KAS International Reports 04/2011

4|11 4|11
KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS

INTERNATIONAL REPORTS ■
■
KAS
INTER N A T I O N A L R E P O R T S
4|11
ISSN 0177-7521
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V.
Volume 27
Tiergartenstraße 35
10785 Berlin
Germany
Phone (030) 2 69 96-33 83
Fax (030) 2 69 96-35 63
Internet: http://www.kas.de
http://www.kas.de/internationalreports
e-mail: stefan.burgdoerfer@kas.de
Account Details:
Commerzbank AG, Bonn Branch,
Account № 110 63 43, Sort Code 380 400 07
IBAN DE64 3804 0007 0110 6343 00
BIC COBADEFF
Editor:
Dr. Gerhard Wahlers
Editorial Team:
Frank Spengler
Hans-Hartwig Blomeier
Dr. Stefan Friedrich
Dr. Hardy Ostry
Jens Paulus
Dr. Helmut Reifeld
Editor-in-chief:
Stefan Burgdörfer
The designated contributions do not necessarily

reflect the opinions of the editorial team.
Subscriptions:
The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung publishes twelve
issues of International Reports per year.
Subscription rate for twelve issues is €50.00 plus
postage. Individual issues €5.00. There is a special
discount for school attendees and students.
The subscription will be extended for a further

year in each case unless it is cancelled, in writing,
by November 15 th.
To order a subscription:
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. (address as above)
KAS International Reports holds the copyright

in all articles published.
Cover design:
SWITSCH KommunikationsDesign, Cologne
This publication is carbon-neutral, printed using
vegetable-oil-based ink on chlorine-free bleached
Typesetting: paper from 100% recycled post-consumer waste fibre
racken, Berlin that has been awarded the EU Ecolabel (FR/011/003).
Content
4 | EDITORIAL
6 | From C limate EconomY to Gree n Econo my

Christian Hübner
19 | From K yoto to Dur ban –

Th e Europ ean Union’s Climate Policy
Céline-Agathe Caro / Christiane Rüth
36 | Emergi ng po wer s: Th e IBSA states as

partner s and leader s in a f ut ure
global Clim ate Cha nge regi me
Romy Chevallier
59 | Indo nesia’s Role in Inter natio nal Climate

Policy: Financial Ince ntives to Pre ser ve
the Rainfores t – An Effective Model?
Marc Frings
77 | Clim ate Policy in the People’s R epublic

OF CH INA – Groundwork for sustainable
gro wth?
Andreas Dittrich
94 | Harmony as a national mission –

Singapore ’s way of dealing with
Immigratio n and Integratio n
Paul Linnarz
109 | Post-Election Slovakia: Th e First

Half-Year of the Center-Right
Gover nment
Grigorij Mesežnikov
4 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 4|2011
Editorial
Dear Readers,
Participants at the global climate conference held in

Cancún (Mexico) at the end of last year once again failed to
agree on a binding treaty on climate protection. However,
some important steps were taken towards a global climate
agreement, such as the approval of the two degree target.
But it remains to be seen whether this will be enough to
reach an agreement at the climate conference to be held
later this year in Durban (South Africa). The dangerous
consequences of global climate change make it all the
more important for negotiations to be brought quickly to a
successful conclusion.
It is now a matter of great urgency that an international

climate protection treaty should be put into effect without
delay. For this to happen, participants will need to learn
from what happened with the Kyoto Protocol. This means
that all industrialised nations will have to play their part in
reducing harmful greenhouse gas emissions, and the USA
is no exception. It will of course be necessary to take into
account the state of economic development in the various
emerging nations and to consider the character of individual
developing countries. However, it is not acceptable for
countries such as China and India to try to avoid their
responsibilities. China recently announced that environ-
mental pollution represents a serious threat to its future
development, so it is to be hoped that this assessment will
be reflected in future negotiations on climate protection.
It will be necessary to replace the economic instruments
which were used in the past but which proved to be largely
ineffective. We should however welcome any economic
instruments that encourage voluntary steps towards
climate protection.
4|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 5
The European Union is taking the lead on climate pro-

tection issues and is currently setting the international
standard, especially in light of the tactical manoeuvrings
and sometimes open opposition to an international climate
treaty.
What is now required is a binding and consistent regulatory

framework for environmental and climate protection. But
this framework must also safeguard individual economic
freedoms and so ensure that individual societies can
protect the environment and the climate for future genera-
tions while at the same time creating prosperity.
Environmental and climate protection is therefore not just

a regulatory issue. It is also first and foremost a responsi-
bility to protect the whole of creation.
Dr. Gerhard Wahlers

Deputy Secretary-General
gerhard.wahlers@kas.de
From Climate EconomY

to Green Economy
Christian Hübner
Christian Hübner is
Coordinator for En-
vironmental, Climate In 1992 the largest environmental conference of the UN,
and Energy Issues
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Deve-
in the European and
International Coope- lopment (UNCED), also called “Earth Summit”, was held in
ration Department of Rio de Janeiro. The focus of the conference was the need
the Konrad-Adenauer-
for a new paradigm for sustainable social development,
Stiftung in Berlin.
to stop the unabated overstraining of natural resources.
As a result, the concept of sustainability gained worldwide
popularity, and a flood of new ideas and approaches
from various scientific disciplines penetrated the global
society. However, viewed in retrospect, the popularity of
the sustainability paradigm also led to the fact that the
term was used more and more inflationary and nowadays
is hardly ever associated with its original meaning. Among
the outcomes of the conference are the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change agreement
(UNFCCC), the United Nations Convention to Combat
Desertification agreement (UNCCD), and the Convention
on Biological Diversity agreement (CBD).
In its wake, the Convention for Climate Protection in

particular emerged to catch the media’s attention the
most and to be an annually recurring valve for disputes in
the global environmental protection. The reasons for this
until today lie in the anxieties about possible restrictions
concerning the economy through a mandatory reduction
of climate-damaging greenhouse gas emissions.1 Looking
at the actual reductions of harmful CO2 emissions reveals
that to date only sporadic global progress has been made
1 | Environmentally harmful emissions include, amongst others,

carbon dioxide (CO2), methane, nitrous oxide and hydrofluro-
carbons (HFC’s). In literature, they usually converted into
CO2-equivalents, so that in the following they will only be
referred to as CO2 emissions.
and that as of yet, it has not been managed to reduce

the absolute CO2 emissions. The opposite is actually the
case, the CO2 emissions are rising, particularly through
the increasing energy demands of the newly industrialised
countries.
In light of this, it appears that the debate about a sustainable

resource-efficient development increasingly focuses on
the issue of de-carbonisation, that is the
de-coupling of economic development from The terms “Green Economy” and
the CO2 emissions. In this context, the terms “Green Growth” are heard more and
more frequently, and could potentially
“Green Economy” and “Green Growth” are replace the expression “sustainability”.
heard more and more frequently, and could
potentially replace the expression “sustainability”.2 There
is good reason that in 2012 another conference, again in
Rio de Janeiro, will look back at 20 years of the Rio Decla-
ration and put the issue of sustainable development – this
time under the term “Green Economy” – into focus. A key
question in this debate will be which experiences, while
dealing with climate change, were gained so far and how
they can be used for a “Green Economy”.
Climate Change and Costs
Climate change is an extremely complex phenomenon

that threatens the livelihood of humankind. Tangible
consequences can be observed through, amongst others,
extreme weather events, rising sea levels and melting
glaciers. Listed as deciding factors for the climate change
are the use of fossil fuels such as oil or natural gas, the
industrialised agriculture and the changing land use.
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change – IPCC, 2007, it is considered very likely, that
the anthropogenic CO2 emissions in the second half of
the 20th Century will cause observed global temperature
increases. These developments are supported by more
recent research findings. It is expected that the sea level
rises significantly, the Arctic sea ice is shrinking rapidly
2 | The United Nations Environment Programme defines Green

Economy as “one that results in improved human well-being
and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental
risks and ecological scarcities.” UNEP, 2011, Towards a Green
Economy: Pathways to Sustainable Development and Poverty
Eradication – A Synthesis for Policy Makers, http://unep.org/
greeneconomy (accessed March 7, 2011).
and glaciers are melting faster than they previously were

expected to be.3
The problem with society perceiving climate change as

a political responsibility is that, due to the complexity of
the phenomenon, the actual consequences that are to be
expected cannot be concluded with absolute certainty.
Statistically speaking, “very likely” means “only” 90
per cent. Science’s attempts to counter this uncertainty
include the identification of sensitive elements of the
climate system, which when irreversibly damaged can
result in disasters. This is also the goal of the frequently
cited Two-Degree-Target in the climate debate, officially
acknowledged in last year’s climate change conference in
Cancún, Mexico. If the average global temperature rises by
more than two degrees, there is the risk that some of the
more sensitive elements of the earth system could collapse
and unforeseeable consequences may occur.
The debate over the necessity to avoid Such sensitive elements are for example
a dangerous climate change culmina- the Greenland ice shield, which, if it melted,
ted in the question of what actions
should be taken, considering the unfore- would result in a global rise of the sea level
seeable damage to the earth system. by seven meters.4 Therefore, the debate
over the necessity to avoid a dangerous
climate change culminated in the question of what actions
should be taken, considering the possible enormous and
unforeseeable damage to the earth system.
At this point, economists try to present courses for action

by calculating the potential costs of the climate change.
In general, they use the Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
which serves as an indicator of the prosperity of a society.
A reduction of the GDP verifiably linked to the climate
change would thus result in a lessened prosperity. There
are different approaches to calculating such GDPs. One
approach could be that economists fall back on scientific
patterns, which depict the effects of the climate change as
a model and then add the observed effects through prices.
3 | Cf. Ian Allison et al., The Copenhagen Diagnosis, 2009:

Updating the world on the Latest Climate Science (Sydney:
The University of New South Wales Climate Change Research
Centre CCRC 2009).
4 | Ottmar Edenhofer, Hermann Lotze-Campen, Johannes
Wallacher, Michael Reder (eds.), Global, aber gerecht:
Klimawandel bekämpfen, Entwicklung ermöglichen,
1st edition, Beck, 2010, 94.
In greatly simplified terms, this can be done by resorting to

values, predicted by the climate induced sea-level rise and
calculating respective costs for the building of dykes or by
observing the impact of the climate change on food crops.
Potential yield reduction can be calculated based on market
prices and be used as costs of climate change. Another is
provided by the opportunity to statistically measure the
influence of the climate on the income of the population.
Thereby, scientific modelling is no longer necessary. Both
approaches have their methodological advantages and
disadvantages that, in a calculation, need to be evaluated.5
The differences in the calculation of the costs are mainly

due to the high uncertainty of scientific modelling and the
sometimes very risky assumptions of economists. The
focus of this controversy is the assumptions about the
calculations of the damages of climate change. Namely,
this would require the availability of the knowledge about
the value future climate-change damage would have for
us today. Philosophers and economists like to clash at this
point. Thus, the effects of climate change are indeed already
visible, but the major damage will occur in
the coming one hundred years. Therefore, To receive a reasonable calculation,
to receive a reasonable present-day calcu- the assumption must be made on the
costs the climate change will have
lation, the assumption must be made on the caused in a hundred years. These
costs the climate change will have caused costs must then be scaled down to the
present-day.
in a hundred years. The (discounted) costs,
scaled down to the present-day, would then
be included in the calculation. The problem now lies in the
selection of the discount factor, meaning the factor with
which to calculate the future costs onto the present-day
costs. Depending on that factor, the current costs can be
either very low or very high. Behind this, is an ethical issue:
What costs do and should we impose on future generations
by present actions or inaction?
5 | At an increase in average global temperature of 2.5 degrees

