A RAND NOTE

0 The PLO and Israel in Central America:

The Geopolitical Dimension

N Bruce Hoffman

March 1988

JAN 19 1990

Aroved for pubic releagel

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RAND 9 0 01 18 0 15
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A RAND NOTE N-2685-RC

The PLO and Israel in Central America:

The Geopolitical Dimension

Bruce Hoffman

March 1988

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PREFACE

In recent years, attention has been drawn to the close relations that exist between the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the ruling Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.
The support, training, and arms furnished by the PLO to the Sandinistas and like-minded
revolutionary movements in surrounding Central American countries have often been cited
as proof that Nicaragua has been transformed into a base for international terrorism in the
Western Hemisphere.
This Note assesses the relationship between the PLO and the Sandinistas. In
particular, it examines the geopolitical dimension of this relationship, i.e., the extension or
transposition of the conflict between the PLO and Israel in the Middle East to Central
America. In this respect, PLO support and assistance to the Sandinistas and other
revolutionary movements in surrounding countries has served as a counterbalance to Israeli
support and arms sales to Nicaragua's neighbors in Central America.
This study was supported by The RAND Corporation from its own funds. It should
be of interest to U.S. policymakers concerned with Centrai American events and issues, and
to the general public as well.

~t)
 -v-

SUMMARY

The relations reportedly established between international terrorist organizations in

Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East with the ruling Sandinista regime in Nicaragua
have been used as a justification for U.S. efforts to isolate Nicaragua and marshal support
for the Reagan administration's Central America policies. The support, training, and arms
furnished to the Sandinistas by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) have at times
figured prominently in this campaign.
Two key elements appear to underlie the ties between the PLO and Nicaragua. The
first, the PLO's long-standing commitment to promote solidarity among the world's various
revolutionary and national liberation movements, provides an ideological basis for the
cooperation, support, training, weapons, and logistical and financial assistance provided by
the PLO to other terrorist and guerrilla groups. The second, the geopolitical dimension of
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict resulting from Israel's long relationship with the deposed
Somoza regime, laid the groundwork for the PLO's involvement with the Sandinistas and
continues to color that relationship as a result of Israel's military assistance to Honduras,
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Costa Rica. In this context, the conflict between Israel and the
Palestinians in the Middle East has been transposed, or has spilled over, to Central America,
providing an additional motivation for Palestinian activity in the region.
The origins of PLO-Sandinista ties can be traced back to 1966, when Cuban leader
Fidel Castro sponsored the Tri-Continental Conference (also referred to as the Organization
of the Solidarity of the Peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America Conference) in Havana.
At that conferer ce, more than 500 delegates from an array of worldwide radical leftist
groups-including representatives of the PLO-met to formulate a "global revolutionary strategy
to counter the global strategy of American imperialism." One outcome of the conference
was the pact reportedly signed in the late 1960s between the PLO and the Sandinista
guerrillas who were then fighting the government of Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua-a pact
which called for the training of Sandinista troops at Palestinian bases in Lebanon.
The most celebrated case of Sandinista participation in Palestinian terrorism was the
involvement of Patrick Arguello Ryan in the attempted hijacking of an Israeli aircraft by
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) terrorists in September 1970. During
the clashes that erupted in Jordan later that month when King Hussein moved to oust the
PLO from his kingdom, Sandinistas fought alongside Palestinian guerrillas against the
 - vi -

Jordanian armed forces. It appears that after the PLO was expelled from Jordan, Sandinista
cadres continued to receive training at the PLO's relocated camps and operations bases in
Lebanon.
After their victory, the Sandinistas rewarded the PLO for its assistance by opening a
PLO embassy in Managua. Indeed, during the weeks following the revolution, delegations
of Palestinians arrived regularly in Nicaragua, while Sandinista officials frequently visited
PLO bases in the Middle East. PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat was among the dignitaries who
attended celebrations in the capital on the first anniversary of the Sandinista victory, in July
1980. Soon after, reports began to surface of 25 PLO advisers who had arrived in Nicaragua
sometime during 1980.
Apparently, PLO aid to the Sandinistas has not been confined to guerrilla training and
weapons supply. In January 1982, Arafat was quoted by the Beirut newspaper al-Safir as
stating that PLO pilots had been sent to Nicaragua. The PLO has also provided the
Sandinista regime with economic aid. In November 1981, Arafat announced that the PLO
had loaned Nicaragua $10 million. Additional loans amounting to $12 million appear to
have been made in succeeding years. The PLO has also played a leading role in forming a
Nicaraguan national airline. In late 1979, the first of several Boeing 727 aircraft was
reportedly donated by the PLO to Aeronica, the Nicaraguan airline.
The expansion of PLO support for the Sandinistas since the late 1970s must,
however, be viewed alongside the increasing military assistance provided by Israel to the
beleaguered Somoza regime during the same period. It can be argued, in fact, that the
confluence of PLO and Israeli involvement in Nicaraguan affairs since that time has resulted
in a reconfiguration of the Sandinistas' internal revolution into a geopolitical struggle,
represented on the one hand by PLO support for the Sandinista National Liberation Front
(FSLN), and on the other by Israeli aid to the Sandinistas' opponents.
Israel's close relations with the ruling Somoza regime date back to 1948. During
Israel's war of independence, Nicaragua was one of the few countries to sell arms to Israel
and indeed was among the first to recognize the new state-two actions the Israelis never
forgot and that served to cement relations between the two countries until Somoza's fall in
1979. Given the extent of Israel's support of Somoza, it is neither surprising nor illogical
that the Palestinians and the Sandinistas should have gravitated toward one another. By the
same token, it is not surprising that as PLO-Sandinista ties solidified after the revolution and
PLO military assistance to the FSLN increased, Israel became involved in U.S.-backed
efforts to aid the Nicaraguan rebel groups known as the contras in their opposition to the
Sandinista regime. Although the enmity between Israel and the PLO appears, on the
 - vii -

surface, to account for this development, an examination of Israeli motivations reveals a

different-and more complex-set of foreign policy imperatives at work.
In recent years, Latin America has emerged as one of Israel's principal markets for
defense-related exports. Indeed, Israel's aggressive arms export policy is at the root of
Israeli involvement in Central America. But, pragmatic economic considerations aside,
there are other, equally compelling, political and diplomatic concerns behind these sales.
Israeli policy in this regard is part and parcel of Israel's self-perceived role as a defender of
Western interests-a role that has led to claims that Israel acts as a U.S. surrogate in extending
aid to Latin American governments, authoritarian military regimes, or rebel groups (such as
the contras) who, because of human-rights violations or other issues objectionable to U.S.
domestic political opinion, would otherwise be unable to obtain such aid from the United
States.
The geopolitical confrontation in Nicaragua between the PLO and Israel has also
spilled over into surrounding Central American countries. PLO arms and training have been
provided to the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Force (FMLN) in El Salvador (a
coalition of the five principal rebel groups in that country), as well as to the Guatemalan
National Revolutionary Union (URNG), a rebel force operating in Guatemala. At the same
time, Israel has been equally active in Central America, providing arms and assistance to
Nicaragua's neighbors in Honduras, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and El Salvador. Israel's arms
trade with these Central American countries has irreparably damaged its already strained
relations with the ruling Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. Diplomatic relations between the
two countries were formally severed in Aug-uot 1 82, three years after the revolution that
brought the FSLN to power.
However, although close-and long-standing--ties have indeed been forged between the
PLO and the Sandinistas, and considerable support and assistance has been provided by the
PLO to the FSLN regime, the assertion that Nicaragua has become a base for Palestinian
terrorist operations in Central America or in the Western Hemisphere as a whole cannot be
substantiated. Data compiled in the RAND Chronology of International Terrorism reveal
that only thirteen terrorist incidents attributable to either Palestinian terrorists or indigenous,
regional terrorist groups acting at the behest of the PLO or in demonstrations of
"revolutionary solidarity" with the Palestinians have occurred in Latin America since 1970,
and none have occurred since 1983. Palestinian terrorists were actually responsible for only
one operation, an attack against Israel's embassy in Paraguay in 1970. Moreover, only four
of the thirteen incidents occurred in Central American countries.
 - viii -

Thus, while expressions of revolutionary solidarity between the PLO and the
Sandinistas initially formed an ideological framework for their relationship, it appears that
the real motivation of the PLO has been the opportunity to counter-and thereby
exploit-Israel's longer and more extensive involvement in Central America. Accordingly, it
seems likely that as long as Israel continues to supply military assistance to El Salvador,
Guatemala, Costa Rica, Honduras, and the Nicaraguan rebel groups, a PLO presence will
remain in Nicaragua, and Palestinian ties to leftist insurgent groups in El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Costa Rica will remain as well.
This is not meant to imply that Israel is somehow responsible for the PLO's presence
in Central America or that the PLO would cease operations in Managua if Israel stopped
providing military assistance to any of Nicaragua's enemies. The point is that, until recently,
the PLO's involvement in the region--despite revolutionary lip-service to the contrary-was
minimal at best and certainly much less than Israel's. Israel's backing of Somoza, provision
of aid to the Contras, and supplying of weaponry to Nicaragua's neighbors appear to have
enabled the PLO to gain a foothold in Nicaragua and to build upon it through relations with
leftist groups in other Central American countries.
At the same time, however, PLO activities in Nicaragua do not appear to have been
designed to use that country as a base for terrorist operations against Israeli or Jewish targets
elsewhere in Latin America. Although Nicaragua admittedly could serve as a PLO base for
terrorist operations in the Western hemisphere in the future, this seems unlikely. The lone
instance of a Palestinian terrorist attack in Latin America seventeen years ago, the relative
paucity of surrogate operations against Israeli or Jewish interests in the region during the
febrile period following Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and the complete absence of
surrogate activity since 1983 provide no indication of a reversal of this situation.
Much depends, of course, on the future course of Palestinian terrorism. A change in
Sandinista policy regarding the Palestinians and the use of Nicaragua as a base could only
follow a radical shift within the PLO itself. The PLO's interests in Nicaragua appear, rather,
to be commercial (as demonstrated by the organization's alleged ownership of 25 percent of
Aeronica) and-like Israel's interests in other Central American countries-aimed at exploiting
an available market for weapons and military assistance and training.
 - ix-

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to acknowledge the helpful suggestions made by Anthony Maingot
of Florida International University and Nikola Schahgaldian of the RAND research staff,
who reviewed an earlier draft of this Note. Without the encouragement and support of
Barbara Williams and Richard Darilek, Head and Associate Head, respectively, of the
Behavioral Sciences Department at RAND, the research reported here would not have been
possible. A special debt is owed to Janet DeLand, whose masterful editorial skills greatly
improved the manuscript. The views expressed in this Note, as well as any errors, are, of
course, entirely the author's.
 - xi -

CONTENTS

PR EFA CE ..................................................... .ii

SU M M A R Y .................................................... v

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .......................................... ix

Section
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................... ..

