EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 171947-48. December 18, 2008.]

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE
AND SPORTS, 1 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME
GROUP, and DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, petitioners, vs.
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, represented and joined by DIVINA V. ILAS,
SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH DELA PEÑA, PAUL DENNIS
QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA, FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE
SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA, SARAH JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS,
FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, and JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA, respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J p:
The need to address environmental pollution, as a cause of climate change, has of late gained the
attention of the international community. Media have finally trained their sights on the ill effects of
pollution, the destruction of forests and other critical habitats, oil spills, and the unabated improper
disposal of garbage. And rightly so, for the magnitude of environmental destruction is now on a scale
few ever foresaw and the wound no longer simply heals by itself. 2 But amidst hard evidence and clear
signs of a climate crisis that need bold action, the voice of cynicism, naysayers, and procrastinators can
still be heard. dctai
This case turns on government agencies and their officers who, by the nature of their respective offices
or by direct statutory command, are tasked to protect and preserve, at the first instance, our internal
waters, rivers, shores, and seas polluted by human activities. To most of these agencies and their
official complement, the pollution menace does not seem to carry the high national priority it deserves,
if their track records are to be the norm. Their cavalier attitude towards solving, if not mitigating, the
environmental pollution problem, is a sad commentary on bureaucratic efficiency and commitment.
At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud historic past, once brimming with
marine life and, for so many decades in the past, a spot for different contact recreation activities, but
now a dirty and slowly dying expanse mainly because of the abject official indifference of people and
institutions that could have otherwise made a difference. HTCaAD
This case started when, on January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a
complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies,
among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. Raffled to
Branch 20 and docketed as Civil Case No. 1851-99 of the RTC, the complaint alleged that the water
quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code. This environmental
aberration, the complaint stated, stemmed from:
. . . [The] reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission or commission [of the
defendants] resulting in the clear and present danger to public health and in the depletion and
contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay, [for which reason] ALL defendants must be held
jointly and/or solidarily liable and be collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its
water quality to class B waters fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation. 3
In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of petitioners in
abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others: EHSADa
(1) Respondents' constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;
(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);
(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);
(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);
(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);
(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);
(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);
(8) Executive Order No. 192;
(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);
(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;
(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and
(12) International Law ADCIca
Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay
and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.
The trial of the case started off with a hearing at the Manila Yacht Club followed by an ocular
inspection of the Manila Bay. Renato T. Cruz, the Chief of the Water Quality Management Section,
Environmental Management Bureau, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
testifying for petitioners, stated that water samples collected from different beaches around the Manila
Bay showed that the amount of fecal coliform content ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most probable
number (MPN)/ml when what DENR Administrative Order No. 34-90 prescribed as a safe level for
bathing and other forms of contact recreational activities, or the "SB" level, is one not exceeding 200
MPN/100 ml. 4 IaHCAD
Rebecca de Vera, for Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) and in behalf of other
petitioners, testified about the MWSS' efforts to reduce pollution along the Manila Bay through the
Manila Second Sewerage Project. For its part, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) presented, as part
of its evidence, its memorandum circulars on the study being conducted on ship-generated waste
treatment and disposal, and its Linis Dagat (Clean the Ocean) project for the cleaning of wastes
accumulated or washed to shore.
The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay
On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision 5 in favor of respondents. The dispositive
portion reads:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the complaint, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed
defendant-government agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and
restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for swimming, skin-diving and other forms of
contact recreation. To attain this, defendant-agencies, with defendant DENR as the lead agency, are
directed, within six (6) months from receipt hereof, to act and perform their respective duties by
devising a consolidated, coordinated and concerted scheme of action for the rehabilitation and
restoration of the bay. CaEIST
In particular:
Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain adequate [sewerage] treatment facilities in
strategic places under its jurisdiction and increase their capacities.
Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings, provide, construct and operate
sewage facilities for the proper disposal of waste.
Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay, to install, operate and maintain
waste facilities to rid the bay of toxic and hazardous substances.
Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of ship-generated wastes but also of
other solid and liquid wastes from docking vessels that contribute to the pollution of the bay.
Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill
and/or adequate solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal system
such as re-use or recycling of wastes. TACEDI
Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to revitalize the marine life in
Manila Bay and restock its waters with indigenous fish and other aquatic animals.
Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for the purpose of cleaning up and
rehabilitation of Manila Bay.
Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that obstruct the free flow of
waters to the bay. These nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes which eventually end up in Manila
Bay. As the construction and engineering arm of the government, DPWH is ordered to actively
participate in removing debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels, and other non-biodegradable garbage
in the bay.
Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of septic and sludge companies and
require them to have proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming
from septic tanks. cCAaHD
Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people through education the importance
of preserving and protecting the environment.
Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to protect at all costs the Manila Bay
from all forms of illegal fishing.
No pronouncement as to damages and costs.
SO ORDERED.
The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed before the Court of Appeals
(CA) individual Notices of Appeal which were eventually consolidated and docketed as CA-G.R. CV
No. 76528.
On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police
(PNP) Maritime Group, and five other executive departments and agencies filed directly with this
Court a petition for review under Rule 45. The Court, in a Resolution of December 9, 2002, sent the
said petition to the CA for consolidation with the consolidated appeals of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74944. TEHDIA
Petitioners, before the CA, were one in arguing in the main that the pertinent provisions of the
Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not
cover cleaning in general. And apart from raising concerns about the lack of funds appropriated for
cleaning purposes, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act
which can be compelled by mandamus.
The CA Sustained the RTC
By a Decision 6 of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners' appeal and affirmed the Decision of
the RTC in toto, stressing that the trial court's decision did not require petitioners to do tasks outside of
their usual basic functions under existing laws. 7 IcHSCT
Petitioners are now before this Court praying for the allowance of their Rule 45 petition on the
following ground and supporting arguments:
THE [CA] DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT HERETOFORE PASSED UPON BY
THE HONORABLE COURT, I.E., IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION DECLARING
THAT SECTION 20 OF [PD] 1152 REQUIRES CONCERNED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO
REMOVE ALL POLLUTANTS SPILLED AND DISCHARGED IN THE WATER SUCH AS
FECAL COLIFORMS.
ARGUMENTS
I
[SECTIONS] 17 AND 20 OF [PD] 1152 RELATE ONLY TO THE CLEANING OF SPECIFIC
POLLUTION INCIDENTS AND [DO] NOT COVER CLEANING IN GENERAL SECATH
II
THE CLEANING OR REHABILITATION OF THE MANILA BAY IS NOT A MINISTERIAL ACT
OF PETITIONERS THAT CAN BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS.
The issues before us are two-fold. First, do Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings,
Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited
only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents? And second, can petitioners be compelled by
mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay?
On August 12, 2008, the Court conducted and heard the parties on oral arguments.
Our Ruling
We shall first dwell on the propriety of the issuance of mandamus under the premises. AEDISC
The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus
Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. 8 A ministerial duty
is one that "requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment." 9 It connotes an act in
which nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a "simple, definite duty arising
under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law." 10 Mandamus is available to
compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment
or discretion one way or the other.
Petitioners maintain that the MMDA's duty to take measures and maintain adequate solid waste and
liquid disposal systems necessarily involves policy evaluation and the exercise of judgment on the part
of the agency concerned. They argue that the MMDA, in carrying out its mandate, has to make
decisions, including choosing where a landfill should be located by undertaking feasibility studies and
cost estimates, all of which entail the exercise of discretion. SaHTCE
Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the statutory command is clear and that petitioners' duty to
comply with and act according to the clear mandate of the law does not require the exercise of
discretion. According to respondents, petitioners, the MMDA in particular, are without discretion, for
example, to choose which bodies of water they are to clean up, or which discharge or spill they are to
contain. By the same token, respondents maintain that petitioners are bereft of discretion on whether or
not to alleviate the problem of solid and liquid waste disposal; in other words, it is the MMDA's
ministerial duty to attend to such services.
We agree with respondents.
First off, we wish to state that petitioners' obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one
hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts. While the
implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement
of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be
compelled by mandamus. We said so in Social Justice Society v. Atienza 11 wherein the Court directed
the City of Manila to enforce, as a matter of ministerial duty, its Ordinance No. 8027 directing the three
big local oil players to cease and desist from operating their business in the so-called "Pandacan
Terminals" within six months from the effectivity of the ordinance. But to illustrate with respect to the
instant case, the MMDA's duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste
and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems is ministerial, its duty being a
statutory imposition. The MMDA's duty in this regard is spelled out in Sec. 3 (c) of Republic Act No.
(RA) 7924 creating the MMDA. This section defines and delineates the scope of the MMDA's waste
disposal services to include: AHCaES
Solid waste disposal and management which include formulation and implementation of policies,
standards, programs and projects for proper and sanitary waste disposal. It shall likewise include the
establishment and operation of sanitary land fill and related facilities and the implementation of other
alternative programs intended to reduce, reuse and recycle solid waste. (Emphasis added.)
The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec. 41 of the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act
(RA 9003) which prescribes the minimum criteria for the establishment of sanitary landfills and Sec. 42
which provides the minimum operating requirements that each site operator shall maintain in the
operation of a sanitary landfill. Complementing Sec. 41 are Secs. 36 and 37 of RA 9003, 12 enjoining
the MMDA and local government units, among others, after the effectivity of the law on February 15,
2001, from using and operating open dumps for solid waste and disallowing, five years after such
effectivity, the use of controlled dumps. SHIETa
The MMDA's duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in the
Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper
waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion
presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially according to their
judgment or conscience. 13 A discretionary duty is one that "allows a person to exercise judgment and
choose to perform or not to perform." 14 Any suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or not
to perform its solid waste disposal-related duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis.
A perusal of other petitioners' respective charters or like enabling statutes and pertinent laws would
yield this conclusion: these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to
perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and
preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to perform these duties.
Consider: TaDSHC
(1) The DENR, under Executive Order No. (EO) 192, 15 is the primary agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development, and proper use of the country's environment and natural
resources. Sec. 19 of the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004 (RA 9275), on the other hand, designates
the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its enforcement and implementation,
more particularly over all aspects of water quality management. On water pollution, the DENR, under
the Act's Sec. 19 (k), exercises jurisdiction "over all aspects of water pollution, determine[s] its
location, magnitude, extent, severity, causes and effects and other pertinent information on pollution,
and [takes] measures, using available methods and technologies, to prevent and abate such pollution".
The DENR, under RA 9275, is also tasked to prepare a National Water Quality Status Report, an
Integrated Water Quality Management Framework, and a 10-year Water Quality Management Area
Action Plan which is nationwide in scope covering the Manila Bay and adjoining areas. Sec. 19 of RA
9275 provides: DEcSaI
Sec. 19. Lead Agency. — The [DENR] shall be the primary government agency responsible for
the implementation and enforcement of this Act . . . unless otherwise provided herein. As such, it shall
have the following functions, powers and responsibilities:
a) Prepare a National Water Quality Status report within twenty-four (24) months from the
effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the Department shall thereafter review or revise and publish
annually, or as the need arises, said report;
b) Prepare an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework within twelve (12) months
following the completion of the status report;
c) Prepare a ten (10) year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan within 12 months
following the completion of the framework for each designated water management area. Such action
plan shall be reviewed by the water quality management area governing board every five (5) years or as
need arises. CScaDH
The DENR has prepared the status report for the period 2001 to 2005 and is in the process of
completing the preparation of the Integrated Water Quality Management Framework. 16 Within twelve
(12) months thereafter, it has to submit a final Water Quality Management Area Action Plan. 17 Again,
like the MMDA, the DENR should be made to accomplish the tasks assigned to it under RA 9275.
Parenthetically, during the oral arguments, the DENR Secretary manifested that the DENR, with the
assistance of and in partnership with various government agencies and non-government organizations,
has completed, as of December 2005, the final draft of a comprehensive action plan with estimated
budget and time frame, denominated as Operation Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy, for the
rehabilitation, restoration, and rehabilitation of the Manila Bay.
The completion of the said action plan and even the implementation of some of its phases should more
than ever prod the concerned agencies to fast track what are assigned them under existing laws.
HESCcA
(2) The MWSS, under Sec. 3 of RA 6234, 18 is vested with jurisdiction, supervision, and control
over all waterworks and sewerage systems in the territory comprising what is now the cities of Metro
Manila and several towns of the provinces of Rizal and Cavite, and charged with the duty:
(g) To construct, maintain, and operate such sanitary sewerages as may be necessary for the proper
sanitation and other uses of the cities and towns comprising the System; . . .
(3) The LWUA under PD 198 has the power of supervision and control over local water districts. It
can prescribe the minimum standards and regulations for the operations of these districts and shall
monitor and evaluate local water standards. The LWUA can direct these districts to construct, operate,
and furnish facilities and services for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewerage, waste, and
storm water. Additionally, under RA 9275, the LWUA, as attached agency of the DPWH, is tasked
with providing sewerage and sanitation facilities, inclusive of the setting up of efficient and safe
collection, treatment, and sewage disposal system in the different parts of the country. 19 In relation to
the instant petition, the LWUA is mandated to provide sewerage and sanitation facilities in Laguna,
Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to prevent pollution in the Manila Bay. ATICcS
(4) The Department of Agriculture (DA), pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292),
20 is designated as the agency tasked to promulgate and enforce all laws and issuances respecting the
conservation and proper utilization of agricultural and fishery resources. Furthermore, the DA, under
the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 (RA 8550), is, in coordination with local government units
(LGUs) and other concerned sectors, in charge of establishing a monitoring, control, and surveillance
system to ensure that fisheries and aquatic resources in Philippine waters are judiciously utilized and
managed on a sustainable basis. 21 Likewise under RA 9275, the DA is charged with coordinating with
the PCG and DENR for the enforcement of water quality standards in marine waters. 22 More
specifically, its Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under Sec. 22 (c) of RA 9275 shall
primarily be responsible for the prevention and control of water pollution for the development,
management, and conservation of the fisheries and aquatic resources. aADSIc
(5) The DPWH, as the engineering and construction arm of the national government, is tasked
under EO 292 23 to provide integrated planning, design, and construction services for, among others,
flood control and water resource development systems in accordance with national development
objectives and approved government plans and specifications.
In Metro Manila, however, the MMDA is authorized by Sec. 3 (d), RA 7924 to perform metro-wide
services relating to "flood control and sewerage management which include the formulation and
implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects for an integrated flood control, drainage
and sewerage system."
On July 9, 2002, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into between the DPWH and MMDA,
whereby MMDA was made the agency primarily responsible for flood control in Metro Manila. For the
rest of the country, DPWH shall remain as the implementing agency for flood control services. The
mandate of the MMDA and DPWH on flood control and drainage services shall include the removal of
structures, constructions, and encroachments built along rivers, waterways, and esteros (drainages) in
violation of RA 7279, PD 1067, and other pertinent laws. ACTESI
(6) The PCG, in accordance with Sec. 5 (p) of PD 601, or the Revised Coast Guard Law of 1974,
and Sec. 6 of PD 979, 24 or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976, shall have the primary responsibility
of enforcing laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of the
Philippines. It shall promulgate its own rules and regulations in accordance with the national rules and
policies set by the National Pollution Control Commission upon consultation with the latter for the
effective implementation and enforcement of PD 979. It shall, under Sec. 4 of the law, apprehend
violators who:
a. discharge, dump . . . harmful substances from or out of any ship, vessel, barge, or any other
floating craft, or other man-made structures at sea, by any method, means or manner, into or upon the
territorial and inland navigable waters of the Philippines;
b. throw, discharge or deposit, dump, or cause, suffer or procure to be thrown, discharged, or
deposited either from or out of any ship, barge, or other floating craft or vessel of any kind, or from the
shore, wharf, manufacturing establishment, or mill of any kind, any refuse matter of any kind or
description whatever other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid
state into tributary of any navigable water from which the same shall float or be washed into such
navigable water; and HAIaEc
c. deposit . . . material of any kind in any place on the bank of any navigable water or on the bank
of any tributary of any navigable water, where the same shall be liable to be washed into such
navigable water, either by ordinary or high tides, or by storms or floods, or otherwise, whereby
navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed or increase the level of pollution of such water.
(7) When RA 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Act of 1990
was signed into law on December 13, 1990, the PNP Maritime Group was tasked to "perform all police
functions over the Philippine territorial waters and rivers." Under Sec. 86, RA 6975, the police
functions of the PCG shall be taken over by the PNP when the latter acquires the capability to perform
such functions. Since the PNP Maritime Group has not yet attained the capability to assume and
perform the police functions of PCG over marine pollution, the PCG and PNP Maritime Group shall
coordinate with regard to the enforcement of laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution
within the territorial waters of the Philippines. This was made clear in Sec. 124, RA 8550 or the
Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998, in which both the PCG and PNP Maritime Group were authorized
to enforce said law and other fishery laws, rules, and regulations. 25 ISDHcT
(8) In accordance with Sec. 2 of EO 513, the PPA is mandated "to establish, develop, regulate,
manage and operate a rationalized national port system in support of trade and national development."
26 Moreover, Sec. 6-c of EO 513 states that the PPA has police authority within the
ports administered by it as may be necessary to carry out its powers and functions and attain its
purposes and objectives, without prejudice to the exercise of the functions of the Bureau of Customs
and other law enforcement bodies within the area. Such police authority shall include the following:
xxx xxx xxx
b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the port, of persons and vehicles, as
well as movement within the port of watercraft. 27 CASaEc
Lastly, as a member of the International Marine Organization and a signatory to the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as amended by MARPOL 73/78, 28 the
Philippines, through the PPA, must ensure the provision of adequate reception facilities at ports and
terminals for the reception of sewage from the ships docking in Philippine ports. Thus, the PPA is
tasked to adopt such measures as are necessary to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and
liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports
and apprehend the violators. When the vessels are not docked at ports but within Philippine territorial
waters, it is the PCG and PNP Maritime Group that have jurisdiction over said vessels.
(9) The MMDA, as earlier indicated, is duty-bound to put up and maintain adequate sanitary
landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal system as well as other alternative garbage disposal
systems. It is primarily responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the provisions of RA
9003, which would necessary include its penal provisions, within its area of jurisdiction. 29
Among the prohibited acts under Sec. 48, Chapter VI of RA 9003 that are frequently violated are
dumping of waste matters in public places, such as roads, canals or esteros, open burning of solid
waste, squatting in open dumps and landfills, open dumping, burying of biodegradable or non-
biodegradable materials in flood-prone areas, establishment or operation of open dumps as enjoined in
RA 9003, and operation of waste management facilities without an environmental compliance
certificate. aEHIDT
Under Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA 7279), eviction or demolition
may be allowed "when persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage
dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks and
playgrounds". The MMDA, as lead agency, in coordination with the DPWH, LGUs, and concerned
agencies, can dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in
breach of RA 7279 and other pertinent laws along the rivers, waterways, and esteros in Metro Manila.
With respect to rivers, waterways, and esteros in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna that
discharge wastewater directly or eventually into the Manila Bay, the DILG shall direct the concerned
LGUs to implement the demolition and removal of such structures, constructions, and other
encroachments built in violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws in coordination with the DPWH
and concerned agencies. aSTECA
(10) The Department of Health (DOH), under Article 76 of PD 1067 (the Water Code), is tasked to
promulgate rules and regulations for the establishment of waste disposal areas that affect the source of
a water supply or a reservoir for domestic or municipal use. And under Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the DOH, in
coordination with the DENR, DPWH, and other concerned agencies, shall formulate guidelines and
standards for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage and the establishment and operation of a
centralized sewage treatment system. In areas not considered as highly urbanized cities, septage or a
mix sewerage-septage management system shall be employed.
In accordance with Sec. 72 30 of PD 856, the Code of Sanitation of the Philippines, and Sec. 5.1.1 31
of Chapter XVII of its implementing rules, the DOH is also ordered to ensure the regulation and
monitoring of the proper disposal of wastes by private sludge companies through the strict enforcement
of the requirement to obtain an environmental sanitation clearance of sludge collection treatment and
disposal before these companies are issued their environmental sanitation permit. IDScTE
(11) The Department of Education (DepEd), under the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), is
mandated to integrate subjects on environmental education in its school curricula at all levels. 32 Under
Sec. 118 of RA 8550, the DepEd, in collaboration with the DA, Commission on Higher Education, and
Philippine Information Agency, shall launch and pursue a nationwide educational campaign to promote
the development, management, conservation, and proper use of the environment. Under the Ecological
Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003), on the other hand, it is directed to strengthen the integration
of environmental concerns in school curricula at all levels, with an emphasis on waste management
principles. 33
(12) The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is tasked under Sec. 2, Title XVII of the
Administrative Code of 1987 to ensure the efficient and sound utilization of government funds and
revenues so as to effectively achieve the country's development objectives. 34
One of the country's development objectives is enshrined in RA 9275 or the Philippine Clean Water
Act of 2004. This law stresses that the State shall pursue a policy of economic growth in a manner
consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of the quality of our fresh, brackish, and
marine waters. It also provides that it is the policy of the government, among others, to streamline
processes and procedures in the prevention, control, and abatement of pollution mechanisms for the
protection of water resources; to promote environmental strategies and use of appropriate economic
instruments and of control mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to formulate a holistic
national program of water quality management that recognizes that issues related to this management
cannot be separated from concerns about water sources and ecological protection, water supply, public
health, and quality of life; and to provide a comprehensive management program for water pollution
focusing on pollution prevention. EICScD
Thus, the DBM shall then endeavor to provide an adequate budget to attain the noble objectives of RA
9275 in line with the country's development objectives.
All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in themselves clear, categorical, and
complete as to what are the obligations and mandate of each agency/petitioner under the law. We need
not belabor the issue that their tasks include the cleanup of the Manila Bay.
Now, as to the crux of the petition. Do Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code encompass the
cleanup of water pollution in general, not just specific pollution incidents? ACSaHc
Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code Include Cleaning in General
The disputed sections are quoted as follows:
Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality. — Where the quality of water has deteriorated to a degree
where its state will adversely affect its best usage, the government agencies concerned shall take such
measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed water quality
standards.
Section 20. Clean-up Operations. — It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain, remove
and clean-up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the
government agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and
expenses incurred in said operations shall be charged against the persons and/or entities responsible for
such pollution.
When the Clean Water Act (RA 9275) took effect, its Sec. 16 on the subject, Cleanup Operations,
amended the counterpart provision (Sec. 20) of the Environment Code (PD 1152). Sec. 17 of PD 1152
continues, however, to be operational. IaDTES
The amendatory Sec. 16 of RA 9275 reads:
SEC. 16. Cleanup Operations. — Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 15 and 26 hereof,
any person who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies in excess of the applicable and prevailing
standards shall be responsible to contain, remove and clean up any pollution incident at his own
expense to the extent that the same water bodies have been rendered unfit for utilization and beneficial
use: Provided, That in the event emergency cleanup operations are necessary and the polluter fails to
immediately undertake the same, the [DENR] in coordination with other government agencies
concerned, shall undertake containment, removal and cleanup operations. Expenses incurred in said
operations shall be reimbursed by the persons found to have caused such pollution under proper
administrative determination . . . . Reimbursements of the cost incurred shall be made to the Water
Quality Management Fund or to such other funds where said disbursements were sourced. TcIHDa
As may be noted, the amendment to Sec. 20 of the Environment Code is more apparent than real since
the amendment, insofar as it is relevant to this case, merely consists in the designation of the DENR as
lead agency in the cleanup operations.
Petitioners contend at every turn that Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code concern themselves
only with the matter of cleaning up in specific pollution incidents, as opposed to cleanup in general.
They aver that the twin provisions would have to be read alongside the succeeding Sec. 62 (g) and (h),
which defines the terms "cleanup operations" and "accidental spills", as follows:
g. Clean-up Operations [refer] to activities conducted in removing the pollutants discharged or
spilled in water to restore it to pre-spill condition.
h. Accidental Spills [refer] to spills of oil or other hazardous substances in water that result from
accidents such as collisions and groundings. aATEDS