Nordhaus (2006) calculated costs of 0.9 per cent of the global
GDP. Stern (2006) assumes a GDP decline of between 5 and
20 per cent, depending on projections. The difference in the
calculations shows the difficulties in using such results. Cf.
William D. Nordhaus, “Geography and Macroeconomics: New
Data and new Findings”, Proceedings of the National Academy
of Science, 103 (10): 3510-3517, 2006; Nicholas Stern et al.,
Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006).
In addition to the studies that take a direct approach at

calculating the costs of climate change such as for the
building of dykes, calculations, asking for the value of
biodiversity, health of the entire ecosystem are increas-
ingly becoming the focus. Here, immediate monetary
assessments are particularly difficult. While environmental
economists have started very early to calculate monetary
values for individual environmental goods, such as the sea
or clean air, which are subject to no proprietary regula-
tions, holistic considerations in connection with scientific
modelling had a much longer road to travel. The American
economist Bob Costanza caused quite a stir as the first
trying to calculate the economic value of
To emphasise the more people-orienta- ecosystems worldwide.6 Costanza came up
ted view of ecosystems, the concept of with 33 trillion dollars per year, twice the
ecosystem services was developed. It
includes goods and services provided value of the worldwide gross national product
by nature that cannot be traded. back then, which was 18 trillion U.S. dollars.
To emphasise the more people-orientated
view of ecosystems, the concept of ecosystem services
was developed. In the broadest sense, this means goods
and services provided by nature that cannot be traded in
any market.
The “Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Report” (2005)

of the United Nations structured the ecosystem services
in supply-, regulatory-, cultural- and support services.7
Coral reefs are often named a prominent example of
such services, particularly threatened by climate change.
Almost half of the world’s people live in coastal areas and
therefore are in a direct or indirect relationship to the
reefs, which are of fundamental importance for all coastal
ecosystems. Ecosystem services provided to the people by
an intact coastal ecosystem are food and raw materials
(supply services), climate control and the balancing of
extreme weather events (regulatory services), and tourism
(cultural services).
6 | Robert Costanza et al., “The value of the world’s ecosystem

services and natural capital”, in: Nature 387, May 15, 1997,
253-260.
7 | Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA), Ecosystems and
Human Well-being: Synthesis (Washington, D.C.: Island
Press, 2005).
In terms of adaptation to climate change, ecosystem

services are increasingly brought together with the concept
of “ecological infrastructure” of which the protection is
absolutely necessary. The ecological infra-
structure includes all natural and human- Ecosystem services are brought to-
made ecosystems, such as fresh water gether with the concept of “ecological
infrastructure” of which the protection
supply, climate-regulating systems (forests, is absolutely necessary. It includes all
wetlands, rivers), soil conservation (forests, natural and human-made ecosystems.
pastures), natural disaster prevention (coral
reefs, mangrove forests) or cultural landscapes. Their
stability ensures that climate fluctuations can be better
absorbed.
The study “The Economics of Ecology and Biodiversity”

(TEEB), initiated by Germany under its G8 presidency
in 2007 together with the European Commission, calcu-
lated the total value of the ecosystem services, currently
provided by protected zones worldwide, to be 4.4 to 5.2
billion U.S. dollars per year.8 In addition, the investment
was calculated, which would be needed to maintain a
global protected area with 15 per cent of global land area
and 30 per cent of the sea surface with a value of 5.000
billion U.S. dollars. For this, a total of 45 billion U.S. dollars
would be required. This ratio makes clear that it may well
be worthwhile for humankind to invest in environmental
protection. Estimating a monetary value to ecosystems
and biodiversity, in addition to the previously mentioned
methodological difficulties, see discounting, leads to
another ethical question: Should biodiversity or health
have a price?
Scientific and economic studies on the consequences of

climate change are therefore associated with a conside
rable uncertainty. The monetisation of the climate change
poses additional significant ethical questions that could
cast doubt on the calculated costs potentially being used
as a basis for political action. However, these studies can
be quite advantageous insofar that the problem of climate
change is perceived more strongly in the public.
8 | TEEB (2008), “The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity:

An Interim Report,” European Commission, Brussels,
http://teebweb.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=u2fMSQoWJf0%
3d&tabid=1278&language=en-US and http://www.bmu.de/
english/nature/convention_on_biological_diversity/doc/45527
(accessed March 23, 2011).
Climate Economics
From an economic point of view, climate change also is a

problem of unresolved property rights of the atmosphere.
Ultimately, it belongs to everyone – or no one. Conse-
quently, it is overloaded with emissions, without potential
companies having to justify negative consequences. In
economic theory, emissions are therefore described as not
internalised, that means not priced-in side effects (exter-
nalities), which can emerge from economic activities, and
thus are not included in the cost decisions of a company.
However, if environmentally harmful emissions had to be
paid for, then companies would have an incentive for its
reduction as these costs could reduce their profits.
In this context, the so-called Pigovian tax is mentioned

repeatedly.9 According to that, as a measure to avoid
climate change, the cost for a ton of emitted CO2 could be
calculated and imposed as tax on the emitting party, e.g.
an energy company. As a consequence, the
An optimal tax rate would have to cor- company would have higher costs and thus
respond to the actual damage cost of a an incentive for the avoidance of harmful CO2
ton of CO2 emissions, in order for the
tax mechanism to work efficiently. emissions. The problem with this is that an
optimal tax rate would have to correspond
to the actual damage cost of a ton of CO2 emissions, in
order for the tax mechanism to work efficiently. However,
as previously shown, the exact calculation of such costs
of climate change is virtually impossible. In this context,
the well-known climate economist Richard Tol rightly called
the climate change the “mother of all externalities: larger,
more complex and more uncertain than any other environ-
mental problem”.10
Currently asserting itself as an alternative, is the idea of the

economist Ronald Coase. Thereupon, CO2 emissions can
be incorporated into a company’s decision-making process
without taxes. The principle is relatively simple: The state
establishes a specific maximum limit of emissions, which
in an ideal case prevents a dangerous climate change.
9 | The Pigovian tax is named after the English economist Arthur

Cecil Pigou.
10 | R.S.J. Tol, “The Economic Effects of Climate Change,” Journal
of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 23, No. 2/2009, 29-51.
Certificates for these emissions are then distributed or

companies can bid to obtain them and with it, the right to
emit. If a party wants to emit more than his or her certif-
icate permits, he or she can purchase additional certificates
from other market participants. Consequently, those who
reduce their emissions, for example, by developing low-CO2
technologies, will be rewarded with the profit from the sale
of leftover emission. The climate-damaging CO2 emissions
will then be avoided, where it is best possible. In addition,
the state can limit itself to having a framework-setting
role and leave the companies as much scope as possible.
Here, however, the biggest problem of an emission-trading
scheme manifests itself. The system can only help to avoid
climate change if it includes all the possible companies that
emit environmentally harmful gases. If this is not the case,
then a shift from industries outside the ETS takes place
(leakage problem) – to where companies do not have to buy
certificates, and therefore have lower costs.
In Europe, which has the world’s largest A global emissions trading system
emissions trading scheme, this problem should be pursued, including preferably
all CO2 intensive companies worldwide.
is always criticised as a unilateral location The chances for this are not bad at all.
disadvantage. From a regulatory perspective
on avoiding the climate change, a global emissions trading
system should therefore be pursued, including preferably
all CO2 intensive companies worldwide. The chances for
this are not bad at all, considering China’s recent efforts.
Besides the framework-setting capacity of the state to

avoid climate change, states increasingly fall back onto
sectored methods on a national level. In the classical
application, this mainly concerns the energy sector and in
the recent climate policy primarily the ecosystem services.
Energy
Up to now, finite energy resources such as oil and

coal, used for the production of energy, release a large
amount of harmful CO2 emissions. For the combating of
climate change through a modified energy supply, there
is a variety of technological possibilities, including, for
example, the option to separate climate-damaging CO2
emissions when using coal (CCS-Carbon Capture Storage).
It is also conceivable to make greater use of uranium,
which serves as a basic material for the production of
nuclear power. Alternatively, even more renewable energy

sources such as wind power, hydropower, geothermal,
biomass or solar energy can be used. Energy efficiency,
for example, through modernisation of old power plants or
building renovation provides another attractive approach
of reducing CO2 emissions.
Against the background of climate change from an

economic perspective, only energy sources and measures
should be used that have the highest efficiency, meaning
that they are least costly. The economic efficiency can for
example be calculated using the CO2 abatement costs, that
is the value, which expresses how expensive it is to reduce
a ton of CO2 emissions.
Next to climate protection, states also have additional goals

in the energy sector, such as a sustainable energy supply,
jobs, and furtherance of technology. In the bundling of
multiple objectives, renewable energies (RE) worldwide
are of particular importance. In the U.S., Brazil, Europe,
and China they are increasingly encouraged.
The “German model” for the promotion of RE is anchored in

the Renewable Energy Sources Act (Erneuerbare-Energien-
Gesetz, EEG). According to this, the legislators have imple-
mented a statutory purchase obligation and minimum
purchase prices for RE produced from biomass, wind or
sun (fit-in-tariff). The price difference between the more
expensive RE’s and the conventional finite energy sources
are passed on to consumers as an additional cost to their
electricity bill, which is why the power costs
In recent years, the proportion of re- rises for the consumers as more electricity
newable energies in the electricity is supplied by renewable sources. In recent
consumption significantly increased in
Germany. In Europe alone, 19 countries years, the proportion of renewable energies
enacted a similar funding structure. in the electricity consumption significantly
increased in Germany. Through this, exten-
sive investments in research and development of RE were
made possible, which would not otherwise have been
made. Since then, the EEG has been found to be an export
hit. In Europe alone, 19 countries already have a similar
funding structure.
Besides the price-based EEG, there is the quantity-based

quota system with certificates, which is used, for example,
in England. This basically works like the previously des-

cribed emission trading system. The law regulates how
much energy from renewable sources will be incorpo-
rated into the electricity grid. After that, certificates for
electricity from renewable energy sources are issued. In
that case, businesses specialised in feeding
electricity into the grid have to prove that The quantity-based quota system with
they, according to the quota, have a suffi- certificates does not promote any spe-
cific technology. Ultimately, those RE’s
cient number of certificates. These certifi- will gain the upper hand that can be
cates can then be traded on a market. Thus, made available at the lowest prices.
there is competition for the best possible
production of electricity from renewable energy sources.
The advantage of this model is that it is an incentive for
innovation, but does not promote any specific technology.
Ultimately, those RE’s will gain the upper hand that can be
made available at the lowest prices.
In principle both ways are suitable to support the use of