II. THE EXTENSION OF THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT

TO NICARAGUA .......................................... 3
The PLO's Intervention In Nicaraguan Affairs ................... 3
Israel's Intervention In Nicaraguan Affairs ...................... 12

III. THE EXTENSION OF THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT

TO CENTRAL AMERICA ................................... 22
Israel's Involvement in Central America ........................ 22
PLO Involvement in Central America .......................... 30

IV. CONCLUSION ........................................... 35

BIBLIOGRA PHY ................................................ 39

 -1-

I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the relations reportedly established among international terrorist

organizations in Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East with the ruling Sandinista
regime in Nicaragua have served as a justification for U.S. efforts to isolate Nicaragua and
marshal support for the Reagan administration's Central America policies. The support,
training, and arms furnished to the Sandinistas by the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) have at times figured prominently in this campaign.I
However, while much attention has been focused on the PLO and the Sandinistas as
separate revolutionary phenomena, comparatively little has been paid to the actual links
between them. Moreover, those few analyses that have examined PLO-Sandinista relations
and are considered the principal sources of information on this subject 2 have largely ignored
the geopolitical dimension of this relationship, whereby the conflict between the PLO and
Israel in the Middle East has been extended, or transposed, to Central America. PLO
support and assistance to the Sandinistas and other revolutionary movements in surrounding
countries has occurred alongside of, or as a counterbalance to, Israeli support and arms sales
to Nicaragua's neighbors in Central America.
This Note assesses and analyzes the PLO-Sandinista relationship within the context
of Israel's relations with the deposed Somoza regime in Nicaragua, the Nicaraguan anti-
Sandinista rebel groups known as the contras, and surrounding Central American states such
as Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Costa Rica. It examines the historical
background of Palestinian and Israeli involvement in Nicaraguan affairs, their intervention in
the internal conflicts of other surrounding Central American countries, and the potential

IU.S. Department of State and Department of Defense, The SandinistaMilitary

Build-up, Washington, D.C., May 1985, p. 34; and U.S. Department of State, The
Sandinistasand Middle Eastern Radicals,Washington, D.C., August 1985, p. 14.
2Ibid.; and
Center for International Security, "The Salvadoran Communists and the
PLO: An Unholy Alliance," Spotlight on the Americas, Washington, D.C., February 1984;
Center for International Seurity, "The Sandinista-PLO Axis: A Challenge to the Free
World," Spotlight on the Americas, Washington, D.C., February 1984; David J. Kapilow,
Castro, Israel and the PLO, The Cuban-American National Foundation, Washington, D.C.,
1984; Eileen Scully, "The PLO's Growing Latin American Base," Backgrounder, No. 281,
The Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C., August 2, 1983. The lone exception is Ignacio
Klich, "Latin America and the Palestinian Question," Research Report, Nos. 2 and 3,
Institute of Jewish Affairs, London, January 1986, pp. 18-19.
 -2-

implications of this situation on future international terrorist activity in Central America

sponsored by Nicaragua and facilitated by Palestinian support. The Note thus provides a
case study of a long-standing regional conflict between an established state and an opposing
revolutionary movement in one part of the world manifesting itself in an indigenous conflict
in another part of the world.
This work is based entirely on open sources and does not incorporate any classified
material.
 -3-

II. THE EXTENSION OF THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT TO NICARAGUA

Two key elements appear to underlie the ties between the PLO and Nicaragua: the
PLO's long-standing commitment to promote solidarity among the world's various
revolutionary and national liberation movements, and the geopolitical dimension of the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The commitment to solidarity provides an ideological basis for
the cooperation, support, training, weapons supply, and logistical and financial assistance
provided by the PLO to other terrorist and guerrilla groups.' In addition, Israel's long
relationship with the deposed Somoza iegime laid the groundwork for the PLO's
involvement with the Sandinistas and continues to color that relationship as Israel continues
to provide military assistance to Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Costa Rica. The
conflict between Israel and the Palestinians in the Middle East has been transposed, or has
spilled over, into Central America, thus providing an additional motivation for Palestinian
activity in that region.

THE PLO'S INTERVENTION IN NICARAGUAN AFFAIRS

The PLO-Sandinista ties can be traced back to 1966, when Cuban leader Fidel Castro
sponsored the Tri-Continental Conference (also referred to as the Organization of the
Solidarity of the Peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America Conference) in Havana. More
than 500 delegates from worldwide radical leftist groups, including representatives of the
PLO, met to formulate a "global revolutionary strategy to counter the global strategy of
American imperialism." 2 One outcome of the conference was the pact reportedly signed in
the late 1960s between the PLO and Sandinista guerrillas who were then fighting the
government of Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, whereby Sandinistas would be trained at
Palestinian bases in Lebanon. 3

'See, for example, the interview with George Habash, leader of the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), in al-Nahar, March 5, 1969, cited in Shaul Mishal, The
PLO Under 'Arafat: Between Gun and Olive Branch, Yale University Press, New Haven
and London, 1986, p. 43; the statements attributed to Arafat regarding PLO-Sandinista
relations quoted in Kapilow, Castro, Israel and the PLO, p. 5; and Jillian Becker, The PLO:
The Rise and Fall of the PalestineLiberation Organization,St. Martin's Press, New York,
1985, pp. 166-167.
2Quoted
in Kapilow, Castro,Israel and the PLO, p. 5; see also U.S. Department of
State, The Sandinistas and Middle Eastern Radicals, p. 1; and Scully, "The PLO's Growing
Latin American Base," p. 2.
3 Juan
0. Tamayo, "Sandinistas Attract a Who's Who of Terrorists," Miami Herald,
March 3, 1985; see also Scully, "The PLO's Growing Latin American Base," p. 2.
 -4-

According to a study published by the Center for International Security, the first
contingent of Sandinista guerrillas arrived in Lebanon in 1969. They included Pedro Arauz
Palacios, Eduardo Contreras, and Tomas Borge, the present Nicaraguan Minister of the
Interior and one of the nine commandantes of the Sandinista National Liberation Front
(FSLN) National Directorate. 4 A meeting held later that year in Mexico City between a
senior FSLN official, Benito Escobar, and three representatives of the PLO resulted in 50 to
70 additional Sandinistas being dispatched to PLO-Cuban training camps in Lebanon,
Algeria, and Libya. 5 The Vice Minister of the Interior of Nicaragua, Rene Vivas, the
Minister for External Cooperation, Henry Ruiz, and the late Minister of
Telecommunications, Enrique Schmidt (who was killed in combat against Contra rebels in
November 1984), were among the Sandinistas trained by the PLO during 1969 and 1970.6
Particularly close ties were established between the Sandinistas and the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The global revolutionary aims of the PFLP, which
was founded by a radical Marxist, Dr. George Habash, created a natural affinity with the
Sandinistas. 7 Indeed, the most celebrated case of Sandinista participation in Palestinian
8
terrorism was the involvement of Patrick Arguello Ryan in a PFLP aircraft hijacking.
Arguello was already "wanted by several Central American governments for subversive
activities,"9 when, together with Leila Khaled (a PFLP terrorist and veteran of a previous
aircraft hijacking), he attempted to hijack an El Al passenger jet on September 6, 1970. In
the ensuing struggle with Israeli security agents on board the aircraft, Arguello was killed. 10

4Center
for International Security, "The Sandinista-PLO Axis: A Challenge to the
Free World,"
5Ibid.;
p. 2.
see also U.S. Department of State, The Sandinistasand Middle Eastern
Radicals,p. 1.
6U.S.
Department of State, The Sandinistasand Middle Eastern Radicals,p. 1; see
also Associated Press, August 7, 1985.
7See, for example, the interview with Habash in al-Nahar,March 5, 1969, cited in
Mishal, The PLO Under 'Arafat: Between Gun and Olive Branch, p. 43.
8See Edgar O'Ballance, The Language of Violence: The Blood Politicsof Terrorism,
Presidio Press, San Rafael, Calif., 1979, p. 136; Center for International Security, "The
Sandinista-PLO Axis: A Challenge to the Free World," p. 2; and U.S. Department of State,
The Sandinistasand Middle EasternRadicals, p. 2.
9Zeev Schiff and Raphael Rothstein, Fedayeen: The Story of the Palestinian
Guerrillas,Valentine, Mitchell, London, 1972, p. 145.
10See Leila Khaled, My People Shall Live: The Autobiography of a Revolutionary,
Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1973, pp. 184, 189-191, 193; Schiff and Rothstein,
Fedayeen, p. 145; O'Ballance, The Language of Violence, p. 136; and Christopher Dobson,
Black September: Its Short, Violent History, Robert Hale, London, 1975, p. 80.
 -5-

Khaled later eulogized Arguello as epitomizing the spirit of international revolutionary

solidarity embraced by the PLO:

In joining the struggle for dignity and peoplehood, you have given us a lesson
in international solidarity and brotherhood and cemented the bond of affection
between the people of Latin America and the people of Palestine.... You are
at once a Lafayette, a Byron, a Norman Bethune, a Che Guevera-a Patrick
Arguello, a martyr for Palestinian freedom. You are not dead. You live. You
will live forever! You are the patron saint of Palestine.11

During the clashes that erupted in Jordan during September 1970 (referred to as
"Black September"), when King Hussein moved to oust the PLO from his kingdom,
Sandinistas fought alongside the Palestinian guerrillas against the Jordanian armed forces. 12
After the PLO was expelled from Jordan, Sandinista cadres apparently continued to receive
training at the PLO's relocated camps and operations bases in Lebanon. A former Israeli
intelligence officer who had been based in Nicaragua before the revolution reported that at
least 150 Sandinistas were trained at PLO camps run by the PFLP in Lebanon throughout
the 1970s. 13
During this same period, Tomas Borge was reported to be a major go-between in aid
and arms negotiations between the Sandinistas and the PLO and between the the Sandinistas
and various radical Middle Eastern and Communist-bloc countries. According to the
Department of State, "While acting in his dual capacity as the Sandinistas' PLO liaison and
as Castro's emissary, the wide range of contacts he amassed in the radical Middle East
served him well as he prepared for the Sandinistas' own revolution.1 14 Borge was allegedly

IlKhaled, My People Shall Live, pp. 178-179. Arguello's literary afterlife was
subsequently commemorated by three Japanese Red Army members who staged the Lod
Airport massacre in Israel, at the behest of the PFLP, in May 1972, calling themselves the
"Patrick Arguello Commando." (See Dobson, Black September, p. 80.) The Sandinistas
also named a geothermal powerplant in Nicaragua after Arguello. (See Tamayo,
"Sandinistas Attract a Who's Who of Terrorists," Miami Herald,March 3, 1985.)
'2 Ray Cline and Yonah Alexander, Terrorism: The Soviet Connection, Crane
Russak, New York, 1984, pp. 64, 136; Center for International Security, "The
Sandinista-PLO Axis: A Challenge to the Free World," p. 2; U.S. Department of State, The
Sandinistasand Middle EasternRadicals, p. 2; and U.S. Department of State and
Department of Defense, The SandinistaMilitary Build-up, p. 34.
13 Unidentified
former Israeli intelligence quoted by Tamayo, "Sandinistas Attract a
Who's Who of Terrorists," Miami Herald, March 3, 1985.
14U.S. Department of State, The Sandinistasand Middle EasternRadicals,p. 6.
 -6-

instrumental "in funneling Libyan money and PLO technical assistance into Nicaragua, and
he arranged shipments of arms from North Korea and Vietnam into Nicaragua, El Salvador,
15
and Honduras."
There is some disagreement, however, about the extent of PLO-Sandinista relations
during the 1970s. The most critical study of PLO support for the Sandinistas, that of the
Center for International Security, notes, 'There is little documentation on the
Sandinista-PLO tie during the next several years" (i.e., following September 1970).16
Moreover, a report published by the Institute of Jewish Affairs (IJA), a research institution
based in London and associated with the World Jewish Congress, presented a balanced and
objective analysis of PLO-Sandinista relations, 17 arguing that, "While it was later claimed
that Sandinista-PLO links went back to 1969 and included training in Palestinian camps as
well as combat experience during the Jordanian-Palestinian battles of September 1970...
evidence to support these charges... is hard to come by."1 8 Arguello is cited as the "only
solid proof' of this connection, but even his involvement is dismissed as that of "an
individual recruit," not as part of a wider, more formal, cooperative venture.
It is widely agreed that no formal working relationship was established between the
PLO and the Sandinistas until 1978.19 In February of that year, Benito Escobar again met in
Mexico City with a PLO representative, Issam Sli, a member of the Democratic Front for
the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and, according to the U.S. State Department, "the Latin
American liaison of the PLO." After the meeting, on February 5, a joint communique was
issued expressing the "bonds of solidarity which exist between [the] two revolutionary

