CHINA IMPACT CARDS Page 1 of 12

i. Extension - Internal Link 1 – China Doesn’t Like Containment

1. China has called for less containment by the United States

Xinhua News Agency “CPPCC Calls for Less Containmen in Sino-US Ties,” Xinhua News Agency, China Daily, March
2, 2010 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/guangxisessions/2010-03/02/content_9526797.htm [Ethos]

“There should be more cooperation and less containment in Sino-U.S. relations, which suffered a "spring chill" at the beginning of 2010,
said a spokesman for China's top political advisory body here Tuesday. Zhao Qizheng, spokesman for the third session of the 11th National
Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), made the remarks at a press conference at the Great Hall of the
People in central Beijing. Zhao said since the two countries established diplomatic ties in 1979, the China-U.S. relations had developed rapidly with the volume of bilateral trade
expanding more than 100 times as well as a lot of cultural, political and economic exchanges, which benefited both sides. U.S. President Barack Obama seemed to have some new
but two events, which happened during the first 20 days of 2010, had chilled the China-U.S. ties, said
thinking on the relations,
Zhao, referring to the Obama administration's arms sales plan to Taiwan and Obama's meeting with the Dalai Lama despite
strong opposition from China. "These two events damaged China's core interests," Zhao told hundreds of domestic and foreign journalists. "Changes in the China-U.S. relations are
like changes in weather, from sunny days to cloudy days, and this has aroused Chinese people's concerns." He said Obama's meeting with the Dalai Lama "seriously disturbed" the
Sino-U.S. relations, while the arms sales to Taiwan "seriously violated" three joint communiques between China and the United States and harmed China's national security and
"The responsibility of the setback of the Sino-U.S. relations lies with the U.S. side," he said. "This
cross-Strait peace and stability.
is like playing tennis, the United States served the ball and what China did was simply strike the ball back." "For the sake
of the interests of both countries, there should be more cooperation between China and the United States and less
'containment' from the United States," Zhao said.”

2. Comments after the sinking of the Cheonan display the tension between China and the US and its allies
Peter Lee[Reporter, Staff Writer, and Journalist, Asia Times] “China Smarts at US Slap” Asia Times Online, July 2,
2010 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/LG02Ad02.html [Brackets Added; Ellipses in Original] [Ethos]

“As the People's Republic of China absorbs the impact of a resounding slap to the face administered by United States
President Barack Obama in Toronto, it may have to rethink its attempts to form a win-win relationship of equals between
China, North and South Korea, Japan and the US in North Asia. At the Group of 20 meeting in Toronto, Obama went public with a demand that
China abandon its "willful blindness", as al-Jazeera reports: Barack Obama said he hoped that Hu Jintao, his Chinese counterpart, would
recognize that North Korea crossed a line in the sinking of the Cheonan warship, which killed 46 South Korean sailors. He said he
understood that North Korea and China were neighbors, "There's a difference between restraint and willful blindness to consistent
problems." Obama held talks with Hu on the sidelines of the summit and said he had been "blunt" with him on the issue of North Korea. "My hope is that President Hu will
recognize as well that this is an example of Pyongyang going over the line," he said. China, which is Pyongyang's main international ally, has so far remained non-
committal on the issue, prompting Obama to say that shying away from the harsh facts about North Korea's behavior was
"a bad habit we need to break". Obama said he wanted the UN Security Council to produce a "crystal-clear acknowledgment" of the North's alleged action, which
would require the cooperation of veto-wielding member China. [1] Chosun Ilbo, the South Korean daily newspaper, piled on, making the counter-intuitive,
at least to China, point that heightening tensions with a denunciation was the best way to reduce tensions - while making [made] it clear that South Korea
believed that China was forfeiting its position as regional leader - and even "bringing the Cold War atmosphere back" -
by not going along on the Cheonan campaign: If China had boosted international condemnation of the sinking, the security situation on the peninsula would
have been markedly different. A firm stance by Beijing could have even improved stability. In other words, China is also responsible for bringing the
Cold War atmosphere back to the region ... As long as China insists on standing by North Korea, which continues to produce nuclear weapons and attack South
Korea, the South has no choice but to consider other options. If China continues to take the short-sighted approach of rallying behind a belligerent North Korea, Asian countries and
the international community will grow increasingly suspicious of Beijing's role on the global stage. [2] Amid this storm of criticism, it undoubtedly did not escape Beijing's attention
that the other superpower that has so far declined to endorse the Cheonan findings - Russia - was excused from public humiliation. China riposted promptly with a People's Daily
editorial pointedly entitled "Blindness to China's efforts on the Peninsula", which labeled Obama's remarks as "irresponsible and flippant" and continued: Without China's
involvement, there would not have been the six-party talks, and the outbreak of yet another Korean War might well have been a possibility. Ultimately, the solution to tensions on the
Korean Peninsula hinges on eliminating the last vestiges of the Cold War. This is the time for all sides involved to break the old, hardened pattern and think of new ways of dealing
with North Korea. This is China's constructive proposal that deserves serious consideration by all parties involved. The US cannot ignore the fact that China remains the most
It would appear that the Obama administration's efforts to sideline China
important channel of effective communication in this situation. [3]
and promote South Korea and the US to central stage in managing the North Korea issue have created a perverse
incentive for Beijing and Pyongyang to cooperate and even raise tensions in the peninsula in order to demonstrate their
indispensability. Certainly, China's announcement of live-fire exercises in the East China Sea to counter planned joint South Korea-US exercises in the Yellow Sea between
the Korean Peninsula and China is an indication that China is more willing to play the military card than it has been before. [4] Chinese belligerence represents an interesting
turnaround from several days before, when China was clearly considering a policy of distancing itself from North Korea and presenting itself as an honest broker in Korean affairs.”
CHINA IMPACT CARDS Page 2 of 12

3. The SCO is a reaction to US influence in Asia

Tariue Niazi[Professor, Sociology, University of Wisconsin, Eau Claire; Contributor, Foreign Policy in Focus]
“Pushback to Unilateralism: The China-India-Russia Alliance” Foreign Policy in Focus, Institute in Policy Studies,
December 20, 2007 http://www.fpif.org/articles/pushback_to_unilateralism_the_china-india-russia_alliance [Ethos]