RE with the goal of a sustainable energy supply. In regard
to the primary aim of advancing the climate protection,
the interaction with other methods have to be taken into
consideration. In Europe specifically, it becomes evident
that the simultaneous existence of the European emissions
trading system and the EEG, but also the quota system,
can override the goal of reducing the CO2 emissions. CO2
emissions prevented at national level through the EEG or
the quota system in light of the fixed quota of the European
emissions trading system are now increasingly being
emitted in other countries. National schemes to promote
RE’s can thus nullify international efforts.
Ecosystem Services
Climate change as a global phenomenon affects virtually

every ecosystem on earth. This has consequences that
we only slowly begin to understand. Considered reliable
knowledge is that the previously mentioned ecosystem
services play an important role in preventing and adapting
to the impacts of the climate change.
From an economic perspective, the problem is that many

ecosystem services, as well as climate change, have no
price that could serve as an incentive for their protection.
This is why the damage to the ecosystem through climate
change or other environmental pollution hardly ever filters

into the economic decision-making process. Nevertheless,
there is already a variety of economic tools, which pursue
the goal of creating markets for ecosystem services.
Currently, there is a particular interest in the economic
redevelopment of forest ecosystems. Increased forest
cultivation could remove CO2 from the atmosphere. Recent
calculations assume that the preservation of forests could
prevent greenhouse gas emissions, which in turn corre-
spond to climate change damages in the amount of 3.7
trillion U.S. dollars.11
Politics therefore try to create an economic incentive to

protect forests through so-called REDD mechanisms
(Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degra-
dation) which should be a particularly attractive alternative
for developing countries. Objective of these mechanisms
is to reduce deforestation, by industrial nations providing
money for the protection and development of forests. Here,
however, other societal goals could be affected. Therefore,
it is entirely possible with the aim to store
If entrepreneurs decide on a species of CO2 for the protection of the environment to
tree that stores as much CO2 as possi- operate focused forest cultivation. But then,
ble and grow these as a monoculture,
this would be at the expense of the entrepreneurs would decide on a species of
biodiversity. tree that stores as much CO2 as possible and
would grow these as a monoculture. Such monocultures,
though, would be at the expense of the biodiversity, which
is essential for nature’s resilience to climate fluctuations.
More recent approaches (REDD+) take criteria coupled to
financing for the protection of biodiversity into account,
but how this could be implemented remains to be seen.
In addition, the main problems in implementing the REDD
mechanisms lie in the control and administrative imple-
mentation of such projects on site. In the end, paid forest
protection also must be controlled.
Another economic approach and probably the most deve-

loped for the protection of ecosystem services is currently
being implemented in the EU. Therein, mainly farmers
have the primary responsibility for the preservation of
11 | TEEB (2010), “The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity:

Mainstreaming the Economics of Nature,” European Commis-
sion, Brussels, cf. http://teebweb.org (accessed March 23,
2011).
ecosystems. They are offered to receive additional funding,

if they change their agricultural working processes to be
more in accordance with environmental and climate pro-
tection (less fertiliser, less tillage, etc.). In the specialist
literature, this approach is also referred to as “Payments
for Ecosystem Services”. Thus, farmers ultimately receive
an additional source of income, by acting
as a provider of environmental and climate The importance of environmental pro-
protection. The importance of environmental tection will play a central role in the
negotiations on the design of a com-
protection and thus the protection of the mon agricultural policy in the EU.
ecosystem services will play a central role in
the upcoming negotiations this year on the design of a
common agricultural policy in the EU. Nevertheless, it must
also be differentiated again, whether the state only wants
to protect the climate or whether it wants to promote biodi-
versity, cultural landscape or sustainable energy. Payments
made to farmers should be orientated on that, accordingly.
Here again emerges the dilemma between climate and
biodiversity protection. Thus, the increased cultivation of
biomass as a renewable energy source actually contributes
to the climate protection and is displacing fossil fuels. The
consequences, though, are monocultures to the detriment
of biodiversity. In addition, the growing of biomass also
displaces the food production so that climate protection,
food supply security and biodiversity protection as social
objectives can be in opposition of each other. Even though
the EU has tried to address this problem through the
coupling of payments to the compliance with sustainability
criteria, success depends entirely on the ability to control it.
Another way to protect the ecosystem services is achievable

through their legal allocation. Of particular interest are the
results of the 10th Conference of the Signatory States of the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in Nagoya, Japan
2010. There, the so-called ABS-protocol to regulate access
to genetic resources and the fair sharing of profits for the
use of natural resources was agreed upon. The background
here is the objective to fairly share the profits, for example
for the development of drugs or for breeding. For the eco-
nomy, this results in a more secure framework, which can
guarantee property rights to developing countries for their
genetic resources (such as plants with medicinal properties)
and legal certainty to industrialised countries for future
transactions.
Conclusions
We already live with a human-induced climate change.

Since we can only make uncertain statements about the
impact, we should actually be restricted in our alternative
courses of action. Nevertheless, at present there are a sheer
unmanageable number of initiatives, which try, with the
help of economical approaches, to reduce environmentally
harmful CO2 emissions, among them the emissions trading
system of the EU, the German Federal Government’s
EEG and the REDD-mechanisms in emerging and deve-
loping countries. Ultimately, it turns out, that this variety
of methods could in fact undermine the actual objective
of avoiding dangerous climate change. Furthermore, some
tools particularly take into account those, that contribute
to the ecosystem services and not to the various inter-
actions between climate change, the biodiversity protection
and the food supply security. In emerging and developing
countries, there is also a significant control problem, which
puts the legitimacy of such methods into question.
Politics, whose aim is the prevention of the global climate

change, should therefore go down two routes. Firstly, a
global emissions trading system should be pursued that
includes all CO2 producing industries. There can be no
exceptions. Also, national methods, which could override
this mechanism, must be avoided. Secondly, increased
consideration should be given to how it would be possible
to implement unified markets for ecosystem services,
especially in emerging and developing countries. An
example for this could well be the European approach, in
which landowners act as a provider of climate protection.
The legal basis could be an extended ABS-protocol covering
all ecosystem services from a property rights perspective.
For the “Green Economy”, whose aim among other is to

decarbonise the economy, the introduction of new methods
is not fundamentally necessary. Instead, a unified and
consistent enforcement of a globally binding regulatory
framework should be put in the foreground.
From Kyoto to Durban –

The European Union’s
Climate Policy
Céline-Agathe Caro / Christiane Rüth
“Climate” and “policy” – less than fifty years ago, these

two words were never heard in combination. But at least
since June 1992, when about a hundred heads of state and
government leaders from all over the world came together
at the “Earth Summit” in Rio de Janeiro, the climate has
featured on the developed nations’ political agenda. And
over the last 20 years, international efforts to fight climate
change have intensified in view of the global challenges Dr. Céline-Agathe
being faced in the areas of food, migration and security. Caro is Coordinator
for European Policy in
Europe has claimed a leading role in the talks since the the Political Dialogue
beginning. and Analysis Team of
Stiftung in Berlin.
At the “Earth Summit”, more than 150 countries signed
up to a Framework Convention on Climate Change. This
officially recognises the global character of climate change
and the need for international cooperation in this area.
It also highlights the role of human activity in relation to
global warming and sets itself the goal of stabilising levels
of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere in order to prevent
dangerous man-made climate change.1
Christiane Rüth
This political step taken on an international level is to some studied European
Studies and Adminis-
extent based on the findings of the World Climate Council, an tration at the Univer-
international forum of scientists who have been observing sity of Bremen and
and assessing climate change since 1988.2 In its last report the University of
Leiden (Netherlands).
in 2007 the Council stated that “most of the increase in From September
2010 to March 2011
she has been suppor-
1 | Cf. UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, Item 2
ting the Foreign,
(New York, 1992). Text available at: http://unfccc.int/
Security and Euro-
essential_background/convention/background/items/
pean Policy Team in
2853.php (accessed February 2, 2011).
Berlin.
2 | The official name of the World Climate Council is the
“Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change”, IPCC.
the average global temperature which has been observed

since the mid-20th century (…) is very probably due to
the observed man-made increase in levels of greenhouse
gases”.3 The Council also believes there are clear signs of
global warming, as evidenced by the increase in global
air and sea temperatures, the melting of ice in the Arctic,
the more frequent periods of drought and
Between 1906 and 2005 average tem- extreme heat, the greater intensity of tropical
peratures rose worldwide by 0.74 hurricanes and the rise in sea levels world-
degrees Celsius. This trend has been
accelerating drastically over the last wide. According to the report, between 1906
50 years. and 2005 average temperatures rose world-
wide by 0.74 degrees Celsius. This trend has been accele-
rating drastically over the last 50 years. It is feared that if
temperatures continue to rise there may be negative, even
disastrous consequences not only for eco-systems and
water resources, but also for human health, agriculture,
forestry, industry and society as a whole.
This is why many climate scientists are urging that the rise
in average global temperatures should reach no more than
two degrees Celsius higher than the pre-industrial era. This
has also been set as a clear political goal. At the EU summit
in early 2005, European heads of state and government
leaders recognised the need for this limit of two degrees
in order to meet the overall targets of the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change.4
Targets and Funding for

Environmental Policies
The EU’s main goal in the fight against climate change is to

change lifestyles and consumer habits within its member
states without affecting their prosperity. Innovation
in this area should lead to sustainable growth and high
employment levels. The EU Commission has even talked
about a “new industrial revolution”.5 This should have the
3 | Cf. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IPCC,

“Climate Change 2007 – Summary for Policymakers”,
Fourth Status Report of the IPCC (AR4) (Bern/Vienna/
Berlin, September 2007), 10.
4 | Cf. EU Council, Meeting of the European Council, Brussels,
March 22/23, 2005, “Schlussfolgerungen des Vorsitzes,”
7619/1/05 REV 1, CONCL 1, 15-16.
5 | Cf. European Commission “Kommission legt integriertes
Energie- und Klimapaket zur Emissionsminderung im 21.
Jahrhundert vor”, press release, January 10, 2007.
double effect of halting climate change but also improving

air quality, increasing energy security and strengthening
the EU’s competitiveness through the development
of green technologies. So an ambitious climate policy
should benefit the EU’s interests, both economically and
industrially. Moreover, the long-term costs of this should
be much less than the costs of dealing with uncontrolled
global warming on a worldwide scale.
As large amounts of greenhouse emissions are caused by

the production and consumption of energy, the European
Union’s energy policy plays a crucial role when it comes to
hitting climate targets. Carbon dioxide emissions are to be
reduced, mainly by increasing energy efficiency, limiting
industrial and vehicle emissions, reducing the use of fossil
fuels and diversifying energy sources, such as the further
development of renewable energies.
The Kyoto Process
The 1997 Kyoto Protocol has up till now been the most
important instrument of international climate policy. By
signing the Protocol, the developed countries have pledged
to reduce their collective greenhouse gas emissions by 5.2
per cent compared to the 1990 level between
2008 and 2012. In order to hit this target, The system of “burden sharing” means
the 15 EU member states at that time were that the emission-reduction obligati-
ons are distributed among EU members
faced with reducing their emissions by a in relation to their economic power.
total of 8 per cent. The system of “burden
sharing” means that the emission-reduction obligations
are distributed among EU members in relation to their
economic power. So, for example, Germany has to reduce
its greenhouse emissions by 21 per cent by 2012, while
Portugal is allowed to increase its emissions by 27 per
cent. The new EU member states which have joined since
2004 have set their own targets within the framework of
the Kyoto Protocol.
In order to meet the targets set by the Kyoto Protocol,

in June 2000 the European Commission launched the
European Climate Change Programme (ECCP). This
programme has the aim of supplementing the domestic
efforts of EU countries with European strategies. The main
outcome of this programme is the EU Emissions Trading
System which was introduced in January 2005 for carbon

dioxide emissions (CO2). This is the first multinational
emissions trading system in the world. It is designed to
achieve emission reductions at the lowest possible cost.
Throughout Europe, around 11,000 industrial enterprises
and energy companies are currently involved in the
scheme. Together, these companies are res-
It is already clear that the EU will meet ponsible for around 50 per cent of the EU’s
its Kyoto Protocol targets. The 15 EU CO2 emissions. From 2012 the airline industry
countries have in fact managed to re-
duce their emissions by 14 per cent will also be brought into the Emissions Tra-
compared to 1990. ding System.
It is already clear that the EU will meet its Kyoto Protocol

targets. The 15 EU countries have in fact managed to
reduce their emissions by 14 per cent compared to 1990.
The ten new EU members have also either hit or exceeded
their targets, so the EU-27 should have no problem in
meeting their obligations. Only Austria and Italy are having
problems meeting their targets, but this will have little
impact on the overall EU result.6
The EU’s “3 x 20” Energy Targets
In 2007 Europe’s political leaders made another joint

commitment in the area of climate policy. In the framework
of the European Council in March 2007, during Germany’s
EU Presidency, they agreed to an EU Commission proposal
dated January 2007 which set out new climate protection
goals for the EU. This agreement, known as the “20-20-20”
or “3 x 20”, comprises commitments by the EU to reduce its
total energy consumption by 20 per cent through increased
energy efficiency, to reduce its total carbon emissions by
20 per cent and to increase the overall share of renewable
energy in total EU energy to 20 per cent. These targets are
to be achieved by 2020. The share of biofuels should also
increase to 10 per cent. Like the Kyoto Protocol targets,
the contribution of each EU country is to be based on its
economic capability and emissions levels in order to meet
the overall target.
6 | Cf. “EU schafft Kyoto-Ziel: Österreich am weitesten weg”,

