Political Reform in China:

Elite, Class and Regime Transition

Edited by Xu Rui
 Mae Fah Luang University

Acknowledgment
First and foremost I should thank to the teacher of “Politics and Government” course,
who has provided very good lectures and clearly explanation for the concept relate
with this course. Without the knowledge learned from this subject, I cannot finish this
book.
I am grateful to the teachers and staff of the school of Business Administration, Mae
Fah Luang University, the Thailand who provided a good environment for studying
and research, where I tried out many of the ideas in this book. My understanding of
contemporary China has been shaped by a number of authors, of whom Tony Saich,
Joseph Fewsmith, Li Zhao Jae Ho Chung, and the late Yongnian Zhen deserve special
mention. I would like to thank two anonymous referees for their comments. I did not
agree with all they wrote but they saved me from making a number of mistakes and
caused me to amend some judgments.
Contents

Acknowledge
1. INTRODUCTION

1. 1 Conceptual Frame........................................................................ .. ..2

1.2 Key concepts......................................................................................4

2. Regime transition……….……………………………………….……6

3. Class and Regime Transition……….……………..………………..11

3.1 A New Capitalist Class in a Communist Regime………………….12

3.2 The Middle Class…………………………………………..………14

3.3 Economic influences……………………………………….………16

4. Case study………………………………...………………..18

4.1 A Creditable Performance of Olympic Proportions…………..….20

4.2 Internal Initiatives and Outcomes………………………………..22

4.3 China’s Rising Stature and Big Power Mentality…………..……25

4.4 Challenges beyond the Games…………………………….……..27

Conclusion…………..………………………………………………..29

Reference……………………..…………………………….………...30

APPENDIX….……..…………….....……………………………...…31
Introduction

Despite the many reforms of the post-Mao era, the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) remains the most important political actor in China and therefore the most
crucial factor in considering China’s future. The gradual but steady mercerization and
privatization of the economy has ended the central planning system, a key source of
power in a Leninist political system, but the CCP remains the dominant player in
economic life. Its approval is necessary for major projects and for international details,
and its local leadership shapes patterns of development across China, for better or
worse. The depoliticization of daily life has ended the political campaigns and witch
hunts that characterized the Maoist era, but the party continues to defend its monopoly
on political organization and suppresses all efforts to create autonomous groups that
could pose a threat to its dominance.
The commercialization of the media and the dissemination of new communication
technology, especially the Internet and mobile phones, have weakened the party’s
control over the flow of information, but it is still able to limit the spread of unwanted
news by blocking Internet sites, arresting journalists and editors, and closing down
newspapers and magazines that stray too far from the party’s guidelines. In contrasts
to the Maoist years, the CCP no longer enjoys a high degree of autonomy in
policymaking, but it remains the principal architect of all major initiatives and has
refused to provide or tolerate new institutional arrangements that would limit its
authority. Interest groups in the Western sense are few in number and largely limited
to the economic arena. The legislative system is not part of a checks and balances
scheme to monitor the party’s performance, but instead produces the laws and
regulations to implement the party’s policies. Whether the CCP will be able to
maintain these advantages will in large part determine China’s political future.
Observes of China’s political system have been predicting the downfall of the CCP
since 1989, if not before, but the party has shown itself to be more adaptable and more
resilient that generally believed. Since 1989, it has achieved two relatively smooth
1
power transitions: first, from the revolutionary elders to the so-called third generation
of leaders symbolized by Jiang Zemin, and then from the third generation to the
fourth generation led by Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. The party has disappointed both
those who wished for fundamental political reform leading to greater democratization
and those who predicted the collapse of the regime. How it did so, and whether it will
be able to continue doing so, are the subject of this chapter.
In four chapters below, I will focus on three broad topics: how the CCP has been able
to survive as the ruling party of China; the threats to its future survival, which come
from within the party, from society, and from international influences; and future
alternatives to the current political system, and a case study about the effect on China
from Beijing Olympic Games. In addition, I will stress two themes: one, despite the
array of domestic and foreign challenges to the CCP, it has the potential for remaining
in power indefinitely; and consolidated democracy. The experience of countries in the
“third wave” of democratization and the “fourth wave” of democracy and dictatorship
in the former Soviet bloc show that many transitions from authoritarianism stop well
short of liberal democracy.

1.1 Conceptual Frame

A system theory in political science (Figure 1.1-1) will be applied to analysis the
political environment in China. This model is a highly abstract, partly holistic view of
politics, influenced by cybernetics. The adaptation of system theory to political
science was first conceived by David Easton in 1953.

2
The analysis consists of four elements which are Elite, Class and Regime. In this book,
I examine the possible linkages between elite, class and regime transition in China,
and maintains that China's democratic development needs to be understood in the
context of state-society relations, all the while emphasising that class power is playing
an increasingly significant role in China's elite politics and the people's struggle for
democracy. To have a deep study, a basic review of fiscal policy system from micro
economy will be use to find out how the government influence the fiscal policy, and
how it use these policy to make the National macro-control.
The study will explore the problem in a positivist view, mainly using a
phenomenological methodology which is case studies. The study which focuses on
understanding the dynamics present within single setting 66 (ibid., p. 534). Bonoma
(1985) notes that it must be “constructed to be sensitive to the context in which
management behavior takes place” (ibid., p. 204).”
In this study, primary and secondary research will be both incorporated. The reason
for this is to be able to provide adequate discussion for the readers that will help them
understand more about the issue and the different variables that involve with it. The
3
primary data will be represented by showing the results of some conducted study or
survey. Path analysis is used to describe the directed dependencies among each
variable. On the other hand, the literature reviews to be presented in following section
will represent the secondary data of this study.

1.2 Key concepts

Concepts have a particular importance for political analysis. It is no exaggeration

to suggest that political argument often boils down to a struggle over the legitimate
meaning of terms. Enemies may argue, fight and even go to war, each claiming to be
‘defending freedom’, ‘upholding democracy’ or ‘supporting justice’. The problem is
that words such as ‘freedom’, ‘democracy’ and ‘justice’ have different meanings to
different people, so that the concepts themselves come to seem problematic. In order
to facilitate cross-referencing and avoid unnecessary repetition, the terms that are
listed here are indicated by an asterisk.

“Politics”, in its broadest sense, is the activity through which people make, preserve
and amend the general rules under which they live. Although politics is also an
academic subject (sometimes indicated by the use of ‘Politics’ with a capital P), it is
then clearly the study of this activity. Politics is thus inextricably linked to the
phenomena of conflict and cooperation. On the one hand, the existence of rival
opinions, different wants, competing needs and opposing interests guarantees
disagreement about the rules under which people live. On the other hand, people
recognize that, in order to influence these rules or ensure that they are upheld, they
must work together with others – hence Hannah Arendt’s (1906-75) definition of
political power as ‘acting in concert’. This is why the heart of politics is often
portrayed as a process of conflict resolution, in which rival views or competing
interests are reconciled with one another. However, politics in this broad sense is
better thought of as a search for conflict resolution than as its achievement, as not all
conflicts are, or can be, resolved. From this perspective, politics arises from the facts
4
of diversity (we are not all alike) and scarcity (there is never enough to go round).

“Power” can be broadly defined as the ability to achieve a desired outcome,

sometimes referred to in terms of the ‘power to’ do something. This notion of power
includes everything from the ability to keep oneself alive to the ability of government
to promote economic growth. In political analysis, however, power is usually thought
of as a relationship; that is, as the ability to influence the behavior of others in a
manner not of their choosing. It is referred to in terms of having ‘power over’ others.
Power thus exists when A gets B to do something that B would not otherwise have
done.

“Sovereignty”, in its simplest sense, is the principle of absolute and unlimited*

power. However, a distinction is commonly made between legal sovereignty and
political sovereignty. Legal sovereignty refers to supreme legal *authority; that is, an
unchallengeable right to demand compliance, as defined by *law. Political sovereignty,
in contrast, refers to unlimited political power; that is, the ability to command
obedience, which is typically ensured by a monopoly of coercive force.

“Marxism” is an ideological system within* socialism that developed out of, and
drew inspiration from, the writings of Karl Marx (1818-83). However, Marxism as a
codified body of thought came into existence only after Marx’s death. It was the
product of the attempt, notably by Friedrich Englels (1820-95), Karl Kautsky
(1854-1938) and Georgic Pleckhanov (1856-1918), to condense Marx’s ideas and
theories into a systematic and comprehensive world view that suited the needs of the
growing socialist movement. The core of Marxism is a philosophy of history that
outlines why *capitalism is doormed and why *socialism and eventually
*communism are destined to replace it.

