c
 
  



p
Although Maharashtra is one of India¶s most developed states, a large part of its population suffers
severe and chronic water scarcity. The problem is not generally experienced or even realised in upper
middle class enclaves of cities like Mumbai and Pune. However, as you move away from these
privileged areas, women walking or standing in queue to collect water is a familiar sight across the state.p

In nearly 70% of the state¶s villages (around 27,600 villages), water is either not available within 500
metres or is not available 15 metres below the ground. Or it is not potable (World Bank, î


 


  , Volume 1, 2003, henceforth  ). p

Around a fourth of the state¶s rural households do not have secure access to drinking water (NSSO
1999), and nearly half the rural households in the state do not get drinking water (



  ). p

Household surveys for World Bank projects indicate that average time spent in collecting water by rural
households in Maharashtra is two hours a day; using µopportunity cost¶ principles that translates to Rs 12
per household per day. During summer, the time and cost increases as sources dry up. Every year the
state government spends around Rs 100 crore on supplying water on an emergency basis to severely
water-starved villages. p

The water problem causes enormous daily hardship to women and, coupled with poor sanitation
facilities, leads to three kinds of health problems: µwater wash¶ ailments like conjunctivitis, caused by
contact with poor quality water; diseases like dengue caused by water stagnation; and waterborne
diseases like diarrhoea, which is the leading cause of infant deaths. p

While India¶s Millennium Development Goal Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) target is 28 per 1,000 by the
year 2015, in many districts of Maharashtra such as Nashik, Jalna, Yavatmal, Buldhana, Chandrapur
and Gadchiroli, the IMR is above 75 per 1,000. p

Shortage of water directly impacts livelihoods. Although Maharashtra is among India¶s most urbanised
states, around 60% of its population still lives in rural areas. Even this figure is misleading, for
urbanisation is heavily skewed towards the Mumbai region. In western Maharashtra and Vidarbha,
around three-fourths of the population lives in rural areas; in Marathwada, 85% of the population is rural. p

Hence, agriculture remains the main source of livelihood in the state. While it accounts for roughly 55%
of overall employment in the state, in rural areas, 80% of the population is dependent on agriculture,
either as cultivators (42%) or labourers (38%). p

There can be no agriculture without water, and adequate access to this resource has been crippled by
various factors in Maharashtra. p







p

Rainfall in Maharashtra is uneven. While the Sahyadris (Western Ghats) and Konkan receive heavy
rainfall (around 2,000 mm), most of this water,  


 
 
, flows into the Arabian Sea; only 5% of it is used. To the east of the Sahyadris, the rainfall
drops drastically to 600 or even 500 mm; it then increases as one moves towards Vidarbha, where
rainfall of around 1,400 mm is reported. p

Due to this uneven rainfall pattern and geological conditions, the First Irrigation Commission of
Maharashtra, constituted in 1962, estimated that only 30% of the state¶s total cultivable area can be
brought under surface and groundwater irrigation. p
Xntil recent years, successive governments have been lethargic in working towards realising even this
potential. The percentage of gross irrigated area to gross cropped area in Maharashtra in 2002-03 was
only 16.4, substantially lower than the all-India ratio of 38.7. The percentage was about the same a
decade earlier.p

î 


p

The Maharashtra Water and Irrigation Commission constituted by the Government of Maharashtra
(GoM) in 1995 estimated that out of the state¶s total cultivable land area of 22.54 million hectares, 8.5
million hectares can be brought under surface irrigation. p

However, at an aggregate investment of Rs 269 trillion since 1950, at current prices ( ), the
area brought under surface irrigation in Maharashtra is only 3.86 million hectares. Even this
achievement is an exaggeration. Only 1.23 million hectares, or around a third of the potential created, is
actually irrigated by canals; another 0.44 million hectares was irrigated by wells in command areas of
irrigation projects. p

Among other reasons, the GoM¶s 

  
! 
î
"   #$
lists the following as causes for poor realisation of surface irrigation potential:p

d ³Taking more percentage of crops that require more water like paddy and sugarcane.´
d Thin and scattered irrigation resulting in low efficiency.
d Reduction in storage capacity due to silting.
d Poor maintenance of infrastructure due to financial constraints.
d Non-participation of beneficiaries.