Kleine Zeitung, October 12, 2010, http://kleinezeitung.at/
nachrichten/chronik/2514576 (accessed February 2, 2011).
These ambitious goals are the first compulsory targets to

be set anywhere in the world for the time after the expiry
of the Kyoto Agreement in 2012. In this way the EU is
affirming its desire to actively pursue the goal of limiting
global warming levels to two degrees and to continue to
play a leading role in international climate protection.
In order to ramp up global talks, the European Council
approved the EU’s goal to reduce greenhouse gases by 30
per cent compared to 1990 by the year 2020, “as long as
other developed nations commit to similar emission reduc-
tions and the fast-growing emerging nations accept their
responsibilities and make an appropriate contribution”.7
The Climate Summits in Bali and Poznan
In December 2007 the 13th UN Climate Change Conference

was held in Bali, along with the 3rd Meeting of the Parties
to the Kyoto Protocol. The goal of the conference was
to set goals for the negotiations and a timetable for the
successor to the Kyoto Protocol, which expires in 2012.
The conference culminated in the adoption of the “Bali
Action Plan” and the “Bali Road Map”. In this way the
parties agreed to conduct parallel talks until the 2009
Copenhagen Climate Summit on the specific commitments
and contributions of all countries to reduce emissions and
on how to fund them until 2012 and beyond.
The “Bali Action Plan” was aimed at all parties to the climate
convention, which included the USA.8 It stipulated that all
the developed nations should be set similar targets, but no
concrete figures were set for emission reductions. Instead,
a reduction of 25 to 40 per cent by 2020 compared to 1990
was set for developed nations. For the first time, devel-
oping countries also made a commitment to take specific
steps to combat climate change.9
7 | Cf. EU Council, meeting of the European Council, Brussels,

March 8/9, 2007, “Schlussfolgerungen des Vorsitzes,”
7224/1/07 REV 1, CONCL 1, 12.
8 | However, the USA did not ratify the Kyoto Agreement, despite
signing up to it. In 2001 Washington completely withdrew
from the Kyoto process.
9 | Cf. Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation
and Nuclear Safety, “13. Vertragsstaatenkonferenz der Klima-
rahmenkonvention und 3. Vertragsstaatenkonferenz des Kyoto-
Protokolls,” http://www.bmu.de/klimaschutz/internationale_
klimapolitik/13_klimakonferenz/doc/40146 (accessed Febru-
ary 3, 2011).
The aim of the 14th UN Climate Change Conference,

encompassing the 4th Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto
Protocol held in December 2008 in Poznan, Poland, was to
advance negotiations on the successor to the
Progress was made in Poznan, in parti- Kyoto Protocol and make progress towards
cular the establishment of a fund to the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Summit.
give financial assistance to develo-
ping countries in adapting to climate Progress was made, in particular the estab-
change. lishment of a fund to give financial assistance
to developing countries in adapting to climate change. This
included setting up its decision-making structures, finances
and procedures for awarding funds. And with an eye to
Copenhagen, it was agreed to establish an international
safeguard for countries which are particularly affected by
climate change.10 In this way it managed to meet the official
prerequisites for the Copenhagen Agreement. In Poznan
the EU again stressed its commitment to the two-degree
target and the desire to reduce its emissions by 30 per cent
compared to 1990 by 2020, the most ambitious industrial
target of any of the participants.11
The EU Energy and Climate Package
In January 2008 the European Commission presented a

package of measures designed to coordinate the individual
mechanisms of European climate policy and the 20-20-20
targets. France’s EU presidency which began in July 2008
set energy policy as one of its top priorities. In October
the European Parliament approved the energy and climate
package and a final version was agreed by the European
Council at the EU Summit in December 2008, in parallel to
the climate conference in Poznan.
The main focus of the energy and climate package is on

the future form of the EU emissions trading system. In
the run-up to the agreement there was a lot of debate in
Europe about how emission permits could be awarded to
industries which are very energy-intensive or which are
particularly reliant on exports. Companies threatened to
relocate their operations to non-EU countries if they had
to buy all their emission permits at auction. The EU was
determined to avoid this, as it would inevitably lead to
10 | Cf. Christoph Bals, Klimazug im “Tal des Todes” zwischen

Posen und Kopenhagen (Berlin: Germanwatch, 2009), 4 et seq.
11 | Ibid., 9.
increases in emissions (due to “carbon leakage”), so a

compromise was found whereby certain industries were
made exempt from the auction system.
All other sectors of industry were told that, as of 2027

at the latest, emission permits will only be auctioned and
no longer given out free-of-charge. The aim is to reduce
industry emissions by 20 per cent compared to 2005 by
2020. A new phase of emissions trading will commence
in 2013, in which the number of permits will be gradually
reduced. Rising prices should then offer companies an
incentive to stop auctioning permits but instead to invest
in greener and lower-emission technologies.
The emissions trading system encompasses around 50

per cent of all greenhouse gases emitted in the EU. Other
sectors such as agriculture or small industrial operators
have an overall emissions reduction target of
10 per cent by 2020. On top of this, different By 2020 renewable energies must
countries have set their own domestic tar- make a 20 per cent contribution to
electricity and heat production, with
gets. In addition, for the first time binding a parallel 20 per cent drop in overall
targets have been set for the use of renewable energy consumption.
energies: by 2020 renewable energies must
make a 20 per cent contribution to electricity and heat
production, with a parallel 20 per cent drop in overall
energy consumption.
Breaches of the energy and climate package may lead to

the European Court imposing legal sanctions, so it has
more “teeth” than previous international agreements. It
also constitutes a document which the EU can use as a
basis for future international climate talks. Above all, the
energy and climate package proves that climate policy has
become a central theme in the EU, being afforded high
priority even when times are hard. The EU now has to face
up to the challenge of meeting its 20-20-20 targets. The
emissions trading system, with its new phase starting in
2013, will play a critical role in this respect.
Copenhagen
The 15th United Nations Climate Change Conference and

the 5th Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol took
place on December 7 and 8, 2009 in Copenhagen, one year
on from Poznan and the approval of the European energy
and climate package. In line with the “Bali Action Plan”,
negotiations on international climate protection plans
for the period after 2012 should have been concluded in
Copenhagen. However, after some difficult negotiating
the conference ended with nothing more than a political
agreement, the “Copenhagen Accord”, which covered
certain core elements of future climate policy.
In this Accord, the vast majority of countries confirmed

that average global temperatures should not be allowed
to increase by more than two degrees Celsius. But the
conference failed to provide any binding international agree-
ments or any kind of instrument to allow this two-degree
target to be met. The Copenhagen Accord is
China, India and the USA in particular not a legally-binding agreement but just a
were not keen to commit to binding political declaration which is “acknowledged”
agreements. The EU had found the
outcome particularly disappointing. by the party states.12
During the talks, China, India and the USA in particular

were not keen to commit to binding agreements. The EU
had had high hopes of the climate summit and so found
the outcome particularly disappointing. The President of
the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, said at the
end of February 2010 that Europe had been left sitting
in the corridor while the USA and China struck their own
deal. “We were excluded from the crucial deal between the
USA and the four major developing countries.”13 By this he
meant Brazil, India, China and South Africa.
So the Copenhagen Accord clearly lagged behind the goals

set by Germany and the EU. Earlier there had also been

and Nuclear Safety, “UN-Klimakonferenz in Kopenhagen –
7. bis 18. Dezember 2009,” http://www.bmu.de/15_
klimakonferenz/doc/44133 (accessed February 3, 2011).
13 | Cf. address by Hermann Van Rompuy, President of the Euro-
pean Council to the Collège d’Europe, Bruges, February 25,
2010, http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/
pressdata/en/ec/113067.pdf (accessed February 3, 2011).
discussions within the EU about their joint position: the EU

member states were not in agreement about issues such
as the financial assistance to be given by the developed
nations to poorer countries. Even before the summit,
Germany, France and Italy refused to ratify an EU “offer
of funding” which was championed by Britain, Austria and
the Scandinavian countries. From 2020 the developed
countries will be required to provide a total amount of 100
billion Euro per year. The decision was postponed on how
much of this total the EU would fund and how the financial
burden would be distributed among its member states.14
Even though the climate summit ended without any

binding agreement, it should be stressed that the Accord
contains major core elements of climate policy. The
German government has called it a first step towards a
new agreement for the post-2012 period and would like to
implement it without delay. In addition, many developed
and developing countries have inserted voluntary goals and
actions for the reduction of emissions into the Copenhagen
Accord’s appendices. The EU has reiterated its target of
20 per cent fewer emissions than 1990 by 2020 and is
even prepared to raise this figure to 30 per cent if other
developed nations will commit to similar targets.
It was also agreed in Copenhagen that talks on future

climate policy under the Framework Climate Convention
and the Kyoto Protocol should be continued
until the next climate conference in Cancún. The EU is a trailblazer and role model
So even though it was not possible to conclude when it comes to climate policy and
is the driver of international climate
a new agreement, the Copenhagen Climate protection.
Conference was not fruitless. It brought forth
new initiatives which now have to be started. The EU is
still a trailblazer and role model when it comes to climate
policy and is the driver of international climate protection.
It can also prove that converting to a low-emissions, green
economy is both technically possible and economically
advantageous.15
14 | Cf. “Der Klimagipfel in Kopenhagen. Die Streitpunkte der EU,”

Frankfurter Rundschau, October 30, 2009, http://fr-online.de/
wissenschaft/klimawandel/die-streitpunkte-der-eu/-/
1473244/2695124/-/ (accessed February 3, 2011).
15 | Cf. German federal government scientific advisor on global
environmental changes, Klimapolitik nach Kopenhagen. Auf
drei Ebenen zum Erfolg (April 2010), 7.
Climate Talks at Petersberg
At the climate conference in Copenhagen, German Chan-

cellor Angela Merkel announced that Germany would host
an Environment Ministers’ conference in summer 2010. In

view of the fact that Mexico would be hosting the next
climate conference from November 29 to December 10,
2010, the 2010 Environment Ministers’ conference was
jointly chaired by German Environment Minister Norbert
Röttgen and his Mexican colleague Rafael Elvira Quesasa
at the Petersberg in Bonn. The aim of the meeting was to
agree a political position before the next round of talks of
the UN Climate Secretariat which were due to be held from
May 31 to June 11, 2010, also in Bonn.16
Along with the steps to be taken before the next climate

summit in Cancún, other points for discussion were the
goals of a post-Kyoto agreement, funding for international
climate protection, development of emissions trading and
how to slow rainforest destruction in developing countries.
The Environment Ministers of 43 countries came together,
with climate protection initiatives being pre-
Germany’s Environment Minister Rött- sented which showed how developed and
gen promised immediate federal fun- developing nations can work together on cli-
ding to the tune of at least 350 million
Euro for the prevention of deforestation mate change. Germany’s Environment Minis-
in developing countries. ter Norbert Röttgen promised immediate
federal funding to the tune of at least 350
million Euro for the prevention of deforestation in deve-
loping countries. He also announced a further ten million
Euro contribution to the Adaptation Fund to support emer-
ging nations particularly affected by climate change. And
in view of the upcoming climate conference in Cancún, all
the Ministers once again expressed their support for the
two-degree target.17

and Nuclear Safety, “Kurzinformation: Petersberger Klimadia-
log,” April 23, 2010, http://www.bmu.de/petersberger_
konferenz/doc/45912 (accessed February 4, 2011).
and Nuclear Safety, “Röttgen: Neuer Schwung für die internati-
onalen Klimaverhandlungen,” May 4, 2010, http://www.bmu.de/
pressemitteilungen/aktuelle_pressemitteilungen/pm/45967
(accessed February 4, 2011).
Europe 2020
In 2010 the EU continued their efforts in the sphere of