5Scully, "The PLO's Growing Latin American Base," p. 4; see also U.S.
Department of State, The Sandinistasand Middle EasternRadicals,p. 6.
16 Center for International Security, 'The Sandinista-PLO Axis: A Challenge to the
Free World," p. 2.
17Many of the analyses cited above (including those of Kapilow, Scully, and the
Center for International Security), which are cited frequently in the U.S. Department of
State report, were published by ostensibly ideologically conservative research institutions
such as The Cuban-American National Foundation, The Heritage Foundation, and the
Center for International Security. The IJA report is regarded as a more objective analysis
primarily because the IJA is an ideologically independent research body.
18Klich,
"Latin America and the Palestinian Question," pp. 18-19.
19lbid; Center for International Security,
"The Sandinista-PLO Axis: A Challenge to
the Free World," p. 2; Scully, "The PLO's Growing Latin American Base," p. 4; and U.S.
Department of State, The Sandinistasand Middle EasternRadicals,p. 6; see also
Washington Post, July 12, 1979.
 -7-

organizations" and condemning U.S. "imperialism" and Israeli "Zionism." 20 On March 6, a

second joint joint communique was issued from Havana, announcing a mutual "declaration
of war" 2 1 against "Yankee imperialism, the racist regime of Israel," and the Somoza
22
dictatorship of Nicaragua.
The more practical dimensions of this alliance were first revealed on July 11, 1979,
when a PLO-chartered cargo jct en route from Beirut to Costa Rica landed to refuel in
Tunisia. Although the plane's manifest listed medical and relief supplies for Nicaraguan
refugees who had fled across the border, Tunisian authorities discovered that the crates,
which bore the symbol of the Red Crescent (the Arab world's equivalent of the International
Red Cross), contained 50 tons of Chinese-manufactured arms and ammunition, including
three artillery pieces. 23 According to the U.S. Department of State, this was only the latest
consignment of Libyan-financed weapons shipments dispatched by the PLO to the
Sandinistas that year. 24 Jorge Mandi, a Sandinista spokesman, commented in an interview
published by the Kuwaiti newspaper al-Watan on August 7, 1979,

There is a long-standing blood unity between us and the Palestinians. Many of

the units belonging to the Sandinista movement were at Palestinian revolutionary
bases in Jordan. In the early 1970s Nicaraguan and Palestinian blood was
spilled together in Amman and in other places during the Black September battles.25

Rhetoric regarding the legacy of PLO-Sandinista cooperation aside, the more salient point
appears to be that "whereas available evidence does not suggest that Palestinian weapons
were delivered to the Sandinistas before 1979, there is no doubt that the PLO had a part in
the success of the Sandinista final offensive that year." 26

2°Scully, "The PLO's Growing Latin American Base," p. 4. This meeting is

recounted almost verbatim in Center for International Security, "The Sandinista-PLO Axis:
A Challenge to the Free World," p. 2; and U.S. Department of State, The Sandinistasand
Middle Eastern Radicals, p. 6.
21Quoted
in Center for International Security, 'The Sandinista-PLO Axis: A
Challenge to the Free World," p. 2.
22Quoted in U.S. Department of State, The Sandinistasand Middle EasternRadicals,
p. 6.
23 Washington
Post, July 12, 1979; see also U.S. Department of State, The
Sandinistasand Middle EasternRadicals, p. 6.
24U.S. Department of State, The
Sandinistasand Middle EasternRadicals, p. 6.
25Quoted in Center for International Security, "The Sandinista-PLO Axis: A
Challenge to the Free World," p. 2.
26Klich, "Latin America and the Palestinian Question," pp. 17-18.
 -8-

After their victory, the Sandinistas rewarded the Palestinians by opening a PLO
embassy in Managua. The establishment of "government-to-government" relations between
the FSLN regime and the PLO was, according to both the Center for International Security
and the U.S. Department of State, "unprecedentcd." 27 Whereas most countries have
permitted the PLO to open no more than an "office," Nicaragua accorded the PLO
ambassador and his staff full diplomatic privileges. 28 The embassy staff soon began to
expand, increasing to about 70 officials. 29 Despite this solidification of PLO-Sandinista
bonds, Nicaragua did not break off diplomatic relations with Israel for another three years.
During the weeks following the Sandinista victory, delegations from the PLO and
radical Arab regimes became "regular visitors" to Nicaragua. 3° Sandinista officials
similarly traveled on official visits to the Middle East, and frequent joint solidarity
declarations were issued. In late August 1979, just five weeks after coming to power, the
Sandinistas held a special memorial ceremony at the gravesite of Patrick Arguello.
PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat was among the dignitaries who attended ceremonies in
Managua in July 1980 celebrating the first anniversary of the Sandinista victory. 3 1 At a
state reception given in his honor, Arafat extolled the "strategic and militant ties between the
Sandinistas and Palestinian revolutions." During the ceremony, Nicaraguan Interior
Minister Tomas Borge lauded the PLO's role in the Sandinista victory, and in response,
Arafat declared, "The links between us are not new. Your comrades did not come to our
country just to train, but also to fight. Your enemies are our enemies." 32 Trumpeting a

27Center for International Security, "The Sandinista-PLO Axis: A Challenge to the

Free World," p. 2; and, U.S. Department of State, The Sandinistasand Middle Eastern
Radicals,p. 6; see also Scully, "The PLO's Growing Latin American Base," p. 4.
28U.S. Department of State, The Sandinistasand Middle EasternRadicals, p. 7.
29Scully, "The PLO's Growing Latin American Base," p. 4; and Center for
International Security, "The Sandinista-PLO Axis: A Challenge to the Free World," p. 3.
3°Shirley Christian, Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family, Random House, New
York, 1985, p. 145.
31Center for International Security, "The Sandinista-PLO Axis: A Challenge to the
Free World," p. 3; and U.S. Department of State, The Sandinistas andMiddle Eastern
Radicals,p. 7. In Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family, however, Christian states that
Arafat did not arrive in Managua until "after [the] anniversary day" (p. 164).
32Identical
accounts of the reception are reported and quoted in Center for
International Security, "The Sandinista-PLO Axis: A Challenge to the Free World," p. 3;
U.S. Department of State, The Sandinistasand Middle EasternRadicals, p. 7; and Kapilow,
Castro,Israel and the PLO, p. 5.
 -9-

familiar PLO battle cry, Arafat added, "The road to Jerusalem leads through Managua,"
affirming the PLO 's commitment to fellow revolutionaries. 33 In an interview broadcast
that same day on Radio Sandino, Arafat expanded on the meaning of PLO-Sandinista ties:
"The Nicaraguan people's victory is the victory of the Palestinians.... The freedom in
Nicaragua is the same in Palestine.... The only way, then, is for increased struggle against
imperialism, colonialism, and Zionism." Later that day, at the Cesar Augusto Silva
Convention Center, Arafat declared before an audience which included the nine FSLN
commandantes, "Anyone who threatens Nicaragua will have to face Palestinian
34
combatants."
Reports soon began to surface of 25 PLO advisers who arrived in Nicaragua
sometime during 1980. 35 According to the U.S. Department of State, Arafat assigned
Colonel Mutlag Hamadan to lead the advisory mission, which had been dispatched "to
instruct the Sandinistas in the use of Eastern-bloc weapons." By the following May, the
PLO was reported to be "deeply involved in military and guerrilla training activities in
Nicaragua. Reports in mid-1982 indicated that PLO officers were involved in special
guerrilla training in Nicaragua." 36 However, in March 1982, at a major news conference
detailing the Soviet and Cuban military buildup in Nicaragua, the Deputy Director of the
CIA, Admiral Bobby Inman, was unable to offer any conclusive proof of PLO advisers in
Nicaragua. 37 In September 1985, the U.S. State Department again reported that "a 25-man
PLO team instructed the Sandinista forces in the use of East bloc military equipment," but
38
offered no evidence in support of this claim.

33 Quoted
in Becker, The PLO: The Rise and Fallof the PalestineLiberation
Organization,pp. 166-167.
34 Quoted
in U.S. Department of State, The Sandinistasand Middle Eastern Radicals,
p.7. 35
Klich, "Latin America and the Palestinian Question," p. 19.
36U.S. Department of State, The Sandinistasand Middle EasternRadicals,p. 7.
37
New York Times, March 10, 1982. The above-mentioned Department of State
report cites as sources for these statements Robert F. Lamberg, "The PLO in Latin
America," Swiss Review of World Affairs, June 1982; Business Week, May 3, 1982; and
Clifford A. Kiracofe, "The Soviet Network in Central America," Midstream, May 1981.
See U.S. Department of State, The Sandinistasand Middle EasternRadicals, pp. 17ff., 30,
31. 3 8Quoted
in Associated Press, September 3, 1985.
 -10-

Whether PLO advisers were conducting training in Nicaragua or not, evidence of

Sandinistas training at PLO camps in Lebanon was uncovered when the camps were overrun
by Israeli forces in June and July 1982.39 According to one observer, "The seized
documents reveal a remarkable spirit of camaraderie that seems to tie the PLO very
intimately to the Communist bloc.... Other Third World Communists, notably Cuba's
Castro and the Sandinistas of Nicaragua, have either extended aid or served as models for
PLO ideologues and military planners." 4o
It also appears that PLO aid to the Sandinistas has not been confined to guerrilla
training and weapons supply. In January 1982, Arafat was quoted by the Beirut newspaper
al-Safir as stating that PLO pilots had been sent to Nicaragua. "The Palestinian identity," he
explained, "is one of revolutionary struggle, not racist." 4 1 When reporters pressed George
Salameh, the deputy director of the PLO's Managua embassy, on the exact number of PLO
fliers there, he refused to answer. "The number does not count," he said. "It's the fact in
itself. A small thing is sometimes more significant." 42 In 1985, the Associated Press quoted
a Pentagon spokesman as stating that there were approximately 40 to 50 Palestinian advisers
43
in Nicaragua.
The PLO has also provided the Sandinista regime with economic aid. In November
1981, Arafat announced that the PLO had loaned Nicaragua $10 million. 44 Additional loans
amounting to $12 million appear to have been made in succeeding years. 45 The PLO has
also played a leading role in the creation of a Nicaraguan national airline. In late 1979, the

3 9Ibid.
4"Raphael Israel (ed.), PLO in Lebanon: Selected Documents, St. Martin's Press,
New York, 1983, p. 33. It should be noted that none of the PLO documents referred to
above are actually reproduced in this volume.
41Quoted
in Associated Press, January 12, 1982; see also Center for International
Security, "The Sandinista-PLO Axis: A Challenge to the Free World," p. 3; Kapilow,
Castro,Israeland the PLO, p. 13; U.S. Department of State, The Sandinistasand Middle
FasternRadicals, p. 7; and U.S. Department of State and the Department of Defense, The
SandinistaMilitary Build-up, p. 34.
42Quoted
in Kapilow, Castro,Israel and the PLO, p. 14.
43
Associated Press, August 7, 1985.
4Associated Press, January 12, 1982.
45 Ibid.,
and September 3, 1985; see also James Adams, "The Financing of Terror,"
TVI Report, Vol. 7, No. 3, p. 31; Kapilow, Castro,Israel and the PLO, p. 14; and Scully,
"The PLO's Growing Latin American Base," p. 4.
 -l1-

first of several Boeing 727 aircraft was reportedly donated by the PLO to Aeronica, the
Nicaraguan airline. 46 The PLO's largesse in this regard led some observers to suggest that
the organization owned 25 percent of Aeronica. 47 In addition, after the Reagan
administration canceled $75 million in economic aid to Nicaragua's private sector, the PLO
arranged for a six-month $100 million loan from Libya, which has reportedly since been
48
renewed.
Further evidence of the intimacy of PLO-Sandinista ties was revealed in 1984 when
Arafat met with FSLN representatives in Baghdad, Iraq. The meeting was described by the
Voice of Palestine (the PLO radio station) as having taken place

within the framework of bolstering the militant relations that exist between the
PLO and the world liberation movement and in order to mobilise [sic]
resources and efforts against the imperialist-Zionist onslaught by every
method and means through supporting the world revolutionary forces,
particularly in Latin America.... [Accordingly,] a comprehensive review
was made of the Central American situation as well as developments in
Palestinian-Nicaraguan relations and the means of strengthening them at all
49
levels.

The extent of these relations was most recently demonstrated by reports that al-Fatah, the
PLO member group founded and led by Arafat, was using Nicaraguan aircraft to ferry mer
50
and weapons to Lebanon from PLO bases in North Yemen.