5
 Chapter 2 Regime transition

The CCP has not been a complacent ruling party. It has not been so confident in its
hold on power and its popular appeal that it could afford to ignore the many internal
and external challenges it faced. Instead it, it undertook a variety of reforms designed
to enhance the party’s authority, not to weaken it, and to better integrate itself with
China’s changing society, but not necessarily be more responsive to changing societal
interests.
One of its key steps in this effort was the transformation of its membership and cadre
corps. This is a familiar story, and need not be repeated in any detail here. Beginning
in the early 1980s, the CCP changed its recruitment policies to target younger and
better-educated individuals. By the time of the Sixteenth Party Congress in 2002, 99
percent of Central Committee members, 88 percent of cadres, and 55 percent of all
party members had a college education percentages well above the national average
and well above previous levels with the party.
Table 2-1 Problem Areas Identified in Chinese publications

Rank Problem Areas

1 environments and ecology (12)

2 various disparities (10)

3 education/human resources (9)

3 population/aging (9)

3 rural instability (0)

3 financial reform (9)

7 unemployment (8)

7 state enterprise reform (8)

9 information and technology (7)

9 “alternative ideology” (jingshen wenming) (7)

Note: Figures in the parentheses refers to the number of publications that listed the problem are

6
 concerned

This shift toward better-educated leaders at all levels has led to speculation about the
political implications of the rise of technocrats in China, with the conventional
wisdom being that technocrats
are generally pragmatic leaders
more concerned with economic
development and political
stability than ambitious
political reforms that might
threaten growth and order. So
far that view has proven
largely correct. In particular,
the current fourth generation of
leaders is characterized by its
technocratic credentials. All
nine members of Standing
Committee of the Politburo and
eight of the ten members of
Standing Committee of the
State Council are technocrats.
Below this top level, however,
the predominance of
technocrats has begun to wane.
The percentage of technocrats
on the Central Committee fell from 56 percent in 1997 to 46 percent in 2002. At the
provincial level, the percentage of technocrats fell even father, from 75 percent in
1997 to only 42 percent in 2003, and none of the provincial leadership appointed after
March 2003 are engineers. Instead, the new provincial leadership, the likely source of
central leaders in the fifth generation, is notable for its backgrounds in the social
sciences, the humanities, and the Law.
7
What impact will these trends have on the future of the CCP and the political
system(figure 2-1) it governs? In Taiwan, the emergence of these types of leaders
within the K.MT (Kuomintang) facilitated that party’s opening of the political system,
leading eventually to full-scale democratization. In addition, the future fifth
generation has more international experience that the incumbent fourth generation of
leaders. Many of its members have been to school abroad and have extensive
experience in foreign travel. This experience has exposed them to alternative ways to
getting things done, and provided a better understanding of international norms and
opportunities. They may come to find that “peaceful evolution” (heping yanbian) is
not a foreign plot to destabilize China but a natural, if not evitable, response to the
process of development. The signs in China of such a transition are still tentative and
so far apparent in the local leadership and not the central leadership where such
decisions would be made, but they bear watching as a potential sign of things to come
once the “fifth generation” begins to make its mark.
The clearest signal of the party’s changed priorities is the decline of workers and
farmers, its traditional base of support, among party members. During the 1990s, the
CCP adopted more of an elitist strategy, courting the urban elites who were most
responsible for China’smodernization at the expense of laboring classer. Between
1994 and 2003, the share of workers and farmers in the CCP dropped from 63 to 44
percent. To justify this shift in the party’s orientation, Jiang Zemin developed the
concept of the “three represents” (Sange daibiao), which claimed that the party did not
simply represent the interests of the proletariat, its traditional claim, but instead the
urban elites, modern culture, and the interests of the majority of the Chinese people.
Jiang and other party leaders recognized that their priority in economic growth
necessitated a closer relationship with the entrepreneurs, high-tech specialists and
other newly emerging social strata who were the consequence and primary
beneficiaries of the party’s reform policies. The CCP integrated these new elites in a
variety of ways, including recruitment into the party and appointment to posts in local
party committees, governments, and legislatures. The party has also sanctioned the
formation of a wide variety of social organizations to serve as bridges between state
8
and society. In contrast, it has not provided similar opportunities for workers and
farmers associations have been unsuccessful. It is likely no coincidence that this
dramatic shift in political opportunities has been accompanied by an equally dramatic
rise in economic inequality throughout the country. The privileged few are enjoying
increased political and economic benefits, while growing numbers of workers and
farmers lack a legitimate voice and face uncertain futures.
This elitist orientation of the 1990s has been moderated by China’s current leaders.
Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao have adopted more populist policies designed to soften the
blow against the losers in the reform process. They have portrayed themselves as
more sympathetic to the losers in the reform process and the victims of natural and
manmade disasters, including the SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) crisis
and the spread of AIDS. In early 2004 and 2005, the party issued new central
documents on rural policy, leading to a quick increase in rural incomes and living
standards and at least temporarily a reversal of the flow of migrant workers, whose
dreams of good-paying jobs in the cities have often gone unfulfilled. Unlike Jiang’s
emphasis on the first of the three represents (the advanced productive forces, in other
words the new urban elites), China’s leaders now emphasize the third: the interests of
the vast majority of the Chinese people, in particular the workers and farmers who
have not been the main beneficiaries of recent economic growth. This shift in both
rhetoric an practice is designed to restore a balance to the party’s relationship with
society, and to shed the perception that it has embraced the privileged few who have
gotten rich first and abandoned the larger numbers of people who have not shared in
China’s new wealth.
In another effort to repair relations with society, the CCP has expanded the scope of
local elections. Village elections for chiefs, councils, and representative assemblies
have received the most attention by scholars and journalists, tative assemblies have
received the most attention by scholars and journalists, but local areas have also
experimented with elections for party officials, township officials, urban district
leaders, neighborhood associations, and a range of other local posts. From the CPP’s
perspective, these elections serve several purposes: they identify local talent for
9
recruitment into the party and appointment to other posts; they provide a channel for
legitimate participation, thus reducing local unrest and family planning; they provide
experience in choosing leaders, which requires incumbents to be responsive to local
needs if they hope to be re-elected; and they provide experience in contestation for
posts, both in the party and government. In recent years, various plans for expanding
the scope of elections to ever higher reaches of the Chinese political system have
circulated, and the practice of local elections may be serving as a test of the feasibility
of these plans.
Although local elections have been underway since the 1980s, the process has not
been smooth. Higher-level officials continued to intervene in local elections by
handpicking candidates, rejecting results, and failing to abide by the laws and
regulations that govern elections. Even without meddling by higher levels, local clans
and mafia use elections to expand their control over local affairs, often with the
approval of the local party. China’s experience in local elections has not been perfect,
but proponents of elections have been able to gather feedback on the procedural
aspect of elections in order to improve future rounds, and to publicize the successes of
some areas. By most accounts, in villages with successful elections, villagers have
come to support other nearby village, whose residents then seek similar opportunities.
While the party’s commitment to elections seems strong, their inclusion into China’s
political system has not yet been fully institutionalized. Nevertheless, progress has
been steady and the expansion of elections beyond the village also creates the
potential foundation for actual democratization.
The Leninist nature of the party, however, may continue to trump its commitment to
elections, as well as the formation of truly autonomous social organizations. The party
has been steadfast in protecting its monopoly on political society. To date, the party
has been tolerant of groups that seek and win the party’s approval, but has been
tolerant of groups that seek and win the party’s approval, but has followed a generally
corporatize strategy of not allowing groups to compete against each other and not
allowing them to engage in overtly political activities that do not conform to party
policies. The CCP successfully suppressed the formation of the China Democracy
10
Party, and has not even allowed the eight so-called democratic parties to openly
compete in elections. Although some scholars have found evidence of lobbying by
business associations, others are skeptical; even where such lobbying has occurred, it
has been on matters strictly related to business (for example, setting industrial
standards) and has not extended to broader issues of public policy. In the absence of
such organized parties and interest groups, changes in China’s political system will
continue to be differences of degree, not of kind.
It is important to recognize that the changes identified above have been designed to
make the system work more effectively, not effectively, not necessarily to make it
more responsive to public opinion, much less accountable to it. Although many
observers hoped that the fourth generation leaders would embark on significant
political reforms, their hopes have not yet been met. Instead, the CCP has returned to
its concern with enhancing its governing capacity. The fourth plenum of the Sixteenth
Party Congress, which met in September 2004, issued a report that called for
strengthening party committees, combating corruption, improving the party’s
leadership over the legislative process, and other policies that would enhance the
party’s capacity to govern, not make it more accountable. No new initiatives were
announced, and no specific targets were identified to measure progress in achieving
the goal of improving the CCP’s identified to measure progress in achieving the goal
of improving the CCP’s govering capacity. This plenum, which also marked the full
resignation of Jiang Zemin from his final post as chairman of the Central Military
Commission, may be the clearest indication of what the fourth generation intends to
do now that the leadership transition that began in 2003 is complete. At this point, it
seems clear the fourth generation is content to do the party’s work better, but is not
eager to experiment with ways of doing its work differently. As Andrew Nathan has
written,” Under conditions that elsewhere have led to democratic transition, China has
made a transition from totalitarianism to a classic authoritarian regime, and one that
appears increasingly stable.” A transition from communism does not appear imminent,
and as I will argue below, a democratic transition is by no means inevitable.