European energy and climate policy. As the Lisbon Strategy
expired in 2010, the European Council adopted a successor
strategy, “Europe 2020”: a new European strategy for

employment and growth. Its aim is to encourage a
greener economy which uses fewer resources and is
more competitive. Up to now the EU has played a leading
role in the area of green technologies, and would like to
maintain and extend this role. In this way Europe can use
resources even more effectively and the EU can become
more competitive.18
Part of the Strategy is to take over the EU’s “20-20-20”

climate and energy package which came into force in
2009. The idea behind this is that an economy which uses
fewer resources has financial advantages. So the European
Commission has calculated savings of 60 billion Euro by
2020 on oil and gas imports. Achieving the goal of using
20 per cent renewable energy by 2020 could result in
600,000 new jobs. And if on top of this the EU’s 20 per
cent increased energy efficiency target is met, this could
mean more than a million new jobs.19
The Europe 2020 goals will be driven forward by seven

European Commission flagship initiatives. The “Resource-
Efficient Europe” initiative in particular contains important
points such as the Commission’s plans to create a single
European electricity grid and smart grids. It
also plans to draw up an action plan on energy Germany has set itself the goal of re-
efficiency and specifically encourage electric ducing its greenhouse gases by 40 per
cent by 2020, but it has not yet set an
mobility. Every member state has to present energy efficiency target.
its domestic targets and planned actions in
support of these plans. Germany has set itself the goal of
reducing its greenhouse gases by 40 per cent compared to
1990 by 2020, but it has not yet set an energy efficiency
target. It is expected that all national programmes will be
18 | Cf. European Commission, “Mitteilung der Kommission: Europa

2020 – Eine Strategie für intelligentes, nachhaltiges und inte-
gratives Wachstum,” March 3, 2010, 17, http://ec.europa.eu/
eu2020/pdf/COMPLET%20%20DE%20SG-2010-80021-06-
00-DE-TRA-00.pdf (accessed February 4, 2011).
19 | Ibid., 18.
announced by spring 2011, at which time Germany will

also have to present its specific target figures.20
In November 2010 the European Commission made a call

for proposals to its member states for the world’s biggest
funding programme for demonstration projects to reduce
CO2 emissions and promote renewable energy technolo-
gies. This initiative, called “NER-300”, will be financed
by the sale of 300 million emissions permits with a value
of 4.5 billion Euro. It will fund at least eight projects for
carbon capture and storage and 34 projects for innovative
renewable energy technologies.
Cancún
The United Nations Climate Change Conference took place

in Cancún, Mexico from November 29 to December 10,
2010, and encompassed the 6th Meeting of the Parties to
the Kyoto Protocol. Most politicians had low
Most politicians had low expectations expectations of the conference after the lack
of the conference in Cancún after the of concrete results in Copenhagen. Connie
lack of concrete results in Copenhagen.
José Manuel Barroso also did not anti- Hedegaard, EU Commissioner for Climate
cipate any legally binding agreement. Action since February 2010, said that she did
not expect an agreement to be made on a
Kyoto successor until 2011. The President of the European
Commission, José Manuel Barroso, also did not anticipate
any legally binding agreement to come out of Cancún.21
In the run-up to the conference the EU Council formulated

its goals for Cancún. The EU wanted specific actions on
emission reduction, adaptation to climate change and
deforestation. This groundwork strengthened the EU’s
negotiating position because it allowed it to push for
concrete and realistic actions during the talks. Before
the summit began the EU also announced its willingness
to extend the term of the Kyoto Protocol. After some
tough negotiations the international community reached
an agreement which – unlike the Kyoto Protocol – also
included the USA, China and other emerging and developing

and Nuclear Safety, Strategie Europa 2020 (September 2010),
http://www.bmu.de/europa_und_umwelt/europa_2020/doc/
6424 (accessed February 4, 2011).
21 | Cf. Christian Hübner, Vor dem Klimagipfel in Cancún (Berlin:
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V., 2010), 8.
countries. The two-degree target was officially recognised

by more than 190 participating countries, providing a basis
for a successor to the Kyoto Protocol. NGOs considered
the acceptance of the two-degree target to be a step in
the right direction towards a new climate change treaty.
Between 2013 and 2015 there will even be an appraisal of
how the targets can be adapted to limit global warming to
1.5 degrees Celsius.
In Cancún Bolivia demanded that the international

community should agree to a maximum global warming
level of 1.1 degrees Celsius. The summit almost collapsed
in the face of Bolivia’s refusal to accept the joint agreement.
Bolivia has announced that it will bring the Cancún
agreement before the International Court in The Hague.
First and foremost, the Kyoto Protocol must be carried

through. The developed countries want to reduce their
emissions by 20 to 40 per cent by 2020; however more
specific targets for emissions reduction will not be set until
the Climate Conference in Durban, South Africa, in 2011.
The USA, China and the developing countries are also
required to declare their reduction targets in the framework
of an agreement. It was also agreed to set up a climate
fund with an initial 30 billion dollars p.a., rising to 100
billion dollars p.a. from 2020. The funds will be managed
by the World Bank and used to link climate change with the
fight against poverty.
As deforestation is responsible for more than 15 per cent

of annual greenhouse gas emissions, an agreement was
made on forest protection under the banner
“Reducing Emissions from Deforestation As deforestation is responsible for more
and Forest Degradation” (REDD+). Under than 15 per cent of annual greenhouse
gas emissions, an agreement was made
the terms of this agreement, the developed on forest protection.
nations will provide finance to help develo-
ping countries protect their forests. This would also partic-
ularly include the interests of indigenous people and the
maintenance of biodiversity. It is to be decided in Durban
in 2011 how this scheme will be funded, whether through
the public purse or as part of an emissions trading system.
German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Environment

Minister Norbert Röttgen judged the Cancún Accord to be
a success and a sign that the UN process was working.
However, Röttgen urged that the EU should set a binding
target of a 30 per cent reduction in emissions by 2020.
Merkel called the results of the conference a step along
the path to a successor agreement to Kyoto. Even Green-
peace said the outcome was a hopeful sign. Nevertheless,
environmental groups such as NABU were critical of the
fact that the USA, Japan, Canada, Australia and China had
hindered the setting of more concrete goals.22
The challenge is now to make the right preparations for the

Climate Conference in South Africa in 2011. This means
that countries have to decide how much they can reduce
their emissions and how much they are prepared to pay
for this. The EU has already held an energy summit on
February 4, 2011.
EU Energy Summit
At the meeting of the European Council, which was also

called the EU Energy Summit, the main focus was on
how to boost sustainable growth which
The main goal which the EU member would create jobs and meet the targets of
states set themselves was to achieve the Europe 2020 strategy. The main goal
the internal energy market by 2014.
It would include combining gas and which the 27 member states set themselves
electricity networks and setting joint was to achieve the internal energy market
technical standards.
by 2014, which would include combining
gas and electricity networks, setting joint technical
standards for electric vehicles and developing smart grids
and meters. Investment in energy efficiency should also
increase the EU’s competitiveness, enhance its energy
security and help achieve sustainability with minimum
outlay. It was once again emphasised that it is crucial to
meet the target of 20 per cent more energy efficiency by
2020. In order to hit this target, the Council will review
the European Commission’s new Action Plan for Energy
Efficiency and if necessary expand it by adding further
22 | Cf. “Klimakonferenz: In den Jubel mischt sich Jammer,”

Focus Online, December 11, 2010, http://www.focus.de/
wissen/wissenschaft/klima/weltklimakonferenz-2010/
klimakonferenz-in-den-jubel-mischt-sich-jammer_aid_
580806 (accessed February 5, 2011).
points.23 Particular emphasis will be placed on investments

in renewable energy sources and safe and sustainable low-
carbon technologies.
In its conclusions, the European Council The European Council advocated dra-
advocated drawing up a “Roadmap for a low wing up a “Roadmap for a low carbon
economy 2050” in order to follow the
carbon economy 2050” in order to follow recommendations of the World Climate
the recommendations of the World Climate Council.
Council. According to its estimates, the
developed countries will need to reduce their greenhouse
gas emissions by 80 to 90 per cent compared to 1990
by 2050 – something which will require a “revolution in
energy systems”.24
Outlook
The goal of reducing emissions by 80 to 90 per cent by

2050 presents the world with an enormous challenge for
the future, as the Kyoto Protocol only covers the first five
per cent of this target. The EU has traditionally been a
trailblazer in the area of climate policy, but in order to live
up to this reputation and make an effective contribution to
the fight against global warming it still has several hurdles
to overcome.
The EU must continue to set itself ambitious goals which

give companies in Europe a real incentive to innovate and
invest in green technologies. The financial and economic
crisis has led to a reduction in greenhouse emissions
amongst the industry sectors involved in the emissions
trading scheme. But in turn the price for emissions permits
has dropped so low that there is currently little incentive
for companies to invest in green jobs and technologies. The
EU needs to adapt its emissions reduction targets to reflect
these changes and set itself the goal of reducing emissions
23 | In November 2010 Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger

presented a 10-year plan for the EU’s energy policy. In it he
warned that the EU would not be able to hit its energy-saving
targets without using nuclear energy. See: “EU: Energiegipfel
über das neue Zeitalter – Teil 2”, Greenmag, January 12, 2011,
http://greenmag.de/magazin/meldung/datum/2011/01/12/
alles-fuer-sonne-wind-wasser-und-atom-1.html (accessed
February 5, 2011).
24 | Cf. EU Council, Meeting of the European Council, Brussels,
February 4, 2011, “Schlussfolgerungen,” EUCO 2/11, CO EUR
2 CONCL 1, 1-6.
by 30 per cent by 2020. This would cost very little more

than the previous 20 per cent target25, but would boost
the EU’s credibility in international climate
If the EU succeeds in showing that it talks and put the European economy in
is possible to convert to a green eco- a good position for the future. At the
nomy without loss of prosperity it will
also benefit from its position in econo- moment the EU is the market leader in green
mic terms. technologies. If it succeeds in showing the
international community that it is possible to convert to a
green economy without loss of prosperity it will also benefit
hugely from its position in economic terms.
Yet even if the EU achieves all its targets, it still has to rely
on the support of the international community. Climate
change can only be effectively combated if the biggest
polluters – particularly the USA, China and India – are
willing to reduce their emissions. The next chance for
an international agreement will be at the UN Climate
Conference in Durban in December 2011. Until then, every
country must accept to make concessions in order to make
it possible to agree on a successor to the Kyoto Protocol.
Previous climate summits have shown that small steps

are of particular importance when it comes to interna-
tional climate negotiations. Most participants travelled
to the Copenhagen summit with high hopes, but the EU
left the conference disappointed that the USA, China,
India and some other countries were not willing to share
the Europeans’ ambitious goals. Most participants then
travelled to Cancún with low expectations but with specific
proposals for small steps forward. This led to a joint
agreement which was supported by all the participating
countries.
As trailblazer in climate policy, the EU has to continue

to pursue ambitious goals but must also be aware that
climate change is not afforded the same importance in
other countries. In order to encourage countries like the
25 | Estimates suggest that an increase to 30 per cent would only

