[ G.R. NO.

173253, October 30, 2006 ]

DR. RENATO S. MUÑEZ, MAYOR, MUNICIPALITY OF LA PAZ,
AGUSAN DEL SUR, PETITIONER, VS. PABLITO L. JOMO,
ROLANDO L. GALEON, RICKY L. MONDEJAR, ROMEO M.
DURANGO, DANTE H. FRANCISCO, ELVIN P. GOMEZ,
YOLANDA P. CLAVATON, VIOLETA P. LAMACHO, AVELINO E.
JAVIER, REYNALDO CASONETE, GIL BEBIS, ERNESTO
MONDEJAR, MARCELINO R. PEREZ, ALFREDO T. JABAJAB,
NOEL O. CASTRO, NOEL B. FERNANDEZ, JOVENCIO D. RUAYA,
ERMINIO V. GONZALES, TOMAS B. GOMEZ, ALFREDO J.
CASISON, JR., GILBERT A. OSICO, PEPITO J. GASTA, NELSON
LAS PIÑAS, CECELIO S. SAY-A, DANTE M. MERCADO, PEDRO
R. TESADO, NELSON G. HAVANA AND RIZALDO T. MONTEZ,
AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, TWENTY THIRD
DIVISION, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Before the Court is this petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction
assailing the Resolution[1] dated April 26, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 00611 dismissing the petition for review thereat filed by the petitioner
for having being filed out of time and, in consequence, affirming the Order issued
by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) ordering the reinstatement of the herein
twenty-eight (28) private respondents to their previous positions.

The facts:

Dr. Renato S. Muñez, petitioner herein, is the incumbent mayor of the Municipality
of La Paz, Agusan del Sur while the private respondents are the displaced
employees of the Municipality.

On October 30, 2001, the Sangguniang Bayan of La Paz enacted Ordinance No. 12,
Series of 2001, abolishing the Municipality's two (2) Economic Enterprises, namely:
the Motor Pool and the Road Construction and Maintenance and transferring all the
properties and equipments thereof to the Municipal Engineering Office.

By virtue of said Ordinance, the petitioner, as the local chief executive, effected the
abolition of the two aforementioned offices. As a result, the permanent employees
assigned to the abolished agencies were dismissed from the service. Among them
are the herein twenty-eight (28) private respondents.
In a letter dated April 22, 2002, the private respondents sought the intervention of
the CSC Caraga Regional Office for their possible reinstatement, or, as a secondary
option, the payment of their benefits as a result of their separation from the
service.Upon conduct of a fact finding investigation, the CSC Regional Office
declared the abolition of the two (2) agencies to have been made in bad faith and
was merely resorted to as a disguise for removing the incumbent permanent
employees thereof. Accordingly, in an Order[2] dated 21 January 2003, the CSC
Regional Office adjudged the abolition void and ordered the Municipality of La Paz
to reinstate the affected employees to their previous positions, or, if the same is
not feasible, to a comparable or equivalent position with payment of back salaries
and other benefits from the date of their removal until their actual reinstatement.
Pertinently, the Order reads:
xxx xxx xxx

A review of the record satisfies this Office that the justifications advanced for the
abolition of complainants' offices (economy and efficiency) are but subterfuges
resorted to for disguising an illegal removal of permanent employees, in violation of
the security of tenure guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution and Republic Act 6656,
otherwise known as "An Act To Protect The Security of Tenure Of Civil Service
Officers and Employees In the Implementation of Government Reorganization.

The claim of budgetary deficits effectuated through abolition of these departments

are belied by the fact that out of thirty four (34) employees affected by the
abolition, eleven of these separated permanent employees were hired as casuals in
the year 2002 performing essentially the same functions as the one held by them
prior to the abolition.

xxx xxx xxx

For the months of September to December 2002, there were 104 Job Orders and
Contracts of Services entered into which costs the local government P1,441,535.40.
With the issuance of casual appointments for the year 2002, the local government
paid approximately P2,442,735.90 representing the total amount of the daily wages
of the casuals following the wage rates indicated in the Plantilla of Casual
Appointments. Some of these casual employees and employees under contracts of
services and job orders have replaced/assumed continuously the regular functions
of the thirty four (34) former regular employees who were separated due to
abolition of office.

