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IJPSM
17,7 Corruption – the challenge to
good governance: a South African
perspective
586
Soma Pillay
School of Business, Swinburne University, Hawthorne Campus,
Melbourne, Australia
Keywords Corruption, South Africa, Public sector organizations, Governance, Development
Abstract The effect of corruption in South Africa has seriously constrained development of the
national economy and has significantly inhibited good governance in the country. South Africa’s
complex political design is a contributing factor to the rise of corruption, which has adversely
affected stability and trust and which has damaged the ethos of democratic values and principles.
Although the South African government has been instrumental in systems to fight the evils of
corruption, practical problems have increasingly emerged over the years. The most notable
problems are: insufficient coordination of anti-corruption work within the South African public
service and among the various sectors of society; poor information about corruption and the
impact of anti-corruption measures and agencies; and the impact of corruption on good
governance. This paper is a part of a broader study undertaken on corruption. It addresses issues
related to corruption and good governance in the South African (National) Public Service.
To articulate and analyse the challenges confronting the country, issues regarding coordination of
anti-corruption agencies will be explored.

The International Journal of Public
Sector Management
Vol. 17 No. 7, 2004
pp. 586-605
q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
0951-3558
DOI 10.1108/09513550410562266
Introduction
Corruption is likely to appear on every observer’s list of factors that threaten to
obstruct South Africa’s path towards sustainable development. However, rather than
diminishing, corruption has proliferated in all segments of the South African National
Public Service (SANPS), making it the “common cold” of South African social ills.
South Africa is quickly learning that corruption is one of the major impediments to
effective development. The greater openness that democracy has brought since 1994
offers new opportunities to deal with the problem of corruption in the context of the
country’s new constitutional values. But it also brings a sharper focus on the constraints
that corruption imposes on development and the quality of governance. Corruption
fundamentally runs contrary to accountability and the rule of law because it undermines
governance, diminishes public trust in the credibility of the state, and threatens the
ethics of government and society (Heymans and Lipietz, 1999). The more systemic
corruption is, the more difficult it becomes to identify it, deal with it, and penalise it.
Frisch (1994, p. 60– 61) captured this succinctly: “ . . . corruption kills the
development spirit – nothing is as destructive to a society as the rush to quick and
easy money which makes fools of those who can work honestly and constructively”.
Because of the recent upsurge in the number of reports of corruption, South Africa
offers an interesting case study of the link between corruption and governance.
Such corruption violates the contract between citizens and public officials, and this has
serious ramifications for effective government. For this reason, alone, corruption in
South Africa merits investigation.
 A consistent thread running through this paper is recognition of the need to The challenge to
change the conduct of government within the context of good governance. However, good governance
it is difficult to maintain conceptual and analytical coherence – partly because
South African governmental reform is constantly in a state of transition and flux.
With the increasing attention being paid to the threat to good governance in the
SANPS by corruption, and to the reality of limited state capacity, it becomes important
to explore the complex dynamics that characterise the impact of corruption on good 587
governance and public administration.

Public administration, governance, and corruption

Concerns about corruption in South Africa have intensified in recent years. Calls for
better public administration – including calls for greater efficiency, transparency, and
integrity in public institutions – are driven by a number of factors:
.
the increasing realisation that achievement of the country’s objectives is possible
only by improving governance and preventing corruption;
.
the observation that corruption in the SANPS reinforces the unequal distribution
of opportunities; and
.
the fact that corruption threatens democracy, which is the basic premise of good
public administration.
In the context of good public administration and governance, the main objectives of the
SANPS should be:
.
improving the investigation and prosecution of corruption;
.
rationalising the agencies combating corruption;
.
reviewing present legislation; and
.
improving management systems and discipline at all levels of government.

Understanding governance – a conceptual framework

Kaufman et al. (1999) described governance as “traditions and institutions by which
authority in a country is exercised for [the] common good”. This includes:
.
the process by which governments are selected and replaced;
.
the capacity of the government to formulate and implement sound policies
effectively; and
.
the respect of citizens for the institutions that govern economic and social
interactions among them.
According to Thompson (1996), governance is “ . . . the act or manner of governing, of
exercising control or authority over the actions of subject, a system of regulations”.
Fitzgerald et al. (1997) amplified this definition by describing governance as “working
and listening to citizens in order to manage the public’s resources and respond to the
needs and expectations of citizens as individuals, interest groups, and society as a
whole”. Governance includes active cooperation and engagement in policy processes
among all stakeholders, including citizens. An associated term, as described by Reddy
and Clarke (2000), is “people centered governance” – which can be characterised as
partnerships between government and society in which consultation is a key issue.
IJPSM The concept of “governance” can be used descriptively or prescriptively. Indeed, it
17,7 is a term without agreed usage (Minogue et al., 1998). The term has recently evolved
from the traditional public administration concept of “governing”. It developed from
the descriptive, positivist public management school of thought – which initially
intended to give new meaning to the traditional role of government by focusing on the
effectiveness and efficiency of the outputs and outcomes of governmental actions.
588 One way of looking at the characteristics of “good governance” is to contrast it with
what can be called “malgovernance” or “misgovernance”. Another way of approaching
the concept is to understand what it means in itself. A third way is to look at the
potential benefits of institutionalising good and sustainable governance (Khan, 1998).

