclides that do not emit alpha
(nuclides that emit alpha rays) [Pu ())] [Am ())] [Cm ())] rays)
(Bq) (Bq) (Bq) (Bq) (Bq)

N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.

3.8E+09 – 2.1E+11

Zirconium - Niobium Ruthenium -


Ruthenium Rhodium Cesium Cesium Cerium
95 95 103 106 106 134 137
[ Zr- Nb] [ Ru] [ Ru- Rh] [ Cs] [ Cs] [141Ce]
(Bq) (Bq) (Bq) (Bq) (Bq) (Bq)

N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.

4.1E+10 6.4E+10 5.1E+11 6.0E+10 5.5E+10 5.9E+09


Other nuclides (nuclides that do not emit alpha rays)/Breakdown (by nuclide)
Ruthenium ࠉ Cesium
- Rhodium Cesium - Barium
– – 106 106 134 137 137m

[ Ru- Rh㹛 [ Cs] [ Cs- Ba]
(Bq) (Bq) (Bq)

– – 㸫
N.D. N.D. N.D.

Notes: The radioactivity (Bq) of radioactive liquid waste is obtained by multiplying the concentration of the radioactive material
(Bq/cm3) in the released liquid by the amount of released liquid.
Values lower than the detection limit of radioactivity are indicated as N.D.
The detection limits are as follows. (Bq/cm3)
Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Reprocessing facility Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd., Reprocessing plant (Reprocessing facility)
131
I : 1.8E-03 or less ࠉࠉࠉࠉࠉ131
I : 2E-02 or less
Total alpha radioactivity : 1.1E-03 or less ࠉࠉࠉࠉࠉ Other radionuclides (nuclides that emit alpha rays) : 4E-03 or less
Total beta radioactivity (excluding 3H) (The value for all alpha values was used.)
: 2.2E-02 or less ࠉࠉࠉࠉࠉࠉPu ()) : 1E-03 or less
89
Sr : 2.2E-03 or less ࠉࠉࠉࠉࠉࠉAm ()) : 6E-05 or less
90
Sr : 1.1E-03 or less ࠉࠉࠉࠉࠉࠉCm ()) : 6E-05 or less
95
Zr-95Nb : 4.3E-03 or less ࠉࠉࠉࠉࠉࠉ Other radionuclides (nuclides that do not emit alpha rays) : 4E-02 or less
103
Ru : 1.1E-03 or less (The value for all beta (gamma) values was used.)
106
Ru-106Rh : 3.2E-02 or less 䚷䚷䚷䚷䚷䚷䚷䚷 60
Co : 2E-02 or less
134
Cs : 1.1E-03 or less ࠉࠉࠉࠉࠉ ࠉࠉࠉࠉ90
Sr-90Y : 7E-04 or less
137
Cs : 1.8E-03 or less ࠉࠉࠉ ࠉࠉࠉࠉࠉࠉ106
Ru-106Rh : 2E-02 or less
141
Ce : 2.2E-03 or less ࠉࠉࠉࠉ ࠉࠉࠉࠉࠉ134
Cs : 2E-02 or less
144
Ce-144Pr : 2.2E-02 or less ࠉࠉࠉࠉࠉࠉ ࠉࠉࠉ137
Cs-137mBa : 2E-02 or less
ࠉࠉࠉࠉࠉ ࠉࠉࠉࠉ144
Ce-144mPr,144Pr : 2E-02 or less
ࠉࠉࠉࠉࠉ ࠉࠉࠉࠉ154

ࠉࠉࠉࠉࠉࠉ ࠉࠉࠉ241
Eu : 2E-02 or less
: 3E-02 or less

Pu


637
(5) Waste Burial Facilities, Waste Management Facilities
Waste burial facilities
Radioactive gaseous waste

Tritium Cobalt Cesium


Facility [3H] [60Co] [137Cs]
(Bq/cm3) (Bq/cm3) (Bq/cm3)
*12 Waste burial facilities
– – –
Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. Facilities total
Uranium Enrichment Plant/Low-level Radioactive Waste Disposal Center Control concentration

(Waste burial facilities) targets 5.0E-04 3.0E-07 1.0E-06


*13 Waste burial facilities
– – –
Japan Atomic Energy Agency Facilities total
Tokai Research and Development Center Control concentration
– – –
Nuclear Science Laboratories, Waste burial facility targets

Radioactive liquid waste

Tritium Cobalt Cesium


Facility [3H] [60Co] [137Cs]
(Bq/cm3) (Bq/cm3) (Bq/cm3)
*12
Concentration – – –
Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd.
Uranium Enrichment Plant/Low-level Radioactive Waste Disposal Center Control concentration
(Waste burial facilities) targets 6.0E+00 1.0E-02 7.0E-03
*13
Concentration – – –
Japan Atomic Energy Agency
Tokai Research and Development Center Control concentration
targets – – –
Nuclear Science Laboratories, Waste burial facility

*12 There was no release of gaseous and liquid radioactive waste in the waste burial facility (low-level waste management
building) in Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd., Enrichment and Waste Burial Plant.

*13 Hereinafter, it will be referred to as “Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Waste burial facility.” There is no release of
gaseous or liquid radioactive waste.

638
Waste management facilities
Radioactive gaseous waste

Cobalt Radioactive cesium Radioactive ruthenium


60
Facility [ Co] [Cs] [Ru]
3 3 3
(Bq/cm ) (Bq/cm ) (Bq/cm )
Waste management
Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd.
– N.D. N.D.
Facilities total
Reprocessing plant Control concentration
– 9.0E-07 1.0E-07
(Waste management facilities) targets
*14 Waste management
Japan Atomic Energy Agency N.D. N.D. –
Facilities total
Oarai Research and Development Center *15
– – –
Waste management facilities Control concentration targets

(cont.)
Radioactive gaseous waste

Radioactive argon Plutonium


239
Facility [Ar] [ Pu ]
3 3
(Bq/cm ) (Bq/cm )
Waste management
Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. N.D. –
Facilities total
Reprocessing plant Control concentration
– –
(Waste management facilities) targets
*14 Waste management
Japan Atomic Energy Agency
– N.D.
Facilities total
Oarai Research and Development Center *15
– –
Waste management facilities Control concentration targets

Radioactive liquid waste

Tritium Cobalt Radioactive cesium Others


3
Facility [ H] [60Co] [Cs]
(Bq) (Bq) (Bq) (Bq)
*16 Annual release
– – – –
Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd.
Reprocessing plant Release control target
– – – –
(Waste management facilities) value
*14
Japan Atomic Energy Agency
Annual release
2.4E+10 N.D. N.D. –
Oarai Research and Development Center Release control target
Waste management facilities value 3.7E+12 2.2E+08 1.8E+09 2.2E+08
Notes: Values lower than the detection limit of radioactivity are indicated as N.D.
The detection limits are as follows. (Bq/cm3)

Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd., Reprocessing Plant (Waste managemenJapan Atomic Energy Agency, Waste management facilities
Radioactive gaseous waste Radioactive gaseous waste
ࠉࠉ60
ࠉࠉ Radioactive Cs : 4E-09 or less Co : 6.7E-09 or less
ࠉࠉ Radioactive Ru : 1E-08 or less ࠉࠉ Radioactive Cs : 1.3E-09 or less
ࠉࠉ239
ࠉࠉ Radioactive Ar : 1E-04 or less Pu : 8.9E-10 or less
Radioactive liquid waste
ࠉࠉ60
Co : 3.2E-05 or less
ࠉࠉ Radioactive Cs : 2.6E-05 or less

*14 Hereinafter, it will be referred to as “Japan Atomic Energy Agency, waste management facilities.”
*15 For the waste management facilities of Japan Atomic Energy Agency, the concentration control target values of gaseous waste are
established for each exhaust stack; the concentration control target values for the whole facilities are not established.

*16 Because all of the liquid radioactive waste is stored for disposal within the facilities, there is no external release.

639
(2) Management Status of Radioactive Solid Waste, etc.

(1) Commercial Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities


The amount of solid low-level radioactive waste generated at commercial nuclear power reactor facilities in FY2009 was
equivalent to 72,400 200-liter drums. The amount of cumulative stored waste increased by only 24,100 drums, mainly due to
the amount of waste transported to the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Burial Center and the volume-reducing effects of
measures such as incineration. Accordingly, at the end of FY2009, the amount of waste in solid waste storage at commercial
power reactor facilities was roughly equivalent to 648,500 200-liter drums, which is 70.9 % of the total storage capacity of
approximately 914,600 200-liter drums.
A steam generator storage, etc. is a storage facility exclusively for the radioactive solid waste generated by the processes
including the replacement of steam generators or the upper lids of the reactor in pressurized water reactor (PWR) power
plants. In FY2009, 86 m3 of storage containers of radioactive waste was generated as a result of the replacement of the
reactor containment top heads at Tomari Power Station.
In regard to the feed water heater storage building, etc., 311 m3 of storage containers of radioactive waste was generated as a
result of the replacement of the No. 6 feed water heater (for three reactors) at Japan Atomic Power Co., Ltd., Tokai Daini
Power Station.
Spent control rods, channel boxes, spent resin and a part of the radioactive waste generated by the replacement of the shroud
are stored in the spent fuel pool, storage bunker, tank, etc.

In a solid storage facility, radioactive solid waste is packed in drums and stored.
The amount of radioactive solid waste in drums is expressed as the equivalent number of 200-liter drums. Other types of
radioactive solid waste are oversized equipment, etc., which do not fit in drum cans. The amount generated and amount of
accumulated storage of waste of this kind is indicated by the equivalent number of 200-liter drums.
The “reduction in the station” amount is the sum of the amount of incinerated combustible waste and the amount of volume
reduction by the compressed packaging of waste in the drums. The “reduction outside the station” amount is the amount of
waste transported to the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Burial Center or reduced due to clearance treatment at Japan Atomic
Power Company, Tokai Power Station.
The amount of radioactive solid waste stored in steam generator storage, etc., is shown by the number of stored steam
generators and the volume of the storage containers.
The amount stored in the spent fuel pool, storage bunker, tank, etc., is shown by the number of stored control rods, channel
boxes, or other storage volumes.

(2) Power Reactor Facilities at the Research and Development Stage


The amount of low-level radioactive solid waste generated at the Fugen Decommissioning Engineering Center of the Japan
Atomic Energy Agency in FY2009 was equivalent to roughly 900 200-liter drums. The amount of cumulative storage was
increased by only 160 drums due to volume-reducing efforts such as incineration. Accordingly, the amount in storage at the
end of FY2009 was equivalent to roughly 19,100 200-liter drums, compared with the approximate 21,500-drum capacity of
the storage facility. Ion-exchange resins and filter sludge are stored in tanks, while spent control rods and neutron detectors
are stored in spent fuel pools.
The amount of low-level radioactive solid waste generated at the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Monju of the Japan Atomic
Energy Agency in FY2009 was equivalent to roughly 600 200-liter drums. Accordingly, the amount in storage at the end of
FY2009 was equivalent to roughly 4,400 200-liter drums compared with the approximate 23,000-drum capacity of the
storage facility.

640
(3) Fabrication Facilities
In FY2009, the amount of low-level radioactive solid waste generated at a total of six fabrication facilities, which are
operated by five companies, was equivalent to roughly 4,000 200-liter drums. The amount of cumulative storage was
increased by only 1,500 drums due to volume-reducing efforts such as incineration. Accordingly, the amount of low-level
radioactive solid waste stored at the end of FY2009 was equivalent to roughly 47,300 200-liter drums compared with the
approximate 62,320-drum total capacity of the storage facilities.

(4) Reprocessing Facilities


The amount of low-level radioactive solid waste generated at the Japan Atomic Energy Agency's Reprocessing Facility in
FY2009 was equivalent to roughly 300 200-liter drums. Accordingly, the amount of low-level radioactive solid waste stored
at the end of FY2009 was equivalent to roughly 75,600 200-liter drums compared with the approximate 92,140-drum
capacity of the storage facility. The amount of high-level radioactive solid waste generated was equivalent to 17 200-liter
drums, and the amount of vitrified waste canisters (120-liter containers) was 0. Accordingly, the amount of high-level
radioactive solid waste stored at the end of FY2009 was equivalent to roughly 6,600 200-liter drums compared with the
approximate 10,320-drum capacity of the storage facility. The amount of vitrified waste canisters (120-liter containers)
stored is 247 compared with the 420-capacity of the storage facility.
The amount of low-level radioactive solid waste generated at the reprocessing plant (reprocessing facilities) of the JNFL in
FY2009 was equivalent to roughly 7,800 200-liter drums. Note that 1,280-equivalent drums, which were transported
temporarily from the storage building during waste arrangement to improve the temporary placement status of the waste
before it is stored for disposal, are included in the storage at the end of this fiscal year. Accordingly, the amount of low-level
radioactive solid waste stored at the end of FY2009 was equivalent to roughly 24,700 200-liter drums compared with the
74,750-drum capacity of the storage facility. The amount of sheared and covering pieces generated was equivalent to
roughly 219 1000-liter drums. Accordingly, the amount in storage of the covering pieces, etc., at the end of FY2009 was
equivalent to roughly 219 drums compared with the approximate 2,000-drum capacity of the storage facility. The amount of
generated vitrified waste canisters (containers with approx. 1,340 mm in height and approx. 430 mm in outer diameter) was
0, and the amount of the vitrified waste canisters stored was the same as the amount at the end of the previous fiscal year,
which was equivalent to 107 drums compared with the 3,195-drum capacity of the storage facility.

(5) Waste Burial Facilities, Waste Management Facilities


At the end of FY2009, in the JNFL Enrichment and Burial Plant (waste burial facility), solidified waste equivalent to
roughly 142,000 drums was buried at the No. 1 waste burial facility (capacity: approx. 200,000 200-liter drums) and injected
grout equivalent to roughly 76,000 drums was buried at the No. 2 waste burial facility (capacity: approx. 200,000 200-liter
drums). No low-level radioactive solid waste was generated in association with burial activities.
Roughly 1,670 tons of radioactive solid waste associated with the dismantling of JPDR are already buried at the waste burial
facility of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency.

The amount of low-level radioactive solid waste generated in association with the relevant business at the waste
management facility of the JNFL Reprocessing Plant in FY2009 was equivalent to 56 200-liter drums. Accordingly, the
amount of low-level radioactive solid waste stored at the end of FY2009 was 1,012 200-liter drums compared with the
1,200-drum capacity of the storage facility. At the end of FY2009, 1,338 containers of high-level radioactive solid waste
(returned vitrified waste) were received and managed in the management storage facility which has a capacity of 1,440
containers.
At the end of FY2009, low-level radioactive waste equivalent to roughly 28,800 200-liter drums, which includes
approximately 700 drums of low-level radioactive solid waste generated in association with the activities of the research
institute, is being managed at the waste management facility of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency, which has a capacity
equivalent to 42,800 drums.

The status of radioactive solid waste management in each fiscal year since FY2000 is shown in reference document 5; the
amount of waste by fiscal year transported to the low-level radioactive waste burial center is shown in reference document 6.
Trends in the burial amount of radioactive waste at the waste burial facilities of the JNFL Enrichment and Burial Plant are
shown in reference document 7. The management status of high-level radioactive waste (returned vitrified waste) by fiscal
year at the management facility of the JNFL Reprocessing Plant is shown in reference document 8.


641
(1) Commercial Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities
i) Solid waste storage
Others *1
Drums Total
(equivalent to the Storage equipment
(number of drums) number of drums) (equivalent to capacity
Power station
Solidified the number of (equivalent to the
Injected grout Miscellaneous solid waste drums) *1
number of drums)
waste
Storage at the end of previous fiscal year
368 㸫 4,891 540 5,799
Production in this fiscal year
68 㸫 688 40 796
Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Inc. Reduction in this fiscal year
0 㸫 0 30 30
Tomari Power Station Reduction in the station 0 㸫 0 30 30
Reduction outside the station 0 㸫 0 0 0 18,000
Storage at the end of this fiscal year
436 㸫 5,579 549 6,564
Storage at the end of previous fiscal year
2,236 0 25,380 0 27,616
Production in this fiscal year
152 0 3,384 996 4,532
Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc. Reduction in this fiscal year
640 0 4,900 0 5,540
Onagawa Nuclear Power Station Reduction in the station 0 0 4,900 0 4,900
Reduction outside the station 640 0 0 0 640 30,000
Storage at the end of this fiscal year
1,748 0 23,864 996 26,608
Storage at the end of previous fiscal year
㸫 㸫 4,668 0 4,668
Production in this fiscal year
㸫 㸫 2,028 0 2,028
Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc. Reduction in this fiscal year
㸫 㸫 0 0 0
Higashidori Nuclear Power Station Reduction in the station 㸫 㸫 0 0 0
Reduction outside the station 㸫 㸫 0 0 0 9,000
Storage at the end of this fiscal year
㸫 㸫 6,696 0 6,696
Storage at the end of previous fiscal year
14,616 4,455 152,144 10,155 181,370
Production in this fiscal year
1,115 1,448 14,375 0 16,938
Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. Reduction in this fiscal year
960 2,048 10,607 0 13,615
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
Station
Reduction in the station 0 0 10,607 0 10,607
Reduction outside the station 960 2,048 0 0 3,008 284,500
Storage at the end of this fiscal year
14,771 3,855 155,912 10,155 184,693
Storage at the end of previous fiscal year
636 1,662 14,901 0 17,199
Production in this fiscal year
8 1,089 1,374 0 2,471
Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. Reduction in this fiscal year
0 0 1,285 0 1,285
Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power
Station
Reduction in the station 0 0 1,285 0 1,285
Reduction outside the station 0 0 0 0 0 32,000
Storage at the end of this fiscal year
644 2,751 14,990 0 18,385
Storage at the end of previous fiscal year
0 㸫 24,408 0 24,408
Production in this fiscal year
0 㸫 4,224 0 4,224
Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. Reduction in this fiscal year
0 㸫 56 0 56
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear
Power Station
Reduction in the station 0 㸫 56 0 56
Reduction outside the station 0 㸫 0 0 0 45,000
Storage at the end of this fiscal year
0 㸫 28,576 0 28,576
Storage at the end of previous fiscal year
3,295 1,380 3,123 27,660 35,458
Production in this fiscal year
0 1,376 968 3,100 5,444
Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc. Reduction in this fiscal year
0 1,080 912 3,720 5,712
Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Reduction in the station 0 0 912 3,720 4,632
Reduction outside the station 0 1,080 0 0 1,080 42,000
Storage at the end of this fiscal year
3,295 1,676 3,179 27,040 35,190

*1 (equivalent to the number of drums) indicates the number of drums obtained by rounding off the conversion calculation for the number of drums.

642
Others *1
Drums Total
(equivalent to the Storage equipment
(number of drums) number of drums) (equivalent to capacity
Power station
Solidified the number of (equivalent to the
Injected grout Miscellaneous solid waste drums) *1
number of drums)
waste
Storage at the end of previous fiscal year
8 232 4,208 68 4,516
Production in this fiscal year
0 354 808 0 1,162
Hokuriku Electric Power Co., Inc. Reduction in this fiscal year
0 0 476 0 476
Shika Nuclear Power Station Reduction in the station 0 0 476 0 476
Reduction outside the station 0 0 0 0 0 10,000
Storage at the end of this fiscal year
8 586 4,540 68 5,202
Storage at the end of previous fiscal year
2,176 1,234 21,327 3,160 27,897
Production in this fiscal year
112 1,000 2,844 130 4,086
Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. Reduction in this fiscal year
0 1,200 2,515 0 3,715
Mihama Power Station Reduction in the station 0 0 2,515 0 2,515
Reduction outside the station 0 1,200 0 0 1,200 35,000
Storage at the end of this fiscal year
2,288 1,034 21,656 3,289 28,267
Storage at the end of previous fiscal year
4,801 0 34,067 3,008 41,876
Production in this fiscal year
96 *2 0 4,214 253 4,563
Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. Reduction in this fiscal year
0 0 1,201 0 1,201
Takahama Power Station Reduction in the station 0 0 1,201 0 1,201
Reduction outside the station *3
0 0 0 0 0 50,600
Storage at the end of this fiscal year
4,897 0 37,080 3,261 45,238
Storage at the end of previous fiscal year
3,342 3,423 16,767 3,875 27,407
Production in this fiscal year
115 1,022 3,366 987 5,490
Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. Reduction in this fiscal year
0 0 1,615 0 1,615
Ohi Power Station Reduction in the station 0 0 1,615 0 1,615
Reduction outside the station 0 0 0 0 0 38,900
Storage at the end of this fiscal year
3,457 4,445 18,518 4,863 31,283
Storage at the end of previous fiscal year
252 1,709 20,817 4,509 27,287
Production in this fiscal year
0 684 2,451 151 3,286
Chugoku Electric Power Co., Inc. Reduction in this fiscal year
0 1,280 2,022 772 4,074
Shimane Nuclear Power Station Reduction in the station 0 0 2,022 772 2,794
Reduction outside the station 0 1,280 0 0 1,280 35,500
Storage at the end of this fiscal year
252 1,113 21,246 3,888 26,499
Storage at the end of previous fiscal year
1,665 㸫 17,379 10,283 29,327
Production in this fiscal year
108 96 1,568 853 2,625
Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc. Reduction in this fiscal year
584 0 1,872 0 2,456
Ikata Power Station Reduction in the station 0 0 1,872 0 1,872
Reduction outside the station 584 0 0 0 584 38,500
Storage at the end of this fiscal year
1,189 96 17,075 11,135 29,495
Storage at the end of previous fiscal year
3,774 㸫 23,380 4,687 31,841
Production in this fiscal year
232 182 2,992 734 4,140
Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc. Reduction in this fiscal year
0 0 919 4 923
Genkai Nuclear Power Station Reduction in the station 0 0 919 4 923
Reduction outside the station 0 0 0 0 0 49,000
Storage at the end of this fiscal year
4,006 182 *4 25,453 5,417 35,058

*2 In this fiscal year, 1,092 drums of filled solidified waste were produced in the solid waste solidification building.
*3 In this fiscal year, 1,160 drums of filled solidified waste were taken out as reduction outside the station from the solid waste solidification
building.
*4 Includes ion exchange resin, which is equivalent to 50 200-liter drums (99 100-liter drums).


643
Others *1
Drums Total
(equivalent to the Storage equipment
(number of drums) number of drums) (equivalent to capacity
Power station
Solidified the number of (equivalent to the
Injected grout Miscellaneous solid waste number of drums)
waste drums) *1
Storage at the end of previous fiscal year
2,203 㸫 11,473 3,463 17,139
Production in this fiscal year
73 㸫 994 466 1,533
Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc. Reduction in this fiscal year
0 㸫 594 0 594
Sendai Nuclear Power Station Reduction in the station 0 㸫 594 0 594
Reduction outside the station 0 㸫 0 0 0 37,000
Storage at the end of this fiscal year
2,276 㸫 11,873 3,929 18,078
Storage at the end of previous fiscal year
㸫 0 29 1,352 1,381
Production in this fiscal year
㸫 0 869 384 1,253
Japan Atomic Power Co., Ltd. Reduction in this fiscal year
㸫 0 877 356 1,233
Tokai Power Station Reduction in the station *5 㸫 0 877 356 1,233
Reduction outside the station 㸫 0 0 0 0 1,600
Storage at the end of this fiscal year
㸫 0 *6 21 *6 1,380 *6 1,401
Storage at the end of previous fiscal year
410 108 17,649 35,416 53,583
Production in this fiscal year
219 102 2,156 2,344 4,821
Japan Atomic Power Co., Ltd. Reduction in this fiscal year
56 128 4,255 600 5,039
Tokai Daini Power Station Reduction in the station *7 0 0 4,255 264 4,519
Reduction outside the station 56 *8 128 0 *9 336 520 73,000
Storage at the end of this fiscal year *10
573 82 16,427 37,516 54,598
Storage at the end of previous fiscal year
2,368 250 33,807 29,112 65,537
Production in this fiscal year
56 32 101 2,844 3,033
Japan Atomic Power Co., Ltd. Reduction in this fiscal year
0 0 260 1,688 1,948
Tsuruga Power Station Reduction in the station 0 0 260 1,688 1,948
Reduction outside the station 0 0 0 0 0 85,000
Storage at the end of this fiscal year
2,424 282 33,648 30,268 66,622
Storage at the end of previous fiscal year
42,150 14,453 430,418 137,288 624,309
Production in this fiscal year
2,354 7,385 49,404 13,282 72,425
Total Reduction in this fiscal year
2,240 5,736 33,489 6,814 48,279
Reduction in the station *11 0 0 33,489 6,478 39,967
ࠉ Reduction outside the station 2,240 5,736 0 336 8,312 914,600
Storage at the end of this fiscal year
42,264 16,102 446,333 143,754 648,453

*5 This is the amount of waste transported to Tokai Daini Power Station.


*6 Includes the amount for the five miscellaneous solid waste drums of the demolition waste and 1,372-equivalent drums
of the other miscellaneous solid waste.
*7 This includes the amount reduced at the Tokai Power Station (the amount of 2,506 miscellaneous solid waste drums).
*8 The transported amount for burial treatment (includeing 72 drums at Tokai Power Station).
*9 Amount reduced due to clearance treatment at the Tokai Power Station.
*10 Includes the amount transported from Tokai Power Station during this period (877 miscellaneous solid waste drums and 356 drums
of the other miscellaneous solid waste).
In addition, the amount in storage includes 1,258 miscellaneous solid waste drums of the demolition waste and 4,876-equivalent other drums.
*11 The values do not include the amount reduced due to transportation from the Tokai Power Station to the Tokai Daini Power Station.

644
ii) Steam generator storage, etc.

Steam generator
Storage container
Power station (number of
generators) (m3)

Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Inc.


Production in this fiscal year 㸫 86
Tomari Power Station *12 Storage at the end of this fiscal year
㸫 179

Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.


Production in this fiscal year 0 0
Mihama Power Station Storage at the end of this fiscal year 7 966

Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.


Production in this fiscal year 0 0
Takahama Power Station Storage at the end of this fiscal year 6 894

Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.


Production in this fiscal year 0 0
Ohi Power Station Storage at the end of this fiscal year 8 2,674

Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc.


Production in this fiscal year 0 0
Ikata Power Station Storage at the end of this fiscal year 4 638

Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc.


Production in this fiscal year 0 0
Genkai Nuclear Power Station Storage at the end of this fiscal year 4 663

Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc.


Production in this fiscal year 0 0
Sendai Nuclear Power Station *13 Storage at the end of this fiscal year
3 509

Japan Atomic Power Co., Ltd.


Production in this fiscal year 㸫 0
Tsuruga Power Station *12 Storage at the end of this fiscal year
㸫 170

*12 Stored in the reactor containment top head storage building.”


*13 Stored in the “solid waste storeroom.”

iii) Feed water heater storage, etc.


Feed water heaters
Amount in storage
Power station (number of
generators) (m3)

Japan Atomic Power Co., Ltd.


Production in this fiscal year 3 *14 311
3 *14
Tokai Daini Power Station Storage at the end of this fiscal year 311

*14 Includes the concrete for the building floors that was cut for replacement of the feed water heaters (51.38 m3).


645
iv) Spent fuel pool, storage bunker, tank, etc.

BWR
Spent fuel pool/storage bunker Tank, etc.
Power station
Control rods Channel box, etc. Others Resin, etc.
(number of units) (number of units) (m3) (m3)
Production in this fiscal year 90 277 1 39
Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.
Onagawa Nuclear Power Station
Reduction in this fiscal year 47 44 0 54
Storage at the end of this fiscal year 173 2,774 1 476
Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.
Production in this fiscal year 21 179 0 30
Higashidori Nuclear Power Reduction in this fiscal year 0 0 0 0
Station Storage at the end of this fiscal year 50 395 0 77
Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.
Production in this fiscal year 164 572 1 59
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Reduction in this fiscal year 88 52 0 119
Station Storage at the end of this fiscal year 1,322 20,984 186 3,508
Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.
Production in this fiscal year 66 692 1 142
Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Reduction in this fiscal year 36 150 0 0
Station Storage at the end of this fiscal year 640 8,840 39 4,953
Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.
Production in this fiscal year 0 332 0 37
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Reduction in this fiscal year 0 0 0 0
Power Station Storage at the end of this fiscal year 637 12,407 0 2,324
Production in this fiscal year 13 377 1 13
Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc.
Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station
Reduction in this fiscal year 0 0 0 9
Storage at the end of this fiscal year 494 10,646 29 2,578
Production in this fiscal year 4 10 0 13
Hokuriku Electric Power Co., Inc.
Shika Nuclear Power Station
Reduction in this fiscal year 0 0 0 8
Storage at the end of this fiscal year 39 803 0 124
Production in this fiscal year 8 79 0 4
Chugoku Electric Power Co., Inc.
Shimane Nuclear Power Station
Reduction in this fiscal year 0 0 0 4
Storage at the end of this fiscal year 248 4,315 56 831
Production in this fiscal year 25 178 0.2 36.1
Japan Atomic Power Co., Ltd.
Tokai Daini Power Station
Reduction in this fiscal year 0 0 0 24
Storage at the end of this fiscal year 273 3,591 14 859
Production in this fiscal year 0 115 1 1
Japan Atomic Power Co., Ltd.
Tsuruga Power Station (Unit 1)
Reduction in this fiscal year 0 56 0 4
Storage at the end of this fiscal year 165 1,824 49 820

Note: In addition, 265 m3 and 746 m3 of miscellaneous solid waste is stored in the miscellaneous waste rooms of
Onagawa Nuclear Power Station and Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station, respectively.

646
PWR
Spent fuel pool Tank, etc.
Power station Resin, etc.
Control rod, etc.
(number of units) (m3)
Production in this fiscal year 58 5
Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Inc.
Tomari Power Station
Reduction in this fiscal year 38 0
Storage at the end of this fiscal year 278 84
Production in this fiscal year 12 6
Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.
Mihama Power Station
Reduction in this fiscal year 0 8
Storage at the end of this fiscal year 685 112
Production in this fiscal year 29 10
Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.
Takahama Power Station
Reduction in this fiscal year 24 10
Storage at the end of this fiscal year 1,314 112
Production in this fiscal year 14 8
Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.
Ohi Power Station
Reduction in this fiscal year 0 0
Storage at the end of this fiscal year 1,090 107
Production in this fiscal year 13 2
Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc.
Ikata Power Station
Reduction in this fiscal year 8 0
Storage at the end of this fiscal year 614 151
Production in this fiscal year 33 5
Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc.
Genkai Nuclear Power Station
Reduction in this fiscal year 2 0.2
Storage at the end of this fiscal year 727 160
Production in this fiscal year 8 3
Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc.
Sendai Nuclear Power Station
Reduction in this fiscal year 0 0
Storage at the end of this fiscal year 436 138
Production in this fiscal year 0 4
Japan Atomic Power Co., Ltd.
Tsuruga Power Station (Unit 2)
Reduction in this fiscal year 0 0
Storage at the end of this fiscal year 346 84

GCR
Bunker Tank
Power station Ion exchange
Control rod, etc. Others
resin
(m3) (m3)
(m3)
Production in this fiscal year 0 0 0
Japan Atomic Power Co., Ltd.
Tokai Power Station
Reduction in this fiscal year 0 4 0
Storage at the end of this fiscal year 91 1,302 60


647
(2) Power Reactor Facilities at the Research and Development Stage

i) Solid waste storage


Drums Others *1 Total Storage
(equivalent to the
(equivalent to equipment
(number of units) number of drums)
Facility the number of capacity
Solidified Injected drums) (equivalent to the
Miscellaneous solid waste
waste grout *1 number of drums)
Storage at the end of previous fiscal year 2,016 㸫 6,446 10,476 18,938
Production in this fiscal year 0 㸫 480 408 888
Japan Atomic Energy Agency Reduction in this fiscal year 0 㸫 298 432 730
Fugen Decommissioning Reduction in the station 0 㸫 298 432 730
Engineering Center Reduction outside the station 0 㸫 0 0 0 21,500
Storage at the end of this fiscal year 2,016 㸫 6,628 10,452 19,096
Storage at the end of previous fiscal year 20 0 2,900 928 3,848
Production in this fiscal year 0 0 4 580 584
Japan Atomic Energy Agency Reduction in this fiscal year 0 0 0 0 0
Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Reduction in the station 0 0 0 0 0
Monju Reduction outside the station 0 0 0 0 0 23,000
Storage at the end of this fiscal year 20 0 2,904 1,508 4,432

ii) Spent fuel pool, tank, solid waste storage pool, fuel pond, etc.

Spent fuel pool Tank, etc.