Aside from the voluminous hiring of casuals, employees under job orders and
contracts of services, this Office also observed that LGU-La Paz created a Private
Secretary position assigned in the Office of the Vice Mayor pursuant to Ordinance
No. 13-2001 with an annual salary of P126,420.00 as well as the creation of
Municipal Human Resource Management Office (MHRMO) with one new item,
namely: Municipal Government Assistant Department Head 1 (SG 22) with an
annual salary of P231,012.00 as reflected under the agency's personnel Schedule.

The massive issuance of casual appointments, job orders, contracts of services as

well as the creation of new positions in the local government of La Paz do not speak
well of good faith (economy and efficiency) on the part of respondent Muñez.

Whatever reasons for the abolition of office such as "budgetary deficit" or

"municipal government suffering from limited financial resources" and even the
allegation where said LGU was "compelled to settle the huge statutory and other
financial obligations left by the previous administration" are difficult to comprehend.
No further elucidation is required except for a simple truth of replacing the
permanent employees having security of tenure with men and women of the chief
executive's own choice whose tenure would be highly dependent upon his pleasure
and discretion. Evidently, the abolition of office was in bad faith for it leads us to an
inescapable conclusion that it was resorted to as a disguise for removing incumbent
permanent employees. This is a clear transgression of complainants' security of
tenure guaranteed to them by our fundamental law.

xxx xxx xxx

In the instant case, respondent Muñez justified the non-payment of separation

benefits due to limited financial resources coupled with the alleged huge financial
obligations left by the previous administration. If it were true, why the massive
hiring of casuals? Why so many job orders and contracts of services? Why the
increase in salaries of officers and employees for year 2002? Why the creation of
new positions? And why the filling-up of vacant positions? We find no valid reasons
why the local government could not pay the separations benefits within ninety (90)
days reckoning from January 1, 2002, of these terminated employees who opted to
be separated from the service.

WHEREFORE, ALL THING STUDIED, the abolition of positions is hereby declared

VOID. Accordingly, the Municipal Government of La Paz, Agusan del Sur is ordered
to REINSTATE the twenty-eight (28) separated employees to the positions they
previously held prior to abolition. If no longer feasible, to a comparable or
equivalent position with payment of back salaries and other benefits from the date
of their removal from the service up to their actual reinstatement.

In the case of Pedro Tesado, Nelson Havana and Rizaldo Monte who were already
paid their terminal pay, they can still be reinstated provided they refund the
equivalent amount for terminal pay.
In time, the petitioner mayor moved for a reconsideration. But in a subsequent
Order[3] dated April 8, 2003, the same CSC Regional Office denied the motion. The
mayor's appeal also suffered the same fate as it was likewise denied by the CSC
proper in its Resolution[4] of August 26, 2005, viz:
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Mayor Renato S. Muñez is hereby DISMISSED.
Accordingly, the CSCRO No. III Order dated April 8, 2003 denying the motion for
reconsideration of Mayor Muñez from the CSCRO No. XIII Order dated January 21,
2003, which declared the abolition of positions in said agency as null and void and
ordered the reinstatement of Pablito Jomo, et al., is AFFIRMED. The separated
employees are reinstated without loss of seniority rights, leave credits, and full
payment of back wages pursuant to Section 9, Republic Act No. 6656. Provided,
that those employees who had received their terminal pay shall reimburse the same
amount received or shall have the same deducted from their back wages. Provided
further, that those employees who were hired as casual employees following their
separation shall have the income derived during their illegal separation deducted
from their back wages.
Ultimately, the petitioner mayor elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for
review initiated by a motion for extension of time within which to file said petition,
tentatively docketed in the CA as CA-G.R. SP No. 00611.

On October 28, 2005, the CA issued a resolution granting the mayor's motion for
extension giving him fifteen (15) days from September 20, 2005 within which to file
the intended petition for review, which extended period expired on October 15,
2005.

However, while the first motion for extension was still pending consideration, the
mayor filed a second motion for extension on October 13, 2005.

Expectedly, pursuant to Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, infra, the CA, in
its resolution of February 8, 2006, resolved to 1) deny the second motion for
extension of time; 2) note the petition for review received on November 8, 2005;
and 3) dismiss the petition for being filed out of time, adding that it found no
compelling reason "to grant the second motion for extension."

On March 13, 2006, the mayor moved for a reconsideration of the dismissal
resolution but the same was denied by the CA in the herein challenged Resolution
of April 26, 2006.[5]

Hence, the mayor's present recourse which poses the sole issue of whether the CA
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying both his second motion for
extension of time to file petition and his subsequent motion for reconsideration
thereof.