“The SCO's geopolitical pushback to the unipolar-unilateral makeover of the world is, however, defensive. Both China
and Russia are being protective of their turf. Their internal divisions caused by "extremism, splitism, and terrorism" further unnerve them at
even a slight hint of U.S. or NATO proximity to their "near-abroad." They have created the SCO and CSTO, and formed the Caspian
Sea Alliance to put distance between their respective "spheres of influence" and NATO-US presence. Many argue that this
alliance-building is a reaction to U.S. unilateralism. These alliances, however, cannot threaten U.S. security interests in the region. The allied nations have
been consistently reassuring the U.S. that their alliances are not directed at "third party." In fact, SCO member states have helped the U.S. to protect its security interests in the region.
In the run-up to U.S. military action in Afghanistan in 2001, the Russian President Putin, according to Bob Woodward, stunned the top U.S. policy makers with his unsolicited offer
to let U.S. combat jets use the Russian airspace to strike the Taliban government in Kabul.32 The Bush White House was not even sure if Russians would agree to U.S. airbases in
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan for which it sought Putin's consent. More importantly, China, which shares a long border with Kyrgyzstan and is next door neighbor to Uzbekistan, went
along with the U.S. bases in both countries. Besides, and it is noteworthy for American policy makers, the three nations that broke out in spontaneous outpouring of sympathy for
9/11 victims were not Egypt, Jordan or Saudi Arabia, but Russia, Iran and China--in that order--where hundreds of thousands of marchers held candle-lit vigils and mourned the
tragic deaths of 3,000 Americans in terrorist attacks. In strictly strategic sense, the U.S. by itself and together with its allies, especially Australia, Britain and Japan, continues to be
the dominant force in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Malacca and the Indian Ocean, which are the key sources and supply routes of energy shipments for China and
trade goods for Central Asia. This makes China and the region vulnerable to U.S. retaliation in the event of any perceived or real threat to U.S. security interests.”

4. China is threatened by containment

Robert Kagan[Adjunct Professor, History, Georgetown University; PhD, American History, American University;
Expert, US National Security, Foreign Policy, US Relations with China, NATO Expansion; Former Senior Associate,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Former Member, Policy Planning Staff, State Department; Former
Deputy for Policy, Buruau of Inter-American Affairs, State Department] “Ambition and Anxiety – America's Competition
with China” Published in “The Rise of China: Essays on the Future Competition” New York Encounter Books, 2009, p.
1-23 (ISBN-13: 978-1-59403-231-8; ISBN-10: 1-59403-231-9) [Ethos]

“If the Chinese search for greater “comprehensive national power” is partly driven by the Thycydidean triad of honor, interest,
and fear, what is it that the Chinese fear? They fear what all rising powers fear: they they will be denied. The Chinese do
feel threatened, but not by invasion. What they fear is obstruction. They worry that an American-led world will try to stop them
from fulfilling their ambitions and their destiny. And the leaders of China have their own special fear, that the denial of
Chinese ambitions abroad could ultimately undermine their ability to rule at home. So the cycle continues: Chinese power has produced
ambition, and ambition in turn has produced anxiety. This helps explain the apparent paradox that has puzzled many foreign observers of China's behavior over the past decade.
Although stronger and more secure than ever, China has often acted in a “highly provocate manner,” as if it were “faced with a threat greater than ever before.”

5. Rising Chinese influence has been countered by what China sees as containment
Robert Kagan[Adjunct Professor, History, Georgetown University; PhD, American History, American University;
Expert, US National Security, Foreign Policy, US Relations with China, NATO Expansion; Former Senior Associate,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Former Member, Policy Planning Staff, State Department; Former
Deputy for Policy, Buruau of Inter-American Affairs, State Department] “Ambition and Anxiety – America's Competition
with China” Published in “The Rise of China: Essays on the Future Competition” New York Encounter Books, 2009, p.
1-23 (ISBN-13: 978-1-59403-231-8; ISBN-10: 1-59403-231-9) [Brackets in Original] [Ethos]

“The rise of China in East Asia in the past two decades has challenged but not dislodged American hegemony. Instead of
accepting a new balance of power in the region, the United States since the 1990s has responded to growing Chinese power by
broadening and deepening its military relationship with Japan, strengthening its strategic relationship with Taiwan,
maintaining forces in South Korea, deepening military cooperation with the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia, and other
Southeast Asian nations, and also with Pakistan and Afghanistan, all as part of the fight against terrorism. It has reached
out to India, sanctioning its nuclear program in the interest of closer strategic ties. Americans would deny that any of this constitutes a new
strategy of containment aimed at China, much less an effort to preserve American hegemony. But the Chinese see it as
both. Here is how China's current premier, Hu Jin-tao, describes the course of an American foreign policy that Americans themselves
see as merely reactive: [The United States has] strengthened its military deployments in the Asia-Pacfic region, strengthened the US-Japan military alliance, strengthened
strategic cooperation with India, improved relations with Vietnam, inveigled Pakistan, established a pro-American government in Afghanistan, increased arms sales to Taiwan, and so
on. They have extended outposts and placed pressures points from the east, south, and west.”
CHINA IMPACT CARDS Page 3 of 12

6. Containment is the best way to ignite conflict with China, even if it’s not what we’re intending
The Economist, “Leaders: The Dangers of a Rising China” The Economist, Vol. 397, No, 8711, p. 15, December 4, 2010
[Ethos]

“The best way to turn China into an opponent is to treat it as one. The danger is that spats and rows will sour relations
between China and America, just as the friendship between Germany and Britain crumbled in the decades before the first world war. It is already
happening in defence. Feeling threatened by American naval power, China has been modernising its missiles, submarines, radar, cyber-warfare and anti-satellite weapons.
Now America feels on its mettle. Recent Pentagon assessments of China’s military strength warn of the threat to Taiwan and
American bases and to aircraft-carriers near the Chinese coast. The US Navy has begun to deploy more forces in the
Pacific. Feeling threatened anew, China may respond. Even if neither America nor China intended harm—if they wanted only to
ensure their own security—each could nevertheless see the other as a growing threat.”

ii. Extension - Internal Link 3 – Beijing Uses Nationalism for Personal Gain

1. Beijing has historically encouraged nationalism

Joshua Kurlantzick[Visiting Scholar, China, Carnegie Moscow Center; Fellow, USC School for Public Diplomacy;
Fellow, Pacific Council on International Policy[ “China's Next-Generation Nationalists” Moscow Center, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, May 6, 2008 http://www.carnegie.ru/publications/?fa=20095 [Ethos]