Good governance and corruption: conceptualising a South African profile

As a result of personal experience, as well as academic argument, the problem of
corruption has captured the minds of all South Africans who are committed to good
governance. It is important to note that corruption is not limited to the actions and
attitudes of politicians and public servants. Rather, the problem is widespread.
Nevertheless, the problems and challenges in the public service cannot be ignored.
It must also be recognised that the negative consequences of corruption represent only
one side of the coin. Any focus on corruption must be coupled with an equivalent focus
on the positive aspects of good governance.
With the advent of democracy in South Africa in 1994, the newly elected government
and the people of South Africa inherited a distorted system of governance – with
institutions that were in direct conflict with the imperatives of sustainable economic
growth, social development, and reintegration into the world economy and the
community of nations.
South Africans were faced with a daunting challenge in transforming the country to
address the deeply entrenched poverty affecting millions of people, a racially polarised
society (in terms of wealth distribution and opportunities), and a brutalised society with
intolerably high levels of violence, corruption, social disintegration, and moral decay.
When it joined the community of nations by signing the Copenhagen Declaration in
1995, South Africa achieved another important milestone in its history as a young
democracy (Zuma, 2000). South Africa’s commitments at this time held special
significance for South Africans – as they still do today. These commitments were to
address poverty, promote social integration, create an enabling environment for social
development, promote full employment, and mobilise resources for social development.
Democracy, good governance, and the respect for human dignity were said to form part
of the very nature and culture of Africans (Zuma, 2001). However the ideals of
democracy and good governance cannot be sustained without a secure and stable
environment. Hennesy (1997) has argued that sustainability in a globalised economy is
foremost among the characteristics required of a nation that hopes to flourish.
The World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 highlighted South Africa’s
plan to base sustainability and development on three “pillars” – one of which was
“good governance” (Sunday Times, 2002).
According to Paragon Regional Governance Programme (1999), governance
strengthens the enabling environment for sustainable development. Lack of concern for
government corruption, centralisation, and low levels of effective community participation
are three significant impediments to governance in the South African Public Service.
Governance matters for development outcomes The challenge to
In a developing context, the features of corruption become critical to the institutional good governance
and social dimensions of development (Heymans and Lipietz, 1999). The rules and
practices of governance shape the foundations of sustainable development are shaped,
and if these rules and practices are not effectively monitored and applied, the very
basis of development is compromised.
In the past, only developing countries were perceived to be plagued by corruption. 589
However, more recently, developed countries have also come under the spotlight, and it
has become apparent that corruption is also entrenched in industrialised, democratic
societies. Corruption is especially harmful in developing countries because these
countries tend to have fewer resources, and need to use these scarce resources in the
most effective manner (Camerer, 1997). The developmental approach of the 1960s
associated corruption with the process of modernisation. Every modernising system
was regarded as being susceptible to corruption, as had been the case in Western
societies – which had manifested peak levels of corruption as they experienced
socio-political development. Corruption in developing countries was therefore assumed
to be part of the natural maturation process (Werner, 1983).
Development is closely associated with democracy and state building.
Democratisation makes the state more transparent and more responsive to social
needs. This, in turn, strengthens the state by enhancing its legitimacy and by
integrating different entities (Daddiah, 1999). Kaufman et al. (1999) extended this
association by developing the concept of the “development dividend” for better
governance. According to these authors, an improvement in governance leads to a two-
to four-fold improvement in per capita incomes, a comparable decrease in infant
mortality, and a 20 per cent improvement in adult literacy. These results are a result
of a causal effect between better governance and better development outcomes.
This type of evidence, along with a large and growing body of research, places good
governance at the centre of the development agenda. Social cohesion is necessary if the
South African Public Service is to adapt to the impact of globalisation.

Causes of corruption in the SANPS

The causes of corruption in South Africa are contextual – rooted in the country’s
bureaucratic traditions, political development, and social history. The empirical part of
this study revealed that corruption has flourished as a result of institutional
weaknesses. The normal motivation of public-sector employees to work productively
has been undermined by many factors – including declining civil service salaries and
promotion unconnected to performance. Staff members have also been demoralised by
dysfunctional government budgets, inadequate supplies and equipment, delays in the
release of budget funds, and a loss of organizational purpose. The motivation to remain
honest has further been weakened as a result of senior officials and political leaders
using public office for private gain. In summary, the major contributions to corruption
in the SANPS have been:
.
undesirable social controls;
.
antiquated laws;
.
excess demand;
.
entrepreneurial politics;
IJPSM .
bureaucratisation;
17,7 .
excessive discretion; and
.
defective administrative arrangements (including inadequate controls).
Widespread corruption in the SANPS has brought about injustice, inefficiency,
mistrust of the government by the citizens, waste of public resources, discouragement
590 of enterprise (especially foreign enterprise), political instability, repressive measures,
and restrictions on government policy.

