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SPACE NEG

DDI 2k8 Culpepper/Olsen


G. Zhang

SPACE NEG:

Table of Contents
Space Colonization F/L:.............................................................................................................................4
Space Militarization F/L (1/4):...................................................................................................................5
Space Militarization F/L (2/4):...................................................................................................................6
Space Militarization F/L (3/4):...................................................................................................................7
Ext Space Mil F/L - US ahead now ...........................................................................................................8
1NC 1 Ext:.................................................................................................................................................9
Space Militarization → Nuke War:..........................................................................................................10
Space Militarization → Nuke War:..........................................................................................................11
Space Mil → Arms Races:.......................................................................................................................12
Space Mil → Arms Races (China/Russia):..............................................................................................13
Space Mil → War w/ China:....................................................................................................................14
AT Space Mil Inev:..................................................................................................................................15
Turn: Space Mil Kills US leadership:......................................................................................................16
Heg F/L (1/3):...........................................................................................................................................17
Heg F/L (2/3):...........................................................................................................................................18
Heg F/L (3/3):...........................................................................................................................................19
Ext – Space Colonization → Militarization.............................................................................................20
Space Exploration → Militarization:.......................................................................................................21
Space Exploration  Militarization:.......................................................................................................22
Diseases Turn:..........................................................................................................................................23
Ext. – Space Colonization → diseases:....................................................................................................24
Ext. – Space Colonization → diseases:....................................................................................................25
Space Colonization – Costly:...................................................................................................................26
Space Colonization – Uninhabitable:.......................................................................................................27
Space Colonization – Lack of Funding....................................................................................................28
Space Colonization – Microgravity Damage:..........................................................................................29
Space Colonization – Not Inevitable:......................................................................................................30
Space Colonization - Debris:...................................................................................................................31
Space Colonization – Lack of Personnel:................................................................................................32
Rescind Commercial Ban CP:..................................................................................................................33
Rescind Commercial Ban CP Solvency:..................................................................................................34
Rescind Commercial Ban CP Solvency:..................................................................................................35
Rescind Commercial Ban CP Solvency:..................................................................................................36
International Cooperation Key:................................................................................................................37
Solvency – Economy...............................................................................................................................38
China Cooperation Good:........................................................................................................................39
US Heg Loss Inev:...................................................................................................................................40
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SPACE NEG
DDI 2k8 Culpepper/Olsen
G. Zhang

AT Space Mil Inev:..................................................................................................................................41


Space Mil → Wars:..................................................................................................................................42
Space Mil → Preemptive Strikes:............................................................................................................43
Space Debris Defense:.............................................................................................................................44
Space Debris Defense – Humanity at risk:..............................................................................................45
AT Space Solves Environmental Harms:.................................................................................................46
Securitization K Links – Climate Change:...............................................................................................47
Securitization K Links – Climate Change:...............................................................................................48
Securitization Mpx - Prolif:.....................................................................................................................49
Securitization Mpx - Bare Life:...............................................................................................................50
Solar Power – Popular:............................................................................................................................51
Space Exploration – Unpopular:..............................................................................................................52
Solar Power – Congress supports:...........................................................................................................53
Solar Power – Reps support:....................................................................................................................54
Solar Power – Congress Inaction Now:...................................................................................................55
States CP Shell (1/2):...............................................................................................................................56
States CP Shell (2/2):...............................................................................................................................57
States CP Solvency - Generic:.................................................................................................................58
States CP Solvency – Funding:................................................................................................................59
NASA Spin-off Turn:...............................................................................................................................60

2
Clark-Martin Plan text. Doesn't spec incentives
Thus, the plan:

The United States federal government should provide incentives to the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration for research, development, and implementation of space-based solar power satellites.
We’ll clarify.

NASA Trade-off DA. Maybe have the DOD do it. Consult Congress.
Kernoff-Olney Plan text. Says monetary incentives. For development and deployment of SPS
Plan:

The United States Federal Government should substantially increase monetary incentives for
development and deployment of Solar Power Satellites in the United States. We’ll clarify.
Doesn't have a good fed key warrant – Their national security space office card doesn't say that the
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT specifically should provide incentives, it just says incentives.

Their Hamilton card doesn't have warrants why a NATIONALLY coordinated program would solve or
why it would have to be led by the USFG. It just sounds like the states which make up the US could do
it too.

Their NewScientist card also doesn't even mention the USFG

States CP probably solves. Need to cut ptix links – pop, unpop, incr pcap, decr pcap,

Their Morring card doesn't say we can achieve the types of transformational changes indicated by the
1ac advantages. It just says some change can happen within 10 years.

They claim as their first advantage Information War and say that information solves prolif, but their ev
is talking in the context of surveillance systems in the military. They say that space solves surveillance
which allows for a more effective military. This seems extra-T b/c it's not from alt energy incentives.

Links pretty hard to securitization K – surveillance links, militarism links, balancing, eco-
managerialism

google scholar search on security and space and representations/discourse args. Copenhagen
school.

USFG has to do it – Fisc Disc Net Benefit – US probably has to send the satellites up there.

3
Space Colonization F/L:
1. Building space systems is the first step of all-out militarization of space
Strategy and International Affairs Commission, May 2008. (“The militarization and weaponization of space: Towards a
European space deterrent,” Space Policy, Vol. 24, Issue 2, Pg 61-66. http://www.sciencedirect.com/ science?
_ob=CitedListURL&_method=list&_ArticleListID=769357432&_st=12&view=c&_rr=Y&_acct=C000022698&_version=1&_userid=42
57664&md5=d9217319d34f4f23b498462f3f18fbf2.)
The military use of space is not, however, limited to these “defensive” applications. The concept of militarized
outer space has been replaced by that of “weaponized” outer space. The expression “weaponization of space”
defines the process which results in the deployment of weapons in space which may then become a theatre of
conflict, a battlefield, through the use of weapons aimed at destroying targets either in orbit or on the Earth's
surface. The arming of space constitutes a destabilizing factor for international relations . The media coverage
of the interception test successfully carried out by China on 11 January 2007 on one of its satellites (Feng Yun 1C, “wind and clouds”) by
a rocket derived from a solid propulsion ballistic missile, finally drew the world's attention to the technological capacities of some states
which have this as their aim. This interception is the conclusion of a phase of technological demonstration which has included three other
attempts since 2004; it is difficult to say whether these were failures or merely preliminary verifications. Indeed, the Americans had
themselves developed such systems but decided against their deployment. Nevertheless, they took the opportunity in February 2008 to
demonstrate their ability to intercept and destroy an NRO satellite orbiting at a much lower altitude (about 247 km). The Soviet Union had
its own project in the past. Do the Russians still possess such systems? No visible activity has been observed since the end of the
communist regime. So the Chinese test surprised and shocked us as something of an anachronism, especially as it was a relevant
technological success from a developing country. This sudden reappearance of anti-satellite weapons makes them now no longer a
monopoly of the US strategists but a common property of the whole international community. Therefore, a year later, the US endeavour
against what was claimed to be a threat to human life was not considered so unpredictable, but to some extent understandable. It is to be
feared that these events only give a partial view of the programmes of the most advanced space powers intending to equip themselves
with attack capacities which can be described as “weapons in space”. It is quite possible in fact that the weapons race may in
future take place in other directions than nuclear, space systems being part of one of the elements (C4ISR,3 reactive
infrastructure) of the “new triad” defined in the Nuclear Posture Review 2002, constituting an important “layer” in anti-missile defence. 4
Since the withdrawal of the USA from the ABM treaty, the legal vacuum concerning the aggressive use of space seems clearer and
clearer. Moreover, the non-existence of a multilateral forum for discussion and the consideration of questions of peaceful uses for space
constitutes a serious handicap, while resumption of the Conference on Disarmament talks does not appear to be very realistic.

space exploration will cause environmental exploitation, nuclear annihilation, arms races, and
epidemics
Bruce K. Gagnon, Coordinator of the Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space,
1999. (“Space Exploration and Exploitation,” http://www.space4peace.org/articles/scandm.htm)

We are now poised to take the bad seed of greed, environmental exploitation and war into space.
Having shown such enormous disregard for our own planet Earth, the so-called "visionaries" and
"explorers" are now ready to rape and pillage the heavens. Countless launches of nuclear materials,
using rockets that regularly blow up on the launch pad, will seriously jeopardize life on Earth.
Returning potentially bacteria-laden space materials back to Earth, without any real plans for
containment and monitoring, could create new epidemics for us. The possibility of an expanding
nuclear-powered arms race in space will certainly have serious ecological and political ramifications
as well. The effort to deny years of consensus around international space law will create new global
conflicts and confrontations.

4
Space Militarization F/L (1/4):
1. space exploration will inevitably lead to space militarization
Bruce K. Gagnon, Coordinator of the Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space, 19 99. (“Space Exploration and
Exploitation,” http://www.space4peace.org/articles/scandm.htm)

The Pentagon, through the U.S. Space Command, is working hard to ensure that the space corridor
will remain open and free for private corporate interests. Weapon systems such as nuclear powered
lasers and anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons are now being funded, researched, and tested in the U.S. It
will only be a matter of time until deployment of space based weapons will follow. In the Space
Command’s document, Vision for 2020, they state that "Historically, military forces have evolved to
protect national interests and investments – both military and economic. During the rise of sea
commerce, nations built navies to protect and enhance their commercial interests. …The control of
space will encompass protecting U.S. military, civil and commercial investments in space…. Control
of space is the ability to assure access to space, freedom of operations within the space medium, and
an ability to deny others the use of space, if required." A parallel, military highway will be created
between the Earth and the planets beyond. Documents commissioned by the U.S. Congress suggest
that U.S. military bases on the Moon will enable the U.S. to control access to and from the planet
Earth. The logo of the U.S. Space Command is "Master of Space."

5
Space Militarization F/L (2/4):
2. space militarization makes nuclear war inevitable
Gordon Mitchell, Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Pittsburg, July 2001.
ISIS Briefing on Ballistic Missile Defense no. 6,
http://www.isisuk.demon.co.uk/0811/isis/uk/bmd/no6_paper.html.
A buildup of space weapons might begin with noble intentions of 'peace through strength' deterrence, but this
rationale glosses over the tendency that '… the presence of space weapons…will result in the increased
likelihood of their use'.33 This drift toward usage is strengthened by a strategic fact elucidated by Frank
Barnaby: when it comes to arming the heavens, 'antiballistic missiles and anti-satellite warfare technologies go
hand-in-hand'.34 The interlocking nature of offense and defense in military space technology stems from the
inherent 'dual capability' of spaceborne weapon components. As Marc Vidricaire, Delegation of Canada to the
UN Conference on Disarmament, explains: 'If you want to intercept something in space, you could use the
same capability to target something on land'. 35 To the extent that ballistic missile interceptors based in space
can knock out enemy missiles in mid-flight, such interceptors can also be used as orbiting 'Death Stars',
capable of sending munitions hurtling through the Earth's atmosphere. The dizzying speed of space warfare
would introduce intense 'use or lose' pressure into strategic calculations, with the spectre of split-second
attacks creating incentives to rig orbiting Death Stars with automated 'hair trigger' devices. In theory, this
automation would enhance survivability of vulnerable space weapon platforms. However, by taking the
decision to commit violence out of human hands and endowing computers with authority to make war, military
planners could sow insidious seeds of accidental conflict. Yale sociologist Charles Perrow has analyzed
'complexly interactive, tightly coupled' industrial systems such as space weapons, which have many
sophisticated components that all depend on each other's flawless performance. According to Perrow, this
interlocking complexity makes it impossible to foresee all the different ways such systems could fail. As
Perrow explains, '[t]he odd term "normal accident" is meant to signal that, given the system characteristics,
multiple and unexpected interactions of failures are inevitable'.36 Deployment of space weapons with pre-
delegated authority to fire death rays or unleash killer projectiles would likely make war itself inevitable, given
the susceptibility of such systems to 'normal accidents'. It is chilling to contemplate the possible effects of a
space war. According to retired Lt. Col. Robert M. Bowman, 'even a tiny projectile reentering from space
strikes the earth with such high velocity that it can do enormous damage — even more than would be done by
a nuclear weapon of the same size!'. 37 In the same Star Wars technology touted as a quintessential tool of
peace, defence analyst David Langford sees one of the most destabilizing offensive weapons ever conceived:
'One imagines dead cities of microwave-grilled people'.38 Given this unique potential for destruction, it is not
hard to imagine that any nation subjected to space weapon attack would retaliate with maximum force,
including use of nuclear, biological, and/or chemical weapons. An accidental war sparked by a computer glitch
in space could plunge the world into the most destructive military conflict ever seen.

