Commentary

Human Development 2007;50:328–332

DOI: 10.1159/000109834

When and Why Social Categorization

Produces Inequality (and vice versa)
Rebecca S. Bigler Meagan M. Patterson
University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Tex., USA

Key Words
Children  Essentialism  Intergroup attitudes  Power  Social groups 
Stereotyping

Ramaswami Mahalingam [2007, pp. 300–319] draws on his own and others’
empirical work on children’s and adults’ understanding of social categories to argue
persuasively for the utility of a ‘folk sociology’ of social categorization and inter-
group relations. In doing so, Mahalingam seeks to integrate two dominant perspec-
tives on social categorization – cognitive-developmental and social constructivist
views. He is to be commended for his admirable job of addressing (a) the role that
power plays in the conceptualization of social groups, and (b) the role of myths and
other cultural narratives in developing and reinforcing both power structures and
social categories. In our commentary, we address two issues raised in Mahalingam’s
paper. In the first section of our commentary, we highlight what we consider to be
the greatest contribution of Mahalingam’s work, the spotlight that he shines on the
role of power and status in social categorization and reasoning about social catego-
ries. In the second section, we discuss the ways in which Mahalingam’s model of the
operation of a folk sociology is related to a recent theoretical account of the forma-
tion of social stereotypes and prejudice among children [Bigler & Liben, 2006,
2007].

Power and Social Categorization

The cognitive revolution in psychology dramatically changed the focus of em-

pirical research on social categorization, stereotyping, and prejudice. The change in
zeitgeist shifted attention away from the role of environmental factors (e.g., parents,
media) in shaping individuals’ social categorization and focused attention instead
on the role of cognitive factors (classification skill, heuristics, essentialism). So, for
example, the first author began her career in the late 1980s by documenting the ways

© 2007 S. Karger AG, Basel Rebecca S. Bigler

0018–716X/07/0506–0328$23.50/0 Department of Psychology, University of Texas at Austin
Fax +41 61 306 12 34 1 University Station A8000, Austin, TX 78712-0187 (USA)
E-Mail karger@karger.ch Accessible online at: Tel. +1 512 471 9917, Fax +1 512 471 6175
www.karger.com www.karger.com/hde E-Mail bigler@psy.utexas.edu
in which children’s limited cognitive skills contribute to gender and racial stereotyp-
ing [Bigler & Liben, 1990]. For approximately two decades, the field largely ignored
questions concerning the role of culture in social categorization and ways in which
the origins, functions, and consequences of social categorization and stereotyping
differ among those who are privileged versus oppressed by these processes. Maha-
lingam’s work is one of a host of new perspectives that remedy this neglect. Driven
perhaps by the increasing racial and ethnic diversity of the United States and the
continuing struggle to agree upon and implement social, educational, and legal pol-
icies related to this diversity (e.g., desegregation, affirmative action), the zeitgeist has
shifted again. Environmental influences such as cultural values and parental social-
ization on social identities and intergroup attitudes are again the frequent subject of
empirical study [Hughes, Rodriguez, Smith, Johnson, Stevenson, & Spicer, 2006;
Patterson & Bigler, 2006]. Furthermore, the experiences of privilege and of oppres-
sion have again become major topics of theoretical and empirical study within de-
velopmental and life span psychology [e.g., Brown & Bigler, 2005].
In addition to illustrating the role of status in reasoning, Mahalingam’s work on
caste is interesting because it extends the range of social categories that psychologists
typically study. Work on race, especially the experiences of African Americans ver-
sus European Americans, is common in the literature. More recently, developmen-
tal researchers have applied concepts of status and power to the study of gender [e.g.,
Leaper, 2000]. Mahalingam’s studies, which employ similar methodologies to study
caste and gender, are part of a growing movement within developmental psychology
to develop theoretical models that can explain all forms of social stereotyping, prej-
udice, and discrimination [Bigler & Liben, 2006].
Mahalingam’s work is also interesting because it raises questions regarding the
origins and adaptability of essentialist thought. To what extent is essentialism an in-
evitable consequence of the human cognitive system? To what extent is it shaped by
culture? Most existing work has conceptualized essentialism as a pervasive cognitive
bias that children apply to a variety of natural categories [Gelman, 2003; Gelman,
Taylor, & Nguyen, 2004], and that is probably strongly determined by biological con-
straints. Mahalingam, in contrast, differentiates between cognitive essentialism and
social essentialism, conceptualizing the latter as a process that individuals utilize to
a greater or lesser degree based on their position within the societal power structure.
His empirical work provides compelling evidence that essentialist views vary across
social groups and ages.
Interestingly, there appears to be a growing debate in the United States about
the degree to which gender and race are biologically based versus socially construct-
ed. Some of this debate, it seems to us, is the result of the increasing visibility of in-
dividuals who do not clearly fit into traditional social categories. Biracial and trans-
gendered individuals have sparked controversy over their claims of identity. The
question of what qualifies an individual to be African American or female, for ex-
ample, continues to be debated in the United States (e.g., New York City’s plan to al-
low individuals to legally change their gender without surgery). Such debates often
highlight the ways in which conceptions of social groups differ across groups.
In addition to Mahalingam’s work, which clearly documents variations in essen-
tialist thought across cultures and ages [e.g., Mahalingam & Rodriguez, 2003], there
is intriguing evidence that individuals’ essentialist views can be affected by experi-
ence, and even exposure to relatively brief messages. In a recent study, Aumer-Ryan

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2007;50:328–332
Fig. 1. The process involved in the formation of social stereotypes and prejudice outlined by
developmental intergroup theory [Bigler & Liben, 2006].

