Peacemaking, peacekeeping-international relations 1918-36

Abyssinia 1935-36

The Abyssinian War of 1935-36 was a key turning point both in the fortunes of the League of
Nations and in Mussolini’s foreign policy; as a result of the invasion, his relations with Britain
and France deteriorated and he drew closer to Hitler’s Germany. The League’s authority, already
undermined by its failure in the Manchurian Incident, was further weakened.

Historians disagree about what led Mussolini to invade Abyssinia. Historians like Denis Mack
Smith argue that Mussolini did so in an attempt to divert the Italian people’s attention away from
domestic economic problems. ‘Intentionalist’ historians, such as Martin Blinkhorn, see it in terms
of ‘an outgrowth of Fascism itself, its need to fight and win battles’.

Q. What were Mussolini’s aims in invading Abyssinia?

• To link up Italy’s existing colonies in North-East Africa (Eritrea and Italian Somaliland).
• To gain revenge for the Italian defeat at Adowa (1896).
• To satisfy the many Italian nationalists who had been angry at Italy’s failure to acquire colonies
as a result of the 1919-20 Peace Settlement.
• To be able to claim to be recreating the glories of the ancient Roman Empire in North Africa.

Q. Why did Mussolini believe that Britain and France would permit his invasion of Abyssinia?

⇒ Pierre Laval, the French Foreign Minister, had, in January 1935, agreed that there were no
major French interests at stake in Abyssinia.

⇒ In June 1935, Anthony Eden, the British Foreign secretary, had visited Rome and
proposed a deal between Abyssinia and Italy which would have given Italy the Ogaden
region and compensated Abyssinia with a piece of British Somaliland, allowing
Abyssinia access to the sea.

⇒ In April 1935, Britain and France had signed an agreement with Mussolini, which became
known as the Stresa Front; under its terms, the three countries agreed to take co-
ordinated action against any country unilaterally violating existing treaties. This
agreement was prompted by Hitler’s announcement that he was reintroducing
conscription (March 1935).

At this stage, Mussolini was very suspicious of Hitler’s foreign ambitions and was
anxious they might conflict with Italy’s influence over Austria and his own ambitions to
expand into the Balkans. The British and French governments were very keen to
maintain a common front with Mussolini and to use it as a deterrent against further
German breaches of the Versailles Treaty. The Stresa Front, therefore, conditioned to a
considerable extent British and French policies towards the Abyssinian crisis as they did
not want the crisis to jeopardize their agreement with Mussolini.