6
Space Militarization F/L (3/4):
3. Link Turn: Threats of a space pearl harbor are exaggerated, but if the U.S. deploys space
weapons we will lose our monopoly on space mil.
Kathleen M. Sweet, J. D., Lt. Col. (Ret.) USAF Associate Professor, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical
University August 2003 (“Space Based Offensive Weapons,”
http://satjournal.tcom.ohiou.edu/Issue6/current_weaponry2.html)

Considering the current global situation, it is fair game to debate whether US space based assets are really at risk. Some have foretold of a
“Space Pearl Harbor” but this seems a bit disingenuous. The Soviet Union had a working anti-satellite weapons system in the
early 1970’s and given adequate funding, modern Russia would be capable of building another more up-to date system. Our European
allies could likely build and deploy an ASAT system but have also resisted spending the money to build one. Other countries with space
potential include Brazil, China, India, and Iran. [13] To date, the perceived threat has not matched the enthusiasm to
commit to the effort. The US has no active ASAT program but since 9/11 is more actively pursing the matter. The system would
likely be ground-based initially and deployed sometime in the early decades of the 21st century. This system could be a precursor to an
offensive weapon that would possess the capability to attack and destroy ground targets. This continuing activity begs the additional
question of whether space should be weaponized and whether Congress is poised to fund the programs. Wary of the changes in the former
Soviet states and the threat of global terrorism, it seems that they are willing. Congress realizes that the US military cannot be caught
unprepared again in defense of the Homeland. Consequently, funding for research and development of technologies easily adapted to
space warfare continues, despite reservations about weapons in space. The US does not have a monopoly on the use of space
but does dominate it. The number of nations able to realistically challenge the US in space is limited. The Russian
space program is still operates at an advanced level even though somewhat stagnant due to economic difficulties. China certainly has the
potential to be a major space power in the 21st century. Other countries have launch facilities and technological prowess to pursue interests
in space. How these space capable countries would react or be capable of significantly reacting to further US space superiority remains to
be seen. Regardless, US strategists need to consider the possibilities. Should such a threat materialize, the US monopoly in
space warfare would be eliminated, much as the atomic bomb monopoly was lost when the Soviet Union
developed an atomic bomb. At least some analysts believe that strategy would cover aspects of space control, missile defense and
force application from space.

4. The U.S. is the only country with the capability to weaponize space
Thomas D. Bell, Lt Col, USAF. 1999, Weaponization Of Space:Understanding Strategic and Technological
Inevitabilities. Center for Strategy and Technology.

The weaponization of space provides the asymmetric technology the US needs to win the next war. The United
States is the only nation with the economic and scientific potential to make this technology a reality in the next
thirty years. The technological development of weapons that apply force in, from, and through space must have the goal of fielding
weapons as the technology matures. Just as the doctrine of daylight precision bombing guided the development of the long-range bombers
of World War II, today's Air Force must develop doctrine for the employment of space weapons. This space version of strategic
bombardment doctrine will serve both as a guide to technological development and as a plan for the long-term structure of the Air Force.
If no war comes, US space-based capabilities will have proven an effective deterrent force; if war does come, as the inevitable result of
competition on earth or in space, technological asymmetry will once again be a large factor in giving the United States the capability for
winning a decisive victory. To be effective, however, institutional and doctrinal change must accompany this technological asymmetry.

7
Ext Space Mil F/L - US ahead now
The United States is already secure in its space military operations
General Ralph E. Eberhart, USAF Commander In Chief North American Aerospace Defense Command and United States
Space Command, July 11, 2001 (Statement of General Ralph E. Eberhart, Page 14)

I assure you, NORAD and USSPACECOM are prepared to provide aerospace defense to the people of North
America and space support to U.S. and allied armed forces. We continue to find new ways to improve our
warfighting capabilities by integrating space capabilities into all aspects of our military missions ; we are working to
do the same for computer network operations. As we develop our next generation systems, we must invest the necessary resources and
intellectual capital to protect our vital interests and sustain our lead in space. We appreciate Congress’ continued support to maintain our
high state of readiness. With your help, we will ensure space forces play a key role in our Nation’s future defense.

8
1NC 1 Ext:
space exploration will inevitably lead to space militarization
Bruce K. Gagnon, Coordinator of the Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space,
1999. (“Space Exploration and Exploitation,” http://www.space4peace.org/articles/scandm.htm)

The Pentagon, through the U.S. Space Command, is working hard to ensure that the space corridor
will remain open and free for private corporate interests. Weapon systems such as nuclear powered
lasers and anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons are now being funded, researched, and tested in the U.S. It
will only be a matter of time until deployment of space based weapons will follow. In the Space
Command’s document, Vision for 2020, they state that "Historically, military forces have evolved to
protect national interests and investments – both military and economic. During the rise of sea
commerce, nations built navies to protect and enhance their commercial interests. …The control of
space will encompass protecting U.S. military, civil and commercial investments in space…. Control
of space is the ability to assure access to space, freedom of operations within the space medium, and
an ability to deny others the use of space, if required." A parallel, military highway will be created
between the Earth and the planets beyond. Documents commissioned by the U.S. Congress suggest
that U.S. military bases on the Moon will enable the U.S. to control access to and from the planet
Earth. The logo of the U.S. Space Command is "Master of Space."

9
Space Militarization → Nuke War:

Weaponization of space causes nuclear war in space


Larry Chin, reporter for Global Research, July 16, 2005 (globalresearch.ca, Deep Impact and
the Militarization of Space, page #1)

To again quote Gagnon, "the United Nations, to their credit, created the Moon Treaty and the
Outer Space Treaty as ways to circumvent the war-like tendencies of humankind as we step out into the
cosmos…but the US appears to be heading in the opposite direction by creating
enormous danger and conflict with the current Nuclear Systems Initiative that will expand
nuclear power and weapons into space---all disguised as the noble effort to hunt for the ‘origins of life’ in space.
[ Similarly, the Deep Impact project is also being lauded for "origins of life" research breakthroughs.—LC] Only
a lively and growing global debate about the ethics and morality of current space policy will save us from
igniting the harsh fires of Prometheus in the heavens above us."

10
Space Militarization → Nuke War:
US space militarization causes prolif and arms races
Mike Monre, Senior editors of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, January/February 200 1. (“Watch out for space
command,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, v. 557, pg 24-25, ProQuest.)

The United States may have the best of intentions in seeking “full spectrum dominance of the battlespace.” But
the Melos Syndrome is powerful. Over the course of the next decade or two, you can bet that at least a few states
will attempt to develop the means to counter the planned U.S. domination of space. They will not assume that
U.S. intentions are always benign. The current U.S. attempt to achieve space dominance may in the end
compromise U.S. security, either by promoting an actual arms race in space or by encouraging “asymmetric
responses” - biological weapons perhaps, or cyber weapons, or even nuclear weapons deliverable by means other
than ballistic missiles.

US space militarization encourages nuclear war


Nina Tattenwald, Prof. of Int. Studies at Brown University, Summer 2004 (The Yale Journal of International Law,
Law Versus Power on the High Frontier: The Case for a Rule-Based Regime for Outer Space, lexis)

The choice between a competition for national superiority and a strengthened legal regime that preserves and
balances the interests of all in space will have profound consequences. If the United States aggressively moved
weaponry into space, it would likely provoke other nations to pursue countermeasures, with destabilizing
consequences for global and national security. In addition, by encouraging nations who do not currently have an
interest in placing weapons in space to compete directly and immediately with U.S. space-based assets, the
United States would almost certainly guarantee the loss of the advantages it seeks to protect. Although an arms
race in ASAT weapons is one of the dangers, the threat currently of greatest concern to states such as China and
Russia is the U.S. use of space systems to augment its nuclear and conventional strategic strike capabilities.
From the perspective of these nations, the U.S. decision to expand strategic capabilities into space represents
the collapse of the Cold War bargain of strategic stability based on mutual vulnerability. A military competition
in space could thus invigorate a high-tech arms race and renew emphasis on doctrines of nuclear warfare. 25

11
Space Mil → Arms Races:
Space mil will spur arms races where they didn’t previously exist and anger our allies.
Jonathan Power, reporter for arab news, Mon. May 30, 2005 ( arabnews.com, Militrazing Space is Quite
Unnecessary, page#1)

Space war has been a recurrent political theme since the fright America got when the Soviet Union launched its
Sputnik in 1957. President Lyndon Johnson, not long after, said, “Out in space, there is the ultimate
position — from which total control of the earth may be exercised”. President Ronald Reagan launched his
Strategic Defense Initiative, the so-called “star wars”, meant to deploy space-based weapons to shoot down
incoming missiles. He found his way blocked by a Democratic Congress. But Reagan’s notion pales besides that
of Rumsfeld’s. Rumsfeld has always talked of the need for America’s total domination of space. It must be large
enough and so all encompassing, argued his report, that any counter measures by other countries would be
quickly nullified. This is the ultimate in American unilateralism. It will not only make enemies where they don’t
exist, it will make friends in NATO wonder if they will be pressed to make up the alliance’s inevitable shortfall
in more run-of-the mill programs whilst American indulges itself in its space fantasies.

Weaponizing space leads destabilizes US hegemony and ensures an arms race and conflict
Nina Tattenwald, Prof. of Int. Studies at Brown University, Summer 2004 (The Yale Journal of International Law,
Law Versus Power on the High Frontier: The Case for a Rule-Based Regime for Outer Space, lexis)

The future of peace and security in outer space is at a critical juncture. The legal regime that guides commercial,
military, and scientific activities in space is fragmented and increasingly inadequate to meet the challenges posed
by the growing number of actors seeking to exploit space. The most serious challenge to the space regime is
posed by the stated intent of the George W. Bush administration to pursue national dominance in space, which
may eventually include stationing weapons there. Although space is already militarized to some degree - that is,
used for military support purposes - no nation has yet placed weapons in space. Such a move would cross an
important and longstanding threshold, likely provoking a battle for national superiority in space dominated by
the United States. It would seriously undermine the current legal order in space that is widely supported by the
rest of the world. The deployment of ground-based antisatellite (ASAT) weapons would also constitute a serious
departure from the current regime. Without a concerted effort to develop a more comprehensive legal regime for
space that will limit unconstrained weaponization, the international community will likely face a new military
competition in space, with destabilizing consequences for national and global security. Such a competition will
place at risk existing military, commercial, and scientific activities.

12
Space Mil → Arms Races (China/Russia):
Space weaponization will spur Russia and China to actually start weaponization programs.
Noah Shachtman, Wired.com Reporter. Febuary 20, 2004 Online.
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,62358,00.html. Accessed: 7/4/06.

Space has become an increasingly important part of U.S. military efforts. Satellites are used more and more to
talk to troops, keep tabs on foes and guide smart bombs. There's also long been recognition that satellites may
need some sort of protection against attack. But the Air Force report goes far beyond these defensive capabilities,
calling for weapons that can cripple other countries' orbiters. That prospect worries some analysts that the U.S.
may spark a worldwide arms race in orbit. "I don't think other countries will be taking this lying down," said
Theresa Hitchens, vice president of the Center for Defense Information. The space weapons programs listed in
the Air Force report went largely unnoticed until Hitchens circulated them in an e-mail Thursday. "This will
certainly prompt China into actually moving forward" on space weapon plans of its own, she added. "The
Russians are likely to respond with something as well."

US militarization of space leads to counterbalancing, an arms race and pushes Russia and China
together
Nina Tattenwald, Prof. of Int. Studies at Brown University, Summer 2004 (The Yale Journal of International Law,
Law Versus Power on the High Frontier: The Case for a Rule-Based Regime for Outer Space, lexis)

For several reasons, the first two scenarios are unlikely to lead to stable outcomes. As discussed earlier, U.S.
efforts at space dominance will likely inspire other countries to pursue countermeasures to offset U.S.
capabilities, thus risking a never-ending search for security in space that will leave all actors worse off. Some
advocates of space weaponization argue that others will be deterred from responding to U.S. deployment of
space weapons for fear of a U.S. counterattack, or out of a conviction that there is no point competing because
the United States will always be ahead. 81 But proponents of this view have so far offered little explanation of
how or why this would be the case. Instead, given the vast U.S. dependence on satellites, other countries merely
have to pursue an "asymmetric warfare" strategy of building antisatellite weapons, and there are multiple and
relatively easy ways to do this. 82 Because of this, dominance will be very hard to achieve, and will also have
adverse consequences for the United States - including alienating allies, [*380] pushing Russia and China closer
together, and placing at risk other U.S. interests in space. 83

13
Space Mil → War w/ China:
Space mil will force pre-emptive strike on China
Jeffery Lewis, Center for Defense Information, March 11, 2004 online. http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/scenarios.pdf.

Not surprisingly, the Pentagon is extremely worried about possible Chinese ASATs, and the threat that such
weapons would pose to U.S military superiority. The most recent Pentagon report on Chinese military power
warns that “China is said to be acquiring a variety of foreign technologies which could be used to develop an
active Chinese ASAT capability.”22 The report also warns that, at the outset of a conflict, “the PLA would
attempt to weaken U.S. or other third party’s resolve by demonstrating the capability to hold at risk – or actually
striking – high-value assets. The PLA would seek to leverage emerging asymmetric capabilities to counter or
negate an adversary’s superiorities.”23These weapons could be used to blind the missile warning and radar
satellites that allow the United States to target Chinese ballistic missiles on the ground or in flight, as well as the
communications satellites that would direct systems such as the Common Aero Vehicle (CAV) to their targets. If
the United States were to deploy space-based missile defenses, or place a large number of CAVs in orbit (aboard
a space maneuver vehicle like NASA’s X-37), China might target those weapons with anti-satellite weapons as
well. This situation would essentially put the United States on “hair trigger” alert in space. A Chinese military
exercise, for example, involving the movement of large numbers of troops and mobilization of ballistic missile
units might be mistaken in the United States as a prelude to a surprise attack. With a military strategy that
absolutely depends on vulnerable space assets to protect the homeland, an American president would face the
unenviable task of choosing between launching a surprise attack on China or risking the loss of space-based
intelligence, strike and missile defense assets that protect against nuclear attack.