In recent years, investments in major and medium irrigation structures (excluding market borrowing by
corporations like the Maharashtra Krishna Development Corporation) account, on average, for about
28% of the state government¶s annual capital expenditure. However, the investment does not and will
not translate into a proportionate increase in area covered by surface irrigation. There are three main
reasons for this. p

Firstly, its record of executing irrigation works on time is poor. The GoM¶s financial position is poor; the
situation demands close monitoring of ongoing works rather than heavy new investments. However, for
political reasons, the emphasis is on inaugurating new projects rather than completing ongoing ones. As
a result, funds are thinly spread and delays are inevitable. p

The 2001-02 Comptroller and Auditor General of India ( CAG) civil audit report for Maharashtra noted
that, as of March 31, 2002, there were 117 incomplete irrigation projects in the state, in which around Rs
3,250 crore was blocked. Of these projects, six had remained incomplete for five to 10 years, two
projects had remained incomplete for 15 to 20 years, and two projects had remained incomplete for over
20 years! The total amount blocked in projects delayed by over five years was around Rs 140 crore. In
the case of 15 projects, involving around Rs 190 crore, details were not even made available. p

CAG civil audit reports listed several bizarre states of incompletion, such as dams without canals, canals
without dams, and dams incomplete even after actual expenditure incurred was 10 times the estimated
expenditure. The worst part was that in 14 major, 24 medium, and 67 minor irrigation projects work had
been %
%after an expenditure of around Rs 27 billion, simply because the projects had become
unviable due to cost escalation -- the only people to gain from this criminal waste of public money were
the contractors. p

Secondly, irrigation projects are not often designed to extract maximum irrigation returns. Apart from
sheer incompetence at the planning stage, lobbying can play a big negative role. A classic example is
the Jayakwadi project in Phaltan, which is often considered the pride of Maharashtra. There is no village
by that name near the dam. The project gets its name because it was originally supposed to be located
at a village called Jaykuchiwadi in Majalgaon taluka of Beed. The location to which it has been shifted is
remarkably unsuitable for a dam -- the terrain is flat. As a result, the dam spans an extraordinary
distance of over 10 km; its height above the ground is just 40 feet. The length of the Majalgaon right
bank canal had to be reduced from the originally estimated 148 km to 84 km. Accordingly, the potential
area to be brought under irrigation was reduced by half. p

Thirdly, irrigation projects are meeting rising demand for water from residential and industrial sectors. In
most of the major and medium irrigation projects, water reserved for domestic and industrial use varies
from between 15% and 25%. In years of poor rainfall, this goes up to 50%. In 2003-04, out of the total
water made available from irrigation projects, 31% was used for non-irrigation purposes -- to meet
drinking water demand in cities and the needs of industries. p

Significantly, while agriculture is directly related to life and livelihood of the majority of the state¶s
population, allocation of water resources to agriculture is accorded third priority in the GoM¶s
Maharashtra State Water Policy (2003), below the allocation for industrial and commercial use. This
prioritisation calls into question the sense of using the term µirrigation¶ in connection with these projects.
It also reflects the government¶s interest in strengthening the agriculture sector & the industrial
sector. p

^ 
 
p

As in the rest of the country, groundwater is the main source of water for irrigation in Maharashtra. While
surface water from canals and tanks accounts for around 21% and 14% respectively of the state¶s net
irrigated area, groundwater primarily drawn from borewells using pumps accounts for around 60% of the
net irrigated area. p

The Groundwater Survey and Development Agency (GSDA) of the GoM has identified 2,841 watershed
units in the state (GSDA had earlier arrived at a figure of 1,505 watersheds. This figure, which continues
to be routinely quoted, was revised following new methodology recommended by the Groundwater
Estimation Committee constituted by the Government of India in 1997. The new method involves
delineation of sub-units based on irrigated and non-irrigated areas). p

Of these 2,841 units, in 1997, 132 watershed units were declared µoverexploited¶ -- extraction exceeded
recharge; 275 were in a µcritical¶ state, and another 64 were in a µsemi-critical¶ state. These numbers
probably do not reflect the true picture. As banks are not allowed to advance loans for borewells in
µoverexploited¶ watersheds, there are strong political compulsions 
to declare an area µoverexploited¶.
In any case, the GSDA estimate presents a macro-level picture. The micro or village-level picture (see µ
Rampant overuse of groundwater in drought-prone parts of Maharashtra¶) shows rampant
overexploitation of groundwater. p

Groundwater extraction and lifting of surface water from tanks is encouraged by subsidies for electricity
used to run irrigation pump sets (IPS). Obviously, these subsidies can be enjoyed only by relatively well-
to-do farmers, who can afford to buy IPS and pipes in the first place. p

Of the total number of farmers in the state, only 13% have IPS, and the main beneficiaries of both
groundwater resources as well as electricity subsidies are 3% of the total number of farmers in the state
who have IPS and grow cash crops like sugarcane and banana. Medium and large farmers with large
holdings above two hectares buy several pump sets and account for nearly 80% of the area under
groundwater irrigation. p