Facility Control rods Other
Neutron detector Resin, etc.
(number of
(number of units)
(number of 3
units) (m )
units)
Japan Atomic Energy Agency Production in this fiscal year 0 0 㸫 0.2
Fugen Decommissioning Engineering Reduction in this fiscal year 0 0 㸫 0
Center Storage at the end of this fiscal year 54 128 㸫 216

Solid waste storage pools Fuel pond


Facility Control rod drive mechanism Others Assembly, etc.
guide tube, etc. 3
(number of units) (m ) (number of units)

Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Production in this fiscal year 0 0 0


Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Reduction in this fiscal year 0 0 0
Monju Storage at the end of this fiscal year 5 0 0

648
(3) Fabrication Facilities
i) Radioactive solid waste
Low-level radioactive solid waste Total Storage equipment
(number of drums) (equivalent to capacity
Facility
Drums Other types the number of (equivalent to the
(equivalent to the number of drums)
(200 l) number of drums) *1 drums) *1
Storage at the end of previous fiscal year 13,273 3,527 16,800
Production in this fiscal year 1,701 74 1,775
Global Nuclear Fuel-Japan Co., Ltd.
Reduction in this fiscal year 340 494 834 23,200
Storage at the end of this fiscal year 14,634 3,107 17,741
Storage at the end of previous fiscal year 9,547 943 10,490
Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd. Production in this fiscal year 925 191 1,116
Reduction in this fiscal year 796 244 1,040 11,600
Storage at the end of this fiscal year 9,676 890 10,566
Storage at the end of previous fiscal year 5,161 1,114 6,275
Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd. Production in this fiscal year 466 27 493
Tokai Works Reduction in this fiscal year 272 152 424 8,500
Storage at the end of this fiscal year 5,355 989 6,344
Storage at the end of previous fiscal year 6,704 182 6,886
Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd. Production in this fiscal year 387 41 428
Kumatori Works Reduction in this fiscal year 69 157 226 11,520
Storage at the end of this fiscal year 7,022 66 7,088
Storage at the end of previous fiscal year 497 56 553
Japan Atomic Energy Agency Production in this fiscal year 27 0 27
Uranium enrichment prototype plant Reduction in this fiscal year 0 0 0 800
Storage at the end of this fiscal year 524 56 580
*15 Storage at the end of previous fiscal year (265) 4,303 448 4,785
Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. Production in this fiscal year (23) 175 12 190
Uranium Enrichment Plant/Low-level
Radioactive Waste Disposal Center
Reduction in this fiscal year (0) 0 0 0 6,700
(Fabrication Facilities) Storage at the end of this fiscal year (288) 4,478 460 4,974

ii) Other radioactive waste


Low-level Storage Radioactive
radioactive liquid equipment gaseous waste Storage equipment
Facility waste capacity
(80 kg-cylinder capacity
equivalent (number (number of drums)
3 3
(m ) (m ) of drums))
Production in this fiscal year – –
Global Nuclear Fuel-Japan Co., Ltd. Reduction in this fiscal year – – – –
Storage at the end of this fiscal year – –
Production in this fiscal year 0.06 –
Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd. Reduction in this fiscal year 0.00 3 – –
Storage at the end of this fiscal year 1.80 –
Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd. Production in this fiscal year 0.1 –
Tokai Works Reduction in this fiscal year 0.6 9.6 – –
Storage at the end of this fiscal year 7.15 –
Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd. Production in this fiscal year 0.0 –
Kumatori Works Reduction in this fiscal year 0.0 20.0 – –
Storage at the end of this fiscal year 11.6 –
Japan Atomic Energy Agency Production in this fiscal year – –
Uranium enrichment prototype plant Reduction in this fiscal year – – – –
Storage at the end of this fiscal year – –
Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. Production in this fiscal year 0.12 0
Uranium Enrichment Plant/Low-level
Radioactive Waste Disposal Center
Reduction in this fiscal year 0.0 4.65 0 27
(Fabrication Facilities) Storage at the end of this fiscal year 1.24 0

*15 The number in parentheses is the number of 20-liter drums. The total was calculated assuming that roughly eight 20-liter 参
drums equals one 200-liter drum, with the fractions rounded up.


649
(4) Reprocessing Facilities
i) Radioactive solid waste
Low-level radioactive solid waste Total Storage
(number of drums) equipment
(equivalent to
Facility capacity
Asphalt- Plastic- Other types the number of (equivalent to the
Drums (equivalent to the
drums) *1
solidified waste solidified waste number of drums) *1 number of drums)
Storage at the end of previous fiscal year 31,875 29,967 1,812 11,717 75,371
Japan Atomic Energy Agency Production in this fiscal year 138 0 0 188 326
Reprocessing Facilities Reduction in this fiscal year 0 0 0 144 144 92,140
Storage at the end of this fiscal year 32,013 29,967 1,812 11,761 75,553
Storage at the end of previous fiscal year 9,548 – – 12,827 22,375
Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. Production in this fiscal year 1,516 – – 6,305 7,821 *17
Reprocessing plant Reduction in this fiscal year 2,116 – – *16 3,436 *16 5,552 74,750
(Reprocessing Facility) Storage at the end of this fiscal year 8,948 – – *16 15,696 *16 24,644

Low-level
High-level radioactive solid waste Total Storage
radioactive solid equipment
(equivalent to the number of drums) *1 (equivalent to
Facility waste capacity
Spent filters, Sampling jars, the number of (equivalent to the
Sheared coated debris, etc. drums) *1 number of drums)
etc. etc.

Japan Atomic Energy Agency Production in this fiscal year – 7 0 10 17


Reprocessing Facilities Reduction in this fiscal year – 0 0 0 0 10,320
Storage at the end of this fiscal year – 4,914 302 1,343 6,559
Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. *18 Production in this fiscal year 0 – – – 0
Reprocessing plant Reduction in this fiscal year 0 – – – 0 2,000
(Reprocessing Facility) Storage at the end of this fiscal year 219 – – – 219

ii) Radioactive liquid waste

*19 Low-level radioactive liquid waste High-level


3
Vitrified waste (m ) radioactive
Facility
(number of Low-level radioactive liquid waste
concentrated liquid Sludge Solvent waste
units) waste (m3)
*20
Japan Atomic Energy Agency Production in this fiscal year 0 48 17 0 0
Reprocessing Facilities Reduction in this fiscal year 0 0 0 0 4
Storage at the end of this fiscal year 247 2,768 1,136 *21 105 380
Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. Production in this fiscal year 0 – – – –
Reprocessing plant Reduction in this fiscal year 0 – – – –
(Reprocessing Facility) Storage at the end of this fiscal year 107 – – – –

*16 1,280-equivalent drums that were transported temporarily from the primary low-level radioactive waste storage building for waste arrangement are not
included in the reduction in this fiscal year but included in the storage at the end of this fiscal year.
3 3 3
*17 The storage capacity includes the capacity of the spent resin storage tank (roughly 190 m × 3 units, 80 m × 2 units, 120 m × 1 unit), equivalent to
4,250 drums.
*18 Sheared coated debris, etc. are stored in 1,000-liter drums.
*19 The vitrified waste at the Japan Atomic Energy Agency's Reprocessing Facility is stored in 120-liter drums.
The vitrified waste at the Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd.'s Reprocessing Plant (reprocessing facility) is stored in containers of approx. 1,340 mm height and
approx. 430 mm diameter.
*20 This includes the liquid waste from the liquid waste tanks and the line cleaning water, etc.
3
*21 The reduction to correct the instrumentation is approx. 1 m .

650
(5) Waste Burial Facilities, Waste Management Facilities
i) Radioactive solid waste

Low-level radioactive solid waste Total Storage equipment


(number of drums) (equivalent to capacity
Facility
Asphalt-
Other types the number of (equivalent to the
Drums (equivalent to the number of drums)
solidified waste number of drums) *1 drums) *1
Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd.
Storage at the end of previous fiscal year 0 – 0 0
Uranium Enrichment Plant/Low-level Production in this fiscal year 0 – 0 0
Radioactive Waste Disposal Center Reduction in this fiscal year 0 – 0 0 80
(Waste Burial Facilities) Storage at the end of this fiscal year 0 – 0 0
Storage at the end of previous fiscal year 912 – 44 956
Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. Production in this fiscal year 56 – 0 56
Reprocessing plant Reduction in this fiscal year 0 – 0 0 1,200
(Waste Management Facilities) Storage at the end of this fiscal year 968 – 44 1,012
Storage at the end of previous fiscal year – – – –
Japan Atomic Energy Agency Production in this fiscal year – – – –
Waste Burial Facilities Reduction in this fiscal year – – – – –
*22 Storage at the end of this fiscal year – – – –
Storage at the end of previous (523) (40) (563)
fiscal year
16,365 534 11,594 28,493
Japan Atomic Energy Agency
Production in this fiscal year
(97) 0 (97)
Waste Management Facilities 254 4 85 343
Reduction in this fiscal year 0 0 0 0
Storage at the end of this fiscal (620) (40) (660) 42,795
year
*23 16,619 538 11,679 28,836

ii) Radioactive liquid waste

Low-level
radioactive
Facility
liquid waste
(m3)
Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. Production in this fiscal year –
Uranium Enrichment Plant/Low-level
Radioactive Waste Disposal Center
Reduction in this fiscal year –
(Waste Burial Facilities) Storage at the end of this fiscal year –
Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. Production in this fiscal year 0
Reprocessing plant Reduction in this fiscal year 0
(Waste Management Facilities) Storage at the end of this fiscal year 0
Japan Atomic Energy Agency Production in this fiscal year –
Waste Burial Facilities Reduction in this fiscal year –
*22 Storage at the end of this fiscal year –
Japan Atomic Energy Agency Production in this fiscal year –
Waste Management Facilities Reduction in this fiscal year –
Storage at the end of this fiscal year –

*22 There is no generation of solid or liquid radioactive waste.


Roughly 1,670 tons of solid waste associated with the dismantling of JPDR are already buried.
*23 The numbers in parentheses indicate the amount generated at the facility, and are included in the total amount shown below the numbers. The
numbers on the bottom are the total amount of waste managed at the management facility.
The storage facility capacity includes the capacity of the processing facility and waste burial facility.


651
Reference Document 1: Release of Radioactive Noble Gas in Radioactive Gaseous Waste by Fiscal Year

(1) Commercial Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities (Unit: Bq)


Fiscal year
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Power station

Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Inc.


Tomari Power Station 6.0E+09 8.1E+09 4.5E+09 5.1E+09 3.4E+09 2.8E+09 3.3E+09 3.1E+09 4.4E+09 7.7E+09

Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.


Onagawa Nuclear Power Station N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.

Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.


Higashidori Nuclear Power Station – – – – N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.

Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.


Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power N.D. 1.0E+09 1.7E+08 2.8E+07 N.D. 3.8E+08 1.5E+08 2.2E+08 N.D. N.D.
Station

Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.


Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power N.D. N.D. 3.4E+10 N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.
Station

Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.


Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.
Power Station

Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc.


Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.

Hokuriku Electric Power Co., Inc.


Shika Nuclear Power Station N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.

Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.


Mihama Power Station 1.6E+10 1.4E+10 1.1E+10 6.1E+09 1.9E+09 1.2E+09 2.3E+09 4.6E+09 2.8E+09 4.7E+09

Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.


Takahama Power Station 1.6E+10 1.8E+10 1.2E+10 1.1E+10 1.6E+10 1.2E+10 1.5E+10 1.8E+10 9.3E+11 3.3E+11

Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.


Ohi Power Station 5.7E+10 1.5E+10 2.8E+10 1.8E+10 4.1E+11 6.2E+09 2.9E+09 2.2E+09 1.9E+10 5.0E+11

Chugoku Electric Power Co., Inc.


Shimane Nuclear Power Station N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.

Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc.


Ikata Power Station 2.8E+09 3.8E+09 4.2E+09 7.5E+09 3.9E+09 7.4E+09 6.9E+11 8.7E+11 1.5E+10 2.6E+11

Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc.


Genkai Nuclear Power Station 1.1E+10 8.8E+09 1.2E+10 9.9E+09 1.6E+10 5.1E+11 8.1E+11 4.6E+10 2.6E+10 2.5E+10

Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc.


Sendai Nuclear Power Station 3.1E+10 1.5E+10 1.6E+10 3.1E+10 4.4E+10 2.7E+10 1.6E+10 1.5E+10 1.3E+10 9.4E+09

Japan Atomic Power Co., Ltd.


Tokai Power Station N.D. N.D. – – – – – – – –

Japan Atomic Power Co., Ltd.


Tokai Daini Power Station 5.0E+08 N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.

Japan Atomic Power Co., Ltd.


Tsuruga Power Station 2.6E+09 8.8E+08 9.1E+08 1.6E+09 7.4E+08 N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. 7.4E+08

Total
(excluding N.D.) 1.4E+11 8.5E+10 1.2E+11 9.0E+10 5.0E+11 5.7E+11 1.5E+12 9.6E+11 1.0E+12 1.1E+12

652
(2) Power Reactor Facilities at the Research and Development Stage (Unit: Bq)
Fiscal year
Facility
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Japan Atomic Energy Agency


Fugen Decommissioning Engineering Center N.D. N.D. 1.2E+10 N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.

Japan Atomic Energy Agency


Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Monju N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.

Total
(excluding N.D.) – – 1.2E+10 – – – – – – –


653
Reference Document 2: Release of Radioactive Iodine in Radioactive Gaseous Waste by Fiscal Year

(1) Commercial Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities (Unit: Bq)


Fiscal year
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Power station

Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Inc.


Tomari Power Station N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. 1.2E+05 N.D. 8.7E+04

Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.


Onagawa Nuclear Power Station N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.

Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.


Higashidori Nuclear Power Station – – – – N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.

Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.


Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power 9.7E+06 N.D. 2.3E+05 N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. 5.3E+05
Station

Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.


Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.
Station

Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.


Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. 2.3E+07 N.D. N.D.
Power Station

Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc.


Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. 2.0E+03 N.D. N.D. N.D. 3.0E+05

Hokuriku Electric Power Co., Inc.


Shika Nuclear Power Station N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.

Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.


Mihama Power Station N.D. 9.9E+04 3.8E+05 2.3E+05 N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. 1.2E+05 8.4E+04

Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.


Takahama Power Station N.D. 1.8E+05 3.4E+05 N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.

Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.


Ohi Power Station 1.1E+06 2.7E+05 N.D. N.D. 1.9E+08 N.D. N.D. N.D. 1.7E+06 N.D.

Chugoku Electric Power Co., Inc.


Shimane Nuclear Power Station N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.

Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc.


Ikata Power Station N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. 7.3E+05 1.1E+05 N.D. 9.9E+04

Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc.


Genkai Nuclear Power Station N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. 4.6E+06 3.9E+06 N.D. N.D. N.D.

Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc.


Sendai Nuclear Power Station N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.

Japan Atomic Power Co., Ltd.


Tokai Power Station N.D. N.D. – – – – – – – –

Japan Atomic Power Co., Ltd.


Tokai Daini Power Station N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.

Japan Atomic Power Co., Ltd.


Tsuruga Power Station 3.8E+05 N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.

Total
(excluding N.D.) 1.1E+07 5.5E+05 9.5E+05 2.3E+05 1.9E+08 4.6E+06 4.6E+06 2.3E+07 1.8E+06 1.1E+06

654
(2) Power Reactor Facilities at the Research and Development Stage ࠉࠉ (Unit: Bq)
Fiscal year
Facility
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Japan Atomic Energy Agency


Fugen Decommissioning Engineering Center N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.

Japan Atomic Energy Agency


Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Monju N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.

Total
(excluding N.D.) – – – – – – – – – –


655
Reference Document 3: Release of Radioactivity (excluding Tritium) in Radioactive Liquid Waste by Fiscal Year

(1) Commercial Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities (Unit: Bq)


Fiscal year
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Power station

Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Inc.


Tomari Power Station N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.

Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.


Onagawa Nuclear Power Station N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.

Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.


Higashidori Nuclear Power Station – – – – N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.

Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.


Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.
Station

Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.


Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.
Station

Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.


Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.
Power Station

Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc.


Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. 2.7E+04 N.D. N.D. N.D.

Hokuriku Electric Power Co., Inc.


Shika Nuclear Power Station N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.

Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.


Mihama Power Station N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.

Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.


Takahama Power Station N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. 3.1E+05 N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.

Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.


Ohi Power Station N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.

Chugoku Electric Power Co., Inc.


Shimane Nuclear Power Station N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.

Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc.


Ikata Power Station N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.

Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc.


Genkai Nuclear Power Station N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.

Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc.


Sendai Nuclear Power Station N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.

Japan Atomic Power Co., Ltd.


Tokai Power Station 2.3E+06 5.1E+05 2.3E+05 8.9E+04 2.8E+04 N.D. 7.2E+03 N.D. N.D. 9.3E+04

Japan Atomic Power Co., Ltd.


Tokai Daini Power Station N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. 2.2E+05 3.4E+08 1.3E+07

Japan Atomic Power Co., Ltd.


Tsuruga Power Station N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.

Total
(excluding N.D.) 2.3E+06 5.1E+05 2.3E+05 8.9E+04 3.4E+05 – 3.4E+04 2.2E+05 3.4E+08 1.3E+07

656
(2) Power Reactor Facilities at the Research and Development Stage (Unit: Bq)
Fiscal year
Facility
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Japan Atomic Energy Agency


Fugen Decommissioning Engineering Center N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.

Japan Atomic Energy Agency


Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Monju N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.

Total
(excluding N.D.) – – – – – – – – – –


657
Reference Document 4: Release of Tritium in Radioactive Liquid Waste by Fiscal Year

(1) Commercial Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities (Unit: Bq)


Fiscal year
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Power station

Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Inc.


Tomari Power Station 3.3E+13 3.1E+13 2.9E+13 2.2E+13 1.9E+13 3.1E+13 2.9E+13 2.7E+13 2.0E+13 3.0E+13

Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.


Onagawa Nuclear Power Station 9.0E+10 6.2E+10 7.9E+10 5.6E+09 8.0E+08 2.1E+09 5.4E+09 5.1E+09 6.7E+09 6.6E+10

Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.


Higashidori Nuclear Power Station – – – – 9.4E+08 3.9E+10 3.4E+10 5.3E+10 9.0E+10 2.3E+11

*1
Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power 2.0E+12 1.4E+12 7.8E+11 1.4E+12 1.0E+12 1.3E+12 2.6E+12 1.4E+12 1.6E+12 2.0E+12
Station

Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.


Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power 7.6E+11 1.3E+12 9.1E+11 3.8E+11 3.5E+11 9.6E+11 6.6E+11 7.3E+11 5.0E+11 9.8E+11
Station

Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.


Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear 9.6E+11 4.1E+11 1.2E+11 8.5E+11 4.9E+11 8.1E+11 8.8E+11 8.8E+11 9.2E+11 5.4E+11
Power Station

Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc.


Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station 6.1E+11 6.2E+11 7.5E+11 5.9E+11 4.6E+11 7.5E+11 6.8E+11 6.0E+11 7.3E+11 6.4E+11

Hokuriku Electric Power Co., Inc.


Shika Nuclear Power Station 1.6E+11 1.8E+11 6.5E+10 2.2E+11 1.2E+11 1.8E+11 1.8E+11 2.5E+10 7.6E+10 3.9E+11

Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.


Mihama Power Station 2.1E+13 1.7E+13 1.8E+13 2.3E+13 1.6E+13 1.5E+13 1.4E+13 2.0E+13 1.8E+13 2.3E+13

Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.


Takahama Power Station 4.1E+13 5.3E+13 6.3E+13 5.9E+13 6.3E+13 6.9E+13 6.8E+13 6.0E+13 4.0E+13 4.3E+13

Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.


Ohi Power Station 6.6E+13 1.3E+14 6.4E+13 9.0E+13 9.8E+13 6.6E+13 7.7E+13 8.9E+13 7.4E+13 8.1E+13

Chugoku Electric Power Co., Inc.


Shimane Nuclear Power Station 6.0E+11 5.2E+11 3.6E+11 5.2E+11 6.3E+11 6.3E+11 3.0E+11 6.6E+11 2.8E+11 2.2E+11

Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc.


Ikata Power Station 5.5E+13 4.7E+13 5.2E+13 5.4E+13 6.8E+13 5.3E+13 4.6E+13 6.6E+13 5.8E+13 5.7E+13

Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc.


Genkai Nuclear Power Station 7.5E+13 6.0E+13 9.1E+13 9.5E+13 7.3E+13 7.4E+13 9.9E+13 8.6E+13 6.9E+13 8.1E+13

Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc.


Sendai Nuclear Power Station 4.3E+13 4.2E+13 3.2E+13 3.8E+13 5.1E+13 4.8E+13 3.5E+13 3.8E+13 5.3E+13 5.0E+13

Japan Atomic Power Co., Ltd.


Tokai Power Station 9.5E+09 5.0E+09 6.5E+10 3.7E+06 N.D. 4.1E+08 2.0E+08 1.0E+09 1.3E+09 7.5E+07

Japan Atomic Power Co., Ltd.


Tokai Daini Power Station 6.4E+11 6.3E+11 8.6E+11 8.5E+11 6.1E+11 7.4E+11 6.2E+11 5.8E+11 5.5E+11 7.0E+11

Japan Atomic Power Co., Ltd.


Tsuruga Power Station 1.4E+13 1.0E+13 1.4E+13 2.2E+13 2.6E+13 9.2E+12 1.5E+13 1.3E+13 4.9E+12 1.5E+13

Total 3.5E+14 4.0E+14 3.7E+14 4.1E+14 4.2E+14 3.7E+14 3.9E+14 4.0E+14 3.4E+14 3.9E+14

Notes: The data for PWR power stations include the amount of tritium released from secondary sources.
*1 The data include the amount of radioactivity emitted outside a control zone due to mingling of condensation water replenishment system
water with the indoor steam system and the water of the reactor auxiliary cooling system of Unit 1.

658
(2) Power Reactor Facilities at the Research and Development Stage (Unit: Bq)
Fiscal year
Facility
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Japan Atomic Energy Agency


Fugen Decommissioning Engineering Center 3.6E+12 4.0E+12 1.5E+12 3.7E+11 8.4E+11 1.0E+12 1.4E+12 8.9E+11 2.6E+12 2.1E+12

Japan Atomic Energy Agency


Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Monju 2.7E+08 6.2E+05 9.3E+06 4.9E+08 1.3E+08 4.7E+08 2.0E+08 2.1E+07 2.1E+08 2.7E+08

Total
(excluding N.D.) 3.6E+12 4.0E+12 1.5E+12 3.7E+11 8.4E+11 1.0E+12 1.4E+12 8.9E+11 2.6E+12 2.1E+12


659
Reference Document 5: Management Status of Radioactive Solid Waste (Solid Waste Storage) by Fiscal Year
(1) Commercial Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities (Unit: equivalent to the number of drums)
Power station FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009

Production in this fiscal year


505 380 356 307 436 516 387 412 845 796
Hokkaido Electric Power
Reduction in this fiscal year
Co., Inc. 0 664 100 135 0 1 0 0 801 30

Reduction in the station


0 0 100 135 0 1 0 0 65 30

Reduction outside the station


Tomari Power Station 0 664 0 0 0 0 0 0 736 0
*1 *1 *1 *1 *1
Storage at the end of this fiscal year
3,864 3,579 3,835 4,007 4,442 4,957 5,343 5,755 5,799 6,564
Storage equipment capacity
18,000 18,000 18,000 18,000 18,000 18,000 18,000 18,000 18,000 18,000
Production in this fiscal year
2,124 3,720 2,912 2,692 3,876 3,116 2,704 3,720 5,320 4,532
Tohoku Electric Power Co.,
Reduction in this fiscal year
Inc. 904 1,108 1,500 1,664 532 1,520 3,648 2,844 3,012 5,540

Reduction in the station


904 1,108 1,500 1,664 532 1,520 3,648 1,852 2,052 4,900
Onagawa Nuclear Power
Reduction outside the station
Station 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 992 960 640
Storage at the end of this fiscal year
15,384 17,996 19,408 20,436 23,780 25,376 24,432 25,308 27,616 26,608
Storage equipment capacity
30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000
Production in this fiscal year
– – – – 0 580 720 1,224 2,144 2,028
Tohoku Electric Power Co.,
Reduction in this fiscal year
Inc. – – – – 0 0 0 0 0 0

Reduction in the station


– – – – 0 0 0 0 0 0
Higashidori Nuclear Power
Reduction outside the station
Station – – – – 0 0 0 0 0 0

Storage at the end of this fiscal year


– – – – 0 580 1,300 2,524 4,668 6,696

Storage equipment capacity


– – – – 9,000 9,000 9,000 9,000 9,000 9,000

Production in this fiscal year


10,388 14,588 15,618 19,835 18,397 20,169 18,129 16,694 16,626 16,938
Tokyo Electric Power Co.,
Reduction in this fiscal year
Inc. 9,078 15,556 16,187 22,441 19,691 13,574 16,448 11,484 14,549 13,615

Reduction in the station


7,878 11,556 12,347 16,481 15,691 10,374 12,448 11,484 12,629 10,607
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Reduction outside the station
Power Station 1,200 4,000 3,840 5,960 4,000 3,200 4,000 0 1,920 3,008
*1
Storage at the end of this fiscal year
171,244 170,276 169,707 167,101 165,807 172,402 174,083 179,293 181,370 184,693

Storage equipment capacity


284,500 284,500 284,500 284,500 284,500 284,500 284,500 284,500 284,500 284,500
Production in this fiscal year
730 1,353 3,281 3,390 3,566 4,760 2,871 3,259 2,302 2,471
Tokyo Electric Power Co.,
Reduction in this fiscal year
Inc. 18 3,174 6,607 6,161 5,101 2,860 1,794 1,257 3,021 1,285

Reduction in the station


18 1,102 4,607 4,161 3,101 1,900 1,794 1,257 1,021 1,285
Fukushima Daini Nuclear
Reduction outside the station
Power Station 0 2,072 2,000 2,000 2,000 960 0 0 2,000 0
Storage at the end of this fiscal year
22,392 20,571 17,245 14,474 12,939 14,839 15,916 17,918 17,199 18,385
Storage equipment capacity
32,000 32,000 32,000 32,000 32,000 32,000 32,000 32,000 32,000 32,000

Production in this fiscal year


808 862 761 980 2,114 4,127 3,474 691 2,083 4,224
Tokyo Electric Power Co.,
Reduction in this fiscal year
Inc. 124 140 24 50 0 18 13 27 53 56

Reduction in the station


124 140 24 50 0 18 13 27 53 56
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear
Reduction outside the station
Power Station 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Storage at the end of this fiscal year


9,641 10,363 11,100 12,030 14,144 18,253 21,714 22,378 24,408 28,576

Storage equipment capacity


30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 45,000 45,000

Production in this fiscal year


4,208 3,840 1,876 4,157 3,436 3,506 4,280 3,736 5,300 5,444
Chubu Electric Power Co.,
Reduction in this fiscal year
Inc. 2,622 3,654 1,380 4,412 3,876 3,592 3,682 3,282 5,880 5,712

Reduction in the station


2,102 2,574 340 3,332 2,900 2,512 2,602 2,202 4,800 4,632
Hamaoka Nuclear Power
Reduction outside the station
Station 520 1,080 1,040 1,080 976 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080
Storage at the end of this fiscal year
35,085 35,271 35,767 35,512 35,072 34,986 35,584 36,038 35,458 35,190

Storage equipment capacity


42,000 42,000 42,000 42,000 42,000 42,000 42,000 42,000 42,000 42,000

*1 The sum of the amount of storage at the end of the previous fiscal year and the amount generated in this fiscal year do not correspond to the values due
to the error from rounding off the conversion calculation.

660
(Unit: equivalent to the number of drums)
Power station FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009

Production in this fiscal year


320 112 324 268 420 460 744 993 1,000 1,162
Hokuriku Electric Power Co.,
Reduction in this fiscal year
Inc. 0 0 0 0 0 0 392 477 768 476

Reduction in the station


0 0 0 0 0 0 392 477 368 476

Reduction outside the station


Shika Nuclear Power Station 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 400 0

Storage at the end of this fiscal year


1,832 1,944 2,268 2,536 2,956 3,416 3,768 4,284 4,516 5,202

Storage equipment capacity


5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000

Production in this fiscal year


1,651 3,504 3,135 4,337 2,698 3,260 3,856 3,235 4,444 4,086
Kansai Electric Power Co.,
Reduction in this fiscal year
Inc. 526 2,540 3,423 5,527 3,143 3,008 3,431 3,544 3,729 3,715

Reduction in the station


526 2,044 2,703 3,983 1,703 1,576 2,191 2,344 2,369 2,515

Reduction outside the station


Mihama Power Station 0 496 720 1,544 1,440 1,432 1,240 1,200 1,360 1,200

Storage at the end of this fiscal year


*1 *1
27,772 28,736 28,448 27,258 26,813 27,065 27,490 27,181 27,897 28,267

Storage equipment capacity


35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000

Production in this fiscal year


1,593 1,375 1,440 1,724 1,893 3,557 3,721 2,706 3,810 4,563
Kansai Electric Power Co.,
Reduction in this fiscal year
Inc. 1,160 797 743 606 653 2,027 1,280 1,256 1,711 1,201

Reduction in the station


1,160 797 743 606 653 2,027 1,280 1,256 1,711 1,201

Reduction outside the station


Takahama Power Station 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Storage at the end of this fiscal year


30,723 31,301 31,998 33,116 34,356 35,886 38,327 39,777 41,876 45,238

Storage equipment capacity


50,600 50,600 50,600 50,600 50,600 50,600 50,600 50,600 50,600 50,600

Production in this fiscal year


3,801 4,233 2,726 3,377 3,592 3,344 3,336 3,329 3,544 5,490
Kansai Electric Power Co.,
Reduction in this fiscal year
Inc. 3,055 4,086 4,273 3,934 3,891 3,673 3,476 1,580 1,375 1,615

Reduction in the station


2,415 2,726 2,777 2,582 2,395 2,177 1,980 1,580 1,375 1,615

Reduction outside the station


Ohi Power Station 640 1,360 1,496 1,352 1,496 1,496 1,496 0 0 0

Storage at the end of this fiscal year


*1 *1 *1 *1
26,214 26,361 24,814 24,257 23,958 23,628 23,488 25,237 27,407 31,283

Storage equipment capacity


38,900 38,900 38,900 38,900 38,900 38,900 38,900 38,900 38,900 38,900

Production in this fiscal year


4,099 1,770 1,795 4,434 4,075 2,674 4,312 4,128 3,350 3,286
Chugoku Electric Power Co.,
Reduction in this fiscal year
Inc. 1,304 767 3,143 3,585 4,297 4,313 4,614 3,373 3,462 4,074

Reduction in the station


1,304 767 3,143 3,585 3,409 3,033 3,334 2,333 3,462 2,794
Shimane Nuclear Power
Reduction outside the station
Station 0 0 0 0 888 1,280 1,280 1,040 0 1,280

Storage at the end of this fiscal year


28,303 29,306 27,958 28,807 28,585 26,946 26,644 27,399 27,287 26,499

Storage equipment capacity


35,500 35,500 35,500 35,500 35,500 35,500 35,500 35,500 35,500 35,500

Production in this fiscal year


3,003 3,314 2,452 2,233 3,509 4,253 2,804 2,492 2,632 2,625
Shikoku Electric Power Co.,
Reduction in this fiscal year
Inc. 1,144 791 828 1,264 1,080 845 1,357 2,247 1,326 2,456

Reduction in the station


1,144 791 828 1,264 1,080 845 1,357 1,367 1,326 1,872

Reduction outside the station


Ikata Power Station 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 880 0 584

Storage at the end of this fiscal year


*1 *1 *1
15,378 17,901 19,524 20,492 22,921 26,329 27,776 28,021 29,327 29,495

Storage equipment capacity


38,500 38,500 38,500 38,500 38,500 38,500 38,500 38,500 38,500 38,500


661
(Unit: equivalent to the number of drums)
Power station FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009

Production in this fiscal year


2,136 3,235 2,094 2,347 4,066 3,078 2,259 2,242 3,266 4,140
Kyushu Electric Power Co.,
Reduction in this fiscal year
Inc. 995 1,166 2,303 1,801 1,051 845 611 402 641 923

Reduction in the station


659 1,166 1,703 1,801 1,051 845 611 402 641 923
Genkai Nuclear Power
Reduction outside the station
Station 336 0 600 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Storage at the end of this fiscal year


18,074 20,143 19,934 20,480 23,495 25,728 27,376 29,216 31,841 35,058

Storage equipment capacity


29,000 29,000 29,000 29,000 49,000 49,000 49,000 49,000 49,000 49,000

Production in this fiscal year


1,489 549 769 1,170 1,005 1,039 1,504 2,580 3,485 1,533
Kyushu Electric Power Co.,
Reduction in this fiscal year
Inc. 266 463 394 147 438 1,031 1,301 649 228 594

Reduction in the station


266 463 394 147 438 1,031 1,301 649 228 594
Sendai Nuclear Power
Reduction outside the station
Station 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Storage at the end of this fiscal year


9,689 9,775 10,150 11,173 11,740 11,748 11,951 13,882 17,139 18,078

Storage equipment capacity


17,000 17,000 17,000 17,000 17,000 17,000 17,000 17,000 37,000 37,000

Production in this fiscal year


1,456 604 468 280 651 4,730 799 2,167 2,000 1,253
Japan Atomic Power Co.,
Reduction in this fiscal year
Ltd. 1,464 656 616 156 879 3,794 795 1,770 2,012 1,233

Reduction in the station *2


1,464 656 616 156 879 3,794 639 1,678 1,784 1,233
*5 *5 *5
Reduction outside the station
Tokai Power Station 0 0 0 0 0 0 156 92 228 0

Storage at the end of this fiscal year


360 308 160 284 56 992 996 1,393 1,381 1,401

Storage equipment capacity


1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600

Production in this fiscal year


1,272 1,752 776 1,660 1,264 1,702 1,585 1,277 2,587 4,821
Japan Atomic Power Co.,
Reduction in this fiscal year
Ltd. 1,088 1,072 888 700 0 26 1,812 2,420 2,714 5,039

Reduction in the station *3


1,088 1,072 888 700 0 26 1,812 2,420 2,498 4,519
*6 *6
Reduction outside the station
Tokai Daini Power Station 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 216 520

Storage at the end of this fiscal year *4


40,410 41,746 42,250 43,366 45,509 50,979 51,391 51,926 53,583 54,598

Storage equipment capacity


73,000 73,000 73,000 73,000 73,000 73,000 73,000 73,000 73,000 73,000

Production in this fiscal year


5,148 3,220 1,897 1,920 2,272 2,290 1,952 2,321 2,884 3,033
Japan Atomic Power Co.,
Reduction in this fiscal year
Ltd. 3,956 2,688 1,632 3,860 1,384 2,080 1,256 1,333 2,468 1,948

Reduction in the station


3,956 2,688 1,632 2,748 1,384 1,784 1,256 1,333 2,084 1,948

Reduction outside the station


Tsuruga Power Station 0 0 0 1,112 0 296 0 0 384 0

Storage at the end of this fiscal year


63,482 64,014 64,279 62,339 63,227 63,437 64,133 65,121 65,537 66,622

Storage equipment capacity


85,000 85,000 85,000 85,000 85,000 85,000 85,000 85,000 85,000 85,000

Production in this fiscal year


44,731 48,411 42,680 55,111 57,270 67,161 59,437 57,206 67,622 72,425

Reduction in this fiscal year


26,240 38,666 43,425 56,287 45,137 39,413 45,271 36,267 45,966 48,279

Reduction in the station *7


Grand Total 23,544 28,994 33,729 43,239 34,337 29,669 36,019 30,983 36,682 39,967
*8 *8 *8 *8
Reduction outside the station
2,696 9,672 9,696 13,048 10,800 9,744 9,252 5,284 9,284 8,312

Storage at the end of this fiscal year


*1 *1 *1 *1 *1 *1 *1 *1 *1
519,847 529,591 528,845 527,668 539,800 567,547 581,712 602,651 624,309 648,453

Storage equipment capacity


845,600 845,600 845,600 845,600 874,600 879,600 879,600 879,600 914,600 914,600

*2 This is the amount of waste transported to the Tokai Daini Power Station.
*3 This includes the amount reduced at the Tokai Power Station.
*4 This includes the waste that was transported from the Tokai Power Station.
*5 Amount reduced due to clearance treatment.
*6 Includes the transported amount for burial treatment includes the amount at Tokai Power Station (72 drums in FY2008, 72 drums in FY2009).
In addition, this includes the amount of waste reduced due to clearance treatment at the Tokai Power Station (24 drums in FY2008, 336 drums in FY2009).
*7 The values do not include the amount reduced due to transportation from the Japan Atomic Power Company Co., Ltd. Tokai Power Station to the Tokai Daini
Power Station.
*8 This includes the amount of waste reduced due to clearance treatment at the Tokai Power Station (156 drums in FY2006, 92 drums in FY2007, 252 drums in
FY2008, and 336 drums in FY2009).