We DISMISS.

Procedural rules setting the period for perfecting an appeal or filing an appellate
petition are generally inviolable. It is doctrinally entrenched that appeal is not a
constitutional right but a mere statutory privilege. Hence, parties seeking to avail of
the privilege must comply with the statutes or rules allowing it. The requirements
for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law must,
as a rule, be strictly followed. Such requirements are considered indispensable
interdictions against needless delays and are necessary for the orderly discharge of
judicial business. For sure, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the
period set by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well. Failure to perfect
an appeal renders the judgment appealed from final and executory. [6]
The Court may deign to veer away from the general rule only if, in its assessment,
the appeal on its face appears absolutely meritorious. [7] In the circumstances
obtaining in this case, however, the occasion does not warrant the desired
relaxation.

Section 4 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is explicit:

SEC. 4. Period of appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of its last
publication.

xxx xxx xxx

xxx the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only
within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted
except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
Although the second motion for extension was filed within the first extended period,
the reason proffered by the petitioner for seeking a second extension cannot, by
any stretch of imagination, be seen as compelling.

The petitioner mayor would want the Court to turn a blind eye to his excuse that he
did not want to take the risks of submitting illegible photocopies of the material
portions of the records and thought it best to certify as true copy each and every
page of the one thousand seven hundred and forty four (1,744) attachments to the
petition. Of course, this was an unnecessary exaggeration, the consequence of
which the petitioner had to bear.

The mayor would proffer, as an added cause for his delay, the fact that he was not
able to sign the petition's verification and certification because he was then in
Palawan on official business. Such flimsy excuse deserved no consideration at all.

Accordingly, we see no reason to discuss any further the substantial issues raised
by the petitioner.

All told, we rule and so hold that the CA did not, in any way, abuse its discretion in
rendering the herein challenged resolution dismissing the petition filed before it for
having been filed out of time.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, this petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 [ G.R. No. 174244, February 13, 2009 ]
MAYOR MARCEL S. PAN, REPRESENTING THE MUNICIPALITY
OF GOA, CAMARINES SUR AS MAYOR, PETITIONER, VS.
YOLANDA O. PEÑA, MARIVIC P. ENCISO, MELINDA S.
CANTOR, ROMEO ASOR AND EDGAR A. ENCISO.
RESPONDENTS,

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Marcel Pan (the mayor), after winning the mayoralty post in the Municipality of
Goa, Camarines Sur in the 1998 Elections, initiated a reorganization of the local
government, allegedly due to the large budgetary deficit of the municipality brought
about by a bloated bureaucracy.[1]

To start the bureaucratic shake-up, the Sangguniang Bayan (Sanggunian) passed

Resolution No. 025-98[2] authorizing the mayor to partly reorganize the
bureaucracy. This resolution was eventually amended by Resolution No. 046-98 [3] to
give the mayor full authority to restructure the local government unit (LGU).

The Sanggunian thereafter created a Placement Committee via Resolution No. 054-
98[4] to oversee the LGU reorganization in terms of selection and placement of
personnel, in consonance with the procedures laid down in Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6656,[5] the Act to Protect the Security of Tenure
of Civil Service Officers and Employees in the
Implementation of Government Reorganization of 1988,
and its implementing rules.[6]

Affected by this reorganization were herein respondents Yolanda Peña (Peña),

Marivic Enciso (Marivic), Melinda Cantor (Cantor), Romeo Asor (Asor) and Edgar
Enciso (Enciso), who were permanent employees assigned at the various
departments of the LGU but whose positions were abolished. The positions held by
respondents were: local revenue collection officer I (waterworks supervisor) for
Peña; utility worker II for Marivic; revenue collection clerk II for Cantor; utility
worker II for Asor; and utility worker I for Enciso. [7]

Respondents applied for the newly created positions in the LGU's new organization
and staffing pattern, ─ Peña as cashier II; Marivic as local legislative staff or
bookbinder; Cantor as revenue collection clerk; Asor as local legislative staff; and
Enciso as bookbinder.

The Placement Committee did not approve respondents' applications. Instead, it

recommended, and the mayor appointed Evelyn Granadino, Salvacion Asor, Myrna
Macuja, Ma. Christina Mendoza and Mina Natalia Vargas to fill up the ranks. [8]

After due notice and hearing, a total of thirty one (31) employees, including
respondents, were separated from the service effective October 30, 1998. [9]

Respondents filed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) which, after
consideration of the qualifications of the parties involved, noted as follows:

Romeo Asor, fourteen (14) years in government service and with 112 training
hours, applied for local legislative staff, but was denied. Instead, Myrna Macuja,
who has three (3) years government service was appointed.