14
AT Space Mil Inev:

15
Turn: Space Mil Kills US leadership:
Focus on space militarization will spur arms races that the U.S. will lose, ending U.S. space
leadership
Charles V. Peña and Edward L. Hudgins, sen. defense policy analyst/form. director at Cato Institute,
March 18, 2002 (Should the United States "Weaponize" Space? Military and Commercial Implicatons,
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=1286&print=Y)

Advocates of a more aggressive U.S. military policy for space argue that the United States is more reliant on the
use of space than is any other nation, that space systems are vulnerable to attack, and that U.S. space systems are
thus an attractive candidate for a "space Pearl Harbor." But as important and potentially vulnerable as current
U.S. space-based assets may be, deploying actual weapons (whether defensive or offensive) will likely be
perceived by the rest of the world as more threatening than the status quo. Any move by the United States to
introduce weapons into space will surely lead to the development and deployment of anti-satellite weapons by
potentially hostile nations. As the dominant user of space for military and civilian functions, the United States
would have the most to lose from such an arms race. National security must be one component of total U.S.
space policy, but it must certainly not be the primary component. In the post-Cold War environment--with no
immediate threat from a rival great power and none on the horizon--the United States must not establish over-
stated and costly military requirements for space-based resources. The military must make greater use of
commercial space assets. Also, the United States should strive to foster an environment that allows commercial
space activity to grow and flourish rather than use it to create a new area for costly military competition.

16
Heg F/L (1/3):
1. Hegemony fuels anti-american sentiments, terrorism and nuclear war
Layne (Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M) 2006
[Christopher, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to Present, Cornell University
Press (Ithica), p. 190-192 //wfi-tjc]

Advocates of hegemony claim that it is illusory to think that the United States can retract its military power safely from Eurasia. The answer to this
assertion is that the risks and costs of American grand strategy are growing, and the strategy is not likely to work
much longer in any event. As other states—notably China— rapidly close the gap, U.S. hegemony is fated to end
in the next decade or two regardless of U.S. efforts to prolong it . At the same time, understandable doubts about the credibility of
U.S. security guarantees are driving creeping re-nationalization by America’s Eurasian allies, which, in turn, is leading to a reversion to multipolaritv .
In
this changing geopolitical context, the costs of trying to hold on to hegemony are high and going to become higher. Rather
than fostering peace and stability in Eurasia, America’s military commitments abroad have become a source of insecurity
for the United States, because they carry the risk of entrapping the United States in great power Eurasian wars. The events
of 9/11 are another example of how hegemony makes the United States less secure than it would he if it followed an offshore
balancing strategy. Terrorism, the RAND Corporation terrorism expert Bruce Hoff- man says, is “about power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of
power, and use of power to achieve political change~.” If we step hack for a moment from our horror and revulsion at the events of September 11, we can
see that the attack was in keeping with the Clausewitzian paradigm of war: force was used against the United States by its adversaries to advance their
political objectives.87 As Clausewitz observed, “War is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object.”88 September 111
represented a violent counter reaction to America’s geopolitical—and cultural—hegemony. As the strategy expert Richard K. Betts presciently observed in
a 1998 Foreign Affairs article: It is hardly likely that Middle Eastern radicals would be hatching schemes like the destruction of the World Trade Center if
the United States had not been identified so long as the mainstay of Israel, the shah of Iran, and conservative Arab regimes and the source of an eternal
assault on Islam. U.S. hegemony fuels terrorist groups like al Qaeda and fans Islamic fundamentalism, which is a
form of “blowback” against America’s preponderance and its world role.9°As long as the United States
maintains its global hegemony—and its concomitant preeminence in regions like the Persian Gulf—it will he the
target of politically motivated terrorist groups like al Qaeda . After 9/li, many foreign policy analysts and pundits asked the question,
“Why do they hate us?” This question missed the key point. No doubt, there are Islamic fundamentalists who do “hate” the United States for cultural,
religious, and ideological reasons. And even leaving aside American neoconservatives’ obvious relish for making it so, to some extent the war on terror
inescapably has overtones of a “clash of civilizations.” Still, this isn’t—and should not be allowed to become a replay of the Crusades. Fundamentally
9/11 was about geopolitics, specifically about U.S. hegemony. The United States may be greatly reviled in some quarters of the
Islamic world, but were the United States not so intimately involved in the affairs of the Middle East, it’s hardly likely that this detestation would have
manifested itself in something like 9/11. As Michael Scheurer, who headed the CIA analytical team monitoring Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, puts it,
“One of the greatest dangers for Americans in deciding how to confront the Islamist threat lies in continuing to believe—at the urging of senior U.S.
leaders—that Muslims hate and attack us for what we are and think, rather than for what we do.”91 It is American policies—to be precise, American
hegemony—that make the United States a lightning rod for Muslim anger. Hegemony has proven to be an elusive goal for the great
powers that have sought it. The European great powers that bid for hegemony did so because they were on a geopolitical treadmill. For them, it seemed as
if security was attainable only by ~eliminating their great power rivals and achieving continental hegemony. And it is this fact that invested great power
politics with its tragic quality, because the international system’s power-balancing dynamics doomed all such bids to failure. The United States, on the
other hand, has never faced similar pressures to seek security through a hegemonic grand strategy, and, too often, instead of enhancing U.S. security as
advertised, America’s hegemonic grand strategy has made the United States less secure. In the early twentyfirst century, by
threatening to embroil the United States in military showdowns with nuclear great powers and exposing the United States to
terrorism, the pursuit of hegemony means that “over there” well may become over here. Objectively, the United States
historically has enjoyed an extraordinarily high degree of immunity from external threat, a condition that has had nothing to
do with whether it is hegemonic and everything to do with geography and its military capabilities. Consequently, the United
States has, should it wish to use it, an exit ramp—offshore balancing—that would allow it to escape from the tragedy of
great power politics that befalls those that seek hegemony. The failure of the United States to take this exit ramp constitutes
the real tragedy of American diplomacy.

17
Heg F/L (2/3):
2. Collapse of heg is inevitable – their plan leads to great power conflict
Charles Kupchan, Associate Prof at Georgetown University, 2003 [Charles, “the Rise of Europe, America’s
Changing Internationalism and the End of US Primacy”, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 119, no. 2//mac-dch]

Combine the rise of Europe and Asia with the decline of liberal internationalism in the United States and it
becomes clear that America's unipolar moment is not long for this world. At the same time that alternative
centers of power are taking shape, the United States is drawing away from multilateral institutions in favor
of a unilateralism that risks estranging those power centers, raising the chances that their ascent will lead to
a new era of geopolitical rivalry. As unipolarity gives way to multipolarity, the strategic competition now
held in abeyance by U.S. primacy will return--and with a vengeance if America's unilateralist impulse
prevails. No longer steadied by U.S. hegemony, processes of globalization and democratization are likely
to falter, as are the international institutions currently dependent upon Washington's leadership to function
effectively. Geopolitical fault lines will reemerge among centers of power in North America, Europe, and
East Asia. The central challenge for U.S. grand strategy will be managing and taming the dangers arising
from these new fault lines. The United States cannot and should not resist the end of unipolarity and the
return of a world of multiple centers of power. To do so would only risk alienating and risking conflict with
a rising Europe and an ascendant Asia. And it would likely stoke an isolationist backlash in the United
States by pursuing a level of foreign ambition for which there would be insufficient political support.
Asking that the United States prepare for and manage its exit from global primacy, however, is a tall order.
Great powers have considerable difficulty accepting their mortality; few in history have willfully made
room for rising challengers and adjusted their grand strategies accordingly. In managing the return of
multipolarity, America should be guided by the principles of strategic restraint and institutional binding.
Strategic restraint means making room for rising centers of power so that they array their rising strength
with rather than against the United States. Institutional binding entails the use of international institutions to
bind major powers to each other and to bound their behavior through adherence to common norms.
Institutions also promise to fulfill another important function--that of guiding America down a multilateral
path that offers a middle ground between unilateralism and isolationism

3. Decline in US heg won't cause bad shit – other mechanisms for global stability exist
Michael Mandelbaum, Professor Foreign Policy Johns Hopkins, 2005, The Case for Goliath: How America acts as the
world’s government in the 21st Century, p. 201-2

The establishment of a world government is therefore no more likely to occur in the twenty-first century, even if the United States lowers
its international profile considerably, than in the centuries preceding. Still, a substantial retraction of American power without
the advent of a global authority to replace it would not necessarily plunge the world into deadly and costly
disorder because government, whether formally constituted or supplied de facto by the United States, is not the
only source of order in the international system.

18
Heg F/L (3/3):
US PURSUIT OF MILITARISM AND EMPIRE THREATENS PLANETARY SURVIVAL
Carl Boggs, Social Science Professor National University (L.A.) , 2005, Planetary Politics: human rights, terror, and global society, ed.
Stephen Eric Bronner, p. 80-1

A potentially explosive contradiction of empire is the built-in conflict between global dimensions of power
associated with the world hegemon and a range of distinctly national interests and agendas that elites want to
pursue—a predicament embedded in the Middle East cauldron today. A strong patriotic mobilization that feeds
into domestic legitmation needs quickly evaporates beyond American borders, where it breeds contempt,
hostility, and resistance; nationalism by its very logic cannot serve general interests on the global terrain, even as it
seeks universal justification. The single hegemon predictably works against diversity, independent centers of power, and peaceful balance, favoring
coercive methods in support of a single neoliberal order, enforced along lines of an American-style fundamentalism . Empire rests on a logic
of
perpetual expansion: the global managers can never accrue sufficient power of enough mastery of the universe,
just as billionaires can never accumulate enough wealth. Despite the onset of a supposedly postnational
globalization, distinct national agendas lie behind US pursuit of international global double standards: breaking
treaties, violations of the UN Charter and international law, refusal to accept inclusive disarmament processes,
rejection of the World Criminal Court, seizing hold of space militarization for itself, launching of preemptive
wars, hectoring of other nations for human rights abuses the United States itself commits on an even larger scale
(and more regularly) around the globe. Further, to even speak of globalization as some kind of objective, abstract, benign historical process
is mystified nonsense, largely a cover for American corporate, geopolitical, and military interests that have little in common with a balanced, multipolar
globalism in which single-power domination becomes obsolete. As the cycle of militarism and terrorism intensifies – as the world moves ever closer to
barbarism—the very premise of warfare as a method of advancing national goals has become bankrupt and irrational, for reasons having less to do with
democracy or worldwide diffusion of liberal values than with the brutal nature of contemporary warfare itself. The proliferation of WMDs—and the
growing prospect that such horrific weapons will be used – only underscores the insanity of militarism in a world where deep social polarization is the
norm and universal disarmament seems a distant fantasy. Put differently, American designs for implementing “full-spectrum
dominance” across a global system where anti-US sentiment flourishes are bound to jeopardize planetary
survival. We stand at a juncture where large-scale military action tends to aggravate national, religious, and
other conflicts, a point doubly applicable to the lone superpower as it takes measures to secure global
domination. The classic strategic view that war unfolds as an extension of politics thus makes no sense for twenty-first century realities. As the Iraq
disaster shows, war (and its aftermath) is the vehicle of senseless death and destruction, destroying civilian infrastructures, violating established rules of
engagement, and destabilizing entire countries and regions. Civilian populations are deeply and irrevocably drawn into the horrors of modern warfare. As
Istvan Meszaros argues, if the efforts of the only superpower to maintain total armed supremacy persist long into the
future, the result is sure to be a “recipe for military suicide.” As the militarization of society proceeds, the
confluence of the domestic war economy and global empire generates popular attitudes inconsistent with a
vibrant, democratic public sphere: fear, hatred, jingoism, racism, and aggression. We have arrived at a bizarre
mixture of imperial arrogance and collective paranoia, violent impulses and retreat from norms of civic engagement and obligation
that patriotic energies furnish only falsely and ephemerally. Further, the celebration of guns and violence in American society, cavalier attitudes toward
war and military escapades abroad, and widespread indifference to established moral and legal codes gives elites wider autonomy to pursue their global
schemes. As war becomes more acceptable, often the preferred instrument to fight ubiquitous enemies, we can
expect further erosion of the domestic infrastructure and culture. For elites this could well be tolerable, but the
long-term consequences for US imperial hegemony—both domestically and globally – are certain to be
disastrous.