662
(2) Power Reactor Facilities at the Research and Development Stage (Unit: equivalent to the number of drums)
Facility FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009

Production in this fiscal year


719 566 631 394 456 315 562 462 573 888

Reduction in this fiscal year


Japan Atomic Energy Agency 199 283 308 90 134 225 728 808 541 730

Reduction in the station


199 283 308 90 134 225 728 808 541 730

Reduction outside the station


Reactor decommissioned 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Storage at the end of this fiscal year


Research and Development Center 18,096 18,379 18,702 19,006 19,328 19,418 19,252 18,906 18,938 19,096

Storage equipment capacity


21,500 21,500 21,500 21,500 21,500 21,500 21,500 21,500 21,500 21,500

Production in this fiscal year


200 156 244 216 328 256 320 232 236 584

Reduction in this fiscal year


Japan Atomic Energy Agency 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Reduction in the station


0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Reduction outside the station


Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Storage at the end of this fiscal year


Monju 1,860 2,016 2,260 2,476 2,804 3,060 3,380 3,612 3,848 4,432

Storage equipment capacity


23,000 23,000 23,000 23,000 23,000 23,000 23,000 23,000 23,000 23,000

Production in this fiscal year


919 722 875 610 784 571 882 694 809 1,472

Reduction in this fiscal year


199 283 308 90 134 225 728 808 541 730

Reduction in the station


Total 199 283 308 90 134 225 728 808 541 730

Reduction outside the station


0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Storage at the end of this fiscal year


19,956 20,395 20,962 21,482 22,132 22,478 22,632 22,518 22,786 23,528

Storage equipment capacity


44,500 44,500 44,500 44,500 44,500 44,500 44,500 44,500 44,500 44,500


663
(3) Fabrication Facilities (Unit: equivalent to the number of drums)
Facility FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009

Production in this fiscal year


142 238 289 268 183 2,663 296 1,673 1,739 1,775

Reduction in this fiscal year


156 123 173 255 228 191 1,003 551 669 834
Global Nuclear Fuel-Japan Co., Ltd.
Storage at the end of this fiscal year
12,644 12,759 12,875 12,888 12,843 15,315 14,608 15,730 16,800 17,741

Storage equipment capacity


16,260 16,260 16,260 16,260 16,260 18,460 18,460 20,250 21,550 23,200

Production in this fiscal year


1,307 1,083 1,137 1,178 871 901 1,134 749 961 1,116

Reduction in this fiscal year


Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd. 1,250 1,064 986 1,136 824 629 1,048 796 1,072 1,040

Storage at the end of this fiscal year


10,031 10,050 10,201 10,243 10,290 10,562 10,648 10,601 10,490 10,566

Storage equipment capacity


11,600 11,600 11,600 11,600 11,600 11,600 11,600 11,600 11,600 11,600

Production in this fiscal year


640 529 509 603 510 604 834 638 627 493

Reduction in this fiscal year


Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd. 411 619 624 489 391 389 380 398 466 424

Storage at the end of this fiscal year


Tokai Works 5,177 5,087 4,972 5,086 5,205 5,420 5,874 6,114 6,275 6,344

Storage equipment capacity


8,500 8,500 8,500 8,500 8,500 8,500 8,500 8,500 8,500 8,500

Production in this fiscal year


512 468 255 767 1,249 1,204 691 390 348 428

Reduction in this fiscal year


Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd. 0 0 306 618 535 670 172 1 70 226

Storage at the end of this fiscal year


Kumatori Works 3,886 4,354 4,303 4,452 5,166 5,700 6,219 6,608 6,886 7,088

Storage equipment capacity


7,400 7,400 7,700 7,500 7,500 7,500 7,500 11,520 11,520 11,520

Production in this fiscal year


31 10 4 92 77 0 48 43 0 27

Reduction in this fiscal year


Japan Atomic Energy Agency 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 103 0 0

Storage at the end of this fiscal year


Uranium enrichment prototype plant 382 392 396 488 565 565 613 553 553 580

*9 Storage equipment capacity


800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800

Production in this fiscal year


Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. 379 379 191 163 134 152 224 77 252 190
Uranium Enrichment Plant/Low-level
Reduction in this fiscal year
Radioactive Waste Disposal Center 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
*1 *1 *1 *1 *1
Storage at the end of this fiscal year
(Fabrication facilities) 3,216 3,595 3,785 3,947 4,081 4,232 4,456 4,533 4,785 4,974

Storage equipment capacity


4,700 4,700 6,700 6,700 6,700 6,700 6,700 6,700 6,700 6,700

Production in this fiscal year


3,011 2,707 2,385 3,071 3,024 5,524 3,227 3,570 3,927 4,029

Reduction in this fiscal year


Total 1,817 1,806 2,089 2,498 1,978 1,879 2,603 1,849 2,277 2,524
*1 *1 *1 *1 *1
Storage at the end of this fiscal year
35,336 36,237 36,532 37,104 38,150 41,794 42,418 44,139 45,789 47,293

Storage equipment capacity


49,260 49,260 51,560 51,360 51,360 53,560 53,560 59,370 60,670 62,320

*9 Combustible and combustion-resistant waste is not included in the data up to FY2002.

664
(4) Reprocessing Facilities (Unit: equivalent to the number of drums)
Facility FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009

Production in this fiscal year


1,286 1,223 1,040 1,029 879 830 424 423 381 343

Reduction in this fiscal year


Japan Atomic Energy Agency 0 0 920 920 920 0 0 52 228 144

Storage at the end of this fiscal year


Reprocessing facilities 78,724 79,947 80,067 80,176 80,135 80,965 81,389 81,760 81,913 82,112

*10 Storage equipment capacity


102,460 102,460 102,460 102,460 102,460 102,460 102,460 102,460 102,460 102,460

Production in this fiscal year


Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. 544 728 1,800 3,924 960 1,805 6,109 4,503 1,771 7,821
*13
Reduction in this fiscal year
Reprocessing plant 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5,552
*1 *13
Storage at the end of this fiscal year
(Reprocessing Facility) 776 1,504 3,304 7,228 8,188 9,993 16,101 20,604 22,375 24,644

*12 Storage capacity *11


11,350 11,350 11,350 11,350 61,350 66,350 74,750 74,750 74,750 74,750

Production in this fiscal year


1,830 1,951 2,840 4,953 1,839 2,635 6,533 4,926 2,152 8,164
*13
Reduction in this fiscal year
Total 0 0 920 920 920 0 0 52 228 5,696
*1 *13
Storage at the end of this fiscal year
79,500 81,451 83,371 87,404 88,323 90,958 97,490 102,364 104,288 106,756

Storage equipment capacity


113,810 113,810 113,810 113,810 163,810 168,810 177,210 177,210 177,210 177,210

*10 The value excludes the amount of vitrified waste. In addition, at the end of FY2009, out of the 420 drum capacity, 247 drums of vitrified waste were being
stored.
*11 The storage capacity includes the capacity of the waste resin tanks (roughly 190 m3 × 3 units, 80 m3 × 2 units, 120 m3 × 1 unit), equivalent to 4,250 drums.
*12 In addition, 219 1,000-liter drums of sheared coated debris of low-level radioactive solid waste were being stored out of a 2,000 drum capacity.
In addition, at the end of FY2009, 107 drums out of the 3,195-drum capacity of vitrified waste were being stored.
*13 1,280-equivalent drums that were transported temporarily from the primary low-level radioactive waste storage building for waste arrangement are not
included in the reduction in this fiscal year but included in the storage at the end of this fiscal year.


665
(5) Waste Burial Facilities, Waste Management Facilities (Unit: equivalent to the number of drums)
Facility FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009

Production in this fiscal year


Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Uranium Enrichment Plant/Low-level
Reduction in this fiscal year
Radioactive Waste Disposal Center 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Storage at the end of this fiscal year


(Waste burial facilities) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Storage equipment capacity


80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80

Production in this fiscal year


Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. 32 36 60 44 32 68 44 120 172 56

Reduction in this fiscal year


Reprocessing plant 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Storage at the end of this fiscal year


(Waste management facilities) 380 416 476 520 552 620 664 784 956 1,012

Storage equipment capacity


1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200

Production in this fiscal year


Japan Atomic Energy Agency 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫

Reduction in this fiscal year


ࠉ Waste burial facilities 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫

Storage at the end of this fiscal year


㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫

*14 Storage equipment capacity


㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫
(97) (24) (28) (20) (13) (35) (10) (97)
Production in this fiscal year
Japan Atomic Energy Agency 1,038 754 520 473 561 317 426 517 336 343

Reduction in this fiscal year


Waste management facilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(319) (457) (485) (505) (518) (553) (563) (660)
Storage at the end of this fiscal year
24,589 25,343 25,863 26,336 26,897 27,214 27,640 28,157 28,493 28,836

*15 Storage equipment capacity


35,870 35,870 42,795 42,795 42,795 42,795 42,795 42,795 42,795 42,795

Production in this fiscal year


1,070 790 580 517 593 385 470 637 508 399

Reduction in this fiscal year


Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Storage at the end of this fiscal year


24,969 25,759 26,339 26,856 27,449 27,834 28,304 28,941 29,449 29,848

*16 Storage equipment capacity


37,150 37,150 44,075 44,075 44,075 44,075 44,075 44,075 44,075 44,075

*14 No storage facilities.


*15 The numbers in parentheses indicate the amount generated at the facility, and are included in the total amount shown below the numbers.
*16 The amount generated in this fiscal year includes waste generated at facilities other than the relevant facilities managed by the Japan Atomic Energy
Agency (Waste management facility).

666
Reference Document 6: Amounts Transported to the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Burial Center by Fiscal Year
(Unit: number of drums)
Fiscal year Cumulative
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
amount
Power station
Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Inc.
Tomari Power Station 0 664 0 0 0 0 0 0 736 0 1,400

Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.


Onagawa Nuclear Power Station 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 992 960 640 6,840

Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.


Higashidori Nuclear Power Station – – – – 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.


Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power 1,200 4,000 3,840 5,960 4,000 3,200 4,000 0 1,920 3,008 87,942
Station (560) (4,000) (3,840) (5,960) (4,000) (3,200) (4,000) (1,600) (2,048) (29,208)
Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.
Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power 0 2,072 2,000 2,000 2,000 960 0 0 2,000 0 11,032
Station (2,000) (2,000) (2,000) (960) (2,000) (8,960)
Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Station

Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc.


Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station 520 1,080 1,040 1,080 976 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080 24,013
(520) (1,080) (1,040) (1,080) (976) (1,080) (1,080) (1,080) (1,080) (1,080) (10,096)
Hokuriku Electric Power Co.
Shika Nuclear Power Station 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 400 0 400
(400) (400)
Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.
Mihama Power Station 0 496 720 1,544 1,440 1,432 1,240 1,200 1,360 1,200 19,112
(720) (1,440) (1,440) (1,080) (1,104) (1,200) (1,200) (1,200) (9,384)
Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.
Takahama Power Station 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,080 1,200 1,160 13,616
(1,080) (1,200) (1,160) (3,440)
Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.
Ohi Power Station 640 1,360 1,496 1,352 1,496 1,496 1,496 0 0 0 16,536
(360) (1,360) (1,496) (1,352) (1,496) (1,496) (1,496) (9,056)
Chugoku Electric Power Co., Inc.
Shimane Nuclear Power Station 0 0 0 0 888 1,280 1,280 1,040 0 1,280 16,128
(888) (1,280) (1,280) (1,040) (1,280) (5,768)
Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc.
Ikata Power Station 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 880 0 584 4,432

Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc.


Genkai Nuclear Power Station 336 0 600 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6,536

Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc.


Sendai Nuclear Power Station 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Japan Atomic Power Company Co.,


Ltd. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 72 72 144
Tokai Power Station
(72) (72) (144)
Japan Atomic Power Company Co.,
Ltd. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 120 112 5,424
Tokai Daini Power Station
(120) (56) (176)
Japan Atomic Power Company Co.,
Ltd. 0 0 0 1,112 0 296 0 0 384 0 6,432
Tsuruga Power Station

Grand Total 2,696 9,672 9,696 13,048 10,800 9,744 9,096 6,272 10,232 9,136 219,987
(1,440) (6,440) (9,096) (11,832) (10,800) (9,096) (8,960) (4,400) (7,672) (6,896) (76,632)

Note 1: Homogeneous solidified waste has been transported to the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Burial Center since FY1992.
Note 2: Injected grout solid waste has been transported to the low-level radioactive burial center since FY2000; the amount of injected grout,
which is shown in parentheses, is included in the amount of total waste shown above it.


667
Reference Document 7: Trends in Burial Amounts of Radioactive Waste at the Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited, Enrichment and
Burial Plant (waste burial facility)
(Unit: number of drums)
Burial capacity
(equivalent to
Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 the number of
drums)

Received
1,256 3,232 600 1,216 0 648 136 1,872 2,560 2,240
quantity
Waste
Burial Buried
1,256 3,232 600 1,216 0 648 136 1,872 2,240 1,600 204,800
Facility quantity
No.1 Total number
of drums 130,851 134,083 134,683 135,899 135,899 136,547 136,683 138,555 140,795 142,395
buried

Received
1,440 6,440 9,096 11,832 10,800 9,096 8,960 4,400 7,672 6,896
quantity
Waste
Burial Buried
1,440 6,440 7,952 10,080 12,600 9,000 8,152 6,400 5,248 9,000 207,360
Facility quantity
No.2 Total number
of drums 1,440 7,880 15,832 25,912 38,512 47,512 55,664 62,064 67,312 76,312
buried

Received
2,696 9,672 9,696 13,048 10,800 9,744 9,096 6,272 10,232 9,136
quantity

Buried
Total 2,696 9,672 8,552 11,296 12,600 9,648 8,288 8,272 7,488 10,600 412,160
quantity
Total number
of drums 132,291 141,963 150,515 161,811 174,411 184,059 192,347 200,619 208,107 218,707
buried
Notes: The burial capacity is the maximum burial capacity of the waste burial site.

Reference Document 8: Management Status of High-Level Radioactive Waste (Returned Vitrified Waste) at the Waste
Management Facility of the Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd., Reprocessing Plant by Fiscal Year
(Unit: number of drums)
Storage
Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 equipment
capacity
Received quantity in
192 152 0 276 0 288 130 0 0 28
this fiscal year
1,440
Total received
464 616 616 892 892 1,180 1,310 1,310 1,310 1,338
quantity

668
(Reference)

(Bq) Trends in Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Waste Amounts Released from Commercial Power
(Reactors)
Reactors and the Number of Reactors by Fiscal Year
1E+06
E+15 60
1E+05
E+14
1E+04
E+13 50

1E+03
E+12
Reactors 40
Amount released

1E+02
E+11
Noble gas

Reactors
1E+01
E+10 Iodine
30
㻝㻜㻝㻞
1E+00
E+09 Liquid waste

㻝㻜㻝㻞
1E-01
E+08 20
㻝㻜㻝㻞
E+07
1E-02
E+06
1E-03 10
1E-04
E+05
㻱㻗㻜㻡
1E-05
E+04 0
OE
'90 '91 '92 '93 '94 '95 '96 '97 '98 '99 '00 '01 '02 '03 '04 '05 '06 '07 '08 '09
Fiscal year

(equivalent to Trends in Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Waste Amounts Released from Commercial Power (equivalent to
10s of thousands 10s of thousands
of drums)
Reactors and the Number of Reactors by Fiscal Year of drums)

10 100
9 90

8 80
Amount of waste generated

Cumulative storage amount/


Storage equipment capacity
7 70
6 60

5 50
4 40
3 Cumulative storage 30
amount
Storage equipment
2 capacity
20
Amount of waste
1 generated 10
0 0
'90 '91 '92 '93 '94 '95 '96 '97 '98 '99 '00 '01 '02 '03 '04 '05 '06 '07 '08 '09
Fiscal year


669
ϱϭ-2 Status of Occupational Radiation Exposure Management

(1) Licensees for the construction of reactors, etc., are obligated to control the exposure levels of personnel engaged in radiation work
at nuclear facilities so that they do not exceed the exposure limit prescribed by the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law.
In FY2009, the occupational radiation exposure dose was lower than the limit at all nuclear facilities.
Individual exposure limits of personnel engaged in radiation work: In response to the recommendation by ICRP in 1990,
relevant laws were amended as follows. After FY2001, the individual radiation exposure limit is 100
millisievert per five years and 50 millisievert per year.
(The exposure limit for female personnel, which is defined in Article 9-2 of the Regulations Concerning
Construction, Operation, etc. of Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors, is 5 millisievert per three months,
in addition to the prescribed limit mentioned above.)

(2) The status of radiation exposure management for FY2009 is as follows.

(1) In FY2009, the total number of personnel engaged in radiation work at commercial nuclear reactor facilities was roughly
83,500, compared with roughly 79,700 in the previous fiscal year. The collective exposure dose was 82.08 person-sievert
compared with 84.04 person-sievert in the previous fiscal year.
The average dose per person was 1.0 millisievert (1.1 millisievert in the previous fiscal year).

(2) In FY2009, the total number of personnel engaged in radiation work at power reactor facilities in a research and
development stage was roughly 2,000, compared with roughly 2,000 in the previous fiscal year. The collective exposure
dose was 0.11 person-sievert compared with 0.43 person-sievert in the previous fiscal year.
The average dose per person was 0.1 millisievert (0.2 millisievert in the previous fiscal year).

(3) In FY2009, the total number of personnel engaged in radiation work at fabrication facilities was roughly 2,700, compared
with roughly 2,800 in the previous fiscal year. The collective exposure dose was 0.27 person-sievert compared with 0.31
person-sievert in the previous fiscal year.
The average dose per person was 0.1 millisievert (0.1 millisievert in the previous fiscal year).

(4) In FY2009, the total number of personnel engaged in radiation work at reprocessing facilities was roughly 7,200, compared
with roughly 7,100 in the previous fiscal year. The collective exposure dose was 0.67 person-sievert compared with 0.40
person-sievert in the previous fiscal year.
The average dose per person was 0.1 millisievert (0.1 millisievert in the previous fiscal year).

(5) In FY2009, the total number of personnel engaged in radiation work at waste burial facilities and waste management
facilities was roughly 1,500, compared with roughly 1,300 in the previous fiscal year. The collective exposure dose was 0.02
person-sievert compared with 0.01 person-sievert in the previous fiscal year.
The average dose per person was 0.0 millisievert (0.0 millisievert in the previous fiscal year).

(6) The exposure dose limit was set not to exceed 100 millisievert in the five year period which started in April 1, 2006, and no
person had exceeded the exposure limit at the end of FY2009.

(3) Occupational exposure management in nuclear facilities is managed by each plant. When a person works at more than one facility,
their exposure record in each facility is checked to maintain accurate exposure management.
The registration, recording and maintenance of occupational exposure data is managed in a unified fashion by the Occupational
Exposure Central Registration Center of the Radiation Effects Association.

670
(4) The dosage distribution of personnel engaged in radiation work in FY2009 and the distribution of exposure levels of female
personnel (defined in Article 9-2 of the Rules for the Installation, Operation, etc., of Commercial Power Reactors) are shown for
three months.
The exposure dose of personnel at nuclear facilities by fiscal year beyond FY2000 is presented in the reference documents.

The following are notes for the tables.


(1) The “total” number of personnel engaged in radiation work is the sum of all numbers recorded at each nuclear facility.
Therefore, workers who have worked at more than one facility are counted more than once.
(2) The total exposure dose values for employees and others were rounded to two decimal places. For some data, the sum of
employees and others does not correspond with the total, which is an error arising from the calculation method described
above.
(3) The “average dose” values were rounded to one decimal place.
(4) The “maximum exposure dose” values are the actual dose at the facility.
(5) The numbers of personnel engaged in radiation work and exposure doses have been collected since the institution of control
zones.
(6) The data for plants that have facilities in which nuclear fuel material is handled as defined in the Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Law include some of the data of personnel engaged in radiation work at these facilities.


671
(1) Dosage Distribution of Personnel Engaged in Radiation Work for FY2009
(1) Commercial Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities
Distribution of exposure dosage (number of personnel)
Category of
5 mSv 10 mSv 15 mSv 20 mSv 25 mSv
workers
Power station 5 mSv greater than greater than greater than greater than greater than
engaged in
radiation work or less 10 mSv 15 mSv 20 mSv 25 mSv 30 mSv
or less or less or less or less or less
Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Inc. Employee 377 0 0 0 0 0
Tomari Power Station Others 2,527 82 26 2 0 0
Total 2,904 82 26 2 0 0
Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc. Employee 461 0 0 0 0 0
Onagawa Nuclear Power Station Others 3,733 120 24 0 0 0
Total 4,194 120 24 0 0 0
Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc. Employee 250 0 0 0 0 0
Higashidori Nuclear Power Station Others 1,786 2 1 0 0 0
Total 2,036 2 1 0 0 0
Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. Employee 1,070 36 2 0 0 0
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Others 8,269 671 220 35 0 0
Station Total 9,339 707 222 35 0 0
Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. Employee 699 0 0 0 0 0
Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Others 6,418 144 13 0 0 0
Station Total 7,117 144 13 0 0 0
Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. Employee 1,168 1 0 0 0 0
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Others 9,188 163 50 16 0 0
Station Total 10,356 164 50 16 0 0
Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc. Employee 714 1 0 0 0 0
Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Others 3,538 143 31 0 0 0
Total 4,252 144 31 0 0 0
Hokuriku Electric Power Co. Employee 373 0 0 0 0 0
Shika Nuclear Power Station Others 2,413 0 0 0 0 0
Total 2,786 0 0 0 0 0
Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. Employee 455 0 0 0 0 0
Mihama Power Station Others 3,420 166 42 9 0 0
Total 3,875 166 42 9 0 0
Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. Employee 483 1 0 0 0 0
Takahama Power Station Others 3,678 355 90 25 0 0
Total 4,161 356 90 25 0 0
Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. Employee 496 5 0 0 0 0
Ohi Power Station Others 3,572 536 395 159 0 0
Total 4,068 541 395 159 0 0
Chugoku Electric Power Co., Inc. Employee 381 2 0 0 0 0
Shimane Nuclear Power Station Others 2,242 174 23 0 0 0
Total 2,623 176 23 0 0 0
Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc. Employee 321 0 0 0 0 0
Ikata Power Station Others 2,388 86 11 0 0 0
Total 2,709 86 11 0 0 0
Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc. Employee 535 1 0 0 0 0
Genkai Nuclear Power Station Others 3,800 202 21 0 0 0
Total 4,335 203 21 0 0 0
Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc. Employee 287 0 0 0 0 0
Sendai Nuclear Power Station Others 2,034 181 10 0 0 0
Total 2,321 181 10 0 0 0
Japan Atomic Power Company Co., Employee 292 0 0 0 0 0
Ltd. Others 1,401 0 0 0 0 0
Tokai Power Station Total 1,693 0 0 0 0 0
Japan Atomic Power Company Co., Employee 372 6 0 0 0 0
Ltd. Others 4,654 291 108 12 0 0
Tokai Daini Power Station Total 5,026 297 108 12 0 0
Japan Atomic Power Company Co., Employee 421 0 0 0 0 0
Ltd. Others 4,471 101 7 0 0 0
Tsuruga Power Station Total 4,892 101 7 0 0 0
Employee 9,155 53 2 0 0 0
Grand Total Others 69,532 3,417 1,072 258 0 0
Total 78,687 3,470 1,074 258 0 0

672
Distribution of exposure dosage (number of personnel)
30 mSv 35 mSv 40 mSv 45 mSv Total dose Mean dose Maximum dose
greater than greater than greater than greater than 50 mSv Total
35 mSv 40 mSv 45 mSv 50 mSv greater than (person-Sv) (mSv) (mSv)
or less or less or less or less
0 0 0 0 0 377 0.06 0.1 3.6
0 0 0 0 0 2,637 2.27 0.9 16.2
0 0 0 0 0 3,014 2.33 0.8 16.2
0 0 0 0 0 461 0.09 0.2 2.8
0 0 0 0 0 3,877 2.50 0.7 14.4
0 0 0 0 0 4,338 2.59 0.6 14.4
0 0 0 0 0 250 0.04 0.2 1.3
0 0 0 0 0 1,789 0.42 0.2 10.3
0 0 0 0 0 2,039 0.46 0.2 10.3
0 0 0 0 0 1,108 0.85 0.8 12.9
0 0 0 0 0 9,195 14.00 1.5 18.0
0 0 0 0 0 10,303 14.85 1.4 18.0
0 0 0 0 0 699 0.19 0.3 3.6
0 0 0 0 0 6,575 3.67 0.6 13.1
0 0 0 0 0 7,274 3.87 0.5 13.1
0 0 0 0 0 1,169 0.28 0.2 5.0
0 0 0 0 0 9,417 5.43 0.6 18.2
0 0 0 0 0 10,586 5.71 0.5 18.2
0 0 0 0 0 715 0.28 0.4 8.1
0 0 0 0 0 3,712 3.09 0.8 14.7
0 0 0 0 0 4,427 3.36 0.8 14.7
0 0 0 0 0 373 0.05 0.1 2.0
0 0 0 0 0 2,413 0.26 0.1 4.2
0 0 0 0 0 2,786 0.32 0.1 4.2
0 0 0 0 0 455 0.13 0.3 5.0
0 0 0 0 0 3,637 3.83 1.1 17.5
0 0 0 0 0 4,092 3.96 1.0 17.5
0 0 0 0 0 484 0.13 0.3 5.1
0 0 0 0 0 4,148 7.05 1.7 18.6
0 0 0 0 0 4,632 7.18 1.5 18.6
0 0 0 0 0 501 0.32 0.6 9.5
0 0 0 0 0 4,662 14.50 3.1 19.5
0 0 0 0 0 5,163 14.82 2.9 19.5
0 0 0 0 0 383 0.22 0.6 8.1
0 0 0 0 0 2,439 3.03 1.2 13.5
0 0 0 0 0 2,822 3.25 1.2 13.5
0 0 0 0 0 321 0.04 0.1 2.0
0 0 0 0 0 2,485 1.99 0.8 13.5
0 0 0 0 0 2,806 2.03 0.7 13.5
0 0 0 0 0 536 0.10 0.2 5.6
0 0 0 0 0 4,023 4.26 1.1 14.2
0 0 0 0 0 4,559 4.36 1.0 14.2
0 0 0 0 0 287 0.04 0.1 3.3
0 0 0 0 0 2,225 2.92 1.3 11.6
0 0 0 0 0 2,512 2.96 1.2 11.6
0 0 0 0 0 292 0.01 0.0 1.6
0 0 0 0 0 1,401 0.02 0.0 2.9
0 0 0 0 0 1,693 0.02 0.0 2.9
0 0 0 0 0 378 0.21 0.6 7.5
0 0 0 0 0 5,065 6.54 1.3 15.5
0 0 0 0 0 5,443 6.74 1.2 15.5
0 0 0 0 0 421 0.09 0.2 2.6
0 0 0 0 0 4,579 3.17 0.7 12.9 参
0 0 0 0 0 5,000 3.27 0.7 12.9
0 0 0 0 0 9,210 3.13 0.3 12.9
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
74,279
83,489
78.95
82.08
1.1
1.0
19.5
19.5

673
(2) Power Reactor Facilities at the Research and Development Stage
Distribution of exposure dosage (number of personnel)
Category of
5 mSv 10 mSv 15 mSv 20 mSv 25 mSv
workers
Facility 5 mSv greater than greater than greater than greater than greater than
engaged in
radiation work or less 10 mSv 15 mSv 20 mSv 25 mSv 30 mSv
or less or less or less or less or less
Japan Atomic Energy Agency Employee 108 0 0 0 0 0
Reactor decommissioned Others 495 2 0 0 0 0
Research and Development Center Total 603 2 0 0 0 0
Japan Atomic Energy Agency Employee 331 0 0 0 0 0
Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Monju Others 1,081 0 0 0 0 0
Total 1,412 0 0 0 0 0
Employee 439 0 0 0 0 0
Grand Total Others 1,576 2 0 0 0 0
Total 2,015 2 0 0 0 0

(3) Fabrication Facility


Distribution of exposure dosage (number of personnel)
Category of
5 mSv 10 mSv 15 mSv 20 mSv 25 mSv
workers
Facility 5 mSv greater than greater than greater than greater than greater than
engaged in
radiation work or less 10 mSv 15 mSv 20 mSv 25 mSv 30 mSv
or less or less or less or less or less
Global Nuclear Fuel-Japan Co., Ltd. Employee 417 0 0 0 0 0
Others 277 0 0 0 0 0
Total 694 0 0 0 0 0
Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd. Employee 397 0 0 0 0 0
Others 84 0 0 0 0 0
Total 481 0 0 0 0 0
Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd. Employee 233 0 0 0 0 0
Tokai Works Others 138 0 0 0 0 0
Total 371 0 0 0 0 0
Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd. Employee 227 0 0 0 0 0
Kumatori Works Others 130 0 0 0 0 0
Total 357 0 0 0 0 0
Japan Atomic Energy Agency Employee 64 0 0 0 0 0
Uranium enrichment prototype plant Others 110 0 0 0 0 0
Total 174 0 0 0 0 0
Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. Employee 157 0 0 0 0 0
Uranium Enrichment Plant/Low-level Radioactive
Waste Disposal Center Others 464 0 0 0 0 0
(fabrication facility) Total 621 0 0 0 0 0
Employee 1,495 0 0 0 0 0
Grand Total Others 1,203 0 0 0 0 0
Total 2,698 0 0 0 0 0

674
Distribution of exposure dosage (number of personnel)
30 mSv 35 mSv 40 mSv 45 mSv Total dose Mean dose Maximum dose
greater than greater than greater than greater than 50 mSv Total
35 mSv 40 mSv 45 mSv 50 mSv greater than (person-Sv) (mSv) (mSv)
or less or less or less or less
0 0 0 0 0 108 0.02 0.1 1.7
0 0 0 0 0 497 0.10 0.2 5.9
0 0 0 0 0 605 0.11 0.2 5.9
0 0 0 0 0 331 0.00 0.0 0.0
0 0 0 0 0 1,081 0.00 0.0 0.0
0 0 0 0 0 1,412 0.00 0.0 0.0
0 0 0 0 0 439 0.02 0.0 1.7
0 0 0 0 0 1,578 0.10 0.1 5.9
0 0 0 0 0 2,017 0.11 0.1 5.9

Distribution of exposure dosage (number of personnel)


30 mSv 35 mSv 40 mSv 45 mSv Total dose Mean dose Maximum dose
greater than greater than greater than greater than 50 mSv Total
35 mSv 40 mSv 45 mSv 50 mSv greater than (person-Sv) (mSv) (mSv)
or less or less or less or less
0 0 0 0 0 417 0.08 0.2 3.6
0 0 0 0 0 277 0.01 0.0 0.3
0 0 0 0 0 694 0.08 0.1 3.6
0 0 0 0 0 397 0.07 0.2 2.9
0 0 0 0 0 84 0.00 0.0 0.4
0 0 0 0 0 481 0.07 0.2 2.9
0 0 0 0 0 233 0.07 0.3 2.9
0 0 0 0 0 138 0.00 0.0 1.0
0 0 0 0 0 371 0.07 0.2 2.9
0 0 0 0 0 227 0.05 0.2 2.4
0 0 0 0 0 130 0.00 0.0 0.3
0 0 0 0 0 357 0.05 0.1 2.4
0 0 0 0 0 64 0.00 0.0 0.0
0 0 0 0 0 110 0.00 0.0 0.6
0 0 0 0 0 174 0.00 0.0 0.6
0 0 0 0 0 157 0.00 0.0 0.4
0 0 0 0 0 464 0.00 0.0 0.1
0 0 0 0 0 621 0.00 0.0 0.4
0 0 0 0 0 1,495 0.27 0.2 3.6
0 0 0 0 0 1,203 0.01 0.0 1.0
0 0 0 0 0 2,698 0.27 0.1 3.6


675
(4) Reprocessing Facility
Distribution of exposure dosage (number of personnel)
Category of
5 mSv 10 mSv 15 mSv 20 mSv 25 mSv
workers
Facility 5 mSv greater than greater than greater than greater than greater than
engaged in
radiation work or less 10 mSv 15 mSv 20 mSv 25 mSv 30 mSv
or less or less or less or less or less
Japan Atomic Energy Agency Employee 443 0 0 0 0 0
Reprocessing facility Others 1,126 0 0 0 0 0
Total 1,569 0 0 0 0 0
Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. Employee 1,314 0 0 0 0 0
Reprocessing Plant Others 4,333 3 0 0 0 0
(reprocessing facility) Total 5,647 3 0 0 0 0
Employee 1,757 0 0 0 0 0
Grand Total Others 5,459 3 0 0 0 0
Total 7,216 3 0 0 0 0

(5) Waste Burial Facilities, Waste Management Facilities


Distribution of exposure dosage (number of personnel)
Category of
5 mSv 10 mSv 15 mSv 20 mSv 25 mSv
workers
Facility 5 mSv greater than greater than greater than greater than greater than
engaged in
radiation work or less 10 mSv 15 mSv 20 mSv 25 mSv 30 mSv
or less or less or less or less or less
Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. Employee 57 0 0 0 0 0
Uranium Enrichment Plant/Low-level Radioactive
Waste Disposal Center Others 256 0 0 0 0 0
(waste burial facility) Total 313 0 0 0 0 0
Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. Employee 199 0 0 0 0 0
Reprocessing Plant Others 760 0 0 0 0 0
(waste management facility) Total 959 0 0 0 0 0
Japan Atomic Energy Agency Employee – – – – – –
Waste Burial Facility Others – – – – – –
Total – – – – – –
Japan Atomic Energy Agency Employee 31 0 0 0 0 0
Waste Management Facility Others 235 0 0 0 0 0
Total 266 0 0 0 0 0
Employee 287 0 0 0 0 0
Grand Total Others 1,251 0 0 0 0 0
Total 1,538 0 0 0 0 0