46Adams, 'The Financing of Terror," p. 31. See also, Center for International
Security, "The Sandinista-PLO Axis: A Challenge to the Free World," p. 3.
47Adams, "The Financing of
Terror," p. 31.
48Cline
and Alexander, Terrorism: The Soviet Connection,p. 70; see also Kapilow,
Castro, Israel andthe PLO, pp. 3, 14. In 1985, Pentagon spokesmen reported that Libya had
contributed a total of $300 million in loans and grants to the Sandinistas (see Associated
Press, August 7, 1985). However, according to Miami Herald reporter Juan 0. Tamayo, the
$100 million loan was a "one-shot deal" and was followed only by a $20 million loan.
(Conversation between the author and Tamayo, May 5, 1985.)
49 "Voice of Palestine,"
British Broadcasting Corporation Summary of World
Broadcasts, June 12, 1984.
50Jerusalem Domestic
Radio Service, Israel, January 5, 1987. The broadcast stated
that "Israeli security sources" had confirmed a report published in the Israeli newspaper
Davar on January 5, 1987, citing the West German newspaper Die Welt regarding the
airlifts.
 - 12-

The U.S. Department of State reported in 1985 that the FSLN regime had actively
abetted Palestinian terrorist activities in Central America, providing "Nicaraguan passports
to radicals and terrorists of other nationalities... thus enabling them to travel in Western
countries without their identities being known. ... The Sandinistas' willingness to provide
new documentation and a base from which to travel is undoubtedly one reason why
51
Nicaragua has become a haven for terrorists and radicals."

ISRAEL'S INTERVENTION IN NICARAGUAN AFFAIRS

The expansion of PLO support for the FSLN since the late 1970s, however, occurred
as Israel was providing increasing military assistance to the beleaguered Somoza regime. It
can be argued, in fact, that the confluence of PLO and Israeli involvement in Nicaraguan
affairs resulted in a reconfiguration of the Sandinistas' internal revolution into a geopolitical
struggle.
Israel's close relations with the Somoza regime date back to 1948.53 During the
Israeli war of independence, Nicaragua was one of the few countries that sold arms to Israel.
(It also provided Israeli arms agents with "diplomatic covers necessary for purchasing arms
in Europe.") 5 4 Nicaragua was among the first nations to recognize the new state. 55
As early as the mid-1950s, Israel was providing military assistance to Nicaragua.-
In February 1957, a $1.2 million arms deal was negotiated by a Nicaraguan delegation with
the Director General of the Israeli Defense Ministry, Shimon Peres.5 Israel continued to

5 1U.S. Department of State, The Sandinistasand Middle EasternRadicals, p. 13.

Ironically, identical charges that "the Israeli consulate in Costa Rica has... allegedly
provided false passports to Nicaraguan counter-revolutionaries for travel throughout Central
America" have been made against Israel (see Cynthia Aronson, "Israel and Central
America," New Outlook, March-April 1984, p. 21).
52U.S. Department
of State, The Sandinistasand Middle Eastern Radicals, p. 13.
53 Klich, "Latin America
and the Palestinian Question," p. 18; Milton Jamail and
Margo Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa
Rica," Middle East Report, May-June 1986, p. 27; Miami Herald,March 3, 19F'5; and
Washington Post, December 12, 1986.
54 Jamail and Gutierrez, "Israel
in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El
Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 27.
55 Ibid.;
and Klich, "Latin America and the Palestinian Question," p. 18.
56Aaron S. Klieman,
Israel'sGlobal Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy,
Pergamon-Brassey's, Washington and London, 1985, p. 133; and Jamail and Gutierrez,
"Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 27.
57Peres is presently Israel's Foreign Minister, he previously served as Prime
Minister.
 -13-

sell tanks, light aircraft, armored cars, automatic rifles, and ammunition to the Nicaraguan
military, 58 and by the 1970s, Israeli weapons sales accounted for 98 percent of Nicaragua's
arms imports. 59
During the final weeks of Somoza's rule, Israel was among the few nations that did
not abandon him or seek to enter a dialogue with his potential successors. 6° This aid was
especially critical following the U.S. embargo on arms shipments to Nicaragua. 6 1 It is not
surprising to find that as PLO-Sandinista ties solidified after the revolution, Israel became
involved in U.S.-backed efforts to aid the anti-Sandinista Nicaraguan rebels known as the
contras. Although on the surface, the enmity between Israel and the PLO would appear to
account for this, 62 a far more complex set of foreign policy imperatives was in fact at
63
work.
Israeli weapons sales form part of a "diplomatic offensive" that has assumed global
proportions in Israel's campaign to combat the PLO and international terrorist groups linked
to it. Assistance to Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica thus forms part of a "broad
diplomatic strategy of countering Arab and PLO influence or pressure upon third party
countries whenever, wherever and however possible, including.., the use of arms
leverage." At the same time, however, this strategy is also a reflection of the overall
intema:ional arms trade:

5 8Jamailand Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El

Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 27.
59Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, cited in Jamail and Gutierrez,

ibid.
6°Klich, "Latin America and the Palestinian Question," p. 18.
6 1Ibid.;
Aronson, "Israel and Central America," p. 20; Jamail and Gutierrez, "Israel
in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 27; Scully, "The
PLO's Growing Latin American Base," p. 4; Associated Press, August 7, 1985; New York
Times, December 17, 1982; and Washington Post, December 12, 1986.
62See, for example, Aronson, "Israel and Central America," p. 20; and Time, May 7,
1984.
63 ndeed, according to unidentified U.S. State Department and intelligence officials
quoted in a 1982 New York Times news article, "The opportunity to combat the Palestine
Liberatien Organization which is supporting the Sandinista Government in Nicaragua... [is
an] added but not critical element" in Israel's involvement in Central America (New York
Times, December 17, 1982).
64Klieman, Israel'sGlobal Reach.: Arms Sales as Diplomacy, p. 42.
 - 14-

Israeli leaders, having committed themselves and the indigenous arms industry
to a competitive export drive, and perfectly aware that other sellers show few
inhibitions in closing contracts, must confront the choice of either gaining
influence by making sales or of losing it by refusing to compete because of
unilateral restraint. Israeli arms diplomacy aims, therefore, at precluding
others from achieving those very same goals of influence and income which it
seeks for itself.65

In recent years, Latin America has emerged as one of Israel's principal markets for
defense-related exports. 66 Moreover, Israeli arms sales and military assistance have long
exceeded all other Israeli sales to the region, 67 expanding by 608 percent between 1972 and
1982.6 8 Israel ranks ninth in the percentage share of world arms exports 69 and heads the list
70
of Third World country arms exporters.
At the root of Israel's arms export policy is the desire "to build markets essential to
the economic strength of its large military industries and to cushion [the] diplomatic isolation
caused by Arab diplomacy." 7 1 Israeli leaders reason that because of Israel's international

65Ibid.
6For example, according to the Israeli government, a total of $1.2 billion in arms
sales was recorded in 1980. One-third of the receipts, according to the Washington Post,
came "from sales to Argentina and El Salvador. Since then, sales to Central and South
America are reported to have escalated" (Washington Post, December 7, 1982). See also
George Black, with Milton Jamail and Norma Stoltz Chincilla, GarrisonGuatemala,
Monthly Review Press, New York, 1984, pp. 55, 146, 154-158; Klich, "Latin America and
the Palestinian Question," pp. 16-18; Aharon S. Klieman, Israeli Arms Sales: Perspectives
and Prospects,The Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, No. 24, February 1984, pp. 43-44
(although his forename in this publication is spelled differently, Klieman is also the author of
Israel'sGlobal Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy); Jamail and Gutierrez, "Israel in Central
America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica," pp. 26-30; Cheryl A. Rubenberg,
"Israel and Guatemala: Arms, Advice and Counterinsurgency," Middle East Report,
May-June 1986, pp. 16-22; and Washington Post, December 12, 1986.
67 Klich, "Latin America and the Palestinian Question," p. 16 .

68Klieman, Israel'sGlobal Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy, p. 132.

69According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's Center for
Defense Information, the United States is first, with 38.7 percent, followed by the Soviet
Union (27.6), France (10.6), Great Britain (4.7), West Germany (4.0), Italy (3.8), the
Peoples' Republic of China (2.3), Spain (1.2), and Israel (1.0) (cited in Washington Post,
December 12, 1986).
7 0Israel's
percent share of Third World arms exports is 28.0, followed by Brazil
(21.0), Egypt (15.0), South Korea (6.0), Singapore (3.0), South Africa (1.5), Indonesia (1.2),
and Argentina (0.7) (cited in Washington Post,December 12, 1986).
71New York Times, December 17, 1982.
 - 15-

isolation, they cannot be particular about the kinds of regimes they assist.72 Yohana Ramati,
the former head of the Israeli Knesset's foreign relations committee, explained:

Israel is a pariah state. When people ask us for something, we cannot afford to
ask questions about ideology. The only type of regime that Israel would not
aid would be one that is anti-American. Also, if we can aid a country that it
may be inconvenient for the US to help, we would be cutting off our nose to
73
spite our face not to.

But there are also other, equally compelling, political and diplomatic concerns behind
these sales. "Israel's Third World involvement," according to Rubenberg, "is the significant
congruence of interest between Israel and the United States in these areas. Israeli policies
are not dictated by U.S. wishes, but they frequently advance what Washington perceives to
74 There is a great deal of overlap
be its own interests in many Third World countries.
between Israel's anti-Arab, anti-PLO policies and the goals of closer alignment with the
West in general and with the United States in particular. 75 Thus, it can be argued that Israeli
assistance "significantly augments United States policy... and answers the call of the
American administration for greater contributions from allied and friendly countries able to
76
render different forms of such assurance."
Israeli weapons sales to Third World countries, therefore, serve "as an instrument in
the service of U.S. and Western global security." 77 Israel acts as a surrogate in extending
U.S. and Western military assistance78 to Latin American governments and authoritarian
military regimes or rebel groups (e.g., the contras) that, because of human-rights violations
or other issues objectionable to U.S. domestic political opinion, would otherwise be unable
79
to obtain such aid.

72Rubenberg,
"Israel and Guatemala: Arms, Advice and Counterinsurgency," p. 16;
see also73 Klieman, Israel'sGlobalReach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy, p. 42.
Statement by Yohanah Ramati made at a public lecture at Florida International
University, Bay Vista Campus, March 6, 1985, quoted in Rubenberg, "Israel and
Guatemala:
74
Arms, Advice and Counterinsurgency," p. 16.
Ibid.
75 Klieman,
Israel'sGlobalReach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy, p. 42.
76
Ibid., p. 44.
77Klieman, "Israeli Arms Sales: Perspectives and Prospects," p. 43.
78
lbid., p. 44.
79Associated
Press, August 7, 1985.
 -16-

A case in point are the persistent reports that arms were supplied to the contras by
Israel between 1982 and 1985. The shipments apparently began in late 1982, when "several
thousand AK-47 assault rifles" captured from PLO stockpiles during the invasion of
Lebanon earlier that year were delivered to the contras.8° According to one account, some
500 AK-47s were provided to the Revolutionary Democratic Alliance led by Eden Pastora,
one of the three principal rebel groups, and the balance went to another contra guerrilla
81
force, the Nicaraguan Democratic Force, commanded by Edgar Chamorro.
Israel's involvement with the contras may be linked to an offer supposedly made by a
group of Israeli intelligence officials to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in 1982 to
supply untraceable weapons to the Nicaraguan rebels. The approach, it is claimed, was
prompted by the appearance on U.S. news broadcasts of contras using "identifiable
American weapons." Fears within the Reagan administration that these revelations might
provoke widespread public and Congressional opposition to U.S. efforts on behalf of the
rebels had led the Israelis to make the offer82
Although this offer was apparently rejected, it was reported in 1983 that "at the
request of the United States," Israel was shipping weapons captured from the PLO to the
contras through Honduras. The shipments included artillery pieces, mortar rounds, mines,
hand grenades, and ammunition. Citing "senior Reagan administration officials" as its
source, the New York Times observed that "Israel's coordination with the Americans marks
a departure from its previous activities in Central America as an independent supplier of
83
arms. The new role brings Israel closer to acting as a surrogate for the United States."
Israel's motives were described as a desire to improve relations with the United States,
which were described as "cool during the first half of the Reagan administration" and which
had been further strained by the invasion of Lebanon and Israel's occupation of the southern
part of that country.8 4 The initiatives were said by some sources to be motivated by the