Transformation to good governance in South Africa

Corrupt practices threaten to undermine both the growth and the stability of global
trade and financial system. This is especially applicable in emerging and developing
economies. As emerging economies open their doors to foreign investment and trade,
corruption tends to thrive.
Having a strong national state is one of the ways whereby South Africa can be an
influential player in global forums. In its international relations, South Africa has some
bearing on global issues that affect South Africa itself, the Southern African
developing communities, and Africa as a whole (Fraser-Moleketi, 2000).
In the 21st century, people throughout the world are increasingly rejecting the
notion that corruption is inevitable. Success in eradicating corruption depends on
impartial democratic institutions, open elections, and unfettered access to information.
Success also requires leadership and active participation by citizens. Promoting
integrity in government and the marketplace improves the global governance climate,
nurtures long-term growth, and extends the benefits of prosperity to all people. The
challenge for the 21st century is to ensure that transformation activities are integrated
while taking cognisance of what is happening around the globe. Clearly, as a member
of the developing world, South Africa should also ensure that it has an influence in the
global debate to define the role of the state, and in particular, a developmental state.
South African President Mbeki, in his speech on the occasion of the budget vote in
June 2000 stated that “the system of governance we are working to create is radically
different from the one we inherited. It is focused away from repression, control and the
management of people. It is targeted at helping us to meet the provision laid down in the
constitution of improving the quality of life of all citizens and freeing the potential of
each person. Accordingly, ours must be a developmental state” (Fraser-Moleketi, 2000).
The 1994 South African Constitution introduced one of the world’s most elaborate
democracies. It revolves around executive accountability to the legislature, an
independent judiciary, and decentralised governance within a unitary state. The
constitution also provides for institutional mechanisms such as a Public Protector,
a Constitutional Court, and an Auditor-General. Taken together, these facets of the new
constitutional order create conditions for an accountable government in the best
traditions of democracy (Mafunisa, 2000). This is in tune with a more globally held
view that tackling corruption is inextricably linked to increased transparency and
accountability founded on a transition to democracy. Although South Africa can take
comfort from this, it should nevertheless be wary of cases in which democratisation
has actually increased the sources and scale of corruption without strengthening
countervailing political or institutional capacity. Two tools for good governance will be
explored in this study – the Constitution of 1996 and the Batho Pele document.
Tools for good governance The challenge to
The South African constitution, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996) good governance
In South Africa, the Constitution of 1996 (Act 108 of 1996) has provided an
indispensable mechanism for South African national public servants to address the
scourge of corruption. This is reflective of an overall commitment to greater openness
and transparency in government – as opposed to the secretive and unresponsive
culture that characterised public administration during the apartheid regime (Giorgi, 591
1999). South African experiences over the years have made society acutely aware of the
dangers of a government that is neither transparent nor accountable.
Section 195 (1) of Chapter 10 of the constitution sets out the basic values and
principles governing public administration. These include accountable public
administration and the promotion of a high standard of professional ethics. The
relevance of this section of the constitution is underpinned by the fact that the fight
against corruption has become of such a magnitude that it requires a different
approach. The constitution also encourages citizen participation in issues of
governance. Active citizen participation is an essential ingredient in any democratic
dispensation because it ensures that the government of the country remains “on track”
and that public officials serve the general welfare of society (rather than pursuing their
own interests) (Auriacombe, 1999). To this end the South African constitution contains
several mechanisms to ensure that government will be part of solution, rather than
being part of the problem. Public awareness and participation in maintaining efficiency
in government are vital to making a reality of democracy in South Africa (Mandela,
1996). Having achieved democracy and stability, as demonstrated in the most recent
elections, the challenge now facing South Africans is to translate this mandate into
concrete programs of action. The South African government has developed programs
to ensure delivery of quality services to the people and to grow the economy through
the creation of wealth, while combating crime and corruption (Zuma, 1999). The
Constitution thus provides a rich store of ethical substance to inform and guide. It does
this by stating the democratic ideal, by indicating the core values underlying that ideal,
by ensuring the rights of people, and by setting certain key requirements for the
conduct of public administration (Wessels and Pauw, 1999). This is imperative because
public servants are at the coalface of service delivery.
What is therefore contemplated in the provisions of Section 195 (1) of Chapter 10
of the constitution is a transformed public service within the broader context of
democratic transformation and good governance.

The White paper on transformation of the public service, 1997 (Batho Pele)
The White paper on transformation of the public service (WPTPS), also known as the
Batho Pele policy, was introduced in 1997 to provide a policy framework and practical
implementation strategies for transformation of public-service delivery. The policy
strongly signalled the government’s intention to adopt a citizen-oriented approach to
service delivery, informed by the eight principles of consultation, service standards,
access, courtesy, information, openness and transparency, redress and value for
money. In line with constitutional principles, the WPTPS provided a framework that
enabled government to develop strategies promoting good public administration.
Chapter 11 of the WPTPS required government, among other things, to improve
practices that promoted good governance (Republic of South Africa, 1997).
IJPSM In realising the principles of the Batho Pele, four categories of initiatives were
classified by Diphofa (2002) as promoting public-service delivery:
17,7
(1) Efforts that seek to transform and improve the back-office operations of the
SANPS – including the improvement of systems, work processes, and
institutional structures that collectively make service delivery possible.
(2) Efforts that seek to transform and improve the front-office operations of
592 government – the actual interface between government and the public,
representing how the public experiences government.
(3) Efforts that seek to improve internal communication – involving efforts to promote
communication within government about service-delivery transformation and
about the critical role that the public service plays in the lives of citizens.
(4) Efforts that focus on external communication – to inform and build awareness
among citizens as to their rights and reasonable expectations in service delivery.
The adoption of a transformed regime in the public service obviously calls for the
re-engineering of the public service (Khoza, 2002). Therefore, to ensure service delivery
that is envisaged in the constitution and the Batho Pele, a transformed public service is
a sine qua non. The success of the Batho Pele as a tool of service delivery depends
heavily on a transformed public service capable of understanding and implementing
new government policies.