19
Ext – Space Colonization → Militarization
space travel and colonization allows for the unchecked nuclearization of space
Bruce K. Gagnon, Coordinator of the Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space,
1999. (“Space Exploration and Exploitation,” http://www.space4peace.org/articles/scandm.htm)

Nuclear power has become the power source of choice for NASA. Not only has NASA, and the
Department of Energy (DoE), been promoting the use of nuclear power for on-board generators for
deep space missions, but there is growing evidence that the space exploration and exploitation
"adventure" will soon be awash in nuclear materials. According to Marshall Savage, the founder of
the First Millennial Foundation (a pro-space colonization organization), "We really can’t mess up the
Moon, either by mining it or building nuclear power plants. We can ruthlessly strip mine the surface
of the Moon for centuries and it will be hard to tell we’ve even been there. There is no reason why
we cannot build nuclear power plants on the Moon’s surface with impunity. Equipped with limitless
nuclear, the lunar civilization will be capable of prodigious rates of economic growth." One cannot
help but wonder what would happen to the poor Moon miner who becomes contaminated by
radioactive dust after removing his irradiated space suit inside the lunar habitat. There is a growing
call as well for the nuclear rocket to Mars. Already work is underway on the project at Los Alamos
Labs in New Mexico and at the University of Florida Nuclear Engineering Department. In his Space
News op-ed called Nuclear Propulsion to Mars, aerospace industry engineer Robert Kleinberger
states that the nuclear rocket "could be used for defending U.S. space systems, reboosting the
International Space Station, returning to the Moon for exploration or mining, and for exploring and
opening the inner solar system to scientific research. The nuclear vehicle could even assist in the
eventual colonization of Mars." In fact, there is such a growing demand for plutonium for "space
projects" that the DoE is now undertaking an internal review of its production process. The DoE is
considering re-opening plutonium processing lines at such facilities as Hanford in Washington state,
a site that has created enormous contamination during its years of bomb making .

20
Space Exploration → Militarization:
Bruce K. Gagnon, Coordinator of the Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space,
1999. (“Space Exploration and Exploitation,” http://www.space4peace.org/articles/scandm.htm)
“But there are obstacles to U.S. Space “dominance”...well as the Outer Space Treaty.”

21
Space Exploration  Militarization:
Space exploration leads to militarization
Raymond D. Duvall, & Jonathan Havercroft, University of Minnesota & University of Victoria, March 22-25,
2006. (“Taking Sovereignty Out of This World: Space Weaponization and the Production of Late-Modern Political Subjects,”
International Studies Association. http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/9/8/6/8/pages98680/p98680-
1.php).

The weaponization of space—the act of placing weapons in outer space—has an intimate relationship to space
exploration, in that the history of the former is embedded in the latter, while the impetus for space exploration, in turn, is
embedded in histories of military development. Since the launch of Sputnik, states that have ability to access— and hence to
explore—outer space have sought ways in which that access could improve their military capabilities. Consequently,
militaries in general and the U.S. military in particular have had a strong interest in the military uses of space for
the last half century. Early on, the military interest in space had two direct expressions: enhancing surveillance; and
developing rocketry technologies that could be put to use for earth- based weapons, such as missiles. Militaries also have a vested
interest in the “dual-use” technologies that are often developed in space exploration missions. While NASA goes to great lengths in its
public relations to stress the benefits to science and the (American) public of its space explorations, it is noteworthy that many of the
technologies developed for those missions also have potential military use. The multiple interests that tie together space exploration and
space weaponization have been vigorously pursued and now are beginning to be substantially realized by a very small number of
militaries, most notably that of the United States. For example, since the 1990 Persian Gulf War, the U.S. military has increasingly relied
on assets in space to increase its C3I (Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence) functions. Most of these functions are now
routed through satellites in orbit. In addition, new precision weapons, such as JDAM bombs, and unmanned drones, such as the Predator,
rely on Global Positioning System satellites to help direct them to their targets, and often these weapons communicate with headquarters
through satellite uplinks. For another instance, NASA’s recently completed Deep Impact mission, which entailed smashing part of a
probe into a comet to gather information about the content of comet nuclei, directly served the U.S. military in developing the technology
and the logistical capabilities to intercept small objects moving at very fast speeds (approximately 23,000 miles per hour) (NASA,
2005). As such, the technologies can be adapted for programs such as missile defense, where a similar problem of intercepting an object
moving at a very high speed is confronted.

22
Diseases Turn:
a. space exploration will lead to the spread of pathogenic viruses through biohazardous land
samples
Bruce K. Gagnon, Coordinator of the Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space,
1999. (“Space Exploration and Exploitation,” http://www.space4peace.org/articles/scandm.htm)

Potential dangers do exist though. Barry DiGregorio, author and founder of the International
Committee Against Mars Sample Return, has written that "…any Martian samples returned to Earth
must be treated as biohazardous material until proven otherwise." At the present time NASA has
taken no action to create a special facility to handle space sample returns. On March 6, 1997 a report
issued by the Space Studies Board of the National Research Council recommended that such a
facility should be operational at least two years prior to launch of a Mars Sample Return mission.
Reminding us of the Spanish exploration of the Americas, and the smallpox virus they carried that
killed thousands of indigenous people, DiGregorio warns that the Mars samples could "contain
pathogenic viruses or bacteria." There are vast deposits of mineral resources like magnesium and
cobalt believed to be on Mars. In June of 1997, NASA announced plans for manned mining colonies
on Mars, expected around 2007-2009. The mining colonies, NASA says, would be powered by
nuclear reactors launched from Cape Canaveral, Florida.

b. Causes extinction
Daswani, 96 (Kavita, South China Morning Post, ¼, lexis.)

“Despite the importance of the discovery of the...imperial the survival of the human race,” he said.”

23
Ext. – Space Colonization → diseases:
space travel and exploration lead to decreased system immunity thru stresses of spaceflight
NASA, September 29, 2004. (Dolores Beasley, Washington Headquarters, and William Jeffs, Johnson
Space Center Houston, http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2004/sep/HQ_04320_immunity.html.)

A NASA-funded study has found the human body's ability to fight off disease may be decreased by spaceflight.
The effect may even linger after an astronaut's return to Earth following long flights. In addition to the
conditions experienced by astronauts in flight, the stresses experienced before launch and after landing also may
contribute to a decrease in immunity. Results of the study were recently published in "Brain, Behavior, and
Immunity." The results may help researchers better understand the affects of spaceflight on the human immune
response. They may also provide new insights to ensure the health, safety and performance of International
Space Station crewmembers and future spacefarers on extended missions. "Astronauts live and work in a
relatively crowded and stressful environment," said Duane Pierson, the study's principal investigator and NASA
Senior Microbiologist at Johnson Space Center, Houston. "Stresses integral to spaceflight can adversely affect
astronaut health by impairing the human immune response. Our study suggests these effects may increase as
mission duration and mission activity demands increase," he added. The white blood cell count provides a clue
to the presence of illness. The five main types of white cells work together to protect the body by fighting
infection and attacking foreign material. The most prevalent white blood cells are called neutrophils. From 1999
to 2002, scientists from NASA, Enterprise Advisory Services, Inc., of Houston, and the Boston University
School of Medicine compared neutrophil functions in 25 astronauts. They made comparisons after five-day
Space Shuttle missions and after nine to 11 day missions. Researchers found the number of neutrophils increased
by 85 percent at landing compared to preflight levels. Healthy ground control subjects, who did not fly, exhibited
no more than a two percent increase. Researchers also discovered functions performed by these cells,
specifically ingestion and destruction of microorganisms, are affected by factors associated with spaceflight. The
effect becomes more pronounced during longer missions. The increase in astronaut neutrophil numbers resulted
in a corresponding increase (more than 50 percent) in total white blood cell counts at landing. The increase is a
consistent consequence of stress. Pierson emphasized that "no astronauts in the study became ill; however,
longer exploration missions may result in clinical manifestations of decreased immune response." Researchers
concluded the general effect of spaceflight, pre- and post flight-related stress decreases the ability of
crewmembers' neutrophils to destroy microbial invaders. This finding suggests crewmembers returning from
longer missions may be briefly more susceptible to infections than before launch, because these cells are not as
efficient in ingesting and destroying infectious agents.

space travel increases risk for AIDS and cancer through immunodeficiency risks
Sastry, assistant prof of experimental veterinary pathology, 2001. (Dr Jaqannadha K., Texas Medical Center News,
“Studies on Cell-Mediated Immunity Against Immune Disorders,”
http://www.tmc.edu/tmcnews/10_15_01/page_02.html.)

Space travel can cause reduced immunity which leads to increased risk for infections. Immunodeficiency is also the
basis for several cancers and AIDS. This project applied the ground-based microgravity technology developed by NASA to help
understand immune disorders such as cancer and AIDS. This line of study may eventually help in the design of treatments and vaccines
for these conditions.

24
Ext. – Space Colonization → diseases:
Space colonization brings diseases back home
Britt, Senior Space Writer, 2k. (Robert Roy, “Germs from Outer Space! Researchers say flu bugs rain
down from Beyond,” january 21,
http://www.space.com/scienceastronomy/planetearth/flu_in_space_000121.html.)

Maybe not. It could be that increasingly frequent sunspots are driving the virus out of the stratosphere and into
your body. So say Sir Fred Hoyle and Chandra Wickramasinghe of the University of Wales at Cardiff. And while
there is much doubt by many other scientists that the flu comes from space, Hoyle and Wickramasinghe are
generating a lot of interest with their idea. In a new paper, to be published in an upcoming issue of the Indian
journal Current Science, the researchers present data that show how previous periods of high sunspot activity
coincided with flu pandemics (large-scale epidemics). A roughly 11-year cycle of solar activity is increasing now
and is expected to peak soon, other scientists agree. Hoyle and Wickramasinghe say we can expect another flu
pandemic to accompany the solar peak "within weeks." By that claim, perhaps debate over their research will
soon be settled. Injecting the flu into our atmosphere. The researchers say that the virus, or a trigger that causes
it, is deposited throughout space by dust in the debris stream of comets, which are thought by many researchers
to harbor organic material. As Earth passes through the stream, dust (and perhaps the virus) enters our
atmosphere, where it can lodge for two decades or more, until gravity pulls it down.

25
Space Colonization – Costly:
1. space exploration is expensive, time-consuming, and dangerously
Robertson, Freelance space industry journalist, 2006. (Donald F., “Space Exploration: A
Reality Check,” March 6,
http://www.space.com/spacenews/archive06/RobertsonOpEd_030606.html.)
“Two largely unquestioned assumptions long ago...time-consuming and dangerous.”

26
Space Colonization – Uninhabitable:
The land is uninhabitable and scientists haven't worked out the kinks
Bell, former space scientist and adjunct prof for planetary science at the hawaii institute of geophysics & Planetology at the university
of hawaii, 2005. (Jeffrey F., “The dream palace of the space cadets,” Nov. 25, http://www.spacedaily.com/news/oped-
05zzb.html.)

Unfortunately, the new generation of organizations like the Space Frontier Foundation and the Mars Society and
even the staid National Space Society mostly lack something that the old L-5 Society and Space Studies Institute
had: technical sophistication. Just look at Bob Zubrin's vision of Mars colonization. Nowhere in Zubrin's books
is there the kind of detailed engineering design for Mars colonies that the O'Neillians produced for their L-5
colonies. The problems of sustaining human life on Mars are dismissed after superficial discussions devoid of
any hard numbers. And there are obvious problems with colonizing Mars. The first one is that it gets incredibly
cold there - probably down to -130C on winter nights. Every robot Mars probe has used small slugs of Pu-238 to
keep its batteries from freezing at night. And there is air on Mars - not enough to breathe, but enough to conduct
heat. The Martian regolith will not be the perfect insulator that the Moon's is. Thermal control on Mars will not
be simply a matter of adding layers of aluminum foil to reflect the sun. Bases and rovers will need to be
insulated and heated. And how do you keep a human in a spacesuit warm in this climate? And Mars has
permafrost - at least in some places and those places are the ones to colonize. How do we keep the heat leaking
out from our habitat or farm greenhouse into the ground from heating up the ice and melting or subliming it
away? This is a severe problem in permafrost areas of the Earth - how bad will it be on Mars? Zubrin even
proposes underground habitats. These will be in direct contact with the cold subsoil or bedrock which will suck
heat out at a rapid rate. If Gerard O'Neill was still alive and advocating Mars colonies, he would be doing some
basic thermal transfer calculations to see how bad the Martian cold problem really is. He would be figuring out
how big a fission reactor to send along to keep the colony warm and how often its core will need to be
replenished by fresh U-235 from Earth. He would even have a rough number for the amount of Pu-238 everyone
will have to carry in their spacesuit backpacks. Bob Zubrin is perfectly competent to do these calculations since
he has a Ph.D. in nuclear engineering. But you never see this kind of hard engineering analysis from the Mars
Society. Instead, we get propaganda stunts like the Devon Island "Mars Base" which is only manned during the
peak of the Arctic summer when the climate is tropical compared with that of Mars. Another thing you never
see from the Mars Society is a realistic discussion of what would happen to the human body in the low Martian
gravity. Zubrin has discussed at length the need for artificial spin gravity on the 6 month trip to Mars. But he
assumes that the problem ends once the astronauts land on Mars. The problem of bone loss in a 0.38g field on
Mars for ~18 months is completely ignored. When I read Zubrin's book The Case For Mars, I was so intrigued
by this surprising omission that I consulted a friend who is a space medic at JSC. He tells me that this issue was
once discussed at a conference of medical doctors who had actually worked with the long-term residents of Mir
and ISS. NONE of these experts thought that humans could adapt permanently to Mars gravity!