Petitioners proffer the argument that Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 merely direct the government
agencies concerned to undertake containment, removal, and cleaning operations of a specific polluted
portion or portions of the body of water concerned. They maintain that the application of said Sec. 20 is
limited only to "water pollution incidents", which are situations that presuppose the occurrence of
specific, isolated pollution events requiring the corresponding containment, removal, and cleaning
operations. Pushing the point further, they argue that the aforequoted Sec. 62 (g) requires "cleanup
operations" to restore the body of water to pre-spill condition, which means that there must have been a
specific incident of either intentional or accidental spillage of oil or other hazardous substances, as
mentioned in Sec. 62 (h).
As a counterpoint, respondents argue that petitioners erroneously read Sec. 62 (g) as delimiting the
application of Sec. 20 to the containment, removal, and cleanup operations for accidental spills only.
Contrary to petitioners' posture, respondents assert that Sec. 62 (g), in fact, even expanded the coverage
of Sec. 20. Respondents explain that without its Sec. 62 (g), PD 1152 may have indeed covered only
pollution accumulating from the day-to-day operations of businesses around the Manila Bay and other
sources of pollution that slowly accumulated in the bay. Respondents, however, emphasize that Sec. 62
(g), far from being a delimiting provision, in fact even enlarged the operational scope of Sec. 20, by
including accidental spills as among the water pollution incidents contemplated in Sec. 17 in relation to
Sec. 20 of PD 1152. CSHcDT
To respondents, petitioners' parochial view on environmental issues, coupled with their narrow reading
of their respective mandated roles, has contributed to the worsening water quality of the Manila Bay.
Assuming, respondents assert, that petitioners are correct in saying that the cleanup coverage of Sec. 20
of PD 1152 is constricted by the definition of the phrase "cleanup operations" embodied in Sec. 62 (g),
Sec. 17 is not hobbled by such limiting definition. As pointed out, the phrases "cleanup operations" and
"accidental spills" do not appear in said Sec. 17, not even in the chapter where said section is found.
Respondents are correct. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government
agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations
when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the
absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality "has deteriorated to a degree where its
state will adversely affect its best usage". This section, to stress, commands concerned government
agencies, when appropriate, "to take such measures as may be necessary to meet the prescribed water
quality standards". In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the
occurrence of any pollution incident. ACcTDS
For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched, indicates that it is properly
applicable to a specific situation in which the pollution is caused by polluters who fail to clean up the
mess they left behind. In such instance, the concerned government agencies shall undertake the cleanup
work for the polluters' account. Petitioners' assertion, that they have to perform cleanup operations in
the Manila Bay only when there is a water pollution incident and the erring polluters do not undertake
the containment, removal, and cleanup operations, is quite off mark. As earlier discussed, the
complementary Sec. 17 of the Environment Code comes into play and the specific duties of the
agencies to clean up come in even if there are no pollution incidents staring at them. Petitioners, thus,
cannot plausibly invoke and hide behind Sec. 20 of PD 1152 or Sec. 16 of RA 9275 on the pretext that
their cleanup mandate depends on the happening of a specific pollution incident. In this regard, what
the CA said with respect to the impasse over Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 is at once valid as it is
practical. The appellate court wrote: "PD 1152 aims to introduce a comprehensive program of
environmental protection and management. This is better served by making Secs. 17 & 20 of general
application rather than limiting them to specific pollution incidents." 35 EaISTD
Granting arguendo that petitioners' position thus described vis-à-vis the implementation of Sec. 20 is
correct, they seem to have overlooked the fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such
magnitude and scope that it is well-nigh impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general
pollution incident. And such impossibility extends to pinpointing with reasonable certainty who the
polluters are. We note that Sec. 20 of PD 1152 mentions "water pollution incidents" which may be
caused by polluters in the waters of the Manila Bay itself or by polluters in adjoining lands and in water
bodies or waterways that empty into the bay. Sec. 16 of RA 9275, on the other hand, specifically
adverts to "any person who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies", which may refer to an
individual or an establishment that pollutes the land mass near the Manila Bay or the waterways, such
that the contaminants eventually end up in the bay. In this situation, the water pollution incidents are so
numerous and involve nameless and faceless polluters that they can validly be categorized as beyond
the specific pollution incident level.
Not to be ignored of course is the reality that the government agencies concerned are so undermanned
that it would be almost impossible to apprehend the numerous polluters of the Manila Bay. It may
perhaps not be amiss to say that the apprehension, if any, of the Manila Bay polluters has been few and
far between. Hence, practically nobody has been required to contain, remove, or clean up a given water
pollution incident. In this kind of setting, it behooves the Government to step in and undertake cleanup
operations. Thus, Sec. 16 of RA 9275, previously Sec. 20 of PD 1152, covers for all intents and
purposes a general cleanup situation. IDaEHC
The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial stage of the long-term
solution. The preservation of the water quality of the bay after the rehabilitation process is as important
as the cleaning phase. It is imperative then that the wastes and contaminants found in the rivers, inland
bays, and other bodies of water be stopped from reaching the Manila Bay. Otherwise, any cleanup
effort would just be a futile, cosmetic exercise, for, in no time at all, the Manila Bay water quality
would again deteriorate below the ideal minimum standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275, and other
relevant laws. It thus behooves the Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-agencies and the
bureaus and offices under them on continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform, their
mandates and duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and preserving the quality of its water to the
ideal level. Under what other judicial discipline describes as "continuing mandamus": 36 the Court
may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its
decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference. In India, the doctrine of
continuing mandamus was used to enforce directives of the court to clean up the length of the Ganges
River from industrial and municipal pollution. 37 CAaEDH
The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of shanties and other unauthorized structures which
do not have septic tanks along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the National Capital Region (NCR)
(Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the
Meycuayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the
Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and connecting waterways, river banks, and esteros which
discharge their waters, with all the accompanying filth, dirt, and garbage, into the major rivers and
eventually the Manila Bay. If there is one factor responsible for the pollution of the major river systems
and the Manila Bay, these unauthorized structures would be on top of the list. And if the issue of illegal
or unauthorized structures is not seriously addressed with sustained resolve, then practically all efforts
to cleanse these important bodies of water would be for naught. The DENR Secretary said as much. 38
cSTHaE
Giving urgent dimension to the necessity of removing these illegal structures is Art. 51 of PD 1067 or
the Water Code, 39 which prohibits the building of structures within a given length along banks of
rivers and other waterways. Art. 51 reads:
The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their entire length and
within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and forty (40)
meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to the easement of public use in the interest of
recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this zone
longer than what is necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build
structures of any kind. (Emphasis added.) AaCEDS
Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and other industrial establishments standing along or
near the banks of the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. But while they may
not be treated as unauthorized constructions, some of these establishments undoubtedly contribute to
the pollution of the Pasig River and waterways. The DILG and the concerned LGUs, have, accordingly,
the duty to see to it that non-complying industrial establishments set up, within a reasonable period, the
necessary waste water treatment facilities and infrastructure to prevent their industrial discharge,
including their sewage waters, from flowing into the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting
waterways. After such period, non-complying establishments shall be shut down or asked to transfer
their operations.
At this juncture, and if only to dramatize the urgency of the need for petitioners-agencies to comply
with their statutory tasks, we cite the Asian Development Bank-commissioned study on the garbage
problem in Metro Manila, the results of which are embodied in the The Garbage Book. As there
reported, the garbage crisis in the metropolitan area is as alarming as it is shocking. Some highlights of
the report: IcTCHD
1. As early as 2003, three land-filled dumpsites in Metro Manila — the Payatas, Catmon and
Rodriquez dumpsites — generate an alarming quantity of lead and leachate or liquid run-off. Leachate
are toxic liquids that flow along the surface and seep into the earth and poison the surface and
groundwater that are used for drinking, aquatic life, and the environment.
2. The high level of fecal coliform confirms the presence of a large amount of human waste in the
dump sites and surrounding areas, which is presumably generated by households that lack alternatives
to sanitation. To say that Manila Bay needs rehabilitation is an understatement.
3. Most of the deadly leachate, lead and other dangerous contaminants and possibly strains of
pathogens seeps untreated into ground water and runs into the Marikina and Pasig River systems and
Manila Bay. 40 DAHaTc
Given the above perspective, sufficient sanitary landfills should now more than ever be established as
prescribed by the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003). Particular note should be taken
of the blatant violations by some LGUs and possibly the MMDA of Sec. 37, reproduced below:
Sec. 37. Prohibition against the Use of Open Dumps for Solid Waste. — No open dumps shall be
established and operated, nor any practice or disposal of solid waste by any person, including LGUs
which [constitute] the use of open dumps for solid waste, be allowed after the effectivity of this Act:
Provided, further that no controlled dumps shall be allowed (5) years following the effectivity of this
Act. (Emphasis added.)
RA 9003 took effect on February 15, 2001 and the adverted grace period of five (5) years which ended
on February 21, 2006 has come and gone, but no single sanitary landfill which strictly complies with
the prescribed standards under RA 9003 has yet been set up. EaDATc
In addition, there are rampant and repeated violations of Sec. 48 of RA 9003, like littering, dumping of
waste matters in roads, canals, esteros, and other public places, operation of open dumps, open burning
of solid waste, and the like. Some sludge companies which do not have proper disposal facilities simply
discharge sludge into the Metro Manila sewerage system that ends up in the Manila Bay. Equally
unabated are violations of Sec. 27 of RA 9275, which enjoins the pollution of water bodies,
groundwater pollution, disposal of infectious wastes from vessels, and unauthorized transport or
dumping into sea waters of sewage or solid waste and of Secs. 4 and 102 of RA 8550 which proscribes
the introduction by human or machine of substances to the aquatic environment including
"dumping/disposal of waste and other marine litters, discharge of petroleum or residual products of
petroleum of carbonaceous materials/substances [and other] radioactive, noxious or harmful liquid,
gaseous or solid substances, from any water, land or air transport or other human-made structure."
In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to emphasize the extreme
necessity for all concerned executive departments and agencies to immediately act and discharge their
respective official duties and obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence; hence, there is a need to set
timetables for the performance and completion of the tasks, some of them as defined for them by law
and the nature of their respective offices and mandates. HAaDTE
The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical landmark cannot
be over-emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to restore the Manila Bay to its former splendor and
bring back the plants and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. But the tasks ahead, daunting as
they may be, could only be accomplished if those mandated, with the help and cooperation of all civic-
minded individuals, would put their minds to these tasks and take responsibility. This means that the
State, through petitioners, has to take the lead in the preservation and protection of the Manila Bay.
The era of delays, procrastination, and ad hoc measures is over. Petitioners must transcend their
limitations, real or imaginary, and buckle down to work before the problem at hand becomes
unmanageable. Thus, we must reiterate that different government agencies and instrumentalities cannot
shirk from their mandates; they must perform their basic functions in cleaning up and rehabilitating the
Manila Bay. We are disturbed by petitioners' hiding behind two untenable claims: (1) that there ought
to be a specific pollution incident before they are required to act; and (2) that the cleanup of the bay is a
discretionary duty. TacESD
RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform and improve waste
management. It implements Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, which explicitly provides that the
State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political
rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. 41 Even assuming the absence of a
categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and
women representing them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the
waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of
the trust reposed in them. IEHTaA
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV
No. 76528 and SP No. 74944 and the September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 1851-
99 are AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATIONS in view of subsequent developments or supervening
events in the case. The fallo of the RTC Decision shall now read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-government agencies
to clean up, rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its waters to SB level
(Class B sea waters per Water Classification Tables under DENR Administrative Order No. 34 [1990])
to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.
In particular:
(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development, and proper use of the country's environment and natural
resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275, designating the DENR as the primary government agency
responsible for its enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed to fully implement its
Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation, restoration, and
conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time. It is ordered to call regular coordination
meetings with concerned government departments and agencies to ensure the successful
implementation of the aforesaid plan of action in accordance with its indicated completion schedules.
aEcADH
(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 25 of
the Local Government Code of 1991, 42 the DILG, in exercising the President's power of general
supervision and its duty to promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management programs under
Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal,
Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all factories, commercial establishments,
and private homes along the banks of the major river systems in their respective areas of jurisdiction,
such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas)
Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan)
Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers
and waterways that eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to
determine whether they have wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks as prescribed by
existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations. If none be found, these LGUs shall be ordered to
require non-complying establishments and homes to set up said facilities or septic tanks within a
reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes, sewage water, and human wastes from flowing into these
rivers, waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or imposition of fines and other
sanctions. SaHTCE
(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275, 43 the MWSS is directed to provide, install, operate, and
maintain the necessary adequate waste water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite
where needed at the earliest possible time.
(4) Pursuant to RA 9275, 44 the LWUA, through the local water districts and in coordination with
the DENR, is ordered to provide, install, operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities and
the efficient and safe collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage in the provinces of Laguna, Cavite,
Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest possible time.
(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550, 45 the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to improve and
restore the marine life of the Manila Bay. It is also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal,
Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in developing, using recognized methods, the fisheries
and aquatic resources in the Manila Bay. ACHEaI
(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime Group, in accordance
with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination with each other, shall apprehend violators of PD 979, RA
8550, and other existing laws and regulations designed to prevent marine pollution in the Manila Bay.
(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513 46 and the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships, the PPA is ordered to immediately adopt such measures to prevent the discharge
and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters
from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators. EcDATH
(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects for flood control
projects and drainage services in Metro Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected
LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and
other agencies, shall dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other encroachments
established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San
Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros
Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal
implementor of programs and projects for flood control services in the rest of the country more
particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG,
affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other concerned government agencies, shall
remove and demolish all structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279
and other applicable laws along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay
(Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways,
and esteros that discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay. cTDIaC
In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary landfill, as prescribed
by RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year from finality of this Decision. On matters within its
territorial jurisdiction and in connection with the discharge of its duties on the maintenance of sanitary
landfills and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the apprehension and filing of the appropriate
criminal cases against violators of the respective penal provisions of RA 9003, 47 Sec. 27 of RA 9275
(the Clean Water Act), and other existing laws on pollution.
(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275, within one (1) year
from finality of this Decision, determine if all licensed septic and sludge companies have the proper
facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks. The DOH
shall give the companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time within which to set up the
necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its environmental sanitation clearance.
(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152, 48 Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA 9003, 49 the
DepEd shall integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste management, environmental protection,
and like subjects in the school curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds and hearts of students
and, through them, their parents and friends, the importance of their duty toward achieving and
maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire Philippine
archipelago. aSEHDA
(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General Appropriations Act of
2010 and succeeding years to cover the expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration, and preservation
of the water quality of the Manila Bay, in line with the country's development objective to attain
economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of our marine
waters.
(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG,
PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of
"continuing mandamus", shall, from finality of this Decision, each submit to the Court a quarterly
progressive report of the activities undertaken in accordance with this Decision. EHcaDT
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga,
Chico-Nazario, Nachura and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Corona and Brion, JJ., are on leave.
Leonardo-de Castro, J., is on official leave.
Footnotes
1. Now the Department of Education (DepEd). CScTED
2. Gore, AN INCONVENIENT TRUTH 161.
3. Rollo, p. 74.
4. Id. at 53.
5. Id. at 109-123. Penned by Executive Judge Lucenito N. Tagle (now retired Court of Appeals
Justice). IcaEDC
6. Id. at 47-58. Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. De Los Santos and concurred in by
Associate Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Jose C. Reyes, Jr. aDcEIH
7. Id. at 52.
8. Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 122728, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 301, 306.
9. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed., 2004).
10. Lamb v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456, 490 (1912).
11. G.R. No. 156052, March 7, 2007, 517 SCRA 657, as subsequently reiterated on February 13,
2008. cHCIEA
12. RA 9003 was approved on January 26, 2001.
13. 2 Feria Noche, CIVIL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED.
14. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed., 2004).
15. "Providing for the Reorganization of the [DENR], Renaming it as the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, and for Other Purposes".
16. Per DENR Secretary Jose Atienza, the DENR is preparing an EO for the purpose. TSN of oral
arguments, p. 118. EcICSA
17. Per information from the Water Quality Management Section, Environmental Management
Bureau, DENR, as validated by the DENR Secretary during the oral arguments. TSN, pp. 119-120.
18. "An Act Creating the [MWSS] and Dissolving the National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority [NAWASA]; and for Other Purposes". IASCTD
19. Sec. 22. Linkage Mechanism. — The [DENR] and its concerned attached agencies . . . shall
coordinate and enter into agreement with other government agencies, industrial sector and other
concerned sectors in the furtherance of the objectives of this Act. The following agencies shall perform
the functions specified hereunder:
xxx xxx xxx
b) DPWH through its attached agencies, such as the MWSS, LWUA, and including
other urban water utilities for the provision of sewerage and sanitation facilities and the efficient and
safe collection, treatment and disposal of sewage within their area of jurisdiction.
20. Book IV, Title IV, Sec. 2. DcSEHT
21. Sec. 14. Monitoring Control and Surveillance of the Philippine Waters. — A monitoring,
control and surveillance system shall be established by the [DA] in coordination with LGUs and other
agencies concerned to ensure that the fisheries and aquatic resources in the Philippine waters are
judiciously and wisely utilized and managed on a sustainable basis . . . .
22. Sec. 22. Linkage Mechanism. — . . . .
a) Philippine Coast Guard in coordination with DA and DENR shall enforce for the
enforcement of water quality standards in marine waters . . . specifically from offshore sources;
DaScAI
xxx xxx xxx
c) DA, shall coordinate with the DENR, in the formulation of guidelines . . . for the
prevention, control and abatement of pollution from agricultural and aquaculture activities . . .
Provided, further, That the . . . BFAR of the DA shall be primarily responsible for the prevention and
control of water pollution for the development, management and conservation of the fisheries and
aquatic resources.
23. Book IV, Title V, Sec. 2. Mandate. — The [DPWH] shall be the State's engineering arm and is
tasked to carry out the policy enumerated above [i.e., the planning, design, construction, and
maintenance of infrastructure facilities, especially . . . flood control and water resources development
systems]. cEaACD
Sec. 3. Powers and Functions. — The Department, in order to carry out its mandate, shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Develop and implement effective codes, standards, and reasonable guidelines to
ensure the safety of all public and private structures in the country and assure efficiency and proper
quality in the construction of public works;
(3) Ascertain that all public works plans and project implementation designs are
consistent with current standards and guidelines;
xxx xxx xxx
(8) Provide an integrated planning for . . . flood control and water resource and water
resource development systems . . . . SIcCEA
24. Sec. 6. Enforcement and Implementation. — The [PCG] shall have the primary responsibility of
enforcing the laws, rules and regulations governing marine pollution. However, it shall be the joint
responsibility of the [PCG] and the National Pollution Control Commission to coordinate and
cooperate with each other in the enforcement of the provisions of this decree and its implementing rules
and regulations, and may call upon any other government office, instrumentality or agency to extend
every assistance in this respect.
25. Sec. 124. Persons and Deputies Authorized to Enforce this Code. . . . . — The law enforcements
of the [DA], the Philippine Navy, [PCG, PNP], PNP-Maritime Command . . . are hereby authorized to
enforce this Code and other fishery laws . . . . cAaDHT
26. <http://www.ppa.com.ph> (visited November 20, 2008).
27. EO 513, "Reorganizing the Philippine Ports Authority", Sec. 2 provides further:
Section 6 is hereby amended by adding a new paragraph to read as follows:
Sec. 6-c. Police Authority. — . . . Such police authority shall include the following:
xxx xxx xxx
c) To maintain peace and order inside the port, in coordination with local police
authorities;
xxx xxx xxx
e) To enforce rules and regulations promulgated by the Authority pursuant to law.
IaHCAD
28. "International Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships, 1973 as modified
by the Protocol of 1978 Relating Thereto".
29. Sec. 10. Role of LGUs in Solid Waste Management. — Pursuant to the relevant provisions of
RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the LGUs shall be primarily
responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the provisions of this Act within their respective
jurisdictions.
30. Sec. 72. Scope of Supervision of the Department. — The approval of the Secretary or his duly
authorized representative is required in the following matters: IEaCDH
xxx xxx xxx
(g) Method of disposal of sludge from septic tanks or other treatment plants.
31. Sec. 5.1.1.a. It shall be unlawful for any person, entity or firm to discharge untreated effluent of
septic tanks and/or sewage treatment plants to bodies of water without obtaining approval from the
Secretary of Health or his duly authorized representatives.
32. Sec. 53. Environmental Education. — The [DepEd] shall integrate subjects on environmental
education in its school curricula at all levels. It shall also endeavor to conduct special community
education emphasizing the relationship of man and nature as well as environmental sanitation and
practices.
33. Sec. 56. Environmental Education in the Formal and Nonformal Sectors. — The national
government, through the [DepEd] and in coordination with concerned government agencies, NGOs and
private institutions, shall strengthen the integration of environmental concerns in school curricula at all
levels, with particular emphasis on the theory and practice of waste management principles like waste
minimization, specifically resource conservation and recovery, segregation at source, reduction,
recycling, re-use, and composting, in order to promote environmental awareness and action among the
citizenry. aIcSED
34. Title XVII, Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — The national budget shall be formulated and
implemented as an instrument of national development, reflective of national objectives and plans;
supportive of and consistent with the socio-economic development plans and oriented towards the
achievement of explicit objectives and expected results, to ensure that the utilization of funds and
operations of government entities are conducted effectively; formulated within the context of a
regionalized governmental structure and within the totality of revenues and other receipts, expenditures
and borrowings of all levels of government and of government-owned or controlled corporations; and
prepared within the context of the national long-term plans and budget programs of the Government.
35. Rollo, p. 76.
36. Vineet Narain v. Union of India, 1 SCC 226 (1998).
37. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 4 SC 463 (1987).
38. TSN, p. 121. DaScHC
39. Repealed Art. 638 of the CIVIL CODE. See E.L. Pineda, PROPERTY 399 (1999).
40. Asian Development Bank, THE GARBAGE BOOK 44-45 (November 2006).
41. G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 792, 805.
42. Sec. 25. National Supervision over Local Government Units. — (a) Consistent with the basic
policy on local autonomy, the President shall exercise general supervision over local government units
to ensure that their acts are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions. IHDCcT
43. Sec. 8. Domestic Sewage Collection, Treatment and Disposal. — Within five (5) years
following the effectivity of this Act, the Agency vested to provide water supply and sewerage facilities
and/or concessionaires in Metro Manila and other highly urbanized cities (HUCs) as defined in [RA]
7160, in coordination with LGUs, shall be required to connect the existing sewage line found in all
subdivisions, condominiums, commercial centers, hotels, sports and recreational facilities, hospitals,
market places, public buildings, industrial complex and other similar establishments including
households to available sewerage system. Provided, That the said connection shall be subject to
sewerage services charge/fees in accordance with existing laws, rules or regulations unless the sources
had already utilized their own sewerage system: Provided, further, That all sources of sewage and
septage shall comply with the requirements herein.
44. Supra note 18.
45. Sec. 65. Functions of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources. — As a line bureau, the
BFAR shall have the following functions: HIAcCD
xxx xxx xxx
q. assist the LGUs in developing their technical capability in the development,
management, regulation, conservation, and protection of fishery resources;
xxx xxx xxx
s. perform such other related function which shall promote the development,
conservation, management, protection and utilization of fisheries and aquatic resources.
46. Supra notes 25 & 26. 2005cdasia
47. Among the prohibited and penalized acts under Sec. 48 of RA 9003 are: (1) littering and
dumping of waste matters in public places; (2) open burning of solid wastes; (3) squatting in open
dumps and landfills; (4) transporting and dumping in bulk of collected domestic, industrial, commercial
and institutional wastes in areas other than centers and facilities prescribed under the Act; (5)
construction or operation of waste management facilities without an Environmental Compliance
Certificate; and (6) construction or operation of landfills or any waste disposal facility on any aquifer,
groundwater reservoir or watershed area.
48. Supra note 31.
49. Supra note 32. aDIHTE
CASE 2011-0067: METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT
OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
CULTURE AND SPORTS,[1] DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME
GROUP, AND DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCALGOVERNMENT VS.
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OFMANILA BAY, REPRESENTED ANDJOINED BY DIVINA V.
ILAS, SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH DELA PEÑA, PAUL
DENNIS QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA, FATIMA QUITAIN,
VENICE SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA, SARAH JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS
BOBIS, FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, AND JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA (G.R. NOS. 171947-48, 15
FEBRUARY 2011, VELASCO, JR., J.)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF

ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE
AND SPORTS,[1] DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME
GROUP, and DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCALGOVERNMENT,

Petitioners,

- versus -

CONCERNED RESIDENTS OFMANILA BAY, represented andjoined by DIVINA V. ILAS,

SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH

DELA PEÑA, PAUL DENNIS

QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA

LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA, FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE

SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA,

SARAH JOELLE LINTAG,

HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS,

FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, and

JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA,

Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 171947-48

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,

CARPIO,

CARPIO MORALES,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION,

PERALTA,

BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD,

VILLARAMA, JR.,

PEREZ,

MENDOZA, and

SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:

February 15, 2011

x————————————————————————————–x

RESOLUTION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

On December 18, 2008, this Court rendered a Decision in G.R. Nos. 171947-48 ordering
petitioners to clean up, rehabilitate and preserve Manila Bay in their different capacities. The fallo
reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision of the CA in CA-
G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP No. 74944 and the September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case
No. 1851-99 are AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATIONS in view of subsequent developments or
supervening events in the case. The fallo of the RTC Decision shall now read:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-government agencies

to clean up, rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its waters to SB level
(Class B sea waters per Water Classification Tables under DENR Administrative Order No. 34 [1990])
to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.

In particular:

(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development, and proper use of the country’s environment and natural
resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275, designating the DENR as the primary government agency
responsible for its enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed to fully implement its
Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation, restoration, and
conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time. It is ordered to call regular coordination
meetings with concerned government departments and agencies to ensure the successful
implementation of the aforesaid plan of action in accordance with its indicated completion schedules.

(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 25 of the
Local Government Code of 1991, the DILG, in exercising the President’s power of general supervision
and its duty to promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management programs under Sec. 43 of the
Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite,
Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all factories, commercial establishments, and private homes
along the banks of the major river systems in their respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not
limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the
Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the
Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and
waterways that eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to
determine whether they have wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks as prescribed by
existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations. If none be found, these LGUs shall be ordered to
require non-complying establishments and homes to set up said facilities or septic tanks within a
reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes, sewage water, and human wastes from flowing into these
rivers, waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or imposition of fines and other
sanctions.

(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the MWSS is directed to provide, install, operate, and maintain
the necessary adequate waste water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite where
needed at the earliest possible time.

(4) Pursuant to RA 9275, the LWUA, through the local water districts and in coordination with the
DENR, is ordered to provide, install, operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities and the
efficient and safe collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage in the provinces of Laguna, Cavite,
Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest possible time.

(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550, the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to improve and restore the
marine life of the Manila Bay. It is also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite,
Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in developing, using recognized methods, the fisheries and
aquatic resources in the Manila Bay.

(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime Group, in accordance with
Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination with each other, shall apprehend violators of PD 979, RA 8550,
and other existing laws and regulations designed to prevent marine pollution in the Manila Bay.

(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513 and the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships, the PPA is ordered to immediately adopt such measures to prevent the discharge
and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into theManila Bay waters
from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators.

(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects for flood control
projects and drainage services in Metro Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected
LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and
other agencies, shall dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other encroachments
established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San
Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros
Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal
implementor of programs and projects for flood control services in the rest of the country more
particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG,
affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other concerned government agencies, shall
remove and demolish all structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279
and other applicable laws along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay
(Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways,
and esteros that discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay.

In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary landfill, as prescribed
by RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year from finality of this Decision. On matters within its
territorial jurisdiction and in connection with the discharge of its duties on the maintenance of sanitary
landfills and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the apprehension and filing of the appropriate
criminal cases against violators of the respective penal provisions of RA 9003, Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the
Clean Water Act), and other existing laws on pollution.

(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275, within one (1) year from
finality of this Decision, determine if all licensed septic and sludge companies have the proper facilities
for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks. The DOH shall
give the companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time within which to set up the
necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its environmental sanitation clearance.

(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152, Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA 9003, the DepEd shall
integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste management, environmental protection, and like
subjects in the school curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds and hearts of students and,
through them, their parents and friends, the importance of their duty toward achieving and maintaining
a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire Philippine archipelago.

(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General Appropriations Act of
2010 and succeeding years to cover the expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration, and preservation
of the water quality of the Manila Bay, in line with the country’s development objective to attain
economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of our marine
waters.

(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP
Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of “continuing
mandamus,” shall, from finality of this Decision, each submit to the Court a quarterly progressive
report of the activities undertaken in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

The government agencies did not file any motion for reconsideration and the Decision became final in
January 2009.

The case is now in the execution phase of the final and executory December 18, 2008 Decision. The
Manila Bay Advisory Committee was created to receive and evaluate the quarterly progressive reports
on the activities undertaken by the agencies in accordance with said decision and to monitor the
execution phase.

In the absence of specific completion periods, the Committee recommended that time frames be set for
the agencies to perform their assigned tasks. This may be viewed as an encroachment over the powers
and functions of the Executive Branch headed by the President of the Philippines.

This view is misplaced.

The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of judicial power under Art.
VIII of the Constitution, because the execution of the Decision is but an integral part of the adjudicative
function of the Court. None of the agencies ever questioned the power of the Court to implement the
December 18, 2008 Decision nor has any of them raised the alleged encroachment by the Court over
executive functions.

While additional activities are required of the agencies like submission of plans of action, data or status
reports, these directives are but part and parcel of the execution stage of a final decision under Rule 39
of the Rules of Court. Section 47 of Rule 39 reads:

Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.––The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a
court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as
follows:

xxxx

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties of their successors in interest, that only is
deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have
been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
(Emphasis supplied.)

It is clear that the final judgment includes not only what appears upon its face to have been so
adjudged but also those matters “actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.”
Certainly, any activity that is needed to fully implement a final judgment is necessarily encompassed
by said judgment.

Moreover, the submission of periodic reports is sanctioned by Secs. 7 and 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental cases:

Sec. 7. Judgment.––If warranted, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ of continuing
mandamus requiring respondent to perform an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied
and to grant such other reliefs as may be warranted resulting from the wrongful or illegal acts of the
respondent. The court shall require the respondent to submit periodic reports detailing the progress and
execution of the judgment, and the court may, by itself or through a commissioner or the appropriate
government agency, evaluate and monitor compliance. The petitioner may submit its comments or
observations on the execution of the judgment.

Sec. 8. Return of the writ.––The periodic reports submitted by the respondent detailing
compliance with the judgment shall be contained in partial returns of the writ. Upon full satisfaction of
the judgment, a final return of the writ shall be made to the court by the respondent. If the court finds
that the judgment has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court
docket. (Emphasis supplied.)

With the final and executory judgment in MMDA, the writ of continuing mandamus issued in
MMDA means that until petitioner-agencies have shown full compliance with the Court’s orders, the
Court exercises continuing jurisdiction over them until full execution of the judgment.

There being no encroachment over executive functions to speak of, We shall now proceed to the
recommendation of the Manila Bay Advisory Committee.

Several problems were encountered by the Manila Bay Advisory Committee.[2] An evaluation of
the quarterly progressive reports has shown that (1) there are voluminous quarterly progressive reports
that are being submitted; (2) petitioner-agencies do not have a uniform manner of reporting their
cleanup, rehabilitation and preservation activities; (3) as yet no definite deadlines have been set by
petitioner DENR as to petitioner-agencies’ timeframe for their respective duties; (4) as of June 2010
there has been a change in leadership in both the national and local levels; and (5) some agencies have
encountered difficulties in complying with the Court’s directives.

In order to implement the afore-quoted Decision, certain directives have to be issued by the
Court to address the said concerns.
Acting on the recommendation of the Manila Bay Advisory Committee, the Court hereby resolves to
ORDER the following:

(1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), as lead agency in the
Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004, shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the updated
Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy.

The DENR is ordered to submit summarized data on the overall quality of Manila Bay waters for all
four quarters of 2010 on or before June 30, 2011.

The DENR is further ordered to submit the names and addresses of persons and companies in Metro
Manila, Rizal, Laguna,Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan that generate toxic and hazardous waste
on or before September 30, 2011.

(2) On or before June 30, 2011, the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) shall
order the Mayors of all cities in Metro Manila; the Governors of Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan,
Pampanga and Bataan; and the Mayors of all the cities and towns in said provinces to inspect all
factories, commercial establishments and private homes along the banks of the major river systems––
such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the National Capital Region (Paranaque-
Zapote, Las Pinas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-
Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, and the Laguna De
Bay––and other minor rivers and waterways within their jurisdiction that eventually discharge water
into the Manila Bay and the lands abutting it, to determine if they have wastewater treatment facilities
and/or hygienic septic tanks, as prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, rules and regulations. Said
local government unit (LGU) officials are given up to September 30, 2011 to finish the inspection of
said establishments and houses.

In case of non-compliance, the LGU officials shall take appropriate action to ensure compliance by
non-complying factories, commercial establishments and private homes with said law, rules and
regulations requiring the construction or installment of wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic
septic tanks.

The aforementioned governors and mayors shall submit to the DILG on or before December 31, 2011
their respective compliance reports which will contain the names and addresses or offices of the owners
of all the non-complying factories, commercial establishments and private homes, copy furnished the
concerned environmental agency, be it the local DENR office or the Laguna Lake Development
Authority.

The DILG is required to submit a five-year plan of action that will contain measures intended to ensure
compliance of all non-complying factories, commercial establishments, and private homes.