Mayor Pan's only justification was that Asor has no civil service eligibility. Records,
[sic] show that Macuja also has no civil service eligibility. He likewise did not
dispute Asor's allegation.

Edgardo Enciso, a college level (engineering third year) [sic] who has six (6) years
government service and with 16 training hours, applied for Bookbinder position, but
was denied. In his stead, C[h]ristina Mendoza, a graduate of midwifery[,] was
appointed.

Again, Mayor Pan justified that Edgardo Enciso is non-eligible. However, records
reveal that Mendoza is likewise a non-civil service eligible. Under the Qualification
Standard (QS), civil service eligibility is not required for the said position. Enciso's
allegation was also uncontested.

xxxx

Yolanda Peña, an Accounting graduate with Civil Service Eligibility (Professional)

and has been in the government service for twenty five (25) years and 289 hours of
training [sic], applied for Cashier II position. She was not appointed to said position
and neither to any position and, instead Evelyn Granadino who has only eleven (11)
years in the service was preferred and appointed to Cashier II.
The justification by Mayor Marcel Pan for not appointing Peña to Cashier II is self-
serving. There was no proof shown to support his allegation that the Municipality of
Goa incurred losses of Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00) during Peña's
incumbency as Supervisor of Waterworks System.

Marivic Enciso, who has been in the government service for ten years and eight
months (10 years & 8 months) and with 119 hours of training, applied for Local
Legislative Staff and in the alternative for Bookbinder but her application was
denied. Instead, Myrna Macuja, who is new in the service[,] was appointed. Natalia
Vargas, who has seven years in service[,] was appointed as Bookbinder.

The only justification Mayor Pan gave for not appointing [Marivic] was that the
latter has no civil service eligibility. Records, however, show that Macuja and
Vargas also have no civil service eligibilities. Further, Mayor Pan did not rebut
[Marivic's] allegation regarding Macuja[`s] and Vargas' length of service.

Melinda Cantor, civil service eligible (Subprofessional) and who has seven (7) years
government service and 104 hours training, likewise applied for Clerk II position.
The same was denied. Instead[,] Salvacion Asor, with only four (4) months
government service, and Fernando Pardinas and Leticia Parpan, both High School
graduates were appointed.[10]

The CSC, by Resolution No. 992183 dated September 23, 1999, found for
respondents, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby granted. The Commission rules that the
separation of herein appellants, except Aurora Pacis, was in violation of the
provisions of Republic Act No. 6656. Accordingly, Yolanda O. Peña, Marivic Enciso,
Melinda Cantor, Romeo Asor and Edgar Enciso shall be reinstated or reappointed
to their former positions or their equivalent under the new staffing pattern
without loss of seniority rights and shall be paid backwages from the time they
were separated until their actual reinstatement. Aurora Pacis' non-appointment
was, however, justified. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Via Motion for Reconsideration,[11] the mayor adduced additional evidence and
grounds in support of his decision not to appoint respondents, such as Peña's poor
job performance as former waterworks supervisor resulting in financial losses;
Cantor's lack of actual experience in the work of a revenue collections clerk; and
Marivic's, Asor's and Enciso's failure to submit their respective performance
evaluation reports for them to be considered by the Placement Committee, as well
as their questionable promotions to their last stated positions.
And the mayor informed:

When the present administration reorganized, the most affected department was
the Municipal Treasurer's Office where Melinda Cantor, Romeo Asor and Marivic
Enciso belonged to make the local treasury more viable. From twenty-seven (27)
employees, this department was reduced to nine (9) employees. Another
office affected heavily by the reorganization is the Waterworks operation where
Yolanda Pe[ñ]a and Edgar Enciso were formerly connected. From eight (8)
employees, this office was trimmed down to two (2) employees. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

The motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution No. 000617, [12] he
went up to the Court of Appeals for recourse.

In sustaining the CSC, the appellate court, by Decision [13] of July 14, 2005, took
note of why the new positions were filled up by others "who are less preferred or
qualified in terms of status of appointment, training, education and length of
service,"[14] instead of by respondents who were holding permanent positions.

Reconsideration of the appellate court's Decision having been denied by

Resolution[15] of August 14, 2006, the present petition was filed by the mayor
"representing the municipality of Goa" (hereafter petitioner) on the following
contentions:
I

THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY

EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND IS BASED ON SURMISES AND CONJECTURES.