11
 figure 2-1

Chapter 3 Class and Regime Transition

Many of the reforms outlined above have come in response to changes in the
CCP’s social environment, changes that are the direct if unintended consequences of
the CCP’s reform agenda. In a sense, the CCP has forged a new social contract since
1989, involving more consultation with a wider variety of elites, particularly urban
economic and technological elites. Jiang Zemin was the champion of the new elitist
strategy, symbolized most clearly in his three represents slogan, which changed the
nature of the CCP from supporting the interests of China’s proletariat to also
representing the interests of China’s economic and cultural elites. Hu Jintao and Wen
Jiabao have tried to foster a more populist image for themselves and the party,
recognizing that the focus on elites was contributing to growing inequlity and popular
unrest. But they have not abandoned Jiang’s elitist strategy either, which is an
essential part of the overall economic reform agenda. The consequence of this
12
strategy has been the emergence of new social groups who are playing an ever greater
political role, and who may help shape China’s political future. This pluralization of
social interests will make it harder for the CCP to govern. As more of these new elites
come to play the electoral game by running in local elections, they will gain
legitimacy from popular support, and not have to rely solely on the CCP’s support for
their political influence. This will limit the CCP’s autonomy in the selection of
personnel and the setting of policy. More importantly, it may create popular pressure
for interested liberalization and democratization.

3.1 A New Capitalist Class in a Communist Regime

One of the most watched trends in China has been the dramatic growth in the
private sector of the economy. Many outside observers see this as the forename of
eventual democratization. Some critics of this trend within the CCP see it as the
abandonment of the party’s traditional goals and bases of support, and a threat to the
survival of the party itself. Whether they forecast regime change as beneficial or
detrimental, most view the rise of the private sector as having potentially dramatic
political consequences. As Samuel Huntington pointed out, there is no greater threat
to an authoritarian regime than the rise of an entrepreneurial class with independent
sources of wealth.

13
 Figure 3.1-1
The CCP has not been a passive observer of the emergence of this entrepreneurial
class in China. It has developed a two-pronged strategy of inclusion targeted at
entrepreneurs, on the one hand co-opting many of the successful entrepreneurs into
the party (and many more were already in the party before going into business) and on
the other hand creating corporatist-style organizations to link the party with the
private sector. As a consequence of this strategy, and the generally progrowth policies
in places in China, the private sector has been a primary beneficiary of the reform era.
The government-business relationship in China has generally been more cooperative
than confrontational, with the private sector willing to follow the state’s lead in most
policy areas. To the extent that private sector has been politically active, it has been
on matters directly related to business, especially in the area of property rights.
Entrepreneurs have not yet tried to weigh in on broader public policy matters, and
seem reluctant to play the role that some outside observers expect of them. Their
willingness to lobby diminishes the state’s flexibility in the economic arena, but they
have not pressured the CCP into enacting new political reforms.
While business is often a key player in transitions from authoritarianism, individual
businessmen are rarely the primary agents of change. More often, they follow the lead
14
of others, but can play the role of kingmaker if they shift support from the state
toward the opposition, or pit one element of the state against another. Some individual
entrepreneurs in China have provided financial support to dissident and opposition
groups. For example, Wan Runnan’s very visible support of the student demonstrators
in 1989 led to a brief crackdown on the private sector, and the imposition of a formal
ban on recruiting entrepreneurs into the party that lasted for more than ten years. This
is a notable exception to the rule, however. More generally, China’s entrepreneurs are
focused on promoting their economic interests and deepening the regime’s
commitment to economic liberalization. They have not been active in promoting a
parallel political liberalization.
Still, the potential exists that the interests of the business community will come to
diverge from that of the CCP, in which case the current symbiotic relationship
between the party and the private sector could become more rancorous. One potential
flash point is the growing problems of official corruption. Although the party and
government have gradually granted more protection to private property, local
implementation has been spotty. In a number of communities, local officials continue
to see the private sector not just as the source of new jobs, new investment, and tax
revenue, but as a cash cow, able to be exploited for a variety of purposes. A perfect
example of this is Sun Dawu, a former peasant turned self-made millionaire, who was
to complain of the party’s corruption and interference in the private economy.
Because of his willingness to complain publicly about official practices that many
others suffered in silence, he received widespread, though muted, support.
The CCP is mindful of the important role of the private sector, both in providing
economic growth and in maintaining regime continuity, and actively promotes its
interests and inclusion in the policy-making process. Private entrepreneurs commonly
fill official posts, either by popular election or appointment by the party and
government. This growing integration of the economic and political elites has
dismayed many orthodox party members, and contributes to the party’s reputation as
a corrupt political machine committed to growth at any cost. While the growth of
capitalism in China clearly undermines what little is left of communism, ironically it
15
does not pose an immediate threat to the CCP itself.

3.2 The Middle Class

Alongside their interest in entrepreneurs, many observers also note the emergence
of a middle class in China and speculate about its political consequences. This interest
is also driven by the renewed attention given to modernization theory following the
third wave of
democratization. In
particular, a
commonly cited
condition of
democratization is a
rising middle class
with greater interest
in property rights and
government
accountability, which
therefore demands greater participation in the selection of leaders and the making of
policy. The ongoing liberalization of an authoritarian regime and the emergence of
organized professionals create opportunities for promoting collective political action
once an opening appears. So far, these insights have been more speculated about than
demonstrated in China, but the link between the middle class and democratization
remains a key part of the conventional wisdom on transition from authoritarianism.
One of the difficulties in this line of reasoning is defining the scope of the middle
class. It is often used synonymously with private entrepreneurs, although comparative
works on development and democratization draw a clear distinction between the two
groups. A 2004 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) study found that
“experts cannot agree on whether a middle class is still taking shape in China or if one
already exists. Different criteria for measuring the size of the middle class (for
16
example, occupation, income level, lifestyle and consumption habits, or individual
self-perception) produce varying results. Although the notion of a middle class is an
amorphous concept, it has become commonly used shorthand to refer to urban white
collar workers and professionals with incomes around the median level. The CASS
study noted above estimated that the middle class included 4.1 – 7 percent of China’s
population between the ages of 16 and 70 (approximately 35 – 60 million people); in
China’s major cities, and estimated 8.7 – 12 percent China’s middle class as
households with annual incomes between 60,000 and 500,000 yuan, approximately 5
percent of China’s population in 2004. More importantly, the size of the middle class,
regardless of its definition, is growing markedly. CASS and the SSB predicted the
middle class would grow to 40 and 45 percent, respectively, of China’s population by
2020. As was the case for private entrepreneurs, however, the political implications of
these trends remain uncertain.
Form the CCP’s perspective, the number of individuals in the middle class is of less
consequence than how they organize themselves. China’s law on social organizations
sets limits on the types of groups that can be approved, and also limits competition
between groups in a given community. These restrictions were relaxed in 2004, and it
will be important to watch whether any discernible change in the kinds of groups that
organize or the activities they engage in will result. Besides business associations and
other professional organizations, a variety of groups have grown in size and activity,
often with international links. These include human rights groups, local churches, and
environmental groups. In 2005, the CCP began to tighten up its monitoring of these
groups, rejecting the applications of some new groups for official recognition and
forcing other existing groups to disband. These efforts were allegedly aimed at
avoiding the spread of “color revolutions,” social movements that brought down
governments in Ukraine, Georgia, and other countries.
A particularly interesting example of the potential impact of such groups is the
Tiananmen Mothers, an informal group of mothers of sons and daughters who died or
disappeared during the popular protests of 1989. Led by Ding Zilin, a retired
university professor, they have worked for years trying to document the number of
17
deaths that occurred, seeking compensation for the victims’ families, and challenging
the official secrecy that surrounds the massacre. Like the mothers of the Plaza de
Mayo in Argentina, the Tiananmen mothers in China present an awkward dilemma
for the CCP. If it allows them to collect and disseminate information on the names
and numbers of these victims, its prestige will be further tarnished. If it cracks down
too hard on them, it will create additional sympathy and support for them. In lieu of a
better solution, it plays a cat-and-mouse game with them, harassing them just enough
to prevent them from being successful in their quest, but not so much that it draws
much domestic or international attention. Because of the tremendous symbolism
attached to their issue, it may prove to be an effective litmus test for the prospects of
political change in China. If they are able to be more active and vocal, and if they
receive more support, either officially or quietly, this may be a sign that further
changes are underway just below the surface. But to the extent that they continue to
be harassed, or more so if they are suppressed more firmly, the prospects for a
political opening will be more remote.