676
Distribution of exposure dosage (number of personnel)
30 mSv 35 mSv 40 mSv 45 mSv Total dose Mean dose Maximum dose
greater than greater than greater than greater than 50 mSv Total
35 mSv 40 mSv 45 mSv 50 mSv greater than (person-Sv) (mSv) (mSv)
or less or less or less or less
0 0 0 0 0 443 0.04 0.1 2.9
0 0 0 0 0 1,126 0.11 0.1 5.0
0 0 0 0 0 1,569 0.15 0.1 5.0
0 0 0 0 0 1,314 0.04 0.0 2.1
0 0 0 0 0 4,336 0.48 0.1 6.2
0 0 0 0 0 5,650 0.52 0.1 6.2
0 0 0 0 0 1,757 0.08 0.0 2.9
0 0 0 0 0 5,462 0.59 0.1 6.2
0 0 0 0 0 7,219 0.67 0.1 6.2

Distribution of exposure dosage (number of personnel)


30 mSv 35 mSv 40 mSv 45 mSv Total dose Mean dose Maximum dose
greater than greater than greater than greater than 50 mSv Total
35 mSv 40 mSv 45 mSv 50 mSv greater than (person-Sv) (mSv) (mSv)
or less or less or less or less
0 0 0 0 0 57 0.00 0.0 0.4
0 0 0 0 0 256 0.00 0.0 0.3
0 0 0 0 0 313 0.01 0.0 0.4
0 0 0 0 0 199 0.00 0.0 0.0
0 0 0 0 0 760 0.00 0.0 0.0
0 0 0 0 0 959 0.00 0.0 0.0
– – – – – – – – –
– – – – – – – – –
– – – – – – – – –
0 0 0 0 0 31 0.00 0.0 0.7
0 0 0 0 0 235 0.01 0.0 1.1
0 0 0 0 0 266 0.01 0.0 1.1
0 0 0 0 0 287 0.00 0.0 0.7
0 0 0 0 0 1,251 0.01 0.0 1.1
0 0 0 0 0 1,538 0.02 0.0 1.1


677
(2) Three-month Radiation Dosage Distribution of Female Personnel Engaged in Radiation Work
(1) Commercial Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities (number of personnel)
Dosage distribution (measured at abdomen)
Power station Period 1 mSv or less
Greater than 1 mSv, Greater than 2 mSv,
Greater than Total
and less than or equal and less than or equal
to 2 mSv to 5 mSv 5 mSv

1st quarter 3 0 0 0 3
Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Inc. 2nd quarter 0 0 0 0 0
Tomari Power Station 3rd quarter 4 0 0 0 4
4th quarter 2 0 0 0 2
1st quarter 15 0 0 0 15
Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc. 2nd quarter 16 0 0 0 16
Onagawa Nuclear Power Station 3rd quarter 18 0 0 0 18
4th quarter 20 0 0 0 20
1st quarter 5 0 0 0 5
Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc. 2nd quarter 7 0 0 0 7
Higashidori Nuclear Power Station 3rd quarter 6 0 0 0 6
4th quarter 4 0 0 0 4
1st quarter 82 2 0 0 84
Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. 2nd quarter 80 0 0 0 80
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
3rd quarter 69 1 0 0 70
Station
4th quarter 65 0 0 0 65
1st quarter 74 0 0 0 74
Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. 2nd quarter 69 0 0 0 69
Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power
3rd quarter 59 0 0 0 59
Station
4th quarter 67 0 0 0 67
1st quarter 72 0 0 0 72
Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. 2nd quarter 71 1 0 0 72
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power
3rd quarter 64 0 0 0 64
Station
4th quarter 60 0 0 0 60
1st quarter 24 0 0 0 24
Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc. 2nd quarter 37 0 0 0 37
Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station 3rd quarter 32 0 0 0 32
4th quarter 27 0 0 0 27
1st quarter 1 0 0 0 1
Hokuriku Electric Power Co., Inc. 2nd quarter 1 0 0 0 1
Shika Nuclear Power Station 3rd quarter 1 0 0 0 1
4th quarter 1 0 0 0 1
1st quarter 4 0 0 0 4
Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. 2nd quarter 4 0 0 0 4
Mihama Power Station 3rd quarter 2 0 0 0 2
4th quarter 3 0 0 0 3
1st quarter 3 0 0 0 3
Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. 2nd quarter 2 0 0 0 2
Takahama Power Station 3rd quarter 4 0 0 0 4
4th quarter 5 0 0 0 5
1st quarter 2 0 0 0 2
Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. 2nd quarter 1 0 0 0 1
Ohi Power Station 3rd quarter 2 0 0 0 2
4th quarter 3 0 0 0 3

678
(number of personnel)
Dosage distribution (measured at abdomen)
Power station Period 1 mSv or less
Greater than 1 mSv, Greater than 2 mSv,
Greater than Total
and less than or equal and less than or equal
to 2 mSv to 5 mSv 5 mSv

1st quarter 20 0 0 0 20
Chugoku Electric Power Co., Inc. 2nd quarter 16 0 0 0 16
Shimane Nuclear Power Station 3rd quarter 13 0 0 0 13
4th quarter 17 0 0 0 17
1st quarter 17 0 0 0 17
Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc. 2nd quarter 13 0 0 0 13
Ikata Power Station 3rd quarter 12 0 0 0 12
4th quarter 11 0 0 0 11
1st quarter 10 0 0 0 10
Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc. 2nd quarter 8 0 0 0 8
Genkai Nuclear Power Station 3rd quarter 9 0 0 0 9
4th quarter 4 0 0 0 4
1st quarter 0 0 0 0 0
Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc. 2nd quarter 3 0 0 0 3
Sendai Nuclear Power Station 3rd quarter 1 0 0 0 1
4th quarter 0 0 0 0 0
1st quarter 16 0 0 0 16
Japan Atomic Power Co., Ltd. 2nd quarter 17 0 0 0 17
Tokai Power Station 3rd quarter 17 0 0 0 17
4th quarter 18 0 0 0 18
1st quarter 22 0 0 0 22
Japan Atomic Power Co., Ltd. 2nd quarter 24 0 0 0 24
Tokai Daini Power Station 3rd quarter 28 0 0 0 28
4th quarter 26 0 0 0 26
1st quarter 12 0 0 0 12
Japan Atomic Power Co., Ltd. 2nd quarter 11 0 0 0 11
Tsuruga Power Station 3rd quarter 11 0 0 0 11
4th quarter 12 0 0 0 12
1st quarter 382 2 0 0 384
2nd quarter 380 1 0 0 381
Grand Total
3rd quarter 352 1 0 0 353
4th quarter 345 0 0 0 345


679
(2) Power Reactor Facilities at the Research and Development Stage (number of personnel)
Dosage distribution (measured at abdomen)
Facility Period 1 mSv or less
Greater than 1 mSv, Greater than 2 mSv,
Greater than Total
and less than or equal and less than or equal
to 2 mSv to 5 mSv 5 mSv

1st quarter 1 0 0 0 1
Japan Atomic Energy Agency 2nd quarter 1 0 0 0 1
Fugen Decommissioning Engineering Center 3rd quarter 3 0 0 0 3
4th quarter 2 0 0 0 2
1st quarter 6 0 0 0 6
Japan Atomic Energy Agency 2nd quarter 4 0 0 0 4
Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Monju 3rd quarter 4 0 0 0 4
4th quarter 4 0 0 0 4
1st quarter 7 0 0 0 7
2nd quarter 5 0 0 0 5
Grand Total
3rd quarter 7 0 0 0 7
4th quarter 6 0 0 0 6

(3) Fabrication Facilities (number of personnel)


Dosage distribution (measured at abdomen)
Facility Period 1 mSv or less
Greater than 1 mSv, Greater than 2 mSv,
Greater than Total
and less than or equal and less than or equal
to 2 mSv to 5 mSv 5 mSv

1st quarter 30 0 0 0 30
2nd quarter 28 0 0 0 28
Global Nuclear Fuel-Japan Co., Ltd.
3rd quarter 28 0 0 0 28
4th quarter 27 0 0 0 27
1st quarter 6 0 0 0 6
Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd. 2nd quarter 11 0 0 0 11
3rd quarter 8 0 0 0 8
4th quarter 8 0 0 0 8
1st quarter 6 0 0 0 6
Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd. 2nd quarter 7 0 0 0 7
Tokai Works 3rd quarter 8 0 0 0 8
4th quarter 8 0 0 0 8
1st quarter 19 0 0 0 19
Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd. 2nd quarter 21 0 0 0 21
Kumatori Works 3rd quarter 20 0 0 0 20
4th quarter 19 0 0 0 19
1st quarter 5 0 0 0 5
Japan Atomic Energy Agency 2nd quarter 5 0 0 0 5
Uranium enrichment prototype plant 3rd quarter 5 0 0 0 5
4th quarter 5 0 0 0 5
1st quarter 5 0 0 0 5
Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd.
Uranium Enrichment Plant/Low-level Radioactive 2nd quarter 3 0 0 0 3
Waste Disposal Center
3rd quarter 4 0 0 0 4
(Fabrication facilities)
4th quarter 4 0 0 0 4
1st quarter 71 0 0 0 71
2nd quarter 75 0 0 0 75
Grand Total
3rd quarter 73 0 0 0 73
4th quarter 71 0 0 0 71

680
(4) Reprocessing Facilities (number of personnel)
Dosage distribution (measured at abdomen)
Facility Period 1 mSv or less
Greater than 1 mSv, Greater than 2 mSv,
Greater than Total
and less than or equal and less than or equal
to 2 mSv to 5 mSv 5 mSv

1st quarter 9 0 0 0 9
Japan Atomic Energy Agency 2nd quarter 10 0 0 0 10
Reprocessing facilities 3rd quarter 8 0 0 0 8
4th quarter 14 0 0 0 14
1st quarter 51 0 0 0 51
Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. 2nd quarter 60 0 0 0 60
Reprocessing plant 3rd quarter 55 0 0 0 55
(Reprocessing facility) 4th quarter 52 0 0 0 52
1st quarter 60 0 0 0 60
2nd quarter 70 0 0 0 70
Grand Total
3rd quarter 63 0 0 0 63
4th quarter 66 0 0 0 66

(5) Waste Burial Facilities, Waste Management Facilities (number of personnel)


Dosage distribution (measured at abdomen)
Facility Period 1 mSv or less
Greater than 1 mSv, Greater than 2 mSv,
Greater than Total
and less than or equal and less than or equal
to 2 mSv to 5 mSv 5 mSv

1st quarter 1 0 0 0 1
Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd.
Uranium Enrichment Plant/Low-level Radioactive 2nd quarter 1 0 0 0 1
Waste Disposal Center
3rd quarter 1 0 0 0 1
(Waste burial facilities)
4th quarter 1 0 0 0 1
1st quarter 11 0 0 0 11
Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. 2nd quarter 11 0 0 0 11
Reprocessing plant 3rd quarter 12 0 0 0 12
(Waste management facilities) 4th quarter 13 0 0 0 13
1st quarter – – – – –
Japan Atomic Energy Agency 2nd quarter – – – – –
Waste burial facilities 3rd quarter – – – – –
4th quarter – – – – –
1st quarter 0 0 0 0 0
Japan Atomic Energy Agency 2nd quarter 0 0 0 0 0
Waste management facilities 3rd quarter 0 0 0 0 0
4th quarter 0 0 0 0 0
1st quarter 12 0 0 0 12
2nd quarter 12 0 0 0 12
Grand Total
3rd quarter 13 0 0 0 13
4th quarter 14 0 0 0 14


681
Reference Document: Exposure Dosage of Personnel Engaged in Radiation Work by Fiscal Year

(1) Dose at Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Inc., Tomari Power Station (3) Dose at Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc., Higashidori Nuclear Power Station

Items Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Items Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Number of Employee 358 343 307 301 297 294 289 292 376 377 Number of Employee – – – – 176 229 241 247 250 250
workers workers
engaged in engaged in
radiation work
Others 1,646 1,644 1,240 1,662 1,699 1,508 1,226 1,729 2,885 2,637 radiation work
Others – – – – 720 1,088 1,579 1,292 1,770 1,789
(number of (number of
personnel) Total 2,004 1,987 1,547 1,963 1,996 1,802 1,515 2,021 3,261 3,014 personnel) Total – – – – 896 1,317 1,820 1,539 2,020 2,039

Total Employee 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.06 Total Employee – – – – 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04
exposure exposure
Others 1.07 1.30 0.56 1.24 1.37 0.99 0.63 1.21 2.99 2.27 Others – – – – 0.00 0.02 0.13 0.04 0.36 0.42
dose dose
(person-Sv) Total 1.12 1.37 0.59 1.30 1.42 1.04 0.66 1.24 3.03 2.33 (person-Sv) Total – – – – 0.00 0.03 0.15 0.06 0.39 0.46

Employee 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 Employee – – – – 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Mean dose Mean dose
Others 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.7 1.0 0.9 Others – – – – 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2
(mSv) (mSv)
Total 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.9 0.8 Total – – – – 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2

Number of reactors 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 Number of reactors – – – – 1 1 1 1 1 1

682
(2) Dose at Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc., Onagawa Nuclear Power Station (4) Dose at Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc., Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station

Items Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Items Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Number of Employee 437 451 420 407 404 443 451 425 475 461 Number of Employee 872 861 840 921 923 1,018 1,071 1,080 1,096 1,108
workers workers
engaged in engaged in
radiation work
Others 2,131 2,963 2,827 2,324 3,033 2,782 2,401 3,139 4,190 3,877 radiation work
Others 9,144 8,280 8,703 8,988 7,285 7,580 8,159 8,707 9,260 9,195
(number of (number of
personnel) Total 2,568 3,414 3,247 2,731 3,437 3,225 2,852 3,564 4,665 4,338 personnel) Total 10,016 9,141 9,543 9,909 8,208 8,598 9,230 9,787 10,356 10,303

Total Employee 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.09 Total Employee 0.67 0.68 0.70 0.97 0.69 0.76 0.90 0.78 0.75 0.85
exposure exposure
Others 0.55 1.53 3.69 2.64 1.87 1.05 0.85 2.99 2.57 2.50 Others 24.52 17.32 24.03 21.66 20.36 14.73 16.60 15.30 14.05 14.00
dose dose
(person-Sv) Total 0.60 1.60 3.76 2.72 1.96 1.12 0.92 3.08 2.63 2.59 (person-Sv) Total 25.18 18.01 24.72 22.63 21.04 15.50 17.50 16.08 14.80 14.85

Employee 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 Employee 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8
Mean dose Mean dose
Others 0.3 0.5 1.3 1.1 0.6 0.4 0.4 1.0 0.6 0.7 Others 2.7 2.1 2.8 2.4 2.8 1.9 2.0 1.8 1.5 1.5
(mSv) (mSv)
Total 0.2 0.5 1.2 1.0 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.9 0.6 0.6 Total 2.5 2.0 2.6 2.3 2.6 1.8 1.9 1.6 1.4 1.4

Number of reactors 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Number of reactors 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6


(5) Dose at Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc., Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station (7) Dose at Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc., Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station

Items Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Items Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Number of Employee 530 545 543 629 626 619 663 682 685 699 Number of Employee 745 778 691 714 717 657 666 673 671 715
workers workers
engaged in engaged in
radiation work
Others 5,937 6,116 6,278 5,971 6,202 5,669 5,626 6,588 5,459 6,575 radiation work
Others 4,006 4,716 4,910 4,340 4,618 3,854 3,936 3,893 3,579 3,712
(number of (number of
personnel) Total 6,467 6,661 6,821 6,600 6,828 6,288 6,289 7,270 6,144 7,274 personnel) Total 4,751 5,494 5,601 5,054 5,335 4,511 4,602 4,566 4,250 4,427

Total Employee 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.22 0.21 0.19 Total Employee 0.37 0.47 0.63 0.44 0.36 0.34 0.35 0.37 0.29 0.28
exposure exposure
Others 3.55 3.63 6.05 8.24 5.45 4.15 3.44 6.60 3.58 3.67 Others 5.90 9.83 11.67 10.61 6.66 3.14 6.31 5.08 1.74 3.09
dose dose
(person-Sv) Total 3.73 3.82 6.23 8.43 5.61 4.31 3.62 6.83 3.79 3.87 (person-Sv) Total 6.27 10.30 12.29 11.05 7.03 3.49 6.66 5.45 2.03 3.36

Employee 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 Employee 0.5 0.6 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4
Mean dose Mean dose
Others 0.6 0.6 1.0 1.4 0.9 0.7 0.6 1.0 0.7 0.6 Others 1.5 2.1 2.4 2.4 1.4 0.8 1.6 1.3 0.5 0.8
(mSv) (mSv)
Total 0.6 0.6 0.9 1.3 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.6 0.5 Total 1.3 1.9 2.2 2.2 1.3 0.8 1.4 1.2 0.5 0.8

Number of reactors 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Number of reactors 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5

683
(6) Dose at Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc., Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station (8) Dose at Hokuriku Electric Power Co., Shika Nuclear Power Station

Items Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Items Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Number of Employee 930 940 946 994 997 1,051 1,085 1,197 1,153 1,169 Number of Employee 294 274 289 274 335 315 309 366 354 373
workers workers
engaged in engaged in
radiation work
Others 6,460 6,392 6,624 6,331 5,822 7,048 6,673 7,294 9,616 9,417 radiation work
Others 1,611 1,745 676 2,035 2,165 2,455 2,732 2,345 2,273 2,413
(number of (number of
personnel) Total 7,390 7,332 7,570 7,325 6,819 8,099 7,758 8,491 10,769 10,586 personnel) Total 1,905 2,019 965 2,309 2,500 2,770 3,041 2,711 2,627 2,786

Total Employee 0.44 0.48 0.44 0.53 0.40 0.42 0.37 0.31 0.23 0.28 Total Employee 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.09 0.05
exposure exposure
Others 4.96 7.70 7.96 13.78 5.24 8.96 6.24 7.31 10.48 5.43 Others 0.89 1.08 0.15 3.25 1.17 0.68 0.86 0.46 2.29 0.26
dose dose
(person-Sv) Total 5.40 8.19 8.39 14.31 5.64 9.38 6.61 7.62 10.72 5.71 (person-Sv) Total 0.97 1.14 0.18 3.36 1.25 0.73 0.93 0.47 2.37 0.32

Employee 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 Employee 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.1
Mean dose Mean dose
Others 0.8 1.2 1.2 2.2 0.9 1.3 0.9 1.0 1.1 0.6 Others 0.6 0.6 0.2 1.6 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.2 1.0 0.1
(mSv) (mSv)
Total 0.7 1.1 1.1 2.0 0.8 1.2 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.5 Total 0.5 0.6 0.2 1.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.9 0.1

Number of reactors 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 Number of reactors 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2



(9) Dose at Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc., Mihama Power Station (11) Dose at Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc., Ohi Power Station

Items Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Items Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Number of Employee 448 453 452 404 398 431 426 436 446 455 Number of Employee 514 512 513 488 453 514 517 492 493 501
workers workers
engaged in engaged in
radiation work
Others 2,956 2,849 2,541 2,920 2,224 2,625 2,500 2,978 2,821 3,637 radiation work
Others 3,794 3,756 3,033 3,037 3,894 3,220 3,536 3,459 4,040 4,662
(number of (number of
personnel) Total 3,404 3,302 2,993 3,324 2,622 3,056 2,926 3,414 3,267 4,092 personnel) Total 4,308 4,268 3,546 3,525 4,347 3,734 4,053 3,951 4,533 5,163

Total Employee 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.13 Total Employee 0.21 0.23 0.20 0.22 0.31 0.33 0.31 0.27 0.35 0.32
exposure exposure
Others 4.13 3.41 3.46 2.68 0.95 1.85 1.58 2.37 2.93 3.83 Others 4.91 5.46 4.15 4.81 6.43 6.03 8.64 6.93 8.65 14.50
dose dose
(person-Sv) Total 4.25 3.53 3.56 2.80 1.01 1.92 1.66 2.45 3.01 3.96 (person-Sv) Total 5.12 5.69 4.35 5.03 6.74 6.36 8.96 7.20 9.00 14.82

Employee 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 Employee 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.6
Mean dose Mean dose
Others 1.4 1.2 1.4 0.9 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.1 Others 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.4 2.0 2.1 3.1
(mSv) (mSv)
Total 1.2 1.1 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.0 Total 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.7 2.2 1.8 2.0 2.9

Number of reactors 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Number of reactors 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4

684
(10) Dose at Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc., Takahama Power Station (12) Dose at Chugoku Electric Power Co., Inc., Shimane Nuclear Power Station

Items Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Items Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Number of Employee 491 490 506 476 459 489 473 482 525 484 Number of Employee 379 360 352 338 309 275 337 359 363 383
workers workers
engaged in engaged in
radiation work
Others 3,367 3,383 3,280 3,407 3,092 2,779 3,121 3,877 4,232 4,148 radiation work
Others 2,824 1,659 1,474 2,507 2,621 2,078 2,326 2,660 2,158 2,439
(number of (number of
personnel) Total 3,858 3,873 3,786 3,883 3,551 3,268 3,594 4,359 4,757 4,632 personnel) Total 3,203 2,019 1,826 2,845 2,930 2,353 2,663 3,019 2,521 2,822

Total Employee 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.14 0.13 Total Employee 0.23 0.19 0.22 0.29 0.16 0.13 0.20 0.24 0.20 0.22
exposure exposure
Others 3.85 5.73 3.94 4.63 3.92 3.48 3.57 6.93 8.55 7.05 Others 9.05 0.81 1.10 4.01 3.73 2.02 1.97 4.78 2.56 3.03
dose dose
(person-Sv) Total 3.99 5.85 4.06 4.77 4.05 3.62 3.69 7.08 8.69 7.18 (person-Sv) Total 9.28 1.01 1.32 4.30 3.88 2.15 2.17 5.01 2.77 3.25

Employee 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 Employee 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6
Mean dose Mean dose
Others 1.1 1.7 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.8 2.0 1.7 Others 3.2 0.5 0.8 1.6 1.4 1.0 0.8 1.8 1.2 1.2
(mSv) (mSv)
Total 1.0 1.5 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.6 1.8 1.5 Total 2.9 0.5 0.7 1.5 1.3 0.9 0.8 1.7 1.1 1.2

Number of reactors 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Number of reactors 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2


(13) Dose at Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc., Ikata Power Station (15) Dose at Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc., Sendai Nuclear Power Station

Items Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Items Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Number of Employee 374 419 401 401 288 294 279 280 289 321 Number of Employee 247 258 234 252 247 251 254 261 293 287
workers workers
engaged in engaged in
radiation work
Others 2,364 2,960 2,384 2,392 2,909 2,696 2,380 2,417 2,688 2,485 radiation work
Others 1,906 1,606 1,630 2,074 2,238 1,707 1,612 2,842 3,659 2,225
(number of (number of
personnel) Total 2,738 3,379 2,785 2,793 3,197 2,990 2,659 2,697 2,977 2,806 personnel) Total 2,153 1,864 1,864 2,326 2,485 1,958 1,866 3,103 3,952 2,512

Total Employee 0.12 0.16 0.11 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 Total Employee 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.04
exposure exposure
Others 3.51 5.01 2.89 2.62 3.88 3.52 3.36 2.41 3.02 1.99 Others 2.52 1.56 1.44 3.59 4.32 1.65 1.19 4.94 6.44 2.92
dose dose
(person-Sv) Total 3.62 5.16 3.00 2.71 3.93 3.55 3.40 2.46 3.06 2.03 (person-Sv) Total 2.59 1.61 1.49 3.68 4.41 1.70 1.23 5.03 6.53 2.96

Employee 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 Employee 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.1
Mean dose Mean dose
Others 1.5 1.7 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.0 1.1 0.8 Others 1.3 1.0 0.9 1.7 1.9 1.0 0.7 1.7 1.8 1.3
(mSv) (mSv)
Total 1.3 1.5 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.3 0.9 1.0 0.7 Total 1.2 0.9 0.8 1.6 1.8 0.9 0.7 1.6 1.7 1.2

Number of reactors 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Number of reactors 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

685
(14) Dose at Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc., Genkai Nuclear Power Station (16) Dose at Japan Atomic Power Company, Tokai Power Station

Items Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Items Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Number of Employee 468 459 445 461 476 469 472 487 514 536 Number of Employee 293 312 270 292 295 324 307 307 301 292
workers workers
engaged in engaged in
radiation work
Others 3,103 4,137 3,188 2,935 3,220 3,091 3,316 3,187 3,404 4,023 radiation work
Others 1,066 953 844 694 899 1,027 986 1,094 1,026 1,401
(number of (number of
personnel) Total 3,571 4,596 3,633 3,396 3,696 3,560 3,788 3,674 3,918 4,559 personnel) Total 1,359 1,265 1,114 986 1,194 1,351 1,293 1,401 1,327 1,693

Total Employee 0.06 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.08 0.14 0.13 0.06 0.06 0.10 Total Employee 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
exposure exposure
Others 1.96 4.98 4.97 2.73 3.47 3.75 3.99 2.73 2.69 4.26 Others 0.27 0.02 0.16 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02
dose dose
(person-Sv) Total 2.02 5.09 5.08 2.79 3.56 3.89 4.12 2.79 2.76 4.36 (person-Sv) Total 0.28 0.02 0.18 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02

Employee 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 Employee 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mean dose Mean dose
Others 0.6 1.2 1.6 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.2 0.9 0.8 1.1 Others 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(mSv) (mSv)
Total 0.6 1.1 1.4 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.1 0.8 0.7 1.0 Total 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Number of reactors 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Number of reactors 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1



(17) Dose at Japan Atomic Power Company, Tokai Daini Power Station (19) Total Dose for All BWRs

Items Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Items Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Number of Employee 312 320 353 396 352 405 360 382 409 378 Number of Employee 4,814 4,870 4,768 5,041 5,215 5,426 5,568 5,807 5,838 5,906
workers workers
engaged in engaged in
radiation work
Others 1,986 2,967 2,994 3,429 2,171 3,885 2,617 2,586 3,517 5,065 radiation work
Others 36,590 37,382 36,406 38,236 36,989 38,871 38,561 40,898 44,799 47,832
(number of (number of
personnel) Total 2,298 3,287 3,347 3,825 2,523 4,290 2,977 2,968 3,926 5,443 personnel) Total 41,404 42,252 41,174 43,277 42,204 44,297 44,129 46,705 50,637 53,738

Total Employee 0.16 0.19 0.26 0.21 0.18 0.21 0.18 0.17 0.22 0.21 Total Employee 2.31 2.46 2.64 2.96 2.27 2.28 2.46 2.33 2.17 2.28
exposure exposure
Others 0.65 3.07 2.48 3.02 0.67 5.70 1.72 0.84 3.37 6.54 Others 52.47 46.34 58.21 68.89 46.76 42.19 39.97 44.77 44.11 41.22
dose dose
(person-Sv) Total 0.82 3.26 2.74 3.23 0.85 5.91 1.90 1.01 3.59 6.74 (person-Sv) Total 54.79 48.82 60.82 71.86 49.02 44.51 42.43 47.10 46.29 43.50

Employee 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 Employee 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Mean dose Mean dose
Others 0.3 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.3 1.5 0.7 0.3 1.0 1.3 Others 1.4 1.2 1.6 1.8 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.9
(mSv) (mSv)
Total 0.4 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.3 1.4 0.6 0.3 0.9 1.2 Total 1.3 1.2 1.5 1.7 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8

Number of reactors 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Number of reactors 28 29 29 30 31 32 32 32 32 32

686
(18) Dose at Japan Atomic Power Company, Tsuruga Power Station (20) Total Dose for All PWRs

Items Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Items Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Number of Employee 356 386 407 423 442 444 452 442 439 421 Number of Employee 3,198 3,262 3,188 3,129 2,966 3,081 3,085 3,103 3,304 3,290
workers workers
engaged in engaged in
radiation work
Others 3,547 3,524 3,200 3,396 3,698 2,708 3,517 4,047 3,975 4,579 radiation work
Others 21,123 22,261 19,367 20,415 21,485 18,719 19,633 23,122 25,739 26,178
(number of (number of
personnel) Total 3,903 3,910 3,607 3,819 4,140 3,152 3,969 4,489 4,414 5,000 personnel) Total 24,321 25,523 22,555 23,544 24,451 21,800 22,718 26,225 29,043 29,468

Total Employee 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.21 0.22 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.13 0.09 Total Employee 0.81 0.89 0.76 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.82 0.78 0.85 0.85
exposure exposure
Others 3.43 2.25 1.94 3.07 5.21 1.94 3.03 4.12 4.72 3.17 Others 22.98 28.33 22.27 23.69 27.93 21.46 24.13 30.27 36.88 37.71
dose dose
(person-Sv) Total 3.59 2.40 2.09 3.28 5.43 2.11 3.22 4.29 4.85 3.27 (person-Sv) Total 23.76 29.21 23.03 24.52 28.78 22.30 24.97 31.05 37.73 38.56

Employee 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 Employee 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Mean dose Mean dose
Others 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.9 1.4 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.2 0.7 Others 1.1 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4
(mSv) (mSv)
Total 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.9 1.3 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.1 0.7 Total 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3

Number of reactors 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Number of reactors 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 24 24


(21) Total Dose for All Nuclear Power Plants (23) Dose at Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Monju

Items Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Items Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Number of Employee 8,048 8,161 7,969 8,171 8,194 8,522 8,652 8,890 9,132 9,210 Number of Employee 245 240 236 232 236 242 251 255 314 331
workers workers
engaged in engaged in
radiation work
Others 57,848 59,650 55,826 58,442 58,510 57,800 58,243 64,134 70,552 74,279 radiation work
Others 616 714 734 670 629 949 1,044 906 1,022 1,081
(number of (number of
personnel) Total 65,896 67,811 63,795 66,613 66,704 66,322 66,895 73,024 79,684 83,489 personnel) Total 861 954 970 902 865 1,191 1,295 1,161 1,336 1,412

Total Employee 3.13 3.35 3.41 3.80 3.12 3.12 3.28 3.11 3.03 3.13 Total Employee 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
exposure exposure
Others 75.72 74.69 80.64 92.60 74.74 63.76 64.14 75.06 81.00 78.95 Others 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
dose dose
(person-Sv) Total 78.83 78.05 84.03 96.41 77.86 66.91 67.43 78.18 84.04 82.08 (person-Sv) Total 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

Employee 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 Employee 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mean dose Mean dose
Others 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1 Others 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(mSv) (mSv)
Total 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0 Total 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Number of reactors 52 53 53 54 55 56 56 56 57 57 Number of reactors 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

687
(22) Dose at Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Fugen Decommissioning Engineering Center (24) Dose at Global Nuclear Fuel-Japan Co., Ltd.

Items Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Items Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Number of Employee Number of Employee 333 335 342 346 341 350 387 390 405 417
206 197 188 144 112 103 104 105 103 108
workers workers
engaged in engaged in
radiation work
Others 1,826 1,648 840 701 522 596 505 424 599 497 radiation work
Others 229 234 277 295 326 380 348 273 263 277
(number of (number of
personnel) Total 2,032 1,845 1,028 845 634 699 609 529 702 605 personnel) Total 562 569 619 641 667 730 735 663 668 694

Total Employee 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.02 Total Employee 0.05 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.08
exposure exposure
Others 2.21 1.78 0.98 0.40 0.34 0.15 0.18 0.08 0.39 0.10 Others 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
dose dose
(person-Sv) Total 2.39 1.96 1.12 0.46 0.37 0.16 0.20 0.09 0.43 0.11 (person-Sv) Total 0.05 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.08

Employee 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.1 Employee 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Mean dose Mean dose
Others 1.2 1.1 1.2 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.7 0.2 Others 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
(mSv) (mSv)
Total 1.2 1.1 1.1 0.5 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.2 Total 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1

Number of reactors 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1



(25) Dose at Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd. (27) Dose at Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd., Kumatori Works

Items Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Items Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Number of Employee 276 278 274 274 272 284 335 350 379 397 Number of Employee 233 245 257 254 283 260 254 237 257 227
workers workers
engaged in engaged in
radiation work
Others 77 77 110 80 94 83 65 52 71 84 radiation work
Others 159 178 173 217 221 235 195 200 163 130
(number of (number of
personnel) Total 353 355 384 354 366 367 400 402 450 481 personnel) Total 392 423 430 471 504 495 449 437 420 357

Total Employee 0.05 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.07 Total Employee 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05
exposure exposure
Others 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Others 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
dose dose
(person-Sv) Total 0.07 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.07 (person-Sv) Total 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05

Employee 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 Employee 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Mean dose Mean dose
Others 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Others 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0
(mSv) (mSv)
Total 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 Total 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1

688
(26) Dose at Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd., Tokai Works (28) Dose at Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Prototype Uranium Enrichment Plant

Items Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Items Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Number of Employee 226 217 227 219 223 218 212 220 223 233 Number of Employee 51 76 79 69 65 64 57 57 64 64
workers workers
engaged in engaged in
radiation work
Others 150 118 103 100 141 226 156 153 218 138 radiation work
Others 231 239 237 171 179 147 115 90 118 110
(number of (number of
personnel) Total 376 335 330 319 364 444 368 373 441 371 personnel) Total 282 315 316 240 244 211 172 147 182 174

Total Employee 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.07 Total Employee 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
exposure exposure
Others 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Others 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
dose dose
(person-Sv) Total 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.07 (person-Sv) Total 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

Employee 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 Employee 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mean dose Mean dose
Others 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Others 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(mSv) (mSv)
Total 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 Total 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(29) Dose at Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd., Enrichment and Burial Plant (fabrication facility) (31) Dose at Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd., Reprocessing Plant (reprocessing facility)

Items Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Items Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Number of Employee 177 190 168 160 135 119 103 110 142 157 Number of Employee 261 277 405 618 1,042 1,258 1,472 1,605 1,392 1,314
workers workers
engaged in engaged in
radiation work
Others 513 458 460 364 304 272 294 308 477 464 radiation work
Others 832 938 1,817 3,416 3,235 4,671 4,473 4,839 4,178 4,336
(number of (number of
personnel) Total 690 648 628 524 439 391 397 418 619 621 personnel) Total 1,093 1,215 2,222 4,034 4,277 5,929 5,945 6,444 5,570 5,650

Total Employee 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Total Employee 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.04
exposure exposure
Others 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Others 0.00 0.06 0.76 1.84 0.17 0.12 0.19 1.01 0.28 0.48
dose dose
(person-Sv) Total 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 (person-Sv) Total 0.00 0.06 0.78 1.88 0.18 0.13 0.21 1.05 0.30 0.52

Employee 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Employee 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mean dose Mean dose
Others 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Others 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1
(mSv) (mSv)
Total 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Total 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1

689
(30) Dose at Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Reprocessing Facility (32) Dose at Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd., Enrichment and Burial Plant (waste burial facility)

Items Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Items Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Number of Employee 600 565 552 492 474 483 453 447 465 443 Number of Employee 45 64 58 64 65 58 55 52 54 57
workers workers
engaged in engaged in
radiation work
Others 1,959 2,051 1,972 1,617 1,539 1,387 1,254 1,103 1,098 1,126 radiation work
Others 78 107 117 119 136 101 143 179 130 256
(number of (number of
personnel) Total 2,559 2,616 2,524 2,109 2,013 1,870 1,707 1,550 1,563 1,569 personnel) Total 123 171 175 183 201 159 198 231 184 313

Total Employee 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.04 Total Employee 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
exposure exposure
Others 0.09 0.23 0.22 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.11 Others 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
dose dose
(person-Sv) Total 0.11 0.28 0.27 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.09 0.10 0.15 (person-Sv) Total 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01

Employee 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 Employee 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mean dose Mean dose
Others 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 Others 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(mSv) (mSv)
Total 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 Total 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0



(33) Dose at Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd., Reprocessing Plant (waste management facility) (35) Dose at Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Waste Management Facility

Items Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Items Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
*1

Number of Employee 199 160 192 198 194 189 182 232 201 199 Number of Employee 20 20 20 22 20 27 28 27 30 31
workers workers
engaged in engaged in
radiation work
Others 420 341 463 485 562 605 569 842 669 760 radiation work
Others 283 291 276 244 246 195 192 181 172 235
(number of (number of
personnel) Total 619 501 655 683 756 794 751 1,074 870 959 personnel) Total 303 311 296 266 266 213 220 208 202 266

Total Employee 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Total Employee 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
exposure exposure
Others 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Others 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
dose dose
(person-Sv) Total 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (person-Sv) Total 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01

Employee 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Employee 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mean dose Mean dose
Others 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Others 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
(mSv) (mSv)
Total 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Total 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

*1 This facility used to belong to the former Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute. Those employees are classified as “Other” before, and
“Employee” after unifying the employees of the former Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute.