The changing milieu of the South African public service

The changing milieu of the South African public service has become increasingly
complex over the years – bringing varied and growing challenges in service
delivery.
The unpredictability of change is a key characteristic of the contemporary world
(Wessels, 1999). South African corruption is a manifestation of many social tensions
resulting from an environment that is in a constant state of flux. In South Africa’s
complex political economy, these tensions have given rise to several forms of
corruption. The new social forces governing South Africa have historically been
excluded from the economy, but now control state power, and are responsible for
delivering services to previously excluded and marginalised people. However, the new
administrative cadre finds itself stifled by a bureaucratic, rule-bound public system.
Bribery, fraud, nepotism, and systematic corruption are common forms of corruption in
contemporary South Africa (Public Service Commission Report, 2001a). It has therefore
become necessary for several state agencies to be put in place to combat and prevent
corruption in the SANPS.
In October 1997, the South African Cabinet noted that consultation with existing
anti-corruption agencies was necessary to reduce fragmentation in the ongoing fight
against corruption (Public Service Commission Report, 2001b). A year later, the Public
Sector Anti-Corruption Conference resolved that government should explore the need
for a co-ordination structure while improving and strengthening the role of existing
agencies and similarly, that it should review the scope and jurisdiction of existing
agencies. The Public Service Commission, as an oversight body responsible for
monitoring and evaluation, was mandated to play an active role in evaluating the
effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies and to suggest necessary improvements.
The anti-corruption agents in existence are:
 .
constitutional and oversight bodies (Office of the Auditor-General, Office of the The challenge to
Public Protector, Office of the Public Service Commission, Independent good governance
Complaints Directorate);
.
criminal justice agencies (SAPS Commercial Crime Unit, SAPS Anti-Corruption
Unit, National Prosecuting Authority, Directorate of Serious Operations, Asset
Forfeiture Unit, Special Investigating Unit, SIU); and
.
other players (Department of Public Service and Administration, National 593
Intelligence Agency, South African Revenue Services, National Anti-Corruption
Forum).
Each of these has a specific function, as spelt out in its enabling legislation or
regulations. Combating corruption is not the primary function of any of the
agencies – with the exception of the SIU and the South African Police Service
Anti-Corruption Unit. Certain of the agencies are able to exercise discretion with regard
to cases of criminal misconduct, which might include corruption. However, with
ongoing restructuring of the public service, there is uncertainty regarding the future of
some of the agencies. For example, with five of the regional offices of the South African
Police Service Anti-Corruption Unit closed down, there is much uncertainty regarding
its future. The same is true of the Commercial Branch of the South African Police
Service.
In terms of rationalising certain directorates, the Directorate of Special Operations
(DSO), commonly known as “the Scorpions”, now forms part of the National
Directorate of Public Prosecutions (NDPP). However, the former Special Directorates
on Organised Crime and Public Safety, Serious Economic Offences and Corruption
have not been formally restructured in terms of their operations – other than to reside
under the DSO.
Mechanisms built into legislation to avoid turf wars and functional overlap have not
been activated. For example, the operating arrangements between the DSO and other
criminal justice components (such as the South African Police Service) that should be
spelt out by the Ministerial Committee (as required by S31 of the National Prosecuting
Authority Amendment Act) have not been finalised.
Combating corruption requires a dynamic and multi-faceted strategy that uses
scarce resources effectively on a constructive, shared basis. The development of
a simple, clear national strategy for combating corruption that makes use of existing
capacity is more of a priority than the creation of a single anti-corruption agency.
A key element of such a national strategy should be efforts to prevent corruption
and to make corruption unacceptable. This will require long-term education and the
raising of awareness. Sensational moral crusades that are punitive and media-driven
do little to address the realities of the problem, and often serve to polarise people and
confuse issues. Organizational mandates are distinct and unique, and they do not
always prioritise corruption as a problem.

A single anti-corruption agency for South Africa – the challenge ahead

This section explores the possibility of a single anti-corruption agency and the
challenges that exist. Much of this section is derived from material contained in
a report prepared by the Office of the South African Public Service Commission
(Public Service Commission Report, 2001a).
IJPSM Resources
17,7 In terms of resources, many of the bodies audited in the report have insufficient
financial and human resources to carry out their mandates. This raises questions
regarding the political will of government to ensure the functioning of certain key
institutions. In certain cases, the lack of resources constrains the effectiveness of
agencies. For example, the Independent Complaints Directorate, which is supposed to
594 have about 500 staff, is able to employ only 100 with its budget – which, in real terms,
has remained static. Similarly, the Office of the Public Protector, which is supposed to
have about 200 staff, is able to fill only half of these posts due to insufficient resources
(Public Service Commission Report, 2001a).
The discrepancies between the budgets and resources of certain agencies is a cause
for concern. For example, the Directorate of Special Operations has an inordinately
large budget, whereas other bodies, such as the South African Police Service
Commercial Crime Branch has a restricted budget to investigate ordinary reported
cases of crime. The difficulties in securing evidence for corruption convictions should
be a motivation for specialised training – primarily for the DSO.
Internal integrity mechanisms, beyond screening of personnel, seem to be acquiring
a greater significance in most agencies. Anti-corruption agencies are a target for
organised criminal elements and have to be beyond reproach when it comes to their
internal integrity.
Public interaction through promotional material, public information campaigns,
and so on, is variable across agencies. This is definitely an area that requires attention.
It is vital that individual citizens (as potential complainants) be made aware of who can
help in particular instances. Greater information and awareness of the mandates and
functions of agencies is likely to reduce inappropriate confusion of agency roles
and unnecessary referral of cases.

Case information
The absence of comprehensive information on corruption cases dealt with by the
agencies is a matter of concern. For instance figures on corruption cases resulting in
a conviction are currently non-existent within the National Prosecuting Authority.
The nature of corruption being dealt with by each agency is often not clearly specified
(for example, in terms of bribery, maladministration, and so on).
Within the criminal justice system, the apparent low priority given to information
systems to capture information on corruption is a problem (Mafunisa, 2000).
Using current data, it is generally not possible to determine the extent of corruption in
South Africa. However, there are exceptions. The Independent Complaints Directorate,
the South African Police Service Anti-Corruption Unit, and South African Police
Service Commercial Crime Branch stand out in terms of having readily available
figures.
There are significant backlogs of corruption-related cases – particularly within the
South African Police Service Commercial Branch and SIU. Specialisation within the
prosecution service, in the form of specialised commercial crime courts has offered
some relief to the South African Police Service and Directorate of Special Operations.
There are plans to extend these commercial crime courts, which have been very
effective. Some of the agencies expressed a desire to see specialisation within the
judiciary – in particular with respect to highly complicated corruption and related
cases (such as asset-forfeiture issues). Many cases are dealt with by an agency not best The challenge to
placed to deal with the complaint. This is particularly true of the Public Service good governance
Commission, the Public Protector, the Independent Complaints Directorate, and the
DSO. The referral of such cases among agencies is apparently not tracked in a formal
comprehensive fashion – although the Independent Complaints Directorate keeps a
record of all referrals. There is no record as to the outcome of referred cases, largely
a result of limited follow-up capacity. 595
Performance and effectiveness indicators among agencies vary according to their
specific mandate. In general, bearing in mind resource constraints, agencies often
express dissatisfaction with present arrangements. In certain cases, such as the DSO,
performance indicators are still being developed. The challenge seems to be to
persuade the public that the agencies currently tasked with preventing and controlling
corruption are, in fact, performing. The breakdown in public confidence with the
criminal justice system seems to stem from the apparent lack of visible justice and
a lack of high-profile convictions for corruption-related cases.