27
Space Colonization – Lack of Funding
Lack of funding prevents colonization
Hobby Space, 2005. (“Solar Sci-Fi,” January 25, http://www.hobbyspace.com/SolarSciFi/essay/html.)
A paradox of the post-Moon Race era is that while interest and support of the U.S. public for space exploration
collapsed, the popularity of space-based science fiction literally skyrocketed. Star Trek, Star Wars, Close
Encounters of Third Kind, ET, and other such movie and television space adventures have enjoyed huge success
since the early 1970's, when, ironically, the Apollo project ended without a follow-on program of lunar
development and Mars exploration. Polls continue to show little support for an ambitious space program and
NASA's budget has fallen to a quarter of it's high in the 1960s. Even among many hard-core sci-fi addicts and
Trekkers, the interest in current space exploration is remarkably low.
A number of reasons for this come to mind:
 Space travel in Sci-fi is easy and cheap. The Enterprise can take hundreds of people to another star as
easily as a 747 goes from New York to London.
 An Apollo Moonshot, on the other hand, cost hundreds of millions of dollars to send three people to the
moon in a small, cramped pod, which was the only thing leftover from a skyscraper tall rocket.
 It is difficult to picture oneself ever riding in a small capsule on top of a throwaway missile while it's
easy to imagine walking on the roomy bridge of the Enterprise.
 The huge costs seemed extravagant during a period of so much economic and social turmoil in the US.
Sci-Fi adventures cost only the price of a theater ticket or were free on the tube.
 The Space Shuttle was disappointingly expensive and complicated, involving thousands of support staff
to fly only a few times a year. Hardly the DC-3 of space as promised.
 Space Sci-Fi usually involves faster-than-light travel that makes accessible a whole galaxy of amazing
planets and alien civilizations.
 Meanwhile, our unmanned planetary explorers showed a solar system of cratered, desolate, and
seemingly lifeless worlds with little appeal.

28
Space Colonization – Microgravity Damage:
degradation of humans' physiological systems through expose to microgravity deters people from
colonizing space
CNN, 2k. (“The science of the international space station,” December 26,
http://archives.cnn.com/2000/TECH/space/12/26/part.two/index.html.)

One of the priorities for NASA is to use the ISS to study what microgravity does to people. Four decades of
human space travel show that it weakens the bones, the muscles and even the cardiovascular system. Some
astronauts experience nausea or have trouble sleeping. Uri says the goal of this new research is to find ways to
make space a friendlier place to live. "Some of the earlier things we're going to be studying is understanding the
mechanisms of how those changes actually occur," he says. "So far we've observed what the changes are and now
we need to know what the mechanisms are so we can develop counter measures to prevent those changes."

29
Space Colonization – Not Inevitable:
space colonization isn't inevitable
The Space Review, 2005. (Stephen Ashworth, “The mission, the business, and the tandem (part 1),”
January 31, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/312/1.)

How realistic is this model? If governments are to deliver sustainable progress in space, then at the
very least the goal of interplanetary civilization will have to be deeply embedded in their
institutional psyches—as deeply as, say, such goals as creating the welfare state, or defeating Hitler,
or demonstrating falling unemployment and rising prosperity. At present, there is no sign of this
happening. The intellectual ideal of civilization in space remains the special preserve of a minority
of visionaries, rather than the popular passion of society as a whole. To politicians, manned
spaceflight remains a hobby for rich countries, not part of their core business: pure exploration, not
economic growth. Meanwhile, the space agencies are offering to spend large amounts of other
people’s money without submitting their work to the disciplines of either international competition
or the commercial market. Under these circumstances, the hope that the continuous application of
sizeable government space budgets will lead incrementally and inevitably to permanent
extraterrestrial settlements is very much a hostage to fortune. This hope is vulnerable to the kind of
changing circumstances that closed off the potential of the Apollo-Saturn system for evolutionary
growth and doomed it to cancellation (a winged flyback version of the Saturn first stage was
designed, and lunar bases sketched out). It is vulnerable to the kind of bureaucratic inefficiency
which wasted many tens of billions of dollars, rubles, and euros on the International Space Station,
while gaining us no progress whatsoever towards making spaceflight more affordable or sustainable,
whether through opening up the key extraterrestrial resources of asteroidal ice and solar power, or
through making spaceflight accessible to the public at an economical price, or even through
demonstrating artificial gravity or medical methods of adaptation to weightlessness.

30
Space Colonization - Debris:
The debris from a space war would destroy our ability to explore space
Joel Primack, September 2004. Bulletin of Atomic Sciences, “Pelted by Paint, Drowned by Debris” Online.
http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/2002/so02/so02primack.html

Weaponization of space would make the debris problem much worse, and even one war in space could encase
the entire planet in a shell of whizzing debris that would thereafter make space near the Earth highly hazardous
for peaceful as well as military purposes. The nickname "Star Wars" for missile defense all too accurately
reflects the popular fantasy about how things work in space. In the Star Wars movies and in hundreds of other
popular science fiction films, we see things blow up in space and the fragments quickly dissipate, leaving empty
space behind. But in reality, space does not clear after an explosion near our planet. The fragments continue
circling the Earth, their orbits crossing those of other objects. Paint chips, lost bolts, pieces of exploded rockets--
all have already become tiny satellites, traveling at about 27,000 kilometers per hour, 10 times faster than a
high-powered rifle bullet. A marble traveling at such speed would hit with the energy of a one-ton safe dropped
from a threestory building. Anything it strikes will be destroyed and only increase the debris. With enough
orbiting debris, pieces will begin to hit other pieces, fragmenting them into more pieces, which will in turn hit
more pieces, setting off a chain reaction of destruction that will leave a lethal halo around the Earth. To operate a
satellite within this cloud of millions of tiny missiles would be impossible: no more Hubble Space Telescopes or
International Space Stations. Even communications and GPS satellites in higher orbits would be endangered.
Every person who cares about the human future in space should also realize that weaponizing space will
jeopardize the possibility of space exploration.

31
Space Colonization – Lack of Personnel:
Alt Causality – Lack of personnel prevents space systems from functioning
Stephen P. Randolph, 2002, National Defense university,
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books_2002/Transforming%20Americas%20Mil%20-%20CTNSP%20-
%20Aug%202002/14_ch12.htm.

Sometimes termed the quiet crisis of the U.S. space program, workforce issues face the space community in
every sector and every skill set. The community has evolved into a bimodal age distribution, with the wave of people who
entered the space world during the glory days of the Apollo Program now on the verge of retirement. There is a
serious demographic gap where their successors should be found. The problems range across the military, civil, and
commercial space sectors, as more attractive opportunities open up in other industries. The acute pressures of a few
years ago have been relieved, as people who had left the industry to seek their fortunes in the Internet startup world have drifted back. But
over the long run, broader issues of job satisfaction and compensation will have to be faced to ensure that the right people remain in this
community.

32
Rescind Commercial Ban CP:
TEXT: The United States federal government should remove commercial space technology from the
munitions list in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations.

33
Rescind Commercial Ban CP Solvency:
US-Chinese cooperation over space tech is K to international space cooperation and the
American economy
Dr. James Clay Moltz, CNS Deputy Director, 1/26/06, “Space Conflict or Space Cooperation?”
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/060126.htm.) “A current assumption of U.S. Defense...and political goals in space.”

34
Rescind Commercial Ban CP Solvency:
China is currently the only country subjected to US regulatory policies on space tech – this
destroys our ability to cooperate with almost any nation in terms of space
Guo Xiaobing, Researcher at the China Institute of Contemporary international Relations and visiting scholar at the university of
georgia's center for international trade and security, 20 07. http://www.wsichina.org/attach/cs2_7.pdf.

“There are two puzzles surrounding U.S. Regulatory policies...cooperation will be beneficial for both
China and the United States.”

35
Rescind Commercial Ban CP Solvency:
Current restrictions on commercial space tech hurts America's ability to cooperate with other
nations over space
Vincent G. Sabathier, Space Attache at the Embassy of France and a visiting senior fellow at the center for
strategic and international studies in washington dc, 200 7. “Europe and China”
http://www.space.com/adastra/china_europe_0505.html.

“at present, the relationship between the West and China remains...face should it explore space alone.”

36
International Cooperation Key:
Without international cooperation, space exploration won’t happen
Tariq Malik, journalist, May 4, 2004 (“Space Experts Say International Cooperation is Key for NASA's Space
Vision”, http://www.space.com/news/commission_ny_040504.html)

NEW YORK CITY -- NASA should not limit itself to merely seeking support from the American public to push
forward its vision of the human exploration of space, according to the foreign space agency directors, scientists
and space enthusiasts addressing a presidential commission Monday. While support from the American people,
and the politicians who represent them, is a critical component of the space vision, so to[o] is international
cooperation, panelists said during the final meeting of the Commission on the Implementation of United States
Space Exploration Policy. The commission, held at the Asia Society here, was appointed by President George W.
Bush to recommend the steps needed to full his vision of sending humans to the moon and Mars. "Space is a
global industry," said Daniel Sacotte, a director with the European Space Agency's (ESA) human spaceflight,
microgravity and exploration programs. "[The vision] is most difficult, but it is most important that we
cooperate."

37
Solvency – Economy
US space tech restrictions make int'l space cooperation and competition impossible – ITAR needs
to be changed in order to save the economy
Andhra Pradeshu, Indian PressWire, 9/27/07, “US regulations restrict space industry growth”
http://www.indiaprwire.com/businessnews/20070927/24683.htm.

“International traffic in Arms Regulations...spectrum resources were in the hands of government, he


added.”

38
China Cooperation Good:
despite some weaknesses in China's technology, the US can gain a lot from cooperating with them
over space tech and help us develop our own market
Guo Xiaobing, Researcher at the China Institute of Contemporary international Relations and visiting scholar at the university of
georgia's center for international trade and security, 20 07. http://www.wsichina.org/attach/cs2_7.pdf.

“After Shenzhou V successfully carried...to the U.S. space industry.”

cut the rest of that article – has AT china gets US tech secrets, AT kills US business.

39
US Heg Loss Inev:
US will inevitably lose military supremacy in space
Major Willson, Bachelor's Degree from C.W. Post College; J.D., Touro School of Law; LL.M., The Judge Advocate General School)
is the International & Operational Law Attorney, Army Space Command, Colorado Springs, Co. 2001 (An Army
View of Neutrality in Space: Legal Options for Space Negation, lexis)

Operation Desert Storm was the first war in which satellites played a major role for the U.S. ground commander.
27 Prior to the war, President Saddam Hussein's ground forces were matched in size with the Coalition forces,
and Iraq possessed relatively modern weapons purchased with oil money. A critical difference between the two
was that the Coalition forces had space systems allowing them to see, hear, and speak to each other--a capability
which Iraqi forces lost within the first hours of the war. 28 Martin Faga, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Space at the time of the war stated, "the world watched and learned. Many . . . will want and will eventually
obtain their own space assets . . . adversaries will seek to dilute the effectiveness of ours." 29 U.S. Space
Command takes the increasing importance of space commercialization to its logical conclusion: "As commercial
space systems provide global information and nations tap into this source for military purposes, protecting (as
well as negating) these non-military space systems will become more difficult."

US power in space will inevitably decline


E. Michael O’Hanlon, Ph.D from Princeton University, 2004 (Neither Star Wars Nor Sanctuary 61-2)

If space-related technologies could be frozen in place in their current state, the United States would be in a
fortunate position. It dominates the use of outer space for military purposes today. Russia's capabilities have
declined, to the point where its weakness may be of greater concern than its strength, given the lack of
dependable early-warning satellites for ballistic missile launch. China's assets remain rudimentary, as do those of
America's other potential rivals (or current enemies). The United States is able to use satellites for a wide range
of missions, including not only traditional reconnaissance and early-warning purposes but also real-time
targeting and data distribution in warfare. Although it hopes to develop space-based missile defense assets
someday, the present need for Such capabilities is generally rather limited, and ground-based systems
increasingly provide some protection, in any event. More exotic capabilities, such as space-to-Earth kinetic rods,
airplanes that would bounce along the top of the atmosphere, or intercontinental artillery, are not of pressing
need given existing U.S. Capabilities for projecting power anywhere in the world. On the whole, the current
configuration of global space technologies and assets is highly desirable from an American perspective and
unlikely to improve much further, if at all. Deterioration in the U.S. position seems more likely.