On or before June 30, 2011, the DILG and the mayors of all cities in Metro Manila shall consider
providing land for the wastewater facilities of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
(MWSS) or its concessionaires (Maynilad and Manila Water, Inc.) within their respective jurisdictions.
(3) The MWSS shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the list of areas in Metro
Manila, Rizal and Cavite that do not have the necessary wastewater treatment facilities. Within the
same period, the concessionaires of the MWSS shall submit their plans and projects for the
construction of wastewater treatment facilities in all the aforesaid areas and the completion period for
said facilities, which shall not go beyond 2037.

On or before June 30, 2011, the MWSS is further required to have its two concessionaires submit a
report on the amount collected as sewerage fees in their respective areas of operation as of December
31, 2010.

(4) The Local Water Utilities Administration is ordered to submit on or before September 30, 2011
its plan to provide, install, operate and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities in said cities and
towns and the completion period for said works, which shall be fully implemented by December 31,
2020.

(5) The Department of Agriculture (DA), through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources,
shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 a report on areas in Manila Bay where marine life
has to be restored or improved and the assistance it has extended to the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal,
Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan in developing the fisheries and aquatic resources in
Manila Bay. The report shall contain monitoring data on the marine life in said areas. Within the same
period, it shall submit its five-year plan to restore and improve the marine life in Manila Bay, its future
activities to assist the aforementioned LGUs for that purpose, and the completion period for said
undertakings.

The DA shall submit to the Court on or before September 30, 2011 the baseline data as of September
30, 2010 on the pollution loading into the Manila Bay system from agricultural and livestock sources.

(6) The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) shall incorporate in its quarterly reports the list of violators
it has apprehended and the status of their cases. The PPA is further ordered to include in its report the
names, make and capacity of the ships that dock in PPA ports. The PPA shall submit to the Court on or
before June 30, 2011 the measures it intends to undertake to implement its compliance with paragraph
7 of the dispositive portion of the MMDA Decision and the completion dates of such measures.

The PPA should include in its report the activities of its concessionaire that collects and disposes of the
solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes, which shall state the names, make and
capacity of the ships serviced by it since August 2003 up to the present date, the dates the ships docked
at PPA ports, the number of days the ship was at sea with the corresponding number of passengers and
crew per trip, the volume of solid, liquid and other wastes collected from said ships, the treatment
undertaken and the disposal site for said wastes.

(7) The Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group shall submit on or before June 30, 2011
its five-year plan of action on the measures and activities it intends to undertake to apprehend the
violators of Republic Act No. (RA) 8550 or thePhilippine Fisheries Code of 1998 and other pertinent
laws, ordinances and regulations to prevent marine pollution in Manila Bayand to ensure the successful
prosecution of violators.

The Philippine Coast Guard shall likewise submit on or before June 30, 2011 its five-year plan of
action on the measures and activities they intend to undertake to apprehend the violators of Presidential
Decree No. 979 or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976 and RA 9993 or the Philippine Coast Guard
Law of 2009 and other pertinent laws and regulations to prevent marine pollution in Manila Bay and to
ensure the successful prosecution of violators.

(8) The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) shall submit to the Court on or
before June 30, 2011 the names and addresses of the informal settlers in Metro Manila who, as of
December 31, 2010, own and occupy houses, structures, constructions and other encroachments
established or built along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas)
Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros, in
violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws. On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA shall submit
its plan for the removal of said informal settlers and the demolition of the aforesaid houses, structures,
constructions and encroachments, as well as the completion dates for said activities, which shall be
fully implemented not later than December 31, 2015.

The MMDA is ordered to submit a status report, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Resolution,
on the establishment of a sanitary landfill facility for Metro Manila in compliance with the standards
under RA 9003 or the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act.

On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA shall submit a report of the location of open and controlled
dumps in Metro Manila whose operations are illegal after February 21, 2006,[3] pursuant to Secs. 36
and 37 of RA 9003, and its plan for the closure of these open and controlled dumps to be accomplished
not later than December 31, 2012. Also, on or before June 30, 2011, the DENR Secretary, as
Chairperson of the National Solid Waste Management Commission (NSWMC), shall submit a report
on the location of all open and controlled dumps in Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga and
Bataan.

On or before June 30, 2011, the DENR Secretary, in his capacity as NSWMC Chairperson, shall submit
a report on whether or not the following landfills strictly comply with Secs. 41 and 42 of RA 9003 on
the establishment and operation of sanitary landfills, to wit:

National Capital Region

1. Navotas SLF (PhilEco), Brgy. Tanza (New Site), Navotas City

2. Payatas Controlled Dumpsite, Barangay Payatas, Quezon City

Region III

3. Sitio Coral, Brgy. Matictic, Norzagaray, Bulacan

4. Sitio Tiakad, Brgy. San Mateo, Norzagaray, Bulacan

5. Brgy. Minuyan, San Jose del Monte City, Bulacan

6. Brgy. Mapalad, Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija

7. Sub-zone Kalangitan, Clark Capas, Tarlac Special

Economic Zone
Region IV-A

8. Kalayaan (Longos), Laguna

9. Brgy. Sto. Nino, San Pablo City, Laguna

10. Brgy. San Antonio (Pilotage SLF), San Pedro, Laguna

11. Morong, Rizal

12. Sitio Lukutan, Brgy. San Isidro, Rodriguez (Montalban), Rizal (ISWIMS)

13. Brgy. Pintong Bukawe, San Mateo, Rizal (SMSLFDC)

On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA and the seventeen (17) LGUs in Metro Manila are ordered to
jointly submit a report on the average amount of garbage collected monthly per district in all the cities
in Metro Manila from January 2009 up to December 31, 2010 vis-à-vis the average amount of garbage
disposed monthly in landfills and dumpsites. In its quarterly report for the last quarter of 2010 and
thereafter, MMDA shall report on the apprehensions for violations of the penal provisions of RA 9003,
RA 9275 and other laws on pollution for the said period.

On or before June 30, 2011, the DPWH and the LGUs in Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga,
and Bataan shall submit the names and addresses of the informal settlers in their respective areas who,
as of September 30, 2010, own or occupy houses, structures, constructions, and other encroachments
built along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus
(Cavite) River, the Laguna de Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways and esteros that discharge
wastewater into the Manila Bay, in breach of RA 7279 and other applicable laws. On or before June
30, 2011, the DPWH and the aforesaid LGUs shall jointly submit their plan for the removal of said
informal settlers and the demolition of the aforesaid structures, constructions and encroachments, as
well as the completion dates for such activities which shall be implemented not later than December
31, 2012.

(9) The Department of Health (DOH) shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the names
and addresses of the owners of septic and sludge companies including those that do not have the proper
facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks.

The DOH shall implement rules and regulations on Environmental Sanitation Clearances and shall
require companies to procure a license to operate from the DOH.

The DOH and DENR-Environmental Management Bureau shall develop a toxic and hazardous waste
management system by June 30, 2011 which will implement segregation of hospital/toxic/hazardous
wastes and prevent mixing with municipal solid waste.

On or before June 30, 2011, the DOH shall submit a plan of action to ensure that the said companies
have proper disposal facilities and the completion dates of compliance.

(10) The Department of Education (DepEd) shall submit to the Court on or before May 31, 2011 a
report on the specific subjects on pollution prevention, waste management, environmental protection,
environmental laws and the like that it has integrated into the school curricula in all levels for the
school year 2011-2012.

On or before June 30, 2011, the DepEd shall also submit its plan of action to ensure compliance of all
the schools under its supervision with respect to the integration of the aforementioned subjects in the
school curricula which shall be fully implemented by June 30, 2012.

(11) All the agencies are required to submit their quarterly reports electronically using the forms
below. The agencies may add other key performance indicators that they have identified.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1] Now the Department of Education (DepEd).

[2] On February 10, 2009, the Court En Banc approved a resolution creating an Advisory Committee
“that will verify the reports of the government agencies tasked to clean up the Manila Bay.” It is
composed of two members of the Court and three technical experts:

Hon. Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.

Chairperson and ponente of MMDA vs. Concerned Residents of Manila

Hon. Jose Midas P. Marquez

Court Administrator

Vice-Chairperson
Members/Technical Experts:

Dr. Gil S. Jacinto

Former Director, UP Marine Science Institute

Dr. Elisea G. Gozun

Chair of Earth Day Network and Former DENR Secretary

Dr. Antonio G.M. La Viña

Former DENR Undersecretary

Dean of the Ateneo School of Government

[3] Our Decision in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila
Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947-48, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 661, 690, states: “RA 9003 took effect on
February 15, 2001 and the adverted grace period of five (5) years [in Sec. 37 of RA 9003] which ended
on February 21, 2006 has come and gone, but no single sanitary landfill which strictly complies with
the prescribed standards under RA 9003 has yet been set up.” (Emphasis supplied.)
497 U.S. 871, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 31 ERC 1553, 111 L.Ed.2d 695, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,962

Briefs and Other Related Documents

Judges and Attorneys
Supreme Court of the United States
Manuel LUJAN, Jr., Secretary of the Interior, et al., Petitioners
v.
NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, et al.

No. 89-640.

Argued April 16, 1990.

Decided June 27, 1990.

National wildlife group filed action challenging the “land withdrawal review program” of the Bureau of
Land Management. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, John H. Pratt, J., 699
F.Supp. 327, granted summary judgment against the group. Appeal was taken. The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia, 878 F.2d 422, reversed and remanded. Certiorari was granted. The
Supreme Court, Justice Scalia, held that: (1) affidavits which were filed by members of the group and
which indicated the members' recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment of land “in the vicinity” of land
covered by agency actions under the Bureau's “land withdrawal review program” were insufficient to
show that the affiants' interests were actually affected; (2) the “land withdrawal review program” was
not “agency action” or “final agency action,” within meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act; and
(3) affidavit, which indicated that the group's ability to fulfill its informational and advocacy functions
was “adversely affected” by alleged failure of the Bureau to provide adequate information and
opportunities for public participation with respect to the “land withdrawal review program” failed to
identify any particular “agency action” that was the source of the group's alleged injuries.

Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed.

Justice Blackmun, dissented and filed opinion in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined.

West Headnotes

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In order to obtain judicial review under the general review provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act, the person claiming right to sue must identify some agency action that affects him in specified
fashion and must show that he has suffered legal wrong because of the challenged agency action or is
adversely affected or aggrieved by that action within the meaning of a relevant statute. 5 U.S.C.A. §
702.

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When judicial review of agency action is sought, not pursuant to specific authorization in substantive
statute, but only under general review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act as person
suffering legal wrong because of challenged agency action or adversely affected or aggrieved by that
action, the “agency action” must be final agency action. 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 551(13), 701(b)(2), 702, 704.

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To be adversely affected or aggrieved within meaning of statute, for purposes of obtaining judicial
review of agency action under general review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, plaintiff
must establish that the injury he complains of (his aggrievement, or the adverse affect upon him) falls
within the “zone of interests” sought to be protected by the statutory provision whose violation forms
the legal basis for his complaint. 5 U.S.C.A. § 702.

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Summary judgment must be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against party
who fails to make showing sufficient to establish the existence of element essential to that party's case
on which that party will bear burden of proof at trial. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56(c), 28 U.S.C.A.

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In order to avoid summary judgment, party who is seeking judicial review of agency action under the
general review provision of the Administrative Procedure Act has burden to set forth specific facts,
even though they may be controverted by the government, showing that he has satisfied its terms. 5
U.S.C.A. § 702; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S.C.A.

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Summary judgment rule does not require movant to negate elements of nonmovant's case; rather,
regardless of whether movant accompanies its summary judgment motion with affidavits, the motion
may, and should, be granted so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that standard
for entry of summary judgment is satisfied. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rules 56, 56(c), 28 U.S.C.A.

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Affidavits, which were filed by members of national wildlife group and which indicated the members'
recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment of land “in the vicinity” of land covered by agency actions
under the “land withdrawal review program” of the Bureau of Land Management, were insufficient to
show that the members' interests were actually affected, for purposes of the general review provisions
of the Administrative Procedure Act; affidavits indicated only that the members used unspecified
portions of immense tract of territory, on some portions of which mining activity had occurred or
probably would occur by virtue of the governmental action, and missing facts could not be “presumed”
to establish the injury that was generally alleged. 5 U.S.C.A. § 702; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28
U.S.C.A.

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When ruling on summary judgment motion, district court must resolve any factual issues of
controversy in favor of nonmovant only in the sense that, where facts specifically averred by
nonmovant contradict facts specifically averred by movant, motion must be denied. Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S.C.A.

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“Land withdrawal review program” of the Bureau of Land Management was not “agency action” for
purposes of general review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, much less “final agency
action,” within meaning of the Act; term “land withdrawal review program” did not refer to single
Bureau order or regulation, or even to completed universe of particular Bureau orders and regulations,
but, rather, referred to the continuing and thus constantly changing operations of the Bureau in
reviewing withdrawal revocation applications and the classifications of public lands and developing
land use plans as required by the Federal Land Policy and Management Act. Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976, § 102 et seq., 43 U.S.C.A. § 1701 et seq.; 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 702, 704.

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Substantive rule which as a practical matter requires plaintiff to adjust his conduct immediately is
agency action “ripe” for judicial review at once, whether or not explicit statutory review apart from the
Administrative Procedure Act is provided. 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 702, 704.

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Flaws in the entire “land withdrawal review program” of the Bureau of Land Management cannot be
laid before the courts for wholesale correction under the Administrative Procedure Act simply because
one of them that is ripe for review adversely affects one member of national wildlife group.

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Except where Congress explicitly provides for correction of the administrative process at higher level
of generality, the Supreme Court intervenes in the administration of the laws only when, and to the
extent that, specific “final agency action” has actual or immediately threatened effect. 5 U.S.C.A. §§
702, 704.

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Declining to admit supplemental affidavits, which were filed in response to district court's briefing
order following the summary judgment hearing, was not abuse of discretion, in action brought under
the general review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act; the affidavits were untimely under
applicable rules, and although the district court could perhaps have overcome the apparent lack of a
motion, of a showing of cause, and of excusable neglect to admit the affidavits, it was not compelled to
receive them. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rules 6(b, d), 56, 56(c), 28 U.S.C.A.; 5 U.S.C.A. § 702.

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Affidavit, which indicated that national wildlife group's ability to fulfill its informational and advocacy
functions was adversely affected by alleged failure of the Bureau of Land Management to provide
adequate information and opportunities for public participation with respect to the Bureau's “land
withdrawal review program,” failed to identify any particular “agency action” that was source of the
group's alleged injury, and, thus, group was not entitled to judicial review of the Bureau's actions under
the general review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act; the “land withdrawal review
program” was not identifiable action or event, and group could not demand general judicial review of
the Bureau's day-to-day operations. 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 702, 704.

**3179 Syllabus FN*

FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter
of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321,
337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed. 499.
*871 The National Wildlife Federation (hereinafter respondent) filed this action in the District Court
against petitioners, the Director of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and other federal parties,
alleging that, in various respects, they had violated the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of
1976 (FLPMA) and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) in the course of
administering the BLM's “land withdrawal review program,” and that the complained-of actions should
be set aside because they were “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law” within the meaning of § 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5
U.S.C. § 706. Under the program, petitioners make various types of decisions affecting the status of
public lands and their availability for private uses such as mining, a number of which decisions were
listed in an appendix to the complaint. The court granted petitioners' motion for summary judgment
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, holding that respondent lacked standing to seek judicial
review of petitioners' actions under the APA, § 702. The court ruled that affidavits by two of
respondent's members, Peterson and Erman, claiming use of public lands “in the vicinity” of lands
covered by two of the listed decisions, were insufficient to confer standing as to those particular
decisions, and that, even if they had been adequate for that limited purpose, they could not support
respondent's attempted APA challenge to each of the 1,250 or so individual actions effected under the
program. The **3180 court rejected as untimely four more member affidavits pertaining to standing,
which were submitted after argument on the summary judgment motion and in purported response to
the District Court's postargument request for additional briefing. The Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that the Peterson and Erman affidavits were sufficient in themselves, that it was an abuse of
discretion not to consider the four additional affidavits, and that standing to challenge the individual
decisions conferred standing to challenge all such decisions.

Held:

1. The Peterson and Erman affidavits are insufficient to establish respondent's § 702 entitlement to
judicial review as “[a] person ... *872 adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute.” Pp. 3185-3189.

(a) To establish a right to relief under § 702, respondent must satisfy two requirements. First, it must
show that it has been affected by some “agency action,” as defined in § 551(13). See § 701(b)(2). Since
neither the FLPMA nor NEPA provides a private right of action, the “agency action” in question must
also be “final agency action” under § 704. Second, respondent must prove that it is “adversely affected
or aggrieved” by that action “within the meaning of a relevant statute,” which requires a showing that
the injury complained of falls within the “zone of interests” sought to be protected by the FLPMA and
NEPA. Cf. Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U.S. 388, 396-397, 107 S.Ct. 750, 755-756, 93
L.Ed.2d 757. Pp. 3185-3186.

(b) When a defendant moves for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff has failed to
establish a right to relief under § 702, the burden is on the plaintiff, under Rule 56(e), to set forth
specific facts (even though they may be controverted by the defendant) showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial. Cf. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265.
Where no such showing is made, the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id., at 323,
106 S.Ct., at 2552. Pp. 3186-3187.

(c) The specific facts alleged in the two affidavits do not raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether
respondent has a right to relief under § 702. It may be assumed that the allegedly affected interests set
forth in the affidavits-“recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment”-are sufficiently related to respondent's
purposes that respondent meets § 702's requirements if any of its members do. Moreover, each affidavit
can be read to complain of a particular “agency action” within § 551's meaning; and whatever “adverse
effect” or “aggrievement” is established by the affidavits, meets the “zone of interests” test, since
“recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment” are among the sorts of interests that the FLPMA and NEPA
are designed to protect. However, there has been no showing that those interests of Peterson and Erman
were actually “affected” by petitioners' actions, since the affidavits alleged only that the affiants used
unspecified lands “in the vicinity of” immense tracts of territory, only on some portions of which, the
record shows, mining activity has occurred or probably will occur by virtue of the complained-of
actions. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the District Court had to presume specific facts
sufficient to support the general allegations of injury to the affiants, since such facts are essential to
sustaining the complaint and, under Rule 56(e), had to be set forth by respondent. United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 37
L.Ed.2d 254, distinguished. Pp. 3187-3189.

*873 2. Respondent's four additional member affidavits did not establish its right to § 702 review. Pp.
3189-3193.

(a) The affidavits are insufficient to enable respondent to challenge the entirety of **3181 petitioners'
“land withdrawal review program.” That term does not refer to a single BLM order or regulation, or
even to a completed universe of particular BLM orders and regulations, but is simply the name by
which petitioners have occasionally referred to certain continuing (and thus constantly changing) BLM
operations regarding public lands, which currently extend to about 1,250 individual decisions and
presumably will include more actions in the future. Thus, the program is not an identifiable “agency
action” within § 702's meaning, much less a “final agency action” under § 704. Absent an explicit
congressional authorization to correct the administrative process on a systemic level, agency action is
not ordinarily considered “ripe” for judicial review under the APA until the scope of the controversy
has been reduced to manageable proportions, and its factual components fleshed out, by concrete action
that harms or threatens to harm the complainant. It may well be, due to the scope of the “program,” that
the individual BLM actions identified in the affidavits will not be “ripe” for challenge until some
further agency action or inaction more immediately harming respondent occurs. But it is entirely
certain that the flaws in the entire “program” cannot be laid before the courts for wholesale correction
under the APA simply because one of them that is ripe for review adversely affects one of respondent's
members. Respondent must seek such programmatic improvements from the BLM or Congress. Pp.
3189-3191.