8°Jamail and Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El

Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 28; see also Associated Press, August 7, 1985; New York Times,
December 17, 1982, and July 21, 1983; and Washington Post, November 12, 1983, and
December 12, 1986.
8 1Jane Hunter, "Reagan's Unseen Ally
in Central America," Israeli ForeignAffairs,
Vol. 1,No. 1, December 1984, p. 1.
82
New York Times, February 8, 1987.
83New
York Times, July 21, 1983.
8Ibid.
 -17-

desire to increase Israel's leverage over Washington's Middle East policy,8 5 while other
sources cited concern over possible Congressional limitations on U.S. involvement in
Central America as the reason the Reagan administration had encouraged these Israeli
86
activities.
The politically sensitive nature of Washington's use of Israeli support of the contras
to circumvent Congressional restrictions on U.S. aid decreed that a complex web of
deception be grafted on to the ams transfers. Israel was a particularly appealing partner for
this arrangement because of its reputation for knowing how to run a secret operation. 7
Both Israel and the United States have repeatedly officially denied the existence of such an
agreement. 8 8 Thus, to preserve official deniability, two covers were developed to facilitate
the Israeli weapons shipments.
The first, as previously mentioned, was the use of Honduras as a conduit for Israeli
arms supplies to the contras. The use of such a "third party" is a key aspect of Israel's
international arms trade. Weapons are transferred through a third party-a country or a private
agent-to avoid complications and to enable spokesman to insist that arms are not being
supplied to a belligerent directly. 89 Reagan administr-'" .,ficii!! were quoted in the New
York Times on July 21, 1983, as saying thlt f x)iduras "has been a silent partner with the
United States in organizing and s-pporting the insurgents" and, more specifically, in
channeling to the contras capturLd PLO ,,'-nor purchased from Israel by the Honduran
military. The groundwork for this circuitous arrangement may have been laid during an
"unpublicized visit" by General Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, then commander of the
Honduran armed forces, in early 1983 to a Central Intelligence Agency training center in
Virginia, where he reportedly examined samples of the captured Palestinian weapons. 90
The second cover was the use of private Israeli arms dealers to handle the weapons
sales, thereby preserving the veneer of official deniability for the U.S. administration.
Confirmation of this arrangement was subsequently provided by Edgar Chamorro, a director

85Rubenberg,
"Israel and Guatemala: Arms, Advice and Counterinsurgency," p. 16.
86New York Times, July 21, 1983.
87Time, 7 May 1984.
88 Ibid., December
17, 1982, July 21, 1983, April 27, 1984, January 13, 1985,
February 8, 1987, and February 28, 1987; Jamail and Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America:
Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 28; Time, May 7, 1984; and Washington
Post, December 12, 1986.
89Klieman, Israel'sGlobalReach:
Arms Sales as Diplomacy, p. 197.
9°New York
Times, July 21, 1983.
 - 18-

of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), one of the contra groups. Chamorro said that
in October 1983 his group received about 2,000 weapons from Israel (mostly AK-47s taken
from the PLO's stockpiles in Lebanon) in a deal orchestrated by a private arms dealer; he
emphasized "that this was a one-time shipment."9 1 However, considerable evidence exists
to suggest that the weapons shipments not only continued, but were increased during 1984
and 1985.92
Following the Congressicnally mandated suspension of U.S. aid to the contras in
1984, Israel reportedly was one of the countries the CIA tumed to "to fill the gap."9 3 The
weapons provided by Israel in 1984 included "Soviet-made rocket-propelled grenade
launchers and grenades, assault rifles, and ammunition," which were delivered to the
Honduran army and subsequently transferred to the contras. 94 Although the Israeli Foreign
Ministry formally denied any participation in these sales in April 1984, stating that it had not
'"provided Soviet-made arms to Nicaraguan rebels,9 5 details of the shipments were
uncovered by the Israeli newspaper Maariv,which published copies "of user certificates for
these weapons, signed by Honduran military officials." The newspaper also quoted
unnamed arms dealers as saying the weapons "ultimately ended up with the contras. ' 96 An
additional tip-off that the transfers had been executed by Honduras was the fact "that the
7
Honduran army is not known to use the RPG-7 grenade launcher, but the contras are."9
Further evidence of Israeli arms shipments reaching the contras through Honduras
during this period was presented by Jack Terrell, a U.S. citizen who was based in Honduras
between 1984 and 1985 and was involved in assisting the contras. Terrell recalled a meeting

9 1Time,May 7, 1984. A "contra leader and former officer in Somoza's National

Guard" was quoted in an NBC Nightly News broadcast on April 23, 1984, as also
confirming the shipment of Israeli arms to the contras (see Jamail and Gutierrez, "Israel in
Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 28).
92Associated Press, August 7, 1985; Jamail and Gutierrez, "Israel in Central
America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 28; New York Times, January
13, 1985, February 8, 1987, and February 28, 1987; and Washington Post, December 12,
1986.
93Washington Post, December 12, 1986.
"Washington Post, December 12, 1986.
9 5Quoted in New York Times, April 27, 1984.
96Washington Post, December 12, 1986.
97Ibid.
 -19-

with Adolfo Calero, a director of the FDN, in November 1984, when the group was
planning a commando raid. Terrell reportedly told Calero that the raiding party would need
Israeli-made Uzi submachine guns and 9-mm ammunition for the operation. Calero was
quoted by Terrell as saying, "I'll get this as soon as I can. We're expecting two ships in
from Israel in February. When they get in, you will get your stuff." 9 8 Additional Israeli
weapons shipments were carried out in 1985, according to Terrell, following a visit by
Calero's brother, Mario, to Israel to arrange the purchase of "10,000 Soviet-made AK-47
rifles" captured from the PLO. Terrell explained that he was told in Honduras that the
weapons were shipped with the necessary documentation signed by Honduran military
officials. The weapons were then sold to the contras; the Honduran officers made a 30
percent profit on the deal. The sales were arranged by Israeli arms dealers who were acting
"with at least the tacit approval of their government."9

At least three Israeli arms merchants we-- identified as key figures in the arms
traffic. One of them was later involved in "secret White House arms sales to Iran," which
were the subject of the aforementioned U.S. Congressional investigations into the
Iran-contra affair. 100 Indeed, these investigations concluded that the Israeli government
"aided the contras through private arms dealers as a means of winning points with the
Reagan administration."' 101 According to transcripts of the Congressional hearings, Yaacov
Nimrodi "played a key role in setting up the secret exchange between Washington and
Tehran" in 1985 that involved shipping U.S. arms to Iran in exchange for the release of
American hostages being held in Lebanon. Nimrodi was described as a London-based arms
dealer who was the military attache at the Israeli embassy in Iran in the days of the Shah.
Citing "informed sources in Washington," the Washington Postclaimed that Nimrodi
"handled shipments of arms to the contras purchased with Israeli funds that were supplied at
CIA director [William] Casey's behest in 1984." A second Israeli allegedly involved in the
shipments was Pesah Ben Or, "a former Israeli paratrooper who divides his time between
Guatemala and Miami." Ben Or, according to a report published in Maariv,"arranged the
three shipments that were delivered to the contras via the Honduran army." David Marcos
Katz, an Israeli arms dealer based in Mexico City, who reportedly specialized in sales of jet
fighters, artillery, and radar, "helped broker another deal with the contras in 1985."10° 2

98Quoted
in New York Times, February 8, 1987.
99Ibid.
1°°WashingtonPost, December 12, 1986.
1°)New York Times, February 8, 1987.
1°2 Washington Post, December 12, 1986.
 - 20 -

In addition to increasing the flow of weapons to the contras, Israel was reported to be
providing the rebel forces with military advisers. 103 According to Time magazine, Israeli
intelligence experts helped the CIA train the contras, and retired or reserve Israeli army
commandos were hired by "shadowy private firms" to assist the rebels. 104 In some cases,
these advisers were said to have been officially assigned to these duties by the Israeli
Defense Forces. 105 Israel, however, has "repeatedly and emphatically denied providing any
assistance to the contras." 1°6 In December 1986, Israeli Defense Minister Itzhak Rabin
informed the Knesset that Israel did not maintain contacts or ties with the rebels in
Nicaragua or supply them with arms: "Israel did not grant permission to any Israeli to assist,
supply know-how or sell weapons from Israel to the rebels in Nicaragua." 10 7 Two months
later, Rabin again denied aiding the contras, stating that Israel had rejected repeated
overtures from the Reagan administration to do so. 1 8
Rabin's denials flew in the face of evidence presented in the report on the Iran-contra
affair issued by the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee in January 1987. Former White
House Chief of Staff Donald T. Regan testified that "he had attended a briefing of President
Reagan [in September 19861 an hour before a meeting.., with Shimon Peres, then the
Israeli Prime Minister," during which an offer made by Rabin to deliver a "shipload of
Soviet-made weapons to the contras" was discussed. In an interview broadcast on Israeli
television in February 1987, Rabin disputed Regan's account, maintaining "that no weapons
were sent and that Israel had declined a direct request by a National Security Council aide
for assistance to the contras." However, an Israeli source cited by the New York Times
claimed that the weapons shipment had in fact been dispatched by Israel, but it "was recalled
en route immediately after the Iran-contra affair became public." 1°9 Rabin then recanted
his denial, but insisted that the request for the shipment had "originated with the White
10
House."

103 1bid., January

13, 1985.
1°4Time, May
7, 1984.
105The Guardian,
October 11, 1985, cited in Jamail and Gutierrez, "Israel in Central
America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 28ff, 38.
1°6New York
Times, February 8, 1987; see also Washington Post,December 12,
1986.
"Quoted in Washington Post,December 12, 1986.
108New York
Times, Feoruary 8, 1987.
1O9lbid.
I 101bid., February 28, 1987.
 -21 -

Additional evidence concerning Israel's involvement in contra aid schemes was

presented in the Tower Commission report.11 1 A White House memorandum made public
by the Commission revealed that Lieutenant-Colonel Oliver North, who at the time was on
the staff of the U.S. National Security Council, had described to Vice Admiral John
Poindexter, then President Reagan's national security adviser, an Israeli offer to provide the
contras with military instructors. In a statement issued on behalf of Rabin by the Israeli
Defense Ministry, the offer referred to in the memorandum was dismissed as "totally
groundless." Indeed, the Israeli statement again stated that it was the United States that
1 12
asked for such help, which was refused by the Defense Minister."

11'Shortly after news of the secret U.S. "arms for hostages" deal with Iran broke in
November 1986, President Reagan appointed a special commission, under the chairmanship
of former Senator John Tower, to conduct an investigation of the incident. The Commission
concluded that "Israel was heavily involved in encouraging the United States to approach
Iran and attempt to exchange arms for hostages" (Ibid.).
1 12Rabin
said that during a visit to New York in May 1986, he received a request
from North for an "urgent meeting." He continued, "Colonel North dwelt at length on the
problems of the contras and said he had suggested to the U.S. President [the idea of
organizing] a private group of some 20 to 50 Israeli or British instructors. Colonel North
said that he preferred a group of Israeli instructors, since they have greater experience and
also speak Spanish." North was also quoted as stating that in his opinion the matter had to
be conducted privately, and not via the governments (quoted in Ibid.).
 - 22 -

III. THE EXTENSION OF THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT

TO CENTRAL AMERICA

The geopolitical confrontation in Nicaragua between the PLO and Israel has spilled
over into surrounding Central American countries as well. The U.S. Department of State
has reported that "PLO agents working in Central America... use Nicaragua as their base
of operations" in the Western Hemisphere, 1 and Scully contends that "the PLO works
closely with Nicaragua's radical Sandinista regime and [in particular] is helping those who
are trying to overthrow El Salvador's democratically elected government." 2 PLO arms and
training have been provided to the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Force (FMLN) in
El Salvador (a coalition of the five principal rebel groups in that country) and the
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (URNG). 3 At the same time, as noted above,
Israel has been equally active in providing arms and assistance to Central America. 4

ISRAEL'S INVOLVEMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA

In addition to the weaponry channeled through Honduras to the contras, Israel has
provided direct military assistance to the Honduran military. In 1977, Israel sold 12
refurbished French-made Dassault Super-Mystere supersonic bombers to Honduras. 5

'U.S. Department of State, The Sandinistasand Middle EasternRadicals, p. 13.