II

THE PRINCIPLE OF FINALITY OF FACTUAL FINDINGS OF ADMINISTRATIVE

AGENCIES SHOULD HAVE BEEN FIRST APPLIED TO THE DECISION OF THE
PLACEMENTS BOARD. (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner insists that all those retained in the reorganization are permanent
employees holding permanent positions who are equally, if not better, qualified
compared with respondents. [16] And he questions the conflicting actions of the CSC
when it still ordered the reinstatement of respondents despite its approval of the
appointment of the new appointees.[17]

In their Comment[18] on the petition, respondents prefatorily contend that the

petition calls for a re-assessment of the evidence adduced before the CSC and the
appellate court which this Court, so they argue, is not permitted to do in the
absence of any of the recognized exceptions. [19] On the substantive aspect,
respondents merely quote, for the most part, the appellate court's conclusions.

The issue arising from petitioner's first contention is whether petitioner complied
with the provisions of R.A. 6656 in effecting respondents' separation from the
service. The second contention raised by petitioner is misplaced as the findings of
facts of the CSC pertain to whether the Municipality of Goa undertook a
reorganization in good faith, and not whether the qualifications of the appointees
are on a par with, or even above par respondents', wherein there lies no dispute.

The petition is bereft of merit.

A reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or

abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions." [20] It alters the
existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of
control, authority and responsibility between them [21] to make the bureaucracy
more responsive to the needs of the public clientele as authorized by law. [22] It
could result in the loss of one's position through removal or abolition of an office.
For a reorganization for the purpose of economy or to make the bureaucracy more
efficient to be valid, however, it must pass the test of good faith, otherwise it is
void ab initio. [23]

. . . As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the

purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no
dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position
itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese
wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else but a separation or
removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or
otherwise not in good faith, no valid "abolition" takes place and whatever "abolition"
is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as where there is merely a
change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy are belied by the
existence of ample funds. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 2 of R.A. No. 6656 cites certain circumstances showing bad faith in the
removal of employees as a result of any reorganization, thus:

Sec. 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a
valid cause and after due notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal exist when,
pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered
redundant or there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to
meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by the Civil
Service Law. The existence of any or some of the following
circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith
in the removals made as a result of the reorganization,
giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment
by an aggrieved party:

a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new

staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned;

b) Where an office is abolished and another performing

substantially the same functions is created;

c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified

in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit;

d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the

department or agency concerned and the reclassified
offices perform substantially the same functions as the
original offices;

e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof.
(Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

And Section 3 of the same law provides for the order of removal of employees as
follows:

Sec. 3.In the separation of personnel pursuant to reorganization, the following

order of removal shall be followed:

(a) Casual employees with less than five (5) years of government service;

(b) Casual employees with five (5) years or more of government service;

(c) Employees holding temporary appointments; and

(d) Employees holding permanent appointments: Provided, That those in the same
category as enumerated above, who are least qualified in terms of performance and
merit shall be laid first, length of service notwithstanding.

In the case at bar, petitioner claims that there has been a drastic reduction of
plantilla positions in the new staffing pattern in order to address the LGU's gaping
budgetary deficit. Thus, he states that in the municipal treasurer's office and
waterworks operations unit where respondents were previously assigned, only 11
new positions were created out of the previous 35 which had been abolished; and
that the new staffing pattern had 98 positions only, as compared with the old which
had 129.

The CSC, however, highlighted the recreation of six (6) casual positions for clerk II
and utility worker I, which positions were previously held by respondents Marivic,
Cantor, Asor and Enciso. Petitioner inexplicably never disputed this finding nor
proferred any proof that the new positions do not perform the same or substantially
the same functions as those of the abolished. And nowhere in the records does it
appear that these recreated positions were first offered to respondents.

The appointment of casuals to these recreated positions violates R.A. 6656, as

Section 4 thereof instructs that:

Sec. 4. Officers and employees holding permanent appointments shall be given

preference for appointment to the new positions in the approved staffing pattern
comparable to their former positions or in case there are not enough comparable
positions, to positions next lower in rank.