40
AT Space Mil Inev:
Space militarization is not inevitable
Charles Park, University of Houston Law Center; M.A., New York University; B.A., Columbia University, Spring
2006 (Houston Journal of International Law, INCREMENTAL STEPS FOR ACHIEVING SPACE SECURITY:
THE NEED FOR A NEW WAY OF THINKING TO ENHANCE THE LEGAL REGIME FOR SPACE, lexis)

The fallacy of the inevitability argument is that, in the short run at least, the United States is the only country that
possesses the resources and capabilities necessary to deploy space weapons. 92 This has never been the case in
American history. As one historian notes, from the "development of ironclad warships in the 1860s, Dreadnought
battleships after 1900, or atomic weapons in the 1940s," different nations were simultaneously [*889]
developing the same technology. 93 This left a choice to the different governments to either take the lead in the
arms race or get passed by. 94 In the space weapons debate, in contrast, "the United States can unilaterally [for
the time being] choose whether space will be weaponized." 95 Consequently, the United States controls the
inevitability of space weaponization. This conviction is dangerously close to evolving into a self-fulfilling
prophecy that simply cannot be refuted.

Your inevitability arguments are false—we can’t predict the future


Charles Park, University of Houston Law Center; M.A., New York University; B.A., Columbia University, Spring
2006 (Houston Journal of International Law, INCREMENTAL STEPS FOR ACHIEVING SPACE SECURITY:
THE NEED FOR A NEW WAY OF THINKING TO ENHANCE THE LEGAL REGIME FOR SPACE, lexis)

The question of whether weaponization will occur is still yet to be determined, but it will undoubtedly be
affected by the decisions of U.S. military space policymakers in the coming years. 99 Because the choices ahead
are so important, it would be irresponsible of the United States to rely solely on an argument lacking in critical
analysis and "based upon little more than superficial historical analogies and glib strategic aphorisms." 100 The
bottom line is that the use of the word "inevitable," in the context of the weaponization of space, is dangerous
simply [*890] because there are too many variables to be able to discern the future with any degree of certainty
at this point.

41
Space Mil → Wars:
Space militarization leads to catastrophic war
Sean R. Mikula, Lawyer and former Military Intelligence Officer,200 1,( Blue Helmets in the Next Frontier: The
Future is Now,The Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, lexis)

ABOVE ALL, we must guard against the misuse of outer space. We recognized early on that a legal regime was
needed to prevent it [from] becoming another area of military confrontation. The international community has
acted jointly, through the United Nations, to ensure that outer space would be developed peacefully. But there is
much more to be done. We must not allow this century, so plagued with war and suffering, to pass on its legacy
to the next, when the technology at our disposal will be even more awesome. We cannot view the expanse of
space as another battleground for our earthly conflicts. - Kofi Annan, 1 United Nations Secretary-General

Space weaponization causes an all-out arms race and global war


Charles Park, University of Houston Law Center; M.A., New York University; B.A., Columbia University, Spring
2006 (Houston Journal of International Law, INCREMENTAL STEPS FOR ACHIEVING SPACE SECURITY:
THE NEED FOR A NEW WAY OF THINKING TO ENHANCE THE LEGAL REGIME FOR SPACE, lexis)

Quite possibly the most important cost of space weaponization, in terms of its geostrategic impact and the threat
most important to communicate, is that space-based weapons do not simply enhance existing threats, they also
introduce a new and greater danger because of the threat they pose to strategic stability. 179 The vulnerability of
space-based weapons will likely create incentives for other states and nonstate actors to develop space weapons,
most obviously because they lack the conventional military and force projection abilities in comparison with the
United States. 180 Once again, the unfortunate end result could easily be a destabilizing arms race making the
world less safe and more prone to war.

Space militarization leads to a destabilizing arms race—the status quo solves


Nina Tattenwald, Prof. of Int. Studies at Brown University, Summer 2004 (The Yale Journal of International Law,
Law Versus Power on the High Frontier: The Case for a Rule-Based Regime for Outer Space, lexis)

Today the freedom of the seas principle is increasingly dysfunctional, but hegemony need not be. The United
States should use its power and position to support the creation of an operational regime for space based on the
rule of law, rather than pursue a short-sighted policy of competition for national dominance. Security in space
will be more effectively achieved through a rulebased regime than through the deployment of destabilizing
weapons systems. The rest of the world is not rushing to weaponize space, and instead appears ready to follow
the U.S. lead in devising new rules for its effective management. In the long run, the best way to protect U.S.
commercial, scientific, and security interests in space will be through the stability of the rule of law, rather than
through unilateral assertions of military power. The United States should take the lead in promoting the
transition to a regime of mutual restraint and benefit in space.

42
Space Mil → Preemptive Strikes:
US space militarization encourages preemptive strikes
Nina Tattenwald, Prof. of Int. Studies at Brown University, Summer 2004 (The Yale Journal of International Law,
Law Versus Power on the High Frontier: The Case for a Rule-Based Regime for Outer Space, lexis)

A contest over national superiority in space could extinguish the explicit equal right to use space that all nations
enjoy, creating instead a de facto regime of control over access and use by the first nation to successfully deploy
weapons based in space or weapons on the ground that target satellites. Given the immense value of outer space
and its resources, other nations might develop their own antisatellite weapons designed to break this monopoly.
Countries that lack the capabilities to build such weapons might purchase them. Space-based weapons would
also generate instability due to the incentives for preemptive attack that powerful but vulnerable weapons
systems seem likely to create.

Space weaponization causes preemptive war


Nina Tattenwald, Prof. of Int. Studies at Brown University, Summer 2004 (The Yale Journal of International Law,
Law Versus Power on the High Frontier: The Case for a Rule-Based Regime for Outer Space, lexis)

This vulnerability would be exacerbated in space, where factors of speed, the susceptibility of space activities to
disruptions with consequent effects on earth, and the perceived close link between military activity on Earth and
military activity in space would enhance the risk posed to others. Here it is useful to distinguish between the
physical effects of space weapons and their geostrategic impact. From the perspective of their physical effects, in
most cases, space-based weapons increase present threats rather than replace them with much greater threats.
Space-launched missiles move hardly any faster and reach no farther than submarine-launched missiles. Space-
borne weapons are much more vulnerable than land-based weapons. And inland nations are not really safer from
attack from the oceans than attack from space. However, space-based directed energy weapons, such as lasers,
would move faster and could strike targets on Earth and in the atmosphere with enormous speed. 205 Lasers
would also pose a significant threat to the survivability of space systems. They might make possible a prompt
"sky-sweeping" attack against military satellites without significant tactical warning. In such a case, redundancy
of satellites would be of little value. This would pose a threat of great magnitude to a state dependent on
satellites for essential military functions. More generally, strategic defense systems based in space would pose
significant threats to other space-based systems, and to targets in the atmosphere and on earth as well. In terms
of their geostrategic impact, space-based weapons do not simply enhance existing threats but introduce a new
and greater danger because of the threat they pose to strategic stability. The vulnerability of spacebased weapons
will likely create incentives for preemptive attack to protect the weapons during a crisis, greatly increasing the
likelihood of war. Further, although supporters of space weapons claim that, consistent with the United States'
defensive orientation to the world, such weapons would be for defensive purposes, the reality is that, given their
characteristics, many of them are inherently offensive weapons. It is widely recognized that space- [*400] based
ballistic missile defense systems could carry out surprise attacks against terrestrial targets or satellites.

43
Space Debris Defense:
Space debris is threatening future space operations
Steven A. Mirmina, sr. attorney, July 2005,(The American Society of Intl Law American Jrnl. of Intl Law, p. lexis)

More than one hundred thousand pieces of space junk are floating in orbit around the Earth and endangering
critical operations upon which the world depends every day -- such operations as weather forecasting,
telecommunications, television broadcasting, global navigation, and aviation. As more governments and private
entities become active in space, and if no steps are taken to reverse the growth of the orbital debris population,
the likelihood of collisions between pieces of debris or between debris and active space objects will increase.

Space debris threatens space exploration


Edward R. Finch, Attorney, former Special Ambassador to Panama, an Editor of Journal of Space Law, an elected member of
International Academy of Astronautics and of Board of Governors of National Space Society, Spring 19 99 (“The Future of World Peace
and Outer Space,” ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law, lexis)

Space debris is both natural and man made. The Space Shuttle several times changed course to avoid debris. In
1998 there has been a very large increase of about 912 United States satellites and payloads, for
telecommunications, in low earth orbit. In geostationary orbit with more than 700 catalogued objects we are
down to less than two degrees spacing. That is definitely "crowding," both for essential satellite controls and
communications purposes. The United States Space Surveillance Network tracks 8,500 objects in low earth
orbit. It is well aware of these 1998 United States 912 additions from Iridium of Motorola, from Globalstar of
Loral Space and Communications, and from other Satellites. To these we must add the new satellites of the
European Space Agency nations, the Japanese NASDA, the Chinese satellites, and, of course, the new Indian,
African, and South American satellites. Despite the International Telecommunications Union Agreement and the
World Administrative Radio conferences in 1999, and particularly in the year 2000, the satellite payload
crowding, in both equatorial and polar LEO orbits, becomes serious. The linear geometric progression of
increased space debris from satellites hitting on themselves, physically and communications' wise, has become a
much more serious international problem than envisaged just a few years ago. To all this we add much increased
natural meteor shower activity in 1998 and 1999, which is now confirmed. Thus, there is a space debris national
security problem for all nations that will make news headlines in 1999 and the year 2000.

44
Space Debris Defense – Humanity at risk:
Space advancements puts humanity at risk to space debris
David Tan, Harvard Law School Tutor in Law Trinity College, University of Melbourne, 2k. (The Yale Journal of International Law,
Towards a New Regime for the Protection of Outer Space, lexis)

In recent years, man-made space debris or space refuse has been an environmental hazard whose seriousness is a
shared concern of many scientists and policy-makers in the international community. The deployment of an ever-
increasing number of man-made objects into outer space has created a potential for malfunctioning and decay. It
has also resulted in a concomitant rise in the number of defunct, damaged, or abandoned objects, which, together
with other debris caused by explosions and collisions, has fast become a threat to space activities. It has been
estimated that there are over 7000 trackable man-made objects in space and a substantially larger number of
untrackable objects. Most of the trackable objects are located in lowearth- orbit (LEO) 24 with a significant
number in geosynchronous orbit (GEO) an area of intense space activity. The limited empirical data reveal that
objects of sizes between 0.01 and 1 centimeter can cause significant damage upon impact. Objects larger than 1
centimeter can produce catastrophic effects. Present spacecraft systems are particularly vulnerable as they have
not been designed with these threats in mind. If the growth in numbers is permitted to continue without adequate
measures to safeguard active space objects from damage caused by explosion, collision, or harmful radiation, it
could easily result in serious accidents involving the loss of human lives or substantial property damage.
Collision and interference are the major risks space debris poses to human life and active payloads. Perhaps the
most serious consequence of collisions with space debris is the cascade effect: (1) As the number of space
objects in earth-orbit increases, the probability of collisions between them also increases; (2) collisions would
produce new orbiting fragments (secondary debris), each of which would heighten the risk of further collisions;
(3) collisions and any ensuing cascading would lead to an exponential increase of debris flux and could lead to
the formation of a debris belt around the Earth by the end of this century.

45
AT Space Solves Environmental Harms:
Going to space does not solve—there must be a change in the global ethic to solve environmental
harms
David Tan, Harvard Law School Tutor in Law Trinity College, University of Melbourne, 2k. (The Yale Journal of International Law,
Towards a New Regime for the Protection of Outer Space, lexis)

Current literature has concentrated on the notion of sustainable development as involving the integration of
economic and environmental considerations at all levels of decision-making. But the outer-space environment
has been largely ignored, as if it were simply economic development on Earth that must be environmentally
sound. There is no reason, however, why the precautionary principles that emerge from the concept of
sustainable development in the Stockholm Declaration, the Rio Declaration, and the World Charter for Nature
should not apply equally to the outer-space environment. Few states, if any, will take issue with the proposition
that the exploration and use of outer space should be sustainable. It is in the common interest of all states,
whether spacefaring or otherwise, to subscribe to a regime that allows for the development of space activities in
a manner that leaves the space environment in a substantially unimpaired condition for future generations. One
might even ultimately find that the uniqueness and vulnerability of the outer-space environment demand that the
international community as a whole recognize sustainable development as a "global ethic" that transcends
terrestrial boundaries, as a peremptory norm that prohibits "policies and practices that support current living
standards by depleting the productive base, including natural resources, and that leaves future generations with
poorer prospects and greater risks than our own."