(b) The District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to admit the supplemental affidavits.
Since the affidavits were filed in response to the court's briefing order following the summary judgment
hearing, they were untimely under, inter alia, Rule 6(d), which provides that “opposing affidavits may
be served not later than 1 day before the hearing.” Although Rule 6(b) allows a court, “in its
discretion,” to extend any filing deadline “for cause shown,” a post -deadline extension must be “upon
motion made,” and is permissible only where the failure to meet the deadline “was the result of
excusable neglect.” Here, respondent made no motion for extension nor any showing of “cause.”
Moreover, the failure to timely file did not result from “excusable neglect,” since the court's order
setting the hearing on the summary judgment motion put respondent on notice that its right to sue was
at issue, and that (absent proper motion) the time for filing additional evidentiary materials was, at the
latest, the day before the hearing. Even if the court could have overcome these obstacles to admit the
affidavits, it was not compelled, in exercising its discretion, to do so. Pp. 3191-3193.

*874 3. Respondent is not entitled to seek § 702 review of petitioners' actions in its own right. The brief
affidavit submitted to the District Court to show that respondent's ability to fulfill its informational and
advocacy functions was “adversely affected” by petitioners' alleged failure to provide adequate
information and opportunities for public participation with respect to the land withdrawal review
program fails to identify any particular “agency action” that was the source of respondent's alleged
injuries, since that program is not an identifiable action or event. Thus, the affidavit does not set forth
the specific facts necessary to survive a Rule 56 motion. Pp. 3193-3194.

278 U.S. App. D.C. 320, 878 F.2d 422 (1989), reversed.

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE,
O'CONNOR, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 3194.

Acting Solicitor General Roberts argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were
Assistant Attorney General Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Lawrence S. Robbins, Peter R.
Steenland, Jr., Anne S. Almy, Fred R. Disheroon, and Vicki L. Plaut.

E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were John C. Keeney,
Jr., Kathleen C. Zimmerman, and Norman L. Dean, Jr. William Perry Pendley filed a brief for
respondents Mountain States Legal Foundation et al. *

* Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Farm Bureau Federation et al. by
Kathryn A. Oberly and John J. Rademacher; for the American Mining Congress by Jerry L. Haggard
and Gerrie Apker Kurtz; for the National Cattlemen's Association et al. by Constance E. Brooks; for
the Pacific Legal Foundation by Ronald A. Zumbrun, Robin L. Rivett, and James S. Burling; and for
the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Terence P. Ross, Daniel J. Popeo, and Richard A. Samp.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of California et al. by John K. Van de
Kamp, Attorney General of California, Andrea Sheridan Ordin, Chief Assistant Attorney General, and
Craig C. Thompson, Susan L. Durbin, Clifford L. Rechtschaffen, and Nilda M. Mesa, Deputy Attorney
Generals, and for the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Robert A. Butterworth of
Florida, Lacy H. Thornburg of North Carolina, Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., of Ohio, Jeffrey L. Amestoy
of Vermont, and Joseph B. Meyer of Wyoming; and for the Wilderness Society et al. by Bruce J. Ennis,
Jr.

*875 Justice SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case we must decide whether respondent, the National Wildlife Federation **3182 (hereinafter
respondent), is a proper party to challenge actions of the Federal Government relating to certain public
lands.
I
Respondent filed this action in 1985 in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
against petitioners the United States Department of the Interior, the Secretary of the Interior, and the
Director of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), an agency within the Department. In its amended
complaint, respondent alleged that petitioners had violated the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 90 Stat. 2744, 43 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. (1982 ed.), the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 83 Stat. 852, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq., and § 10(e) of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706, in the course of administering what the complaint called the
“land withdrawal review program” of the BLM. Some background information concerning that
program is necessary to an understanding of this dispute.

In various enactments, Congress empowered United States citizens to acquire title to, and rights in, vast
portions of federally owned land. See, e.g., Rev.Stat. § 2319, 30 U.S.C. § 22 et seq. (Mining Law of
1872); 41 Stat. 437, as amended, 30 U.S.C. § 181 et seq. (Mineral Leasing Act of 1920). Congress also
provided means, however, for the Executive to remove public lands from the operation of these
statutes. The Pickett Act, 36 Stat. 847, 43 U.S.C. § 141 (1970 ed.), repealed, 90 Stat. 2792 (1976),
authorized the President “at any time in his discretion, temporarily [to] withdraw from settlement,
location, sale, or entry any of the *876 public lands of the United States ... and reserve the same for
water-power sites, irrigation, classification of lands, or other public purposes....” Acting under this and
under the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, ch. 865, 48 Stat. 1269, as amended, 43 U.S.C. § 315f, which
gave the Secretary of the Interior authority to “classify” public lands as suitable for either disposal or
federal retention and management, President Franklin Roosevelt withdrew all unreserved public land
from disposal until such time as they were classified. Exec. Order No. 6910, Nov. 26, 1934; Exec.
Order No. 6964, Feb. 5, 1935. In 1936, Congress amended § 7 of the Taylor Grazing Act to authorize
the Secretary of the Interior “to examine and classify any lands” withdrawn by these orders and by
other authority as “more valuable or suitable” for other uses “and to open such lands to entry, selection,
or location for disposal in accordance with such classification under applicable public-land laws.” 49
Stat. 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 315f (1982 ed.). The amendment also directed that “[s]uch lands shall not be
subject to disposition, settlement, or occupation until after the same have been classified and opened to
entry.” Ibid. The 1964 classification and multiple use Act, 78 Stat. 986, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1418 (1970
ed.) (expired 1970), gave the Secretary further authority to classify lands for the purpose of either
disposal or retention by the Federal Government.

Management of the public lands under these various laws became chaotic. The Public Land Law
Review Commission, established by Congress in 1964 to study the matter, 78 Stat. 982, determined in
1970 that “virtually all” of the country's public domain, see Public Land Law Review Commission,
One Third of the Nation's Land 52 (1970)-about one-third of the land within the United States, see id.,
at 19-had been withdrawn or classified for retention; that it was difficult to determine “the extent of
existing Executive withdrawals and the degree to which withdrawals overlap each other,” id., at 52; and
that there were inadequate records to show the purposes*877 of withdrawals and the permissible public
uses. Ibid. Accordingly, it recommended that “Congress should provide for a careful review of (1) all
Executive withdrawals and reservations, and (2) BLM retention and disposal classifications under the
Classification and Multiple Use Act of 1964.” Ibid.
**3183 In 1976, Congress passed the FLPMA, which repealed many of the miscellaneous laws
governing disposal of public land, 43 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. (1982 ed.), and established a policy in favor
of retaining public lands for multiple use management. It directed the Secretary to “prepare and
maintain on a continuing basis an inventory of all public lands and their resource and other values,” §
1711(a), required land use planning for public lands, and established criteria to be used for that
purpose, § 1712. It provided that existing classifications of public lands were subject to review in the
land use planning process, and that the Secretary could “modify or terminate any such classification
consistent with such land use plans.” § 1712(d). It also authorized the Secretary to “make, modify,
extend or revoke” withdrawals. § 1714(a). Finally it directed the Secretary, within 15 years, to review
withdrawals in existence in 1976 in 11 Western States, § 1714( l )(1), and to “determine whether, and
for how long, the continuation of the existing withdrawal of the lands would be, in his judgment,
consistent with the statutory objectives of the programs for which the lands were dedicated and of the
other relevant programs,” § 1714( l )(2). The activities undertaken by the BLM to comply with these
various provisions constitute what respondent's amended complaint styles the BLM's “land withdrawal
review program,” which is the subject of the current litigation.

Pursuant to the directives of the FLPMA, petitioners engage in a number of different types of
administrative action with respect to the various tracts of public land within the United States. First, the
BLM conducts the review and recommends the determinations required by § 1714( l ) with *878
respect to withdrawals in 11 Western States. The law requires the Secretary to “report his
recommendations to the President, together with statements of concurrence or nonconcurrence
submitted by the heads of the departments or agencies which administer the lands”; the President must
in turn submit this report to the Congress, together with his recommendation “for action by the
Secretary, or for legislation.” § 1714( l )(2). The Secretary has submitted a number of reports to the
President in accordance with this provision.

Second, the Secretary revokes some withdrawals under § 204(a) of the Act, which the Office of the
Solicitor has interpreted to give the Secretary the power to process proposals for revocation of
withdrawals made during the “ordinary course of business.” U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Memorandum
from the Office of the Solicitor, Oct. 30, 1980. These revocations are initiated in one of three manners:
An agency or department holding a portion of withdrawn land that it no longer needs may file a notice
of intention to relinquish the lands with the BLM. Any member of the public may file a petition
requesting revocation. And in the case of lands held by the BLM, the BLM itself may initiate the
revocation proposal. App. 56-57. Withdrawal revocations may be made for several reasons. Some are
effected in order to permit sale of the land; some for record-clearing purposes, where the withdrawal
designation has been superseded by congressional action or overlaps with another withdrawal
designation; some in order to restore the land to multiple use management pursuant to § 102(a)(7) of
the FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(7) (1982 ed.). App. 142-145.

Third, the Secretary engages in the ongoing process of classifying public lands, either for multiple use
management, pt. 2420, for disposal, pt. 2430, or for other uses. Classification decisions may be initiated
by petition, pt. 2450, or by the BLM itself, pt. 2460. Regulations promulgated*879 by the Secretary
prescribe the procedures to be followed in the case of each type of classification determination.

II
In its complaint, respondent averred generally that the reclassification of some withdrawn**3184 lands
and the return of others to the public domain would open the lands up to mining activities, thereby
destroying their natural beauty. Respondent alleged that petitioners, in the course of administering the
Nation's public lands, had violated the FLPMA by failing to “develop, maintain, and, when appropriate,
revise land use plans which provide by tracts or areas for the use of the public lands,” 43 U.S.C. §
1712(a) (1982 ed.); failing to submit recommendations as to withdrawals in the 11 Western States to
the President, § 1714( l ); failing to consider multiple uses for the disputed lands, § 1732(a), focusing
inordinately on such uses as mineral exploitation and development; and failing to provide public notice
of decisions, §§ 1701(a)(5), 1712(c)(9), 1712(f), and 1739(e). Respondent also claimed that petitioners
had violated NEPA, which requires federal agencies to “include in every recommendation or report
on ... major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed
statement by the responsible official on ... the environmental impact of the proposed action.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(C) (1982 ed.). Finally, respondent alleged that all of the above actions were “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” and should therefore be
set aside pursuant to § 10(e) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706. Appended to the amended complaint was a
schedule of specific land-status determinations, which the complaint stated had been “taken by
defendants since January 1, 1981”; each was identified by a listing in the Federal Register.

In December 1985, the District Court granted respondent's motion for a preliminary injunction
prohibiting petitioners from “[m]odifying, terminating or altering any withdrawal, classification, or
other designation governing the protection *880 of lands in the public domain that was in effect on
January 1, 1981,” and from “[t]aking any action inconsistent” with any such withdrawal, classification,
or designation. App. to Pet. for Cert. 185a. In a subsequent order, the court denied petitioners' motion
under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the complaint for failure to
demonstrate standing to challenge petitioners' actions under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 702. App. to Pet. for
Cert. 183a. The Court of Appeals affirmed both orders. National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 266
U.S.App.D.C. 241, 835 F.2d 305 (1987). As to the motion to dismiss, the Court of Appeals found
sufficient to survive the motion the general allegation in the amended complaint that respondent's
members used environmental resources that would be damaged by petitioners' actions. See id., at 248,
835 F.2d, at 312. It held that this allegation, fairly read along with the balance of the complaint, both
identified particular land-status actions that respondent sought to challenge-since at least some of the
actions complained of were listed in the complaint's appendix of Federal Register references-and
asserted harm to respondent's members attributable to those particular actions. Id., at 249, 835 F.2d, at
313. To support the latter point, the Court of Appeals pointed to the affidavits of two of respondent's
members, Peggy Kay Peterson and Richard Erman, which claimed use of land “in the vicinity” of the
land covered by two of the listed actions. Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded, there was “concrete
indication that [respondent's] members use specific lands covered by the agency's Program and will be
adversely affected by the agency's actions,” and the complaint was “sufficiently specific for purposes
of a motion to dismiss.” Ibid. On petitions for rehearing, the Court of Appeals stood by its denial of the
motion to dismiss and directed the parties and the District Court “to proceed with this litigation with
dispatch.”, National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 269 U.S.App.D.C. 271, 272, 844 F.2d 889, 890
(1988).

*881 Back before the District Court, petitioners again claimed, this time by means of a motion for
summary judgment under Rule 56 **3185 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (which motion had
been outstanding during the proceedings before the Court of Appeals), that respondent had no standing
to seek judicial review of petitioners' actions under the APA. After argument on this motion, and in
purported response to the court's postargument request for additional briefing, respondent submitted
four additional member affidavits pertaining to the issue of standing. The District Court rejected them
as untimely, vacated the injunction and granted the Rule 56 motion to dismiss. It noted that neither its
earlier decision nor the Court of Appeals' affirmance controlled the question, since both pertained to a
motion under Rule 12(b). It found the Peterson and Erman affidavits insufficient to withstand the Rule
56 motion, even as to judicial review of the particular classification decisions to which they pertained.
And even if they had been adequate for that limited purpose, the court said, they could not support
respondent's attempted APA challenge to “each of the 1250 or so individual classification terminations
and withdrawal revocations” effected under the land withdrawal review program. National Wildlife
Federation v. Burford, 699 F.Supp. 327, 332 (DC 1988).

This time the Court of Appeals reversed. National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 278 U.S.App.D.C.
320, 878 F.2d 422 (1989). It both found the Peterson and Erman affidavits sufficient in themselves and
held that it was an abuse of discretion not to consider the four additional affidavits as well. FN1 The
Court of Appeals also concluded that *882 standing to challenge individual classification and
withdrawal decisions conferred standing to challenge all such decisions under the land withdrawal
review program. We granted certiorari. 493 U.S. 1042, 110 S.Ct. 834, 107 L.Ed.2d 830 (1990).

FN1. As an additional basis for its conclusion, the Court of Appeals held that the earlier panel's finding
that the Peterson and Erman affidavits were sufficient to establish respondent's right to sue was the
“law of the case.” We do not address this conclusion, as the earlier panel's ruling does not, of course,
bind this Court. Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444, 32 S.Ct. 739, 740, 56 L.Ed. 1152 (1912).

III
A
[1] [2] We first address respondent's claim that the Peterson and Erman affidavits alone suffice to
establish respondent's right to judicial review of petitioners' actions. Respondent does not contend that
either the FLPMA or NEPA provides a private right of action for violations of its provisions. Rather,
respondent claims a right to judicial review under § 10(a) of the APA, which provides:

“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.” 5 U.S.C. §
702.

This provision contains two separate requirements. First, the person claiming a right to sue must
identify some “agency action” that affects him in the specified fashion; it is judicial review “thereof” to
which he is entitled. The meaning of “agency action” for purposes of § 702 is set forth in 5 U.S.C. §
551(13), see 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(2) (“For the purpose of this chapter ... ‘agency action’ ha[s] the
meanin[g] given ... by section 551 of this title”), which defines the term as “the whole or a part of an
agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act,” 5
U.S.C. § 551(13). When, as here, review is sought not pursuant to specific authorization in the
substantive statute, but only under the general review provisions of the APA, the “agency action” in
question must be “final agency action.” See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (“Agency action made reviewable by
statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to
judicial review” (emphasis added).

**3186 *883 [3] Second, the party seeking review under § 702 must show that he has “suffer[ed] legal
wrong” because of the challenged agency action, or is “adversely affected or aggrieved” by that action
“within the meaning of a relevant statute.” Respondent does not assert that it has suffered “legal
wrong,” so we need only discuss the meaning of “adversely affected or aggrieved ... within the
meaning of a relevant statute.” As an original matter, it might be thought that one cannot be “adversely
affected or aggrieved within the meaning ” of a statute unless the statute in question uses those terms
(or terms like them)-as some pre-APA statutes in fact did when conferring rights of judicial review.
See, e.g., Federal Communications Act of 1934, § 402(b)(2), 48 Stat. 1093, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §
402(b)(6) (1982 ed.). We have long since rejected that interpretation, however, which would have made
the judicial review provision of the APA no more than a restatement of pre-existing law. Rather, we
have said that to be “adversely affected or aggrieved ... within the meaning” of a statute, the plaintiff
must establish that the injury he complains of ( his aggrievement, or the adverse effect upon him ) falls
within the “zone of interests” sought to be protected by the statutory provision whose violation forms
the legal basis for his complaint. See Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U.S. 388, 396-397, 107
S.Ct. 750, 755-756, 93 L.Ed.2d 757 (1987). Thus, for example, the failure of an agency to comply with
a statutory provision requiring “on the record” hearings would assuredly have an adverse effect upon
the company that has the contract to record and transcribe the agency's proceedings; but since the
provision was obviously enacted to protect the interests of the parties to the proceedings and not those
of the reporters, that company would not be “adversely affected within the meaning” of the statute.

B
Because this case comes to us on petitioners' motion for summary judgment, we must assess the record
under the *884 standard set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56(c) states
that a party is entitled to summary judgment in his favor “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” Rule 56(e) further provides:

“When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse
party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.”

[4] As we stated in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986),
“the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for
discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of
proof at trial.” Id., at 322, 106 S.Ct., at 2552. Where no such showing is made, “[t]he moving party is
‘entitled to a judgment as a matter of law’ because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient
showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.” Id., at
323, 106 S.Ct., at 2552.
[5] [6] These standards are fully applicable when a defendant moves for summary judgment, in a suit
brought under § 702, on the ground that the plaintiff has failed to show that he is “adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute.” The burden is on the party
seeking review under § 702 to set forth **3187 specific facts (even though they may be controverted
by the Government) showing that he has satisfied its terms. *885 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,
740, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 1369, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972). Celotex made clear that Rule 56 does not require the
moving party to negate the elements of the nonmoving party's case; to the contrary, “regardless of
whether the moving party accompanies its summary judgment motion with affidavits, the motion may,
and should, be granted so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for
the entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” 477 U.S., at 323, 106 S.Ct., at
2553.

C
[7] We turn, then, to whether the specific facts alleged in the two affidavits considered by the District
Court raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether an “agency action” taken by petitioners caused
respondent to be “adversely affected or aggrieved ... within the meaning of a relevant statute.” We
assume, since it has been uncontested, that the allegedly affected interests set forth in the
affidavits-“recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment”-are sufficiently related to the purposes of
respondent association that respondent meets the requirements of § 702 if any of its members do. Hunt
v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977).

As for the “agency action” requirement, we think that each of the affidavits can be read, as the Court of
Appeals believed, to complain of a particular “agency action” as that term is defined in § 551. The
parties agree that the Peterson affidavit, judging from the geographic area it describes, must refer to
that one of the BLM orders listed in the appendix to the complaint that appears at 49 Fed.Reg. 19904-
19905 (1984), an order captioned W-6228 and dated April 30, 1984, terminating the withdrawal
classification of some 4,500 acres of land in that area. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners 8-10. The parties
also appear to agree, on the basis of similar deduction, that the Erman affidavit refers to the BLM order
listed in the appendix that appears at *886 47 Fed.Reg. 7232-7233 1982), an order captioned Public
Land Order 6156 and dated February 18, 1982.

