Explain the role of the German army in the development of the German aircraft industry between 1908 and

1918. Did the army support or hinder the technological development and the production of aircraft?

Historical background: The first German aircraft firms were founded in 1908. The firms, which were
small in scale, experimented with various designs. In the course of the First World War the airplane became
an indispensable weapon of warfare. By the end of the war, most of the European powers had recognized
the military potential of airplanes.

DOCUMENT 1
Excerpt taken from the German army publication, Annual Report on Aviation, September 1908
The German army presently believes that its own work in the field of aviation technology is not yet
absolutely necessary, since no type of flying machine has yet demonstrated its suit-ability for military
purposes. The solution to the problem should therefore be left to private firms with whom the army should
maintain constant contact.

Negative- army does not want to work in the field of aviation and instead wants to leave it to private
companies.

DOCUMENT 2
Taken from a memorandum issued by the German Army Transportation Research Unit, March 15, 1910
The development of the airplane has been the fastest of any modern technical creation. A special military
aviation organization is necessary to make the airplane useful for military purposes. Otherwise the creation of
exceptional aircraft with high performance under good conditions will occur, but not the creation of aircraft
that will be usable and safe in the field under difficult conditions.

Wants the aircraft, and needs creation of a special military branch to insure it is “useful for military purposes”

DOCUMENT 3
Taken from a memorandum of the chief of the German general staff to the War Ministry, November 8, 1911
I am pleased that the newly created military aviation commission provides for prizes, subsidies, and contests
to promote the further development of our domestic aircraft industry. In light of the anticipated heavy loss of
aircraft in the field, the presence of an industry capable of delivering sufficient and usable replacements in
time of war is a vital matter.... I also request that the military aviation research unit be as well equipped as
possible, so that it can test all aircraft improvements that appear to be militarily worthwhile.

In favor of the aircraft project but it needs total support

DOCUMENT 4
Figures taken from Statisticson Aircraft Manufacture, 1914-1918, German Archives, Freiburg, 1919
 DOCUMENT 5
Letter from the War Ministry to the German Aircraft Manufacturers' Trade Association, May 6, 1912,
published in the German Aviators' Journal, May 19, 1912
It must be concluded that the army will be almost the sole customer for aircraft in the immediate future.
Therefore, in the opinion of the army, it seems in the interest of the national aircraft industry that any new
factories be large-scale, well-capitalized, and build only types of aircraft that are assured of success. The
army recommends that the Aircraft Manufacturers' Trade Association impress these conditions upon its
members.

+ Build big factories to make warplanes

_ Focus only on making warplanes

DOCUMENT 6
Recommendations of the Military Aviation Crash Commission accepted and enacted by the German army,
October 1913
In order to prevent further accidents like Lieutenant Eckenbrecher's recent crash, the aviation commission
proposes that the army proceed in the following manner in the future:

*Subject all army aircraft types to practical weight tests to ascertain their strength.
*Establish and publish requirements (standards) for materials used in aircraft construction.
*Continue to award monetary prizes for instruments that measure the stresses on aircraft in flight.

In stating the above points, the commission believes that the army flight safety codes will still allow the
factories sufficient freedom to innovate; thus the army will not be saddled with responsibility for the
performance of the manufacturerst aircraft.
Pushing for greater requirements and durability standards – award engineering prizes – fund factory
innovation.

DOCUMENT 7
Letter from Director W. Froebus of the LFG Aircraft Company to August Euler, aircraft manufacturer,
December 2, 1914
The army recently set new performance requirements for airplanes. Aircraft firms however are pointing out
that they cannot meet these demands overnight and that several months will be necessary for construction and
testing. Furthermore the firms have already prepared the materials for a planned large series of aircraft
machines. These materials must first be used up before the firms can consider starting a new type of aircraft.

DOCUMENT 8
Memorandum issued by the chief of field aviation of the German army, June 5, 1915
Military aviation must presently rely upon a few factories whose capabilities are totally inadequate to meet
the great demands of the near future. Thus the firms avoid costly experiments. Progress is retarded, and
achievement stands still. Without fail, we must induce our large industrial enterprises to undertake aircraft
construction, either by building new plants or by buying the most proven small factories and transforming
them into large plants.

DOCUMENT 9
Anthony Fokker, quoted in Flying Dutchman: The Life of Anthon y Fokker, 1931
In late 1915 I was asked by the army to cooperate with Hugo Junkers, father of the thick wing and all-metal
airplane, in developing an all-metal single-seater monoplane. Professor Junkers is one of the pioneers in
airplane construction. His theories have frequently been in advance of his time, but he has trouble modifying
them for immediate practical purposes. For example, I persuaded him to construct many parts of his planes of
steel tubing, and urged him to permit the rudder, elevator, and ailerons [movable parts of an airplane wing] to
be fabric-covered to facilitate manufacture. Yet Junkers refused to give up his all-metal construction for the
sake of wartime necessity.

Supports development but warplanes require compromises that engieneers resisted

DOCUMENT 10
Anthony Fokker, quoted in Flying Dutchman: The Life of Anthony Fokker, 1931
In the fall of 1916, I concentrated on designing an altogether new and advanced pursuit plane. Soon I had
developed a biplane of radical appearance, with cantilever wing construction which required no external
bracings. It had both speed and climb, and went through all combat maneuvers like greased lightning. I
telephoned a request to army officials in Berlin to come at once. Staring coldly at my biplane, they walked
around it as if it would bite. Someone wondered idiotically what was going to keep the wings on. They
wanted something visible supporting the wings. This was the sort of thing to which they were accustomed.
Desperately I flew the plane as it had never been flown before. They seemed a little disappointed that the
wings hadn't fallen off in the air to confrm their views. Even the so-called scientific members of the group
could not bring themselves to recommend it for military use. After an entire day of futile argument, I was
forced to admit that the ship was simply too far in advance of its time.

Negative – military officials did not accept new aviator technology because they were fearful of innovation.

DOCUMENT 11
From a position paper prepared by the German Aircraft Manufacturers' Trade Association in defense of
patent protection during wartime, May 30, 1916
With regard to aviation technology and research, more was achieved before the war for the war than has
been achieved during the war for the war. Those changes that the war has brought about are limited more to
specialized technical matters, such as bombing, photography, radiotelegraphy, instrumentation, and
accessories. The enlargement and development of the aircraft industry caused by the war contracts is almost
completely a matter of expanded production.
Negative – technological breatkthroughs have been limited because of lack of patent laws.

DOCUMENT 12
From a memorandum on German and Allied aviation from the records of the United States Army Air Force,
September 20, 1918
The German army has controlled its aircraft manufacturers by a central technical organization which has
given the general contractors technical instructions to follow. These directions have permitted a reduction in
the number of types of military aircraft being produced. The results of this method are perhaps a slower
improvement than ours in machines, but a steadier and more equal advance by the different
manufacturers. Builders have been brought in contact one with the other, and they cannot keep their
discoveries or the result of their studies to themselves. In other words, the Germans have brought about a
far greater standardization in construction than have the Allies. Standardization has simplified and
cheapened production.

DOCUMENT 13
Richard Blunck, Hugo Junkers: A Life for technology and Air Travel, 1951
It was often asserted that Hugo Junkerst firm had made huge profits during the war. One can only reply that
it was not a matter of profits as huge as other armament firms, but that Junkers ploughed his profits
completely into new research work. Junkers maintained the essence of his enterprises-research. Research
tasks dominated, enabling his firm to recover quickly after the apparently hopeless collapse of aircraft
factories at the end of the war.

Factories collapsed after the war…