3.3 Popular Protest

One of the unintended consequences of economic reform has been the repeated
incidents of mass protests. They occur with some regularity throughout the country, in

urban and rural areas alike. Protests on a host of issues——corruption; excessive

taxation; confiscation of property without adequate compensation; unpaid wages,

severance pay, or pensions; and so on——have been reported throughout China.

Some are spontaneous and short lived, others at least loosely organized and sustained
for weeks. The number of people involved in these protests often reaches the tens of
thousands. By themselves, they do not pose an immediate challenge to the regime
because they do not seek a change of policy, much less the form of government;
instead, they typically seek to have central policies implemented properly and fairly
and to have past promises fulfilled. So long as the separate incidents do not trigger a

18
cascade effect that would create multiple local crises simultaneously, and so long as
the individual protests do not lead to organized collective action, the regime will
likely be able to continue dealing with these protests. They are more a threat to local
political stability that to the regime as a whole, and because most of the demands are
economic in nature, they are able to be resolved without the need to surrender any
portion of the CCP’s power.
The upsurge in public protests is in large part driven by the perception that
higher-level leaders maybe sympathetic to local complaints. The apparently wide
spread belief that they key to success in these protests is to get the attention of
sympathetic leaders has led protesters to seek media coverage and travel to provincial
capitals and Beijing. High-level leaders are then stuck with a dilemma: the complaints
of protestors usually have merit, but they run the risk of encouraging even more
protests if they overrule or replace the local officials whose actions triggered the
protests. The CCP has therefore followed a carrot-and-stick approach: grant the
material demands at least somewhat, but arrest and punish the leaders of the protests
as a signal that this form of political participation still has potentially high costs. They
have also encouraged local leaders to prevent protestors from traveling outside their
area to seek support and local leaders have responded by intimidating protestors who
try to appeal to higher authorities. These efforts have only been partially successful,
however, and seem not to have diminished the frequency or the size of mass protests.
The form these protests are beginning to take, moreover, poses an even greater
challenge to the CCP. As research by Kevin O’Brien and Lianjiang Li shows, public
protests increasingly display a sense of citizenship and rights that poses a real
quandary to the state. While the state has been active at that poses a real quandary to
the state. While the state has been active at producing a more extensive and detailed
set of laws and regulations on a range of economic and social issues, protesters are
now taking advantage of these laws to challenge the propriety of local governance.
They point out that local taxes exceed legal limits, that local elections are not held in
compliance with the central election law, and that local officials engage in corrupt
behavior that would not be sanctioned by their superiors. To seek solutions to these
19
problems, “rightful resistance entails the innovative use of laws, policies, and other
officially promoted values to defy’ disloyal’ political and economic
eleties……Rightful resisters assert their claims largely through approved channels
and use a regime’s policies and legitimating myths to justify defiance,” They do not
seek new rights and privileges, only that the rights already granted by the state be
properly enforced, especially when these rights are being denied or suppressed by
local officials. This emerging sense of citizenship is speared by political entrepreneurs,
who provide advice from outside the area; in other cases, they are retired soldiers with
relatively good education and experience in organizational efforts. Their actions are
not illegal per se, but they are still subject to arrest and punishment for disrupting
political order. However, the development of a rights-based vocabulary of resistance
and a repertoire of political protest that relies on official channels of participation and
communication has the potential to pose a more severe challenge to the political status
quo as the logic and tactics of rightful resistance continue to spread.

Chapter 4 Case study

China Post Olympics: Rising Confidence amidst Challenges

China has dazzled the world by putting on a performance of truly Olympic

proportions at the 2008 Beijing Olympics. The opening and closing ceremonies were
spectacular, stunning and unparalleled. 80 world leaders attended the opening
ceremony, a record in the Games’ history. China’s gold medal tally of 51 was the
highest. Even its Olympic Village won a gold award. More significantly, the Games
showcased China’s socioeconomic achievements and cemented its status as an
important player on the world stage. China awed the world with its strong state
capacity and organizational skills, abundant resources and talents, rich and vibrant
cultural traditions as well as intellectual prowess. China’s model of development was
somewhat vindicated by the Games. To soothe external concerns with its growing
stature, China used the Games as a platform to convey a message of peace and
20
reiterate its harmonious world vision. President Hu Jintao stated just before the
Games that China’s development would not threaten other countries and that China
would work with other countries to ensure a world of sustainable peace and mutual
prosperity.
China undertook a number of initiatives before and during the Games to project a
modern and progressive image. They include designating three public parks as
“protest zones”; improving the regulatory environment for foreign journalists; and,
introducing measures to ensure clear and blue skies in Beijing. The necessary sports
and supporting infrastructure was also methodologically put in place. Despite the
herculean effort, Beijing continued to be criticized for its alleged appalling human
rights record, suppression of press freedom and lack of democracy. Its detractors
even pounced on China’s seeming attempt to deceive the audience with the
lip-synching and prerecorded fireworks footage episodes in the opening ceremony.
Despite the pressure, China stood firm and did not overreact. It countered attempts
to politicize the Games as violating the Olympic spirit of peace, friendship and
progress. China further skillfully managed Chinese nationalistic sentiments when
various groups tried to disrupt the Olympic torch relay. Such levelheadedness boosted
China’s international standing. As the euphoria of the Games subsides, China has to
grapple with a number of challenges. Foremost among them is the pace of political
reforms. There are increasing demands for more competitive elections within the
Party to improve accountability and strengthen governance. How to meet these
demands and whether the contemplated changes are sufficient are critical issues.
China will also come under scrutiny on whether it will continue to engage in media
liberalization beyond the Games. On the environment, China will need to push as
hard for a balance between environmental considerations and economic growth. At
the societal level, China will have to do more to address the grievances of disgruntled
individuals and groups in Tibet, Xinjiang and elsewhere.

21
On foreign policy, China will be expected to do more to persuade the regimes in
Sudan and Myanmar to move in a positive direction as deemed by the international
community. Managing
Chinese nationalist
sentiments will also
become more challenging
as its people will be more
sensitive to perceived
sights or provocations by
other countries given
China’s growing stature.
Human Rights Abuse Cannot Co-exist with Beijing Olympics
China seemed to have emerged from its success at
the Games with a new found sense of confidence. A more confident China, coupled
with continued rapid economic growth and social stability, is more likely to be of
greater benefit to the region and the world.