690
In FY2005, since there were nine workers who were classified as both “Employee” and “Others,” this number was subtracted from the total
(34) Dose at` Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Waste Burial Facility number.

Items Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Number of Employee 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
workers
engaged in
radiation work
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(number of
personnel) Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Total Employee 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
exposure
Others 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
dose
(person-Sv) Total 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

Employee 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mean dose
Others 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(mSv)
Total 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(Reference)

Trends in Collective Dosages at Commercial Power Reactor Facilities


(person-Sv) and the Number of Reactors by Fiscal Year (Reactors)

120 60
Reactors
Total exposure dose
100 50

80 40
Total exposure dose

Reactors
60 30

40 20

20 10

0 0
'90 '91 '92 '93 '94 '95 '96 '97 '98 '99 '00 '01 '02 '03 '04 '05 '06 '07 '08 '09
Fiscal year

Trends in Average Individual Dosages at Commercial Power Reactor Facilities by Fiscal


(mSv) Year

Total

3 BWR

PWR
Mean dose

0
'90 '91 '92 '93 '94 '95 '96 '97 '98 '99 '00 '01 '02 '03 '04 '05 '06 '07 '08 '09
Fiscal year


691
ϱϭ-3 Information System on Occupational Exposure (ISOE)


1. ISOE History and Objectives
The Committee on Radiation Protection and Public Health (CRPPH) of OECD/Nuclear Energy
Agency (NEA) launched the Information System on Occupational Exposure (ISOE) program
on 1 January 1992 after two-year pilot program to provide a forum for radiation protection
experts from both nuclear electricity utilities and national regulatory authorities to discuss,
promote and co-ordinate international co-operative undertaking for the radiological protection
of workers at nuclear power plants.
Since 1993, The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has co-sponsored the ISOE
Program for those non-NEA member countries.
In 1997, the NEA and IAEA formed a Joint Secretariat.
Japan has been a member since April 1992.
Republic of Korea has been a member since October 1996.
ISOE provides a worldwide information exchange system for the optimization of radiological
protection of workers at nuclear power plants and the implementation of the ALARA (As Low
As Reasonably Achievable) principle.

2. ISOE Structure and Organization
The annual Management Board Meeting, consisted of regulatory authority and utility
representatives from all participating countries, supported by the joint OECD/NEA and IAEA
Secretariat, provides overall direction of the ISOE.
Furthermore, to promote the execution of timely actions regarding various ISOE activities, the
ISOE Bureau Meetings, which comprise, as a minimum, the Chairperson, the Chairperson-Elect,
the Vice-Chairperson and Past-Chairperson are held twice to three times a year. The ISOE
Technical Centers are generally invited to attend the meetings. Four ISOE Technical Centers
established in Asia, Europe, North America and IAEA, manage the day-to-day technical
operations in support of the membership in the four regions.


ISOE P r o g r a m M a n a g e m e n t St r u c t u r e

OECD㸭NEA

CRPPH


ISOE ISOE
 ISOE secretariat Management Board Bureau
 OECD㸭NEA
 & IAEA


Asian European North American Non-NEA member
 countries
Technical center Technical center Technical center
JNES CEPN Illinois University Technical center
IAEA

*CEPN (French Nuclear Protection Evaluation Center)

692
3. Main Activities and Achievements
▪ ISOE international and regional symposia
Each technical center holds symposia to provide important forums to exchange practical
information on radiation protection such as good practices, and promotes ISOE activities by
membership countries.

Asian Technical Center


September, 2009 ( Aomori, Japan) 2009 ISOE Asian ALARA Symposium
November, 2008 (Kyoto, Japan) 2008 ISOE International ALARA Symposium
September, 2007 (Seoul, Korea) 2007 ISOE Asian ALARA Symposium
October, 2006 (Yuzawa, Japan) 2006 ISOE Asian ALARA Symposium
November, 2005 (Hamaoka, Japan) 2005 ISOE Asian ALARA Symposium
European Technical Center
June, 2008 (Turku, Finland) 2008 ISOE European Symposium
March, 2006 (Essen, Germany) 2006 ISOE International ALARA Symposium
North American Technical Center
January, 2009 (Ft. Lauderdale, FL, USA) 2009 ISOE North American ALARA Symposium
January, 2008 (Ft. Lauderdale, FL, USA) 2008 ISOE North American ALARA Symposium
January, 2007 (Ft. Lauderdale, FL, USA) 2007 ISOE International ALARA Symposium
January, 2006 (Ft. Lauderdale, FL, USA) 2006 ISOE North American ALARA Symposium
January, 2005 (Ft. Lauderdale, FL, USA) 2005 ISOE International ALARA Symposium
IAEA Technical Center
October 2009 (Vienna, Austria) 2009 ISOE International ALARA Symposium

* Symposia held since 2005 are listed (for related documents, refer to the ISOE web site).

▪ ATC published a Japanese version of the following OECD document.


“Work Management to Optimise Occupational Radiological Protection at Nuclear Power
Plants” (OECD/NEA 2009)
This is a significant update to a previous 1997 ISOE work management report, and reflects the
current state of knowledge, technology and experience in occupational radiation protection of
workers at nuclear power plants in order to provide practical guidance.
The Japanese version can be downloaded from the web site of the ISOE Asia Technical Center:
(http://www.jnes.go.jp/isoe/)


693

BWR average annual collective dose per reactor by country  



 㻶㼍㼜㼍㼚 㼁㻚㻿㻚㻭㻚 㻳㼑㼞㼙㼍㼚㼥
㻭㼚㼚㼡㼍㼘㻌㻱㼤㼜㼛㼟㼡㼞㼑㻌㼐㼛㼟㼑䠄㻼㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚䞉㻿㼢㻛㻾㼑㼍㼏㼠㼛㼞䠅


㻿㼣㼑㼐㼑㼚 㻲㼕㼚㼘㼍㼚㼐 㻿㼣㼕㼠㼦㼑㼞㼘㼍㼚㼐





 㻞



 㻝


 㻜
㻝㻥㻥㻥 㻞㻜㻜㻜 㻞㻜㻜㻝 㻞㻜㻜㻞 㻞㻜㻜㻟 㻞㻜㻜㻠 㻞㻜㻜㻡 㻞㻜㻜㻢 㻞㻜㻜㻣 㻞㻜㻜㻤

 㻲㼕㼟㼏㼍㼘㻌㼅㼑㼍㼞


PWR average annual collective dose per reactor by country  

 㻠
㻭㼚㼚㼡㼍㼘㻌㻱㼤㼜㼛㼟㼡㼞㼑㻌㼐㼛㼟㼑䠄㻼㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚䞉㻿㼢㻛㻾㼑㼍㼏㼠㼛㼞䠅

 㻶㼍㼜㼍㼚 㼁㻚㻿㻚㻭㻚 㻳㼑㼞㼙㼍㼚㼥



㻲㼞㼍㼚㼏㼑 㻮㼑㼘㼓㼕㼡㼙 㻷㼛㼞㼑㼍
 㻟


 㻞


 㻝


 㻜
 㻝㻥㻥㻥 㻞㻜㻜㻜 㻞㻜㻜㻝 㻞㻜㻜㻞 㻞㻜㻜㻟 㻞㻜㻜㻠 㻞㻜㻜㻡 㻞㻜㻜㻢 㻞㻜㻜㻣 㻞㻜㻜㻤
㻲㼕㼟㼏㼍㼘㻌㼅㼑㼍㼞

694
䠄㻼㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚䡡䠯䡒䠋㻾㼑㼍㼏㼠㼛㼞䠅


































䠄㻼㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚䡡䠯䡒䠋㻾㼑㼍㼏㼠㼛㼞䠅 

 㻜㻚㻡
 㻝㻚㻡


 㻝







㻶㼍㼜㼍㼚
㻭㼞㼙㼑㼚㼕㼍 㻹㼑㼤㼕㼏㼛
㻲㼕㼚㼘㼍㼚㼐
㻿㼛㼡㼠㼔㻌㻭㼒㼞㼕㼏㼍㻘㻌㻾㼑㼜㻌㼛㼒
㻮㼞㼍㼦㼕㼘 㻶㼍㼜㼍㼚

㻾㼡㼟㼟㼕㼍㼚㻌㻲㼑㼐㼑㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚
㼁㼚㼕㼠㼑㼐㻌㻿㼠㼍㼠㼑㼟
㼁㼚㼕㼠㼑㼐㻌㻿㼠㼍㼠㼑㼟
㻲㼞㼍㼚㼏㼑
㻳㼑㼞㼙㼍㼚㼥
㻼㼍㼗㼕㼟㼠㼍㼚 㻳㼑㼞㼙㼍㼚㼥

695
㻿㼣㼑㼐㼑㼚
㻯㼔㼕㼚㼍
㻷㼛㼞㼑㼍㻘㻌㻾㼑㼜㻌㼛㼒 㻿㼣㼕㼠㼦㼑㼞㼘㼍㼚㼐

㻿㼣㼕㼠㼦㼑㼞㼘㼍㼚㼐
㻮㼑㼘㼓㼡㼕㼡㼙
㻿㼣㼑㼐㼑㼚
㻴㼡㼚㼓㼍㼞㼥
㻿㼜㼍㼕㼚
㼀㼔㼑㻌㻺㼑㼠㼔㼑㼞㼘㼍㼚㼐㼟

(Note) The contents of pages 692-695 are adapted from the ISOE homepage.
㻿㼜㼍㼕㼚
2008 PWR average collective dose per reactor by country
2008 BWR average collective dose per reactor by country

㻮㼡㼘㼓㼍㼞㼕㼍
㼁㼚㼕㼠㼑㼐㻌㻷㼕㼚㼓㼐㼛㼙
㻿㼘㼛㼢㼍㼗㻌㻾㼑㼜㼡㼎㼘㼕㼏 㻲㼕㼚㼘㼍㼚㼐

㻿㼘㼛㼢㼑㼚㼕㼍
㻯㼦㼑㼏㼔㻌㻾㼑㼜㼡㼎㼘㼕㼏



SAFETY REGULATION ADMINISTRATION

ϱϮ SAFETY REGULATION
ADMINISTRATION


697
ϱϮ–1 Overview of safety regulation administration
ϱϮ-1-1 Overview of Safety Regulations
When a nuclear facility is established and operated, the facility operator must independently establish a safety
management system to ensure the safety of the facility. On the other hand, in order to ensure public safety, the
Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry implements strict safety regulations through the designation and
approval of nuclear businesses (approval of reactor establishment), approval of design and construction methods,
pre-service inspections, welding inspections, approval of safety regulations, periodical inspections of facilities
after their operation has commenced, investigations into the observation status of safety regulations and
management and supervision of facility operation, according to the Law for the Regulation of Nuclear Source
Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors (hereinafter referred to as the "Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law").
Figure XVII-1-1 shows an overview of the safety regulations.
In regard to nuclear power reactors, approval of construction plans, pre-service inspections, welding inspections
and periodical inspections based on the Electricity Utilities Industry Law are also part of safety regulations being
enforced.

Establishment license application

% Commercial power reactors and nuclear power reactors in a research and development stage
% Refining facilities, processing facilities, spent fuel storage facilities, disposal facilities (waste burial
facilities, waste management facilities)
% Reprocessing facilities

Establishment
license Consult
% Atomic Energy Commission
Ministry of % Nuclear Safety Commission
Economy, Trade Report
and Industry

Subsequent regulations by other


government administrative agencies

[Construction phase]
% Approval of design and construction methods
% Pre-service inspections
% Fuel assembly inspection
% Welding safety management inspections
% Approval of safety regulations
[Operational phase]
% Periodical facility inspections
% Inspections of the situation of compliance with operational safety program
[Decommissioning phase]
% Application for decommissioning plan approval
% Periodical facilities inspection
(When nuclear fuel material exists within reactor facilities that are
subject of decommissioning㸧
% Inspections of the situation of compliance with operational safety program
% Confirmation of completion of decommissioning measures


Figure ϱϮ-1-1 Overview of Safety Regulations of Nuclear Facilities


699
ϱϮ-1-2 Safety Regulations of Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities

Safety regulations of nuclear power reactor facilities are implemented according to the Nuclear Reactor
Regulation Law and the Electricity Utilities Industry Law. The main flow of the safety regulations of commercial
nuclear power reactors is shown in Figure XVII-1-2.

1. Reactor Establishment License


Those who are planning to establish a commercial power reactor or a nuclear power reactor in a research and
development stage (hereinafter referred to as "establishers") are required to obtain approval for the reactor
from the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry according to Article 23 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Law.
Once an application for a reactor establishment license is received from an establisher, the Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) examines whether the basic design of the reactor presents any
obstacles to disaster prevention. At that time, experts on the Nuclear Safety Committee of the Advisory
Committee on Natural Resources and Energy are consulted on technical issues as needed. The Minister of
Economy, Trade and Industry then asks the Atomic Energy Commission and the Nuclear Safety Commission
for opinions on the examination results, and grants a license to the establisher upon obtaining the approval of
the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology.
To obtain a reactor establishment license, the reactor must satisfy the following requirements:
(1) There is no possibility of it being used for anything other than peaceful purposes.
(2) There is no possibility that approval for the establishment of the reactor could prevent the development
and utilization of nuclear power from being carried out as planned.
(3) The applicant has technical competence and basic knowledge about accounting required to establish a
reactor. The applicant also has sufficient technical competency to correctly operate a reactor.
(4) The location, structure and equipment of the reactor facility do not present obstacles in preventing
disasters that may be caused by nuclear fuel material (including spent fuel), materials contaminated with
nuclear fuel material (including nuclear fission products) or reactors.

2. Technical Standards
Technical standards on atomic power under Article 39-1 of the Electricity Utilities Industry Law include:
%& Ordinance on Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Equipment
%& Ordinance on Establishing Technical Standards on Nuclear Fuel Material for Power Generation
%& Ordinance on Establishing Technical Standards on the Welding of Electrical Structures
%& Ordinance on Establishing Technical Standards on Electrical Equipment
An establisher is obliged to maintain electrical structures for business use so that they conform to these
technical standards. These technical standards are very important in that they provide not only standards on
which orders are issued under Article 40 of the Electricity Utilities Industry Law, Article 47: Approval of
Construction Plans; Article 48: Report of Construction Plans; Article 49: Qualification Standard of Pre-
service Inspections; and Article 54: Qualification Standard of Periodical Inspections.
Article 39-2 of the law stipulates basic requirements that must be satisfied when technical standards are
established as shown below:

700
(1) Ensure that electrical structures for business use do not harm the human body or damage any property.
(2) Ensure that electrical structures for business use do not electrically or magnetically affect the functions
of other electrical equipment or other property.
(3) Ensure that destruction of electrical structures for business use does not significantly disturb the
electricity supply of general electricity utilities.
(4) If electrical structures for business use are used for a general electricity enterprise, ensure that
destruction of the electrical structures do not significantly disturb the electricity supply related to the
enterprise.
The Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law further stipulates technical standards on construction, maintenance and
operation of nuclear power reactor facilities in a research and development stage required to ensure the safety
of such facilities.
These technical standards provide guidelines upon which approval is given to design and construction
methods when a nuclear power reactor facility in a research and development stage is established, as well as
acceptance criteria of pre-service inspections and periodical inspections of such a facility. Standards set
according to the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law include:
%& Article 9 of the Rules for the Installation, Operation, etc. of Commercial Power Reactors in the
Research and Development Stage (technical standards on performance)
%& Rules for Technical Standards for Design and construction methods of Nuclear Power Generation
Equipment in the Research and Development Stage
%& Rules for Technical Standards on Welding of Nuclear Power Reactors in a Research and Development
Stage

3. Approval of Construction Plans


For construction or reconstruction of electrical structures for business use that are especially important in
ensuring public safety, approval must be obtained for the plans for such construction (Article 47 of the
Electricity Utilities Industry Law).
Requirements that such plans must satisfy to obtain approval are specified in Article 47-3 of the Electricity
Utilities Industry Law. These requirements are listed below:
(1) The electrical structures for business use must conform to the technical standards specified in
ordinances from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and stipulated in Article 39-1 of the
Electricity Utilities Industry Law.
(2) If the electrical structures for business use are used for electricity production, the electrical structure
must be technologically suited to ensuring a smooth electricity supply.
(3) If the electrical structures for business use are involved in a specified business, the electrical structures
must conform to an assessment note related to a notice specified in Article 46-17-2 of the Electricity
Utilities Industry Law related to the specified business.
(4) If the electrical structures for business use are involved in a business that is categorized into class 2
specified in Article 2-3 (excluding a specified business), other than a business specified in Article 2-4,
measures specified in Article 4-3-2 (including in the event that the article is applied in Articles 4-4 and
29-2 of the law) must have been adopted.
For construction or reconstruction of a nuclear power reactor facility in a research and development stage,
approval must be obtained for the design and construction methods according to Article 27 of the Nuclear
Reactor Regulation Law.
As for the approval criteria, conformance to the provisions of Article 27-3 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Law is required.


701
4. Inspections of Nuclear Power Plants
Along with the construction plan approval and reporting system and independent safety systems, inspections
provide another means to ensure the safety of nuclear power plants. The Electricity Utilities Industry Law
contains provisions concerning pre-service inspections, fuel assembly inspections, welding safety
management inspections and periodical inspections. The Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law contains
provisions concerning the status of observance of safety regulations (safety inspections) and on-the-spot
inspections.
On the other hand, for nuclear power reactor facilities in a research and development stage, the Nuclear
Reactor Regulation Law contains provisions concerning pre-service inspections, welding inspections and
periodical facility inspections in a similar fashion to the Electricity Utilities Industry Law.
Accordingly, nuclear power reactor facilities in a research and development stage are subject to both of these
laws. However, because there are few substantial differences found between the inspections specified in
these laws, the Electricity Utilities Industry Law partially uses inspection results specified in the Nuclear
Reactor Regulation Law for most inspection items excluding final function inspections.
(1) Pre-service inspections (Article 49 of the Electricity Utilities Industry Law)
1) Purpose
A pre-service inspection is intended to check whether or not construction of an electrical structure
has been carried out according to the construction plan approved and reported in response to the
relevant regulations.
2) Inspection objects
Pre-service inspections are to be conducted on electrical structures that are installed or
reconstructed according to the construction plan for which approval has been obtained under
Article 47 of the Electricity Utilities Industry Law or that has been reported under Article 48 of the
law, or more specifically, on electrical structures specified in an approved or reported construction
plan.
3) Acceptability criteria
The acceptance criteria of a pre-service inspection are specified in Article 49-2 of the Electricity
Utilities Industry Law, and electrical structures must satisfy all of the following requirements to
pass a pre-service inspection:
a. Construction must have been carried out according to an approved or reported plan.
b. The electrical structure must conform to the technical standards specified in ordinances from
the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry stipulated in Article 39-1 of the Electricity
Utilities Industry Law.
4) Inspection timing and methods
Such electrical structures must undergo pre-service inspections in each of the construction
processes specified in Article 69 of the Rules for the Enforcement of the Electricity Utilities
Industry Law. This is because a determination on whether some electrical structures satisfy
acceptance criteria cannot be made until they are under construction, and some must be checked in
certain pre-service processes to ensure their safety. A pre-service inspection is intended to check
items specified separately for each construction process, and what is inspected and by what
method, as well as other details, depend on construction specifics. In a nuclear power plant, pre-
service inspections are conducted in the following construction processes (Article 69 of the Rules
for the Enforcement of the Electricity Utilities Industry Law):
a. When the reactor itself, the reactor cooling system equipment, the instrumentation and control
system equipment, the fuel equipment, the radiation management equipment, the disposal
equipment or the reactor containment facility is ready to undergo a structural inspection, a
strength inspection or a leakage inspection.
b. For the steam turbine, when the lower half of the shell casing of the steam turbine is installed
and when the boiler of the auxiliary boiler is built.

702
c. When the reactor is ready to be loaded with fuel.
This is an inspection called an inspection prior to fuel loading and is conducted when the
construction of the nuclear facility is almost complete. This inspection is conducted on
systems that must be inspected before the reactor is loaded with fuel for safety reasons or that
cannot be inspected after the reactor is loaded with fuel. Whether these systems function as
specified in the construction plan and whether they conform to relevant technical standards is
checked during the inspection.
d. When the reactor goes critical.
In this stage, the characteristics of the reactor are checked. The first critical test is conducted
to verify whether the nuclear characteristics conform to design values specified in the
construction plan.
e. When construction related to the construction plan is completed.
All of the equipment specified in the construction plan is subject to inspection, conducted in
reference to relevant technical standards and documents attached to the construction plan, to
verify that the equipment and systems inspected in processes a to d above do not impact on
the safety of the entire nuclear power plant or a smooth electricity supply.
(2) Fuel assembly inspection (Article 51 of the Electricity Utilities Industry Law)
Nuclear fuel materials used for fuel for nuclear reactors must undergo inspections specified by the
Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry in each process. This inspection is called a fuel assembly
inspection. This inspection covers not only fuel materials and clads, but also other fuel assembly
components.
(3) Welding safety management inspection (Article 52 of the Electricity Utilities Industry Law)
1) Purpose
If a containment vessel contains radioactive materials in high concentration or a pressure vessel of
a high temperature and high pressure steam and other materials, breakage of the vessel will result
in significant damage. In order to prevent such damage, welding, which makes up an important
part of the manufacturing process of these vessels, is inspected in certain processes on a voluntary
basis. Systems under which these inspections are conducted are also reviewed in order to ensure
the safety of electrical structures.
2) Inspection objects
Vessels on which welding safety management inspections must be conducted are specified in
Articles 79 to 81 of the Rules for the Enforcement of the Electricity Utilities Industry Law. Vessels
to be covered by welding safety management inspections in a nuclear facility include vessels that
constitute a reactor itself or a reactor containment facility, vessels that constitute reactor cooling
system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment or radiation management
equipment and other equipment that is used as safety equipment in an emergency.
3) Acceptability criteria
The acceptance criteria of a welding safety management inspection are specified in Article 52-2 of
the Electricity Utilities Industry Law. To pass a welding safety management inspection, the
welding must conform to technical standards stipulated in ordinances from the Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry.
(4) Periodical inspections (Article 54 of the Electricity Utilities Industry Law)
Establishers of nuclear power plants are required to undergo periodical inspections conducted by the
Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry for electrical structures of their plants that are important in
ensuring safety and a smooth electricity supply, according to Article 54 of the Electricity Utilities
Industry Law.
1) Purpose
A periodical inspection is intended to ensure the proper maintenance and safe operation of nuclear
power plants. In a periodical inspection,

a. electrical structures are checked for age deterioration to ensure their safety, and

703
b. electrical structures are checked for performance deterioration or for decreased supply
capability due to deterioration to ensure a smooth electricity supply.
2) Inspection objects
Electrical structures in a nuclear power plant that need to be inspected are specified in Articles 89
and 90 of the Rules for the Enforcement of the Electricity Utilities Industry Law as follows:
Steam turbine
Nuclear power reactor and associated equipment
(Reactor itself, reactor cooling system equipment, instrumentation and control system equipment,
fuel equipment, radiation management equipment, disposal equipment, reactor containment facility
and emergency standby power generation device)
3) Inspection timing
Article 91 of the Rules for the Enforcement of the Electricity Utilities Industry Law stipulates that
establishers of nuclear power plants undergo periodical inspections at the following times:
a. Steam turbine that constitutes a nuclear power station: the day on which it is brought into
operation or within 13 months after one year has passed since the previous periodical
inspection
b. Nuclear power reactor and associated equipment: the day on which it is brought into operation
or within 13 months after the previous periodical inspection
A periodical inspection period starts on the day when the inspection object is separated from the
electrical system to be inspected and ends on the day when a full load test, which is conducted at
the end of a periodical inspection, is completed. The next periodical inspection must therefore be
conducted on a nuclear power reactor and associated equipment within 13 months after the last full
load test was conducted.
4) Inspection methods
Conduct a teardown or overhaul inspection and a function test depending on the importance of the
equipment and the status of use.
Check that the safety and integrity of the equipment have not been undermined and are in no
danger of being undermined by future use.
(5) Periodical safety management inspection (Article 55 of the Electricity Utilities Industry Law)
A periodical safety management inspection, which is specified in Article 55 of the Electricity Utilities
Industry Law, is another periodical inspection conducted by the government. In a periodical safety
management inspection, systems under which periodical voluntary inspections are conducted are
examined.
1) Purpose
The suitability of organizations involved in periodical voluntary inspections, periodical voluntary
inspection methods, process management and training in inspections is examined and the results
are evaluated on a scale of 1 to 3. A periodical safety management inspection provides an incentive
regulation that adds or reduces inspection items in the next inspection depending on the evaluation.
2) Inspection objects
A periodical safety management inspection is conducted on organizations involved in periodical
voluntary inspections, periodical voluntary inspection methods, process management, etc.
(6) Inspection of safety regulation observance status
1) Safety inspections
An inspection of the observational status of safety regulations (hereinafter referred to as "safety
inspections") is an inspection that the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry conducts and
requires establishers to undergo according to Article 37-5 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law.

704
a. Purpose
A safety inspection is intended to maintain the proper operation of nuclear power plants,
including periodical evaluations of facilities, by requiring establishers to periodically check
the observance status of safety regulations regarding operation management, etc.
b. Inspection timing
A safety inspection is to be conducted at each nuclear power plant once every quarter
according to the stipulations in ordinances from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.
c. Inspection method
A safety inspection is to be conducted by appropriately combining the following methods
according to the stipulations in ordinances from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry:
%& On-the-spot inspections of offices and plants
%& Inspection of accounts, documents, equipment and other materials
%& Questioning workers and other concerned parties
%& Submission of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel material, materials contaminated
with nuclear fuel material or other materials (minimum amount required for a test)

5. Measures involved in decommissioning of reactors


Nuclear facility establishers who have a plan to decommission their facilities must dismantle the reactor
facilities, transfer nuclear fuel materials they possess, remove nuclear fuel material contamination, dispose of
materials contaminated with nuclear fuel materials, and take other measures stipulated in ordinances from the
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (hereinafter called "decommissioning measures") according to
Article 43-3-2 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law. Before taking decommissioning measures, they must
establish a plan for the decommissioning measures (hereinafter called a "decommissioning plan") and obtain
approval for the plan from the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry under ordinances from METI.
Even in a decommissioning stage, establishers are still subject to regulations on approval of safety
regulations, periodical facility inspections (if the reactor facility to be decommissioned contains nuclear fuel
materials) and investigations of safety regulation observance status under the Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Law. When extending a facility, they are subject to regulations on approval of design and construction
methods and pre-service inspections.
After decommissioning measures are completed, the establishers must have the results of the measures
approved by the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry as conforming to standards stipulated in
ordinances from METI. When completion of decommissioning measures is confirmed, the establishment
license given to the establisher for the reactor is invalidated.


705
Figure ϱϮ-1-2 Legal Procedures from Site Selection to Completion of
Decommissioning Measures
Government
Electric utility
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry Others
Opinion
Site selection Prefectural governor
Location

Environmental Environmental [First public Ministry of the


survey review Environment
hearing]
Land acquisition

Consult
Application for Safety

Second public
establishment examination

Commission
Commission

hearing
license

Nuclear
Nuclear

Safety
Report
Establishment
license Nuclear Reactor
Consent of the Minister of
Regulation Law Education, Culture, Sports,
Notification of alteration of Science and Technology
Design

electrical structures Receipt of notification Electricity Utility Law


Nuclear Reactor
Application for construction Approval of construction Electricity Utility Law Regulation Law
plan approval plan
Notification of alteration of Receipt of notification Electricity Utility Law
operational safety program
Notification of assignment of Receipt of notification Electricity Utility Law
chief boiler turbine/electric
engineer

Application for fuel assembly Fuel assembly design


design approval approval Electricity Utility Law

Start of construction work


Fuel assembly
Issuance of permission

Application for different types


of inspection inspection Electricity Utility Law
certificate

Welding safety management


inspection Electricity
Utility Law
Pre-operation inspection Electricity
Construction

Utility Law
Notification of assignment of
nuclear material protection Receipt of Nuclear Reactor
manager notification Regulation Law

Application for approval of nuclear Approval of nuclear material Nuclear Reactor


material protection rules protection rules Regulation Law

Notification of assignment of chief Receipt of notification Nuclear Reactor


reactor engineer Regulation Law
Application for approval of Approval of operational Nuclear Reactor
safety regulations safety program Regulation Law

Notification of Nuclear Reactor


Receipt of notification Regulation Law
operational plan
Notification of business Receipt of notification Electricity Utility Law
commencement
Application for periodical Periodical inspection Electricity Utility Law
inspection
Application for periodical safety Periodical safety Electricity Utility Law
management review management review
Nuclear Power Plant Receipt of report Electricity Utility Law and
Report for operation Nuclear Reactor
Operation

Regulation Law

Maintenance of electrical Technical standards conformation order


structures
Electricity Utility Law
Technical Standards
*
Inspection of safety regulation Nuclear Reactor Includes periodical evaluation of
observance status* Regulation Law nuclear facilities
Inspection of nuclear material Same as
protection rule observance status above
On-the-spot inspection Electricity Utility Law and
Nuclear Reactor
Regulation Law

706

Application for Approval of Nuclear Reactor
decommissioning plan approval decommissioning plan Regulation Law
Notification of Receipt of notification Electricity Utility Law
alteration of electrical
structures
or * or *
Application for Approval of closing Electricity Utility Law
approval of closing business
Decommissioning

business
Approval of alteration of Nuclear Reactor
Application for approval Regulation Law
safety regulations
for alteration of safety
regulations Inspection of safety regulation Nuclear Reactor
observance status Regulation Law
Application for periodical facility Periodical facility Equipment to be installed in a stage of

permission certificate
inspection inspection Nuclear Reactor decommissioning also requires approval for
(If the facility to be decommissioned

Issuance of
Regulation Law the installation changes and for the design
contains nuclear fuel materials㸧 and construction methods, and must undergo
pre-operation inspections under the Nuclear
Application for confirmation of Confirmation of completion Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law.
completion of decommissioning of decommissioning Reactor
measures measures Regulation
Invalidation of establishment Law
license for that reactor

* General electric utilities (electric power companies) are required to apply for approval for any alteration of electrical structures, while wholesale electric
utilities are required to apply for approval of a business closure.


707
ϱϮ-1-3 Safety Regulations of Refining, Fabrication, Storage and Reprocessing Business

Safety regulations for refining, fabrication, storage and reprocessing facilities are implemented according to the
Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law. The main flow of the safety regulations is shown in Figure XVII-1-3.

1. Designation/Approval of Business
Those who are planning to undertake refining, fabrication, storage or reprocessing business must be
designated as a licensed business by, or obtain approval from the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry
according to the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law.
%& Refining business (Designation under Article 3 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law)
%& Fabrication business (Approval under Article 13 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law)
%& Storage business (Approval under Article 43-4 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law)
%& Reprocessing business (Designation under Article 44 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law)
Upon receiving an application for designation as a licensed business or an application for permission, METI
examines whether the basic design of the reactor facility is sufficiently safe or not. The Minister of Economy,
Trade and Industry then consults the Atomic Energy Commission and the Nuclear Safety Commission on the
examination results. After receiving reports from them, the minister then designates the applicant as a
licensed business or grants business permission upon obtaining the approval of the Minister of Education,
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology.
A business license or permission is granted when the business satisfies the following requirements:
(1) There is no possibility of the spent fuel storage facility or reprocessing facility being used for anything
other than peaceful purposes.
(2) There is no possibility that designation of the refining business, permission for storage business or
designation of the reprocessing business could prevent the development and utilization of nuclear power
from being carried out as planned.
Permission for the fabrication business does not cause excessive fabrication capacity.
(3) The applicant has technical competence and a basic knowledge about accounting required to do the
business properly.
(4) The location, structure and equipment of the refining, fabrication, storage or reprocessing facility does
not impede the prevention of disasters that may be caused by nuclear source materials or nuclear fuel
material.