“The explosion of nationalist sentiment, especially among young people, might seem shocking, but it's been simmering for a long
time. In fact, Beijing's leadership, for all its problems, may be less hard-line than China's youth, the country's future. If China ever were to become a truly free political system, it
might actually become more, not less, aggressive. China's youth nationalism tends to explode over sparks like the Tibet unrest. It burst into violent anti-American protests after
NATO's accidental bombing of China's embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in 1999. (Most young Chinese I've met don't believe that the bombing was an accident.) Even after 9/11, a
time when the governments of China and the United States were building a closer relationship, some young Chinese welcomed America's pain. "When the planes crashed into the
World Trade Center, I really felt very delighted," one student told Chinese pollsters. Youth nationalism exploded again into anti-Japan riots across China in 2005, after the release of
Japanese textbooks deemed offensive in China for their apparent whitewashing of World War II atrocities. During the riots, I was working in Lanzhou, a gritty, medium-sized city in
industrial central China. Day after day, young Chinese marched through Lanzhou and looked for shops selling Japanese goods to smash up -- though, of course, these stores were
owned by local Chinese merchants. Hardly uneducated know-nothings, young nationalists tend to be middle-class urbanites. Far more than rural Chinese, who remain mired in
poverty, these urbanites have benefited enormously from the country's three decades of economic growth. They also have begun traveling and working abroad. They can see that
Shanghai and Beijing are catching up to Western cities, that Chinese multinationals can compete with the West, and they've lost their awe of Western power. Many middle-aged
Chinese intellectuals are astounded by the differences between them and their younger peers. Academics I know, members of the Tiananmen generation, are shocked by some
students' disdain for foreigners and, often, disinterest in liberal concepts such as democratization. University students now tend to prefer business-oriented majors to liberal arts-
oriented subjects such as political science. The young Chinese interviewed for a story last fall in Time magazine on the country's "Me Generation" barely discussed democracy or
Beijing has long encouraged nationalism. Over the last decade, the government has introduced
political change in their daily lives.
new school textbooks that focus on past victimization of China by outside powers. The state media, such as the People's Daily,
which hosts one of the most strongly nationalist Web forums, also highlight China's perceived mistreatment at the hands of the United States
and other powers. In recent years, too, the Communist Party has opened its membership and perks to young urbanites, cementing the belief that their interests lie with the
regime, not with political change -- and that democracy might lead to unrest and instability. According to Minxin Pei of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "The party
showers the urban intelligentsia, professionals and private entrepreneurs with economic perks, professional honors and political access." In the 1980s, by contrast, these types of
professionals and academics were at the forefront of Tiananmen protests. The state media also increasingly highlight the problems of rural China -- China now has income inequality
on par with many Latin American nations -- suggesting to urbanites the economic and political catastrophe that might befall them if these rural peasants swamped wealthy cities.”

2. Beijing has been using nationalism as a tool for political stability, to rally public support
Suisheng Zhao[Professor and Executive Director, Center for China-US Cooperation, Josef Korbel School of
International Studies, University of Denver; PhD, Political Science, University of California, San Diego; Member,
Board of Governors, US Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific; Member, National
Committee on US-China-Relations; Research Associate, Fair Banks Center for East Asian Research, Harvard
University; Campbell National Fellow, Hoover Institution, Harvard University; Honor Professor, Beijing University,
Renmin University, and Fudan University] “China's Pragmatic Nationalism: Is It Manageable?” The Washington
Quarterly, Winter 2005, Vol. 29, No. 1, p. 131-144 [Ethos]

“Anxiety is growing in Asia and the West that a virulent nationalism has emerged out of China’s “century of shame and humiliation,”
threatening to make China’s rise less peaceful. Yet, Chinese nationalism is a phenomenon much more complex than the expression of its emotional rhetoric on
the streets. Although the Chinese government is hardly above exploiting nationalist sentiment when doing so suits its
purposes, Beijing has practiced a pragmatic nationalism tempered by diplomatic prudence. State-led and largely reactive, pragmatic
nationalism is not fixed, objectified, and defined for all time; nor is it driven by any ideology, religious beliefs, or other abstract ideas. Rather, pragmatic nationalism is
an instrument that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) uses to bolster the population’s faith in a troubled political
CHINA IMPACT CARDS Page 4 of 12

system and to hold the country together during its period of rapid and turbulent transformation into a post-Communist society. These leaders have set peace and
development as China’s primary international goals and have tried to avoid confrontations with the United States and other Western powers that hold the key to China’s
modernization. They have made use of nationalism to rally public support, but they realize that, if allowed to persist unrestrained, nationalist sentiments
could jeopardize the overarching objectives of political stability and economic modernization on which the CCP’s legitimacy is ultimately based. The question remains, can Beijing
keep this nationalism reined in, or will it begin to accelerate out of control?”

3. Using nationalism as protection against outside influence is highly effective given China's history
Suisheng Zhao[Professor and Executive Director, Center for China-US Cooperation, Josef Korbel School of
International Studies, University of Denver; PhD, Political Science, University of California, San Diego; Member,
Board of Governors, US Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific; Member, National
Committee on US-China-Relations; Research Associate, Fair Banks Center for East Asian Research, Harvard
University; Campbell National Fellow, Hoover Institution, Harvard University; Honor Professor, Beijing University,
Renmin University, and Fudan University] “China's Pragmatic Nationalism: Is It Manageable?” The Washington
Quarterly, Winter 2005, Vol. 29, No. 1, p. 131-144 [Ethos]

“Chinese people share a deeply rooted historical sense of injustice at the hands of foreign countries, as well as a “dream
of a strong China” (qiangguomeng). For this reason, the nationalist card is particularly effective when China faces hostility and
challenges from abroad. According to one former Chinese senior official, if Chinese people felt threatened by external forces, the
solidarity among the Chinese would be strengthened, and nationalism would be a useful tool for the regime to justify its
leadership role. In fact, even though corruption and social as well as economic problems have undermined the CCP’s legitimacy to an extent, many people side with the
government when foreigners criticize it, believing that, no matter how corrupt the government is, foreigners have no right to make unwarranted remarks about China and its people.
Many Chinese people are upset by U.S. pressure on issues such as human rights, intellectual property rights, trade
deficits, weapons proliferation, and Taiwan because they believe that the United States has used these issues to demonize
China in an effort to prevent it from achieving great-power status.””

iii. Extension - Internal Link - Nationalism Promotes Aggression

1. Political leaders are effected by nationalist groups that support a less submissive attitude towards the rest of the
world
The Economist “Less Biding and Hiding: A Special Report on China’s Place in the World” The Economist, Vol. 397, No.
8711, after p. 62, p. 8-10, December 4, 2010 [Ethos]

“Whatever the leaders think, they are operating in a society that is changing rapidly. These days they are more influenced
by a new set of foreign-policy interests, including resource companies, financial institutions, local government, research organisations, the press and online
activists. Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), who have studied
these groups, say many of them feel strongly that China should be “less submissive” towards the outside world.”