cost an extra 11 billion Euro compared to the original 20 per
cent figure. This represents less than 0.1 per cent of the EU’s
economic output. And the cost of delaying is high: the Inter-
national Energie Agency (IEA) estimates that delays in inves-
ting in low-carbon energy sources worlwide incurs annual
costs of 300 to 400 billion Euro. See: “30 Prozent weniger
Emissionen bis 2020,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, July 15,
2010, http://faz.net/-01d9g0 (accessed February 8, 2011).
USA to get on board, the EU will have to be willing to make

compromises. On an international level, Europe needs to be
seen as a role model, not as a teacher. If it manages this,
then more important progress may be made in Durban in
the fight against climate change. But it remains to be seen
whether this will be sufficient to succeed in limiting global
warming to two degrees Celsius in the long-term.
Paper finished on February 11, 2011. The article has been

translated from the German.
Emerging powers
The IBSA states as partners and leaders in
a future global Climate Change regime 1
Romy Chevallier
Romy Chevallier is
1
Senior Researcher
for the Governance The global challenge of climate change is well beyond the
of Africa’s Resources
capacity of any one country or region to tackle alone. Given
Programme at the
South African Institute the magnitude and scale of what is required in response
of International Affairs to its impacts, collective action from the developed and
(SAIIA) in Johannes-
developing world is the only way forward. India, Brazil
burg.
and South Africa, the so-called IBSA states, are becoming
increasingly significant global actors and strategic partners
in global environmental governance. As a result of impor-
tant changes in the global geo-political landscape and their
growing political and economic importance, there is a need
to recognize the important contribution of these countries
towards a more equitable global climate change regime.
As these countries have tremendous domestic challenges
to deal with, it is interesting to explore new areas of
engagement between traditional actors and new partners
on issues of international concern.
IBSA member states share similar challenges of dealing

simultaneously with energy security, climate change and
socio-economic development. These common policy issues
have become key pillars around which these governments
seek potential allies and appropriate forums of dialogue
with key Southern partners. IBSA’s cooperation on the
mitigation agenda is particularly timely and significant
1 | A version of this paper was originally prepared for “New

directions in the ‘South’? Assessing the Importance and
Consequences of the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue
Forum (IBSA) to International Relations”, IUPERJ, June 23-24,
2008, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Within this chapter, the author
has also referred to work she has completed within a SAIIA
publication called Climate Change and Trade (in the process
of being published).
given that the second phase of the Kyoto Protocol is

currently being negotiated, with the next round of talks
on the Bali Roadmap to take place in Durban in December
2011. The next phase will entail penalties for the non-
compliance of mitigation actions by big emitters. In this
regard, large developing economies are faced with signifi-
cant mitigation and development challenges.
It is thus important and particularly timely Beyond the climate mitigation agenda,
to strengthen and extend the dialogue and it is important to consider the role of
IBSA in influencing the adaptation agen-
partnership among fossil-fuel producing and da. It is essential that they engage
consuming countries. proactively in this debate.
Beyond the climate mitigation agenda, it is important to

consider the role of IBSA in influencing the adaptation
agenda. Given that developing countries will be the most
vulnerable to the negative impacts of climate change and
its variability2, it is essential that they engage proactively
in this debate, seeking methods of increased resilience and
financing for their own societies but also of their respective
regions. This vulnerability is a function of the interaction
between socio-economic challenges that face all devel-
oping countries: endemic poverty; the reliance of sectors
that are susceptible to climate fluctuations, the limited
access to capital and global markets; poor governance;
ecosystem degradation; complex disaster and conflicts;
and rapid urbanisation and over-population – all of which
will undermine a communities’ ability to adapt to climate
change, and increase the risk of impoverishment.3 These
shared economic, developmental and security implica-
tions have therefore generated a perceptible shift in the
way that decision-makers in the South are talking about
climate change, as well as in the way they are beginning to
cooperate at a myriad of levels.
2 | 2007 Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), the UN’s Intergovern-

mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and UNDP, Fighting
Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World, Human
Development Report, 2007/08 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2007) 18–19.
3 | Boko, Niang, Nyong, Vogel, Githeko et al., Climate Change
2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, Contribution of
Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
IBSA and the reduction of greenhouse gases:

Forging a common Southern position
The mitigation of greenhouse gases (GHG) presents a

common challenge to all emerging Southern economies
whose energy profiles are predominantly made up of
cheap coal-based energy. Developing countries “have
a substantial role to play in GHG emission reductions,
as future emissions are likely to be dominated by the
growth in developing countries”.4 In the current round of
climate change negotiations there is increasing pressure
on non-Annex I5 polluters to initiate their own mitigation
strategies and to participate actively and responsibly in the
post 2012 climate change regime. However, considering
the immediate development challenges that all developing
countries face, constrained economic growth (by reducing
their dependence on cheap coal) will present an additional
burden to these countries.
It is also important that developing countries forge a

common position on climate change to ensure that the
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
negotiations in December seek some form of resolve – a
new multilateral agreement that is equitable and repre-
sents the development concerns of the developing world.
Emphasis should therefore be placed on the following
key issues: deeper cuts in GHG emissions in the North;
international support of development through additional
finance; the adequate transfer of technology and capacity
building; deforestation and incentive mechanisms for best
practice; and the paying for those having to adapt to the
adverse impacts of climate change. A common Southern
position on these issues would give the developing world
more leverage in the negotiations to encourage ‘common
but differentiated responsibilities’ from that of the historical
emitters in the North. Coordinated positions in the form of
an alliance (IBSA, BASIC or other) and further unilateral
4 | Professor Winkler from South Africa’s Energy Research Centre,

quoted after Tyrer, “Rough Road: South Africa’s path on the
steep and rocky road to Copenhagen”, Engineering News,
February 2009, 20-26.
5 | ‘Non-Annex countries’ is a classification by the UNFCCC that
refers to countries in the developing world that due to imme-
diate development and socio-economic constraints do not
have legal obligations to reduce GHG emissions in this Kyoto
period (2008-2012).
and voluntary commitments by large developing economies

would encourage a more ambitious global agreement6 and
put further pressure on the United States, Canada, Japan,
and Australia, and hold other big GHG emitters to account.
Developing countries collaboration on climate change

can also exist at numerous levels beyond a commitment
at the multilateral level. Large developing economies
should show leadership nationally and in
their regions, and continue unabated with The IBSA countries should collaborate
innovative approaches to protect themselves on ways and means to reduce overall
carbon emissions by highlighting the
and the global environment. It is essential, potential economic benefits of a green
for example, that IBSA countries improve the economy.
accuracy and availability of their scientific
projections and relevant data. It is essential that they
understand their vulnerabilities and prepare for the impacts
of climate change. These countries should also collaborate
on ways and means to reduce overall carbon emissions
by highlighting the potential economic benefits of a green
economy.
Cooperation to further improve climate

projections and predictions
Developing countries have been ill-prepared and slow at

developing effective ‘early warning’ systems and response
measures to the impacts of climate change. Cooperation
in the development of more substantial climate data and
analysis capabilities is essential to project climate variability
and to analyse its potential impact on vulnerable sectors.
Data collection and analysis can be done at a national level
with the assistance of international partners – for example
in the construction of meteorological stations and in the
training of human resources in this capacity, or at an inter-
national level through the cooperation on the provision of
scientific data and climate information.
According to the CSIR’s Project on Natural Resources

and the Environment (South Africa), Australia is the only
country in the southern hemisphere to have developed a
coupled global climate model, that is, a model that can be
6 | “G8 Climate Scorecards 2009,” Commissioned by Allianz and

WWF, July 2009, authors included: Hohne, Eisbrenner,
Hagemann and Moltmann.
used to predict global climate change. Australia is therefore

also the only country to have contributed such predictions
to the Assessment Report 4 (AR4) of the UN’s Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and been part of
the broader debate on climate variability in the southern
hemisphere. All other countries in the geographical South
depend on the North to provide them with global climate
change predictions. More active involvement by southern
hemisphere oceanographers, climatologists, terrestrial
ecologists and modellers in coupled model development
is critically needed, in order to improve the simulations of
southern hemisphere circulation dynamics.
Brazil and South Africa have recently There is an urgent need for developing
made progress in developing coupled countries to collectively establish centres of
climate models capable of making pro-
jections of global change. expertise and best practice in this regard.
Brazil and South Africa have recently made
progress in developing coupled climate models capable of
making projections of global change. This raw data and
sufficient knowledge gathering and generation would
substantially add to the process of understanding the
science of climate change, making climate predictions
more accurate and relevant to their respective regions.
Cooperation on a climate mitigation agenda
The biggest emitters of carbon dioxide in absolute terms

are located not only in the rich world but also in rapidly
emerging economies. According to the 2008 International
Energy Outlook, emerging countries are now producing
more than 50 per cent of global carbon dioxide emissions
(2007 figure).7 Rapid economic growth, a large manufac-
turing sector and a rapidly expanding population have
resulted in China overtaking the USA as the biggest
polluter.8 Brazil and India have also leapt up the emission
7 | In 2030 carbon dioxide emissions from China and India

combined are projected to account for 34 per cent of total
world emissions, with China alone responsible for 28 per cent
of the world total. Energy Information Administration of the
U.S. Department of Energy, International Energy Outlook 2008,
Washington, D.C., June 2008, http://eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/pdf/
0484(2008).pdf (accessed March 8, 2011).
8 | Euromonitor: Energy Information Administration of the U.S.
Department of Energy, December 2010, http://euromonitor.
com/Mapping_global_pollution_The_worlds_biggest_polluters
ranks as their economies have continued to grow. These

statistics prove that large polluting developing economies
have a global responsibility to reduce their emissions and
find ethical, sustainable and equitable solutions.
However, it must be noted that these figures do not accu-

rately reflect the inverse relationship between the respon-
sibility for climate change and the vulnerability to its
effects. They do not take account, for example, of the
historical contribution of GHG emissions by developed
countries, nor do they take into account
the current level of development, economic IBSA member states and China have
growth, population or industrialisation by insisted on climate equity in the UNFCCC
negotiations. India and China support
developing countries9. It is understandable an “equal per-capita basis with accoun-
therefore that the IBSA member states and ting for historical responsibility”.
China have insisted on climate equity in the
UNFCCC negotiations. India and China support an “equal
per-capita basis with accounting for historical respon-
sibility” in the international negotiations. South Africa,
with one of the highest emissions per capita ratios in the
developing countries, insists more on National Appropriate
Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) – taking developing countries
economic and development levels into account.
Stringent mitigation commitments are often seen in tension

with development priorities, as the majority of emissions
from the developing world are derived from the energy and
transport sectors, both of which are essential to sustain
national economic development. Electricity produced from
fossil fuels (such as coal, which is found in relative abun-
dance in many African and Asian countries) produces high
GHG emissions, but provides power at a comparatively
low cost.10 South Africa’s most profitable sectors are,
for example, highly carbon-intensive, and 90 per cent
of its electricity production is from coal. Changing South
9 | The now developed countries emitted three times as much

fossil-fuel CO2 between 1850 and 2002 as did the now deve-
loping countries (Baumert, Herzog et al., 2005). Developed
countries have reached their targets of development and
industrialisation without carbon constraints. Developing coun-
tries need the space to develop to meet the basic needs of
their populations.
10 | The current level of proven coal reserves worldwide stands
at roughly 850 billion tonnes, about 50 billion of which occur
in Africa. Coal is much more widely distributed geographically
than any other fossil fuel.
Africa’s development path to one that is more carbon-

efficient would be extremely costly, and present numerous
challenges in the security of short-term electricity supply.
This apparent conflict between the needs of addressing