2. Approval of Design and Construction Methods


A fabrication, storage or reprocessing establisher must obtain approval for the design and construction
methods before commencing construction of the facility from the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry
according to relevant government ordinances.
The requirements that such design and construction methods must satisfy to obtain approval are specified in
the provisions of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law. These requirements are listed below:
(1) Fabrication business (Article 16-2 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law.)
1) The design and construction methods must conform to what is approved in Article 13-1 or Article
12-1 or reported in Article 13-2.
2) The design and construction methods must conform to technical standards stipulated in ordinances
from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.
(2) Storage business (Article 43-8 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law.)
1) The design and construction methods must conform to what is approved in Article 43-4-1 or
Article 42-1 or reported in Article 43-2.

708
2) The design and construction methods must conform to technical standards stipulated in ordinances
from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.
(3) Reprocessing business (Article 45 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law.)
1) The design and construction methods must conform to what is specified in Article 44-1, what is
approved in Article 44-3 or Article 43-3, or what is reported in Article 44-2 or Article 44-4.
2) The design and construction methods must conform to technical standards stipulated in ordinances
from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.

3. Inspections of Refining, Fabrication, Storage and Reprocessing Facilities


Inspections are important in ensuring the safety of refining, fabrication, storage and reprocessing facilities,
and the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law contains provisions on pre-service inspections, welding inspections,
periodical facility inspections, inspections of safety regulation observance status (safety inspections) and on-
the-spot inspections.
(1) Pre-service inspections
Fabrication, storage and reprocessing undertakers must have the facility's construction and performance
inspected by the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry according to METI ordinances, and the
facility must pass the inspection before it can be put into use.
%& Fabrication business (Article 16-3 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law)
%& Storage business (Article 43-9 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law)
%& Reprocessing business (Article 46 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law)
1) Acceptance criteria
In order to pass, a facility must satisfy the following requirements:
a. The construction has been carried out in accordance with the design and methods approved as
described in 2.
b. Performance must conform to technical standards stipulated in ordinances from METI.
2) Inspection items
Pre-service inspections are conducted for inspection items specified separately for each facility in
ordinances from METI and are divided into items concerning construction and items concerning
performance. Definitive items include:
%& Fabrication business (Article 3-6 of the Rules for Fabrication of Nuclear Fuel Materials)
a. Items relating to materials or components that must be air- or water-tight
When a nondestructive test, mechanical test, pressure test or leakage test is conducted or
when deemed appropriate by the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry.
b. Items relating to the construction of the fabrication equipment itself, a nuclear fuel material
storage facility or a radioactive waste disposal facility
When the dimensions of major parts of these facilities can be measured or when a
nondestructive test, a mechanical test, a pressure test or a leakage test is conducted.
c. When the construction of a building, a radiation management facility or other fabrication
facility is completed.
d. Items relating to the performance of a fabrication facility
When the fabrication facility is operated on a trial basis at maximum capacity or when
deemed appropriate by the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry.


709
%& Storage business (Article 8 of the Rules for Storage of Spent Fuel)
a. Items relating to radiation shielding materials or materials or components that must be air- or
water-tight
When a chemical analysis, nondestructive test, mechanical test, pressure test or leakage test is
conducted or when deemed appropriate by the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry.
b. Items relating to the construction of the spent fuel storage equipment itself, a facility
receiving spent fuel or a radioactive waste disposal facility
When the dimensions of major components of these facilities can be measured or when a
nondestructive test, mechanical test, pressure test or leakage test is conducted.
c. Items relating to the construction of a building, an instrumentation and control system facility,
a radiation management facility and other facilities that constitute spent fuel storage
equipment
When these facilities are completed.
d. Items relating to the performance of the spent fuel storage facility
When the spent fuel storage facility is completed or when deemed appropriated by the
Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry.
%& Reprocessing business (Article 6 of the Rule for Reprocessing of Spent Fuel)
a. Items relating to radiation shielding materials or materials or components that must be air- or
water-tight or corrosion resistant
When a chemical analysis, nondestructive test, mechanical test, pressure test or leakage test is
conducted or when deemed appropriate by the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry.
b. Items relating to the construction of a facility receiving or storing spent fuel, the reprocessing
equipment itself, a product storage facility or a radioactive waste disposal facility
When the dimensions of major parts of these facilities can be measured or when a
nondestructive test, mechanical test, pressure test or leakage test is conducted.
c. Items relating to the construction of a building, an instrumentation and control system facility,
a radiation management facility and other reprocessing facilities
When these facilities are completed.
d. Items relating to the performance of the reprocessing facility
When the reprocessing facility is operated on a trial basis at maximum capacity or when
deemed appropriate by the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry.
(2) Welding inspections
Fabrication, storage and reprocessing undertakers must obtain approval for the welding methods of their
facility from, and have the welding inspected by the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry according
to the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law. The facility must pass the inspection before it can be put into
use. Facilities to be covered by welding inspections and the acceptance criteria are outlined below:
1) Objects of a welding inspection
%& Fabrication business (Article 16-4 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law)
Vessels or pipes carrying liquid or gas containing plutonium or a plutonium compound, vessels or
pipes carrying liquid or gas containing uranium or a uranium compound, containers that heat
uranium hexafluoride and other fabrication facilities as specified in Article 3-8 of the Rules for
Fabrication of Nuclear Fuel Materials (Fabrication Facilities that must Undergo a Welding
Inspection).
%& Storage business (Article 43-10 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law)
Vessels and pipes specified in Article 11 of the Law on Storage of Spent Fuel (Spent Fuel Storage
Facilities that must Undergo a Welding Inspection).

710
%& Reprocessing business (Article 46-2 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law)
Spent fuel dissolvers, vessels and pipes specified in Article 7-2 of the Rule for Reprocessing of
Spent Fuel (Reprocessing Facilities that must Undergo a Welding Inspection)
2) Acceptance criteria
In order to pass, welding must satisfy the following requirements:
a. The welding must have been carried out in accordance with the method approved by the
Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry.
b. The welding must conform to technical standards stipulated in ordinances from METI.
(3) Periodical facility inspections
These facilities must undergo periodical facility inspections conducted annually by the Minister of
Economy, Trade and Industry concerning performance as stipulated in relevant government directives,
and according to ordinances from METI (periodical facility inspections of storage business are
conducted less frequently than once a year).
Periodical facility inspections are conducted to verify whether these facilities conform to the technical
standards stipulated in ordinances from METI.
%& Fabrication business (Article 16-5 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law)
%& Storage business (Article 43-11 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law)
%& Reprocessing business (Article 46-2 -2 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law)
(4) Inspections of safety regulation observance status
For details about the approval of safety regulations, refer to XVII-1-5 below.
1) Safety inspections
Refining, fabrication, storage and reprocessing licensees must undergo inspections conducted
periodically by the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry to verify safety regulation observance
status (hereinafter referred to as "safety inspections").
%& Refining business (Article 12-5 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law)
Article 7-2 of the Law on Refining of Nuclear Source Materials and Nuclear Fuel Material
(inspection of safety regulation observance status)
%& Fabrication business (Article 22-5 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law)
Article 8-2 of the Rules for Fabrication of Nuclear Fuel Materials (Inspection of safety regulation
observance status)
%& Storage business (Article 43-20-5 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law)
Article 38 of the Rules for Storage of Spent Fuel (Inspection of safety regulation observance
status)
%& Reprocessing business (Article 50-5 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law)
Article 17-2 of the Rule for Reprocessing of Spent Fuel (Inspection of safety regulation observance
status)
a. Purpose
A safety inspection is intended to allow operators of these facilities to conduct their respective
businesses in an appropriate manner by verifying compliance with safety regulations
concerning operational management.
b. Inspection timing
Safety inspections are to be conducted by the Nuclear and Industrial Agency and inspectors
stationed at nuclear safety inspection offices every quarter for each facility according to the
provisions in ordinances from METI.


711
c. Inspection method
A safety inspection is to be conducted by combining the following items appropriately
according to the provisions of ordinances of METI:
%& On-the-spot inspection of offices or plants
%& Inspection of account books, documents, equipment, and other objects
%& Asking workers and other parties concerned questions
%& Submission of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel material, materials contaminated
with nuclear fuel material or other materials (minimum amount required for an
inspection).
2) Periodical evaluation of facilities
Fabrication and reprocessing undertakers are required to periodically evaluate the safety of their
facilities.
a. Article 7-8-2 (Periodical Evaluation of the Safety of Fabrication Facilities) and Article 8-13
(Safety Regulations) of the Rules for Fabrication of Nuclear Fuel Materials
b. 16-2 (Periodical Evaluation of the Safety of Reprocessing Facilities) and Article 17-16 (Safety
Regulations) of the Rule for Reprocessing of Spent Fuel Business
In periodical evaluations of a facility, the facility operator must:
a. evaluate the status of safety activity implementation for the facility
b. evaluate how the latest technical expertise has been reflected in safety activities at the facility.
Fabrication and reprocessing undertakers are also required to adopt the following measures within
20 years after the commencement of their businesses:
a. Technically evaluate age deterioration of the facility.
b. Prepare a 10-year plan on measures that must be adopted to ensure the safety of the
fabrication facility based on the above technical evaluation.

712
Figure ϱϮ-1-3 Procedures to Be Followed for Nuclear Fuel Facilities According to the
Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law
Refining facility Fabrication facility Storage facility Reprocessing facility

Construction
phase

Application for a business license Application for a business license Application for a business license Application for a business license

Safety examination by the METI Safety examination by the METI Safety examination by the METI Safety examination by the METI

Submission to and report from the Submission to and report from the Submission to and report from the Submission to and report from the
Atomic Energy Commission and Atomic Energy Commission and Atomic Energy Commission and Atomic Energy Commission and
the Nuclear Safety Commission the Nuclear Safety Commission the Nuclear Safety Commission the Nuclear Safety Commission

Designated as a licensed business Approval of business Approval of business Designated as a licensed business

Approval of design and Approval of design and Approval of design and


construction methods construction methods construction methods

Approval of welding methods Approval of welding methods Approval of welding methods

Pre-operation inspection Pre-operation inspection Pre-operation inspection

Welding inspection Welding inspection Welding inspection

Approval of operational Approval of operational Approval of operational Approval of operational


safety program safety program safety program safety program

Notification of assignment of Notification of assignment of Notification of assignment of


nuclear fuel chief technician nuclear fuel chief technician nuclear fuel chief technician

Approval of nuclear material Approval of nuclear material Approval of nuclear material Approval of nuclear material
protection rules protection rules protection rules protection rules

Notification of assignment of Notification of assignment of Notification of assignment of Notification of assignment of


nuclear material protection nuclear material protection nuclear material protection nuclear material protection
manager manager manager manager

Operational
phase

Notification of start of business Notification of start of business Notification of start of business Notification of start of business

Notification of operational plan

Periodical facility inspection Periodical facility inspection Periodical facility inspection

Keeping of records Keeping of records Keeping of records Keeping of records

Taking of measures necessary Taking of measures necessary Taking of measures necessary


to ensure the safety of facilities to ensure the safety of facilities to ensure the safety of facilities

Report Report Report Report

On-the-spot inspection On-the-spot inspection On-the-spot inspection On-the-spot inspection

Safety inspection Safety inspection Safety inspection Safety inspection

Nuclear material protection Nuclear material protection Nuclear material protection Nuclear material protection
inspection inspection inspection inspection

Periodical evaluation of facilities Periodical evaluation of facilities



713
Refining facility Fabrication facility Storage facility Reprocessing facility

Decommission-
ing phase Approval of decommissioning plan Approval of decommissioning plan Approval of decommissioning plan Approval of decommissioning plan

Periodical facility inspection Periodical facility inspection Periodical facility inspection


(If the facility to be (If required by ministerial (If required by ministerial
decommissioned contains ordinances) ordinances)
nuclear fuel materials㸧

Keeping of records Keeping of records Keeping of records Keeping of records

Taking of measures necessary Taking of measures necessary Taking of measures necessary


to ensure the safety of facilities to ensure the safety of facilities to ensure the safety of facilities

Report Report Report Report

On-the-spot inspection On-the-spot inspection On-the-spot inspection On-the-spot inspection

Safety inspection Safety inspection Safety inspection Safety inspection

Confirmation of completion of Confirmation of completion of Confirmation of completion of Confirmation of completion of


decommissioning measures decommissioning measures decommissioning measures decommissioning measures

Invalidation of license Invalidation of license Invalidation of license Invalidation of license

714
ϱϮ-1-4 Safety Regulations of the Waste Disposal Business

Safety regulations of waste disposal facilities (waste burial facilities and waste management facilities) are
implemented according to the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law. The main flow of the safety regulations is shown
in Figure XVII-1-4.

1. Safety Regulations of the Waste Burial Business


(1) Approval of business
Those who plan to do waste disposal business must obtain approval for the business from the Minister
of Economy, Trade and Industry under Clause 51-2 of the law regulating nuclear reactors, etc.
Upon receiving an application for permission, the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry conducts a
safety examination according to the approval requirements stipulated in Article 51-3 of the Nuclear
Reactor Regulation Law. The minister then consults the Atomic Energy Commission and the Nuclear
Safety Commission on the examination results. After receiving reports from them, the minister approves
the business upon obtaining approval of the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and
Technology.
The criteria for permission is as follows (Article 51-3 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law):
1) There is no possibility that approval of the business will impede the development and utilization of
nuclear power from being carried out as planned.
2) The applicant has technical competence and a basic knowledge about accounting required to do the
business properly.
3) The location, structure and equipment of the waste burial facility do not present obstacles to the
prevention of disasters that may be caused by nuclear fuel material or materials contaminated with
nuclear fuel material.
(2) Inspections relating to waste burial facilities
1) Verification relating to waste burial
Waste burial undertakers must have the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry verify that
nuclear fuel material or materials contaminated with nuclear fuel material that are to be buried in
their facilities, as well as measures to be taken for the safe burial of these materials conform to the
technical standards (see Note 1) stipulated in ordinances from METI, according to Article 51-6 of
the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law
(Note 1) Articles 6 and 8 of the Rules for Burial of Nuclear Fuel Materials or Materials
Contaminated with Nuclear Fuel Materials
2) Inspections of safety regulation observance status
For details about the approval of safety regulations, refer to XVII-1-5 below.
An inspection of safety regulation observance status (or a safety inspection) is an inspection that
the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry periodically conducts and requires waste burial
undertakers to undergo according to Article 51-18-6 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law.
a. Purpose
Safety inspections are intended to ensure the appropriate use of nuclear facilities by requiring
waste burial undertakers to periodically verify compliance with safety regulations concerning
operational management.
b. Inspection timing
Safety inspections are to be conducted by the Nuclear and Industrial Agency and inspectors
stationed at nuclear safety inspection offices every quarter for each waste disposal facility
according to the provisions in ordinances from METI. 参


715
c. Inspection method
A safety inspection is to be conducted by combining the following items appropriately
according to the provisions of ordinances of METI:
%& On-the-spot inspection of offices or plants
%& Inspection of account books, documents, equipment, and other objects
%& Asking workers and other parties concerned questions
%& Submission of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel material, materials contaminated
with nuclear fuel material or other materials (minimum amount required for an
inspection).

2. Safety Regulations of a Waste Management Business


(1) Approval of business
Those who plan to do waste disposal business must obtain approval for the business from the Minister
of Economy, Trade and Industry under Clause 51-2 of the law regulating nuclear reactors, etc.
Upon receiving an application for permission, the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry conducts a
safety examination according to the approval requirements stipulated in Article 51-3 of the Nuclear
Reactor Regulation Law. The minister then consults the Atomic Energy Commission and the Nuclear
Safety Commission on the examination results. After receiving reports from them, the minister approves
the business upon obtaining approval of the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and
Technology.
The criteria for permission is as follows (Article 51-3 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law):
1) There is no possibility that approval of the business will impede the development and utilization of
nuclear power from being carried out as planned.
2) The applicant has technical competence and a basic knowledge about accounting required to do the
business properly.
3) The location, structure and equipment of the waste management facility do not present obstacles to
the prevention of disasters that may be caused by nuclear fuel material or materials contaminated
with nuclear fuel material.
(2) Approval of design and construction methods
Waste management undertakers must obtain approval from the Minister of Economy, Trade and
Industry for the design and construction methods of the facility before commencing construction of
special waste management facilities according to relevant government directives.
The criteria for approval is as follows: (Article 51-7-3 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law):
%& The design and construction methods must conform to what was approved by the Minister of
Economy, Trade and Industry.
%& The design and construction methods must conform to technical standards (see Note 2) stipulated
in ordinances from METI.
(Note 2) Rules for Technical Standards for Design and Construction Methods of Designated Waste
Management Facilities
(3) Inspections of waste management facilities
Inspections are important in ensuring the safety of facilities and the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law
contains provisions on pre-service inspections, welding inspections, periodical facility inspections,
inspections of safety regulation observance status (safety inspections) and on-the-spot inspections.

716
1) Pre-service inspections
Waste management undertakers must have the construction and performance of their designated
waste management facilities inspected by the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry according
to Article 51-8 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law. The facilities must pass the inspection
before they can be put into use.
The passing criteria is as follows: (Article 51-8-2 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law):
%& The construction has been carried out in accordance with the design and methods approved by
the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry.
%& Performance must conform to technical standards (see Note 3) stipulated in ordinances from
METI.
(Note 3) Article 9 of the Rules for Management of Nuclear Fuel Materials or Materials
Contaminated with Nuclear Fuel Materials
2) Approval of welding methods and welding inspections
Waste management undertakers must obtain approval from the Minister of Economy, Trade and
Industry for the welding methods of a tank of liquid nuclear fuel material or liquid materials
contaminated with nuclear fuel material and other special waste management facilities, according
to Article 51-9 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law. The welding of such special waste
management facilities must undergo an inspection by the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry
and they must pass before they can be put into use.
The passing criteria is as follows: (Article 51-9 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law):
%& The welding must have been carried out in accordance with the method approved by the
Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry.
%& The welding must conform to technical standards (see Note 4) stipulated in ordinances from
METI.
(Note 4) Rules for Technical Standards for Welding of Fabrication Facilities, Reprocessing
Facilities and Designated Waste Management Facilities
3) Periodical facility inspections
Waste management undertakers must have the performance of special waste management facilities,
or those specified by government directives such as a waste receiving facility, waste management
equipment, an instrumentation and control system facility and a radiation management facility,
inspected by the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry once a year according to Article 51-10
of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law.
Periodical facility inspections are conducted to verify compliance to the technical standards (see
Note 5) stipulated in ordinances from METI.
(Note 5) Article 22 of the Rules for Management of Nuclear Fuel Materials or Materials
Contaminated with Nuclear Fuel Materials
4) Approvals of safety regulations and inspections of safety regulation observance status
For details about the approval of safety regulations, refer to XVII-1-5 below.
Inspections of safety regulation observance status (safety inspections) are conducted in the same
way as for waste burial undertakers. Please refer to (2)-2) in the previous section.


717
Figure ϱϮ-1-4 Procedures to Be Followed for Waste Disposal Facilities
According to the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law
Waste Repository Disposal Facility Waste management Facility

Application for approval for Application for approval for


waste repository disposal facility waste management facility

Safety Examination by METI Safety Examination by METI

Consult Consult

Atomic Energy Commission Nuclear Safety Commission Atomic Energy Commission Nuclear Safety Commission

(Examination of (Examination of (Examination of (Examination of


applicant's basic applicant's disaster applicant's basic applicant's disaster
knowledge of Report prevention knowledge of Report prevention
accounting and and technical accounting and and technical
ability to work competence) ability to work competence)
systematically) Consultation systematically) Consultation

Minister of Minister of
Education, Culture, Education, Culture,
Sports, Science Sports, Science
and Technology and Technology

Approval by the Minister of Approval by the Minister of


Economy, Trade and Industry Economy, Trade and Industry

Approval of design and construction


Confirmation of the waste burial facility methods
Approval of welding methods

Approval of operational safety program


Pre-operation inspection and
welding inspection
Notification of business commencement

Approval of operational safety program

On-the-spot inspection
Notification of
Safety inspection business commencement

Confirmation of waste to be buried

Periodical facility inspection


Keeping of records
Taking of measures Hearings
necessary to ensure safety
On-the-spot inspection
Approval of alteration of
Safety inspection
operational safety program
(Go to the second phase)

Keeping of records
Approval of alteration of Taking of measures
operational safety program necessary to ensure safety
(Go to the third phase)

Approval of decommissioning plan


Approval of decommissioning plan

Approval of alteration of
Approval of alteration of
operational safety program
operational safety program
(Go to the phase of
(Go to the phase of
decommissioning measures)
decommissioning measures)

Confirmation of completion of
Confirmation of completion of
decommissioning measures
decommissioning measures

Invalidation of license
Invalidation of license

718
ϱϮ-1-5 Operational Management and Supervision

1. Violations of Safety
Safety measures for nuclear facilities in Japan consist not only of technical standards, safety examinations
and different types of inspections, but also of safety regulations instituted by establishers upon obtaining
approval from the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry under the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law.
Items decided by these safety regulations are determined by the following rules:
(1) Refining business (Article 12 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law)
Article 7 of the Rules for Refining of Nuclear Source Materials and Nuclear Fuel Material (Safety
Regulations)
(2) Fabrication business (Article 22 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law)
Article 8 of the Rules for Fabrication of Nuclear Fuel Materials
(3) Power reactor establisher (Article 37 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law)
Article 16 of the Rules for the Installation, Operation, etc. of Commercial Power Reactors (Safety
Regulations)
Article 36 of the Rules for the Installation, Operation, etc. of Commercial Power Reactors in the
Research and Development Stage (Safety Regulations)
(4) Storage business (Article 43-20 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law)
Article 37 of the Law on Storage of Spent Fuel (Safety Regulations)
(5) Reprocessing business (Article 50 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law)
Article 17 of the Rule for Reprocessing of Spent Fuel (Safety Regulations)
(6) Waste disposal business (Article 51-18 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law)
Article 20 of the Rules for Burial of Nuclear Fuel Materials or Materials Contaminated with Nuclear
Fuel Materials (Safety Regulations)
Article 34 of the Rules for Burial of Nuclear Fuel Materials or Materials Contaminated with Nuclear
Fuel Materials (Safety Regulations)

Generally, safety regulations are prescribed by the following items:


1. Matters relating to the duties and organization of those who operate, control and manage nuclear
facilities
2. Matters relating to safety education for those who operate, control and manage nuclear facilities
including:
a. Matters relating to the implementation of safety education policies, including the preparation of
implementation plans
b. Matters relating to details about safety education including the following:
1) Matters relating to relevant laws and safety regulations
2) Matters relating to the structure, performance, operation and control of nuclear facilities
3) Matters relating to radiation control
4) Matters relating to the handling of nuclear fuel material and materials contaminated with
nuclear fuel material
5) Matters relating to measures to be taken in an emergency
c. Other necessary items related to safety education concerning nuclear facilities 参
3. Matters relating to the control of equipment that requires special management for safety reasons
4. Matters relating to safety investigations into the operation of nuclear facilities

719
5. Matters relating to the institution of control zones, conservation and peripheral monitoring areas and
restrictions on access to these areas
6. Matters relating to ventilation monitoring equipment, discharge monitoring equipment and sea
discharge monitoring equipment
7. Matters relating to dosages, dose equivalents, concentration of radioactive materials, monitoring of the
density of radioactive materials on the surface of substances contaminated with radioactive materials,
and decontamination
8. Matters relating to the management of radiation measuring instruments and radiation measuring
methods
9. Matters relating to tours and inspections of nuclear facilities and procedures involved with them
10. Matters relating to periodical self-inspections of nuclear facilities
11. Matters relating to receipt and payment, delivery, transportation, storage and other handling procedures
of nuclear fuel material
12. Matters relating to the disposal of radioactive waste
13. Matters relating to measures that should be taken in an emergency
14. Matters relating to records of safety regulation activities for nuclear facilities (including observation
status)
15. Matters relating to the safety management of nuclear facilities (excluding the provisions in 16. below)
16. Matters relating to periodical evaluations of nuclear facilities
17. Matters relating to quality assurances of nuclear facilities
18. Other necessary items relating to safety regulations concerned with nuclear facilities

In light of the lessons about safety measures learned from the critical accident in a uranium processing plant
in September 1999, the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law was partially amended and safety management
systems were reviewed in December 1999, in order to further enhance the safety of nuclear facilities.
Specifically, the following measures were taken:
1) Introduction of a safety inspection system
The critical accident in the uranium processing plant occurred in September 1999 because the plant
systematically ignored work procedures approved by laws and regulations. The Nuclear Reactor
Regulation Law was accordingly amended in December 1999, and the duty of establishers of nuclear
facilities to simply comply with their safety regulations that existed prior to the amendment was revised
so that periodical inspections of observance status must also now be conducted. This inspection is
conducted every quarter and comprises an appropriate combination of a physical inspection, on-the-spot
inspection, the questioning of concerned parties and a submission of samples.
2) Reviews of safety regulations
In the amendment to the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law in December 1999, a stipulation that safety
regulations should contain provisions on safety education was added and a safety inspection system to
verify compliance with those regulations was introduced. This has encouraged the drastic revision and
enhancement of the details of these same regulations.
In particular, the amended law now requires nuclear facility operators to include in their safety
regulations, provisions that they establish a safety education plan and educate employees based on that
plan, as well as confirming that employees of contractors also receive safety education.
Furthermore, the law also requires operators of commercial power reactors to include provisions on
operational conditions. Specifically, and in reference to the technical specifications of the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC), they are now required to clearly, and in detail, specify: (1) general
operational limit conditions, (2) how frequently these conditions are to be checked, and (3) measures to
be taken when these conditions are deviated from and the time required for action.
In August 2003, it was also revealed that Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. falsified reports on self-
inspections of its nuclear power station. The Subcommittee on Nuclear Safety Regulation Legal

720
Systems of the Nuclear Safety Committee of the Advisory Committee on Natural Resources and
Energy, which was established to work on measures to prevent the reoccurrence of such false reports,
then proposed specific preventative measures.
Under these circumstances, safety regulation of high quality nuclear power was enhanced from October
2003, and relevant laws were amended to require that nuclear facility operators include provisions on
appropriate quality assurance systems and maintenance management activities in their safety activity
regulations, and that the government conduct safety inspections to verify implementation status.
Concerning the establishment of these quality assurance systems, the aim should be for nuclear facility
operators to verify their own safety activities and to assume accountability for quality assurance in order
to win the understanding of the public, and these safety activities should be intended to support
appropriate safety management at different levels of functioning and significance so that the
performance, functions and safety levels that nuclear power generation facilities possess can be
maintained.

2. Reactor Chief Engineers, Nuclear Fuel Chief Technicians, etc.


Reactor establishers are required to appoint a chief reactor engineer or a chief nuclear fuel technician from
those who have passed the chief reactor engineer examination conducted by the Minister of Economy, Trade
and Industry and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology or a nuclear fuel chief
technician examination conducted by the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry to their reactor facilities
according to the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law. A chief reactor engineer or a nuclear fuel chief technician
is expected to supervise the safe control of the operation of a nuclear facility. These qualified personnel are
also expected to have broad knowledge and understanding of nuclear facilities and able to provide workers
with appropriate instructions.
The choice of chief engineer or technician depends on the nuclear facility as follows:
(1) Fabrication facility Nuclear fuel chief technician (Article 22-2-2 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Law)
(2) Nuclear power reactor facility Chief reactor engineer (Article 40 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Law)
(3) Storage facility Spent fuel chief technician (Appointed from those with a nuclear fuel chief technician
qualification under Article 43-22 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law)
(4) Reprocessing facility Nuclear fuel chief technician (Article 50-3 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Law)
(5) Waste disposal facility Radioactive waste chief technician (Appointed from those with a nuclear fuel
chief technician qualification or a chief reactor engineer qualification under Article 51-20 of the Nuclear
Reactor Regulation Law)
3. Others
(1) Safeguards
The Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law requires nuclear facilities to establish a nuclear material
accountancy system to confirm that nuclear materials are not used for nuclear weapons or for other
unknown purposes. Under the system, they are obliged to keep records of the amounts of nuclear
material received from outside in exchange for payment as well as inventory levels in the facility, and to
report to the government. The law also stipulates that national inspectors may visit nuclear facilities to
check records kept and nuclear material used in the facility in order to verify that records reported to the
government accurately reflect fluctuations in nuclear material, and contain them or instruct them to
install monitoring instruments or to remove nuclear material as needed.
(2) Nuclear material protection
There are regulations for nuclear material protection in place to prevent the illegal transfer of nuclear
materials and sabotage.
1) Establishers must take measures for nuclear material protection depending on the material and 参
amounts.


721
2) Establishers must establish nuclear material protection rules and obtain approval for those rules
from the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry before starting to handle it. They must undergo
an inspection by the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry once a year to establish that they
observe the nuclear material protection rules.
3) Establishers must appoint a nuclear material protection manager who satisfies certain conditions
for each place of business in order to have him or her manage business related to nuclear material
protection in a standard manner.
(3) Regulations on disposal of waste outside own facilities
When reactor establishers dispose of radioactive waste outside their facilities, they must take measures
necessary for safety under ordinances from METI, according to Article 58-2-1 of the Nuclear Reactor
Regulation Law. (Note 6) To dispose of imported radioactive waste, they must have the Minister of
Economy, Trade and Industry confirm that their safety measures conform to the provisions of
ordinances from METI, according to Article 58-2-2 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law.
(Note 6) Article 2 of the Rules for Disposal of Nuclear Fuel Materials Outside Plants or Other Places
of Business stipulates that nuclear fuel materials should be disposed of in a waste disposal
facility so that radiation hazards can be prevented. It also stipulates standards for imported
waste.
(4) Regulations on the transport of nuclear fuel materials away from places of business
When reactor establishers transport nuclear fuel materials away from their plants or other places of
business, they are subject to the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law for land transportation and to the
Shipping Safety Law for sea transportation. For land transportation, they must take the necessary safety
measures according to technical standards specified in orders from the competent ministry under Article
59-2-1 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law. Specifically, what is transported (transportation
containers and contents) and how they are transported (loading methods, load limits, etc.) must conform
to the technical standards.
When they transport certain materials that government ordinances specify especially to be needed in
order to prevent disaster and protection of a designated nuclear fuel materials, such as uranium fuel and
other fissionable materials, spent fuel, and high-level radioactive waste, they must also have the
competent minister confirm that what is transported and the transportation methods conform to the
technical standards for each transportation under Article 59-2.
They can obtain approval for transportation containers in advance of transportation under Article 59-3
(approval of containers) and for container designs in advance of approval of containers.
For consistency, in cases involving both land and sea transportation, transportation containers and
contents deemed to conform to relevant technical standards under the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law
are also deemed to conform to the Shipping Safety Law (Article 91-9-7 of the Rules for Shipping and
Storage of Hazardous Materials).
There are other regulations on the transportation of nuclear fuel material, such as regulations on the
notification of transportation routes (prefectural public safety commissions) and those on the
confirmation of agreements on the transfer of responsibility (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports,
Science and Technology).

722
The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry holds jurisdiction over regulations on containers and contents to be
transported as outlined in the following table:

Facility subject to Competent Order of the competent


Incident type
regulations government office ministry
Nuclear power reactor
establishers, fabricating Ministry of
licensees, reprocessing Economy, Trade Rules for Transportation
licensees, waste disposal and Industry of Nuclear Fuel
Transported licensees, etc. Materials away from
material
Land transport Ministry of Plants or Other Places of
Users, etc. Business
(Overview) Education, Culture,
(Laboratories, Sports, Science and
experimental reactors, etc.) Technology
Ministry of Land, Rules for Transportation
Transportation
Transportation by vehicle Infrastructure and of Nuclear Fuel
methods
Transport Materials by Vehicle
Transported Rules for Shipping and
material Ministry of Land, Storage of Hazardous
Sea transport All facility operators Infrastructure and Materials under the
Transportation Transport Shipping Safety Law
methods


723
ϱϮ-2 Overview of Nuclear Safety Inspector Offices

1. Nuclear Safety Inspector Offices


In the wake of an accident at Three Mile Island (U.S.) Power Plant in March 1979,
a senior specialist system for nuclear power plants was established. In light of the
lessons learned from Japan’s first critical accident in a uranium processing plant of
JCO Co., Ltd. in September 1999, the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law (Law for the
Regulations of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors) was
partially amended in December 1999 in order to provide substantial additional
assurance for the safety of nuclear power stations (The amended law took effect in
July 2000). In April 2000, the senior specialist system for nuclear power plants
was replaced by a nuclear safety inspector system.
In addition, in order to drastically strengthen measures to prevent nuclear disasters
in Japan, the Special Law on Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures was enacted (taking
effect in June 2000), and a director system for nuclear disaster prevention was
established under the law.
In the reorganization of government ministries in January 2001, the Nuclear and
Industrial Safety Agency was established in the Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry. Nuclear safety administration related to the manufacture of fuel for
power generation, reprocessing of spent fuel, disposal of radioactive waste and other
stage of the nuclear fuel cycle or to power reactors in a research and development
stage, which had been undertaken by the Science and Technology Agency, was left
entirely to the NISA.
Under these circumstances, nuclear safety inspectors and directors of nuclear
disaster prevention are now stationed at nuclear safety inspector offices built in
nuclear facilities in order to make strengthen assurance double sure on the safety
regulations of nuclear facilities and disaster prevention measures.