2. Growing nationalism will become more important as the elections draw closer in 2012; compromise can be seen
as weakness
The Economist “Less Biding and Hiding: A Special Report on China’s Place in the World” The Economist, Vol. 397, No.
8711, after p. 62, p. 8-10, December 4, 2010 [Brackets & Ellipses in Original] [Ethos]

“Nationalism may frame an issue before the leaders get to deal with it. By the time the row over, say, the disputed
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands reaches their desks, the propaganda department, along with commentators in the press and statements from the PLA,
may have created a context that they cannot back away from without looking weak. This dynamic is not new. It greatly complicated the
mid-air collision between a Chinese fighter and an American spy plane in 2001, which the PLA had (wrongly) blamed on the Americans. But just now, in the run-up to
the change of the country’s leadership in 2012, seeming to be a pushover could wreck careers. The risk, writes Ms Shirk, is
that “compromise is likely to be viewed as capitulation.” That creates dangers for anyone in China who favours detente. Speaking to Mr Lampton about
Taiwan, one Chinese scholar put it this way: “If we suppose that there are two options and they use tough measures…and
the leader fails to resolve [a problem], he is justified. But if [he] uses too much honey and he fails, he is regarded as
guilty by all future generations.””
CHINA IMPACT CARDS Page 5 of 12

iv. Extension - Brink 1 – Nationalism is Growing in Strength and Numbers

1. It is questionable how long Beijing can continue to control nationalism and pursue cooperation with the West
Suisheng Zhao[Professor and Executive Director, Center for China-US Cooperation, Josef Korbel School of
International Studies, University of Denver; PhD, Political Science, University of California, San Diego; Member,
Board of Governors, US Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific; Member, National
Committee on US-China-Relations; Research Associate, Fair Banks Center for East Asian Research, Harvard
University; Campbell National Fellow, Hoover Institution, Harvard University; Honor Professor, Beijing University,
Renmin University, and Fudan University] “China's Pragmatic Nationalism: Is It Manageable?” The Washington
Quarterly, Winter 2005, Vol. 29, No. 1, p. 131-144 [Ethos]

“Despite the warnings of some China watchers, the rise of nationalism in China has not made Beijing’s foreign policy particularly
uncooperative or irrational. Of course, the future might be different. Although China has nominally remained a
Communist authoritarian state, it is no longer ruled by charismatic leaders such as Mao or Deng who had the authority to arbitrate disputes
among the leadership or to set the country’s course personally. Current Chinese leaders must cater to a range of constituencies and will be
increasingly constrained by rising nationalist sentiment. More than two decades of opening and reform has made the
regime more responsive to public opinion. In particular, the telephone and the Internet give the average Chinese citizen instant access to information, as well as
new means to express their views, including their nationalist feelings. China’s pragmatic leaders have maintained their authoritarian power and
prevented nationalism from getting out of hand thus far, but it remains to be seen how long their absolute control can
last.”

2. Nationalist sentiments within China have risen in recent months

Christopher Bodeen[Staff Writer, Associated Press] “Chinese Nationalists Increasingly Strident” Associated Press,
Seattle Times, June 25, 2010
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2012206131_apaschinanationalism.html?syndication=rss [Ethos]

“Over recent months, such nationalist sentiments have increasingly found their way into print with the publication of
jingoistic tomes such as "Unhappy China," which details the causes of Beijing's anger at the West, and "China Dream"
whose author, PLA Senior Colonel Liu Mingfu, states that China must seize global supremacy or face certain ruin. Uniformed
officers have spoken out publicly as well. Gen. Ma Xiaotian, deputy chief of the PLA's general staff, took a swipe at
Washington at a security conference earlier this month in Singapore, complaining of "the threat to use force in international relations, and
interference in other countries' internal affairs." Senior officers make such statements knowing they will be well received
both among the public and with a significant portion of the political elite, said Michael Swaine, an expert on Chinese civil-military relations at
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "And the senior (Chinese) leadership is probably either unaware of or does not actively suppress
such views as long as they do not strongly attack the party's basic pro-reform and opening line or the authority of the party, or openly argue for conflict with the US," Swaine
said. Chinese politicians ignore nationalist voices at their peril, especially with a looming leadership transition set to begin in 2012. At such times, no aspiring leader can afford to
appear soft toward the U.S., particularly on an issue as sensitive as Taiwan.”

3. Chinese nationalism grows from three different sources: younger generations, social media, and the Chinese
“netizens”
The Economist “Less Biding and Hiding: A Special Report on China’s Place in the World” The Economist, Vol. 397, No.
8711, after p. 62, p. 8-10, December 4, 2010 [Ethos]

“The first generation to get that treatment is now nearing its 30s, and its nationalism
shows every sign of being genuine and widespread. “On Tibet
and Taiwan it’s not just Chinese ministers who bang tables,” says Lord Patten, who negotiated the handover of Hong Kong from Britain to China,
“but Chinese dissidents, too.” “This is a people with a sense of their past greatness, recent humiliation, present
achievement and future supremacy,” says Mr White, the former Australian security and defence official. “It’s a potent
mix.” China’s more commercial media have found that nationalism sells. According to Susan Shirk, an American academic and former deputy
assistant secretary of state, readers like stories complaining about Japan, Taiwan and America—and the censors are usually happy to see coverage of
such things. SIPRI found that the most influential journalism on foreign policy appears in the Global Times, which is written by hardline
nationalists. The country’s excitable “netizens” tend to spread the idea that China is misunderstood and to see a slight
round every corner. In 2008, during a Chinese row with Vietnam over the South China Sea, another suggested teaching the Vietnamese a lesson—and published an invasion
CHINA IMPACT CARDS Page 6 of 12

plan to show how. This feeds China’s sense of victimhood. One blogger and journalist, called Fang Kechang, worked out that since 1948 the Chinese people had officially been
“humiliated” at least 140 times—and that the insults were more common in the reform era than in Mao’s time.”

4. Nationalism is from more than public opinion; government officials are growing more nationalist as well
The Economist “Less Biding and Hiding: A Special Report on China’s Place in the World” The Economist, Vol. 397, No.
8711, after p. 62, p. 8-10, December 4, 2010 [Ethos]

“What passes for public opinion in China is not the only source of pressure on the leaders. The factions within China’s
elite “selectorate”, no passive monolith, have also been finding their voice. And that, too, tends to nudge policy towards
nationalism. Foreign affairs used to be the business of the pro-detente foreign ministry. It was mocked as the “ministry for selling out the country” and, supposedly, was sent
calcium pills by members of the public who wanted to stiffen its spine. Now the issues are more complex, domestic ministries and mid-level bureaucrats are
also involved—and they tend to be more nationalistic than senior foreign-ministry officials. The SIPRI researchers found that the
ministry of state security, in particular, has a bigger role in foreign policy. At the climate-change talks in Copenhagen authority lay with the National Development and Reform
Commission, charged with economic development. China attracted foreign criticism for taking a hard line, against the foreign ministry’s advice.”

v. Extension - Brink 2 – Conflict is Likely

1. China's self-interest paradigm put the US and China at odds, hinting at a collision of national egos
Robert Samuelson[Contributing Editor, Newsweek and Washington Post] “The China Miscalculation” Real Clear
Politics, February 15, 2010
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2010/02/15/the_china_miscalculation_100294.html [Ethos]