No new employees shall be taken until all permanent officers and

employees have been appointed, including temporary and casual employees
who possess the necessary qualification requirement, among which is the
appropriate civil service eligibility, for permanent appointment to positions in the
approved staffing pattern, in case there are still positions to be filled, unless such
positions are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In the case of respondent Peña, petitioner claims that the position of waterworks
supervisor had been abolished during the reorganization. Yet, petitioner appointed
an officer-in-charge in 1999 for its waterworks operations [24] even after a supposed
new staffing pattern had been effected in 1998. Notably, this position of waterworks
supervisor does not appear in the new staffing pattern of the LGU. [25] Apparently,
the Municipality of Goa never intended to do away with such position wholly and
permanently as it appointed another person to act as officer-in-charge vested with
similar functions.

While the CSC never found the new appointees to be unqualified, and never
disapproved nor recalled their appointments as they presumably met all the
minimum requirements therefor, there is nothing contradictory in the CSC's course
of action as it is limited only to the non-discretionary authority of determining
whether the personnel appointed meet all the required conditions laid down by law.
[26]

Congruently, the CSC can very well order petitioner to reinstate respondents to
their former positions (as these were never actually abolished) or to appoint them
to comparable positions in the new staffing pattern.

In fine, the reorganization of the government of the Municipality of Goa was not
entirely undertaken in the interest of efficiency and austerity but appears to have
been marred by other considerations in order to circumvent the constitutional
security of tenure of civil service employees like respondents.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The challenged July 14, 2005 Decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

[ G.R. No. 112745, October 16, 1997 ]

AQUILINO T. LARIN, PETITIONER, VS. THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF FINANCE, COMMISSIONER OF
THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND THE COMMITTEE
CREATED TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATIVE
COMPLAINT AGAINST AQUILINO T. LARIN, COMPOSED OF
FRUMENCIO A. LAGUSTAN, JOSE B. ALEJANDRINO AND
JAIME M. MAZA, RESPONDENTS.

In this regard, it is worth mentioning that Section 2 of R.A. No. 6656 lists down the
circumstances evidencing bad faith in the removal of employees as a result of the
reorganization, thus:

Sec. 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a
valid cause and after due notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal exist when,
pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered
redundant or there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to
meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by the Civil
Service Law. The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may be
considered as evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result of the
reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an
aggrieved party:

a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new

staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned;

b) Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same

functions is created;

c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of

appointment, performance and merit;

d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency

concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as
the original offices;

e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3

hereof."

A reading of some of the provisions of the questioned E.O. No. 132 clearly leads us
to an inescapable conclusion that there are circumstances considered as evidences
of bad faith in the reorganization of the BIR.

Section 1.1.2 of said executive order provides that:

"1.1.2 The Intelligence and Investigation Office and the Inspection Service
are abolished. An Intelligence and Investigation Service is hereby created
to absorb the same functions of the abolished office and service. xxx"
(italics ours)

This provision is a clear illustration of the circumstance

mentioned in Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 6656 that an office
is abolished and another one performing substantially the
same function is created.

Another circumstance is the creation of services and divisions in the BIR resulting to
a significant increase in the number of positions in the said bureau as contemplated
in paragraph (a) of section 2 of R.A. No. 6656. Under Section 1.3 of E.O. No. 132,
the Information Systems Group has two newly created Systems Services. Aside
from this, six new divisions are also created. Under Section 1.2.1, three more
divisions of the Assessment Service are formed. With this newly created offices,
there is no doubt that a significant increase of positions will correspondingly follow.

Furthermore, it is perceivable that the non-reappointment of the petitioner as

Assistant Commissioner violates Section 4 of R.A. No. 6656. Under said provision,
officers holding permanent appointments are given preference for appointment to
the new positions in the approved staffing pattern comparable to their former
position or in case there are not enough comparable positions to positions next
lower in rank. It is undeniable that petitioner is a career executive officer who is
holding a permanent position. Hence, he should have given preference for
appointment in the position of Assistant Commissioner. As claimed by petitioner,
Antonio Pangilinan who was one of those appointed as Assistant Commissioner, "is
an outsider of sorts to the bureau, not having been an incumbent officer of the
bureau at the time of the reorganization." We should not lose sight of the second
paragraph of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6656 which explicitly states that no new
employees shall be taken in until all permanent officers shall have been appointed
for permanent position.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted, and petitioner is hereby

reinstated to his position as Assistant Commissioner without loss of seniority rights
and shall be entitled to full backwages from the time of his separation from service
until actual reinstatement unless, in the meanwhile, he would have reached the
compulsory retirement age of sixty-five years in which case, he shall be deemed to
have retired at such age and entitled thereafter to the corresponding retirement
benefits.