2. System of Nuclear Safety Inspector Offices


As of July 13, 2010, nuclear safety inspector offices are positioned in 21 nuclear
facilities and a total of 112 nuclear safety inspectors and directors of nuclear disaster
prevention who have received the necessary training are stationed at these offices.
21 out of the 112 nuclear safety inspectors supervise these nuclear safety inspector
offices as chief nuclear safety inspectors.
35 out of the 55 directors of nuclear disaster prevention also serve as nuclear safety
inspectors, and the other 20 are exclusive directors of nuclear disaster prevention.
When a nuclear facility is in operation, one inspector from the nuclear safety
inspector office is always on duty even on holidays on a rotation basis.

3. Roles of Nuclear Safety Inspector Offices


(1) Roles of nuclear safety inspectors
1) Inspections of the compliance status of safety preservation rules and
investigations of operational management status
% Performance of safety inspections under the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law
(quarterly)
% Inquiries into operational management status and the verification of records
% Walkdowns of nuclear facilities
% Witnessing of periodical self-inspections by licensees
2) Response to accidents
% Upon receiving a report about an accident, inspectors immediately notify the
Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, survey the site, investigate the causes
of the accident and verify countermeasures to prevent the reoccurrence of
such accidents in collaboration with the agency.
3) Instructions to licensees on operational management

724
(2) The work of directors of nuclear disaster prevention
1) Work during normal operation
% Provision of instructions or advice on disaster prevention plans to licensees
and confirming the installation, maintenance and inspection status of disaster
prevention materials and equipment
% Provision of advice on regional disaster prevention plans to local
governments
% Maintenance of equipment in offsite centers
% Planning and implementation of nuclear disaster countermeasure drills
% Promotion of local resident understanding of nuclear disaster
countermeasures
2) Response to emergencies
% Keeping track of conditions at the disaster site
% An offsite center is launched
% Summarizing information on the response of nuclear licensees and related
organizations
% Provision of explanations or advice on the situation to local governments
3) Measures following the disaster


725

7DEOHϱϮ/LVWRI1XFOHDU6DIHW\,QVSHFWRU2IILFHV

Office name Location Nuclear facilities covered

Tomari Office Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office Kyowa Town, Hokkaido Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Inc., Tomari Power
Station
Rokkasho Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office Rokkasho Village, Aomori Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited
Reprocessing Plant
㻌 㻌 Enrichment and Burial Plant
Higashidori Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office Higashidori Village, Aomori Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc., Higashidori Nuclear
Power Station
Onagawa Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office Onagawa Town, Miyagi Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc., Onagawa Nuclear
Power Station
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Safety Inspectors Okuma Town, Fukushima Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc., Fukushima Daiichi
Office Nuclear Power Station
Fukushima Daini Nuclear Safety Inspectors Okuma Town, Fukushima Tokyo Electric Power Co., Ltd., Fukushima Daini
Office Nuclear Power Station
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Safety Inspectors Kashiwazaki City, Niigata Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc., Kashiwazaki-Kariwa
Office Nuclear Power Station
Tokai Oarai Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office Tokai Village, Ibaraki Japan Atomic Power Company Co., Ltd., Tokai Power
Station
㻌 㻌 Japan Atomic Power Company Co., Ltd., Tokai Daini
Power Station
㻌 㻌 Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd.
㻌 㻌 Nuclear Fuel Industries., Ltd., Tokai Works
㻌 㻌 Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Tokai Research
Establishment
㻌 㻌 Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Oarai Research
Establishment
Yokosuka Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Global Nuclear Fuel - Japan Co., Ltd.
Hamaoka Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office Omaezaki City, Shizuoka Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc., Hamaoka Nuclear
Power Station
Shika Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office Shika Town, Ishikawa Hokuriku Electric Power Co., Shika Nuclear Power
Station
Tsuruga Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office Tsuruga City, Fukui Japan Atomic Power Company Co., Ltd., Tsuruga
Power Station
㻌 㻌 Japan Atomic Power Company Co., Ltd., Fugen
Decommissioning Engineering Center
㻌 㻌 Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Monju Fast Breeder
Reactor Research and Development Center
Mihama Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office Mihama Town, Fukui Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc., Mihama Power
Station
Ohi Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office Ohi Town, Fukui Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc., Ohi Power Station
Takahama Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office Takahama Town, Fukui Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc., Takahama Power
Station
Kumatori Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office Kumatori Town, Osaka Nuclear Fuel Industries., Ltd., Kumatori Works
Kamisaibara Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office Kagamino Town, Okayama Japan Atomic Energy Agency
㻌 㻌 Ningyo-toge Environmental Engineering Center
Shimane Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office Matsue City, Shimane Chugoku Electric Power Co., Inc., Shimane Nuclear
Power Station
Ikata Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office Ikata Town, Ehime Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc., Ikata Power Station
Genkai Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office Karatsu City, Saga Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc., Genkai Nuclear
Power Station
Sendai Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office Satsumasendai City, Kagoshima Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc., Sendai Nuclear
Power Station


726


5HSRUWDQG1RWLILFDWLRQRI%UHDNGRZQVDQG$FFLGHQWV


1XFOHDUIDFLOLW\ 5HSRUW 1XFOHDUVDIHW\ 1RWLI\ 1XFOHDUDQG
,QYHVWLJDWH LQVSHFWRU ,QYHVWLJDWH ,QGXVWULDO6DIHW\
DQGSURYLGH DQGSURYLGH
LQVWUXFWLRQV LQVWUXFWLRQV $JHQF\
,QVWUXFWLRQ
5HSRUW

5HSRUW

,QVWUXFWLRQ
+HDGRIILFH
5HDFWRU
HVWDEOLVKHU 


727
Figure ϱϮ-2-1 Nuclear Safety Inspectors and Directors of Nuclear Disaster
Prevention Stationed at Nuclear Safety Inspector Offices
Number of nuclear safety inspectors and directors of nuclear disaster prevention㸸112
Number of nuclear safety inspectors㸸112㸦including 21 chief nuclear safety inspectors)
Number of directors of nuclear disaster prevention㸸55㸦including 35 directors who also serve as nuclear safety inspectors㸧
Number of nuclear safety inspector offices㸸21

General nuclear safety manager for the Wakasa region(1) Shika Nuclear Safety
Inspectors Office
Tsuruga Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office
Nuclear safety inspectors㸸4
Nuclear safety inspectors㸸6
Directors of nuclear disaster
Directors of nuclear disaster prevention㸸3㸦2㸧 Prevention㸸2㸦1㸧
Japan Atomic Power Company Co., Ltd., Tsuruga Power Station Hokuriku Electric Power Co. Inc.
Japan Atomic Energy Agency,
Shika Nuclear Power Station
Fugen Decommissioning Engineering Center
Monju Fast Breeder Reactor Research and Development Center

Mihama Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office


Nuclear safety inspectors㸸5
Directors of nuclear disaster prevention㸸3㸦2㸧

Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc., Mihama Power Station

Ohi Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office


Nuclear safety inspectors㸸6
Directors of nuclear disaster prevention㸸3㸦2㸧
Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc., Ohi Power Station

Takahama Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office


Nuclear safety inspectors㸸6
Directors of nuclear disaster prevention㸸2㸦1㸧

Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc., Takahama Power Station

Shimane Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office


Nuclear safety inspectors㸸4
Directors of nuclear disaster prevention㸸2㸦1㸧

Chugoku Electric Power Co., Inc., Shimane Nuclear Power Station

Genkai Nuclear Safety ‫ۑ‬Fukui


Inspectors Office ‫ۑ‬
Matsue
Nuclear safety inspectors㸸6
Directors of nuclear disaster
prevention㸸2㸦1㸧 Okayama‫ۑ‬ Osaka
‫ۑ‬
Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc.
Genkai Nuclear Power Station
Kumatori Nuclear Safety
‫ۑ‬Saga ‫ۑ‬Matsuyama Inspectors Office
Nuclear safety inspectors㸸2
Directors of nuclear disaster
Prevention㸸2㸦1㸧
Sendai Nuclear Safety
Kamisaibara Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office Nuclear Fuel
Inspectors Office Industries., Ltd.
Nuclear safety inspectors㸸4 Kagoshima Nuclear safety inspectors㸸1
‫ۑ‬ Directors of nuclear disaster prevention㸸1㸦1㸧 Kumatori Works
Directors of nuclear disaster
Prevention㸸2㸦1㸧 Japan Atomic Energy Agency
Ningyo-toge Environmental Engineering Center
Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc.
Sendai Nuclear Power Station Ikata Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office
Nuclear safety inspectors㸸5
Directors of nuclear disaster prevention㸸3㸦2㸧

Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc., Ikata Power Station

Note: Figures in parentheses are the numbers of directors for nuclear disaster prevention
who also serve as nuclear safety inspectors.
728
$VRI-XO\ 

General nuclear safety manager for the Aomori region (1㸧

Higashidori Nuclear Safety Inspectors


Office
Tomari Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office Nuclear safety inspectors㸸4
Nuclear safety inspectors㸸5 Directors of nuclear disaster prevention㸸3㸦2㸧
Directors of nuclear disaster prevention㸸2㸦1㸧
Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.
Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Inc., Higashidori Nuclear Power
Tomari Power Station Station

‫ۑ‬Sapporo
Rokkasho Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office
Nuclear safety inspectors㸸8
Directors of nuclear disaster prevention㸸5㸦4㸧

Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Safety Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited


Inspectors Office Reprocessing Facility
Enrichment and Disposal Facility
Nuclear safety inspectors㸸9
Directors of nuclear disaster prevention㸸2㸦1㸧
Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. ‫ۑ‬ Onagawa Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Aomori Nuclear safety inspectors㸸5
Station Directors of nuclear disaster prevention㸸3㸦2㸧

Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.


Onagawa Nuclear Power Station

Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office


Nuclear safety inspectors㸸8
Directors of nuclear disaster prevention㸸3㸦2㸧
Sendai‫ۑ‬
Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.
‫ۑ‬Niigata Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station
Fukushima
‫ۑ‬ Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office
Nuclear safety inspectors㸸6
Directors of nuclear disaster prevention:3㸦2㸧

Mito‫ۑ‬ Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.


Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station
Tokyo‫ە‬
Yokohama‫ۑ‬ Tokai Oarai Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office
Nuclear safety inspectors㸸8
Shizuoka‫ۑ‬ Directors of nuclear disaster prevention㸸4㸦3㸧

Japan Atomic Power Company Co., Ltd.


Tokai Power Station
Yokosuka Nuclear Safety Inspectors Tokai Daini Power Station
Office Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd.
Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd.,
Nuclear safety inspectors㸸3 Tokai Works
Directors of nuclear disaster Prevention㸸3㸦2㸧 Japan Atomic Energy Agency,
Tokai Research Establishment
Global Nuclear Fuel-Japan Co., Ltd. Oarai Research Establishment

Hamaoka Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office


Nuclear safety inspectors㸸7
Directors of nuclear disaster prevention㸸2㸦1㸧

Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc., 参


Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station


729
ϱϮ-3 Nuclear Disaster Prevention

1. Overview of Nuclear Disaster Prevention System


The fundamentals of nuclear disaster prevention had been based on the Disaster
Measures Basic Law and specified in the Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures,” which
was amended in June, 1997. However, in light of the lessons learned from a
criticality accident in a uranium processing facility in Tokai Village, Ibaraki
Prefecture, on September 30, 1999, the Special Law on Nuclear Disaster
Countermeasures was enacted on December 17, 1999, and took effect in June, 2000.
Legislation on nuclear power stations and nuclear disaster countermeasures was then
developed.

2. Special Law on Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures


The Special Law on Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures, which covers not only
nuclear power stations but also processing facilities, storage and other facilities,
clarified the duties of nuclear licensees such as reporting when certain incidents
occurred, and enhanced cooperation between the central government and local
governments. The law also stipulates that a disaster countermeasure headquarters
be established in an emergency and provides a foundation of nuclear disaster
prevention.
(See attachment 1).

3. Response to Emergencies
If an emergency arises at a nuclear power plant, it must be reported to the
government and local governments and efforts made to investigate the causes and to
prevent damage from spreading. The Special Law on Nuclear Disaster
Countermeasures now requires licensees to notify the competent minister of certain
incidents that did not reach an emergency level. The law also requires competent
ministers who receive reports of an emergency to immediately inform the prime
minister, who must then declare a state of nuclear emergency and establish a nuclear
disaster countermeasure headquarters headed by the prime minister.
On the other hand, the law requires that a joint council for nuclear disaster
countermeasures be established in an appropriate emergency response facility
(offsite center), which is supposed to cover certain nuclear power plants so that the
government, local governments and licensees can gather to share information and
work on countermeasures for the emergency and that the vice minister of the
competent ministry implement countermeasures as the chief of the on-the-spot
disaster countermeasure headquarters.
(See attachments 2 and 3).

730
(See attachment 1).
Overview of the Special Law on Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures

In light of the lessons learned from Japan’s first critical accident in a uranium
processing facility of JCO Co., Inc. in September 1999, the Special Law on Nuclear
Disaster Countermeasures was enacted in December 1999 and took effect on June 16,
2000, in an effort to develop laws to prevent nuclear disasters in Japan(See reference 1).
The following are the results of major efforts by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry:

1. Outline of the Special Law on Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures


1) Prompt initial response
% The law requires licensees to report abnormal situations
% The law requires that a nuclear disaster countermeasure headquarters headed
by the prime minister be immediately established in a nuclear emergency, and
that the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry serve as the vice chief.
2) Systematic collaboration between the central and local governments
% The law requires that an on-the-spot disaster countermeasure headquarters be
established
% The law requires that a joint council for nuclear disaster countermeasures be
organized in an emergency response facility (offsite center) to enhance
collaboration on countermeasures to be taken at the site between the central
and local governments.
% The law requires that nuclear disaster countermeasure drills be implemented
at sites.
3) Strengthening of emergency communication and response systems
% Legally qualified directors of nuclear disaster prevention are stationed at
nuclear facilities.
% Offsite centers are designated by the Minister of Economy, Trade and
Industry.
% Different types of response functions are promptly cast onto the site in a
nuclear emergency
4) Clarification of nuclear licensee responsibility
% Nuclear licensees are required to prepare and report plans of disaster
countermeasures
% Nuclear disaster prevention managers must be stationed at each plant

2. The work and deployment of directors of nuclear disaster prevention


Directors of nuclear disaster prevention are now stationed at nuclear power plants to
conduct the following:
1) Work during normal operation
% Provision of instructions or advice on disaster prevention plans to licensees
and confirming the installation, maintenance and inspection status of disaster
prevention materials and equipment
% Provision of advice on regional disaster prevention plans to local
governments
% Maintenance of equipment in offsite centers
% Planning and implementation of nuclear disaster countermeasure drills
% Promotion of local resident understanding of nuclear disaster
countermeasures
2) Response to emergencies
% Keeping track of conditions at the disaster site

% An offsite center is launched
% Summarizing information on the response of nuclear licensees and related 付
731
organizations
% Provision of explanations or advice on the situation to local governments
3) Measures following the disaster

3. Designation of Offsite Centers


A total of 19 offsite centers were designated across the country for nuclear power
plants by March 29, 2002, and the Higashidori Offsite Center was designated on
October 22, 2004. (See reference 2).

4. Nuclear Disaster Countermeasure Drills


This law requires the central government, local governments and licensees to
annually conduct nuclear disaster countermeasure drills.
In FY2009, there was a plan to conduct a drill in Ibaraki Prefecture on December 21㺃
22, 2009, under the assumption that an accident occurred in Tokai Daini Power Station,
The Japan Atomic Power Company.

732
Overview of Laws Related to Nuclear Disaster Prevention

[Basic Law on Disaster Countermeasures]


& Promotes basic, comprehensive and systematic disaster prevention administration focusing on natural
disasters
& Requires the preparation of disaster prevention plans
& Disaster prevention measures, disaster response measures (led by municipalities or prefectures),
disaster recovery measures
[Nuclear Reactor
Regulation Law]
& Provides regulations on
the operation of nuclear [Special Law on Nuclear Disaster Countermeasure]
reactors to prevent & Clarifies licensees' responsibility
disasters and ensure & Clarifies roles of the government and responses in times
public safety. of emergency
& Provides for special measures in consideration of the
uniqueness of nuclear disasters, such as the
establishment of offsite centers

% Orders of measures

733
under Article 64 of the Basic plans of disaster prevention
Nuclear Reactor & Basic plans for disaster prevention (Provide for specific
Regulation Law operation of the Basic Law on Disaster Countermeasures)

Nuclear licensee disaster Regional disaster


prevention work plans Disaster prevention work plans
& Relevant ministries' and prevention plans
& Preventive measures, emergency & Prefectural and municipal plans
agencies' plans relating to
response and post-accident relating to disaster prevention
disaster prevention
measures by licensee
(Reference 1)

* Disaster countermeasure drills must be conducted to promote collaboration between related


organizations and to strengthen their capacity to respond to nuclear disasters



Emergency response facility (Reference 2)
Prefecture Offsite center name Location Covered by licensees

261-1, Miyaoka, Kyowa Town, Iwanai County,


Hokkaido Hokkaido Offsite Center Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Inc., Tomari Power Station
Hokkaido

1-67, Aza-Nozuki, Oaza-Obuchi, Rokkasho Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited, Reprocessing Facility
Rokkasho Offsite Center ͤ1
Village, Kamikita County, Aomori Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited, Enrichment and Disposal Facility
Aomori
Aza-Sawauchi, Oaza-Sunagomata, Higashidori
Higasidori Offsite Center Tohoku-Electric Power Co., Inc., Higashidori Nuclear Power Station
Village, Shimokita County, Aomori

Miyagi Prefecture Disaster 12-1, Aza-Ise, Onagawa-hama, Onagawa Town,


Miyagi Tohoku-Electric Power Co., Inc., Onagawa Nuclear Power Station
Prevention Center Oshika County, Miyagi

Fukushima Prefecture Nuclear 476-3, Aza-Ono, Oaza-Shimonogami, Okuma Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc., Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station
Fukushima
Energy Offsite Center Town, Futaba County, Fukushima Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc., Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station

Kashiwazaki Kariwa Offsite


Niigata 5-48, Sanwa-cho, Kashiwazaki City, Niigata Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc., Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station
Center

Ibaraki Ibaraki Prefecture Nuclear 11601-12, Nishijusanbugyo, Hitachinaka City, Japan Atomic Power Company Co., Ltd., Tokai Power Station
Energy Offsite Center ͤ1 Ibaraki
Japan Atomic Power Company Co., Ltd., Tokai Daini Power Station

Japan Atomic Energy Agencye, Tokai Research Establishment

Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Oarai Research Establishment

Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Tokai Works

Japan Atomic Energy Agency, O-arai Engineering Center

Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd.

Nuclear Development Corporation

Graduate School of Engineering, Tokyo University


Nuclear Engineering Research Laboratory

Nuclear Material Control Center


Tokai Safeguards Center

Nuclear Fuel Industries., Ltd., Tokai Works

Nippon Nuclear Fuel Development Co., Ltd.

Kanagawa 1-1-6, Hinode-cho, Kawasaki-ku, Kawasaki City, Nuclear Engineering Laboratory, Toshiba Corporation
Kawasaki Offsite Center ͤ 2
Kanagawa Research Reactor Control Center, Toshiba Corporation

Kanagawa Yokosuka Offsite Global Nuclear Fuel-Japan Co., Ltd.


1-4-7, Hinode-cho, Yokosuka City, Kanagawa
Center Institute for Atomic Energy, Rikkyo University

Shizuoka Hamaoka Offsite Center 5215-1, Ikeshinden, Omaezaki City, Shizuoka Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc., Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station

Ishikawa Prefecture Shika 34-1, Gai, Abuya, Shika Town, Hakui County,
Ishikawa Hokuriku Electric Power Co., Inc., Shika Nuclear Power Station
Offsite Center Ishikawa

Fukui Fukui Prefecture Tsuruga Offsite 99-11-47, Kanayama, Tsturuga City, Fukui Japan Atomic Power Company Co., Ltd., Tsuruga Power Station
Center
Japan Atomic Energy Agency
Monju Fast Breeder Reactor Research and Development Center

Japan Atomic Energy Agency


Fugen Decommissioning Engineering Center

Fukui Prefecture Mihama Kenohana 1-6, 64, Sada, Mihama Town, Mikata
Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc., Mihama Power Station
Offsite Center County, Fukui

Fukui Prefecture Ohi Offsite


1-1-1, Seiwa, Ohi Town, Ohi County, Fukui Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc., Ohi Power Station
Center

Fukui Prefecture Takahama 14, Aza-Hitotsubashi, 35, Sonobe, Takahama-cho,


Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc., Takahama Power Station
Offsite Center Ohi County, Fukui

Higashi Osaka Offsite Center


1-3, Shinkamikosaka, Higashi-Osaka City, Osaka Kinki University Atomic Energy Research Institute
ͤ2
Osaka
2-1010-2, Asashiro, Kumatori Town, Sennan Kyoto University Research Reactor Institute
Kumatori Offsite Center ͤ1
County, Osaka Nuclear Fuel Industries., Ltd., Kumatori Works

514-1, Kamisaibara, Kagamino Town, Tomata Japan Atomic Energy Agency


Okayama Kamisaibara Offsite Centerͤ1
County, Okayama Ningyo-toge Environmental Engineering Center

Shimane Prefecture Offsite


Shimane 52, Nakabara-cho, Matsue City, Shimane Chugoku Electric Power Co., Inc., Shimane Nuclear Power Station
Center

1993-1, Minatoura, Ikata Town, Nishiuwa


Ehime Ehime Offsite Center Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc., Ikata Power Station
County, Ehime

Saga Saga Prefecture Offsite Center 2-5, Nishinohama-machi, Karatsu City, Saga Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc., Genkai Nuclear Power Station

Kagoshima Kagoshima Offsite Center 1-3, Kanda-cho, Satsumasendai City, Kagoshima Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc., Sendai Nuclear Power Station

Designated by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (16 offsite centers), ͤ1㸸Designated by the Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, Technology (4 offsite centers) ,ͤ2㸸Designated by
the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, Technology (2 offsite centers)

734
㸦(Reference 2)

Locations of Offsite Centers

‫ ڸ‬㸸 Designated by the Ministry of Economy,


Trade and Industry
(16 offsite centers)
‫ە‬㸸Designated the Ministry of Economy, Trade
and Industry and the Ministry of Education, Kyowa Town
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology
(4 offsite centers) ‫ڸ‬
‫ ڦ‬㸸 Designated by the Ministry of Education,
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology
(2 offsite centers)
‫ ڸ‬Higashidori Village
‫ە‬
Rokkasho Village

‫ڸ‬ Onagawa Town


Kashiwazaki City

‫ڸ‬ ‫ڸ‬ Okuma Town


Shika Town
‫ڸ‬
‫ە‬ Hitachinaka City
Kagamino Town

Matsue City ‫ڸڸڸڸ‬


‫ڦ‬
‫ڸ‬ ‫ە‬ ‫ڸ‬ Kawasaki City
‫ڦ‬ ‫ڸ‬ Yokosuka City
‫ە‬
Karatsu City
‫ڸ‬ Higashiosaka Omaezaki City
‫ڸ‬
Ikata Town Kumatori

Fukui
‫ڸ‬
Satsumasendai City
Tsuruga City
‫ڸ‬
‫ ڸ‬Ohi Town
‫ڸ‬
‫ ڸ‬Mihama Town

Takahama Town


735
(Attachment 2)

Overview of Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures (The following table assumes that the Minister of
Economy, Trade and Industry is the competent minister)
Stage of alert Response to an emergency
Government Information sharing with related & Nuclear disaster countermeasure headquarters
ministries and agencies Chief: Prime minister
Ministry of & Nuclear disaster alert headquarters of Vice chief: Minister of Economy, Trade and
Economy, the METI Industry
Trade and Chief: Minister of Economy, Location: Prime Minister’s official residence
Industry Trade and Industry Secretary General: Director General of the
Tokyo

Vice chief: Vice minister, Nuclear and Industrial


parliamentary Safety Agency
secretary, etc. Head office: Emergency response center of the
Head office: Emergency METI
response center of The countermeasure headquarters of the
the METI METI is also integrated into the government
countermeasure headquarters.
Government Information sharing at the site & On-the-spot nuclear disaster countermeasure
headquarters
Ministry of & On-the-spot nuclear disaster alert Chief: Vice Minister of Economy, Trade and
Economy, headquarters of the METI Industry
Trade and Chief: Director of disaster Vice chief: Councilor of the Nuclear and
Disaster site

Industry prevention Industrial Safety Agency


' As a rule, the Vice
Minister of Economy, Location: Offsite center
Trade and Industry serves The on-the-spot headquarters of the METI is
as the chief of the also integrated into the government
headquarters. countermeasure headquarters.
Location: Offsite center

Occurrence of an incident to be Response to a nuclear emergency


reported situation
[Article 10 of the Special Law on Nuclear [Article 15 of the Special Law on Nuclear
Common incidents

Disaster Countermeasures] Disaster Countermeasures]


!In the vicinity of the boundary of the !In the vicinity of the boundary of the
site site
5 (Sv/h 500 µSv/h
(Over a period of 10 minutes) (Over a period of 10 minutes)
Radiation dose and
!Incident that may reach an emergency !Incident that indicates the occurrence of degree of accidents
situation an emergency situation
(When reactor coolant was leaked (Failure of the injection systems of all)
activating an emergency core cooling
device etc.)

Accident in Unit 2 at Mihama NPP (Feb 1991) Accident at TMI (Mar. 1979)
(An emergency core cooling device was activated) (Radiation dose of about 600 (Sv/h
around the site)

Accident at JCO (Sept. 1999)


(Maximum radiation dose
of 840 (Sv/h)

Stage of alert Response to an emergency situation


Initial response of 1) The licensee reports the incident to the METI 1) The METI determines the situation of the nuclear emergency
the government 2) The Director General of the Nuclear and Industry 2) The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry reports the
Safety Agency submits the report to the Minister of situation to the Prime Minister and proposes a draft of a public
announcement and instructions to local governments.
Economy, Trade and Industry 3) The prime minister declares a state of emergency
3) The Minister establishes an alert headquarters under 4) A nuclear disaster countermeasure headquarters is established
the METI after being put to the Cabinet
(conducts press release activities and shares
information with related ministries and agencies) [Disaster site] % A joint council for nuclear disaster
countermeasures is organized.
[Disaster site] % Receive the same report. The head of the on-the-spot headquarters, the
heads of related local governments and other
% Safety inspectors investigate the site concerned parties gather to share information
% An offsite center is launched and work on countermeasures in collaboration
with each other.The headquarters is established
in an offsite center

736
(Exhibit 3)
Concept of Emergency Response Measures under the Special Law on
Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures
(The following figure assumes that the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry is the
competent minister.)

Accident
occurrence

The licensee reports


the incident

Ministry of Economy, Trade


Government (nuclear disaster and Industry
countermeasure headquarters) The Minister of Economy, Trade
Chief: Prime minister and Industry reports
Vice chief: Minister of Economy, the incident to the prime minister.
Trade and Industry Declare a state of
Members: Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Minister of
Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and nuclear emergency
Telecommunications,
Nuclear Safety Technical the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports,
Commission Advice Science and Technology, the Minister of
Land, Infrastructure and Transport,
the Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare,
the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and
Fisheries,
the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for
Crisis Management, etc.
Dispatch
investigators Dispatch personnel to site (delegate partial
to the site authority)

Government (on-the-spot Take initial actions


countermeasure headquarters)
Chief: Vice Minister of Economy, Trade
and Industry
Members: Personnel of the Cabinet Directors for nuclear
Office, the METI, the MEXT, disaster prevention
the MLIT, the MHLW, the (stationed at site)
Defense Agency, the Fire

!"#$% &"'$&#() *"+) $'&(,-+)


Defense Agency, etc.

.#/-/%,+)&"'$%,+0,-/'+,/
(Instruction) (Instruction)

Instruction
Prefecture Municipality Evacuation and
sheltering
Emergency response facility
(Offsite center)
Request for
dispatch
Take emergency measures

National Institute of
Radiological
Sciences

Technical support

Self-Defense Police Fire Japan Nuclear Energy


Forces department Safety Organization
Provide Fire fighting Japan Atomic Energy
security and life saving Agency
activities
Technical support

Licensee's prevention organizations against nuclear


disasters (disaster prevention managers)


737
REFERENCE

Ref.


739



5()(5(1&(

7UHQGVLQ:RUOG1XFOHDU(OHFWULF3RZHU*HQHUDWLRQ


㸯㸬:RUOG1XFOHDU(OHFWULF3RZHU*HQHUDWLRQ)DFLOLWLHV

7DEOH:RUOG1XFOHDU(OHFWULF3RZHU*HQHUDWLRQ)DFLOLWLHV㸦$VRI-DQVW 


㸰㸬7UHQGVLQ&DSDFLW\)DFWRUVRI1XFOHDU3RZHU3ODQWVLQWKH:RUOG

7DEOH7UHQGVLQ&DSDFLW\)DFWRUVRI1XFOHDU3RZHU3ODQWVLQWKH:RUOG

 7UHQGVLQ&DSDFLW\)DFWRUVRI1XFOHDU3RZHU3ODQWVLQWKH:RUOG
IRUWKH3DVW<HDUV
 &DSDFLW\)DFWRUVRI1XFOHDU3RZHU3ODQWVLQWKH:RUOGLQ




Ref.


741
7UHQGVLQ:RUOG1XFOHDU(OHFWULF3RZHU*HQHUDWLRQ
㼀㼍㼎㼘㼑㻌㻝㻌㻌㼃㼛㼞㼘㼐㻌㻺㼡㼏㼘㼑㼍㼞㻌㻱㼘㼑㼏㼠㼞㼕㼏㻌㻼㼛㼣㼑㼞㻌㻳㼑㼚㼑㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㻲㼍㼏㼕㼘㼕㼠㼕㼑㼟

%UHDNGRZQV 6WDJHRISURJUHVV
2SHUDWLQJ 8QGHUFRQVWUXFWLRQ %HLQJSODQQHG 7RWDO
&RXQWU\RU 1XPEHU 1XPEHU 1XPEHU 1XPEHU
UHJLRQQDPH 2XWSXW RI 2XWSXW RI 2XWSXW RI 2XWSXW RI
XQLWV XQLWV XQLWV XQLWV
86$        
)UDQFH        
-DSDQ        
5XVVLD        
*HUPDQ\        
.RUHD        
8.        
8NUDLQH        
&DQDGD        
6ZHGHQ        
6SDLQ        
%HOJLXP        
7DLZDQ        
%XOJDULD        
6ZLW]HUODQG        
)LQODQG        
,QGLD        
6ORYDNLD        
&KLQD        
%UD]LO        
6RXWK$IULFD        
+XQJDU\        
&]HFK5HSXEOLF        
0H[LFR        
$UJHQWLQD        
6ORYHQLD        
5RPDQLD        
1HWKHUODQGV        
3DNLVWDQ        
$UPHQLD        
2WKHUV        
7RWDO        
㸦1RWHV㸧ࠉ
7KLVWDEOHZDVFRPSLOHGEDVHGRQWKH5HSRUWRQWKH7UHQGVLQ:RUOG1XFOHDU
(OHFWULF3RZHU*HQHUDWLRQ'HYHORSPHQW -DSDQ$WRPLF,QGXVWULDO)RUXP,QF 
7KLVWDEOHLVRQO\IRUQXFOHDUSRZHUSODQWVZLWKJURVVFDSDFLW\RIPRUHWKDQN:
-DSDQGDWDDVRI0DU
0RQMXDSURWRW\SHIDVWEUHHGHUUHDFWRURIN:XQGHUFRQVWUXFWLRQ
LVLQFOXGHGLQWKH-DSDQ
$GYDQFHG%RLOLQJ:DWHU5HDFWRU $%:5 LVLQFOXGHGLQ%:5FDWHJRU\
2WKHUVDUH,UDQ,QGRQHVLD(J\SW,VUDHO7XUNH\.D]DNKVWDQ9LHWQDP8QLWHG$UDE(PLUDWHV

742
㻔㻭㼟㻌㼛㼒㻌㻶㼍㼚㻚㻌㻝㼟㼠㻘㻌㻞㻜㻝㻜㻕
8QLWN: 
HDFWRUW\SH LQFOXGLQJWKHUHDFWRUVLQRSHUDWLRQXQGHUFRQVWUXFWLRQDQGEHLQJSODQ
/LJKWZDWHUPRGHUDWHGUHDFWRU
*UDSKLWH +HDY\ZDWHU
3UHVVXUL]HG %RLOLQJZDWHU )DVWEUHHGHU
PRGHUDWHG PRGHUDWHG
ZDWHU UHDFWRU UHDFWRU 7RWDO UHDFWRU
UHDFWRU UHDFWRU
㸦㹎㹕㹐㸧 㸦㹀㹕㹐㸧
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     

Ref.


743
7DEOH7UHQGVLQ&DSDFLW\)DFWRUVRI1XFOHDU3RZHU3ODQWVLQWKH:RUOG
8QLW
&DOHQGDU\HDU

&RXQWU\          
RUUHJLRQQDPH
-DSDQ                    
㹀㹕㹐                    
㹎㹕㹐                    
㹅㹁㹐 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫 㸫
86$                    
)UDQFH                    
5XVVLD                    
*HUPDQ\                    
.RUHD                    
8.                    
8NUDLQH                    
&DQDGD                    
6ZHGHQ                    
6SDLQ                    
%HOJLXP                    
7DLZDQ                    
%XOJDULD                    
6ZLW]HUODQG                    
/LWKXDQLD                    
)LQODQG                    
,QGLD                    
6ORYDNLD                    
&KLQD                    
%UD]LO                    
6RXWK$IULFD                    
+XQJDU\                    
&]HFK5HSXEOLF                    
0H[LFR                    
$UJHQWLQD                    
6ORYHQLD                    
5RPDQLD                    
1HWKHUODQGV                    
3DNLVWDQ                    
$UPHQLD                    
㸦1RWHV㸧
7KHFDSDFLW\IDFWRUVRI-DSDQDUHOLFHQVHHVXSSOLHGGDWDHGLWHGE\-1(6
7KHFDSDFLW\IDFWRUVRIRWKHUFRXQWULHVH[FHSW-DSDQDUHEDVHGRQWKH,$($35,6 3RZHU5HDFWRU,QIRUPDWLRQ6\VWHP GDWD
 $VRI6HS

744
(1)  Trends in Capacity Factors of Nuclear Power Plants in the World for the Past 10 Years

㻝㻜㻜  㻶㼍㼜㼍㼚

 㼁㻚㻿㻚㻭

㻥㻜  㻲㼞㼍㼚㼏㼑

㻯  㻾㼡㼟㼟㼕㼍

㼍  㻳㼑㼞㼙㼍㼚㼥


㻤㻜  㻷㼛㼞㼑㼍

㼏  㼁㻚㻷㻚

㼠  㼁㼗㼞㼍㼕㼚㼑

㻣㻜

 㻯㼍㼚㼍㼐㼍

㼒  㻿㼣㼑㼐㼑㼚

㼏 㻢㻜  㻿㼜㼍㼕㼚

㼠  㻮㼑㼘㼓㼕㼡㼙

㼞  㼀㼍㼕㼣㼍㼚
㻡㻜
咁  㻿㼣㼕㼠㼦㼑㼞㼘㼍㼚㼐

咂  㻲㼕㼚㼘㼍㼚㼐

㻠㻜  㻵㼚㼐㼕㼍

 㻿㼘㼛㼢㼍㼗㼕㼍

 㻯㼔㼕㼚㼍
㻟㻜  㻴㼡㼚㼓㼍㼞㼥
㻞㻜㻜㻜 㻞㻜㻜㻝 㻞㻜㻜㻞 㻞㻜㻜㻟 㻞㻜㻜㻠 㻞㻜㻜㻡 㻞㻜㻜㻢 㻞㻜㻜㻣 㻞㻜㻜㻤 㻞㻜㻜㻥
 㻯㼦㼑㼏㼔㻌㻾㼑㼜㼡㼎㼘㼕㼏
㻯㼍㼘㼑㼚㼐㼍㼞㻌㼅㼑㼍㼞

Note: Countries that have less than two operating plants are excluded.