“China's policies reflect a different notion: China First. Unlike the isolationist America First movement of the 1930s, China First does not mean global
disengagement. It does mean engagement on China's terms. China accepts and supports the existing order when that serves its
needs, as when it joined the World Trade Organization in 2001. Otherwise, it plays by its own rules and norms. Trade policy is explicitly discriminatory to
address two crucial problems: surplus labor and scarce commodities. The undervalued renminbi aims to help create 20 million or more jobs that Jacques cites as needed annually.
China is scouring the globe to make investments in secure raw materials, particularly fuel. The object of "economic reform," Jacques writes, was "never Westernization" but "a desire
to restore the (Communist) Party's legitimacy." Most American-Chinese disputes reflect China's unwillingness to endanger domestic goals for international ends. It won't commit to
binding greenhouse gas cuts because these could reduce economic growth and (again) jobs. On Iran, it values its oil investments more than it fears Iranian nukes. Likewise, it worries
that unrest in North Korea could send refugees spilling across the border. Because Taiwan is regarded as part of China, U.S. arms sales there become domestic interference. And
censorship is needed to maintain one-party control. China's worldview threatens America's geopolitical and economic interests. Just recently,
19 U.S. trade associations wrote the Obama administration warning that new Chinese rules for "indigenous innovation" could "exclude a wide array of U.S. firms" from the Chinese
market -- or force them to turn over advanced technology. (British firms are so incensed by "overwhelming protectionism" that some may quit China, reports the Telegraph
newspaper.) It would be a tragedy if these two superpowers began regarding each other as adversaries. But that's the drift.
Heirs to a 2,000-year cultural tradition -- and citizens of the world's largest country -- the Chinese have an innate sense of superiority, Jacques writes.
Americans, too, have a sense of superiority, thinking that our values -- the belief in freedom, individualism and democracy -- reflect
universal aspirations. Greater conflicts and a collision of national egos seem inevitable. No longer should we sit passively while China's
trade and currency policies jeopardize jobs here and elsewhere. Political differences between the countries are increasingly hard to ignore. But given China's growing
power -- and the world economy's fragile state -- a showdown may do no one any good. Miscalculation is leading us down dark alleys.”

2. It is unlikely that the US would peacefully concede its waning power in East Asia, due to conflicting ideologies
Robert Kagan[Adjunct Professor, History, Georgetown University; PhD, American History, American University;
Expert, US National Security, Foreign Policy, US Relations with China, NATO Expansion; Former Senior Associate,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Former Member, Policy Planning Staff, State Department; Former
Deputy for Policy, Buruau of Inter-American Affairs, State Department] “Ambition and Anxiety – America's Competition
with China” Published in “The Rise of China: Essays on the Future Competition” New York Encounter Books, 2009, p.
1-23 (ISBN-13: 978-1-59403-231-8; ISBN-10: 1-59403-231-9) [Ethos]

“Competition between the United States and China is not the only possible scenario, however. One can imagine a situation in which a
gradual decline in American power and influence in East Asia produced not war but a Pax Sinica. Great powers, and even superpowers, have given way to rising
regional powers in the past, even to former rivals. Great Britain withdrew from the Western Hemisphere at the end of the 19th century and ceded the region
to a rather belligerent United States. More recently, the United States has been gradually ceding its once-dominant position in Europe to the leadership of the European Union.
Would the United States pursue a similar course in East Asia? It is unlikely. The reason is not only that Americans would
fear instability, insecurity, a loss of trade and access to reources, or damage to other American material interests. After all, a
Pax Sinica might well provide secure access to trade and resources, and even a stable peace. What makes the siutation in East Asia different is
something less tangible but perhaps more powerful. It is the conflicting ideologies of the United States and China. Great
CHINA IMPACT CARDS Page 7 of 12

Britain could cede the Western Hemisphere to the United States in part because it was a fellow liberal democracy, and they shared common social values and political and economic
principles. At a time when the British people faced a growing challenge from German and Russia, whose political and cultural values they did not share, they trusted the American
democracy to not turn its growing power and influence against them. Similarly, the Untied States can reduce its role in Europe because the continent has become, as Americans like
to say, “whole and free.” Even though the United State fought two horrific wars against European powers in the past century, Americans cannot really imagine Europe turning its
power against them again. In American eyes, the ideological transformation of Europe has been decisive. In East Asia, the situation is different. There is a clash not only of
Because China is not a democracy, and its leaders insist they have no intention
competitive powers, but also of competitive political systems.
of making it one, Americans, quite simply, don't trust it. Chinese leaders have their own fears and suspicions. They
recognize America's ideological hostility. Because they are not a democracy, they fear that a persistent and growing
American liberal hegemony in East Asia, with its ring of democratic states on China's periphery, will eventually undermine their legitimacy
at home. Indeed, the Chinese may have an even clearer sense than most Americans about what a large role ideology plays in shaping the relationship between the two powers.”

3. China and the US mistrust each other, aware of potential conflict

The Economist, “Leaders: The Dangers of a Rising China” The Economist, Vol. 397, No. 8711, p. 15, December 4, 2010
[Ethos]

“So far, things have gone remarkably well between America and China. While China has devoted itself to economic growth, American security
has focused on Islamic terrorism and war in Iraq and Afghanistan. But the two mistrust each other. China sees America as a waning power that
will eventually seek to block its own rise. And America worries about how Chinese nationalism, fuelled by rediscovered
economic and military might, will express itself (see ourspecial report).”

4. Mistrust between China and the US is deepening

The Economist, “Brushwood and Gall: A Special Report on China’s Place in the World” The Economist, Vol. 397, No.
8711, after p. 62, p. 3-5, December 4, 2010 [Ethos]

America is constantly looking for signs that China is going to

“Such things are perhaps small in themselves, but they matter because of that double bet.
welsh on the deal and turn aggressive—and China is looking for signs that America and its allies are going to gang up to stop its
rise. Everything is coloured by that strategic mistrust. Peering through this lens, China-watchers detect a shift. “The smiling
diplomacy is over,” says Richard Armitage, deputy secretary of state under George Bush. “China’s aspiration for power
is very obvious,” says Yukio Okamoto, a Japanese security expert. Diplomats, talking on condition of anonymity, speak of
underlying suspicions and anxiety in their dealings with China. Although day-to-day traffic between American and Chinese government departments
flows smoothly, “the strategic mistrust between China and the US continues to deepen,” says Bonnie Glaser of the Centre for
Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC.”

5. Though war is unlikely for now, soured relations could lead to a longer conflict between China and the US,
undermining the prospects of global peace
The Economist, “Brushwood and Gall: A Special Report on China’s Place in the World” The Economist, Vol. 397, No.
8711, after p. 62, p. 3-5, December 4, 2010 [Ethos]

“Now, however, many factors, on many sides, from domestic politics to the fallout from the financial crisis, are conspiring to
make relations worse. The risk is not war—for the time being that remains almost unthinkable, if only because it would be so greatly to everyone’s
disadvantage. The danger is that the leaders of China and America will over the next decade lay the foundations for a deep
antagonism. This is best described by Henry Kissinger. Under Richard Nixon, Mr Kissinger created the conditions for 40 years of peace in Asia by seeing that
America and China could gain more from working together than from competing. Today Mr Kissinger is worried. Speaking in September at a meeting of the
International Institute for Strategic Studies, he observed that bringing China into the global order would be even harder than bringing in Germany had been a
century ago. “It is not an issue of integrating a European-style nation-state, but a full-fledged continental power,” he said. “The DNA of both [America and
China] could generate a growing adversarial relationship, much as Germany and Britain drifted from friendship to
confrontation…Neither Washington nor Beijing has much practice in co-operative relations with equals. Yet their leaders
have no more important task than to implement the truths that neither country will ever be able to dominate the other,
and that conflict between them would exhaust their societies and undermine the prospects of world peace.””

