Travis Oldham

Dr. Russell Wahl

Philosophy 430

29th May, 2008

The Anti-Reductionist Argument

Science strives to provide at least two things: quality explanations and accuracy in predictive

statements. As long as scientists wish to improve or are unsatisfied with current explanations of the

phenomenal world and/or current predictive accuracy, scientists will continue to search and create new

explanations and predictive statements that will hopefully meet their standards. One technique that

scientists attempt in their search for better theories is reduction. As Ernest Nagel states, the term

reduction has no standard definition in science (907). For the time being I will use the term reduction

with two things in mind, the first being what Harold Kincaid has said, "one core notion behind

'reducibility' has always been that one theory can be shown to do all the work of another" (576). The

second in mind will be again what Nagel calls an inhomogenous reduction, a reduction in which bridge

laws are required to connect the statements in the reduced theory to the reducing theory, in such a way

that through the bridge principles the reduced theory can be derived from the reducing theory (910).

Harold Kincaid also uses terms such as "higher-level theories" and "lower-level theories." In Kincaid's

theory, the higher-level theory is the theory attempting to be reduced, and the lower-level theories are

the potentially reducing theories (576). Henceforth I will be using this terminology in discussion about

the different theories in biological sciences.

The purpose behind attempting reduction in science is to find better explanation and better

prediction in theories. In fact, history has shown that reduction has served science in just this way, as

Newton's reduction of Kepler's theories or Lavoisier's reduction of phlogiston theory to what would

become modern chemistry will demonstrate. However it would be incorrect to say that reduction is the

best problem-solving mechanism for finding better explanations and predictions. In fact, attempting to
reduce a higher-level theory to a lower-level one in at least the case of classical genetics has shown to

be, according to Kitcher and Kincaid, impossible, due to a number of false assumptions that

reductionists make, and also due to problems that arise during the attempt. After reviewing Kitcher and

Kincaid's reasoning, I will attempt to apply that reasoning to the case of ecology, and attempt to

demonstrate that ecology cannot be reduced to biology for the same reasons that classical genetics

cannot be reduced to molecular biology.

In attempting to perform reduction from classical genetics to molecular biology, Harold

Kincaid outlines three problems that arise that prevent reduction from being successful. These

problems are the problems of multiple realizations, the problem of context-sensitivity, and the problem

of presupposing higher-level explanations (576). These problems arise due to what Kitcher calls false

assumptions made by reductionists. These assumptions are labeled as R1, R2, and R3, and are as

follows: R1 is the assumption that classical genetics has general laws stated that can serve as

conclusions in a reductive derivation; R2 claims that the two vocabularies of classical genetics and

molecular biology can be tied together with bridge principles; R3 is the assumption that from molecular

biology, general principles about gene transmission can be derived and will explain why the "laws" of

gene transmission stand (973).

Kitcher argues that there is no general law in classical genetics to speak of. The statement in

classical genetics that comes closest to a law is Mendel's "laws" about gene transmission between

generations. However, he later states that, "Cytology not only teaches us that the second law is false; it

also tells us how to tackle the problem at which the second law was directed (the problem of

determining frequencies for pairs of genes in gametes)" (975). According to Kitcher then, Mendel's

Laws, even if amended, falls short of satisfying R1 (if I'm not mistaken, he's saying that rather than

being an actual law, Mendel's second law, when revised, becomes a statement about results obtainable

using a certain technique) (975). Another point of interest is that Kitcher thinks the law is irrelevant to

understanding gene transmission, that gene transmission can be studied by "analyzing the cases that
interest us from a cytological perspective, " (974). As I understand him, then, gene inheritance does not

need to be studied at a lower, molecular biological level, since it can be understood at the higher,

cytological level. He later discusses a proposal called explanatory extension, an additional set of

information that molecular biology might provide for classical genetics and the cytological story, but

that it cannot do this on its own, and that as an auxiliary theory the "laws" of gene transmission cannot

be derived from it (990).

The first assumption made by reductionists, according to Kitcher, is false. I can make no

statement for or against Kitcher, since I have no extensive knowledge of biology. What can be argued is

what the definition of a law is, and whether or not Mendel's Laws actually do qualify as one.. This,

however, is a problem of another sort, one which I will not attempt to tackle here. I will for now define

a law as a universal statement that is used in conjunction with facts about the phenomenal world to

make predictions and or explanations. For further readings on laws and what they are, I will refer any

reader to a work done by A. J. Ayer, "What Is a Law of Nature", and a work done by Fred I. Dretske,

"Laws of Nature."

The second supposed assumption that reductionists make, the assumption that the two

vocabularies of classical genetics and molecular biology can be connected via bridge principles, is

shown by Kitcher to be false on the grounds that Molecular biologists provide no statement of the

form: (*)(x)(x is a gene <---> Mx), where "x is a gene" is the statement in classical genetics, and Mx is

a statement using the vocabulary of molecular biology about x (975). The reason, he says, that

molecular biologists cannot provide this statement is because, even though molecular biologists can say

that genes are segments of DNA (or RNA, for some organisms, henceforth ignored), in molecular

biology there are what Kincaid calls multiple realizations of what classical genetics calls a gene

(Kitcher 977 & Kincaid 576). In other words, molecular biology cannot create a statement saying what

the properties of a gene are since a classical gene takes on an indefinite number of forms on the

molecular level. While theoretically there are a finite number of genes that could be identified,
molecular biologists can't make a statement about what a gene is that will include counter-factuals as

well, which prevents reduction since laws support hypothetical situations in which there are an

indefinite number of genes that could have existed.

Kitcher says that molecular biology can make no bridge law between classical genetics other

than that genes are composed of DNA, which is according to Kitcher a weak statement. However, C.