Coordination
Informal interaction between the various agencies tasked with fighting corruption
takes place on a regular basis – in particular between certain investigating agencies
(such as the South African Police Service and the DSO) and the prosecuting authorities
(who have a monopoly over the prosecution of cases). However, there is no formal
agreement between the key agencies with regard to coordination of case-related
information. The need for coordination has been repeatedly stressed by all agencies.
A draft Memorandum of Co-operation (that was not signed in 1999) tried to address
this issue among the following agencies: SIU, Public Protector, Auditor-General, South
African Police Service, and NDPP.
In the investigation of criminal corruption, the police are the primary agents tasked
to deal with criminal issues such as fraud, bribery, and extortion. The DSO is in
a position to deal with high-level, organised, criminal corruption.
Investigations into other aspects of corruption (such as ethical transgressions or
maladministration) are conducted by agencies such as the Public Protector, the Public
Service Commission, and the SIU. Coordination of these efforts with the criminal
aspects is necessary if duplication is to be avoided.
Each agency sees its anti-corruption role as distinctive. It is important to recognise
that the original reasons for the creation of each of the agencies still exist, even though
some overlap of functions has emerged.

Areas of specialisation
Each of the agencies has its own special focus:
.
The Auditor-General has a unique role in fighting corruption – that of proactive
prevention. Through its small forensic auditing division, this agency is able to
follow up on “red flag” issues that are picked up during routine auditing. It can
then provide assistance and cooperation. The office is not responsible for the
prevention and detection of economic crime in the public sector; rather, this is
perceived to be the responsibility of management (as accounting officers).
.
The Public Protector does not play a role with regard to corruption in the narrow
criminal sense. Rather, it identifies and refers these cases to the relevant agency
IJPSM (such as the National Prosecuting Authority). Non-criminal cases of broadly
17,7 defined corruption involving ethical transgressions (such as conflicts of interest,
or code-of-conduct transgressions) are investigated by the Public Protector’s
office – which has the power to make recommendations.
.
The Public Service Commission plays a key role with regard to public-service
corruption in terms of prevention, oversight, monitoring, and investigating.
596 A small investigating unit has been established to deal with anti-corruption
investigations within the public service.
.
The Independent Complaints Directorate has discretion to investigate cases of
police misconduct, including corruption. These cases are fairly simple and do not
require extensive resources – because corruption is not a priority for this
directorate.
.
The South African Police Service Commercial Branch has the primary function
of investigating criminal offences, including corruption.
.
The South African Police Service Anti-Corruption Unit has a very clear focus on
corruption, and is responsible for investigating cases of alleged corruption by
members of the South African Police Service. This unit follows a reactive and
proactive approach.
.
The National Prosecuting Authority is the only body that can prosecute criminal
cases of corruption.
.
The Directorate of Special Operations (using the “troika principle” of intelligence,
investigation, and prosecution) is able to deal with organised, high-profile,
complex corruption.
.
The Asset Forfeiture Unit has the capacity to investigate cases and to seize or
freeze assets that are related to criminal offences of an organised nature.
.
The Department of Public Service and Administration has a policy and
strategic-planning role with regard to anti-corruption issues in the public
sector.
The existence of these various agencies makes it apparent that South Africa has made
significant efforts to address corruption. However, the existence of so many agencies
requires effective coordination. There is overlap between the functions (particularly
with regard to investigations) of certain existing anti-corruption agencies, and rational
principles should be applied to address the situation (Public Service Commission
Report, 2001b). Complainants often approach a variety of agencies to deal with specific
matters. A lack of information sharing at the entry stage of an investigation leads
to a waste of investigative resources on the same case. One strategy could be the
creation of a clearing house at which decisions can be made as to who can deal
with the case most effectively, and how a balance can be struck between various
approaches.
The Public Service Commission Report (2001a) revealed the following areas of
overlap between the agencies:
.
The Office of the Auditor-General maintained that there is overlap between the
work being done by its office, the Public Service Commission, the SIU, and even
IDSEO.
 .
The Public Protector believed that there is overlap, particularly with respect The challenge to
to itself and the SIU (where “maladministration” is included in the SIU Act). good governance
The legislation is confusing.
.
The Public Service Commission deals with maladministration, as does the Public
Protector and the SIU.
.
The functions of the Independent Complaints Directorate overlap with those of
the South African Police Service Anti-Corruption Unit, but the Anti-Corruption
597
Unit does most of the investigating work of cases referred to the Independent
Complaints Directorate.
.
The investigations of the South African Police Service (Commercial Branch) into
corruption overlap with those of the DSO – which is in a position to
“cherry-pick” the type of cases it will deal with.
.
The work of the South African Police Service Anti-Corruption Unit overlaps with
the Independent Complaints Directorate, and there is close interaction with the
South African Police Service.
.
The DSO overlaps with the South African Police Service in investigating
corruption cases. The Ministerial Committee, which has to devise protocols as to
how the various criminal justice agencies interact, has yet to finalise these.
.
The Asset Forfeiture Unit has some overlap with the South African Police
Service and significant overlap with the SIU.
.
The SIU overlaps, to some extent, with the Asset Forfeiture Unit and the Public
Protector.
It has often been suggested that South Africa should follow the example of other
jurisdictions (such as Hong Kong, New South Wales, Botswana, Malawi, and
Tanzania) by establishing a single agency to fight corruption. An alternative strategy
is strategic coordination among existing bodies that have an anti-corruption mandate.
The literature on corruption has noted that arguments for the establishment of an
independent anti-corruption institution indicate the inability of existing government
institutions to fight corruption effectively. The main reasons for an independent
anti-corruption agency are the very low efficiency of the existing state agencies
(especially the supervisory, law-enforcement, and court structures) and the lack of
public trust in them.
Anti-corruption agencies can be effective in combating corruption in only a limited
number of contexts – because the variables behind their success are complex and
specific to individual countries. In this regard the often-cited Hong Kong model of an
Independent Commission Against Corruption comes to mind.
However, the extent to which the “Hong Kong model” is transferable to South Africa
is unclear – because the Hong Kong model is very much a product of its own particular
social environment and polity. Policies that fail to take into account the unique
historical context and the current fiscal environment are doomed to failure.