climate change and fostering development objectives
therefore presents a dilemma for democratic governance
throughout the developing world, as the body politic in
each country will have to agree to pay hefty initial costs
for mitigation and adaptation programmes, with a view
to reaping long-term gains. This will require leaders to
look beyond electoral cycles and educate
Efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate their communities – particularly those most
variability should be presented as vulnerable. It is thus imperative that efforts
complementary to the broader econo-
mic agendas of developing countries. to mitigate and adapt to climate variability
should be presented as complementary to
the broader economic agendas of developing countries,
and that they should not be seen as impeding wider
development objectives. As the Institute of Development
Studies reasons, “if climate change policies are to have
any chance of achieving the political support from leaders
necessary for implementation, climate policies will have to
be ‘development-led’”.11
For these reasons and others it is important for developing

countries to look for areas of cooperation on climate change
that promotes economic development. They therefore need
to take advantage of the economic opportunities apparent
in a path towards a low carbon trajectory. This would mean
collectively investing in the research and development of
clean energy projects through the transfer of renewable
sources of energy and clean technologies.
Developing countries collaboration

on an adaptation agenda
Irrelevant of the negotiated outcomes that succeed the

Kyoto Protocol, all countries will need to adapt to the
changes that a global warming climate will force on them.
Mitigation efforts cannot exist alone and must be comple-
mented by adaptation measures. Adaptation refers to
the various means used to address the vulnerability of
11 | Institute for Development Studies, “Climate change adapta-

tion”, IDS In-Focus, 2, November 2007.
developing countries to climatic changes and its associated

effects, both in the present and the future.12 As noted
earlier, particularly within the LDC context, a country’s
vulnerability depends not only on climate variability
itself, but also on its government’s ability to increase
efficiency in the usage of natural resources and energy
supplies. Financial, technical and institutional support and
capacity-building are often needed to assist
poor nations to switch to more sustainable Even the most conservative figures
development pathways. While cost estimates estimate a loss of 0-3 per cent of glo-
bal gross domestic product annually
are rudimentary and subject to uncertainty by the time the temperature has risen
in the cases of individual countries, even the 2-3 degrees Celsius.
most conservative figures estimate a loss
of 0-3 per cent of global gross domestic product (GDP)
annually by the time the temperature has risen 2-3 degrees
Celsius.13 According to the Stern Review, inaction – that is,
not taking any steps towards adaptation – could cost up
to five trillion U.S. Dollar globally. Stern further predicts
that the losses incurred if high-emission countries continue
with a ‘business as usual’ approach could reach 5-20 per
cent of world GDP annually.14
Developing countries (particularly the Small Island and

Least Developed Countries) are the most vulnerable to
these impacts, and most of them are already facing climate-
related stresses, such as an increase in water scarcity and
vector-borne diseases, an increase in the frequency and
intensity of extreme weather conditions, unpredictability
in rainfall and a decrease in crop yields. As a result, all
developing countries will need to build the capacity of their
national and regional governments to address these climate
risks, by inter alia, ensuring better water management,
promoting agricultural development and developing more
effective disaster management and early warning systems.
Sharing knowledge on best practice adaptation strategies
can be crucial for urban planning and the construction of
climate-resilient infrastructure.
12 | Romy Chevallier, “Integrating adaptation into development

strategies: The Southern African perspective in Climate and
Development,” Earthscan, Vol. 2, Issue 2, 2010, 191-193.
13 | John Llewellyn, The Business of Climate Change: Challenges
and Opportunities, Lehman Brothers, February 2007,
http://lehman.com/press/pdf_2007/TheBusinessOfClimate
Change.pdf (accessed March 8, 2011).
14 | Nicholas Stern, Stern Review on the Economics of Climate
Change (London, Cambridge, 2006).
Effective adaptation of the kind required is costly and

involves not only significant investment in research,
awareness-raising and capacity-building, but practical
measures such as the ‘climate-proofing’ of infrastructure
projects. Adaptation therefore requires substantial and
predictable financial support from partners to help meet
the additional costs. According to a ‘guesstimate’ by the
UN Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Develop-
ment Report, poor countries may need as much as 86
billion U.S. Dollar a year in additional financing by 2015 to
help them adapt to the consequences of climate change.15
The report also states that in the same period “at least 44
billion U.S. Dollar will be required annually for the climate-
proofing of development investments”.16 This
The international response to climate adds to the financial and human burden on
change adaptation has thus far fallen the already strained resources of developing
short on all fronts. Several financing
mechanisms have been created but economies. The international response to
only limited amounts have been paid climate change adaptation has thus far fallen
out.
short on all fronts. Several dedicated multi-
lateral financing mechanisms have been created but only
limited amounts have been paid out by these mechanisms.
To date, IBSA has been vocal on the urgency of this matter

and the inadequate response thus far from the North. It
is important that they remain engaged in this regard and
that they collectively call for improved commitments by
developed nations to move the debate beyond rhetoric, and
instead set out specific obligations on the donor community
and stringent time frames for implementation in recipient
countries. IBSA could lead the discussion on adaptation
financing by voluntarily making a financial contribution to
the Adaptation Fund (which essentially contributes to the
development in their respective regions). IBSA could also
potentially use its existing Development Fund to highlight
areas of co-benefit – while pursuing development-related
projects. It will deal with issues related to climate adap-
tation.
15 | UNDP, n. 2, 194.
16 | Ibid., “Summary”, 25; these are 2005 figures.
Table 1
Voluntary pledges to the Copenhagen Accord
by countries
India 20-25 per cent reduction in carbon intensity

(carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP) by
2020 in comparison to 2005 levels
South Africa Reduce emissions by 34 per cent and 42 per cent

below B.A.U for 2020 and 2025 respectively
(conditional of funding)
Brazil Reduce emissions by 39 per cent by 2020

compared with B.A.U
Source: UNFCCC website. Nationally appropriate mitigation actions

of developing country Parties. 2010. http://unfccc.int/home/items/
5265.php (accessed March 8, 2011)
Key developing countries and their future

role a Global Climate Change Regime
Despite the common challenge of climate change, countries

act and react to the negotiations primarily from a national
standpoint. It would be naïve to expect countries to be
driven by anything less than domestic stakeholders, national
interests and local realities. Therefore in order to make
progress in coalitions of climate change and to advance
the global agenda in this regard, it is perhaps practical to
focus on the less contentious issues and to make progress
first on “low-hanging fruit” areas. Common positions can
be forged at a myriad of levels, on a number of issues,
to show tangible and concrete effort towards
achieving a common goal, while gathering Many countries in Africa are dependent
momentum. Many countries in Africa, for on fossil fuels. They can gain tremen-
dous experience from participating in
example, are still dependent on fossil fuels cooperative alliances with industria-
for their primary source of their electricity lised countries.
supply. These countries can gain tremendous
experience from participating in cooperative alliances with
industrialised countries, especially when attempting to
reform their energy policies through renewable energy and
carbon efficient technologies. Large developing countries
have also shown initiative and demonstrated progress
towards a low-carbon future, fast becoming important
manufacturers of renewable energy technologies. Devel-

oping countries have also inscribed voluntary emission
reduction commitments (Table 1) and are in the process of
developing national plans to implement mitigation actions,
including further renewable energy targets (Table 2).
Table 2
Renewable energy targets implemented
in selected developing countries
Country Renewable Target Progress
India 10 per cent of power generation On track to meet or exceed RE target, having
by 2012 already achieved 8 per cent in 2009
Brazil Maintain 46 per cent by 2020 Maintain this share
China 10 per cent by 2010 and 15 By 2006 having achieved 8 per cent of its pri-
per cent by 2020 mary energy production from RE. Now scaling
up wind and solar to meet these goals
Source: Renewables 2007: Global Status Report and REN21:

RE Policy Network for 21st Century (2007)
India
With 17 per cent of the world’s population, India contributes

only 4.6 per cent of the world’s GHG emissions and its per
capita emissions of 1.5 tonnes carbon dioxide equivalent
are far below the word average. However, in absolute
terms India is the fourth largest emitter and emissions are
quickly increasing to rapid economic growth, population
expansion and urbanisation.17 Coal is the mainstay of India’s
energy economy, and coal-based power plants account for
two-thirds of the total electric generation installed capacity
of 135,000 MW. In 2003-2004 coal accounted for 62
per cent of India’s share of energy production, while oil
accounted for only 36 per cent.18
17 | WWF Report 2010, Emerging Economies: How the developing

world is starting a new era of climate change leadership,
November 2010, http://assets.panda.org/downloads/emerging_
economies_report_nov_2010.pdf (accessed March 25, 2011).
18 | Climate Brief 2, India’s Climate Change Policy and Trade
Concerns: Issues, Barriers and Solutions, Centre for Trade
and Development.
India has made progress towards climate-friendly measu-

res, particularly in the area of renewable energy and
clean coal technology. Today, India has the fourth largest
installed wind capacity in the world, currently producing
7,000 MW of wind energy.19 In 2009, renewable energy
power accounted for more than 8 per cent of the total power
generation capacity in India.20 The Indian government has
also been seen to be proactive in terms of
using market mechanisms and incentive The Indian government has been pro-
schemes to encourage independent power active in terms of using market mecha-
nisms and incentive schemes to encou-
producers to feed on to the national grid. rage independent power producers to
The necessary regulatory policies have been feed on to the national grid.
put in place to facilitate this movement and
encourage the reduction of India’s energy intensity by 20
per cent per unit of GDP between 2007-2008 and 2016-2017
as stated in the 11th Five Year Plan (2006-2012). In mid
2008 India also adopted an ambitious National Action Plan
on Climate Change (NAPCC) on mitigation, adaptation and
strategic knowledge integration.21
However, like South Africa, India’s government is deter-

mined that its national climate and energy-related policies
are to have no adverse impact on its GDP growth. India
still experiences severe developmental challenges with
approximately 55 per cent of India’s population still without
access to commercial energy (600 million people) and 70
per cent of the Indian population still cook with traditional
biomass.22 It is expected that economic growth will bring
a transition to these sources of household energy and that
as a result India’s emissions from power generation are
expected to increase six-fold by 2030 23
as India’s service
sector expands substantially.
19 | “India: Addressing Energy Security and Climate Change,”

Ministry of Environment and Forests and Ministry of Power
Bureau of Energy Efficiency, Government of India, 10/2007.
20 | WWF Report 2010, n. 16.
21 | Prasad and Kochhner, “Climate change and India – Some major
issues and policy implications,” Department of Economic
Affairs and Ministry of Finance, Government of India, Working
Paper No. 2/2009-DEA, March 2009.
22 | E. Somanathan, “What do we expect from an international
climate agreement? A perspective from a low-income country,”
December 2008, Discussion Paper 08-27, 11, The Harvard
Project on International Climate Agreements, Harvard Kennedy
School, Indian Statistical Institute.
23 | “Melting Asia-China, India and climate change,” The Economist
(U.S.), June 5, 2008.
Brazil
Brazil’s energy sector contributes little to the country’s

GHG emissions, with low emissions intensity for electricity
generation due to the extensive use of hydropower. Three-
quarters of its emissions result from deforestation and
unsustainable land use – as agricultural frontiers expand
mainly in the Amazon region. Land use is this regard is
mainly for large soybean plantations and cattle rearing.
Brazil’s emissions from raising cattle are also substantial.
As a result, energy emissions per person are relatively low
(1.8 per cent in 2004).24
Brazil maintains that annual emissions should not be

seen as a proxy for a country’s responsibility for climate
change. This responsibility, it argues, is more
Brazil argues that a country’s respon- closely related to the historical contributions
sibility for climate change is closely of economies to the global temperature
related to the historical contributions
to the global temperature increase. increase – since CO2 remains in the atmos-
phere for more than one century on average.
As a result, in international negotiations, Brazil has refused
to accept emission targets before the middle of the century.
Nevertheless, Brazil has developed a National Plan for