6. Chinese and American security interests and the paradox of security are one reason why relations will probably
sour
The Economist, “The Fourth Modernization: A Special Report on China’s Place in the World” The Economist, Vol. 397,
CHINA IMPACT CARDS Page 8 of 12

No. 8711, after p. 62, p. 6-8, December 4, 2010 [Ethos]

“That logic works in China, too. America has not been shy of going to war in recent years. Not long ago a retired Chinese admiral likened the American
navy to a man with a criminal record “wandering just outside the gate of a family home”.American strength in the 1990s made China feel insecure, so
it transformed the PLA to shore up its policy on Taiwan and protect its economically vital coastline. Yet by adding to its own
security, China has taken away from that of its neighbours and of the United States. Perhaps China does not mean ever to use its weapons
aggressively. But American defence planners cannot rely on that, so they must respond. In this way two states that never intend harm can begin to
perceive each other as growing threats. If you do not arm, you leave yourself open to attack. If you do, you threaten the
other country. A British historian, Herbert Butterfield, called this the “absolute predicament and irreducible dilemma”. It is one reason why relations
between China and America will probably sour.”

7. As China’s strength has been revealed, it’s appetite for power has grown, hastening the inevitable strategic
competition with the United States
The Economist, “Less Biding and Hiding: A Special Report on China’s Place in the World” The Economist, Vol. 397,
No. 8711, after p. 62, p. 8-10, December 4, 2010 [Ethos]

China has a keen sense of its growing national power and American decline, sharpened by the
“Start with China’s changing strategy.
financial crisis, which uncovered flaws in America and Europe and found China to be stronger than many had expected. “There is a
perception in China that the West needs China more than China needs the West,” says one diplomat in Beijing. America’s difficult wars have
added to the impression. According to Raffaello Pantucci, a visiting scholar at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, Chinese analysts “gleefully” conclude that NATO forces
will lose in Afghanistan. “We used to hide our power—deny our power,” a Chinese scholar told David Lampton of the School of
Advanced International Studies in Washington. “But then this became increasingly impossible as our strength increased.” For a time this led to redoubled
efforts to reassure America and the region. But today, according to Yuan Peng, of the China Institutes of Contemporary International
Relations in Beijing, “many Chinese scholars suggest that the government give up the illusion of US partnership and face
squarely the profound and inevitable strategic competition.” China’s desire to assert itself springs from a natural appetite.
A rising country is like a diner sitting down to a full table: until he starts eating, he does not realise how hungry he is. “Power changes nations,” writes Robert
Kagan, an American foreign-policy commentator. “It expands their wants and desires, increases their sense of
entitlement, their need for deference and respect. It also makes them more ambitious. It lessens their tolerance to
obstacles, their willingness to take no for an answer.””

vi. Extension - Brink 3 – Violence is Possible

1. Beijing has continued to modernize and sustain a force capable of attacking Taiwan
Foster Klug[Staff Writer, Associated Press] "US Official Warns of China, Taiwan Conflict" The Associated Press, The
China Post, February 14, 2009 http://www.chinapost.com.tw/china/national-news/2009/02/14/195982/U.S.-official.htm
[Brackets Added] [Ethos]

“Taiwan and China split amid civil war in 1949, and Beijing threatens to attack should Taiwan formalize its de facto
independence. The United States and China came close to conflict over Taiwan in 1996, when President Bill Clinton deployed warships in response to China lobbing missiles
into waters near Taiwan. [National Intelligence Director Dennis] Blair called recent warming ties between China and Taiwan
“positive” and “very encouraging.” New Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou has worked to defuse tensions and expand trade with China. But Blair also said
in testimony that Chinese “preparations for a possible Taiwan conflict continue to drive the modernization goals of the
People's Liberation Army and the Chinese defense-industrial complex.””

2. China has continued to maintain the ability to attack Taiwan, labeling Taiwan as its main potential adversary
Hsu Shai-Hsuan[Reporter, Staff Writer, and Journalist, Taipei Times] "PRC's Preparations to Attack Taiwan Accelerate:
Report" Taipei Times, July 19, 2010 http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2010/07/19/2003478290/1 [Ethos]

“Despite repeated displays of goodwill by the government of President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) since it came to power in 2008,
China’s military preparations for
an attack on Taiwan continue to accelerate, a report by the Ministry of National Defense’s intelligence research branch says. The
report says China’s military preparedness for an attack on Taiwan has never been relaxed and that if the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
launched a missile attack on Taiwan, it would destroy more than 90 percent of the nation’s political, economic, military and civil infrastructure. It also predicts the number of Chinese
missiles aimed at Taiwan could reach 2,000 by the end of the year. Although the government’s pro-Beijing policies have been strongly criticized domestically, the ministry’s decision
CHINA IMPACT CARDS Page 9 of 12

to post the internal research report on its official Web site has raised eyebrows. Lin Cheng-yi (林正義), a researcher at the Institute of European and American Studies at
Academia Sinica, said following Ma’s accession to power, China has moved its military exercises from the coastal areas of Fujian Province to other parts of the country and that it no
longer uses Hong Kong media to attack Taiwan. Lin said that while this was intended to create a more relaxed atmosphere, in
reality China’s military threat is
constantly growing. The ministry sees through the smokescreen, continues to keep track of China’s military posture and therefore is remaining true to its responsibilities,
Lin said. Although China has reduced the number of military exercises simulating an attack on Taiwan, its activities in the South China Sea and in the
waters north and east of Taiwan have been increasing, Lin said. The report said that a June 1993 meeting of China’s Central
Military Commission readjusted its strategic goals, unambiguously making Taiwan its main potential adversary.”

3. Liberal nationalists have openly and vocally attacked the United States
Suisheng Zhao[Professor and Executive Director, Center for China-US Cooperation, Josef Korbel School of
International Studies, University of Denver; PhD, Political Science, University of California, San Diego; Member,
Board of Governors, US Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific; Member, National
Committee on US-China-Relations; Research Associate, Fair Banks Center for East Asian Research, Harvard
University; Campbell National Fellow, Hoover Institution, Harvard University; Honor Professor, Beijing University,
Renmin University, and Fudan University] “China's Pragmatic Nationalism: Is It Manageable?” The Washington
Quarterly, Winter 2005, Vol. 29, No. 1, p. 131-144 [Ethos]
“Since 1989, both nativism and antitraditionalism have found their expressions in liberal nationalism. Nativism has become more acceptable to liberal nationalists as mainstream
Chinese intellectual discourse shifted dramatically in the 1990s in response to China’s deteriorating relations with major Western countries, particularly the United States, and the
Many liberal nationalists came to suspect that the Western powers, particularly the
Western media’s rising advocacy to contain China.
United States and Japan, were conspiring to prevent China from rising to the status of a great power and voiced strong
criticisms in response. In fact, liberal nationalism propelled the anti-U.S. demonstrators in May 1999 and the anti-Japanese demonstrators in April 2005. Because of
their vocal attacks on Western countries’ “evil” intentions, some Western observers have labeled liberal nationalists as
neo-authoritarianists who have argued that a centralized power structure must be strengthened to maintain China’s social
stability and economic development.”