2Scully,
"The PLO's Growing Latin American Base," p. 1.
3Ibid.,
p. 5; Kapilow, Castro,Israel and the PLO, pp. 4, 13, 31; Klich, "Latin
America and the Palestinian Question," p. 17; and Associated Press, August 7, 1985.
4Between 1970 and 1983, Israel supplied El Salvador with Arava STOL (short take-
off and landing) military transport aircraft-said to be the favorite choice of rural
conunterinsurgency strategists (Black et al., GarrisonGuatemala,p. 155), Fouga Magister
trainers, Dassault Ouragan fighters, 80-mm rocket launchers, Uzi submachine guns, and
ammunition and spare parts. Guatemala also received Aravas, along with Kfir combat
aircraft, armored cars, large stocks of Galil assault rifles, mobile field kitchens, helmets,
infantry equipment, other light arms, and ammunition. Honduras was provided with Galils
and Uzi submachine guns, mortars, Aravas, Westwind reconnaissance aircraft, Dassault
Super-Mystere fighter-interceptors, Kfir combat aircraft, coastal naval patrol vessels, and
armored cars. And Costa Rica received a variety of small arms and ammunition, including
Galils and Uzis (Klieman, Israel'sGlobal Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy, p. 135; see
also Klieman, "Israeli Arms Sales: Perspectives and Prospects," p. 43; Jamail and
Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica,"
p. 29; and Washington Post,December 7, 1982).
5Washington
Post, December 7, 1982; see also New York Times, December 17, 1982.
 - 23 -

Subsequent Israeli sales included three Arava transport aircraft, a Westwind executive
passenger jet, Galil automatic rifles, Uzi submachine guns, RBY Mk armored cars, 106-mm
6
mortars, and five rapid patrol boats.
In 1982, Ariel Sharon, the Israeli Defense Minister, made a secret (but subsequently
much publicized) visit to the region. 7 Accompanied by the head of Israel's air force,
General David Ivry, the Director-General of the Israeli Defense Ministry, General Aaron
Bet Halmachi, 8 and David Marcos Katz, 9 Sharon met with several senior Honduran
government and military officials, including President Roberto Suazo Cordova, the
Commander-in-Chief of Honduras's armed forces, General Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, the
10
Defense Minister, Jose Serra Hemandez, and the Foreign Minister, Edgardo Paz Bamica.
At a news conference held shortly after his arrival, Sharon stated, "During my brief stay, I
could take advantage of the opportunity to sign agreements of a military nature with
Honduras, as well as some agreements on agriculture, health and cultural assistance."'1
Sharon reportedly offered to supply arms captured from the PLO in Lebanon free of
charge to Honduras and Costa Rica, if they would pay the shipping costs. 12 In addition,
according to Honduran military officials, an agreement was made for the purchase of Kfir
fighter jets, tanks, and Galils, and the provision of Israeli training personnel, significantly
escalating the Central American military buildup. 13 Honduras already had the most
advanced air force in the region, largely as a result of its earlier purchase of the
Super-Mystere aircraft. 14 Shortly after the Defense Minister's tour was completed, Katz

6 Jamail and Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El

Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 29; and Washington Post,December 7, 1982.
7Washington
Post, December 12, 1986; see also Aronson, "Israel and Central
America," p. 19; ChristianScience Monitor, December 14, 1982; Klieman, Israel'sGlobal
Reach: Armz Sales as Diplomacy, p. 162; and New York Times, December 8, 1982.
8Christian
Science Monitor, December 14, 1982; see also Black et al., Garrison
Guatemala,p. 155; and Jamail and Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua,
Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 29.
9Washington Post, 12 December 1986.
1eNew York Times, December 8, 1982.

" Quoted in Ibid.

12Black
et al., GarrisonGuatemala,p. 155; and New York Times, December 17,
1982.
13 ChristianScience Monitor, December 14, 1982.
14Ibid.; and Washington Post, December 7, 1982.
 - 24 -

was reported to have signed several deals with the Hondurans on behalf of the Israeli
government.' 5
Honduras did, in fact, eventually receive three more Aravas, four Mystere fighter
planes, and 12 Kfir combat aircraft from Israel. 16 Honduras's desire to obtain the Kfirs
followed a U.S. refusal to sell U.S.-manufactured F-5 aircraft to Honduras, and apparently
reflected Alvarez's determination to lessen his dependence on Washington. 7 Klieman
notes,

Although most of Honduran military needs are filled by the United States,
arms deals of a modest nature had been concluded with Israel in previous
years; its leaders are vitally concerned at the inability of the United States to
contain revolutionary forces backed by Nicaragua and Cuba in the arc of
instability surrounding Honduras; and they therefore are permitting the
country to serve as a Western base for counterinsurgents, training,
prepositioning supplies, and intelligence activities while at the same time
seeking to diversify their own sources of supply. 18

Although the Sharon visit and subsequent arms deals appear not to have been
undertaken at the behest of the United States, a high U.S. State Department official
commented that the Reagan administration was not unhappy with the Israelis helping out. 19
Sharon's visit and the agreements signed, in fact, underlined Israel's growing role as an arms
broker and U.S. proxy in Central America. 2° Klieman explains,

The advantages to the United States are appreciable since tacit arrangements
permit the U.S. to keep at a safe distance from Israel publicly; yet, the United
States stands to benefit geopolitically: pro-Western states bolstered militarily
and inflicting defeats upon Soviet-armed clients, the assurance that American
equipment will be employed more effectively under Israeli supervision, etc. 2 1

15 Washington Post, December 12, 1986.

16 Deduced from figures cited by Klieman, Israel'sGlobal Reach: Arms Sales as
Diplomacy, p. 135.
17 Aronson,
"Israel and Central America," p. 19.
18 Klieman,
Israel'sGlobalReach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy, p. 134.
19New York Times, December 17, 1982.
2°Christian
Science Monitor, December 14, 1982.
2 1Klieman,
Israel'sGlobalReach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy, p. 169.
 - 25 -

Israel has long maintained close relations with Costa Rica. Indeed, Luis Alberto
Monge served as Costa Rica's ambassador to Israel before becoming president of Costa
Rica in 1982. 22 Moreover, Costa Rica and El Salvador were the only two countries that
23
officially recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and maintained an embassy there.
These warm relations are also apparent in Costa Rica's arms purchases from Israel over the
years and the Israeli advisers who have accompanied the sales. 24 The Costa Rican civil
guard is armed with Israeli-made Galils and Uzis, 25 and Israeli intelligence experts assist the
civil guard with intelligence activities. 26 Foreign Minister Itzhak Shamir 27 visited Costa
Rica just six weeks before Sharon's trip, offering, among other things. to "help [Costa Rica]
28
with internal security" mattcrs.
El Salvador has been a particularly fertile market for Israeli arms exports. 29
Between 1975 and 1983, 83 percent of El Salvador's military purchases were made from
Israel. 30 The weaponry furnished by Israel reportedly included 25 Aravas, six Fouga
Magister training aircraft, 18 Dassault Ouragan jet fighters, 200 80-mm rocket launchers,
Uzis, ammunition, and spare parts. 3 1 Israeli advisers also instruct Salvadoran military

22Jamail and Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El

Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 30.
23 Time, May 7, 1984; see also Aronson, "Israel and Central America," p. 22; and
Klieman, Israel'sGlobalReach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy, p. 134.
24New
York Times, December 17, 1982.
25Jamail and Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El
Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 30.
26New York Times, December 17, 1982; see also Aronson, "Israel and Central
America," p. 22; Klieman, Israel's GlobalReach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy, p. 134; Jamail
and Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica,"
p. 30; and Washington Post, December 7, 1982.
27 Shamir at present is Israel's Prime Minister.
28Washington Post,December 14, 1982; see also Aronson, "Israel and Central
America," p. 22.
29See, for example, Klieman, Israel'sGlobal Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy,
p. 134; New York Times, December 17, 1982, July 21, 1983, and January 13, 1985; and
Washington Post, December 7, 1982.
3°Cited in Jamail and Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El
Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 29.
3 1Klieman, Israel's
Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy, p. 135; see also Jamail
and Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica,"
p. 29.
 - 26 -

personnel in the use of this equipment, 32 and Israeli intelligence specialists have assisted El
Salvador's security forces, particularly in setting up a computer system to help the military
33
and police "seek out government opponents more systematically."
A quid pro quo of military assistance in exchange for diplomatic concessions was
established with the signing of the first arms agreement in 1973, when El Salvador opened
an embassy in Israel. 3 4 Ten years later, following the signing of another arms deal, El
Salvador agreed to relocate its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. 35 Israeli military
assistance to El Salvador has also been linked to U.S. interests in that country. In 1981,
"Israel transferred $21 million in arms credits to El Salvador, following a request from
'36
Washington, thus enabling the Reagan administration to bypass Congress.
Israel's most extensive relationship in Central America is with Guatemala. Israel has
been described as Guatemala's main weapons supplier, 37 and Guatemala is said to be the
only country in Central America where Israeli arms sales rival those of the United States. 38
Guatemala began to purchase weapons from Israel in 1971,39 and the two countries drew
closer in 1975 after the United States, responding to a British request, warned Guatemala not
to go through with a planned invasion of neighboring Belize, which was then negotiating its
independence from Britain.40 By the end of 1975, the first consignment of Arava aircraft,
RBY armored cars, artillery, and small arms, accompanied by Israeli advisers and
41
technicians, had been delivered to the Guatemalan military.

32
New York Times, December 17, 1982; see also Aronson, "Israel and Central
America," p. 21.
33 Jamail
and Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El
Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 30.
34Ibid., pp. 29-30; see also Aronson, "Israel and Central America," pp. 20-21.
35
Time, May 7, 1984.
36Jamail and Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El
Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 30.
37 Associated
Press, August 7, 1985; see also New York Times, July 21, 1983.
38Aronson, "Israel and Central America," p. 20.
39 Ibid.,
pp. 18 and 19.
4°Black et al., GarrisonGuatemala,p. 146.
4 1Ibid.,
p. 155; and Rubenberg, "Israel and Guatemala: Arms, Advice and
Counterinsurgency," pp. 19-20.
 -27-

The Caner administration's decision to make the human-rights issue a cornerstone of

its foreign policy further polarized U.S.-Guatemalan relations. When the U.S. State
Department issued a report criticizing Guatemala for human-rights abuses in 1977, the
Guatemalan leadership announced that it would not tolerate such interference in Guatemalan
internal affairs and declared that it would reject categorically any further military assistance
from the United States. In response, the U.S. Congress, acting on a request from the Carter
administration, voted to suspend U.S. military aid to Guatemala. Guatemala was
subsequently placed on a State Department list of "gross and consistent violators of human
rights," compelling U.S. officials not to support Guatemalan applications for multilateral
loans from either the World Bank or the Inter-American Development Bank unless the loans
42
demonstrably financed "basic human needs."
Israel was quick to exploit this souring of relations between the United States and
Guatemala. Israel put no conditions on its arms sales 43 and soon became Guatemala's
principal arms supplier.44 In June 1977, a 26-ton shipment of Israeli arms and ammunition
in transit to Guatemala was di-,,.overed by customs officials in Barbados after an Argentine
cargo plane transport' , '".
shipment made a refueling stop there. In December 1977,
Israeli President rp- _m Katzir paid a week-long visit to Guatemala which resulted in a
new, and mor- extensive, arms agreement. Shortly afterward, the Guatemalan Defense
Minister wportedly traveled to Israel to negotiate an additional arms deal. Subsequent
meetinigs were held early in 1978

between the defense ministers of the two countries, as well as between

Guatemalan officials and their Israeli counterparts.... The defense ministers
discussed the supply of weapons, munitions, military communications
equipment (including a computer system), tanks and armored cars, field
kitchens, other security items and even the possible supply of the advanced
fighter aircraft, the Kfir. They also talked about sending Israeli personnel to
install computer and radar systems, to assist in training and equipment
maintenance, to establish an electronics school, and to train and advise the
Guatemalan army and internal security police (known as G-2) in
45
counterinsurgency tactics.
42Rubenberg, "Israel and Guatemala: Arms, Advice and Counterinsurgency," p. 20;
see also Associated Press, August 7, 1985; Black et al., GarrisonGuatemala,p. 155;
Washington Post, December 7, 1982.
43 Ibid.;
Associated Press, August 7, 1985; Black et al., GarrisonGuatemala,p. 155;
Washington Post, December 7, 1982.
44Black et al., GarrisonGuatemala,p. 155; see also Yo'av Kamy, "Byzantine
Bedfellows," New Republic, February 2, 1987, p. 25.
45Rubenberg,
"Israel and Guatemala: Arms, Advice and Counterinsurgency," p. 20.
 -28-