4.1 A Creditable Performance of Olympic Proportions

China hosted a successful and impressive 2008 Beijing Olympics from 8-24 August
2008. Headlines such as “Great Show Thanks, China,” and “A Victory for China, “and
“For China, an end and a beginning” and words such as “truly exceptional Games” and
“spectacularly successful Games” showed how Beijing has awed and dazzled the world
for more than two weeks. The opening and closing ceremonies of the Games have been
described as spectacular, stunning and unparalleled. The sporting events proceeded
smoothly with much professionalism and clockwork precision. Gordon Campbell, the
Premier of British Colombia, praised Beijing for its “stupendous job” and said that
Vancouver as host of the 2010 Winter Olympics and Paralympics will try to “replicate
its success”. Even President George Bush, who criticized China on its human rights
before his arrival in Beijing, commented that the entire Olympic experience exceeded
his expectations. China’s gold medal tally of 51 was the highest with the United States

22
a distant second with 36 gold medals. This was a stark reversal of fortunes when China
clinched only 32 gold medals, four less than the US at the 2004 Athens Olympics.
Beijing’s much touted Olympic Village was described as the best ever by IOC President
Jacques Rogge. The village was presented with the Leadership in Energy and
Environmental Design (LEED) gold award by the US for its environmentally friendly
design and efficient use of energy. The Games also brought together the largest ever
gathering of 204 National Olympic Committees (an increase of three from the 2004
Athens Olympics) with 10,500 athletes competing in 302 events (one event more than
in 2004). A total of 80 world leaders attended the opening ceremony, a new record in
the Games’ history.
At a strategic level, the Beijing Olympics showcased China’s socioeconomic
achievements and reaffirmed its rising power status. China’s ability to pull off such a
large scale and complex event reflected its strong state capacity and organizational
skills, abundant resources and talent, rich and vibrant cultural traditions as well as its
intellectual prowess. A total of US$43 billion was reportedly spent to ensure a
memorable experience for athletes, spectators and viewers alike, making the Games
the costliest in history. With China’s growing economic strength, it will be in an e even
stronger position to pursue its interests both domestically and externally. To assuage
the concerns of other countries, China has used the Games as a platform to convey not
only a peaceful image but more importantly, its commitment to peace. In an interview
with media representatives just before the start of the Games, President Hu Jintao
reaffirmed that China’s development would not threaten other countries and that the
Chinese people were prepared to work together with the citizens of other countries to
build a harmonious world of sustainable peace and mutual prosperity. China seemed to
have struck the right notes and conveyed the correct messages. Yet, the Beijing
Olympics was one of the most intensely scrutinized Games ever with China’s detractors
pouncing on any perceived “mistakes” or “wrong doings” on its part. Beijing was
criticized for the lip-synching episode and for inserting prerecorded footage of fireworks
during the opening ceremony. While these actions were taken to ensure a seamless and
near perfect performance, they were criticized as distortion of the truth by China and
23
worse still, as proof of its penchant to resort to whatever means to secure a desired
outcome.
China’s detractors have further criticized the country on other intractable issues such
as human rights, treatment of dissidents, democracy and freedom of the press. On 13
August 2008, Chinese police apparently roughed up and detained a British journalist
after he attempted to cover a Free Tibet protest at a park near the Bird Nest Stadium.
13 Wang Wei, Executive Director of the Beijing Olympic Games Organizing Committee
defended China’s actions and said that the Games were helping China to open up and
accused some people of coming to Beijing with the deliberate intention of criticizing the
regime.
Such cases of manhandling appear to cast doubts on China’s promise to improve the
reporting environment for foreign journalists in the country. They provide fodder for
those who continue to argue that the Beijing Olympics has failed to cajole China to
play by internationally accepted norms and practices. Assuaging the concerns of its
critics which are mostly from the West will not be easy given the differences in values
that underpin the mindset and political systems between China and the West. This will
be an ongoing affair that China can manage to its advantage. The valuable experience
China has gained in dealing with the West through hosting the Games may stand
China in good stead.
After the Games, it is even more pertinent for the Chinese leadership to concentrate on
tackling a host of domestic challenges temporarily overshadowed by the euphoria
surrounding the Games. The hard infrastructure in terms of the stadiums, facilities,
subways and airports that have been built or upgraded will certainly benefit Beijing
residents. The government will however have to do more to look into the needs and
concerns of those in poorer and less penetrable areas in Tibet and Xinjiang where
recent unrest and violent incidents have taken place.
The Chinese leadership will also have to manage demands within the Party for more
competitive elections to foster greater transparency and accountability. There are
increasing calls for more effective methods to check excesses such as corruption and
abuse of power and for new ideas to rejuvenate the Party and government. The
24
leadership will further need to display the political will to press ahead with the
emphasis on environmental considerations while pursuing economic growth.
Externally, the Chinese leadership will have to meet even higher expectations of great
power responsibility on the part of the international community. China appears to have
emerged from the Games with a new found sense of confidence. A more confident
China, coupled with continued rapid economic growth and social stability, is more likely
to be of greater benefit to the region, if not the world.

4.2 Internal Initiatives and Outcomes

China undertook a number of domestic initiatives before and during the Olympic
Games to put its best face forward. These initiatives, ranging from the political to the
socioeconomic realms, were intended to display China’s modern and progressive
image. With its increasing integration with the world, China wants to show that it is a
responsible and constructive player by adhering more closely to international norms
and practices.
One initiative is China’s designation of three public parks as “protest zones” for
people to vent their grievances during the Games. The three protest sites, the Ritan
Park, World Park and Purple Bamboo Park, are located away from the main Olympic
venues. Protesters were required to obtain prior permission from the Ministry of
Public Security, giving the names of organizers, the topic and the number of
participants. The protest sites showed China’s willingness to adhere more closely to
international standards by providing avenues for individuals or groups to express
themselves. At other international gatherings or events such as the 2004 Athens
Olympics and the World Trade Organization meetings, special sites were allocated for
such a purpose.
There were reportedly 77 protest applications. But no protests actually occurred at the
three designated sites. Apparently, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) did not
approve those who made an application. According to Human Rights Watch, a
Chinese activist who applied for permission to protest was detained. The tight control
25
by the MPS showed the gulf between decision-making and decision implementation
which might or might not have been deliberate. It nevertheless raised doubts about
China’s seriousness in creating the sites as outlets for public expression.
Another initiative by China was its promise to improve the reporting environment for
foreign journalists in the country. In the live coverage of the Games, China did a
generally commendable job except for the initial minor hiccups over the fireworks
footage and lip-synching episode. On sports related incidents, it has also been rather
forthcoming with news. A press conference was held shortly after Liu Xiang, China’s
high profile hurdler, was forced to pull out from the 110 meters man’s hurdles due to
an injury. This forthrightness was driven by the need to soothe the emotions of the
Chinese audience given their huge expectations of Chinese athletes to perform.
However, China’s handling of the media beyond sports related matters has received a
rather mixed review, bordering on the negative, from interest groups and observers
from outside China. A common refrain by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International is that China has continued to deny foreign journalists and their Chinese
staff the requisite freedom that it promised when it made the bid to host the Games in
2001. The most recent example was the manhandling of a British journalist by police
when he attempted to cover a Free Tibet protest at a park near the Bird Nest Stadium.
This incident, coupled with other occasional arrests of dissidents and their harsh
treatment, has conveyed a rather unsavory image of China.
Yet another initiative that China pushed hard for was to ensure clear and blue skies
for the Olympics. Many observers had earlier expressed concerns that Beijing would
have difficulty bringing the level of pollution down to the standards required for the
Games. A lot of effort was thus made to shift polluting industries out of Beijing, limit
the number of cars plying the roads, maintain the healthy conditions of the lakes and
ensure sufficient water supply for Beijing. These efforts appeared to have paid off as
there were minimal complaints about the air quality by athletes during the Games.
A total of US$43 billion at China’s prices and costs (this would amount to nearly
US$200 billion based on purchasing power parity) has reportedly been spent by China
in providing, inter alia, the necessary hardware in the form of stadiums, subways,
26
airports, accommodation and other facilities to ensure an Olympics of the highest
standards. The hardware that is in place will directly benefit the residents of Beijing
and travelers to the city. The Shanghai Exposition two years’ later in 2010 will skew
the benefits in favor of Shanghai residents. There is thus a great deal of wealth that
will continue to be concentrated in the major cities.
The spate of unrest that broke out before and during the Games underscore the need
for Beijing to more effectively and speedily distribute wealth to other parts of China.
More importantly, Beijing must address the sociopolitical grievances behind such
unrest. In August 2008, three separate attacks against Chinese security forces by
Uygur extremists in Xinjiang left several dead and wounded. Earlier in March 2008,
Tibetan monks and their sympathizers staged unrest in Tibet and neighboring
provinces. One possible reason behind such unrest is the wealth gap between Xinjiang
and Tibet on the one hand and other parts of China on the other. Other underlying
factors include cultural, religious and ethnic differences between the minority groups
and Han Chinese.