4. Despite claims to the contrary, Chinese aggression is just below the surface, and easily roused
The Economist, “Leaders: The Dangers of a Rising China” The Economist, Vol. 397, No. 8711, p. 15, December 4, 2010
[Ethos]

“In many ways China has made efforts to try to reassure an anxious world. It has repeatedly promised that it means only
peace. It has spent freely on aid and investment, settled border disputes with its neighbours and rolled up its sleeves in UN peacekeeping forces and international organisations.
When North Korea shelled a South Korean island last month China did at least try to create a framework to rein in its neighbour. But reasonable China sometimes
gives way to aggressive China. In March, when the North sank a South Korean warship, killing 46 sailors, China failed to issue
any condemnation. A few months later it fell out with Japan over some Chinese fishermen, arrested for ramming Japanese coastguard
vessels around some disputed islands—and then it locked up some Japanese businessmen and withheld exports of rare earths vital for
Japanese industry. And it has forcefully reasserted its claim to the Spratly and Paracel Islands and to sovereignty over
virtually the entire South China Sea.”

5. China’s modernized forces pose a threat to US interests in the region, that has been ignored by current defense
planning
The Economist, “The Fourth Modernization: A Special Report on China’s Place in the World” The Economist, Vol. 397,
No. 8711, after p. 62, p. 6-8, December 4, 2010 [Brackets Added] [Ethos]

“What does this amount to? Military experts in America, Australia and Japan think China’s new arsenals are a greater threat than its higher-
profile plans to launch aircraft-carriers in the next decade or so. Alan Dupont, of the University of Sydney in Australia, says that “missiles and cyber-
equivalents are becoming the weapons of choice for the conventionally outgunned.” According to the Centre for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments (CSBA), an American research institute, Chinese firepower threatens America’s Asian bases, which until now have been
safe from all but nuclear attack. The Second Artillery’s missiles could swamp the bases’ defences and destroy runways as well as large numbers of fighters and ships.
Japan is already within range of Chinese missiles, many of them currently pointing at Taiwan. Guam soon will be (see chart 1). China’s submarines, missiles and anti-ship cruise
missiles threaten America’s aircraft-carrier strike groups within 1,000 to 1,600 nautical miles of the Chinese coast. According to Ross Babbage, an Australian defence analyst and
founder of the Kokoda Foundation, if China had an anti-ship ballistic missile, coming in fast and without much warning, it would be even harder to defend against. And China’s
space and cyber-weapons could serve as what Chinese planners label an “assassin’s mace” in a surprise attack designed to smash America’s elaborate but fragile electronic networks.
That would leave American forces half-blind and mute, and its bases and carriers more vulnerable still. In sum, China’s abilities to strike have soared far
CHINA IMPACT CARDS Page 10 of 12

beyond seeking to deter American intervention in any future mainland dispute with Taiwan. Today China can project
power out from its coastline well beyond the 12-mile (19km) limit that the Americans once approached without a second
thought. Mr Okamoto, the Japanese security expert, believes China’s strategy is to have “complete control” of what planners call the First Island Chain. Ultimately, China seems
to want to stop the American fleet from being able to secure its interests in the western Pacific. America’s most senior officials have taken note. Last
year Robert Gates, the defence secretary, gave warning that “investments [in countries like China] in cyber- and anti-
satellite warfare, anti-air and anti-ship weaponry and ballistic missiles could threaten America’s primary way to project
power and help allies in the Pacific—in particular our forward air bases and carrier strike groups.” Mr Babbage [an Australian defence analyst]
is blunter: “Current defence planning is invalid,” he says. He and the analysts at CSBA argue that America needs to rethink its strategy in the Pacific. It
should strengthen its bases and be able to disrupt Chinese attacks with decoys and by spreading aircraft and ships around the region. American forces must have better logistics and
be able to fight even when their information networks are impaired. Crucially, they must be in a position to disable China’s electronic reconnaissance, surveillance and battle-damage
assessment, some of which is protected by a system of tunnels beyond easy reach of American weapons.”

6. 3 certainties in Chinese military planning: 1) China has already been able to deter US ships; 2) China’s ability
to project power in the West Pacific is threatening the US’ own ability to project power; and 3) the US faces
obstacles to be able to respond to Chinese modernization
The Economist, “The Fourth Modernization: A Special Report on China’s Place in the World” The Economist, Vol. 397,
No. 8711, after p. 62, p. 6-8, December 4, 2010 [Ethos]

three things are beyond dispute. First, China has already forced American ships to think about
“For all the uncertainties in this debate,
how and when they approach the Chinese coast. The closer American vessels come, the more missiles and submarines they face and the less time they would
have to react to a strike. Anyone sailing a carrier worth $15 billion-20 billion with a crew of 6,000 would think twice about taking on that extra risk. To deny America possession of
China does not need to control its own coastal waters; it just has to be able to threaten American
seas it has dominated for decades,
ships there. Hugh White, a former Australian security and defence official, foresees the western Pacific becoming a
“naval no-go zone”. Second, China’s ability to project power is improving. Its submarines, fighter aircraft, missiles, and cyber- and electronic
warfare, once poor, now pose a threat. China’s weapons will continue to improve, and its forces will gather experience. Provided that the economy does not fall over, budgets will
China can project power into its backyard more easily than America
grow, too, absolutely and possibly as a share of GDP. Other things being equal,
can project power across the Pacific Ocean. At risk is what Mr Gates has called “the operational sanctuary our navy has enjoyed in the
western Pacific for the better part of six decades”. Third, although the United States is able to respond to China, it will have to
overcome some obstacles first. America’s military spending in Asia is overshadowed by the need to cut overall
government spending and by other military priorities, such as Afghanistan. Jonathan Pollack, of the Brookings Institution, points out that some ideas, such
as replacing aircraft-carriers with more submarines, would inevitably run into opposition from the navy and from politicians whose constituencies would suffer. “For many officers
the navy’s core institutional identity is indelibly tied to carriers and the power-projection mission they perform,” he says. “Reducing their numbers is going to be a very painful
process.” Above all, big shifts in military planning take decades: America needs to think now about China in 2025.”