[2007] offered college students the chance to (a) submit a DNA sample and receive a
profile of their racial composition (essentialist condition) or (b) become a member of
a Native American tribe through a cultural training program (social constructivist
condition). Brief exposure to messages about these opportunities altered participants’
perceptions of race. Students who heard about the DNA testing adopted a more bio-
logical – or essentialist – view, whereas those who heard about the Native American
tribe adopted a more social constructivist view of race. Much more research is needed
on this topic and the additional question of whether children’s conceptions of social
categories change as a result of specific types of environmental messages.

Developmental Intergroup Theory

Mahalingam’s proposal for a ‘folk sociology’ view of essentialism is also high-

ly compatible with a recent theoretical model of social stereotyping and prejudice
proposed by Bigler and Liben [2006, 2007]. Developmental intergroup theory out-
lines the processes that contribute to the formation and maintenance of social ste-
reotypes and prejudice among children. (The formation process described by de-
velopmental intergroup theory is depicted in fig. 1.) The first step in the process
involves the establishment of the psychological salience of some human attribute
(gender, race, caste). Salience is established through perceptual discriminability,
proportional group size (i.e., minority status), explicit labeling and use, and im-
plicit use (i.e., the segregation, or sorting, of individuals on the basis of some at-
tribute). The second step involves the categorization of others along the psycho-

330 Human Development Bigler/Patterson

2007;50:328–332
logically salient dimension. The third step involves the acquisition of stereotype
content and prejudiced affect. Stereotypes and prejudice are hypothesized to de-
velop as a consequence of essentialism, ingroup bias, explicit attributions, and im-
plicit attributions or group-attribute covariation. Although developmental inter-
group theory includes essentialism as one factor that contributes to the develop-
ment of stereotypes and prejudice, it does not address cognitive or cultural factors
that might influence essentialism. Mahalingam’s work suggests an obvious addi-
tion to the model: ingroup status should affect the degree to which social categories
are essentialized.
According to developmental intergroup theory, children come to attend to caste,
for example, because it is labeled and used as a basis of segregation within their en-
vironment. Children then develop specific conceptions of caste that are influenced
by explicit and implicit links with particular attributes (e.g., wealth, occupational
roles) in the environment. The myths and narratives that Mahalingam describes
contribute to the salience of caste by explicitly labeling group membership, and to
the development of stereotypes and prejudice by explicitly and implicitly associating
positive and negative characteristics with caste.

Power, Essentialism, and Developmental Intergroup Theory

How do children translate the covariations between group membership and

roles into a broader understanding of power relationships? Although developmental
intergroup theory does not directly address children’s understanding of power struc-
tures and relationships, it is likely that children construct an understanding of pow-
er from correlations among qualities such as wealth, living conditions, decision
making, and visibility. Mahalingam’s folk sociology and developmental intergroup
theory both suggest that children construct an understanding of power and link the
construct to particular social groups in their environment.
Empirical evidence for this process comes from a study by Neff, Cooper, and
Woodruff [in press]. They examined children’s perceptions of gender differences
in power. Although children are aware of power-related gender stereotypes from
an early age [Ruble & Martin, 1998], the research by Neff et al. indicates that it is
not until adolescence that individuals are explicitly aware of the power discrepan-
cies between men and women. Neff et al. found increasing perceptions of power
discrepancies with age: children aged 7–10 showed little knowledge of power in-
equalities, whereas adolescents were aware of gender inequality and this knowl-
edge increased over the course of adolescence. These authors argue that increasing
observation and knowledge of the social world accounts for these increasing per-
ceptions of inequality. This finding is consistent with research by Liben, Bigler, and
Krogh [2001] which found that older but not younger children perceived unfamil-
iar occupations performed by women to be lower in status than those performed
by men.
Group-attribute covariation could also contribute to essentialism. According to
Eagly’s social role theory [Eagly & Wood, 1997], the existence of gender differences
in occupational roles leads to gender stereotyping. For example, the fact that more
women than men work in child care settings leads individuals to believe that women
are more nurturing than men. This appears to be true even for judgments of indi-

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2007;50:328–332
viduals who do not perform traditional group roles [Hoffman & Hurst, 1990]. Re-
search on maternal speech [Gelman et al., 2004] also supports the notion that envi-
ronmental messages contribute to essentialist thinking about gender.

Conclusion

Mahalingam’s work on essentialism, caste, and power makes a valuable contri-

bution to the literature on the development and underlying structures of stereotyp-
ing and prejudice. Mahalingam also demonstrates that essentialism can be
an outcome of, as well as a contributor to, stereotyped views of social groups. Future
research should explore further the role of essentialism in children’s developing con-
cepts of power, as well as their conceptualizations of stereotyped groups.

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