4.3 China’s Rising Stature and Big Power Mentality

China has cemented its status as an important player on the world stage with a
successful Beijing Olympics. This is the first Olympics held in the world’s largest
developing country. In past Olympics, China was a mere participant. It first took part
in the Los Angeles Olympics in 1984. This time round, China was not only a
participant but also an organizer. This outcome is a vindication of the tremendous
socioeconomic progress China has achieved since the open door and reform policy
was introduced three decades ago. From a country on the periphery of world politics,
China has now become a key player which many countries want to befriend.
From the opening to the closing ceremonies, and in the conduct of the Games itself,
China showed its strong governing capacity and exceptional organizational skills. In
addition, the centrality of purpose of the Party and the government, as well as its
athletes and even ordinary Chinese, in working towards a successful Olympics was
particularly impressive. Individual inconveniences were easily overlooked for the

27
national good. The national unity and pride of China was most prominently displayed.
Besides the kudos it received on the international stage, China has gained valuable
software experience in hosting super scale international events. Most specifically,
China would have learnt a lot from coping with a large and diverse group of
foreigners all converging in Beijing at a particular point in time. The software
experience it gleaned would range from diplomacy, media management, public
relations, logistics preparation, and crowd and traffic control to tourism management.
While some of its encounters with foreigners might not have been entirely amicable,
and might at times have been antagonistic, particularly those involving impromptu
protests, these episodes by themselves offered valuable lessons.
To be sure, China faced one of the most politicized Olympic Games in history. In the
lead up to the Games, China came under strong criticism by foreign governments,
interest groups and other parties for its alleged appalling human rights record,
suppression of press freedom and lack of democracy. China’s relations with
undemocratic regimes in Sudan and Myanmar also came under the spotlight. The
apparent crackdown on “peaceful demonstrators” in Tibet in March 2008 galvanized
external pressure on China. Some foreign leaders and renowned individuals even
announced that they would not participate in the Olympic opening ceremony.
Yet China did not buckle under the intense pressure. Instead, it stood firm and
refrained from overreacting. It even countered attempts to politicize the Games as
violating the Olympic spirit of peace, friendship and progress. Foreign Minister Yang
Jiechi asserted that those who attempted to politicize the Games were in the minority
and that they did not represent the international community. China also stated that
those who think that China will be compelled to act according to “their wishes”
because of the Games would be wasting their effort and would be disappointed.
China further proved its mettle when it skillfully managed nationalistic sentiments
against the perceived humiliation and bullying of China when various groups tried to
disrupt the Olympic torch relay. France bore the brunt with numerous calls to boycott
products sold by French companies like Carrefour. In an effort to restore calm,
China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu called on the Chinese people to
28
express their patriotism in a “rational and orderly way within the framework of law”.
Commentaries in the Beijing News and China Youth Daily, two major Beijingbased
newspapers, also exhorted ordinary Chinese to take a calmer and more rationale
approach to express their unhappiness with France.
China’s levelheadedness at a time when emotions were running high among the
Chinese people on the one hand and the West on the other was commendable. This
bolstered China’s international standing and reinforced China’s message of a
harmonious world. The Chinese leaders and authorities were fully aware that
nationalism was a doubleedged weapon that could harm China as much as other
countries. It was also not prudent to play up nationalist sentiments at a time when
China was due to host a major event.

4.4 Challenges beyond the Games

China is now basking in the limelight of a successful Olympic Games. The burning
issues and challenges that confront China have temporarily taken a back seat. As the
euphoria dies down, these issues and challenges will loom large again and require the
urgent attention of the leadership. Going forward, the Chinese leadership will have to
address or carefully manage them to ensure China’s continued stable and peaceful
development in line with its goal of a harmonious society. This will in turn ensure that
the Party retains its dominant hold on power.
At the political level, one of the foremost challenges facing China is the pace of
political reform in the country. There are those who argue that the Beijing Olympics
will prod China to further speed up the pace of political reforms in the country. They
observed that South Korea was a military dictatorship when it was awarded the 1988
Seoul Games and became a vibrant democracy soon after staging them. In a similar
vein, they argue, Beijing could move along the same trajectory. From China’s
perspective, however, political change ought to proceed in an orderly and manageable
manner. It may also proceed fitfully depending on the circumstances.
Political reform in China is not equivalent to having a Western style liberal

29
democracy. It is more about the Party evolving itself to stay relevant to prevailing
circumstances and needs. President Hu Jintao has stated that China will continue to
deepen the reform of the political system as part of overall reforms. 26 The question is
not whether but how to implement political reforms. Within the Party, there are
greater demands for more competitive elections to improve accountability and
strengthen governance. To rejuvenate itself, the Party has to attract talent and
represent the diverse interest of society. Expanding and deepening competitive
elections is a means to attract talent to join the Party.
A related political challenge is the pace of media liberalization in the country. The
party seeks to balance between greater demands for media liberalization and having a
responsible media. The pressures for greater media liberalization include a more
diversified society where individuals are more media savvy and are increasingly
aware of their rights as citizens. They travel more and have greater access to
information technology.
China has indeed improved the regulatory environment for foreign journalists
operating in the country while preparing for the Games. During the Games, China has
also been rather open in its Games related coverage. These media standards are likely
to continue as they do not constitute a policy change on China’s part. It will also do
more harm to China’s image if it were to withdraw these standards so soon after the
Olympics. Moreover, China has other ways of controlling the media in the country.
From the environmental standpoint, China will come under close scrutiny in its efforts
to maintain the same environmental standards that it set for the Games. Should the air
quality in Beijing deteriorate after the Games, China is likely to be criticized for
reverting to its old ways or for being lackluster in enforcing strict environmental
standards. China will also be expected to do more to improve the environment in
other parts of China. Failure to do so will make China’s incessant calls to do more for
the environment increasingly hollow.
At the societal level, China will need to do more to tackle the grievances of
disgruntled groups in China. Despite tight security, Uygur extremists were still able to
mount three attacks on government forces and buildings in just over a week. The
30
authorities initially also appeared hapless in responding to the unrest in Tibet and in
the neighboring provinces. More such incidents can be expected in the future. The
issue confronting Beijing and the relevant local governments is to adopt a more
comprehensive strategy to address the sources of such unrest. Mere reliance on
economic or financial distributive measures will be insufficient. 28
On foreign policy, China will be expected to do more to reinforce its responsible
stakeholder image. It will continue to face criticism for cozying up to dubious regimes
in Myanmar, Sudan and even Iran. To counter such perspectives, China will have to
show that it is able to cajole these regimes to move in a positive direction as deemed
by the international community while adhering to its oft repeated mantra of
noninterference in the domestic affairs of other countries.
More importantly, China will have to pay more attention to managing the potential
negative fallout of nationalistic sentiments on its foreign relations. Such sentiments
are most easily aroused when involving issues related to the US and particularly Japan.
With China’s growing political stature and economic strength, this task will be more
challenging as its people will be more sensitive to perceived slights or provocations
by other countries. Already, some countries are preparing for scenarios where Chinese
nationalism may affect its international behavior. The Chinese leadership may have to
devote more effort to educating people and pacifying their nationalistic sentiments.

In conclusion, I have tried to emphasize two main themes. First, the CCP is
not in imminent danger of collapse, either due to internal decay or external pressure.
Although it faces a host of serious problems, it has repeatedly proved itself to be
adaptable and resilient enough to survive. It has not fully resolved these problems,
and some, such as corruption and public protest, continue to escalate, but it has been
able to cope with them. They renewed emphasis on enhancing the CCP’s governing
capacity suggests the fourth generation of leaders intends to pursue this strategy of
31
survival without undertaking fundamental reforms of the political system. Second,
should regime change arise in the future, it is not inevitable that the alternative will be
a liberal democratic regime. Whether the result of regime change will be democracy
or a new form of dictatorship will be contingent on the context of the transition and
the actors who promote it. These factors cannot be known in advance. While we can
identify the potential sources and agents of change, they are merely clues for what to
be looking for, not definitive views of what is in store.