Views of existing bodies on the creation of a single anti-corruption agency

Agency-specific comments on the proposal for a single agency included the following
(Public Service Commission Report, 2001b):
IJPSM .
The Auditor-General believed that such an agency would need to have strong
17,7 leadership. The DSO could be this anti-corruption agency.
.
The Public Protector maintained that the advantages of such a body would be
many, but that the practicalities involved seemed insurmountable;
.
The Public Service Commission argued that although the ideal of a single agency
held much appeal, it was not seen as viable.
598 .
The Independent Complaints Directorate expressed reservations about
another independent body because this might further confuse complainants.
The Independent Complaints Directorate favoured an overarching network of
bodies “where each of their parameters/roles are very clearly defined so that
there is no overlap”.
.
The South African Police Service Anti-Corruption Unit has offered strong
support for a single anti-corruption agency similar to the Hong Kong model, with
its location being within the South African Police Service.
.
The DSO was opposed to the establishment of a single anti-corruption agency
and believed that systems to fight corruption effectively in South Africa were
already in place;
.
The Asset Forfeiture Unit envisaged the establishment of a single agency,
probably under the NDPP or alongside the NDPP where people could go,
and from which most serious corruption cases would be coordinated and dealt
with.
.
The Department of Public Service and Administration was in favour of a single
anti-corruption agency. However, the design and resource of it was perceived to
be complex and would require further research (because of the need to rationalise
the functions of other agencies).
Important strategic decisions need to be taken as to the proposed functions and focus
of a new single anti-corruption agency – because decisions on these matters will
determine key operational features. One approach would be to follow the Hong Kong
model and adopt a three-pronged approach that includes prevention, investigation,
and public awareness (Camerer, 1999). Before embarking on the creation of a
dedicated organisation more thought and discussion is needed on each of these three
elements – to ensure that a precise niche is defined.
Establishing an anti-corruption agency needs high-level political support, as well as
the necessary political conditions under which it will operate successfully. Even if the
determination to tackle corruption is strong, it often diminishes as the realities of office,
the vested interests in the status quo, and the pressure of more immediate tasks bear on
the actions of government. Political will relates to the commitment of political leaders
to institute action around a specific policy objective – in this case, fighting corruption
– and to ensure that the necessary elements for such a policy to succeed are in place.
Without the necessary political support to provide the resources, powers,
independence, and accountability mechanisms required for such an agency, it will
not materialise. In South Africa, the official commitment to fighting corruption has yet
to be clearly demonstrated by decisive actions.
Under the UN Global Programme Against Corruption, the South African
government has entered into a two-year agreement that includes a dedicated
research project into what is known about corruption in South Africa as well as The challenge to
conducting a base-line integrity survey (Fraser-Moleketi, 2003). It is important that any good governance
strategy adopted to fight corruption takes into account the findings of the UN study
aimed at providing information on the following areas:
.
types of corruption (high-level, low-level, political, economic);
.
areas of corruption (government, executive, legislature, judiciary, central
bureaucracy, local government, private sector, financial system); and 599
.
effects (political system, democratic development, law and order, economic
growth, civil rights).
Challenges to be addressed
In reviewing South Africa’s National Anti Corruption Program, the Public Service
Commission Report (2001a) revealed that certain challenges needed to be addressed.
These are discussed below.
Competition for scarce resources. Setting up anti-corruption agencies with the
ability to investigate (as well as prevent) corruption will require substantial funding if
those agencies are to be effective. Corruption cannot be fought effectively without an
investment of national resources, and political resolve is required if this national
problem is to kept on the agenda and translated into voted public funds. The
anti-corruption initiative will inevitably compete with other political issues that require
resources – such as job creation, poverty, HIV/AIDS, and crime and security.
Other than the DSO, many of the agencies (especially the constitutional and
oversight bodies) are struggling to fulfil their existing mandates with current
resources. The proposal of a single agency is likely to meet resistance from existing
agencies that will be fearful for their own institutional survival.
Specific skills and expertise (in terms of corruption prevention, investigation, and
community relations) would be required. The complicated forensic and legal
investigations that surround corruption cases require skills that are already much
sought after in South Africa. There is a fear that a new agency could strip the police of
their limited capacity for dealing with criminal investigations and compete with an
agency like the scorpions for trained staff.
Effective powers could undermine accountability. Corruption often involves subtle
consensual relationships that are protected by a culture of silence and loyalty.
Moreover, such relationships often involve sophisticated financial dealings. These
arrangements can be more sophisticated than the experience and training of existing
investigating officials. Special powers might be required – including powers of
inspection and questioning, power to confiscate evidence, and power to conduct
cross-border investigations.
Some of these powers might not be palatable in the South African human rights
context. Powers of search and seizure and power to compel witnesses to testify already
exist in various forms under South African law (for example under the SIU). However,
a specific law to create an anti-corruption body would have to draw such powers
together and would have to include sufficient safeguards, checks, and balances to
ensure that such powers were not abused.
There is a very real concern that, in certain circumstances, an anti-corruption
agency might become the political police of a corrupt regime. Ensuring accountability
is a significant concern in such a context.
IJPSM Independence as an institutional priority. A single agency must be operationally
17,7 independent and must function without fear or favour – along the lines of the bodies
enshrined in Chapter 9 of the constitution. All officers responsible for the fight against
corruption must be shielded from political, economic, and personal pressures.
In particular, the operational independence of an agency – within its specific
parameters – must be guaranteed. The concern is that such an agency could be subject
600 to political interference.
To maintain public trust and credibility, the independence of such an agency would
need to be enshrined in national legislation, if not in the constitution. Interference with
its operational independence should be a criminal offence. Effective leadership will be