Within two years, Guatemala had received all the materiel requested. Although
purchase of the Kfir was initially held up by U.S. restrictions on its sale because of its
American-built engine, 46 the aircraft were eventually delivered to the Guatemalan air
force. 47 By 1980, the Guatemalan army had been completely reequipped with some 10,000
Galil assault rifles, at a cost of $6 million, 48 and by 1983, 17 Aravas, five mobile field
kitchens, armored cars, helmets, other infantry equipment, and ammunition had been
delivered. 49 Israel's assistance to Guatemala was so extensive that, according to Time
magazine, army outposts in the Guatemalan jungle had become "near replicas of Israeli
army field camps." In Huehuetenango, Guatemalan troops were using Israeli
communications equipment, mortars, submachine guns, battle gear, and helmets. 5° A "key
51
figure" in the deals was the aforementioned Israeli arms merchant, Pesah Ben Or.
However, the most controversial aspect of the Israeli-Guatemalan relationship has
concerned the role of Israeli advisers in formulating and implementing Guatemala's
counterinsurgency strategy. 52 The Guatemalan ruling elite looks to Israel for models,
expertise, arms, and advice, especially police and internal security assistance. When a U.S.
program was terminated as a result of the 1977 arms embargo, Guatemala turned to Israel
for help. 5 3 In 1979, the first Israeli technicians arrived in Guatemala City to set up a
national computer center containing the names of a reported 80 percent of the country's
population.5 Israeli advisers also worked with the Guatemalan police intelligence
organization.5 5 In 1982, approximately 300 Israeli advisory and training personnel were
-
operating in Guatemala. 6

46Ibid.; see also Black et al., GarrisonGuatemala,p. 155.

47Klieman, Israel'sGlobalReach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy, p. 135.
4 8lbid.; and Black et al., GarrisonGuatemala,p. 155.
49Klieman,
Israel'sGlobalReach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy, p. 135. Enough
helmets were reportedly furnished by the Israelis to supply "virtually an entire army."
(Aronson, "Israel and Central America," p. 20.)
5°Time, March 28, 1983.
5 t Washington Post, December 12, 1986.
52Rubenberg,
"Israel and Guatemala: Arms, Advice and Counterinsurgency," pp. 18
and 20.53
Black et al., GarrisonGuatemala,p. 156.
54Rubenberg,
"Israel and Guatemala: Arms, Advice and Counterinsurgency," p. 20.
55Black et al., GarrisonGuatemala,p. 156; see also New York Times, December
17,1982, and July 21, 1983.
56 Rubenberg, "Israel and Guatemala: Arms, Advice and Counterinsurgency," p. 20.
 - 29 -

The centerpiece of this assistance is the Guatemalan Army Transmissions and

Electronics School, 57 which is designed, staffed, and funded by Israelis. 57 Guatemalan
President Lucas Garcia reportedly described the school's purpose as the training of
Guatemalan technicians in electronic counterinsurgency techniques, including enciphering
and deciphering and monitoring and jamming radio transmissions. 58 The importance of
Israel's role in these activities was evident during the school's opening ceremony, on
November 3, 1981, at which Israel's ambassador to Guatemala praised Guatemala as "one
of our best friends," while the Guatemalan Defense Minister lauded Israel for the "gigantic
job" it was doing for his country's armed forces. 59
Israeli assistance to Guatemala has since expanded to encompass various
commercial, tourist, and investment activities as well as military involvement. 6° When the
Reagan administration came into office, Israel reasoned that "it could increase its leverage
over Washington by performing indispensable functions for the United States in third
countries." This rationale was especially trenchant, given the administration's concern about
events in Central America, and Guatemala's importance in U.S. regional strategy at a time
when Congressional restrictions on direct U.S. assistance were in force. 61 In May 1986,
Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir visited Guatemala, promising to increase Israeli assistance
62
still further.
Israel's arms trade with these Central American countries has irreparably damaged its
already strained relations with the ruling Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. Diplomatic
relations between the two countries were formally severed in August 1982, three years after
the revolution that brought the FSLN to power. Although PLO pressure and the regime's
desire "to express solidarity with the embattled Palestinians in Lebanon" were the ostensible
reasons for the break, U.S. efforts to undermine the Sandinistas and "the use of third
'63
countries, including Israel, to achieve this aim were salient considerations.

57 Aronson,
"Israel and Central America," p. 20; Black et al., GarrisonGuatemala,
p. 156; Karny, "Byzantine Bedfellows," p. 25; and Rubenberg, "Israel and Guatemala: Arms,
Advice and Counterinsurgency," p. 20.
58Rubenberg,
"Israel and Guatemala: Arms, Advice and Counterinsurgency," p. 20.
9Quoted
in Black et al., GarrisonGuatemala,p. 156.
6°For details
of these activities, see ibid., pp. 156-157; and Rubenberg, "Israel and
Guatemala: Arms, Advice and Counterinsurgency," pp. 21-22.
6 1Rubenberg,
"Israel and Guatemala: Arms, Advice and Counterinsurgency," p. 21.
62Ibid.

63Klich, "Latin America and the Palestinian Question," pp. 17-18; see also the
interview with Victor H. Tinoco, Nicaragua's Deputy Foreign Minister, in Goldfield,
GarrisonState: Israel'sRole in U.S. GlobalStrategy, App. II, pp. 72-74.
 - 30-

Sharon's 1982 visit to Honduras was vehemently criticized by Nicaraguan officials.

Deputy Foreign Minister Nora Astorga 64 declared, "With Minister Sharon's presence in
Honduras, the Israeli Government is getting even more involved in the Central America
region and it is not for Nicaragua to remain quiet. I don't know what type of armaments
Israel will supply Honduras, but we can say it is worrisome not only to Nicaragua but to the
Central American region."6 5 In 1985, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega cited Israel's
past support of Somoza and present military assistance to "U.S.-inspired anti-Sandinista
rebels" as the reasons for the termination of relations with Israel. Similarly, Panamanian
Rabbi Heszel Klepfisz, a former adviser on educational affairs to the late president of
Panama, General Omar Torrijos, contended that Israel's initial support of Somoza and
subsequent aid to anti-Sandinista forces poisoned Israeli-Sandinista relations and pushed the
regime "into the PLO's arms."66

PLO INVOLVEMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA

The PLO was quick to capitalize on this dissension and increase its involvement with
the Sandinistas. 67 Indeed, in 1981, Arafat boasted to Western newsmen, "We [the PLO]
have connections with all revolutionary movements around the world, in El Salvador, in
Nicaragua-and I reiterate El Salvador."6s The importance of El Salvador in the PLO's
Central America strategy is emphasized by Scully: "The immediate goal of the PLO and its
allies apparently is to amalgamate the 'revolutionary struggles' of Nicaragua, Honduras, and
El Salvador. El Salvador is the immediate cynosure of PLO efforts." 69
The PLO donated a Boeing 707 transport plane to Nicaragua in May 1982 to use in
funneling arms shipments to the insurgents in El Salvador through the Belgian Air Charter
Service. 70 As early as 1979, at least some contact between the PLO and the leftist

64Until her death in 1988, Astorga was Nicaragua's Ambassador to the United
Nations.
65 Quoted
in New York Times, December 8, 1982.
66Quoted in Klich, "Latin America and the Palestinian Question," p. 18.
67 Scully,
"The PLO's Growing Latin American Base," p. 1.
68Quoted in Kapilow, Castro,Israel and the PLO, p. 12.
69Scully,
7 0Center
"The PLO's Growing Latin American Base," p. 5.
for International Security, "The Sandinista-PLO Axis: A Challenge to the
Free World," p. 3.
 -31 -

insurgents in El Salvador had been established. In November 1979, Salvadoran guerrillas

belonging to the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) kidnapped and murdered South Africa's
ambassador to El Salvador. The kidnappers originally demanded that the Salvadoran
government sever relations with Israel (as well as with South Africa and Chile) and accord
diplomatic status to the PLO. A month later, the Israeli embassy in San Salvador was
bombed by the Popular Revolutionary Army (ERP), another Salvadoran leftist group which
is believed to be a "radical" offshoot of the FPL. 7 1 A statement subsequently issued by the
ERP declared that the attack was undertaken "in solidarity with the Palestinian people," and
demands were again voiced for the establishment of diplomatic relations between El
72
Salvador and the PLO.
Whether these terrorist attacks were undertaken specifically at the behest of the PLO
or were mounted independently by the two guerrilla groups to curry favor with the
Palestinians is not known. However, the PLO is reported to have played a role in the
negotiations held in Havana the following month between the five principal Salvadoran
guerrilla groups that led to the formation of the FMLN. Within the FMLN framework, a
Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) was established under the leadership of Cayetano
Carpio (the leader of the FPL) to plan and coordinate military strategy. The DRU has
73
provided the "primary linkage" with the PLO and its factions since 1980.
Within a month of the 1979 meeting in Havana. a delegation of FMLN
representatives visited Lebanon, where they toured PLO camps and were briefed by local
PLO commanders. ri May 1980, another group of Salvadoran leftists traveled to Beirut to
meet with Abu Jihad (the nom de guerre of Khalil al-Wazir, Arafat's second-in-command)
and George Habash of the PFLP. As a result of these meetings, an agreement was
reportedly negotiated that included arms purchases and training. A month later, the first
group of Salvadoran trainees concluded a course in terrorist warfare at a Fatah camp in
74
Lebanon.

7 1Center
for International Security, "The Salvadoran Communists and the PLO: An
Unholy Alliance," Spotlight on the Americas, Washington, D.C., February 1984, p. 1; and
The RAND Corporation Chronology of International Terrorism.
72The RAND
Corporation Chronology of International Terrorism.
7 3Center
for International Security, "The Salvadoran Communists and the PLO: An
Unholy74Alliance," p. 1.
Ibid., p. 2.
 - 32 -

Since that time, relations between the FMLN and the PLO have continued to
intensify. When Arafat attended the Sandinista revolution's first anniversary celebrations in
Managua in July 1980, he met with representatives of the DRU. PLO advisers subsequently
arrived in El Salvador in September 1980. Later that year, a delegation of Salvadoran
guerrilla officials led by Manuel Franco, the movement's head of foreign relations, returned
to Lebanon at the invitation of George Habash for further discussions. A more extensive
itinerary of meetings subsequently took place in February 1981, again at Habash's behest,
when another group of Salvadoran leftists met with representatives of the PFLP, al-Fatah,
7 5
and the DFLP.
Soon after these meetings took place, Jorge Shafik Handal, the head of the
Communist party in El Salvador 76 and the commander of its military force, the Armed
Forces of Liberation (FAL), 77 arrived in Lebanon, accompanied by Ana Maria Achuria, the
group's chief of foreign affairs, for a series of talks with Arafat, Nawef Hawetmeh, the
commander of the DFLP, and PFLP officials. At the conclusion of this visit, a joint
announcement was made of a cooperation arrangement between the PFLP and a new
structure established to coordinate terrorist activities of the several Salvadoran revolutionary
groups, the National Liberation Front (FNL). In May 1981, Handal made yet another trip to
the Middle East, this time to meet with PLO representatives in Damascus, Syria, and
strengthen the ties between the revolutionary movement in El Salvador and the Palestinian
78
movement.
Throughout this period, Handal appears to have been the key contact between the
Salvadoran leftists and the PLO. 79 His involvement in such ventures is predicated not only
on expressions of revolutionary solidarity between the Salvadoran and Palestinian guerrilla
movements, but also on the "ethnic affinity" felt by Central American descendants of
Palestinian Christians who immigrated to the region earlier in the twentieth century
(Handal's father is reported to have emigrated to El Salvador from Bethlehem in 192180).