(2)  Capacity Factors of Nuclear Power Plants in the World in 2009

㻝㻜㻜 

㻥㻜
㻯 
㼍 㻤㻜 

㼍 
㼏 㻣㻜 

㼠 
㻢㻜
㼥 

㼒 㻡㻜 
㼍 
㼏 㻠㻜 


㼞 㻟㻜 
咁 
䠂 㻞㻜 


㻝㻜

㻜

㻿㼛㼡㼠㼔㻌㻭㼒㼞㼕㼏㼍
㻸㼕㼠㼔㼡㼍㼚㼕㼍㻖䠍

㻺㼑㼠㼔㼑㼞㼘㼍㼚㼐㼟㻖䠍

㻭㼞㼙㼑㼚㼕㼍㻖䠍
㻯㼦㼑㼏㼔㻌㻾㼑㼜㼡㼎㼘㼕㼏
㻿㼘㼛㼢㼑㼚㼕㼍㻖䠍

㼁㻚㻿㻚㻭

㻮㼑㼘㼓㼡㼕㼙

㼁㻚㻷㻚
㻿㼜㼍㼕㼚

㻿㼣㼑㼐㼑㼚
㻾㼛㼙㼍㼚㼕㼍

㻭㼞㼓㼑㼚㼠㼕㼚㼍

㼀㼍㼕㼣㼍㼚

㻮㼡㼘㼓㼍㼞㼕㼍

㻮㼞㼍㼦㼕㼘

㻼㼍㼗㼕㼟㼠㼍㼚

㼁㼗㼞㼍㼕㼚㼑
㻿㼣㼕㼠㼦㼑㼞㼘㼍㼚㼐

㻷㼛㼞㼑㼍

㻹㼑㼤㼕㼏㼛
㻲㼕㼚㼘㼍㼚㼐

㻯㼔㼕㼚㼍

㻴㼡㼚㼓㼍㼞㼥

㻳㼑㼞㼙㼍㼚㼥
㻿㼘㼛㼢㼍㼗㼕㼍

㻲㼞㼍㼚㼏㼑

㻶㼍㼜㼍㼚

㻵㼚㼐㼕㼍
㻾㼡㼟㼟㼕㼍

㻯㼍㼚㼍㼐㼍




Ref.

Note: Capacity factor of over 90% is shown in red.   *1: For only one nuclear power plant 付

745
APPENDIX

App
747
Major Trends in Nuclear Power Generation
Major Trends in Nuclear Power Generation
1955
December 19 Promulgation of the three basic nuclear power laws (Atomic Energy Basic Law, Law Establishing
the Atomic Energy Commission, Law Establishing the Prime Minister's Office (partial amendment))
1956
June 15 The Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute is inaugurated.
1957
June 10 Promulgation of the Law for the Regulations of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material
and Reactors
August 27 JRR-1 of Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute reaches criticality. The first "nuclear light"
in Japan
1963
October 26 Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute succeeds in a JPDR electric power generation experiment
(October 26 subsequently becomes "Nuclear Power Day")
1964
July 11 Promulgation of the Electricity Utilities Industry Law
1966
July 25 Commissioning of Japan Atomic Power Company Co., Ltd.'s Tokai Power Station
1970
March 14 Commissioning of Japan Atomic Power Company Co., Ltd.'s Tsuruga Power Station (First
BWR in Japan)
November 28 Commissioning of Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.'s Mihama Power Station Unit 1 (First
PWR in Japan)
1971
March 26 Commissioning of Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.'s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
Station Unit 1

1979
January 22 The Ministry of International Trade and Industry institutionalizes "public hearings" in locations
convenient to nuclear power plants for the listening of resident opinions.
January 26 The Nuclear Safety Commission determines the general principles of the safety inspection double
checking system.
February 27 A proposed amendment to part of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law is passed in a House of
Representatives plenary session, paving the way for private reprocessing business.
March 28 A large-scale reactor accident occurs in Unit 2 (PWR made by B&W) at the Three Mile Island
(TMI) nuclear power plant (U.S.A.).
March 30 The state governor declares a state of emergency and residents in surrounding areas are evacuated.
June 6 Based on the results of comprehensive inspections of nuclear power plants, the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry instructs each electric power company to make eight specific
improvements.
July 12 The Central Disaster Prevention Council determines measures that should be implemented for the
present time to prevent possible disasters at nuclear power plants.
July 16 A fire occurs at a reprocessing plant in Windscale, U.K.
September 13 The TMI Special Committee of the Nuclear Safety Commission releases its second report,
indicating 52 lessons to be learned (items to be reflected in safety preservation measures).
October 23 The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) releases its final report (NUREG-0585) on the
TMI accident.

App
749
1980
January 17 The Nuclear Safety Commission conducts the first public hearing on the construction of a new
reactor (Unit 3) at the Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.'s Takahama Power Station.
May 6 The Nuclear Safety Commission decides to incorporate "14 items relating to the TMI accident
to be reflected in safety preservation measures" into safety inspections.
June 30 The Nuclear Safety Commission determines the guidelines for nuclear disaster countermeasures.
August 4 For the first time, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry approves the additional
installation of Units 3 and 4 at the Takahama Power Station and Units 3 and 4 at the Fukushima
Daini Nuclear Power Station conditional upon the double checking system.
December 4 The first public hearing on the installation of reactors is conducted (concerning the installation
of Units 2 and 5 at the Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.'s Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power
Station).

1981
January 17 The Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation's Tokai Reprocessing Plant
begins full-scale operation as negotiations on reprocessing between Japan and the U.S. are
settled.
March 26 Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.'s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station achieves an
accumulated electric power record of 100 billion kWh, the highest for a BWR anywhere in the
world.
April 18 A radiation leak occurs at the Japan Atomic Power Company Co., Ltd.'s Tsuruga Power Station.
May 12 The national government designates Sekinehama, Aomori Prefecture, as the new home port for
the nuclear ship "Mutsu."
May 18 The Ministry of International Trade and Industry and the Science and Technology Agency
release a report on the problems of the Tsuruga Nuclear Power Station.
June 17 The Ministry of International Trade and Industry orders the Japan Atomic Power Company Co.'s
Tsuruga Power Station where the accident occurred to suspend operations for 6 months.
July 27 The Ministry of International Trade and Industry begins work on the third improvement and
standardization program (toward the completion of the "Japanese-type light water reactor").
October 20 The Nuclear Safety Commission compiles the first white paper on nuclear safety.

1982
March 26 The Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation begins full-scale operation of
the uranium enrichment pilot plant (centrifuge) at the Ningyo-toge.
The Advisory Committee for Energy of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
announces prospects for long-term energy supply and demand.
April 21 The prospects of August, 1979, are downwardly revised and the goal for nuclear power output
for FY1985 is set at 46 million kW.
Plans to construct a prototype fast breeder reactor "Monju" are approved by the Cabinet.
May 14 The Atomic Energy Commission formulates a new long-term nuclear power utilization plan.
June 30 The policy that private companies should play the central role in uranium enrichment and
reprocessing operations is laid out.

1983
April 28 Unit 1 at the Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station, which began operation in April of the
previous year, achieves a record of 384 days of continuous operation.
May 13 Concerning the installation of Unit 2 at the Chugoku Electric Power Co., Inc.'s Shimane Nuclear
Power Station, a second public hearing was held with those against the installation in attendance
for the first time.
October 26 The US Senate rejects the budget for the Clinch River Breeder Reactor (CRBR) and the
construction plans are canceled.
November 6 The Nuclear Power Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee for Energy at the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry, downwardly revise long-term energy demand prospects and
set the goal for nuclear power output for FY1990 at 34 million kW. It also forecasts that the
construction of a demonstration unit of a fast breeder reactor will begin in the first half of the
1990s.
December 22 The second public hearing on the installation of Units 1 and 2 at the Tomari Power Station is
held with those against the installation not present.

750
1984
January 10 Five European nations enter into long-term cooperation agreements on the joint construction of
commercial fast breeder reactors.
January17 The Scientific Technology Subcommittee of the Liberal Democratic Party decides to take the
nuclear ship "Mutsu" out of service.
January 24 The Atomic Energy Commission stresses the importance of "Mutsu" and prepares the
"Guidelines for Research and Development of Nuclear Ships." It is decided to continue with
the experiment.
April 20 The Federation of Electric Power Companies officially requests Mr. Kitamura, governor of
Aomori Prefecture, to agree on a proposal to construct three nuclear fuel cycle facilities in
Aomori Prefecture.
July 2 The Nuclear Power Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee for Energy releases a report
entitled "Toward the Establishment of an Independent Nuclear Fuel Cycle."
August 7 The Atomic Energy Commission releases an interim report on the disposal of radioactive waste.
August 23 The Nuclear Power Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee for Energy releases an interim
report on the enhancement of light-water reactor technology (increasing the operating rates of
nuclear power stations to more than 80%, etc.).

1985
April 8 The Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute successfully produces plasma for the first time
using the JT-60 plasma experimentation unit.
April 18 Concerned parties reach an agreement to cooperate on the selection of sites for three nuclear
fuel cycle facilities.
May 29 The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approves the restarting of Unit 1 at TMI.
July 31 The Japan-China nuclear power agreement is signed.
September 7 "Super Phoenix", a fast breeder demonstration reactor in France, reaches critical level.

1986
January 14 The French "Super Phoenix" demonstration FBR begins transmission of electric power.
February 5 A radiation leak occurs at a reprocessing plant in Sellafield, U.K.
April 26 The worst nuclear accident in history occurs in Unit 4 at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant
(former USSR).
May 21 The radioactive waste disposal business is newly legislated and a proposed amendment to part
of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law is passed in the House of Councilors.
August 25 The IAEA holds a meeting of experts to discuss the nuclear reactor accident that occurred in
Russia (until Aug. 25 in Vienna).
December 4 The Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute requests the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to
start dismantling the JPDR.

1987
April 30 The Japan Nuclear Fuel Service Company signs a contract with French company SGN
concerning reprocessing technology.
May 26 Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. applies for a license to operate the Rokkasho uranium enrichment plant.
May 28 The Special Committee for Investigation of the Accident in Russia, which was established
within the Nuclear Safety Commission, reports that there are no immediate improvements to be
made.
June 22 The Atomic Energy Commission formulates a long-term nuclear power development and
utilization plan.
The established policy to promote the reprocessing of spent fuel and to shift from light water
reactors to fast breeder reactors is reconfirmed, and nuclear power is defined as a key energy
source.
November 4 The national government signs the new Japan-U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Treaty into which the
"comprehensive prior agreement system" is incorporated.

App
751
1988
February 12 The output adjustment operation of Unit 2 at the Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc.'s Ikata Power
Station is carried out as planned.
July 7 Negotiations to amend the Japan-France Nuclear Treaty begin.
August 10 The national government approves the construction of Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd.'s commercial
uranium enrichment facility (construction to begin on Oct. 14).
October 18 The national and US governments sign the amended version of the new Japan-U.S. Nuclear
Treaty.
Sea transportation of plutonium is incorporated into the comprehensive prior agreement system.
October 21 The IAEA and OSART (Operational Safety Review Team) report that the level of safety at the
Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.'s Takahama Nuclear Power Station is the highest in the world.
October 28 Japan becomes an official member of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material.
November 16 Hokkaido's first nuclear power plant, Tomari Power Station Unit 1, reaches critical level.
December 1 With the construction of the Shika Nuclear Power Station, there are no regions in Japan without
a nuclear power plant.

1989
January 7 Unit 3 at the Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station is shut down due to the malfunction of the
recirculation pump.
February 10 The Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute applies for approval for the installation of a high-
temperature engineering test reactor (HTTR) with a thermal output of 30,000 kW.
March 30 Japan Nuclear Fuel Service Company Limited applies for the licensing of its Rokkasho
reprocessing plant.
April 7 The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approves a new regulation for unifying the
licensing of the standardization, construction and operation of nuclear power plants.
May 15 The World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) is officially established in an inaugural
meeting held in Moscow.
July 10 The Ministry of International Trade and Industry initiates a system for the ranking accidents and
breakdowns of nuclear power plants and for making the information available to the public.
July 16 The important role that nuclear power generation plays in reducing greenhouse gas emissions is
clearly stated at a Summit Meeting in Paris.
July 18 The Science and Technology Agency initiates a system for the ranking accidents and
breakdowns of nuclear fuel cycle facilities and research reactors and for making the information
available to the public.
September 17 The increasing importance of the role of nuclear power generation in protecting the global
environment is emphasized at the 14th World Energy Conference held in Montreal.

1990
June 5 The Advisory Committee for Energy compiles new prospects for long-term energy supply and
demand; the output of nuclear power generation for 2010 was downwardly revised to 72.5
million kW, and the importance of the location of nuclear facilities was highlighted.
July 5 The Ministry of International Trade and Industry announces the assessment result, stating that
there are no problems with the restarting of Unit 3 at the Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power
Station.
July 19 The Japan-France Nuclear Cooperation Treaty, a major premise for the construction of
reprocessing facilities, goes into effect.
August 2 Iraq invades Kuwait, and an economic blockade against Iraq is adopted by the United Nations
Security Council - "the Gulf Crisis"
September 13 Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. completes the delivery of commercial uranium enrichment equipment
and centrifugal separators to be used for the first term (150 tons SWU/year).
October 18 Revision application from Japan Nuclear Fuel Service Company for reprocessing facilities
(results of additional surveys conducted to check geological structures are reflected in the
application). Construction to begin in December 1991
November 15 The national government approves the construction of Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd.'s industrial low-
level radioactive waste burial facilities. Construction to begin on December 6

752
1991
February 9 Unit 2 at the Mihama Power Station is shut down due to the fracturing of heat transfer pipes in
the steam generator (ECCS functioned for the first time).
May 15 The Ministry of International Trade and Industry approves the installation of Units 6 and 7 (the
first improved BWRs) at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station.
May 18 "Monju", a prototype fast breeder reactor, is installed and comprehensive functional testing
begins.
June 6 The Special Investigative Committee for the Mihama Accident established within the Ministry
of International Trade and Industry, releases its interim report that the cause of the accident was
an error made when inserting the side anchor.
October 30 The Nuclear Safety Commission conducts a public hearing on reprocessing facilities and
facilities for handling high-level radioactive returned waste.
November 22 The Special Committee for Investigating the Mihama Accident releases its final report.
It concludes that the cause of the fracture was an error made when inserting the side anchor, and
instructed the company to strengthen countermeasures.
December 18 With the commencement of operation of Unit 3 at the Ohi Power Station, the number of
commercial nuclear power plants in Japan is 42 and their overall generation capacity is
3,340 kW.

1992
January 20 The Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute announces the "Mutsu" dismantling plan.
March 27 Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. begins operation of its uranium enrichment plant (initial output unit:
150 tons SWU/year).
May 6 Japan Nuclear Fuel Service Company begins the first-term construction of its high-level
radioactive returned waste facility (storage of 1,440 vitrified containers of waste).
July 6 An economic declaration is announced at the Munich Summit Meeting. Measures to support
the former USSR and eastern European nations in securing the safety of their nuclear power
plants are incorporated into the declaration.
July 28 The Atomic Energy Commission establishes a long-term planning division to review the long-
term nuclear power development and utilization plan. The Special Group for Radioactive Waste
Countermeasures estimates that radioactive waste disposal operations for the disposal of high-
level radioactive waste will commence in the mid-2030s or mid-2040s.
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the Science and Technology Agency and
the Ministry of Transport, decide to adopt the "International Nuclear Event Scale (INES)" for
nuclear power plants, related facilities and transportation.
August, 1 The Ministry of International Trade and Industry instructs the Tokyo Electric Power Co. to
take countermeasures in order to prevent the reoccurrence of the same accident as that which
occurred in Unit 2 at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.
October 29 It also requests that the presence of ECCS functioning be reported first.
December 8 Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. begins operation of the low-level radioactive waste storage center.
December 24 Licensing of Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant is granted to Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd.

1993
January 5 "Akatsukimaru," a plutonium transport ship, enters Tokai Port.
January 13 In the U.S., ABWR is selected as a progressive reactor and AP600 as a passive reactor based on
detailed engineering designs.
February 17 The Clinton government of the U.S. cuts the budget for new reactor development to a quarter of
the budget of the previous year.
March 23 The Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute achieves the world's highest fusion product
through the operation of the JT-60.
April 28 Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited begins construction of its Rokkasho reprocessing plant.
May 28 A preparatory committee for organizing operators responsible for the disposal of high-level
radioactive waste is established.

App
753
1994
April 5 The prototype fast breeder reactor, "Monju", reaches critical level.
June 24 The Atomic Energy Commission adopts the "Long-term Plan for Nuclear Power Research,
Development and Utilization." It is stated in this plan that policies to promote nuclear fuel
recycling should be maintained and that the plan should be implemented with due consideration
to transparency and information disclosure.
October 13 Unit 2 at the Mihama Power Station begins commercial operation.
The 10th reactor unit in Korea reaches critical level.

1995
January 17 The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake occurs. Nuclear power plants in surrounding regions are
not affected.
May 15 In the supplementary budget of FY1995, emphasis is on science and technology. The Japan
Atomic Energy Research Institute's high-temperature engineering test and research reactor is
completed one year ahead of schedule and reaches critical level in FY1997.
July 11 The Federation of Electric Power Companies requests the Science and Technology Agency and
concerned parties to review the Oma advanced thermal demonstration reactor plan.
September 29 Following the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, the Examination Committee on Seismic Safety
of the Nuclear Safety Commission reviews the Examination Guide for Seismic Design of
Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities, and concludes that the current Guide is appropriate.
December 8 Sodium leakage occurs at the "Monju" prototype fast breeder reactor.

1996
January 23 The governors of Fukushima, Niigata and Fukui Prefectures call on the Director-General of the
Science and Technology Agency and the Minister of International Trade and Industry, to request
that best efforts be made to build a national consensus.
March 15 The Atomic Energy Commission decides that a round-table meeting is to be established to
discuss nuclear policies.
April 16 In the U.S., a plan to construct an intermediate storage facility for spent fuel on the Mescalero
Indian reservation stalls.
June 28 It is decided to terminate the commercial operation of the Japan Atomic Power Company's Tokai
Power Station (GCR) at the end of March 1998 and for the plant to be into a decommissioning stage.

1997
February 14 The Director-General of the Science and Technology Agency and the Minister of International
Trade and Industry hold a meeting with the three governors of Fukui, Fukushima and Niigata
Prefectures to request their cooperation in implementing the nuclear fuel cycle policy.
(1) The thermal use of plutonium is to begin using 3 to 4 units by 2000, with full-scale thermal
use operation to start by around 2010.
(2) The viability of storing spent fuel outside the premises of power plants is to be investigated.
(3) Measures to dispose of high-level radioactive waste are to be investigated.
(4) The safety of the “Monju” reactor is to be verified by performing comprehensive
inspections, and the appropriateness of maintaining its operation is to be clarified.
March 6 Tokyo Electric Power Co. explains the details of its plutonium-thermal project in Niigata and
Fukushima Prefectures.
March 11 A fire and explosion occur at the asphalt solidification facility in the Power Reactor & Nuclear
Fuel Development Corporation's Tokai Plant.
April 15 The Science and Technology Agency establishes the Investigative Committee for Power Reactor
& Nuclear Fuel Reform.
July 2 Unit 7 at Tokyo Electric Co., Inc.'s Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station commences
operation, making the facility the world's largest nuclear power plant.
August 1 The Investigative Committee for Power Reactor & Nuclear Fuel Reform submits a plan to the
Director-General of the Science and Technology Agency on restructuring and the inauguration
of a new corporate body. A working group is established for this new entity.
December 1 The third session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (COP3) is held in Kyoto (until Dec. 11). Nations participating in this
session reach an agreement on the numerical reduction targets of greenhouse gas emissions.
December 23 The Science and Technology Agency announces that the new name of the Power Reactor &
Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation is the "Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute."

754
1998
February 2 The French government decides to shut down the "Super Phoenix" fast breeder reactor.
February 23 Kansai Electric Power Co. submits to Fukui and other prefectures a request for prior
understanding on the plutonium-thermal project.
March 31 The unit at the Japan Atomic Power Company's Tokai Power Station, which was the first
commercial reactor established in Japan, is shut down and put into the decommissioning stage.
April 29 The COP3 protocol is signed.
May 28 Following an underground nuclear test by India, Pakistan also conducts an underground nuclear
test.
June 5 In the U.K., BNFL announces the shutdown of its MOX fuel reprocessing plant in Dounreay.
October 1 The Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (formerly the Power Reactor & Nuclear Fuel
Development Corporation) is established.
October 6 A special investigative committee is established at the Science and Technology Agency to
investigate the falsification of data on neutron shielding material of a spent fuel transportation
container.
November 2 Fukushima Prefecture announces that it will give prior understanding on the plutonium-thermal
project as requested by the Tokyo Electric Power Co.

1999
February 8 The Ministry of International Trade and Industry releases the report "Evaluation of Measures
Taken by Electric Power Companies Concerning Nuclear Plant Aging, and Practical Measures
to Implement to Deal with Aging."
June 28 The Nuclear Safety Commission determines that the current Safety Examination Guideline can
be applied to the safety of ABWR using global MOX fuel.
July 12 Leakage occurs from the heat exchanger of the chemical volume control system in Unit 2 at
Japan Atomic Power Company Co., Ltd.'s Tsuruga Power Station.
September 14 Kansai Electric Power Co. announces that it was notified by BNFL, which supplies Unit 3 at
Takahama with MOX fuel, of doubts over a part of the quality control data.
September 30 A criticality accident occurs at the JCO Tokai Plant (fuel processing facility) in Tokai Village.
December 3 Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited commences operation of its Rokkasho reprocessing plant.
December 9 In order to engender a culture of safety in the nuclear industry, 35 companies and organizations,
including electric power companies, fuel fabricating companies, plant manufacturers, research
institutions, etc. found the Nuclear Safety Network (NS Network).
December 13 The Special Law on Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures and the amended Nuclear Reactor
Regulation Law specifying tightened safety regulations are passed in a House of Councilors
plenary session and go into effect.
December 21 Mr. Hisashi Ouchi, a JCO employee who was exposed to excessive radiation during the JCO
criticality accident, dies at the age of 35. He is the first victim at nuclear facilities in Japan.

2000
March 28 The Science and Technology Agency revoke the fabrication business license of JCO on the
grounds that the company modified equipment without the permission of the regulatory
authority and committed other violations against the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law.
May 24 The Science and Technology Agency assesses the JCO criticality accident as a "level 4" accident
according to the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES).
May 31 The "Law on Final Disposal of Special Radioactive Waste," which specifies the framework for
the disposal of high-level radioactive waste generated by reprocessing, is adopted in a House of
Councilors plenary session and goes into effect.
June 2 The Conference on Long-Term Planning encountered the JCO accident and had a considerable
influence on the course of discussions about the accident. It submits a draft of the final report to
the Atomic Energy Commission.
June 14 The "Special Law on Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures," which specifies the establishment of
off-site centers in 21 locations throughout the country, goes into effect.
October 18 The Nuclear Waste Management Organization of Japan is established as an organization in
charge of controlling the disposal of high-level radioactive waste.
November 16 The Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute concludes agreements with the governments of
Hokkaido and Horonobe Town concerning the study of deep geological strata. 参
November 20 The Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute's Tokai Reprocessing Facility resumes
operation after a suspension period of 3 years and 8 months.
December 19 Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited starts bringing in spent fuel to its Rokkasho reprocessing plant. App
755
2001
January 6 The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency is in charge of dealing with matters related to
commercial power reactors. After the reorganization of government ministries and agencies, the
responsibilities of the Agency were expanded and it was made responsible for not only matters
related to commercial power reactors, but also matters related to refining facilities, fabrication
facilities, reprocessing facilities, disposal facilities and power reactors in a research and
development stage.
July 16 The Nuclear Safety Commission determines the clearance levels for nuclear facilities, heavy
water reactors, fast breeder reactors, etc.
November 7 Pipes fracture in the residual heat removal system of Unit 1 at the Chubu Electric Power Co.,
Inc.'s Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station.

2002
August 29 Falsification of self-inspection records and other issues involving Tokyo Electric Power Co. are
revealed.
October 25 Falsification in the reactor containment leakage rate test of Unit 1 at the Tokyo Electric Power
Co.'s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station is revealed.
October 31 The Subcommittee for Investigation of Nuclear Safety Regulation Laws, established within the
Nuclear Safety Commission, investigates the falsification of self-inspection records involving
licensees, studies preventive measures and releases an interim report.
November 1 Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited commences chemical testing at its Rokkasho reprocessing plant.

2003
October 1 The Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law, the Electricity Utilities Industry Law and other related
laws are amended, and based on these amended laws a new nuclear safety administration system
begins.
The Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES) is established (Incorporated
Administrative Agency).
November 21 Construction begins on Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Inc.'s Tomari Power Station Unit 3
following the granting of approval of the first work plan.
November 26 The FY2003 nuclear disaster drills are carried out in Unit 2 at the Genkai Nuclear Power
Station.
December 12 The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency orders inspections in relation to the damage to outlet
piping in the regenerative heat exchanger at Tomari Power Station Unit 2.
December 22 The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency requests the periodical evaluation of processing and
reprocessing facilities, as well as reporting on aging management.

2004
March 31 The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency establishes a Nuclear Safety Public Relations and
Training Division.
April 22 The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency instructs measures to be taken in relation to the
damage to the main rod of the charging pump in Unit 3 at Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc.'s
Ikata Power Station.
May 29 Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc. applies for approval for the use of MOX fuel at Genkai Nuclear
Power Station Unit 3.
June 29 The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency orders the collection of reports on the ECCS strainer
and clogging of the recirculator sump screen of the containment vessel.
August 9 The secondary piping rupture accident occurs in Unit 3 at Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.'s
Mihama Power Station during preparation for a periodical inspection; five workers are killed
and six are injured.
September 22 Promulgation and enforcement of the Ordinance for the Amendment of the Enforcement
Regulations of the Electricity Utilities Industry Law, which is related to integrity evaluations of
piping that uses austenite low carbon stainless steel for nuclear power generation.
October 1 The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency publishes the safety management evaluation results
of licensee periodical inspections for Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Inc.'s Tomari Power Station
Unit 2, Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.'s Takahama Power Station Unit 1, Shikoku Electric
Power Co., Inc.'s Ikata Power Station Unit 2 and Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc.'s Genkai
Nuclear Power Station Units 2 and 3.
November 16 "Town hall meetings" between local residents in the vicinity of nuclear power facilities and the
Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency begin.
December 16 The first meeting of the Nuclear Power Plant Aging Review Committee is held in Fukui City.
Prior to the meeting, the Nuclear Power Plant Aging Management Office is established at the
inspection division of nuclear power in the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency on December 13.
December 21 Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited commences uranium testing at its Rokkasho reprocessing plant.

756
2005
January 18 Commissioning of Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc.'s Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit 5
(ABWR electrical output of 1,380,000 kW) - the largest generated output in Japan
A workshop on the effectiveness of safety management and inspection activities conducted by
electric power companies is given under the joint auspices of NEA and IAEA.
March 30 The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency compiles the final report on the fracture of secondary
system piping that occurred at the Mihama Power Station Unit 3.
April 13 The Japan Nuclear Technology Institute is established to improve the technological
infrastructure and to promote self-controlled safety preservation activities.
April 22 Pipe fracturing occurs and a solution leaks at a reprocessing plant in Sellafield, U.K.
May 30 The national government wins a case involving the fast breeder reactor "Monju" at the Supreme
Court's decision.
June 9 Results of the OSART evaluation of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Units 4 and 5 are made public.
August 12 The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency issues a guideline regarding how to identify non-
radioactive wastes generated by nuclear power plants.
August 16 Units 1, 2 and 3 at the Onagawa Nuclear Power Station are automatically shut down as the
Miyagi Prefecture Offshore Earthquake occurs and the tremor exceeds a specified safety limit.
August 29 As the hurricane Katrina approaches the United States, the Waterford Nuclear Power Station
was shut down.
October 1 The Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute and Japan and the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Development Institute are consolidated to establish the Japan Atomic Energy Agency.
October 14 The "Nuclear Energy Policy Outline" compiled by the Atomic Energy Commission is approved
at a Cabinet meeting.
November 9 A comprehensive nuclear disaster preparedness drill is given at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa
Nuclear Power Station.
December 5 IAEA makes a TranSas evaluation in Japan.
December 6 The Federation of Electric Power Companies announces a plutonium utilization plan.
December 6 Commissioning of Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.'s Higashidori Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
- a new nuclear power station constructed for the first time in 12 years.
December 10 IAEA and its Director-General El Baradei, are awarded Nobel Peace Prize.

2006
March 15 Shika Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 2 (ABWR) began operation; it is the 55th unit put into
operation in Japan.
March 31 Active tests began at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant.
June 15 At Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 5 stopped operation due to excessive turbine
vibration. It was discovered that the low-pressure turbine blades had fallen off.
June 30 The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency approved the decommissioning plan for Tokai Power
Station of the Japan Atomic Power Company, Ltd.
July 1 Mr. Dale Klein replaced Mr. Nils Diaz as chairman of the U.S. NRC.
July 25 At Forsmark Nuclear Power Station in Sweden, the emergency DG of Unit No. 1 (BWR, 1008
MWe) failed to start due to problems related to opening of the disconnector at the switchyard.
August 8 The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry officially adopted The New National Energy
Strategies
Septembar 14 The national government designated Higashidoori Nuclear Power Station of Tokyo Electric
Power Co., Inc. as an important point of electric power development.
Septembar 19 The Nuclear Safety Commission revised Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Seismic Design of
Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities
Octobar 25 Under the direction of the national government, nuclear disaster countermeasure drills were
conducted at Ikata Power Station of Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc.
Novembar 13 ASN (Nuclear Safety Regulatory Bureau) was established in France, and Mr. Lacoste became
the new chairman.
Novembar 14 The experimental fast reactor Joyo received a historic landmark award of American Nuclear
Society(News) 参
Decembar 6 At the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant, the 2nd step of the active test in the commissioning
process was completed.
App
757
2007
February 27 Exelon Nuclear of the United States, Lassale Unit 1 marked a world record for continuous
operation of 739 days.
March 15 A hidden critical accident at the periodical inspection in 1999 was revealed at Hokuriku Electric
Power Company, Shika Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1.
April 24 The Japan-U.S. joint nuclear energy action plan was announced.
April 26 Active test “third step” finished at Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited, Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant.
July 16 Damage occurred to Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station due to the Niigata Chuetsu-Oki
earthquake.
July 29 Fifty-year anniversary of the establishment of the IAEA.
August 6 The IAEA team started to investigate the state of damage to the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear
Power Station due to the earthquake.
October 24 The “ITER agreement” came into effect and the ITER institution was established formally.
December 4 The construction of Flamanville Unit 3, the first EPR in France, started.
December 27 The Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan revised part of the Examination guide for fire
protection of light water nuclear power reactor facilities.

2008
January 23 The Borssele nuclear power plant in the Netherlands achieved a new record power generation of
3,994 TWh in 2007.
March 14 The Basic Policy on Specified Radioactive Waste Final Disposal, and the Specified Radioactive
Waste Final Disposal Plan were revised (Cabinet approval).
May 5 Kazakhstan and Japan signed a memorandum for strengthening their strategic partnership in the
field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
July 29 The Action Plan for Establishing a Low Carbon Society was approved in the Cabinet.
October 3 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inaugurated the International Seismic Safety
Centre (ISSC).
December 22 The Chubu Electric Power Co., lnc.’s Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station replacement plan
(decommissioning of Units 1 and 2, and building of Unit 6 and a spent fuel dry-storage facility)
was announced.

2009
February 3 India signs a safeguard treaty with the IAEA at a commercial nuclear reactor.
May 20 Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.'s Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 7 resumes
power generation for the first time in 1 year and 10 months since its shutdown due to the
Chuetsu-Oki Earthquake.
June 3 Sweden determines Forsmark to be the final disposal site of spent fuel.
August 11 Chubu Electric Power Co.’s Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Units 4 and 5 automatically shut
down due to the earthquake centered off the coast of Suruga Bay.
September 16 Hatoyama Cabinet, Democratic Party, is established.
October 26 A (center-right) coalition government comprising three parties which promote nuclear power
generation is established in Germany.
November 9 Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc.'s Genkai Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 starts plutonium thermal
operation for the first time in Japan.
December 1 Yukiya Amano, the former ambassador of nuclear nonproliferation, officially assumes the office
of IAEA Director General.
December 22 Hokkaido Electric Co., Inc.'s Tomari Power Station Unit 3 starts commercial operation.

758
759

You might also like