SO ORDERED.
 [ G.R. No. 181559, October 02, 2009 ]

LEAH M. NAZARENO, CARLO M. CUAL, ROGELIO B. CLAMONTE, FLORECITA

M. LLOSA, ROGELIO S. VILLARUBIA, RICARDO M. GONZALES, JR., ROSSEL
MARIE G. GUTIERREZ, NICANOR F. VILLAROSA, JR., MARIE SUE F. CUAL,
MIRAMICHI MAJELLA B. MARIOT, ALMA F. RAMIREZ, ANTOLIN D. ZAMAR,
JR., MARIO S. ALILING, TEODULO SALVORO, JR., PHILIP JANSON
ALTAMARINO, ANTONIETTA PADURA, ADOLFO R. CORNELIA, IAN RYAN
PATULA, WILLIAM TANOY, VICTOR ARBAS, JEANITH CUAL, BRAULIO
SAYSON, DAWN M. VILLAROSA, AGUSTIN A. RENDOQUE, ENRIQUETA
TUMONGHA, LIONEL P. BANOGON, ROSALITO VERGANTINOS, MARIO T.
CUAL, JR., ELAINE MAY TUMONGHA, NORMAN F. VILLAROSA, RICARDO C.
PATULA, RACHEL BANAGUA, RODOLFO A. CALUGCUGAN, PERGENTINO
CUAL, BERNARD J. OZOA, ROGER JOHN AROMIN, CHERYL E. NOCETE,
MARIVIC SANCHEZ, CRISPIN DURAN, REBECO LINGCONG, ANNA LEE
ESTRABELA, MELCHOR B. MAQUILING, RAUL MOLAS, OSCAR KINIKITO,
DARWIN B. CONEJOS, ROMEL CUAL, ROQUETA AMOR, DISODADO LAJATO,
PAUL PINO, LITO PINERO, RODULFO ZOSA, JR. AND JORGE ARBOLADO,
PETITIONERS, VS. CITY OF DUMAGUETE, REPRESENTED BY CITY MAYOR
AGUSTIN PERDICES, DOMINADOR DUMALAG, JR., ERLINDA TUMONGHA,
JOSEPHINE MAE FLORES AND ARACELI CAMPOS, RESPONDENTS.

The integrity and reliability of our civil service is, perhaps, never more sorely tested
than in the impassioned demagoguery of elections. Amidst the struggle of
personalities, ideologies, and platforms, the vigor and resilience of a professional
civil service can only be preserved where our laws ensure that partisanship plays no
part in the appointing process. Consequently, we affirm the validity of a regulation
issued by the Civil Service Commission (CSC or the Commission) intended to
ensure that appointments and promotions in the civil service are made solely on the
basis of qualifications, instead of political loyalties or patronage.
 [ G.R. No. 171705, July 29, 2010 ]

EDUARDO VARELA, PETITIONER, VS. MA. DAISY REVALEZ, RAMON BORROMEO,

YOLANDA BARCENILLA, ERNA LOCSIN, GRACE BARUC, VICENTE MIJARES, JR.,
LOIDA TAJONERA, NIRMLA AGNES MARTINEZ, ANALYN MAYPA, LEMUEL MAYPA,
BERDITH GANCETA, ROGER RAMOS, SUZETTE DE LOS SANTOS, JUDE JAROPILLO,
JOCELYN AZUCENA, VILMA PABALAN, CHANNIBAL BERJA, JERNEY BARZO,
BRIGIDA MANGUINO, SOL GRACE GUSTILO, MARILOU AREVALO, LUCILLE
ARGONOSO, MARCOS BACOMO, MELVIN BACOMO, JR., MERIAM BULLAG, ZOSIMA
DESUYO, MARLENE BACOMO, EUGENE BALASA, ROY DE ASIS, LOLITA RUBEN, JOSE
DIEZ, MILA DIEZ, JESUS DIEZ, DONNABEL ALFON, FRANCISCO DERIADA,
ALEJANDRIA PORDIOS, LIGAYA MAGBANUA, DAISY GORECHO, ANARIEL BACOMO,
FRED DELOTINA, STEPHEN DIPLOMA, MARITES BACABAC, ARACELI MAHINAY,
JULIO OLVIDO, ANTONIO REBOTON, NENETTE JUMUAD, ROSEMARIE ALICANTE,
AGUSTIN JAVIER, JR., LEODY JAVA, NAZARITO PIDO, NENITA BERMEO, DELILAH
FERNANDEZ, WILDABETH LACSON, CYNTHIA DAZA, ROMMEL DELGADO, FLORITA
GELACIO, ROSALLY LEAL, AILEEN VILLANUEVA, NINFA BENIGAY, ROSIE PALMA,
FERNANDO DELGADO, ROMULO BARCENILLA, ROBERTO APIADO, MARIO OLVIDO,
BETTY DELA CRUZ, MARTIN APILADAS, SOLEDAD MAGBANUA, NIDA VISTAL,
FRANCISCO DE LARA, ANTHONY ROCH ACEVEDO, FELIX RAFOLS, YOLANDA
FERNANDEZ, ERNISTINA ALARCON, EMIE ABANID, LOURY TOMPONG, MA. FE
RAFOLS SIA, YOLANDA OLVIDO, FIDEL ARROYO, VITALIANO POBLACION, ZALDY
TERENCIO, ROVIC ESCOBA, JENNIFER CABAHUG, HELEN PAGAY, ARTURO SALVE,
AIDA GOMEZ, AND CITY OF CADIZ, RESPONDENTS.