75
Ibid.
76Kapilow,
Castro, Israel and the PLO, pp. 4, 13.
77Center for International Security, "The Salvadoran Communists and the PLO: An
Unholy78Alliance," p. 2.
1bid.
79 Ibid.;
Associated Press, August 7, 1985; and Scully, "The PLO's Growing Latin
American Base," p. 5.
8°Kapilow,
Castro,Israel and the PLO, pp. 4, 13; see also Center for International
Security, "The Salvadoran Communists and the PLO: An Unholy Alliance," p. 3; and
Scully, "The PLO's Growing Latin American Base," p. 5. Scully, however, states that
Handal's father emigrated from the Gaza Strip, not from Bethlehem.
 - 33-

Moreover, "Handal has boasted that much of the 2,000 member Palestinian community in El
Salvador is involved in underground activity, and [that] his brother Farid has been actively
81
promoting the connection between the PLO and leftists throughout Central America."
Other prominent Central American revolutionaries of Palestinian ancestry include the
82
Nicaraguan Minister of Transportation, Carlos Zarruk.
In January 1982, Arafat announced that additional PLO advisers had been sent to El
Salvador to assist the Salvadoran guerrilla forces. Two months later, another FMLN
emissary known as "Lt. Colonel Martial" met with Arafat in Beirut at the invitation of Abu
Jihad. They concluded a new pact whereby the PLO agreed "to provide weapons and
military guidance to the Salvadoran revolutionaries." Follow-up discussions were
subsequently held in Beirut later that year between Arafat and Carpio. According to the
83
Center for International Security,

Against this background of conspiracy with the Communist-terror

infrastructure in attempting to overthrow the government of El Salvador, the
PLO may be seen in a rather different role than that of the ostensible defender
of the rights and interests of the Palestinian Arabs. In El Salvador, PLO
involvement is nothing other than direct support and participation in
Communist revolution.

However, apart from the kidnap-murder of the South African ambassador by the FPL
in November 1979 and the bombing of the Israeli embassy in San Salvador the following
month, only one terrorist attack was subsequently mounted against an Israeli target by
Salvadoran leftists: The Israeli embassy was bombed by the ERP in December 1979. The
embassy reopened the following year, and there have been no further attacks on Israeli
targets.84
PLO activities in support of other leftist revolutionary groups in Central America
have been reported, but reliable information on this assistance is hard to obtain. Various
sources have detailed how the PLO has provided arms and training to the URNG,8 5 as well

8 1Center for International Security, "The Salvadoran Communists And The PLO:
An Unholy Alliance," p. 3.
82"Voice
of Palestine," British Broadcasting Corporation Summary of World
Broadcasts, June 12, 1984.
83 Center
for International Security, "The Salvadoran Communists and the PLO: An
Unholy Alliance," p. 3.
84The RAND Corporation Chronology of International Terrorism.
8 5Kapilow, Castro,
Israel and the PLO, pp. 4, 13, 31; Klich, "Latin Americr and the
Palestinian Question," p. 17; and Associated Press, August 7, 1985.
 34-

as to leftist insurgents in Costa Rica. Costa Rica's National Security Agency was reported
to have evidence that Libya and the PLO were jointly indoctrinating and giving military
6
training to young "Marxist-oriented" Costa Ricans in Libya, Lebanon, and Costa Rica.8
With these activities, the PLO

has thus made itself available as a willing instrument for the promotion of
terrorism everywhere in the free world, but most particularly in places where
the impact of their activity impinges on the security and policy interests of the
United States, and consequently on Israel as well. From this standpoint,
Central87America serves an an enticing target for terror, subversion and
chaos.

According to The RAND Chronology of International Terrorism, however, only

thirteen terrorist incidents involving Israeli or Jewish interests have in fact occurred in Latin
America since 1970, and none have occurred since 1983. Only the attack on Israel's
embassy in Paraguay in 1970 was actually carried out by Palestinian terrorists.
Latin American terrorists protesting Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 attacked
Israeli and Jewish targets in Guatemala, including the only synagogue in the country. In
Colombia, M- 19 terrorists bombed the Israeli embassy and the ambassador's residence in
Bogota in September 1982, and the following month several Israeli and Jewish
establishments in Brazil received bomb threats from that country's Popular Revolutionary
Vanguard. Finally, a number of unclaimed attacks were staged against Israeli and Jewish
targets in Bolivia and Ecuador during 1982. Since that time, however, there have been no
further terrorist attacks on Israeli or Jewish targets in Latin America by either Palestinian or
indigenous terrorist groups.8 8 Hence, claims that the PLO has established a base in Central
America for terrorist operations in the Western Hemisphere are by no means persuasive.

86Scully, "The PLO's Growing Latin American Base," pp. 7-8.

87Center for International Security, "The Salvadoran Communists and the PLO: An
Unholy8 8Alliance," p. 3.
lbid.
 - 35 -

IV. CONCLUSION

The support, training, and arms furnished by the PLO to the Sandinistas and like-
minded revolutionary movements in surrounding Central American countries have raised
concerns that Nicaragua has been transformed into a base for international terrorism in the
Western Hemisphere. This concern has been most prominently articulated by ideologically
conservative research institutions such as The Heritage Foundation, the Center for
International Security, and The Cuban-American National Foundation. The Heritage
Foundation, for example, contends that,

the PLO has been conducting a two-pronged offensive against what it calls
"American imperialism, Western colonialism, and world Zionism." One
prong is a political campaign against Israel and its allies-the U.S. in
particular-waged in every international forum since the late 1960s. The second
prong is a transnational terrorist network to attack the allies and supporters of
Israel and the United States.

In both cases, the PLO's objective has been to impose upon international,
regional, and civil conflicts the anti-Jewish and anti-American rubric of its
own hostilities. In this, the PLO has found in Latin America particularly
fertile ground.'

The Center for International Security states:

The Sandinista record is clear, and no amount of apologetics or intellectual

sleight-of-hand can obscure the fact of its unholy alliance with the Palestine
Liberation Organization.... The Sandinista-PLO axis must be recognized for
what it is-the vanguard of the growing threat to the stability of the free world. 2

Identical conclusions have also been published by the Department of State and the
Department of Defense.3 The Department of State report, in fact, incorporates material

'Scully, "Mhe PLO's Growing Latin American Base," pp. 1-2.

2Center
for International Security, "The Sandinista-PLO Axis: A Challenge to the
Free World," pp. 1, 4.
3 U.S.
Department of State and Department of Defense, The SandinistaMiltary
Build-up; and, U.S. Department of State, The Sandinistasand Middle EasternRadicals,
passim.
 - 36 -

from these analyses. The relations established between the PLO and the Sandinistas have
thus played an important role in U.S. efforts to isolate Nicaragua and marshal support for the
Reagan administration's Central America policies.
However, despite these relations and the provision of support and assistance by the
PLO to the FSLN regime, the assertion that Nicaragua has become a base for Palestinian
terrorist operations in either Central America or the Western Hemisphere cannot be
substantiated. Of the thirteen terrorist incidents attributable to either Palestinian terrorists or
indigenous, regional, terrorist groups acting at the behest of the PLO or in demonstrations of
"revolutionary solidarity" that have occurred in Latin America since 1970, Palestinian

terrorists were actually responsible for only one, and only four occurred in Central American
countries.
Thus, while expressions of revolutionary solidarity initially formed an ideological
framework for the PLO-Sandinista relationship, it appears that the PLO's real motivation
has been to counter-and thereby exploit-Israel's longer and more considerable involvement in
Central America. The PLO's involvement with Central American revolutionaries did not
begin in earnest until 1979, long after the Israelis became involved in the region (and
particularly with the Somoza regime). The Israeli actions thus served as a pretext for PLO
intervention, not only in Nicaraguan affairs, but in those of surrounding countries as well.
This point was addressed-and dismissee-by the Center for International Security:

There are those who would argue that this unsavory alliance [between the
PLO and the Sandinistas] should be seen in the light of the previous close
relations that obtained between Israel and the Nicaragua of Somoza,
suggesting thereby that the Sandinista-PLO cooperation reflected nothing
more than a temporary coincidence of political interests. Such a benign view
of the Sandinista-PLO connection can readily be extended to justify every
revolutionary and terrorist activity on the basis of political expediency without
4
regard to the inherent moral basis of such action.

However, as this Note has demonstrated, the relationship between the PLO and the
FSLN cannot be treated in isolation from Israel's involvement with the deposed Somoza
regime or its subsequent support of the contras and rebel forces in neighboring Central
American states.

4Center
for International Security, "The Sandinista-PLO Axis: A Challenge To The
Free World," p. 1.
 - 37 -

At the root of Israel's involvement in Central America is its aggressive arms export
policy. But this Israeli policy is part and parcel of Israel's self-perceived role as a defender
of Western interests, a role that has led Israel to extend aid to Latin American governments
or groups that were be unable to obtain such aid from the United States. Thus, the attention
focused on PLO-Sandinista relations by the U.S. government and the concern generated
over Nicaragua's alleged transformation into an international terrorist base of operations
takes on a new light.
This concern has served to encourage and facilitate Israel's involvement with the
contras, alongside-or in tandem with-the Israeli government's own efforts to publicize
PLO-Sandinista links. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir has frequently criticized the
Sandinistas for their support of the PLO, and the Reagan administration's campaign to link
Nicaragua to the PLO appears to be an attempt to encourage and facilitate a greater Israeli
role. 5 Although there may not have been any formal coordination of U.S.-Israeli endeavors
in this regard, there was certainly a tacit understanding that Israeli efforts on behalf of the
6
contras, Honduras, and Guatemala were welcomed and encouraged by the United States.
It seems likely that as long as Israel continues to supply military assistance to Central
America, a PLO presence will remain in Nicaragua, and Palestinian ties will be maintained
with leftist insurgent groups in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Costa Rica. This is not to imply
that if Israel stopped providing military assistance to any of Nicaragua's enemies the PLO
would similarly cease operations in Managua. The point is that, until recently, the PLO's
involvement in the region was minimal at best and certainly much less extensive than that of
Israel.
At the same time, PLO activities in Nicaragua do not appear to have been designed to
provide a base for terrorist operations against Israeli or Jewish targets in Latin America.
Although Nicaragua admittedly could serve as a such a base, there is no reason to suggest
that this is likely to happen.
Much depends, of course, on the future course of Palestinian terrorism. The wing of
the PLO most closely associated with the Sandinistas in recent years has been the moderate
faction led by Arafat, and this group has repeatedly spurned attempts by more radical

5Jamail
and Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El
Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 29.
6See Aronson,
"Israel and Central America," p. 22; Jamail and Gutierrez, "Israel in
Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 30; and Karny,
"Byzantine Bedfellows," p. 25.
 - 38-

elements to begin operations in North America. 7 Hence, it seems that the PLO's interests in
Nicaragua are primarily commercial (as demonstrated by the organization's alleged
ownership of 25 percent of Aeronica) and aimed at exploiting an available market for
weapons and military assistance and training.

7See
Bonnie Cordes, et al., Trends in InternationalTerrorism, 1982 and 1983, The
RAND Corporation, R-3183-SL, August 1984, p. 18.
 - 39 -

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 -41-

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