Reference
1. Andrew Heywood (2002), Politics, Palgrave, 2 edition
2. Jae Ho Chung (2006), Charting China’s future: Political, Social, And
International dimensions, Rowman&Littlefield, 1 edition
3. Bruce J. Dickson (2003), Red capitalists in China, the party, private
entrepreneurs, and prospects for political change, Syndicate, 1 edition
4. Joseph Fewsmith (2001), China since Tiananmen: The politics of Transition,
Cambridge, 1 edition
5. Andrew Heywood (2000), Key Concepts in Politics, Palgrave, 2 edition
6. December Green& Laura Luehrmann (2007) Compapative politics of the third
world, Lynne, 3 edition
7. Tony Saich (2001), Governance and Politics of China, Rudy Andeweg, 1 edition
8. Y Zheng (1994), Development and democracy: Are they compatible in China,
JSTOR, 1 edition

9. 后奥运，中国要自信而不膨胀– author anonymous, News.cn [internet]

Available at:

http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2008-08/26/content_9711768.htm
[Accessed 10 July 2010]

32
APPENDIX
Political Map of China
GOVERNMENT IN CHINA

China is a single-party, bureaucratic, authoritarian state in which

capitalism is allowed to flourish but many rights that are considered
basic in democracies are denied. Blending imperial Chinese traditions,
Confucianism and China’s unique take on Communism, the ruling regime and
party have near complete control over the government. According to the
Economist, when it comes to China Orwell's Animal Farm “seems more like
reportage than allegory."

17th National Congress of the Communist Party in October 2007

Communist governments have has traditionally been regarded as

dictatorships of the Proletariat. The first article of the Chinese
constitution defines China as a “socialist state under the people’s
democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the alliance
of workers and peasants.” Participation in the government is limited to
members of the Communist Party and political power is concentrated in the
Central Committee of the Communist Party.

Local divisions:32 provinces and major cities (22 provinces, five

autonomous regions, including Tibet, and Xinjiang, four
municipalities--Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing--and two
special administartion regions--Hong Kong and Macao).
 Flag: The red flag with five yellow stars was
adopted in 1949. Red is the color of Communism. The five stars (one large
one and four small ones) are a symbol of China. The large star represents
Communist Party leadership. The four smaller stars symbolize the worker,
farmer, petty bourgeoisie and the national capitalist. Five stars in
similar formation are on the Gate of Heavenly Peace at the Forbidden City
in Beijing.

The National anthem Ch'i Lai ("March of the Volunteers") comes from the
1930s film Children of the Storm. The Communist Party anthem is The East
is Red!

Current Chinese Government

China is regarded as an authoritarian government not a totalitarian like

the one that existed under Mao. The current government values economic
growth but doesn’t tolerate dissent. It survives because it uses
heavy-handed methods to put down dissent and the Chinese people are now
enjoying some material benefits and have suffered much worse in the past
than what they are experiencing now.

The Chinese government has a sort of deal with the Chinese people that
it can remain in power as long as it brings prosperity to the people It
seems to have done this by buying off the elite with business deals and
opportunities to make money; placating the middle class with apartments,
cars and travel; and raising hopes among the poor with chances to seek
a better life. Perhaps what is most remarkable about Beijing’s hold on
power is that it is able to keep it up.

The Chinese government is very opaque. It is difficult to see how

decisions are made and how policy is shaped. What one usually sees are
rubber stamps of decisions that have been made behind the scenes. A lack
of accountability, systematic corruption throughout party ranks and the
release of inaccurate statistics for political purposes are also
characteristics of the regime.

Changes tend to be made in an incremental way after a consensus has been

reached among the top leaders. Frederick Teiwes, a China expert at the
University of Sydney, told the New York Times, “China has a tyranny of
the middle. From the perspective of the leadership, things are going
pretty well. They all want stability.”

See Hu Jintao, History

Views on the Chinese Government

A poll conducted by the Pew Research Center before the 2008 Olympics found
that 86 percent of the Chinese interviewed were happy with the direction
that China was going, up from 48 percent in 2002, and two thirds thought
the government was doing a good job. These were much higher numbers than
were found in the United States and European countries on the same issues.
In the United States only 26 percent were happy with the direction the
country was going.

The survey questioned 3,212 Chinese in 16 dialects across the nation.

Approval ratings of the government have increased as the economy has
improved but the people surveyed did have issues with corruption,
environmental problems and inflation.

The Communist system in China depends on legions of police, local party

and government officials to enforce Beijing’s policies and squash
dissent.

Historian Francis Fukuyama of Johns Hopkins wrote: “A lack of constraint

by either law or elections mens accountability flows only in one direction,
upwards towards the Communist Party and central government and not
downwards toward the people. There is a whole range of problems in
contemporary China regarding issues like corruption, environmental
damage, property rights and the like that cannot be properly resolved by
the existing political system.”

China's Constitution
 The Chinese constitution has been
called a “collection of slogans.” It purportedly offers the freedoms
of speech, press and association. Many of the laws are not all that
different from laws in Western countries the only problem is that these
laws have traditionally been ignored, interpreted in strange ways or not
enforced.

The constitution is not allowed to be used for arguments made in court

and courts have no right to review constitutionality. This weakness is
based on judicial interpretation by China’s top prosecutor in the 1950s
that regular laws were detailed and sufficient. The Communist Party is
viewed as the final arbitrator of the law.

The constitution enshrines the values of “security, honor and interests

of the motherland.” It includes Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping
Theory. There was some discussion about Jiang Zemin’s “Three
Represents” being included.

Amendments have been added in the 2000s that guarantee private property
and human rights. See Private Property, Economics, and Human Rights.

Head of Government in China

Current leader Hu Jintao with
former leader Jiang Zemin The primary leadership positions in China are:
1) the President; 2) the General Secretary of the Communist Party; and
3) the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, the de facto head of
the military.

China has a Prime Minister but he is generally regarded as the No. 2 or

No. 3 person in power. He is nominated by the President and confirmed bt
the National People’s Congress. The chairman of the National People’s
Congress is considered the No. 2 leader in China.

The presidency is often regarded as the weakest of the three primary

leadership position. The leadership of the Communist Party is essential
because the party rules the country. Leadership of the military is also
essential because it provides the muscle behind the party. Both Deng
Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin retained the position of Chairman of the Central
Military Commission as way of maintaining power behind the scenes after
giving up the positions of president and party leader.

Some principal leaders have held all three primary leadership positions;
some haven’t. Traditionally the three primary leadership positions and
the Prime Minister job were held by different people. Under Deng Xiaoping,
Hu Yaobang was party chief and Zhao Ziyang was prime minister and Lia Xian
Nian was President . `To bolster his relatively weak position Jiang Zemin
took the Presidency, Party Secretary and top military job, a trend
continued by Hu Jintao.

These days the President is responsible for domestic and foreign policy.
The Prime Minister is largely regarded as China’s economic czar. He is
responsible for economic policy.

There are no set rules on how long leaders can serve and how they are
selected. These days a president and prime minister are limited to two
five year terms and leaders have to rule by consensus. Years of disastrous
one-man under Mao have made Chinese ascribe by the aphorism “tall trees
attract wind.”

Ordinary people know little about the lives of their leaders, but there
are lots of rumors. The typical 20,000 word presidential speech has been
called an exercise in tautology.

The Communist leaders of China are for the most part former engineers.
Rana Foroohar wrote in Newsweek, “China’s faith in its ability to mold
markets may derive from the fact that its leaders are mostly engineers,
trained to build from a plan. Eight of nine top party officials come from
engineering backgrounds, and the practicality of their profession may
help explain why they didn’t buy into risky (and Western) financial
innovation. These ruling engineers preside over a system that is highly
process oriented and obsesses with performance metrics.”

See Choosing New Leaders Below

Standing Committe of the Politburo

Chinese Politburo and Central Committee

The nine-member Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Communist

Party is the country’s effective ruling body. It is headed by the
President. The Politburo (Political Bureau) is made up primarily of
long-time party faithful who have various titles which often have little
relation to how much power they possess. It has 24 members and one
alternate.

The powerful State Council is China’s highest administrative body. The

equivalent of the Cabinet, it make proposals to the Standing Committee
of the Politburo and is appointed National People’s Congress (NPC). Other
top leaders include ministry heads, provincial leaders and mayors of major
cities. A dark blue suit with a red tie is the standard attire for these
top party officials.