From the afore-quoted testimony it is clear that the abolition of the office of
Mr. Borromeo in the guise of reorganization was not done in good faith. 
The abolition was done for "political reasons," (Arao vs. Luspo, L-23982, July
21, 1967, 20 SCRA 722).  As stated in Urgello, if the abolition merely resulted in
placing another person or appointee with a different designation or name but
substantially the same duties, then it will be considered a device to unseat the
incumbent. Clearly the reorganization is not genuine and it is nothing but a ruse to
defeat the constitutionally protected right of security of tenure.

In its 17 August 2005 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the
RTC's 20 June 2001 Decision.  The Court of Appeals held that Varela was personally
liable for the payment of moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and
court appearance fees. It reduced the amounts of attorney's fees and litigation
expenses from P200,000 to P100,000 and from P20,000 to P10,000, respectively,
and deleted the award of court appearance fees. The Court of Appeals held that:

OUR jurisprudence is replete with cases involving the issue of whether or not a
public officer may be held liable for damages in the performance of their [sic]
duties, to quote:

"A public official is by law not immune from damages in his personal capacity for
acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer
protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions."

"Settled is the principle that a public official may be liable in his personal capacity
for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad
faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction."

In addition, Book I, Chapter 9 of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides, to

quote:
"Section 38.  Liability of Superior Officers. -- (1) A public officer shall not be civilly
liable for acts done in the performance of his official duties, unless there is a clear
showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence.  x x x"
In the case at bar, the court a quo found that bad faith attended the performance
of the official acts of the original defendant, Eduardo G. Varela.  x x x

WE find no reason to disturb the finding of bad faith by the court a quo considering
that the same was amply supported by evidence.[11]

Varela was sued in his personal capacity, not in his official capacity. In the
complaint, the employees stated that, "due to the illegal acts of the Defendant,
Plaintiffs suffered mental torture and anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings,
besmirched reputation and social humiliation."  The State can never be the author
of illegal acts.

The complaint merely identified Varela as the mayor of Cadiz City.  It did not
categorically state that Varela was being sued in his official capacity.  The
identification and mention of Varela as the mayor of Cadiz City did not
automatically transform the action into one against Varela in his official capacity.
The allegations in the complaint determine the nature of the cause of action.

In Pascual v. Beltran,[14] the Court held that:

[I]n the case at bar, petitioner is actually sued in his personal capacity
inasmuch as his principal, the State, can never be the author of any
wrongful act.  The Complaint filed by the private respondent with the RTC
merely identified petitioner as Director of the Telecommunications Office,
but did not categorically state that he was being sued in his official
capacity.  The mere mention in the Complaint of the petitioner's position as
Regional Director of the Telecommunications Office does not transform the
action into one against petitioner in his official capacity. What is
determinative of the nature of the cause of action are the allegations in the
complaint.  It is settled that the nature of a cause of action is determined by the
facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action.  The purpose of
an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of
the party filling [sic] the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the
complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.

Qualification Standards Manual prescribed by MC No. 46, s. 1993

The OAS' recommendation is also unduly limiting. For example, a licensed civil
engineer who has obtained a Master in Business Administration degree, or a
government civil engineer who has a master's degree in pubic management, would
be barred from applying for the position.