vii. Extension - Impact 1 – Great Depression

1. Sino-Taiwan war kills US economy, dragging us into a second Great Depression

Lee J Hunkovic[MA, Intelligence Studies, American Military University, President's Roll] "The Chinese-Taiwanese
Conflict: Possible Futures of a Confrontation Between China, Taiwan, and the United States of America" American
Military University, 2009 http://www.google.com/#sclient=psy&hl=en&safe=active&q=
%22IN+520+Analytic+Methods%22&aq=f&aqi=&aql=f&oq=&gs_rfai=&psj=1&fp=cc7ad1a43d378bba [Ethos]

After losing an estimated forty percent of its market value, which has led to an
“The American economy is in terrible shape.
international chain-reaction and a global recession, the political and economic leaders of the United States have been
desperately struggling to keep the crisis from worsening into a second Great Depression. Despite their antagonistic political relationship,
the United States and the PRC conduct tens of billions of dollars in trade each year and the U.S. does billions of dollars worth of trade with Taiwan as well. Therefore,
considering these facts, a war between China and Taiwan, especially with American military involvement, is a losing scenario from an
economic standpoint, regardless of the outcome. While America would shift its most preferred nation status from the PRC to Taiwan if Taiwan were to gain
full independence and pursue a greater trade relationship with them, it would still be damaging its relationship with its other trading partner, which means that it would still suffer
economically. If China were to reabsorb Taiwan with little resistance or before America could intervene, America would still suffer an economic loss in the short term, as trade with
the economic loss of a Cross-Strait war would almost certainly guarantee
China would go on, but Taiwan would be no more. In either case,
that the American economy further declines and the U.S. would enter a second Great Depression, making it a terrible
scenario under the current conditions. Therefore, America has an even greater interest in avoiding a war between the PRC and Taiwan, even if it were to mean
losing Taiwan and degrading America’s image and credibility.”
CHINA IMPACT CARDS Page 11 of 12

viii. Extension - Impact 2 – Engagement Lost

1. The best strategy for “containing” China, is engagement

Henry A Kissinger[Former Secretary of State, Administrations of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford; Former National
Security Advisor, Administrations of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford; Former Director, Psychological Strategy Board,
Harvard University] "China: Containment Won't Work" The Washington Post, June 13, 2005
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/12/AR2005061201533.html [Ethos]
“The test of China's intentions will be whether its growing capacity will be used to seek to exclude America from Asia or whether it will be part of a cooperative effort.
Paradoxically, the best strategy for achieving anti-hegemonic objectives is to maintain close relations with all the major
countries of Asia, including China. In that sense, Asia's rise will be a test of U.S. competitiveness in the world now emerging, especially in the countries of Asia.
The historical American aim of opposing hegemony in Asia -- incorporated as a joint aim with China in the Shanghai Communique of 1972 -- remains valid. It will have to be
pursued, however, primarily by political and economic measures -- albeit backed by U.S. power. In a U.S. confrontation with China, the vast majority of nations will seek to avoid
choosing sides. At the same time, they will generally have greater incentives to participate in a multilateral system with America than to adopt an exclusionary Asian nationalism.
They will not want to be seen as pieces of an American design. India, for example, perceives ever closer common interests with the United States regarding opposition to radical
Islam, some aspects of nuclear proliferation and the integrity of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. It sees no need to give these common purposes an ideological or anti-
Chinese character. It finds no inconsistency between its dramatically improving relations with the United States and proclaiming a strategic partnership with China. American
insistence on an ideological crusade and on a Cold War-type of containment might accelerate such gestures. And it would risk inflaming India's Muslim population. China, in its
own interest, is seeking cooperation with the United States for many reasons, including the need to close the gap between its own developed and developing
regions; the imperative of adjusting its political institutions to the accelerating economic and technological revolutions; and the potentially catastrophic impact of a Cold War with the
United States on the continued raising of the standard of living, on which the legitimacy of the government depends. But it does not follow from this that any damage to China
caused by a Cold War would benefit America. We would have few followers anywhere in Asia. Asian countries would continue trading with China. Whatever happens,
China will not disappear. The American interest in cooperative relations with China is for the pursuit of a stable
international system. Preemption is not a feasible policy toward a country of China's magnitude. It cannot be in our
interest to have new generations in China grow up with a perception of a permanently and inherently hostile United
States. It cannot be in China's interest to be perceived in America as being exclusively focused on its own narrow domestic or Asian interests.”

2. Multi-lateral engagement with China is the best way to avoid 21st century conflict
The Economist, “Leaders: The Dangers of a Rising China” The Economist, Vol. 397, No. 8711, p. 15, December 4, 2010
[Ethos]

“History shows that superpowers can coexist peacefully when the rising power believes it can rise unhindered and the
incumbent power believes that the way it runs the world is not fundamentally threatened. So a military build-up needs to be accompanied
by a build-up of trust. There are lots of ways to build trust in Asia. One would be to help ensure that disputes and misunderstandings do not get out of hand. China should thus be
more open about its military doctrine—about its nuclear posture, its aircraft-carriers and missile programme. Likewise, America and China need rules for disputes including North
America
Korea (see article), Taiwan, space and cyber-warfare. And Asia as a whole needs agreements to help prevent every collision at sea from becoming a trial of strength.
and China should try to work multilaterally. Instead of today’s confusion of competing venues, Asia needs a single regional security forum, such as the East
Asia Summit, where it can do business. Asian countries could also collaborate more in confidence-boosting non-traditional security, such as health, environmental protection, anti-
If America wants to bind China into the rules-based liberal order it
piracy and counter-terrorism, where threats by their nature cross borders.
promotes, it needs to stick to the rules itself. Every time America breaks them—by, for instance, protectionism—it feeds China’s
suspicions and undermines the very order it seeks.”

ix. Extension - Impact 3 - Containment Costs Too Much

1. Containment would be a very bad policy decision to implement against China

The Economist “Friends, or Else: A Special Report on China’s Place in the World” The Economist, Vol. 397, No. 8711,
after p. 62, p. 13-15, December 4, 2010 [Ethos]

“One way to resolve these tensions would be to put security first. America could aim to block China now before it gets any stronger. America
won the cold war by isolating the Soviet economy and stalemating its armed forces. But trying that again would be a bad
idea, as Robert Art explains in a recent issue of Political Science Quarterly. For one thing, the cost would be astronomical; for another, America
might suffer as much as China. The two countries’ economies are intertwined and China owns more American
government debt than anyone else. In war, nations override such factors out of necessity. If an American president tried
to override them in peace out of choice, he would face dissent at home and opprobrium abroad. In any case, a policy of
containment risks backfiring, except against an unambiguously hostile China. Unless America could persuade large parts of the world to join in, China would
still have access to most markets. A belligerent United States would risk losing the very alliances in Asia that it was
CHINA IMPACT CARDS Page 12 of 12

seeking to protect. And Joseph Nye, of the Kennedy School at Harvard, has argued that the best way to make an enemy
of China is to treat it like one.”