needed to resist potential interference and to protect the agency’s operational
independence. However, constructing another complicated statutory or constitutional
body is not in keeping with the general drive to consolidate the institutions of
democratic governance. Given the pressing needs of the existing bodies, the prospect of
dedicating significant resources and energy to plan and build an effective
anti-corruption organisation would be a significant new challenge for South Africa.
Oversight, accountability, and reporting arrangements. Establishing an
anti-corruption agency with extensive legal powers in the absence of effective
oversight is a risky procedure. The major planks of oversight are the rule of law and
the existence of a professional legal system to supervise the special powers of the
agency and to challenge its operations in the courts.
In terms of accountability, such an agency should be accountable to the
South African public – reporting to a special parliamentary committee set up for this
purpose (as in New South Wales). This committee would be made up of members from
all political parties and would exercise oversight over the operations of the agency
(similar to the role-played by the committee on intelligence oversight). The head of
the agency would need to report to parliament on an annual basis, and to the committee
when required. The arrangements would require significant investment in the
oversight body, as well as in the agency itself.
Public interaction as an essential component. Anti-corruption agencies require
effective links with civil society – both to utilise citizen reports as a major part of their
strategy and to build up public support. If little is done to involve the community in the
work of the agency, the inevitable result will be public distrust of the agency and a
failure to provide information. Without information, the agency’s investigative powers
will be useless. Furthermore, its preventive and educational work is likely to be
ignored.
Very few of the existing agencies have effective strategies for interacting with the
public, and even fewer have polled the public on their views of the organisations and
their work. Any new agency would need to establish effective public interaction from
the beginning.
Whether a single agency is the most effective strategy. Anti-corruption agencies
can be effective. However, at their worst, they can have certain disadvantages.
These include:
.
adding another layer of (ineffective) bureaucracy to the law-enforcement sector;
.
diverting resources from existing organisations involved in anti-corruption
work;
 .
functioning inefficiently if unable to target serious or high-level corruption cases; The challenge to
. functioning as a “shield” to satisfy donors and public opinion (as codes of good governance
conduct have often done in relation to private-sector companies, public-sector
organisations, and government departments);
.
delaying the reform of other areas; and
.
functioning as a political police. 601
If such an agency is to be established, a method must be devised to assess its
effectiveness. Much work has been done in the area of effectiveness in Hong Kong and
New South Wales. The substantial costs in setting up and sustaining such an agency
need to be balanced against measurable benefits as reflected in agreed indicators of
effectiveness. At this stage it is not clear that such clear and definite benefits will be
realised.
Strategic coordination agreed, but not implemented. An alternative approach could
be to aim to make better use of the existing agencies through improved cooperation
and coordination. At present there are serious problems with respect to the
coordination of existing anti-corruption organisations. These problems were identified
at the November 1998 Public Sector Anti-Corruption conference hosted in South Africa.
Mbeki (1998) proposed certain measures aimed at improving the situation:
.
determining clear lines of responsibility for different agencies – particularly in
relation to who should deal with particular cases of corruption;
.
ensuring informed decision-taking at an early stage to determine whether criminal
sanctions, civil sanctions, or internal disciplinary measures will apply – because
different procedures involve different rules, standards of evidence, and speed of
reactions;
.
improving the relationships among agencies within the public sector that apply
regulations regarding employer-employee relationships – as distinct from
external agencies that apply the law; and
.
developing an easily understandable regulatory framework to avoid overlap.
In 1999 the South African government decided that a coordinating committee of
representative anti-corruption bodies would meet monthly, but that individual
agencies would meet to share information on specific cases whenever necessary.
To a large extent, the idea of the coordinating forum was overtaken by events flowing
from the resolutions of the April 1999 National Anti-Corruption summit. The need for
coordinating mechanisms still exists, and they should be operationalised as well as
regularly assessed and evaluated.
According to the South African Department of Public Service and Administration,
the Public Service anti-corruption strategy considers the establishment of an
anti-corruption agency as its primary strategic consideration, followed by review and
consolidation of the legislative framework and increasing the efficiency of corruption
related institutions (Fraser-Moleketi, 2001). However, there is merit in sequencing these
steps differently. Priority should be given to increasing the effectiveness of existing
agencies whose mandate includes dealing with corruption. This is more important than
creating a new independent anti-corruption agency, at this stage. The current review of
anti-corruption legislation focuses on creating criminal offences with respect to
IJPSM corruption and ensuring that South Africa is in line with regional and international
17,7 conventions in this respect. Attention should not be focused on legislating for
anti-corruption structures at this point.
The public service anti-corruption strategy recognises that part of the process of
establishing an independent anti-corruption agency is to establish optimal functioning
of existing arrangements. A protocol to describe the delineation of functional mandates
602 and a cooperation agreement are very important and pragmatic steps towards greater
efficiency. It is crucial that the appropriate Cabinet leadership forum is used to
“fast track” such an agreement.
An integrated strategy beyond co-ordination. There is a need for coordination of
investigations to prevent wastage of limited resources. There also needs to be some
type of dedicated capacity acting as a “clearing-house” for corruption-related cases.
From the discussions thus far, it appears that existing agencies have no integrated,
holistic approach to fighting and preventing corruption. The anti-corruption capacities
of the existing agencies need to be optimally utilised in a holistic and strategic
approach to fighting corruption in the public service in South Africa. Only then can the
next step – a single independent anti-corruption agency that deals with all aspects of
corruption – be seriously considered.
The institutions that have an anti-corruption mandate have arisen in response to
specific needs. It appears unlikely that all of these – from revenue collection to auditing
public money – will be replaced by a single agency. Strategic coordination of existing
bodies, together with careful consideration of the proposal to establish a single agency,
might therefore be required in South Africa.