Groundwater extraction by this creamy layer of farmers has multiplied indiscriminately, with little or
absolutely no concern for drinking and agriculture water needs of other people living in the same village
or the needs of the state as a whole. The number of IPS in the state increased by nearly 30% in less
than a decade -- from 1.6 million in 1990-91 to 2.2 million in 1998-99. While consumption of electricity by
all sectors in the state grew in the 1990s by around 7% per annum, IPS consumption increased by over
13% per annum.p

The subsidised consumption cost the Maharashtra State Electricity Board (MSEB) over Rs 1,000 crore
in 1993-94 -- equivalent to the capital cost of about half the power-generation capacity addition required
in that year. According to latest GoM figures, the number of IPS is estimated at 2.4 million; they account
for 25% to 30% of the state¶s total power consumption and cost the exchequer Rs 1,600 crore in
subsidies. p

Maharashtra was among the first states in the country to introduce legislation to check groundwater
exploitation, but the law is violated with impunity and has done little good. Generally, cash crop-growing
IPS users suffer only one check: power cuts. IPS are not put off; whenever there is power they are
working, pumping out water for an average of seven to eight hours a day, irrespective of the crop¶s
actual water needs. p

Xnchecked by law and enjoying social sanction, groundwater extraction has crossed the danger mark in
many districts of the state and caused enormous hardship to the poor. Many drinking water wells, most
of which are 90 to 150 feet deep, have dried up. Due to increasing µcompetition¶ for groundwater, the
watertable has dropped by over 300 feet in many villages, especially in the sugarcane-growing areas of
Sangli, Satara, Nashik, Latur, Beed, Osmanabad and Solapur districts (  
 '

%'
î
" !!(
'
% for the World Bank, 2003).p

Over-extraction of groundwater has several grave implications: p

d The poor are hit first and hardest. While large farmers are able to dig new wells or deepen
existing wells, small and marginal farmers suffer poor quality water and falling well yields.
d Groundwater sources can become polluted by pesticides, fertilisers and industrial waste. The
toxins damage the health of people who use groundwater as drinking water and can also be
taken up by crops, which will contaminate food supplies. High concentrations of nitrate in
groundwater, a result of excessive use of chemical fertiliser, is already reported in Sangli,
Solapur, Satara, Nagpur, Yavatmal, Bhandara, Beed, Osmanabad, Thane and Parbhani
districts.
d Xnderground layers of rock or soil that transmit water, known as aquifers, naturally discharge
into rivers and other waterbodies during dry periods, thereby sustaining natural vegetation.
Over-extraction empties aquifers and causes springs to dry up. In arid and semi-arid regions,
such as drought-prone areas of Maharashtra, these springs feed wild vegetation, serve as
drinking water sources in extreme dry periods, and are a stopping point for birds. Empty aquifers
will lead to a collapse of the ecosystem. The land will become a desert, unable to sustain any
significant amount of human, plant or animal life.

If overexploitation of groundwater resources continues unchecked, the future is clear: p

d Groundwater-based agriculture will collapse.

d Water quality will drop.
d Many villages will be depopulated.

Importantly, these impacts -- which are already being felt, in varying degrees -- will be the result of
pandering to the needs of a minority of farmers. A World Bank report,   )


 
* 
%%
î
 +,
!+ (2002), presents an accurate picture of the
state¶s skewed irrigation policies:p
µOver 75% of the irrigation (from sources including canals and electricity-operated bore- and tubewells)
benefits accrue to farmers with average farm holdings of more than two hectares. On the other hand,
less than 10% of the irrigation benefits accrue to farmers whose average farm size is less than one
hectare.¶p

’
 
p

Due to inherent geographical factors, aggravated by skewed irrigation policies, about 84% of the total
cultivated area in Maharashtra is directly and entirely dependent on the monsoons. The odds are heavily
stacked against many of these farmers. Around a third of the state receives scanty and erratic rainfall
and hence is drought-prone. p

Three GoM committees have, at different times, estimated the number of drought-prone talukas (tehsils)
in the state and arrived at different figures, using different criteria like quantum of rainfall, soil moisture
content, and gap between two consecutive rains. p

Most recently, in July 2007, in the process of constituting a µdushkal mahamandal¶, or µdrought
corporation¶, the GoM listed 166 of the state¶s 355 talukas as µdrought-prone¶ and hence eligible for
whatever assistance the mahamandal might offer. p

