UNDERSTANDING THE TRAGIC ACT IN ARISTOTLE’S POETICS

Helen Horgan

Action is central to our concept of drama. It is action that initiates the unfolding events of a
plot, in a way that engages our minds and involves us also physically. In this way action
initiates the movement of plot, played out through its chosen characters. Plot and character,
character and plot are intricately and equally employed in instancing the motion of the act or
action. In the following paper I would like to talk about Aristotle’s notion of the ‘act’ in the
Poetics with particular emphasis on the dramatic art of Tragedy. I would like at the same
time to consider the ‘act’ in relation to the broader concept of Praxis that is is action which is
purposeful and goal-directed alongside Aristotles teleological philosophy; that is that objects
of nature bear an inherent function and their development is a lifelong process of
proceeding towards this end. The telos, singular in its goal, signifies for Aristotle the
essential form and function of each living thing.

Aristotle is often spoken about as one of the first metaphysical thinkers and at the same
time a scientist. His works reflect a consistent interest in uncovering and categorising the
underlying essences of objects in the world and relating them by analogy to a wider
philosophy. In the Poetics Aristotle outlines a broad yet rigorously defined treatise on the
dramatic arts, poetry and fine art in general “noting the essential quality of each”1. Among
the dramatic arts he gives most weight to Epic Poetry and Tragedy. These are the more
serious forms and their aims are to represent universal aspects of the nature of the human
condition. Methods of artistic representation for Aristotle are bound up within specific forms
of imitation, or mimesis. In the Poetics Aristotle speaks about mimesis as being an instinct
towards imitation that mankind shares. It is by imitating the acts of others that we learn what
it means to be human; by appreciating our likeness in others we can find ourselves thinking
and inferring ‘Ah, that is he.” In a similar way through rhythm, language and harmony, in
varying applications, the poetic arts should imitate and illuminate the elementary forms of
life. Their purpose being to bring it again to our awareness in a sustained frame of
observation. The concept of Praxis is itself a specific form of mimesis or mode of imitation,

1 Aristotle, The Poetics of Aristotle, Ed. S.H Butcher (The MacMillan Company, New York 1907) pg 7
the imitation of an act.2 As Aristotle puts it in book four of the Poetics “Hence, some say, the
name of ‘drama’ is given”3 as the representation of action.

The dramatic form of Tragedy, at first a loose form of improvisation, developed from the
dithyramb and satyric drama. The dithyramb was a hymn sung and danced in honor of the
greek god of wine and fertility Dionysius and it mostly leant an air of merry making and
festivity. The satyric drama was a lighthearted predecessor to the later more somber
tragedy. It had a lampooning or trivial manner and had greater affinities with dancing then
with well crafted plots. The dancing and merriment of the Satyric drama was often
accompanied by a chorus of actors dressed as ‘satyrs’ the mythical half-man half-goat. The
etymological root of the word tragedy as ‘tragos’ ‘oide’ literally ‘goat song’ could be seen to
retain a hidden suggestion to this mythical duality, highlighting the human condition as a
divided state of both conscious actor and passively driven animal. Satyr and Dithyramb as
interpreted in the Poetics are inflated and crude forms of what Greek Tragedy later refined.
Certainly for Aristotle in the Poetics the Satyric and Dithyrambic forms represent the
interests of men of a more base character. For Aristotle there are two kinds of poets and
each find themselves inclined to a particular mode of interests. The jocular and satiric poets
are those whose aim is to represent the lowlier ignoble characters. Those of a more serious
and virtuous nature, what Aristotle terms “Spoudaios” have a wish to follow the tragic arts
and represent men of a noble and honorable kind. Aristotle saw Satire as merely subjective
expression whereas Tragedie’s aims were to explicate the essential structures of the social
being.4 Subsequently in Tragedy the main characters we perceive are of a more serious
and heroic nature, caught up in the resolution of some pivotal act.5 In D.W Lucas’s
interpretation of the Poetics he states that “Man alone, as opposed to animals, can initiate
action”6 and as Aristotle mentions on a number of occasions in book six through to eight of
the Poetics “Tragedy, then is an imitation of an action that is serious, complete and of a
certain magnitude”7.