46
Securitization K Links – Climate Change:
Securitization of climate change militarizes environmental approaches – creating a self-fulfilling
prophecy in resource wars
Michael Brzoska ‘8, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg
[“The securitization of climate change and the power of conceptions of security,” Paper prepared for the
International Studies Association Convention 2008, 3/26-29]

It will affect the living conditions of many people. In many cases the change in living conditions will be for the
worse. This may, in turn, lead to violent conflict. The deterioration of the human environment and the resulting
violent conflict may induce large numbers of people to migrate, thus also creating conflicts in areas less
negatively affected by climate change. Beyond local and regional effects, climate change increases the global
risk of violent conflict by adding another element of contention to the competition among major powers . These
dangers associated with climate change are by now quite well rehearsed. But how high is the probability that
they will occur? How likely is it that climate change will lead to more interstate wars, intrastate wars or
terrorism? How much do we know about the links between climate change and violence? Are these dangers
‘real’ in the sense of having a high likelihood of occurring or are they largely fictitious, edge-of-range
possibilities that are used to draw attention to climate change, a level of attention that would not be attainable by
stressing the more likely, but less spectacular economic and social consequences of the problem? The latter
would be understandable but potentially counterproductive. In the literature on securitization it is implied that
when a problem is securitized it is difficult to limit this to an increase in attention and resources devoted to
mitigating the problem (Brock 1997, Waever 1995). Securitization regularly leads to all-round ‘exceptionalism’
in dealing with the issue as well as to a shift in institutional localization towards ‘security experts’ (Bigot 2006),
such as the military and police. Methods and instruments associated with these security organizations – such as
more use of arms, force and violence – will gain in importance in the discourse on ‘what to do ’. A good example
of securitization was the period leading to the Cold War (Guzzini 2004 ). Originally a political conflict over the
organization of societies, in the late 1940s, the East-West confrontation became an existential conflict that was
overwhelmingly addressed with military means, including the potential annihilation of humankind. Efforts
to alleviate the political conflict were, throughout most of the Cold War, secondary to improving military
capabilities. Climate change could meet a similar fate. An essentially political problem concerning the
distribution of the costs of prevention and adaptation and the losses and gains in income arising from change in
the human environment might be perceived as intractable, thus necessitating the build-up of military and police
forces to prevent it from becoming a major security problem. The portrayal of climate change as a security
problem could, in particular, cause the richer countries in the global North, which are less affected by it, to
strengthen measures aimed at protecting them from the spillover of violent conflict from the poorer countries in
the global South that will be most affected by climate change. It could also be used by major powers as a
justification for improving their military preparedness against the other major powers, thus leading to arms races.

47
Securitization K Links – Climate Change:
Securitizing climate change spills over to military spheres
Michael Brzoska ‘8, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg
[“The securitization of climate change and the power of conceptions of security,” Paper prepared for the
International Studies Association Convention 2008, 3/26-29]

All four stress mitigation as the most important policy objective. Limiting global warming is a common theme
running through all of them, and failing to achieve quick reductions in greenhouse gas emissions is seen as
leading directly to danger. However, beyond the call for mitigation, the studies promote differing agendas. The
CNA report emphasizes the importance of mitigation, the need to improve energy efficiency, and calls for the US
to become a more constructive international partner to prevent destabilizing effects of climate change (Sullivan,
2007. p. 7). In addition, it argues that the ‘US should commit to global partnerships that help less developed
nations build the capacity and resilience to better manage climate impacts’ (ibid). Given the origins of the study,
it is not surprising to read that regional commanders of the US armed forces should be part of this effort. These
recommendations are similar to those found in the other studies, but the CNA study goes further. It also
recommends that climate change be made a national security issue by being addressed in the US National
Security Strategy and the US National Defence Strategy. The goal should be to develop ‘appropriate guidance to
military planners to assess risks to current and future missions caused by projected CC’, for instance in the next
Quadrennial Defense Review. These suggestions put climate change squarely into the field of traditional security
and defence policy. The authors of the study are somewhat vague about the actual role of the military in
preventing or reducing the dangers of global warming, so they emphasize preparedness, in particular
preparedness for ‘natural disasters from extreme weather events, pandemic disease control and other related
missions.’ (ibid) The study quotes one of its contributors, Admiral Bowman, who said: ‘[W]e should begin
developing plans to shore up our own defenses against the potentially serious effects of climate , regardless of the
probability of that occurrence, while making more resilient those countries ill-prepared today to deal with that
potential due to disease, poor sanitation, lack of clean water, insufficient electricity, and large coastal
populations. In doing so, these plans must recognize the interdependency of energy and security.’ (Sullivan et al,
2007, p. 41) The Department of Defense should also ‘conduct an assessment of the impact on US military
installations worldwide of rising sea levels, extreme weather events and other projected climate change impacts
over the next 30 to 40 years.’ (Sullivan et al, p. 7)

48
Securitization Mpx - Prolif:
Securitization of space results in prolif
Space Security, 2007. (“Civil Space Programs and Global Utilities,” Space Security,
http://www.spacesecurity.org/BN-CivilSpaceProgramsAndGlobalUtilities.pdf.)

Growing cooperation and collaboration between major and less developed space powers should bring more
stability to the space security context. This collaboration could act as a means for developing countries to benefit from greater
access to space resources and technology. Larger networks of cooperation could also result in greater transparency of space
activities. If transparency does not accompany increased cooperation, however, it could result in proliferation of military
and dual-use capabilities, which could add a great level of uncertainty to space security.

49
Securitization Mpx - Bare Life:
Space weaponization results in bare life of those we target or exclude militaristically
Raymond D. Duvall, & Jonathan Havercroft, University of Minnesota & University of Victoria, March 22-25,
2006. (“Taking Sovereignty Out of This World: Space Weaponization and the Production of Late-Modern Political Subjects,”
International Studies Association. http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/9/8/6/8/pages98680/p98680-
1.php).

Agamben locates this intersection in the Ancient Roman figure of homo sacer, a person with "a capacity to be
killed and yet not sacrificed, outside both human and divine law" (Agamben 1998: 73). The figure of homo
sacer is a schism between one’s political and biological lives. Homo sacer is “bare life,” the biological aspect of
the individual that exists outside the law and hence outside politics and the state. The paradox of homo sacer is
that the sovereign is the one who decides who homo sacer is, and as such the sovereign power that excludes
“bare life” from the realm of the political also constitutes “bare life” as homo sacer. As such, the bio-political
regime that Foucault distinguishes from the sovereign regime of power is actually constituted by the sovereign’s
capacity to exclude “bare life” from the political. Agamben links the figure of homo sacer with the production
social spaces in which individuals are stripped completely of their political life. n this social space of “the
camp,” “bare life” has no human rights at precisely the moment that he or she needs them most. As we shall see,
we believe that through the weaponization of space a new global regime of sovereignty emerges. One of the
constitutive effects of space weapons is their capacity to ban specific individuals from the global rule of law,
thereby constituting the targets of these weapons as “bare life”.

50
Solar Power – Popular:
Senate majority leader Reid is pushing solar power – gaining popularity
Associated Press, 7/23/08, “Senator Reid seeks refuge in solar power,” Erica Werner,
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2008/07/23/senator_reid_seeks_refuge_in_sol
ar_power/.
WASHINGTON - Senate majority leader Harry Reid has found a refuge in the nation's preoccupation with
record energy prices. Senator Harry Reid, the Senate majority leader, also leads the opposition to new coal-
burning power plants planned for Nevada. GOLD MINER'S SON While the push by President Bush and
congressional Republicans for more oil drilling is resonating with voters, the Nevada Democrat is focused on
solar and other renewable energy sources, which happen to be more abundant in his home state than almost
anywhere else in the country. At some political risk for the gold miner's son, Reid also is leading the opposition
to new coal-burning power plants planned for Nevada, where unions and the energy-hungry casino industry
wield far more political clout than environmentalists. He faces reelection in 2010 in a state up for grabs by both
parties. Reid briefly had the most-watched video on YouTube several weeks ago after the Drudge Report linked
to a television clip of him declaring that "coal makes us sick . . . it's ruining our world." A conservative advocacy
group, the American Future Fund, is using the comments in radio ads in Nevada and Washington, D.C., this
week that claim "Reid says 'yes' to higher energy taxes." But Reid sees potential for jobs and economic benefits
if he can advance his goal of transforming Nevada into "the Saudi Arabia of geothermal and solar energy."
"Nevada doesn't have a whole lot of oil or coal or gas. But it has a whole lot of sun and thermal," said Karl
Gawell, executive director of the Geothermal Energy Association. "Senator Reid is an old-fashioned politician -
he watches his constituency. He understands, with geothermal, how big the potential is for the state." Nevadans
now get about 9 percent of their energy from renewable sources, a number that under state law must rise to 20
percent by 2015. Many energy specialists say the potential is far greater. Despite its relatively small size, Nevada
leads the nation in solar and geothermal resources, according to trade groups and government statistics, and also
has potential for wind energy development. Its fossil fuel stockpiles, by contrast, are negligible. More renewable
energy projects are coming online rapidly. As of early this year Nevada had 40 geothermal projects in
development to squeeze energy from hot water and steam drilled from the earth, more than any other state. Reid
contends that growth of the renewable energy industry could provide a bonanza of new jobs for Nevada and
reduce dependence on fossil fuel, much of it imported from out of state. "It's too bad that it takes an energy crisis
like we're having to cause a focus on renewables. It's a situation where we have these gas prices that are sky
high, and it is an opportunity," Reid said in an interview. "Renewables are good for the economy, create lots of
jobs, and are very good for the environment. That's a pretty good combination of things."

51
Space Exploration – Unpopular:
Space exploration is incredibly unpopular
Progressives Tribe, 6/9/08, “The peaceful exploration of space vs. the violence of warfare on Earth,”
http://progressives.tribe.net/thread/4a64f884-8ecb-42cc-ad50-78daae8d6a4a.

I'm of the mind that some people -- people who claim to be progressive and anti-war -- hate the space program
so much that they would prefer 100 years of war in Iraq to the PEACEFUL exploration of the moon and Mars. I, of
course, prefer the peaceful exploration of the moon and Mars to 100 years of war in Iraq. But in today's modern dystopia, I'm definitley in
the minority here since the space program is extemely unpopular. And as you may know, "society" general hates any and all
ideas that are unpopular.

52
Solar Power – Congress supports:
The US Bureau of Land Management has backed solar power
Forbes, 7/8/08. Joshua Zumbrun and William Pentland, “Solar Power,”
http://www.forbes.com/2008/07/07/energy-solar-blm-biz-beltway-cx_jz_wp_0708solar.html.
Last Wednesday, Vermont's Independent Sen. Bernie Sanders was criticizing a "very unfortunate"--and somewhat obscure--month-old
decision from the U.S. Bureau of Land Management in a meeting on Capitol Hill. The bureau (BLM) decided to stop accepting
applications to build solar plants on federal land until a two-year environmental impact study was complete in 2010. Sanders, with a long
history of backing environmental causes, was livid at the decision. But in the middle of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee
meeting, Sanders unexpectedly got word that the BLM reversed its decision. "I congratulate the bureau for making the
change and for understanding the enormous potential of solar energy ," Sanders said. The turnaround was a welcome
development for backers of the technology--and, more important, demonstrates the alternative energy industry's coming of
age in Washington after decades of behind-the-scenes lobbying effort. What happened? "After six weeks of public outcry
and inquiries from Congress, BLM reversed their position," says Katherine Gensler, the manager of regulatory and legislative affairs for
the Solar Energy Industries Association.

53
Solar Power – Reps support:
The Republicans support solar power – they’re sponsoring an Act that invests in it
United Press International, 7/23/08. (“WH pushing Congress on energy bill,”
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2008/07/23/WH_pushing_Congress_on_energy_bill/UPI-70971216838408/.

WASHINGTON, July 23 (UPI) -- The White House Wednesday called on Congress to act on energy legislation,
saying investment in domestic resources is imperative. White House spokeswoman Dana Perino said the
Republican-sponsored American Energy Act will open up access to the Outer Continental Shelf and the Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge, as well as spurring development of oil shale resources. "The president recognizes, as
do Republicans in Congress, that we don't need just one energy source, we need all of them," Perino told the
daily press briefing. "That's why we are making critical investments in things like solar and wind, hydrogen fuel
cell technologies, hybrid plug-in vehicles, as well as cutting-edge clean coal plants and advanced nuclear power
technologies. "Backers of this legislation clearly understand that we need to increase domestic fuel supply with
appropriate safeguards for the environment. We hope Democratic leaders will recognize this critical need, and
stop standing between the American people and the vast energy resources we have at home." Perino said the
president's decision rescinding the executive order banning new offshore drilling sent a strong signal to markets,
but stopped short of saying the action has resulted in the recent downturn in oil and gasoline prices.

54
Solar Power – Congress Inaction Now:
Congress hasn’t been carrying out its solar power plans – a further boost is necessary
Frederick J. Wilson, Former Publisher of the Independent, Updated 7/24/08. “OP ED: congress all talk, no action when it comes to
oil policy,” South County Independent,
http://www.scindependent.com/articles/2008/07/24/opinion/doc48889074241f1378005293.txt.

We need to develop new technologies for energy sooner than later. In the meantime we should drill for oil both
onshore and offshore. We also need to build additional refining capacity to stabilize supplies. France gets more
than 90 percent of its electricity from nuclear power, we get 20 percent. It is safe and environmentally friendly.
We need to build new nuclear facilities. A very strong “green environment” lobby has prevented Congress from
doing anything about energy independence. They want alternative energy sources like wind, solar, wave and
hydroelectric facilities to provide our electricity: all very good ideas. Unfortunately, they don’t begin to meet our
needs because they are not anywhere as efficient as oil, gas or coal in producing energy. We can’t cover the
planet with solar panels or wind farms. We have been without a real energy policy for too long. If we really want
to, we can solve the problem but it involves making hard choices. It is time for Congress to stop talking and start
doing.

55
States CP Shell (1/2):
Text: The state and federal territorial governments should

Observation 1: competition
The counterplan is non-topical and competes through net-benefits.