The list includes all 13 talukas of Ahmednagar, all 11 talukas of Solapur, and 13 of the 14 talukas in
Nashik. There are no talukas from Bhandara and Gondia in Vidarbha and Thane, Raigad, Ratnagiri and
Sindhudurg from Konkan in the list. Much political heat was generated by the listing. The GoM had
earlier proposed a list of only 90 talukas. After discussions during the 2006-07 budget session of the
state assembly, the list was expanded. Ironically, the debate over the listing preceded the constitution of
the mahamandal; till September 2007, there was no announcement about what the mahamandal would
or wouldn¶t do. p

The political controversy overshadows a basic fact: a contiguous region, covering parts of western
Maharashtra, much of Marathwada, and parts of Vidarbha, and extending to southern Madhya Pradesh
and Gujarat and northern Karnataka, is prone to drought. (  +


  


 %    . GoM figures for scarcity-affected villages over a 20-year
period (between 1960 and 1982) show that the number of villages affected in a year varies from around
600 to over 14,000, out of a total of around 40,000 villages. In the historic 1972-73 drought, nearly
30,000 villages were affected. p

Further, severe drought is experienced over large parts of the state every three to four years. Most
recently, drought affected 11 districts of the state from 2000 onwards; in 2003-04, 71 talukas were
declared to be affected by µsevere drought¶ (see box). p

Ñ
  

  
c
 
 


p ’  p 
Solapurp Barshi, Karmala, Madha, Malshiras,Mangalv
Mohol, Pandharpur, Xttar Solapur,
Sangola, Dakshin Solapur, Akkalkotp
Sanglip Jat, Kavatemahankal, Tasgaon, Miraj,
Khanapur,Atpadi, Kadegaonp
Punep Baramati, Daund, Indapur, Purandar, Shirurp
Satarap Maan, Khatav, Khandala, Phaltan, Koregaon
 Ahmednagarp Sangamner, Kopargaon, Shrirampur, Akola,P
Parner, Shrigonda, Ahmednagar,Rahata, p
Jamkhed, Shevgaon, Rahuri, Nevasa,Karjatp
Nashikp Yevala, Sinner, Nandgaon, Chandvad, Devla
Beedp Parli, Kaij, Ashti, Patoda, Beed, Shirur, Wadv
Osmanabadp Osmanabad, Tuljapur, Xmarga, Lohara, Source: GoM, Revenue and
Kalamb,Vashi, Bhum, Parandap Forests Department, %
Aurangabadp Vaijapur, Gangapurp 
%



 
!%

Laturp Latur, Renapur, Ausa, Nilangap 

%

Jalnap Ambad, Ghansawangip    (2003-04) p

As ascertained and reported by the GoM, drought had the following impacts: p

d In 6,742 villages, the  (estimation of crop output) was less than 50% of the normal
amount. Most of the villages were in Ahmednagar, Solapur, Osmanabad and Beed.
d The kharif crop was estimated to be 50% of normal yields.
d There was an overall drop in the state¶s per hectare productivity of all major crop categories.
Thus, while foodgrain productivity was expected to be 1,058 kg per hectare in 2002-03, it was
actually 797 kg/ha.
d Households above the poverty line were also affected, even people from relatively affluent
families were working in Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS) relief works. In November
2003, 3.50 lakh people chose to work under the EGS in the 11 affected districts. While the GoM
spends Rs 650 to Rs 700 crore on the EGS in a µnormal year¶, it expected to spend Rs 1,600
crore in 2003-04, till June 2004.
d While the government deployed 238 tankers across the state in November 2002, to supply
drinking water, in November 2003 it deployed 1,616 tankers.
d Till November 2003, the government had opened 400 cattle camps in drought-affected districts
to feed 3.8 lakh animals.

The GoM added that the measures it had taken did not ³reveal the endemic vulnerability, which has
been part of the landscape´. The situation on the ground was ³far too grim to be captured by the
statistics´. p

å


p

It was in response to this grim situation, which has not yet been addressed by a long-term drought
mitigation policy, that a network of civil society organisations working in Maharashtra formed a drought
forum called Dushkal Hatavu Manus Jagavu (DHMJ) (to read more about the DHMJ click here). p

While the forum¶s immediate priorities were ascertaining the multi-faced impacts of drought, and
mobilising government relief, it also has the long-term vision of eradicating drought. This is not an
impossible dream. While what is known as meteorological drought, characterised by low rainfall, is an
unalterable reality, there is great scope for minimising the  of meteorological drought. p

Further, if rural poverty in Maharashtra is to be addressed, equitable and rational use of water and
appropriate agriculture practices have to become the main item on the agenda of state policy. p

The policy will have to include several innovative and bold measures, which can be implemented only
with true people¶s involvement. Civil society organisations (CSOs) and networks like the DHMJ can
provide the necessary bridge between people and the government.p
p