We also think that whatever “adverse effect” or “aggrievement” is established by the affidavits was
“within the meaning of the relevant statute”- i.e., met the “zone of interests” test. The relevant statute,
of course, is the statute whose violation is the gravamen of the complaint-both the FLPMA and NEPA.
We have no doubt that “recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment” are among the sorts of interests those
statutes were specifically designed to protect. The only issue, then, is whether the facts alleged in the
affidavits showed that those interests of Peterson and Erman were actually affected.

The Peterson affidavit averred:

“My recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment of federal lands, particularly those in the vicinity of
South Pass-Green Mountain, Wyoming have been and continue to be adversely affected in fact by the
unlawful actions of the Bureau and the Department. In particular, the South Pass-Green Mountain area
of Wyoming has been opened to the staking of mining claims and oil and gas leasing, an action which
threatens the aesthetic beauty and wildlife habitat potential of these lands.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 191a.

Erman's affidavit was substantially the same as Peterson's, with respect to all except the area involved;
he claimed use of land “in the vicinity of Grand Canyon National Park, the Arizona Strip (Kanab
Plateau), and the Kaibab National Forest.” Id., at 187a.

The District Court found the Peterson affidavit inadequate for the following reasons:

“Peterson ... claims that she uses federal lands in the vicinity of the South Pass-**3188 Green
Mountain area of Wyoming for recreational purposes and for aesthetic enjoyment and that her
recreational and aesthetic enjoyment *887 has been and continues to be adversely affected as the result
of the decision of BLM to open it to the staking of mining claims and oil and gas leasing.... This
decision [W-6228] opened up to mining approximately 4500 acres within a two million acre area, the
balance of which, with the exception of 2000 acres, has always been open to mineral leasing and
mining.... There is no showing that Peterson's recreational use and enjoyment extends to the particular
4500 acres covered by the decision to terminate classification to the remainder of the two million acres
affected by the termination. All she claims is that she uses lands ‘in the vicinity.’ The affidavit on its
face contains only a bare allegation of injury, and fails to show specific facts supporting the affiant's
allegation.” 699 F.Supp., at 331 (emphasis in original).

The District Court found the Erman affidavit “similarly flawed.”

“The magnitude of Erman's claimed injury stretches the imagination.... [T]he Arizona Strip consists of
all lands in Arizona north and west of the Colorado River on approximately 5.5 million acres, an area
one-eighth the size of the State of Arizona. Furthermore, virtually the entire Strip is and for many years
has been open to uranium and other metalliferous mining. The revocation of withdrawal [in Public
Land Order 6156] concerned only non-metalliferous mining in the western one-third of the Arizona
Strip, an area possessing no potential for non-metalliferous mining.” Id., at 332.

The Court of Appeals disagreed with the District Court's assessment as to the Peterson affidavit (and
thus found it unnecessary to consider the Erman affidavit) for the following reason:

“If Peterson was not referring to lands in this 4500-acre affected area, her allegation of impairment to
her use and enjoyment would be meaningless, or perjurious.... *888 [T]he trial court overlooks the fact
that unless Peterson's language is read to refer to the lands affected by the Program, the affidavit is, at
best, a meaningless document.

“At a minimum, Peterson's affidavit is ambiguous regarding whether the adversely affected lands are
the ones she uses. When presented with ambiguity on a motion for summary judgment, a District Court
must resolve any factual issues of controversy in favor of the non-moving party.... This means that the
District Court was obliged to resolve any factual ambiguity in favor of NWF, and would have had to
assume, for the purposes of summary judgment, that Peterson used the 4500 affected acres.” 278
U.S.App.D.C., at 329, 878 F.2d, at 431.

[8] That is not the law. In ruling upon a Rule 56 motion, “a District Court must resolve any factual
issues of controversy in favor of the non-moving party” only in the sense that, where the facts
specifically averred by that party contradict facts specifically averred by the movant, the motion must
be denied. That is a world apart from “assuming” that general averments embrace the “specific facts”
needed to sustain the complaint. As set forth above, Rule 56(e) provides that judgment “shall be
entered” against the nonmoving party unless affidavits or other evidence “set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” The object of this provision is not to replace conclusory
allegations of the complaint or answer with conclusory allegations of an affidavit. Cf. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (“[T]he plaintiff
could not rest on his allegations of a conspiracy to get to a jury without ‘any significant probative
evidence tending to support the complaint’ ”), quoting First National Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Service
Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1593, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968). Rather, the purpose of Rule 56 is
to enable a party who believes there is no genuine dispute as to a specific fact essential to the **3189
other side's case to demand at least one *889 sworn averment of that fact before the lengthy process of
litigation continues.

At the margins there is some room for debate as to how “specific” must be the “specific facts” that
Rule 56(e) requires in a particular case. But where the fact in question is the one put in issue by the §
702 challenge here-whether one of respondent's members has been, or is threatened to be, “adversely
affected or aggrieved” by Government action-Rule 56(e) is assuredly not satisfied by averments which
state only that one of respondent's members uses unspecified portions of an immense tract of territory,
on some portions of which mining activity has occurred or probably will occur by virtue of the
governmental action. It will not do to “presume” the missing facts because without them the affidavits
would not establish the injury that they generally allege. That converts the operation of Rule 56 to a
circular promenade: plaintiff's complaint makes general allegation of injury; defendant contests through
Rule 56 existence of specific facts to support injury; plaintiff responds with affidavit containing general
allegation of injury, which must be deemed to constitute averment of requisite specific facts since
otherwise allegation of injury would be unsupported (which is precisely what defendant claims it is).

Respondent places great reliance, as did the Court of Appeals, upon our decision in United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 37
L.Ed.2d 254 (1973). The SCRAP opinion, whose expansive expression of what would suffice for § 702
review under its particular facts has never since been emulated by this Court, is of no relevance here,
since it involved not a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment but a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss on
the pleadings. The latter, unlike the former, presumes that general allegations embrace those specific
facts that are necessary to support the claim. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-
102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).

*890 IV
We turn next to the Court of Appeals' alternative holding that the four additional member affidavits
proffered by respondent in response to the District Court's briefing order established its right to § 702
review of agency action.

A
[9] It is impossible that the affidavits would suffice, as the Court of Appeals held, to enable respondent
to challenge the entirety of petitioners' so-called “land withdrawal review program.” That is not an
“agency action” within the meaning of § 702, much less a “final agency action” within the meaning of
§ 704. The term “land withdrawal review program” (which as far as we know is not derived from any
authoritative text) does not refer to a single BLM order or regulation, or even to a completed universe
of particular BLM orders and regulations. It is simply the name by which petitioners have occasionally
referred to the continuing (and thus constantly changing) operations of the BLM in reviewing
withdrawal revocation applications and the classifications of public lands and developing land use
plans as required by the FLPMA. It is no more an identifiable “agency action”-much less a “final
agency action”-than a “weapons procurement program” of the Department of Defense or a “drug
interdiction program” of the Drug Enforcement Administration. As the District Court explained, the
“land withdrawal review program” extends to, currently at least, “1250 or so individual classification
terminations and withdrawal revocations.” 699 F.Supp., at 332.FN2

FN2. Contrary to the apparent understanding of the dissent, we do not contend that no “land withdrawal
review program” exists, any more than we would contend that no weapons procurement program
exists. We merely assert that it is not an identifiable “final agency action” for purposes of the APA. If
there is in fact some specific order or regulation, applying some particular measure across the board to
all individual classification terminations and withdrawal revocations, and if that order or regulation is
final, and has become ripe for review in the manner we discuss subsequently in text, it can of course be
challenged under the APA by a person adversely affected-and the entire “land withdrawal review
program,” insofar as the content of that particular action is concerned, would thereby be affected. But
that is quite different from permitting a generic challenge to all aspects of the “land withdrawal review
program,” as though that itself constituted a final agency action.

**3190 *891 [10] Respondent alleges that violation of the law is rampant within this program-failure
to revise land use plans in proper fashion, failure to submit certain recommendations to Congress,
failure to consider multiple use, inordinate focus upon mineral exploitation, failure to provide required
public notice, failure to provide adequate environmental impact statements. Perhaps so. But respondent
cannot seek wholesale improvement of this program by court decree, rather than in the offices of the
Department or the halls of Congress, where programmatic improvements are normally made. Under the
terms of the APA, respondent must direct its attack against some particular “agency action” that causes
it harm. Some statutes permit broad regulations to serve as the “agency action,” and thus to be the
object of judicial review directly, even before the concrete effects normally required for APA review
are felt. Absent such a provision, however, a regulation is not ordinarily considered the type of agency
action “ripe” for judicial review under the APA until the scope of the controversy has been reduced to
more manageable proportions, and its factual components fleshed out, by some concrete action
applying the regulation to the claimant's situation in a fashion that harms or threatens to harm him.
(The major exception, of course, is a substantive rule which as a practical matter requires the plaintiff
to adjust his conduct immediately. Such agency action is “ripe” for review at once, whether or not
explicit statutory review apart from the APA is provided. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136, 152-154, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1517-1518, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967); Gardner v. Toilet Goods Assn., Inc.,
387 U.S. 167, 171-173, 87 S.Ct. 1526, 1528-1530, 18 L.Ed.2d 704 (1967). Cf. Toilet*892 Goods
Assn., Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 164-166, 87 S.Ct. 1520, 1524-1526, 18 L.Ed.2d 697 (1967).)

[11] In the present case, the individual actions of the BLM identified in the six affidavits can be
regarded as rules of general applicability (a “rule” is defined in the APA as agency action of “general
or particular applicability and future effect,” 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (emphasis added)) announcing, with
respect to vast expanses of territory that they cover, the agency's intent to grant requisite permission for
certain activities, to decline to interfere with other activities, and to take other particular action if
requested. It may well be, then, that even those individual actions will not be ripe for challenge until
some further agency action or inaction more immediately harming the plaintiff occurs.FN3 But it is at
least entirely *893 certain that the flaws in the entire “program”-consisting principally of the many
individual actions **3191 referenced in the complaint, and presumably actions yet to be taken as well-
cannot be laid before the courts for wholesale correction under the APA, simply because one of them
that is ripe for review adversely affects one of respondent's members.FN4

FN3. Under the Secretary's regulations, any person seeking to conduct mining operations that will
“cause a cumulative surface disturbance” of five acres or more must first obtain approval of a plan of
operations. § 3809.1-4 (1988). Mining operations that cause surface disturbance of less than 5 acres do
not require prior approval, but prior notice must be given to the district office of the BLM. § 3809.1-3.
Neither approval nor notification is required only with respect to “casual use operations,” 43 CFR §
3809.1-2, defined as “activities ordinarily resulting in only negligible disturbance of the Federal lands
and resources,” § 3809.0-5. (Activities are considered “casual” if “they do not involve the use of
mechanized earth moving equipment or explosives or do not involve the use of motorized vehicles in
areas designated as closed to off-road vehicles....” Ibid.) Thus, before any mining use ordinarily
involving more than “negligible disturbance” can take place, there must occur either agency action in
response to a submitted plan or agency inaction in response to a submitted notice.In one of the four
new affidavits, Peggy Peterson, one of the original affiants, states that a corporation has filed a mine
permit application with the BLM covering a portion of the land to which her original affidavit
pertained. App. to Brief in Opposition for Respondent National Wildlife Federation 16. If that permit is
granted, there is no doubt that agency action ripe for review will have occurred; nor any doubt that, in
the course of an otherwise proper court challenge, affiant Peterson, and through her respondent, would
be able to call into question the validity of the classification order authorizing the permit. However,
before the grant of such a permit, or (when it will suffice) the filing of a notice to engage in mining
activities, or (when only “negligible disturbance” will occur) actual mining of the land, it is impossible
to tell where or whether mining activities will occur. Indeed, it is often impossible to tell from a
classification order alone whether mining activities will even be permissible. As explained in the
uncontested affidavit of the BLM's Assistant Director of Land Resources:

“The lands may be subject to another withdrawal of comparable scope or they may be subject to
classification segregations tantamount to such a withdrawal. In that case, the lands would not be
opened to the operation of the public land laws so that the removal of one of the withdrawals has no
practical effect. Another reason why there may not be any change is that before the revocation
occurred, the lands may have been transferred into private ownership. Consequently, the withdrawal
revocation amounts to nothing more than a paper transaction.... In the alternative, a revoked withdrawal
may open the lands to the operation of the public land and mineral laws.... Some withdrawal
revocations are made without prior knowledge as to what subsequent disposition may be made of the
lands. After the lands are opened, they might be transferred out of federal ownership by sale, exchange,
or some other discretionary mode of disposal, not anticipated when the withdrawal was revoked. These
subsequent discretionary actions require separate and independent decisionmaking that, obviously, are
divorced from the prior revocation decision. Environmental and other management concerns and public
participation are taken into account in relation to the post-revocation decisionmaking.” Affidavit of
Frank Edwards, Aug. 18, 1985, App. 61-62.
FN4. Nothing in this is contrary to our opinion in Automobile Workers v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 106
S.Ct. 2523, 91 L.Ed.2d 228 (1986), cited by the Court of Appeals. That opinion did not discuss, and the
respondent Secretary of Labor did not rely upon, the requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 702 and our ripeness
jurisprudence in cases such as Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18
L.Ed.2d 681 (1967); Gardner v. Toilet Goods Assn., Inc., 387 U.S. 167, 87 S.Ct. 1526, 18 L.Ed.2d 704
(1967); and Toilet Goods Assn., Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 87 S.Ct. 1520, 18 L.Ed.2d 697 (1967).
The only challenge made and decided, with respect to the individuals' right to sue, relied upon 19
U.S.C. § 2311(d) (1982 ed.), which according to the Secretary of Labor made entertainment of that suit
“ ‘contrary to Congress's incorporation of the state system into the administration of the Trade Act, and
an affront to the integrity and authority of the state courts.’ ” 477 U.S., at 283, 106 S.Ct., at 2529,
quoting Brief for Respondent in Automobile Workers, O.T. 1985, No. 84-1777, p. 16.

*894 [12] The case-by-case approach that this requires is understandably frustrating to an organization
such as respondent, which has as its objective across-the-board protection of our Nation's wildlife and
the streams and forests that support it. But this is the traditional, and remains the normal, mode of
operation of the courts. Except where Congress explicitly provides for our correction of the
administrative process at a higher level of generality, we intervene in the administration of the laws
only when, and to the extent that, a specific “final agency action” has an actual or immediately
threatened effect. Toilet Goods Assn., 387 U.S., at 164-166, 87 S.Ct., at 1524-1526. Such an
intervention may ultimately have the effect of requiring a regulation, a series of regulations, or even a
whole “program” to be revised by the agency in order to avoid the unlawful result that the court
discerns. But it is assuredly not as swift or as immediately far-reaching a corrective process as those
interested in systemic improvement would desire. Until confided to us, however, more sweeping
actions are for the other branches.

B
[13] The Court of Appeals' reliance upon the supplemental affidavits was wrong for a **3192 second
reason: The District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to admit them. Petitioners filed their
motion for summary judgment in September 1986; respondent filed an opposition but did not submit
any new evidentiary materials at that time. On June 27, 1988, after the case had made its way for the
first time through the Court of Appeals, the District Court announced that it would hold a hearing on
July 22 on “the outstanding motions for summary judgment,” which included petitioners' motion
challenging respondent's § 702 standing. The hearing was held and, as noted earlier, the District Court
issued an order directing respondent to file “a supplemental memorandum regarding*895 the issue of
its standing to proceed.” Record, Doc. No. 274. Although that plainly did not call for the submission of
new evidentiary materials, it was in purported response to this order, on August 22, 1988, that
respondent submitted (along with the requested legal memorandum) the additional affidavits. The only
explanation for the submission (if it can be called an explanation) was contained in a footnote to the
memorandum, which simply stated that “NWF now has submitted declarations on behalf of other
members of NWF who have been injured by the challenged actions of federal defendants.” Record,
Doc. No. 278, p. 18, n. 21. In its November 4, 1988, ruling granting petitioners' motion, the District
Court rejected the additional affidavits as “untimely and in violation of [the court's briefing] Order.”
699 F.Supp., at 328, n. 3.

Respondent's evidentiary submission was indeed untimely, both under Rule 56, which requires
affidavits in opposition to a summary judgment motion to be served “prior to the day of the hearing,”
Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 56(c), and under Rule 6(d), which states more generally that “[w]hen a motion is
supported by affidavit, ... opposing affidavits may be served not later than 1 day before the hearing,
unless the court permits them to be served at some other time.” Rule 6(b) sets out the proper approach
in the case of late filings:

“When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court an act is required or allowed
to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1)
with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the
expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order, or (2) upon motion
made after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was
the result of excusable neglect....”

This provision not only specifically confers the “discretion” relevant to the present issue, but also
provides the mechanism*896 by which that discretion is to be invoked and exercised. First, any
extension of a time limitation must be “for cause shown.” Second, although extensions before
expiration of the time period may be “with or without motion or notice,” any postdeadline extension
must be “upon motion made,” and is permissible only where the failure to meet the deadline “was the
result of excusable neglect.” Thus, in order to receive the affidavits here, the District Court would have
had to regard the very filing of the late document as the “motion made” to file it; FN5 it would have
had to interpret “cause *897 shown” to mean merely **3193 “cause,” since respondent made no
“showing” of cause at all; and finally, it would have had to find as a substantive matter that there was
indeed “cause” for the late filing, and that the failure to file on time “was the result of excusable
neglect.”

FN5. The dissent asserts that a footnote in respondent's reply memorandum to the District Court was a
“motion” within the meaning of Rule 6(b)(2), and was so obviously so that the District Court
committed reversible error in failing to construe it that way. Post, at 3199-3200 and n. 10. We cannot
agree. Rule 6(b) establishes a clear distinction between “requests” and “motions,” and the one cannot
be converted into the other without violating its provisions-or at least cannot be converted on the basis
of such lax criteria that conversion would be not only marginally permissible but positively mandatory
in the present case. Rule 6(b)(1) allows a court (“for cause shown” and “in its discretion”) to grant a
“request” for an extension of time, whether the request is made “with or without motion or notice,”
provided the request is made before the time for filing expires. After the time for filing has expired,
however, the court (again “for cause shown” and “in its discretion”) may extend the time only “upon
motion.” To treat all postdeadline “requests” as “motions” (if indeed any of them can be treated that
way) would eliminate the distinction between predeadline and postdeadline filings that the Rule
painstakingly draws. Surely the postdeadline “request,” to be even permissibly treated as a “motion,”
must contain a high degree of formality and precision, putting the opposing party on notice that a
motion is at issue and that he therefore ought to respond. The request here had not much of either
characteristic. As for formality, it was not even made in a separate filing or in a separate appearance
before the court, but was contained in a single sentence at the end of the first paragraph of one of the 18
single-spaced footnotes in a 20-page memorandum of law. Our district judges must read footnotes with
new care if they are to be reversed for failing to recognize motions buried in this fashion. And as for
precision, the request not only did not ask for any particular extension of time (7 days, 30 days), it did
not specifically ask for an extension of time at all, but merely said that respondent “should be given
adequate opportunity to supplement the record.” Even this, moreover, was not requested (much less
moved for) unconditionally, but only “[i]f the court intends to reverse its prior ruling [regarding NWF
standing].” Record, Doc. No. 294, p. 17, n. 16. We think it quite impossible to agree with the dissent
that the district judge not only might treat this request as a motion, but that he was compelled to do so.