2Elizabeth Belfiore, Aristotleʼs Concept of Praxis in The Poetics in The Classical Journal
(Vol. 79, No. 2, Dec., 1983 - Jan., 1984), pp. 110-124 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3297245
3 Aristotle, The Poetics of Aristotle, Ed. S.H Butcher (The MacMillan Company, New York,1907) pg 13
4 Jacob Bernays, Aristotle and the Effects of Tragedy
5 Aristotle,
The Poetics of Aristotle, Ed. S.H Butcher (The MacMillan Company, New York,1907) pg 17
(1449a 10-15)
6 D.W Lucas, Aristotle Poetics (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1968) pg 96
7 Aristotle, The Poetics of Aristotle, Ed. S.H Butcher (The MacMillan Company, New York,1907) pg 23
Looking more closely at what the concerns of the tragic act and the term Praxis or active
intent mean in relation to virtuous or mindful action the inclination would be to take it as a
concern for rightful action or acting in good conscience but that is not necessarily the case.
As Aristotle puts it “Tragedy…is an imitation of an action that is serious, complete and of a
certain magnitude”8. By something complete Aristotle implies something whole, as in
something that possesses a beginning, a middle and an end. It is the completeness of its
orderly arrangement that Aristotle sees as the beauty of the Tragic act. We perceive the
character of the actors in Tragedy as being somehow implicated in this overall unity, but the
tragic act doesn’t proceed by virtue of merely righting a wrong. Elizabeth Belfiore interprets
the difference between the usage of the term Praxis in Aristotle’s ethical works and in the
Poetics. Praxis involves both action and a consciously acting agent but whereas In
Aristotle’s ethical works Belfiore sees the focus being placed more so on the agent as moral
subject in the Poetics and in Aristotelian Tragedy the focus is primarily on the mode of
action itself.9 The character is merely the vehicle for the defining tragic act.

As Aristotle puts it “Tragedy is a representation not of individuals, but of an

action, and life and happiness and unhappiness is in the action, and the aim is
an action, not a quality; people have some quality according to the traits of
character, but they are also happy or the opposite according to their actions”.10

There is a double meaning to what is said here. On the one hand we can interpret it as
falling into place with Aristotle’s ethical views of what it means to be good. To be a virtuous
man for Aristotle it is not good intentions but virtuous acts that count. Only by doing good do
we become good. At the same time to say “tragedy is a representation not of individuals but
of an action, and life and happiness and unhappiness is in the action” suggests that the
tragic act is somehow beyond the control of its individual players. The serious nature at work
in the act of tragedy is this contradictory position. The agent must be virtuous, that is
mindful, philosophically inclined even, enough to be inclined to act but ultimately in tragedy
the character remains subservient to the totalising and complete form of the plot, he is in a

8 Aristotle, The Poetics of Aristotle, Ed. S.H Butcher (The MacMillan Company, New York,1907) pg 23
9 Elizabeth Belfiore, Aristotleʼs Concept of Praxis in The Poetics in The Classical Journal
(Vol. 79, No. 2, Dec., 1983 - Jan., 1984), pp. 110-124 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3297245
10 Aristotle, The Poetics of Aristotle, Ed. S.H Butcher (The MacMillan Company, New York,1907) pg 27
large sense at its disposal. This brings us to the heart of Aristotelian Tragedy or more
specifically the soul. For Aristotle the plot is the first principle and soul of Tragedy. Its ‘telos’
or deciding aim is to show that the strength lies not in the characters themselves but in the
overarching plot. By its function in representing the causal nature of a unified sequence of
events we realise that the agents act is mapped out in advance so to speak. The viewer is
made aware of the plots causal integrity through a sense of its structural union and
seemingly singular aim. At the same time it is not possible at any moment for the viewer to
gain full objectivity or apprehend the plots intentions in a way that could mentally call a halt
to its tragic consequences. Having said that it would be too simplistic to assume that the
concerns of Tragedy are merely to highlight the dueling actions and passions of chance and
predetermination. A well constructed Tragic plot should be singular in its issue not an
ambiguous rally in two directions. However as Belfiore interpreted earlier Aristotles use of
terms which suggest goal directed or virtuous activity in the Poetics is not to provide the
viewer with a moral education. There appears to be some relation to the Tragic plot acting
on and through a specific kind of agent but if not in a moral sense then what is its purpose
and how does it act?

To reiterate “Tragedy is a representation not of individuals, but of an action…one action

which is whole and complete and has a beginning, middle and end”11. The principle
emphasis here is on singularity, unity and completeness. Aristotle in his characteristically
teleological thinking does not speak of actions in general but in the constitution of one
specific type of action, which proceeds sequentially and by necessity from beginning to
middle and end. The function of the acts singularity is inherent in its particular form and it
provides the structure of the tragic plot with a blinding element of beauty and simplicity.
Beauty depends both on magnitude and on order, an orderly arrangement of parts. Like the
dependent organs of an animal Aristotle says “it will thus resemble a living organism in all its
unity, and produce the pleasure proper to it”.12 The physiognomy of an action, the action of
a particular physical kind places it by analogy into the realm of living things and gives it a
distinct plausibility. The duration of the act in Tragedy is that of a single revolution of the sun,
or just beyond. It formally relates by sense and proportion to the lifespan of a living thing.
The unity of its teleological development can be easily embraced as a whole by the viewer,
just enough for the reader to comprehend in what way things might unfold. This is how

11 Aristotle, The Poetics of Aristotle, Ed. S.H Butcher (The MacMillan Company, New York,1907) pg 27
12 Aristotle, The Poetics of Aristotle, Ed. S.H Butcher (The MacMillan Company, New York,1907) pg 89
Aristotle compares poetry to a philosophical way of thinking and as a higher thing than
History which only gives a detail of accounts that have happened. Poetry on the other hand
follows by imitation natural laws of possibility and necessity, expressing what may happen
according to the specific nature of its form. This engages the viewer in a mode of active
reasoning and inference while also emotionally and empathetically involving him in its
mimetic, lifelike characteristics.