Institutional mechanisms to address corruption in the South African

(National) Public Service
Public-service reform for addressing corruption has several important dimensions.
It starts at the most basic level with making government departments more effective
(Heymans and Lipietz, 1999). It is also crucial to ensure that government decisions and
the monitoring of programs are based on sound data and effective internal controls.
Sound public administration also requires sound financial systems. The South
Africans medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) has been a significant
intervention that obliges national government departments to budget within strategic
goals. South Africa’s Public Finance Management Act also provides a reporting
framework that places lines of accountability in place. With the broad strategic
direction already in place, a series of more specific institutional changes is needed to
establish a “clean” and effective public service.
In addition to the attempts made by the SANPS Mbeki (1998) deliberated on
a professional framework for discussion among managers. The following were
proposed:
.
that ethics in the workplace should be reinforced urgently as a new cultural trait
of the public service;
. that political will and a shared commitment should inform the reinforcement
process;
.
that transparency and accountability should be given their rightful place;
.
that rules of procedure should be clearly articulated;
 .
that the practice of “whistle blowing” should be institutionalised; The challenge to
.
that steps to reward exemplary conduct should be taken; good governance
.
that managers should give moral leadership by example;
.
that misconduct should always be subject to disciplinary sanctions;
.
that integrity training and ethics education should receive priority; and
.
that the public interest should be put first. 603
The above provisional framework was offered to bring together the essential elements
of an ethics management system to eliminate corruption and malpractice in the
South Africa public service.
It has been argued that one of the major impediments to achievement of the
government’s objectives has been the widespread corruption that flourishes in all
levels of society and within the South African public service. Mavuso and Balia (1999)
attribute this to a general mistrust of the SANPS by members of the public.
The organizational culture of the South African public service needs a paradigm shift
from external sanctions (whereby misconduct is belatedly addressed) to stronger
internal control with anticipatory management systems to check deviant behaviour.
Both the spirit and the intention of the law must be adhered to, and public trust must be
constantly re-affirmed in the process of good governance. Sound administrative values
of probity, trust, justice, and fairness must be integrated in the daily work ethic, and
must not be kept separate as an issue of social concern.
It is a fact of life in South Africa that organizational insiders perpetrate the
majority of white-collar crimes. The 1999 KPMG Southern African Fraud Survey
(Open Democracy Brief, 2001) established that South African public-service
institutions pose the single-largest fraud risk – with respect to both the number of
fraudulent instances and the rand value of those frauds. Employees perpetrate an
alarming 75 per cent of frauds – acting either on their own or in collusion with other
parties.
It is significant, however, that 37 per cent of detected fraud is detected as a result of
tip-offs from staff members, customers, and trading partners. This statistic demonstrates
the value of maximising every opportunity to obtain information relating to dishonest
practices from employees and trading partners (Open Democracy Brief, 2001).
On a provincial note, the KwaZulu-Natal government is stepping up the fight
against corruption and fraud with a bill that proposes a new internal audit arm for the
provincial government. This will make KwaZulu-Natal the first province in South
Africa to have an audit committee staffed by accounting experts from the private
sector who will be equipped to detect fraud and make recommendations on what steps
should be taken against corrupt elements within government. The Provincial Audit
Bill contains stringent anti-corruption measures to halt financial irregularities in all
departments.

Conclusion
South Africa has established anti-corruption agencies without proper evaluation and
without the appropriate structural features – thus adversely affecting their
development and operational effectiveness.
Issues to consider include:
IJPSM .
the nature of corruption nationally;
17,7 .
the capacity of existing institutions to address it; and
.
the best way to effect improvements in a realistic way.
Very little empirical information exists on the nature or extent of corruption in the
country. Daily press reports suggest that corruption has increased with the advent of
604 democracy, but this is unverifiable.
Exceptional political and managerial will are necessary to promote and maintain
anti-corruption reform. However, a case study of South Africa, with its unique political
make up, demonstrates the difficulties that exist with universalist solutions.
Evaluation of the various characteristics of the South African context – in relation to
corruption, its causes, and its controls – is only beginning. Further research and analysis
is required to substantiate the proposal for an independent anti-corruption agency.

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Further reading
Act 94 of 1992, Republic of South Africa, The Corruption Act, 1992.