This last substantive obstacle is the greatest of all. The Court of Appeals presumably thought it was
overcome because “the papers on which the trial court relied were two years old by the time it
requested supplemental memoranda” and because “there was no indication prior to the trial court's
request that [respondent] should have doubted the adequacy of the affidavits it had already submitted.”
278 U.S.App.D.C., at 331, 878 F.2d, at 433. We do not understand the relevance of the first point; the
passage of so long a time as two years suggests, if anything, that respondent had more than the usual
amount of time to prepare its response to the motion, and was more than moderately remiss in waiting
until after the last moment. As to the suggestion of unfair surprise: A litigant is never justified in
assuming that the court has made up its mind until the court expresses itself to that effect, and a
litigant's failure to buttress its position because of confidence in the strength of that position is always
indulged in at the litigant's own risk. In any case, whatever erroneous expectations respondent may
have had were surely dispelled by the District Court's order in June 1988 announcing that the hearing
on petitioners' motion would be held one month later. At least when that order issued, respondent was
on notice that its right to sue was at issue, and that (absent proper motion) the time for filing any
additional evidentiary materials was, at the latest, the day before the hearing.

*898 Perhaps it is true that the District Court could have overcome all the obstacles we have described-
apparent lack of a motion, of a showing, and of excusable neglect-to admit the affidavits at issue here.
But the proposition that it was compelled to receive them-that it was an abuse of discretion to reject
them-cannot be accepted.

V
[14] Respondent's final argument is that we should remand this case for the Court of Appeals to decide
whether respondent may seek § 702 review of petitioners' actions in its own right, rather than
derivatively through its members. Specifically, it points to allegations in the amended complaint that
petitioners unlawfully failed to publish regulations, to invite public participation, and to prepare an
environmental impact statement with respect to the “land withdrawal review program” as a whole. In
order to show that it is a “person ... adversely affected or aggrieved” by these failures, it submitted to
the District Court a brief affidavit (two pages in the record) by one of its vice presidents, Lynn A.
Greenwalt, who stated that respondent's mission is to “inform its members and the general public about
conservation issues” and to advocate improvements in laws and administrative practices “pertaining to
the **3194 protection and enhancement of federal lands,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 193a-194a; and that its
ability to perform this mission has been impaired by petitioners' failure “to provide adequate
information and opportunities for public participation with respect to the Land Withdrawal Review
Program.” Id., at 194a. The District Court found this affidavit insufficient to establish respondent's
right to seek judicial review, since it was “conclusory and completely devoid of specific facts.” 699
F.Supp., at 330. The Court of Appeals, having reversed the District Court on the grounds discussed
above, did not address the issue.

We agree with the District Court's disposition. Even assuming that the affidavit set forth “specific
facts,” *899 Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 56(e), adequate to show injury to respondent through the deprivation of
information; and even assuming that providing information to organizations such as respondent was
one of the objectives of the statutes allegedly violated, so that respondent is “aggrieved within the
meaning” of those statutes; nonetheless, the Greenwalt affidavit fails to identify any particular “agency
action” that was the source of these injuries. The only sentences addressed to that point are as follows:

“NWF's ability to meet these obligations to its members has been significantly impaired by the failure
of the Bureau of Land Management and the Department of the Interior to provide adequate information
and opportunities for public participation with respect to the Land Withdrawal Review Program. These
interests of NWF have been injured by the actions of the Bureau and the Department and would be
irreparably harmed by the continued failure to provide meaningful opportunities for public input and
access to information regarding the Land Withdrawal Review Program.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 194a.

As is evident, this is even more deficient than the Peterson and Erman affidavits, which contained
geographical descriptions whereby at least an action as general as a particular classification decision
could be identified as the source of the grievance. As we discussed earlier, the “land withdrawal review
program” is not an identifiable action or event. With regard to alleged deficiencies in providing
information and permitting public participation, as with regard to the other illegalities alleged in the
complaint, respondent cannot demand a general judicial review of the BLM's day-to-day operations.
The Greenwalt affidavit, like the others, does not set forth the specific facts necessary to survive a Rule
56 motion.

*900 * * *

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

It is so ordered.

Justice BLACKMUN, with whom Justice BRENNAN, Justice MARSHALL, and Justice STEVENS
join, dissenting.

In my view, the affidavits of Peggy Kay Peterson and Richard Loren Erman, in conjunction with other
record evidence before the District Court on the motions for summary judgment, were sufficient to
establish the standing of the National Wildlife Federation (Federation or NWF) to bring this suit. I also
conclude that the District Court abused its discretion by refusing to consider supplemental affidavits
filed after the hearing on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. I therefore would affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I
The Federation's asserted injury in this case rested upon its claim that the Government actions
challenged here would lead to increased mining on public lands; that the mining would result in
damage to the environment; and that the recreational opportunities of NWF's members would
consequently be diminished. Abundant record evidence supported the Federation's assertion that on
lands newly opened for mining, mining in fact **3195 would occur. FN1 Similarly, the record
furnishes ample support for NWF's contention that mining activities can be expected to cause severe
environmentaldamage *901 to the affected lands.FN2 The District Court held, however, that the
Federation had not adequately identified particular members who were harmed by the consequences of
the Government's actions. Although two of NWF's members expressly averred that their recreational
activities had been impaired, the District Court concluded that these affiants had not identified with
sufficient precision the particular sites on which their injuries occurred. The majority, like the District
Court, holds that the averments of Peterson and Erman were insufficiently specific to withstand a
motion for summary judgment. Although these affidavits were not models of precision, I believe that
they were adequate at least to create a genuine issue of fact as to the organization's injury.

FN1. Prior to the District Court's entry of the preliminary injunction, 406 mining claims had been
staked in the South Pass-Green Mountain area alone. App. 119. An exhibit filed by the federal parties
indicated that over 7,200 claims had been filed in 12 Western States. Exh. 1 to Affidavit of Joseph
Martyak (Apr. 11, 1986).
FN2. A Bureau of Land Management (BLM) draft of a Resource Management Plan/Environmental
Impact Statement for the Lander, Wyo., Resource Area stated: “In the Green Mountain Management
Unit ... significant long-term impacts to elk and mule deer herds could occur from habitat losses caused
by oil and gas activities over the next 60 years.... In the South Pass Management Unit, significant
acreages of lodgepole pine forest and aspen conifer woodland habitat types could be disturbed, which
would cause significant long-term impacts to moose and elk.... If gold mining activities continued to
erode these high-value habitats, trout fisheries, the Lander moose herd, the beaver pond ecosystems,
and the populations of many other wildlife species would suffer significant cumulative negative
effects.” Draft RMP/EIS pp. 226-228 (Exh. 3 to Defendant-Intervenors' Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition
to Defendants' Motions for Stay Pending Appeal (May 14, 1986)).A BLM Mineral Report issued June
17, 1982, concluded that mining and associated activities “could have an adverse impact on crucial
moose habitat, deer habitat, some elk habitat, and a variety of small game and bird species.
Improvements at campgrounds, as well as land in the immediate vicinity, could either be damaged or
destroyed. These activities could make it difficult for the BLM to manage the forest production and
harvesting in the South Pass area. Historical and cultural resources which have and have not been
identified could be either damaged or destroyed.” Defendant-Intervenors' Exh. 7 (attached as Appendix
1 to Plaintiff National Wildlife Federation's Statement of Points and Authorities in Support of Its
Standing To Proceed (Aug. 22, 1988)).
*902 As the Court points out, the showing (whether as to standing or the merits) required to overcome
a motion for summary judgment is more extensive than that required in the context of a motion to
dismiss. The principal difference is that in the former context evidence is required, while in the latter
setting the litigant may rest upon the allegations of his complaint. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)
“requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings”). In addition, Rule 56(e) requires that the
party opposing summary judgment “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial” (emphasis added). Thus, Courts of Appeals have reiterated that “conclusory” allegations
unsupported by “specific” evidence will be insufficient to establish a genuine issue of fact. FN3

FN3. See, e.g., May v. Department of Air Force, 777 F.2d 1012, 1016 (CA5 1985); First Commodity
Traders, Inc. v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 766 F.2d 1007, 1011 (CA7 1985); Maldonado v. Ramirez,
757 F.2d 48, 51 (CA3 1985); Galindo v. Precision American Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (CA5 1985).
The requirement that evidence be submitted is satisfied here: The Federation has offered the sworn
statements of two of its members. There remains the question whether the allegations in these affidavits
were sufficiently precise to satisfy the requirements of Rule 56(e). The line of demarcation between
“specific” and “conclusory” allegations is hardly a bright one. But, to my mind, the allegations
contained in the Peterson and Erman affidavits, in the context of the record as a whole, were adequate
**3196 to defeat a motion for summary judgment. These affidavits, as the majority acknowledges,
were at least sufficiently precise to enable Bureau of Land Management (BLM) officials to identify the
particular termination orders to which the affiants referred. See ante, at 3187. And the affiants averred
that their “recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment of federal lands ... have been and continue to be
adversely affected in fact by the unlawful *903 actions of the Bureau and the Department.” App. to Pet.
for Cert. 188a (Erman affidavit), 191a (Peterson affidavit). The question, it should be emphasized, is
not whether the NWF has proved that it has standing to bring this action, but simply whether the
materials before the District Court established “that there is a genuine issue for trial,” see Rule 56(e),
concerning the Federation's standing. In light of the principle that “[o]n summary judgment the
inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts contained in [evidentiary] materials must be viewed in
the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion,” United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S.
654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962), I believe that the evidence before the District Court
raised a genuine factual issue as to NWF's standing to sue.

No contrary conclusion is compelled by the fact that Peterson alleged that she uses federal lands “in the
vicinity of South Pass-Green Mountain, Wyoming,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 191a, rather than averring
that she uses the precise tract that was recently opened to mining. The agency itself has repeatedly
referred to the “South Pass-Green Mountain area” in describing the region newly opened to
mining.FN4 Peterson's assertion that her use and enjoyment of federal lands have been adversely
affected by the agency's decision to permit more extensive mining is, as the Court of Appeals stated,
National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 278 U.S.App.D.C. 320, 329, 878 F.2d 422, 431 (1989),
“meaningless, or perjurious” if the lands she uses do not include those harmed by mining undertaken
pursuant to termination order W-6228. FN5 To read particular assertions within the affidavit in light of
the document as a whole is, as the majority might put it, “a world apart” from “presuming” facts that
are neither stated nor implied simply because without them the *904 plaintiff would lack standing. The
Peterson and Erman affidavits doubtless could have been more artfully drafted, but they definitely were
sufficient to withstand the federal parties' summary judgment motion.

FN4. See, e.g., App. 123-139 (declaration of Jack Kelly).

FN5. The areas harmed or threatened by mining and associated activities may extend well beyond the
precise location where mining occurs. See n. 2, supra.
II
I also conclude that the District Court abused its discretion in refusing to consider the supplemental
affidavits filed by NWF after the hearing on the summary judgment motion.FN6 The court's decision
abruptly derailed the Federation's lawsuit after three **3197 years of proceedings involving massive
time and expense. The District Court and Court of Appeals both had concluded that NWF's claims were
sufficiently substantial to warrant the entry of a nationwide injunction. Whatever the ultimate merits of
the Federation's claims, litigation of this magnitude should not be aborted on technical grounds if that
result legitimately can be avoided. The majority's approach reflects an insufficient appreciation both of
the realities of complex litigation and of the admonition that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “shall
be construed to secure *905 the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.” Rule 1.

FN6. Five supplemental affidavits were filed. The first was submitted by Peggy Kay Peterson, in
clarification of her earlier affidavit: “A substantial portion of the lands which I use ... are identical to
those lands” newly opened to mining in the South Pass-Green Mountain area. Peterson Supplemental
Affidavit, App. in No. 88-5397 (CADC), p. 356. Ms. Peterson also asserted that “U.S. Energy
Corporation has filed a mine permit application with the Bureau and Department, (U.S. Energy
Application, TFN 2 4/86), which includes a proposal to mine a significant portion of the federal lands
which I use for recreational purposes and aesthetic enjoyment.” Id., at 355-356. The other affiants were
NWF members David Doran, Merlin McColm, Stephen Blomeke, and Will Ouellette. These
individuals identified termination orders that had opened to mining particular tracts of land used by the
affiants for recreation and aesthetic enjoyment.The federal parties do not concede that the supplemental
affidavits established with certainty the Federation's standing; they contend that further discovery
might show the affiants' allegations to be untrue. The federal parties do concede, however, that the
supplemental affidavits were not facially deficient. Tr. of Oral Arg. 19.
That a requirement is “technical” does not, of course, mean that it need not be obeyed. And an appeal
to the “spirit” of the Federal Rules is an insufficient basis for ignoring the import of their text. If the
Rules imposed an absolute deadline for the submission of evidentiary materials, the District Court
could not be faulted for strictly enforcing that deadline, even though the result in a particular case
might be unfortunate. But, as the Court acknowledges, the Rules expressly permit the District Court to
exercise discretion in deciding whether affidavits in opposition to a summary judgment motion may be
submitted after the hearing.FN7 Once the District Court's power to accept untimely affidavits is
recognized, the question whether that power should be exercised in a particular instance must be
answered by reference to the explanation for the litigant's omission and the purposes the Rules are
designed to serve. In my view, NWF showed adequate cause for its failure to file the supplemental
affidavits prior to the hearing. Moreover, the organization's untimely filing in no way disserved the
purposes of Rule 56(c), and the federal parties suffered no prejudice as a consequence of the *906
delay. Under these circumstances, I believe that the District Court's refusal to consider these
submissions constituted an abuse of discretion.

FN7. Rule 56(c) provides that when a motion for summary judgment is filed, the “adverse party prior
to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits.” Under Rule 56(e), the district court “may permit
affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further
affidavits.” Rule 6(d) states: “When a motion is supported by affidavit, ... opposing affidavits may be
served not later than 1 day before the hearing, unless the court permits them to be served at some other
time.” The district court's authority to permit service “at some other time” is governed in turn by Rule
6(b), which provides that when an act is required to be performed by a specified time, the district court
may “upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the
failure to act was the result of excusable neglect.” See 4A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1165, p. 475 (2d ed. 1987) (Rule 6(b) “gives the court extensive flexibility to modify the
fixed time periods found throughout the rules, whether the enlargement is sought before or after the
actual termination of the allotted time”).
The Federal Rules require that affidavits in opposition to a motion ordinarily must be served at least
one day prior to the hearing; the Rules provide, however, that the affidavits may be filed at a later time
“where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect.” Rule 6(b); see n. 7, supra. Prior to the
July 22, 1988, hearing on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, NWF had been assured
repeatedly that its prior submissions were sufficient to establish its standing to sue. In its memorandum
opinion granting the Federation's motion for a preliminary injunction, the District Court stated: “We
continue to find irreparable injury to plaintiff and reaffirm plaintiff's standing to bring this action.”
National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 676 F.Supp. 280, 281 (D.C.1986).

Later that year the federal parties sought additional discovery on the question of standing. NWF sought
to quash discovery, arguing that “[t]he Court should bar any additional discovery on this issue because
(1) it has already found that plaintiff has standing; (2) plaintiff has already produced affidavits which
demonstrate standing and therefore any additional discovery would be unreasonably cumulative,
duplicative,**3198 burdensome and expensive within the meaning of Rule 26(c)(1); and (3) contrary to
the government defendants' apparent theory, plaintiff need not demonstrate injury as to each and every
action that is part of the program.” Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's
Motion To Quash and for a Protective Order 5-6 (July 1, 1986). In the alternative, NWF argued that if
additional discovery on standing was to be ordered, it should be confined to the requirement that a
limited number of additional affidavits be submitted. Id., at 22. The District Court, on July 14, 1986,
granted in full the Federation's motion to quash and ordered “that no further discovery of plaintiff or
*907 its members, officers, employees, agents, servants, or attorneys shall be permitted until
subsequent order of this court, if any.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 170a-171a. When the District Court's grant
of a preliminary injunction was subjected to appellate review, the Court of Appeals concluded that the
Peterson and Erman affidavits “provide a concrete indication that the Federation's members use
specific lands covered by the agency's Program and will be adversely affected by the agency's actions.”
National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 266 U.S.App.D.C. 241, 249, 835 F.2d 305, 313 (1987).FN8
The majority's statement that “a litigant is never justified in assuming that the court has made up its
mind until the court expresses itself to that effect,” ante, at 3193, is therefore simply irrelevant to the
present case: The District Court and the Court of Appeals repeatedly had indicated that the Federation
had offered sufficient evidence of its standing.