Another important political organization in China is the Communist

Party’s Central Committee, which is made up primarily of provincial party
leaders and important party members chosen from among the delegates at
the party congress. The Central Committee has 362 members (204 full
members and 158 alternate members, the numbers change) and includes
China’s top leaders and important leaders from the party, the state and
the armed forces. Elected for five year terms, the members meet in a
plenary session about once a year .

All major policy decisions in China are made at the top by the Politburo
and the Central Committee.

Party Congress in 2007

Party Congresses in China

Party Congresses are held every five years in the Great Hall of the People
at Tiananmen Square in Beijing. The last one, the 17th, was in autumn 2007.
The next one, the 18th Party Congress is in 2013. The event lasts for about
a week. More than 2,200 representatives attend. They are selected by the
party congresses in each province.

The Party Congress is arguably the most important event on the political
calendar because it is the showcase event for the Chinese Communist Party
and the Communist Party is the most powerful institution in China. Party
Congresses formally ratify laws, establish policy, affirm leadership
positions and select members of the Central Committee, Politburo, and
Politburo Standing Committee. Important speeches are given. The main
meetings are televised nationwide.

Most decisions are made before the congress during months of negotiating
between the members of the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the
Politburo Standing Committee, with intense rounds of deal making taking
place in the weeks before the congress begins. During the congress
endorsements are often made with a show of hands.

Describing the unveiling of the Standing Committee at the Party Congress

in 2007, Edward Cody and Maureen Fan wrote in the Washington Post, “”Hu
led the parade before the cameras, wearing his usual blue suit. The eight
other committee members trailing behind also wore blue suits, most set
off by red or maroon ties...They stood stiffly at attention, clasping
their hands alternately in front and back, as Hu addressed journalists
in the Great Hall of the People. As Hu introduced them one by one, each
man stepped forward and a gave a little wave, like a beauty pageant
contestant acknowledging applause.”

Plenums in China

Plenums are closed door meetings conducted by the Central Committee that
last for around four days and are held once or twice a year. They can be
very important. One in 1978 launched China’s economic reforms and paved
the way for China to become the economic powerhouse that it is today.

Plenums are held amidst tight security and heavy secrecy at the Great
Hall of the People. No one except the participants knows what goes on there.
Plenums are generally attended by the members of the Central Committee.
Policy rubber stamped at Party Congress are often shaped during the
plenums. The content of the meetings is kept tightly under wraps. There
are no details in the press about the agenda or discussion just some vague
statements about broad topics. Whatever information is released after the
meetings are over.

Plenums that endorse five year plans, held every five years, have
traditionally been important political events. The Central Committee
members meet and endorse the five-year plan for the next five years.“The
Fifth Plenum of the 16th Communist Party Central Committee” was held in
September 2005. It was attended by 500 people, 200 committee members and
presumably their aides and lower-ranking officials. They endorsed the
five-year plan for 2006 to 2010. The plenum before that, “The Forth Plenum
of the 16th Communist Party Central Committee,” was held in September
2004 and the one before that was in October 2003.
Legislature in China

The National People's Congress (NPC) is supposed to be China’s

democratically-elected equivalent to the Congress in the United States.
In truth it has little power and its members are not democratically
selected. Instead they are chosen by the Central Committee, which
essentially follow decisions made by the Politburo.

Even though the NPC technically has the power to amend the Constitution
it is essentially a rubber stamp organization whose members obediently
vote the party line. Members don’t have to be members of the Communist
Party but about three fourths of them are. Only 18 percent are “vanguards
of the proletariat”—workers and farmers.

The annual National People’s Congress meeting last for two weeks and
is held in March. It is marked by strict adherence to protocol and attended
largely by colorless officials.

The chairman of the National People’s Congress is regarded as the No.

2 leader in China. Party officials make up the single largest legislative
block.

Legislature Members in China

The NPC is the world's largest legislature. It has 2,000 to 3,000

unelected deputies (2,985 in 2007 and 2,987 deputies in 2008) from 32
provinces and major cities, including ethnic minorities who show up at
the meetings dressed in their traditional costumes and headgear. The
members are indirectly elected to 5 year terms and come from all over China
for the annual legislative sessions.

Most deputies are veteran local government, military officers or

industry officials. They are treated well and have all their expenses to
Beijing paid for the congress. On their duties, the chairman of the
Standing Committee said, “Being subservient to and serving the work of
the party’s choices is the fundamental prerequisite for doing god
legislative work.”

A deputy from a rural area of Sichuan interviewed by the Washington Post

said she had been selected by local officials to attend the congress and
spent much of her time at the congress in discussions on practical matters
like improving crop yields. She offered no policy proposals of her own
but did sign on to some suggested by other deputies. She, like other
deputies, refuses to criticize the government but is willing to express
her gratitude for all the improvements the government has made to her
village and region.

Activities of the Chinese Legislature

The National People’ Congress meets annually in March in the Great Hall
of the People for a 12-day session. Heavy politicking is always high on
the agenda: to make sure the Party policies are approved and make sure
message is brought to the provinces. Leaders sure up their support and
power bases. Some openness is tolerated as long as the party can control
and limit it. Most Chinese have no idea who their representatives are and
have little interest in their meetings.

The Great Hall of the People is the meeting place of the National People's
Congress. Occupying almost the entire western side of Tiananmen Square,
it is a Stalinist monolith with 300 rooms and 170,000 meters of floor space
and was built in only 10 months in 1958 and 1959. Some of the rooms are
quite large and lavish. Other look like lobbies in shabby Chinese hotels
with all the chairs lined against the walls. Each year in March the NPC
meets in the "The Ten Thousand People's Meeting Hall," which seats 10,052
people. Important overseas dignitaries are greeted in a banquet hall large
enough to accommodate a feast for 5000 people or a cocktail party for
10,000 people.

Meetings are always scripted. Prearranged agendas are endorsed.

Preliminary votes are often held to make sure everything goes to plan.
Legislators listen to long speeches and clap on cue. Sometime debates are
held with clearly delineated limits. Leaders listen to concerns of the
delegates, sometimes in public. But more often the sessions are closed.
Describing what goes on one delegate told AP, “We’re making our
contribution to the nation’s economic development and the development
of a well-off society in an all-around way.”

A typical vote is 2,826 in favor, 37 opposed end 22 abstentions. Because

only half of Chinese are able to speak Mandarin and 55 ethnic minorities
are found in China, a team of more than 180 interpreters—who speak Tibetan,
Uighur, Kazak, Korean, Mongolian, Yi, Zhuang and other languages—is put
to work to make sure all members know what is going on.

When Party and People’s Congresses are in session security is tightened

around Beijing. Tiananmen Square is sealed off and anyone regarded as
suspicious or threatening is carted away. Soldiers ring the perimeter of
the square, which becomes a big parking lot for the buses that bring in
the delegates. Other security measures include bomb-sniffing dogs, car
searches, removing potential protesters from the city, bans on hot air
balloons and parachutists, and thorough cleaning of vegetables to make
sure no one gets sick.

In March 2007, hundreds of thousands police and volunteer helpers took

up positions in Beijing to make sure the annual session of the People’s
Congress at the Great Hall of the People went smoothly. Half a million
volunteers patrolled neighborhoods to ensure there were no “outstanding
public security problems and accidents.” Many of the police worked on
their days off.

Chinese People’s Political Consultive Conference (CPPCC)

The Chinese People’s Political Consultive Conference (CPPCC) is an

advisory body to the NPC made up of business people, religious leaders,
academics, athletes and celebrities and other people of influence. It is
officially powerless but its advise is seen as a way of keeping the
legislature and government in touch with the masses and getting feedback
from the ordinary people.

The CPPCC is the legislature’s top noncommunist advisory body. It’s

main meeting often precedes the opening the National People’s Congress.
Party members only account for 40 percent of the CPPCC’s delegates.

The CPPCC had 2,237 members in 2008. In one speech a top official said
the delegates should “play their roles as important democratic channels
for the expanding orderly participation in political affairs by people
from all walks of life.”

At CPPCC meetings there are debates about functions of government bodies

but no debate on the parent’s’s role in that body. Minxin Pei of the
Carnegie Endowment for Peace told the Washington Post “It only consultive
democracy. They party says, 'Once we consult with you, that’s a
democracy.’”

Russel Leigh Moes, a Beijing-based political expert, told the Washington

Post, “The myth about the system is that there is not a diversity of views,
but there are. But there are some big questions not talked about. You
cannot question the party’s authority over everything.”