Kenneth Waters gives a more accurate account of what molecular biologists call a gene, that is, a

sequence of DNA "for a linear sequence in a product at some stage of genetic expression." In this

sense, a molecular gene is more than just a composition of DNA, it is recognized by its function, which

is to code for other sequences in gene expression. A gene at the molecular level can also be recognized

structurally as a sequence of DNA that resides in between start and stop codons, which are segments of

DNA that tell polymerase enzymes when to begin splicing and copying DNA and when to stop. These

codons can be recognized also by their molecular structure. Therefore, molecular biologists have done

exactly what Kitcher has said they have not, which is provide a statement of the form (*)(x)(x is a gene

<---> Mx), which also supports counter-factuals.

It can also be said that phenotypes are a result of gene expression, since phenotypes, such as eye

color in Drosophila are composed of the products of DNA expression, polypeptides. Does this count as

reduction? From the molecular concept of the gene, and the molecular story of gene expression, can

one derive and explain gene transmission?

The answer, I believe, is no. Even though Molecular biologists have succeeded in providing a

refined definition of what a gene is, a definition that biologists in general accept, and even though we

can say that phenotypes are the result of genetic expression, molecular biology still cannot meet the

requirements of R3, that is, from the rules of molecular biology, one cannot derive a conclusion that

will explain gene transmission. The reason being is that in order to understand gene transmission and

inheritance, one has to understand the cytological story, the higher level theory about mitosis, meiosis,

and reproduction at the cellular level. Molecular biology may describe the underlying mechanism of
what is going on at the molecular level during these processes, but this only gives further refinement to

the already established cytological story. This is what Kitcher calls an explanatory extension,

previously mentioned in this paper (990).

Now for a change of focus. What Kitcher and others have done is argue about the relationship

between the different levels of biological study. Recall that reduction of a theory requires that the

reduced theory be derivable from the reducing theory. What I would like to do now is provide a similar

analysis of programming languages in computer science and use this to further illustrate the

relationship of higher-level theories and lower-level theories.

My understanding of programming is rudimentary at best, but I believe the example will

highlight similar issues in reduction that Kitcher and others have demonstrated. Now, at the most basic

level, computer science is a special case of physics, so in theory one could reduce a computer program

to the motion of electrons in circuitry. Beside this case, it could also be said that at the most basic level,

a computer program is a sequence of 1's and 0's, which represent on and off. In conjunction with the

physical properties, the hardware of the computer itself, these sequences of 1's and 0's are a binary

language that tell the computer what to do.

In order to make programming quicker, higher level programming languages, like C/C++ were

developed. These higher level programming languages have a more intuitive language and syntax

structure than the lower level programming languages, like assembly (assembly is considered a second-

generation programming language, whereas the first-generation is programming in the machine

language itself). A compiler is used afterwards to translate, or derive, machine language from the higher

level programming language, which results in an executable program, assuming that there were no

errors in the coding process.

In this analogy, the higher-level programming language is the higher-level theory, the machine

language is the more fundamental theory, and the compiler is the bridge laws that connect the two. The

difference in this analogy from typical reduction is that the more fundamental, lower-level theory, the
machine language, is derived from the higher-level theory with the help of bridge laws, the compiler.

This is opposite from what normal reductionists say, which is that the higher-level theory can be

derived from the lower level theory. The beauty of this example is that the higher-level programming

language is completely reducible to lower level machine code. The interesting point is that it is easy to

reduce higher-level languages to lower-level ones, but it is difficult to take a lower-level language and

derive a higher-level language, because, as Kitcher explains, there is a loss of information, a loss of

explanatory power when a higher-level theory is reduced to a lower level one.

There are programs called decompilers which attempt to recode programs into higher-level

code. Unfortunately what the decompiler cannot do is add the same kinds of comments into the code

that help the programmer understand what exactly is going on. Similarly, whereas coding in a higher-

level language involves assigning values to variables which have been conveniently named by the

programmer, for example, in C, the coding line , "int x = 4;" when compiled, reduces to a program that

takes a segment of memory at some location in memory and stores the value 4 (in binary, so 0100) in

that location. What is lost during the compiling process is the fact that the programmer named that

variable "x," which also could have been named "price," or "speed," or some other useful name that

helps the programmer understand what the program's purpose is. No bridge law (decompiler) can figure

out what these variables were originally named. It would take the original programmer's knowledge at

the higher-level programming level to be able to know what these names were.

The point here is to demonstrate with a little more clarity what Kitcher means when he states

that there is a loss of explanatory power in reduction. Higher-level theories contain necessary

information that help our understanding of phenomena in the world, and if science's goal is to provide

quality explanations and accurate predictions, then it would be wise to understand when higher-level

theories provide information and explanations that lower-level theories cannot. While it is valuable to

know what is going on at the lower levels, reduction comes at a cost, a loss of explanatory power.
 Works Cited

Curd, Martin & Cover, J. A. "8.4 Kitcher on Reduction, Classical Genetics, and Molecular Biology."

Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues. Ed. Martin Curd & J. A. Cover. New York: W. W.

Norton & Company, Inc. 1998. 1028-1038.

Kincaid, Harold. "Molecular Biology And the Unity of Science." Philosophy of Science. Vol. 57.

University of Chicago Press. December 1990. 575-593.

Kitcher, Philip. "1953 and All That: A Tale of Two Sciences." Philosophy of Science: The Central

Issues. Ed. Martin Curd & J.A. Cover. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 1998.

971-1003.

Nagel, Ernest. "Issues in the Logic of Reductive Explanations." Philosophy of Science: The Central

Issues. Ed. Martin Curd & J.A. Cover. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 1998.

905-921.

Waters, Kenneth C. "Genes Made Molecular." Philosophy of Science. Vol. 61. University of Chicago

Press. June 1994. 163-185.