FN8. The Court of Appeals' discussion of standing occurred in the context of a motion to dismiss and
therefore, by itself, might not assure NWF that it had made a sufficient showing to withstand a motion
for summary judgment. But the Court of Appeals, like the District Court before it, also held that the
Federation's showing of injury, as reflected in the Peterson and Erman affidavits, provided an adequate
basis for a preliminary injunction. As the second Court of Appeals panel concluded, “the burden of
establishing irreparable harm to support a request for a preliminary injunction is, if anything, at least as
great as the burden of resisting a summary judgment motion on the ground that the plaintiff cannot
demonstrate ‘injury-in-fact.’ ” National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 278 U.S.App.D.C. 320, 330,
878 F.2d 422, 432 (1989) (emphasis omitted). When the first panel affirmed the District Court's entry
of a preliminary injunction, Judge Williams' separate opinion, concurring and dissenting, stated that
“the specificity required for standing allegations to secure a preliminary injunction will normally be no
less than that required on a motion for summary judgment.” 266 U.S.App.D.C., at 264, 835 F.2d, at
328.
Nor did the District Court's order of June 27, 1988, scheduling a motion hearing for the following July
22, place NWF on notice that its claim of standing might be reconsidered. That order made clear that
the hearing would consider the summary judgment motions of both the federal parties and *908 the
Federation. The principal submission of the federal parties relevant to the hearing was the Defendants'
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and/or for Dissolution of the Preliminary Injunction Issued
on February 10, 1986; that memorandum was filed on September 12, 1986. This 86-page memorandum
included only 9 1/2 pages devoted to standing, and half of that discussion set forth the federal parties'
claim that no broad programmatic challenge could succeed even if the Peterson and Erman affidavits
adequately alleged injury from Government decisions as to particular tracts of land. Moreover, even the
attack on the Peterson and Erman affidavits did not purport to show that summary judgment for the
federal parties should be entered on the ground that the Federation lacked standing. Rather, the federal
parties argued principally that summary judgment for NWF would be inappropriate because a genuine
factual dispute existed as to the Federation's standing to sue. See Defendants' Memorandum, at 45-47.
In fact, the 86-page memorandum included only two sentences arguing that the federal parties should
be awarded summary judgment on standing grounds. Id., at 11-12, 85. The District Court's decision to
schedule a hearing on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment provided no hint that
previous**3199 assurances concerning standing were open to reconsideration.FN9

FN9. At the hearing itself Fred R. Disheroon, the federal parties' attorney, argued at length on other
points before turning to the issue of standing. He began that portion of his argument by observing that
“perhaps the court doesn't want to hear me argue standing, but I think it is imperative that I address that
in the context of this case.” Tr. of Motions Hearing 43 (July 22, 1988).
Certainly the Federation could have submitted additional evidentiary materials in support of its claim of
standing, even though it had no reason to believe that further submissions were necessary. But it would
hardly enhance the efficiency *909 of the adjudicative process to encourage litigants to reargue
questions previously settled in their favor. In my view, NWF established sufficient cause for its failure
to submit the supplemental affidavits prior to the hearing.FN10

FN10. The supplemental affidavits were submitted as an attachment to the supplemental legal
memorandum on standing requested by the District Court. At the time of their submission, NWF stated
only that “NWF now has submitted declarations on behalf of other members of NWF who have been
injured by the challenged actions of federal defendants.” Plaintiff National Wildlife Federation's
Statement of Points and Authorities in Support of Its Standing To Proceed 18, n. 21 (Aug. 22, 1988).
However, in its reply memorandum on the issue, NWF addressed the contention of the federal parties
and the defendant-intervenor that the affidavits should be ignored as untimely filed. NWF stated:
“Plaintiff heretofore, has relied on the court's previous rulings on NWF's standing. In its motion for a
protective order against additional discovery, NWF argued that its standing had already been proven on
the basis of the affidavits of Mr. Greenwalt, Ms. Peterson, and Mr. Erman. The court agreed and
entered the requested protective order. If the court intends to reverse its prior ruling, then NWF
respectfully requests that it should be given adequate opportunity to supplement the record.” Plaintiff
National Wildlife Federation's Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Standing To Proceed 17, n. 16
(Sept. 14, 1988). The Federation also noted that Circuit precedent permitted the filing of supplemental
affidavits on standing issues, even on appeal. Ibid., citing National Wildlife Federation v. Hodel, 268
U.S.App.D.C. 15, 24, 839 F.2d 694, 703 (1988). NWF offered the further explanation: “Ms. Peterson
has supplemented her affidavit to include new information regarding a mine application which has been
filed by U.S. Energy Corporation that includes a proposal to mine lands within the area of South
Pass/Green Mountain previously closed to mining. For the record, NWF initially was told by officials
of the Bureau of Land Management that the U.S. Energy mine application did not include any lands
covered by the court's preliminary injunction. Otherwise, NWF would have supplemented Ms.
Peterson's affidavit earlier.” Reply memorandum, at 12-13, n. 13.Along with its Reply Memorandum,
NWF submitted an additional filing entitled Plaintiff National Wildlife Federation's Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant-Intervenors' Motion To Strike Plaintiff's Supplementation of the Record
(Sept. 14, 1988). That filing stated: “For the reasons stated in [the reply memorandum] at page 17, n.
16, plaintiff requests that defendant-intervenors' motion to strike be denied.” (In light of this separate
submission, addressed solely to the question whether the supplemental affidavits should be considered,
and expressly referring to n. 16 of the reply memorandum, it is difficult to fathom the Court's assertion
that NWF's request was “buried” in the Federation's filings. See ante, at 3192-3193, n. 5.) This separate
filing, in conjunction with the reply memorandum, satisfied Rule 6(b)'s requirement that the request for
enlargement of time be made “upon motion.” Though neither of these filings was expressly
denominated a “motion,” they met the requirements of Rule 7(b): They were submitted in writing, were
signed by counsel, “state [d] with particularity the grounds therefor,” and unambiguously “set forth the
relief ... sought.” See Campos v. LeFevre, 825 F.2d 671, 676 (CA2 1987) (“[N]o particular form of
words is necessary to render a filing a ‘motion.’ Any submission signed by a party that may fairly be
read as a request to the district court to exercise its discretionary powers ... should suffice”), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1014, 108 S.Ct. 718, 98 L.Ed.2d 667 (1988); Smith v. Danyo, 585 F.2d 83, 86 (CA3
1978) (“Rule 7(b) requires no more than that ... a motion ‘state with particularity the grounds' upon
which it is based. Plainly, an affidavit which is filed to obtain an order disqualifying a judge satisfies
the requirements of Rule 7(b).... The ... failure to type in the word ‘motion’ above the word ‘affidavit’
in no way detracts from the notice which the affidavit gave of the nature of the application”). Cf.
Snyder v. Smith, 736 F.2d 409, 419 (CA7) (“The Federal Rules are to be construed liberally so that
erroneous nomenclature in a motion does not bind a party at his peril”), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037,
105 S.Ct. 513, 83 L.Ed.2d 403 (1984); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 709 F.2d 524, 527 (CA9
1983) (“The court will construe [a motion], however styled, to be the type proper for the relief
requested”); 2A J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 7.05, pp. 7-16 to 7-17 (1989) (“[I]t is
the motion's substance, and not merely its linguistic form, that determines its nature and legal effect”).
**3200 *910 Moreover, the District Court's refusal to consider the additional submissions in this case
did not significantly advance the interests that Rule 56(c) is designed to serve. The Rule requires that
affidavits in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must be served “prior to the day of
hearing.” The Courts of Appeals consistently have recognized, however, that “Rule 56 does not
necessarily contemplate an oral hearing. Rather, 10-day advance notice to the adverse party that the
motion and all materials in support of or in opposition to the motion will be taken under advisement by
the trial court as of a certain day satisfies the notice and hearing *911 dictates of Rule 56.” Moore v.
Florida, 703 F.2d 516, 519 (CA11 1983).FN11 Rule 56(c)'s requirement that a summary judgment
motion be filed 10 days in advance of a scheduled hearing serves to ensure that the nonmoving party is
afforded adequate notice of the motion. Similarly, the requirement that opposing affidavits be
submitted prior to the day of the hearing reflects the fact that the district court may rule on the
summary judgment motion at the hearing or at any time thereafter; submission of affidavits prior to that
day is thus essential if the moving party is to be assured the opportunity to respond at a time when a
response is meaningful. The requirement also allows the district court to establish a deadline by which
time all evidence and arguments must be submitted; thereafter, the court may deliberate with the
assurance that no subsequent filings will alter the terms of the dispute.

FN11. Accord, Allied Chemical Corp. v. Mackay, 695 F.2d 854, 856 (CA5 1983) (“Rule 56(c) does not
require an oral hearing in open court. Rather, it contemplates notice to the party opposing the motion
and an adequate opportunity to respond to the movant's arguments”); Bratt v. International Business
Machines Corp., 785 F.2d 352, 363 (CA1 1986).
These are pressing concerns when the hearing on a summary judgment motion represents the parties'
last opportunity to set forth their legal arguments. In the present case, however, the District Court
concluded the July 22, 1988, hearing by requesting supplemental briefing on the issue of standing.
FN12 NWF's supplemental affidavits, filed on August 22 as an attachment to its legal memorandum,
were submitted at a time when the federal parties had ample opportunity to respond. (Indeed, the
opportunity to respond here-10 days-was far greater than would have been the case if NWF had filed
(timely) affidavits the day before the hearing and no *912 supplemental briefing had been allowed.)
The affidavits, moreover, were filed well before the time when the case was to be taken under
advisement. The record in this case is voluminous, currently filling six large boxes; consideration of
five more affidavits would not have added significantly to the complexity of the issues before the
District Court. Under these circumstances, submission of the supplemental affidavits neither disserved
the purposes of the Rule nor prejudiced the federal parties in any respect.

FN12. The District Court subsequently established a schedule for the supplemental briefing. NWF was
requested to file its opening memorandum by August 22, 1988; the federal parties and intervenors were
to file memoranda in opposition by September 1; and NWF's reply was due by September 14. Order of
July 27, 1988.
The District Court discussed none of these factors in explaining its refusal to consider the supplemental
affidavits. Indeed, the District Court offered no justification at all for its action beyond the assertion
that the affidavits were untimely.FN13 Similarly, the Court **3201 today fails to assess the District
Court's action by reference to the excuse for NWF's untimely filing or the absence of prejudice to the
federal parties. The District Court and today's majority fail to recognize the guiding principle of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the principle that procedural rules should be construed pragmatically,
so as to ensure the just and efficient resolution of legal disputes. Some provisions of the Rules strip the
district courts of discretion, and the courts have no choice but to enforce these requirements with
scrupulous precision.FN14 But where the Rules expressly confer a range of *913 discretion, a district
court may abuse its authority by refusing to take account of equitable concerns, even where its action
violates no express command. In my view, such an abuse of discretion occurred here.

FN13. The District Court mentioned these affidavits in a single footnote: “Plaintiff, in addition to its
memorandum filed August 22, 1988 has submitted additional evidentiary material, including
declarations from four of its members. These submissions are untimely and in violation of our Order.
We decline to consider them. See Federal Defendants' Reply to Plaintiff's Statement of Points and
Authorities in Support of Its Standing to Proceed, at 1 n. 1.” National Wildlife Federation v. Burford,
699 F.Supp. 327, 328-329, n. 3 (D.C.1988).
FN14. Rule 6(b), for example, which generally gives the district court broad authority to grant
enlargements of time, establishes the limitation that the court “may not extend the time for taking any
action under Rules 50(b) and (c)(2), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b), and 74(a), except to the extent and
under the conditions stated in them.”
III
In Part IV-A, ante, at 3189, the majority sets forth a long and abstract discussion of the scope of relief
that might have been awarded had the Federation made a sufficient showing of injury from
environmental damage to a particular tract of land. Since the majority concludes in other portions of its
opinion that the Federation lacks standing to challenge any of the land-use decisions at issue here, it is
not clear to me why the Court engages in the hypothetical inquiry contained in Part IV-A. In any event,
I agree with much of the Court's discussion, at least in its general outline. The Administrative
Procedure Act permits suit to be brought by any person “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. In some cases the “agency action” will consist of a rule of broad applicability;
and if the plaintiff prevails, the result is that the rule is invalidated, not simply that the court forbids its
application to a particular individual. Under these circumstances a single plaintiff, so long as he is
injured by the rule, may obtain “programmatic” relief that affects the rights of parties not before the
court. On the other hand, if a generally lawful policy is applied in an illegal manner on a particular
occasion, one who is injured is not thereby entitled to challenge other applications of the rule.

Application of these principles to the instant case does not turn on whether, or how often, the Bureau's
land-management policies have been described as a “program.” FN15 In one sense, *914 of course,
there is no question that a “program” exists. Everyone associated with this lawsuit recognizes that the
BLM, over the past decade, has attempted to develop and implement a comprehensive scheme for the
termination of classifications and withdrawals. The real issue is whether the actions and omissions that
NWF contends are illegal are themselves part of a plan or policy. For example: If the agency had
published a regulation stating that an environmental impact statement (EIS) should never be developed
prior to the termination of a classification or withdrawal, NWF could challenge the regulation (which
would constitute an “agency action”). If the reviewing court then held that the statute required a
pretermination EIS, the relief (invalidation of the rule) would directly affect **3202 tracts other than
the ones used by individual affiants. At the other extreme, if the applicable BLM regulation stated that
an EIS must be developed, and NWF alleged that the administrator in charge of South Pass/Green
Mountain had inexplicably failed to develop one, NWF should not be allowed (on the basis of the
Peterson affidavit) to challenge a termination in Florida on the ground that an administrator there made
the same mistake.

FN15. The term “withdrawal review program” repeatedly has been used in BLM documents. See, e.g.,
Plaintiff's Exhs. 1, 3, 10, 11, 15, 18, 19 (filed July 15, 1985). At oral argument on the cross-motions for
summary judgment, counsel for the federal parties acknowledged: “It is true, BLM referred to this
review process as a land withdrawal review program.” Tr. of Motion Hearing 40 (July 22, 1988).
Counsel went on to say, “but I suggest that using a word, calling it a program, doesn't make a program
in the sense that it is being challenged here.” Ibid. That assertion, though inelegant, seems essentially
correct: An agency's terminology is not decisive in determining whether an alleged illegality is
systemic or site-specific.
The majority, quoting the District Court, characterizes the Bureau's land management program as “
‘1250 or so individual classification terminations and withdrawal revocations.’ ” Ante, at 3189; see
National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 699 F.Supp. 327, 332 (DC 1988). The majority offers no
argument in support of this conclusory assertion, and I am far from certain that the characterization is
an accurate one. Since this issue bears on the scope of the relief ultimately to be awarded should the
plaintiff prevail, rather than on the jurisdiction*915 of the District Court to entertain the suit, I would
allow the District Court to address the question on remand. FN16

FN16. The majority also suggests that the agency actions challenged in this suit may not be ripe for
review. See ante, at 3190-3191. Since the issue of ripeness has not been briefed or argued in this Court,
nor passed on by the courts below, I need not address it. I do note, however, that at the outset of this
case the federal parties made precisely the opposite argument, asserting that a preliminary injunction
should be denied on the ground that NWF's claims were barred by laches. The federal parties
contended: “The Federation offers no explanation why, despite its detailed knowledge of BLM's
revocation and termination activities, it has waited so long to institute litigation.” Defendants'
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction 26 (Aug. 22, 1985).I also
decline to address the adequacy of the affidavit submitted by Lynn Greenwalt, since the Court of
Appeals did not pass on that issue.
IV
Since I conclude that the Peterson and Erman affidavits provided sufficient evidence of NWF's
standing to withstand a motion for summary judgment, and that the District Court abused its discretion
by refusing to consider the Federation's supplemental affidavits, I would affirm the judgment of the
Court of Appeals. I respectfully dissent.

497 U.S. 871, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 31 ERC 1553, 111 L.Ed.2d 695, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,962

Briefs and Other Related Documents (Back to top)

• 1990 WL 10013114 (Appellate Brief) Reply Brief for the Petitioners (Apr. 06, 1990)
• 1990 WL 505743 (Appellate Brief) REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS (Apr. 06, 1990)
• 1990 WL 10013110 (Appellate Brief) Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents Urging
Affirmance (Apr. 02, 1990)
• 1990 WL 10013090 (Appellate Brief) Brief of Mountain States Legal Foundation and Minerals
Exploration Coalition as Respondent Supporting Petitioners (Mar. 02, 1990)
• 1990 WL 10013095 (Appellate Brief) Brief for the Petitioners (Mar. 02, 1990)
• 1990 WL 10013098 (Appellate Brief) Brief of Amici Curiae the Washington Legal Foundation and
the Honorable Steven D. Symms, United States Senator, in Support of Petitioners (Mar. 02, 1990)
• 1990 WL 10013101 (Appellate Brief) Brief Amici Curiae of the American Farm Bureau Federation
and the Wyoming Farm Bureau Federation in Support of Petitioners (Mar. 02, 1990)
• 1990 WL 10013104 (Appellate Brief) Brief of Amici Curiae National Cattlemen's Association, Public
Lands Council, and American Sheep Industry Association, in Support of Petitioners (Mar. 02, 1990)
• 1990 WL 505742 (Appellate Brief) BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS (Mar. 02, 1990)
• 1990 WL 514334 (Appellate Brief) BRIEF OF MOUNTAIN STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION
AND MINERALS EXPLORATION COALITION AS RESPONDENT SUPPORTING
PETITIONERS (Mar. 02, 1990)
• 1990 WL 10013086 (Appellate Brief) Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation in Support of
Petitioners (Mar. 01, 1990)
• 1989 WL 1174074 (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) Petition (Oct. 18, 1989)
• 1989 WL 1127426 (Appellate Brief) Amici Curiae and Brief of Amici Curiae National Cattlemen's
Association, Public Lands Council, American Sheep Industry Association, Rocky Mountain Oil and
Gas Association, and Independent Petroleum Association of America in Support of Petitioners (Oct.
Term 1989)
• 1989 WL 1127430 (Appellate Brief) Reply Brief for the Petitioners (Oct. Term 1989)
• 1989 WL 1127446 (Appellate Brief) Brief of Amici Curiae the Wilderness Society, Defenders of
Wildlife, the Sierra Club, the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, the National Audubon Society, the
Natural Resources Defense Council, the National Parks and Conservation Association, and the Iz aak
Walton League of America in Support of Respondents (Oct. Term 1989)
• 1989 WL 1127447 (Appellate Brief) Brief for Respondent (Oct. Term 1989)
• 1989 WL 434768 (Appellate Brief) BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT (Aug. 09, 1989)

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Judges and Attorneys (Back to top)
Judges | Attorneys
Judges
Blackmun, Hon. Harry A.
Supreme Court of the United States
District of Columbia
Litigation History Report | Profiler

Kennedy, Hon. Anthony M.

Supreme Court of the United States
District of Columbia
Litigation History Report | Judicial Reversal Report | Judicial Expert Challenge Report | Profiler

Marshall, Thurgood
Supreme Court of the United States
District of Columbia
Litigation History Report | Judicial Reversal Report | Profiler

O'Connor, Hon. Sandra Day

Supreme Court of the United States
District of Columbia
Litigation History Report | Judicial Reversal Report | Profiler

Rehnquist, Hon. William H.

Supreme Court of the United States
District of Columbia
Litigation History Report | Judicial Reversal Report | Profiler

Scalia, Hon. Antonin G.

Supreme Court of the United States
District of Columbia
Litigation History Report | Judicial Reversal Report | Judicial Expert Challenge Report | Profiler

Stevens, Hon. John Paul

Supreme Court of the United States
District of Columbia
Litigation History Report | Judicial Reversal Report | Profiler

White, Byron R. Hon.

Supreme Court of the United States
District of Columbia
Litigation History Report | Profiler

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Attorneys
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
Brooks, Constance E.
Denver, Colorado
Litigation History Report | Profiler

Burling, James S.
Sacramento, California
Litigation History Report | Profiler

Haggard, Jerry L.
Phoenix, Arizona
Litigation History Report | Profiler

Kurtz, Gerrie Apker

Phoenix, Arizona
Litigation History Report | Profiler

Oberly, Hon. Kathryn A.

Unknown State
Litigation History Report | Profiler

Ordin, Andrea Sheridan

Los Angeles, California
Litigation History Report | Profiler

Rademacher, John J.
Park Ridge, Illinois
Litigation History Report | Profiler

Rechtschaffen, Clifford L.
San Francisco, California
Litigation History Report | Profiler

Rivett, Robin Lee

Sacramento, California
Litigation History Report | Profiler

Thompson, Craig C.
Sacramento, California
Litigation History Report | Profiler

Van de Kamp, John K.

Los Angeles, California
Litigation History Report | Profiler

Zumbrun, Ronald A.
Sacramento, California
Litigation History Report | Profiler

Attorneys for Petitioner

Robbins, Lawrence S.
Washington, District of Columbia
Litigation History Report | Profiler

Steenland, Peter R. Jr.

Washington, District of Columbia
Litigation History Report | Profiler

Attorneys for Respondent

Keeney, John C. Jr.
Washington, District of Columbia
Litigation History Report | Profiler

Pendley, William P.
Denver, Colorado
Litigation History Report | Profiler

Prettyman, E. Barrett Jr.

Washington, District of Columbia
Litigation History Report | Profiler

Other Attorneys
Butterworth, Robert A.
Fort Lauderdale, Florida
Litigation History Report | Profiler
Celebrezze, Anthony J.
Columbus, Ohio
Litigation History Report | Profiler

Ross, Terence P.
Washington, District of Columbia
Litigation History Report | Profiler

Samp, Richard A.
Arlington, Virginia
Litigation History Report | Profiler

END OF DOCUMENT