The structural unity of the tragic plot ensures its logical probability and therefore a credibility
that appeals to the viewer’s sense of reason but this effect is not merely a cognitive one. As
Aristotle puts it “Tragedy is an imitation of an action that is serious, complete and of a
certain magnitude...in the form of action not of narrative; through pity and fear effecting the
proper purgation of these emotions”13

Central to the notion of Tragedy is its uplifting effect on our sense of reason via the
emotions. This is spoken about by Aristotle in terms of purgation or Katharsis. In the
appreciation of the ideal tragic act the viewer experiences a peculiar pleasure from the
emotional responses of pity and fear. What can explain this peculiar and seemingly
unreasonable response? As has been previously set out the strength in Tragedy lies in its
strong inner logic and effective likeness to life, but to have such a response in true life
situations would seem entirely unreasonable. Also since Aristotle takes Tragedy to be the
highest of the dramatic arts unlike the lowlier dithyrambic and satyric forms and something
the virtuous man would enjoy it hardly seems likely that he would suggest that the virtuous
man would be capable of enjoying feeling the pity and fear of others. To suggest that the
pleasure arrives through the purgation of these emotions, if we take the term purgation to
mean either the purification of some noxious foreign substance or the removal of some
emotional excess does not fit either with the understanding that katharsis through tragic
enjoyment is something that the appropriately virtuous man would either need or enjoy. The
virtuous man is one who has the right kind of emotions in the right conditions and to an
appropriate extent. Neither can we say that the action of purgation and Katharsis transforms
feelings of pity and fear into pleasure. These strong and somber emotions are not simply
eradicated and replaced with pleasure by Katharsis. This would induce a loss of emotional
reason. Somehow the logic and emotional effect of the tragic act works on our emotions in a
way that appeals to our sense of reason in an unexpected manner.

13 Aristotle, The Poetics of Aristotle, Ed. S.H Butcher (The MacMillan Company, New York,1907) pg 12
 “A perfect tragedy” Aristotle tells us “arranged not on the simple but on the
complex plan...should imitate actions which excite pity and fear this being the
distinctive mark of tragic imitation....the change of fortune presented must not be
the spectacle of a virtuous man brought from prosperity to adversity nor should a
downfall of the utter villain be exhibited. A plot of this kind would...satisfy the
moral sense but it would inspire neither pity or fear; for pity is aroused by
unmerited misfortune, fear by the misfortune of a man like ourselves...whose
fortune is brought about not by vice or depravity but by some error or frailty”14

Aristotle places many constraints on the ideal form of tragedy in order that it should be
singular in its effect. He states that its form requires three main ingredients, that of pathos,
reversal of fortune and ultimate recognition. Combined these three induce the emotions of
pity and fear. Pathos refers to strong and grave emotions and by Aristotle’s usage signifies
both objects of pathos and their emotional response. By emotions we do not refer to mere
feelings. Emotions, particularly profound emotions such as these require a depth of belief
and an appeal to reason and rationality that an act of less unitary intent would not demand.
The singular object of pathos in Tragedy is the tragic act and it is a mimesis of a special type
of terrible event. It befalls a man of noble aim, intent on resolution. The viewer observes
the plot proceeding by inherent necessary consequence to the moment of an inadvertently
tragic event. Only at this moment, at the reversal of fortune does the plots full intelligibility
come to light and the protagonist realises too late that his actions have been following a
fatal course all along. This is the misfortune of a man who is not specifically good or bad but
who has been acting under the influence of hamartia15, the tragedy of error or mistaken
action, a blindness which is part of the human condition.16 The viewer is struck in awe by
the sudden and complete revelation of the plots aims. Engaged empathetically and at the
same time shocked and pleased by the astute skill of this mimetic art, the viewer enjoys his
capacity to appreciate its horror from a distance while gaining an invaluable insight into the
human condition. In realising his own fallibility in misapprehending the aims of the act he
acknowledges the extent to which he could have befallen the same tragedy himself.

14 Aristotle, The Poetics of Aristotle, Ed. S.H Butcher (The MacMillan Company, New York,1907) pg 45
15 Hamartia is translated by D.W Lucas in as stemming from the verb hamartanein ‘to miss the mark, to err,
to fail’ for Aristotle a particular case of mistaken action. D.W Lucas, Aristotle Poetics (Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 1968) (pg 299-300)
16 D.W Lucas, Aristotle Poetics (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1968)