Observation 2: solvency
States leadership on energy policy is comparatively better than federal action – multiple reasons.

McKinstry, Jr. partner in the Litigation Department, the Environmental Group, Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll,
Robert B.
LLPand CCS President Thomas D. Peterson, 2007, [The Implications of the New “Old” Federalism in Climate-
Change Legislation: How to Function in a Global Marketplace When States Take the Lead, in Pacific
McGeorge Global Business & Development Law Journal. http://www.climatestrategies.us/ewebeditpro/items/O25F17683.pdf [Alex Kats-
Rubin]

Having states taking the lead in crafting GHG emissions reduction strategies through these bottom-up,
stakeholder driven processes has a number of advantages compared to a more centralized federally developed
strategy.41 Some of these benefits arising out of a state lead may not be achievable at the federal level, even
where stake-holder processes are employed there.42 A. Bottom Up Decision Making and Greater Stakeholder
Involvement. One of the principal advantages of having the states take the lead in designing strategies arises
from the fact that bottom up decision making is frequently employed by these state processes and can function
best at a local level. Such processes at these levels allow greater stakeholder involvement in receiving and
transmitting information and in formulating policy. This results in greater buy-in by stakeholders, who become
more aware of the constraints and goals and have greater confidence in the decision making process and the
information used in that process. It can also often improve the quality of the information used in policy
formulation. The stakeholders frequently can provide more detailed, relevant information about what can
actually be achieved.43 This is particularly important for businesses, whose particularized needs and capabilities
may not be adequately considered at the federal level. Indeed, at the federal level, businesses frequently work
through trade organizations that are forced to represent the lowest common denominator of the business and are
less able to represent the needs and capabilities of individual businesses who may get a voice in state level
stakeholder processes. B. More Narrowly Focused Targets and Strategies. A second advantage of state-based
programs is the ability to develop more narrowly drawn targets that are appropriate for the region and the
industries. For example, strategies aimed at smart growth to reduce miles driven are best targeted in growing
areas. Various agricultural and sequestration strategies may vary according to the predominant type of
agriculture or soil and rainfall patterns. C. Flexibility. Third, since states are smaller than the federal
government, they can have somewhat more flexibility. They may be better able to change strategies if a selected
strategy is ineffective or more costly. D. Ability to Innovate with Less Severe Consequences. Fourth, as
suggested by Justice Brandeis, states may be better able to innovate. An innovation in a particular state that fails

56
States CP Shell (2/2):
will have less of an impact on the national economy than a federal experiment that fails. Innovative
state programs can provide examples of what to do or what not to do. Indeed there is a typical
pattern of upward evolution of national policy through states in the United States. As noted earlier,
most national environmental laws, for instance, have origins in state actions, including the Clean Air
Act, Clean Water Act, and Surface Mining Reclamation Act.44 This pattern is again likely to occur
in the area of climate change policy. In 2005 the U.S. Senate debated two major pieces of legislation
to advance a national GHG policy. These included a vote on the McCain-Lieberman Climate
Security Act of 2003 that failed by a short margin,45 and hours later a majority vote in favor of a
resolution46 introduced by Senator Bingaman to establish a mandatory GHG control policy in the
United States.47 The juxtaposition of these two votes suggests that support for mandatory national
action to control GHG emissions is growing, but the Congress as yet has not settled on a specific
approach. States may provide an important input to this debate by demonstrating policies that reduce
emissions in a politically and economically acceptable manner. E. Police Power Not Subject to
Federal Constitutional Limitations. Finally, states are not subject to certain limitations on federal
power. Federal powers to effect social and economic policy are primarily founded upon the
spending clause and the commerce clause. Relying on the spending clause requires that the federal
government spend money and that each state agree to accept that money and implement the
program. Relying on the commerce clause may limit the ability to influence actions that have no
interstate nexus. While efforts to control climate change should, per se, establish the requisite nexus,
states are not subject to these constraints and are free to regulate all manner of actions without the
need to appropriate funds.

57
States CP Solvency - Generic:
State incentives can promote global solar power development
Gamble-Risley, 9-6-2006( Michelle, writer for the Engineering News-Record, “California Extends
Rebate Plan to Municipal Utilities,
<http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do >, NJ)
Boosters of solar-energy generation are anticipating boom times following enactment of a California bill that
expands the 10-year, $2.9-billion California Solar Initiative created in January. The law, known as SB 1, caps a
two-year effort to make the state the national leader in solar energy. SB 1 extends the coverage of the initiative, also
known as the Million Solar Roofs program, and creates $100.8 million in incentives for residential and commercial
establishments to install solar power systems by 2018. The California Public Utilities Commission created the
earlier program, but CPUC's authority extends only to investor-owned utilities. Under SB 1 the program now
covers municipal utilities such as Sacramento Municipal Utilities District and Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power.
The program aims to generate 3,000 MW using solar energy.The bill creates certainty for the future by offering
incentives and making solar energy attractive, says Les Nelson, executive director of the Rio Vista-based California
Solar Energy Industry Association. The new rules increase the net-metering cap for solar photovoltaic (PV)
systems, allowing energy consumers whose systems generate excess power to sell it into the electrical grid.
"This provision allows customers to capture the full value of their solar PV system's electrical generation,"
Nelson says. Industry officials expect California's solar program to influence the PV market elsewhere. "I believe
California will become an aggressive solar market much like Germany and Japan, two countries widely
known as solar energy users,"says George Douglas, spokesman for the National Renewable Energy Laboratory,
Golden, Colo. He also notes that emerging solar technology such as thin-film technology will help drive down prices,
creating more market demand.

58
States CP Solvency – Funding:
The states can fund NASA in everyway to develop space solar satellites-Epscor proves
Maine Space Grant Consortium, 2008,
http://www.msgc.org/programs/research/MaineNASAEPSCoRProgram.php

The goal of NASA EPSCoR (Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research) is to enable Maine
and the other 24 eligible NASA EPSCoR states, with seed funding, to develop an academic research
enterprise directed toward long-term, self-sustaining, nationally-competitive capabilities in aerospace and
aerospace-related research.  This capability will, in turn, contribute to the state's economic viability and
expand the nation's base for aerospace research and development . Statistical Profiles of all states from NSF
Science Resources Studies Division are available. Specific objectives of the Maine NASA EPSCoR program:
-Contribute to and promote the development of research infrastructure in Maine in areas of strategic
importance to the NASA mission; -Improve the capabilities of Maine to gain support from sources outside the
NASA EPSCoR program; -Develop partnerships between NASA research assets, academic institutions, and
industry; -Contribute to the overall research infrastructure, science and technology capabilities, higher
education, and/or economic development of the state; and -Work in close coordination with the NASA Space
Grant program to improve the environment for science, mathematics, engineering, and technology education in the
state. The Maine Space Grant Consortium has oversight responsibility for the NASA EPSCoR Program.  The NASA
Space Grant Director also serves as the State NASA EPSCoR Director. The Maine Space Grant Consortium, through
the NASA Space Grant/EPSCoR Director, is responsible for the overall development and direction of the program,
the activities of the research groups and/or individuals, construction of a timeline and milestones, achievement of
program milestones, goals and objectives, and national dissemination of research results.  NASA EPSCoR funds
are awarded to the Maine Space Grant Consortium, and subrecipient awards are made to participating
institutions.

59
NASA Spin-off Turn:
Turn: NASA spin-offs hurt the economy
Federation of American Scientists, No Date. (“NASA Technological Spinoff Fables,”
http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/jp_950525.htm.)
Many supporters of the space program have placed great stock in the benefits of technological spinoff from the
space effort for the American economy. Proponents estimates of the rate of return from NASA spending range
from $7 in return from every $1 of NASA spending (Lyttle, David, "Is Space Our Destiny?" Astronomy,
February 1991, page 6) to $23 in return for every $1 of NASA spending (Chase Econometric Associates, "The
Economic Impact of NASA R&D Spending," prepared under NASA contract NASW-2741, April 1976).
Popular citation of these figures to bolster support for NASA funding are quite misleading, since they overlook
the methodology by which they were derived. It is popularly claimed that studies have "concluded" that NASA
research produces an "above average" rate of return. The reality is that these studies have "assumed" that NASA
research has an "average" return relative to other types of reasearch. And a General Accounting Office review of
NASA studies of economic benefits concluded that their results were (General Accounting Office, "NASA
Report May Overstate The Economic Benefits Of Research and Development Spending," PAD-78-18, 18
October 1977): "... not crucial to deciding whether more or less money should be spent on NASA R&D, because
similar effects could be obtained by other forms of government spending -- such as defense procurement or
energy R&D. Tax cuts are, of course, a comparable alternative..." Spinoff proponents overlook the fundamental
difference between private profit-seeking R&D and federal expenditures that are labeled R&D. A 20% return on
investment is an equilibrium value for the typical rate of return currently required on commercial investments.
Those R&D investments promising higher rates of return are funded, and those with lower rates of return are not
funded. This is simply saying that an private commercial investor will seek about this rate of return. This is not
to say that any expenditure labeled "R&D" will provide this return. Commercial and government R&D have
little in common beyond the fact that both are performed by scientists and engineers. Federal "R&D"
expenditure levels are determined by a wide range of factors that seldom includes expected rate of return, and
thus there is no basis for assuming that government research investments will realize a rate of return
commensurate with private investments. One could just as easily assume, absent evidence to the contrary, that
NASA R&D has a rate of return of about zero, since otherwise the R&D would be conducted by the private
sector. And there is little homogeneity in what is considered "R&D" by the government. NASA's "R&D" budget
declined in the early 1980s when the Shuttle was declared "operational" by administrative fiat, but this had little
impact on actual Shuttle program technology content. The argument in favor of spinoffs is further flawed by its
failure to distinguish the relative contributions of technology push and market pull in the transfer process. The
implicit assumption of the spinoff advocates is that the primary bottle-neck to technical innovation is the absence
of new technology, rather than the absence of a market. But in general, the range of technologies that are feasible
from an engineering standpoint is much broader than the range of technologies that pass the test of marketing
feasibility. One has only to look at the fates of quadrophonic sound systems, Betamax video cassets, and laser
video-discs to understand that inadequate engineering ingenuity is not the main barrier to commercial success. A
closer examination of the spinoff record would provide little comfort for space advocates. One recent German
analysis of space spinoffs concluded that (Schmoch, Ulrich, et al, "Analysis of Technical Spin-Off Effect of
Space-Related R&D by Means of Patent Indicators," 41st Congress of the International Astronautical Federation,
6-12 October 1990, IAA-90-610.): "The overall conclusion to be drawn from this is that the spin-off rate is very
low in highly specialized space projects -- a conclusion which coincides with the finds of other investigations.
NASA Spin-off Turn:
60
The concept of a decisive spin-off in the narrow, real sense of the term cannot therefore be validated on the result
of these findings... many standard examples of spin-offs may be traced back to the first R&D boom in the
Sixties... only in the rarest of cases do the spin-offs prove to be identifiable as classic cases in which the source
can be associated exclusively with space technology and the diffusion be associated with a sector unrelated to
space technology. In the majority of cases, both source and diffusion can be associated with multiple purposes
both within and outside space technology." The most comprehensive recent review of the impact of NASA
technology benefits to the commercial sector was conducted for NASA by the Chapman Research Group in 1989
(Chapman Research Group, An Exploration of Benefits From NASA "Spinoff", June 1989, under contract 88-01
with NERAC, Inc.). This study evaluated the benefits derived from technologies identified in the annual NASA
report Spinoff during the period from 1978 through 1986. Unlike the previous econometric studies which
simply assumed that the activities NASA labels "research" have the same payoff as commercial research, this
study actually sought to quantify the econcomic side-benefits of NASA activities. A total of over $21 billion in
sales and savings benefits were identified as resulting from NASA activities. However, the report conceded that
only about $5 billion of this total was due to actual spinoff, that is "instances in which a product, process, or
even an entire company would not have come into existence had it not been for the NASA furnished
technology." Most notable among these is the $1.6 billion in medical instruments, frequently cited as a major
NASA spinoff. The remaining $16 billion in benefits were in areas where "the NASA technology contributed to
the sales, but that contribution can vary widely, from a relatively small percentage of the total sales or savings..."
And in this area, additional sales of commercial aircraft accounted for over $10 billion. The significance of
these findings is best appreciated in the context of overall NASA spending during this period. The total NASA
budget from 1978 through 1986 amounted to over $54 billion, of which about $2.5 billion was devoted to
aeronautical research and development. NASA efforts in aeronautical research would seem to have been quite
effective, with a $2.5 billion investment yielding $10 billion in benefits. Such a 4-to-1 payoff is not too
surprising, given that work in this area is specifically targeted to improving commercial products. But the fact
that the total NASA investment of $55 billion yielded a paltry $5 billion in true spinoffs, creating entirely new
products or industries, suggests a very poor return of ten cents on the dollar. Again, this should not be surprising,
given the highly specialized nature of much of the engineering and development work conducted by NASA. So
rather than being an unusually good investment paying 7:1 or 22:1 for each dollar invested, NASA has an
astoundingly bad 1:10 payoff -- about a factor of 100 worse than the commercial economy as a whole.

61

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