Climate Change (PNMC) in December 2008 as well as an
impressive track record in the renewable energies sector.
According to Brazil’s Ministry of Mines and Energy, 46 per
cent of Brazil’s primary energy is generated from renewable
sources. In 2002, the Brazilian Congress approved a law
aiming to establish a compulsory market for renewable
energy. The programme called PROINFA helps independent
power producers feed power from renewables into the
national electricity grid (including electricity-generating
capacity based on biomass, small hydro power plants and
wind power). This coupled with President Lula’s incen-
tives to increase the attractiveness of private investment
in hydropower-generation, has resulted in 85 per cent of
Brazil’s electricity generation from hydropower.25 Brazil’s
24 | However, Brazil’s industrial emissions are relatively carbon

intensive – as iron and steel, cement, aluminum, chemical,
petrochemical, pulp and paper, transportation are its main
contributing sectors and they are heavily reliant on fossil fuels.
25 | International Energy Outlook 2010, U.S. Energy Information
Administration, http://eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/electricity.html
National Ethanol Programme has also become the largest

commercial application of biomass for producing and using
energy in the world. This Programme demonstrates the
feasibility of large-scale ethanol production from sugarcane
in producing automotive fuels.26
Brazil, home to one of the greatest ecosystems and forests

(carbon sink) of the planet, has established a multi-agency
program to combat the deforestation of the Amazon using a
satellite monitoring system. From 2005-2007 this resulted
in a 52 per cent reduction of the rate of deforestation.27
Brazil has also adopted a National Plan for the Prevention
and Combat of Deforestation which aims to reduce defores
tation in the Amazon region by 70 per cent by 2017.28
South Africa
South Africa is the 13th largest carbon dioxide emitter

globally (from energy related CO2) with emissions per
capita ratio only slightly below industrialised
countries, and well above the developing Emissions from energy supply and use
country average. Emissions from energy constitute by far the largest part of
South Africa’s total emissions. Coal is
supply and use constitute by far the largest the backbone of the country’s economy.
part of South Africa’s total emissions (91 per
cent) – 40 per cent of these emissions accounted for by
electricity generation from Eskom’s coal-fired stations.29
Coal is the backbone of the economy of South African, the
fourth largest coal producer in the world.
26 | La Rovere and Pereira, “Brazil and Climate Change: a country

profile,” Policy Briefs, Science and Development Network,
February 14, 2007, http://www.scidev.net/en/policy-briefs/
brazil-climate-change-a-country-profile.html (accessed March
18, 2011).
27 | This forms part of a speech “Climate Change as a Global
Challenge” delivered by the Director-General of the Depart-
ment of the Environment and Special Themes of the Ministry
of External Relation, Minister Machado, Embassy of Brazil in
London. ‘Climate Change Policy’, August 2007.
28 | It must be noted that the deforestation is not a priority for
other IBSA countries. While forests make up 57.2 per cent of
Brazil’s total land, they only make up 21.2 per cent of China’s
total land, 22.8 per cent of India’s, 33.7 per cent of Mexico’s
and 7.6 per cent of South Africa’s (FOA, 2006, Global Forest
Resources Assessment 2005, Rome).
29 | Eskom, Annual Report 2008, http://financialresults.co.za/
eskom_ar2008/ar_2008/downloads/eskom_ar2008.pdf
South Africa has produced a Long-Term Mitigation

Scenario’s response (LTMS), initiated in 2006, aimed to
formulate a long-term climate policy for South Africa and
an appropriate framework for climate action, based on
the most effective mitigation options available. This study
resulted in various scenarios and strategic options for
South Africa, and also considered mitigation potentials and
cost-effectiveness of different interventions. In July 2008,
South Africa’s cabinet considered the outputs of the LTMS
work and adopted a National Climate Framework laying out
the government’s vision, strategic direction and framework
for long-term climate policy. The framework commits the
government to a “peak, plateau and decline” trajectory for
the country’s future GHG emissions: an emissions peaking
between 2020/25, then stabilising for a decade, before
declining in absolute terms towards mid-century (peak,
plateau and decline).30 This would include, for example,
a change in South Africa’s fuel mix as three quarters of
South African fuel is dependent on coal.31 Its energy mix
is currently being debated within its Integrated Resource
Plan (IRP II).
Despite these ambitious strategies South Africa places its

national poverty reduction strategies as its major concern.
For the foreseeable future, at least, South Africa will remain
dependant on coal-based electricity. Approximately 27 per
cent of its population is still without access to modern
energy, and the majority of its emissions are from sectors
that are essential to sustain its economic growth and
reduce poverty levels. South Africa also supplies electricity
to many of its neighbouring countries.
South-South cooperation in advanced

research, science and technology
At the recent Energy Ministers meeting in May 2009,

the Energy Ministers of the G8 and G13 issued a Joint
Statement as part of their new International Partnership of
30 | Romy Chevallier, “South Africa’s Dilemma: Reconciling Energy-

Climate Challenges with Global Climate Responsibilities,”
chapter 6 in: Climate Change and Trade: The Challenges for
Southern Africa, SAIIA, 2010.
31 | This culminated in the 2nd National Climate Change Summit
of March 2009, with a hope that the LTMS will be translated
into a White Paper in November 2009.
Energy Efficiency Cooperation (IPEEC) that calls for “accel-

erating the demonstration, development and deployment
of low-emission energy technologies, including renewable
energy sources, smart grid systems and energy storage,
refurbishment of power generating facilities and cogene
ration, sustainable mobility and low-emission transport
vehicles, advancing demonstration of carbon capture
and storage (CCS) and nuclear energy”.32 There was a
further call for the ‘coordination of efforts in research,
development, demonstration and deployment of these
low emissions technologies, enabling effective sharing
of knowledge on key technologies’, and particularly the
promotion of the increased use of renewables. This would
include, for example, ‘improving the policy and regulatory
framework to boost investment in renewable energies,
while promoting their deployment and diffusion throughout
all countries’.
Yvo de Boer, former executive secretary of the UNFCCC,

says that getting technology transfer policies right must
be one of the central planks of a new international climate
policy. He mentions CCS in this regard – particularly for
countries with a reliance on coal.33 He also
mentions the increased use of renewables “Both China and India have become
but says that we need to design mechanisms major producers of renewable sources
of energy, so it’s not a matter of techno-
that make joint research and development logy being in the North.” (Yvo de Boer)
between rich and poor countries possible:
“Both China and India have become major producers
of renewable sources of energy, so it’s not a matter of
technology being in the North. It’s more a matter of finding
affordable ways for developing countries to get access to
that technology.”34
One must be aware, however, that there are substantial

economic, social and political hurdles to overcome with the
introduction, transfer and dissemination of technology in
32 | Joint Statement by the G8 Energy Ministers, the European

Energy Commissioner, the Energy Ministers of Brazil, China,
Egypt, India, Korea, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa.
Session I, Italy, May 2009.
33 | “Carbon Capture and Storage Bulletin: A summary of the
High-level conference on fighting climate change with carbon
capture and storage,” published by the International Institute
for Sustainable Development, Vol. 163, No. 1, June 1, 2009.
34 | Interview of Yvo de Boer conducted by Science and Develop-
ment Network, December 1, 2008.
the developing world. These include the lack of technical

capacity to utilise introduced technologies, lack of appro-
priate laws and regulations, defective administrative struc-
tures, and insufficiently developed market conditions.35
Also, those that own the technology need to be protected
by appropriate intellectual property rights. An international
arbitration or insurance scheme must be set up in the IBSA
countries in order to guarantee technology holders’ their
rights.
Seizing opportunities from the global

transition to a low carbon economy
In order to promote the participation of various stake-

holders, particularly in the developing world, it is impera-
tive to emphasise the economic opportunities offered
by mitigation and adaptation projects, for example by
emphasising the profitability of the environmental goods
and services industry (which includes renewable resources
and energy-efficient technology), as well as through Clean
Development Mechanism projects. Southern leaders and
businesspeople are largely unaware that this industry is
worth approximately 600 billion U.S. Dollar globally, and
is growing at a rapid rate. Also, its strong potential for
job creation generally outperforms that of
If South Africa reaches 15 per cent traditional energy and carbon-intensive
generating capacity from renewable industries. Clean technology is positioned to
energy, it will create 34,000 direct
jobs by 2020. become the fifth largest sector in terms of
job creation and investment.36 In Germany,
for example, wind farms are estimated to have created
40,000 jobs. It has also been estimated that if South Africa
reaches 15 per cent generating capacity from renewable
energy, it will create 34,000 direct jobs by 2020. While
generating 5,700 MW of solar photovoltaic power would
create 680 full-time jobs and 8,800 construction jobs.
The International Energy Agency estimates that about 45

trillion U.S. Dollar will be needed to develop and deploy
35 | “Energy efficiency, technology and climate change: The Japa-

nese experience,” chapter 8 in “Climate Change negotiations:
Can Asia change the game?”, Loh, Stevenson and Tay (eds.),
Civic Exchange 2008.
36 | L. Tyrer, “Rough Road: South Africa’s path on the steep and
rocky road to Copenhagen,” Engineering News, February 20-
26, 2009, 84.
new, clean technologies between now and 2050. Although

the number of cleaner and more energy-efficient coal-fired
generation plants and the retirement of fuel sources using
older technologies has accelerated over the past few years,
especially in the developed world, much more needs to
be done to promote the rapid diffusion of technology.
This would make existing sources of renewable energy
economically viable, and a more feasible option for the
developing world.
Genuine cooperative technology transfer Investments need to be targeted to

between developing countries is therefore areas of under-funded ICT research, in
fields such as agricultural production,
essential. Investments need to be targeted to environmental management and pub-
areas of under-funded ICT research, in fields lic health.
such as agricultural production, environmen-
tal management and public health. One important goal
of strengthening the scientific and technology policy in
developing countries is the generation of new goods and
services that can improve carbon reduction. Stimulating
the low carbon technology industry is one way to achieve
commercialization of research and development.37
In 2006 IBSA countries established a joint IBSA Science

and Technology Fund in which each member state allocated
one million U.S. Dollar for collaborative activities.38 To date,
activities have included a limited number of research fields:
medical and pharmaceutical research (especially in HIV,
malaria and tuberculosis); nanotechnology, biotechnology
and oceanography. Some of these research areas clearly
already overlap with climate change priorities and could
provide a co-benefit approach to environmental sustain-
ability more broadly. However, funding could specifically
be dedicated to research on low-carbon technologies and
renewables.
A further example of ‘seizing opportunities’ is provided

by the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which was
established by the UNFCCC to channel finance to renewable
energy initiatives in developing countries. CDM projects are
designed to earn carbon credits for investors who reduce
37 | Juma, Gitta, DiSenso and Bruce. “Forging New technology

alliances: the role of South South cooperation”, 2005, 59.
38 | Cf. The India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum, IBSA
Trilateral Official website, http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org
carbon emissions in developing countries. This credit

scheme stimulates sustainable development and emission
reductions while simultaneously giving industrialised
countries some flexibility in how they meet their emission
limitation targets (as stipulated in the Kyoto Protocol). It
also offers developing countries that host CDMs the oppor-
tunity to seek private and public sector investment, build
capacity and capability, and gain experience in areas such
as the transfer of technology.
The high emission levels in all IBSA member states, and

other developing economies, make them attractive candi-
date countries for CDM projects, which could move the
energy sector into lower emissions intensity and encourage
technology transfer.39
According to the UNFCCC, in 2010, there were 2,453

registered CDM project activities globally. Of these, China
accounts for 41 per cent, India 22 per cent, Brazil seven
per cent, and Mexico five per cent.40 It can therefore be
said that China, India, Brazil and Mexico are the leading
host countries for CDM projects with a combined share of
75 per cent of the total project pipeline. If one analyses the
list of top 20 developing countries in terms of number of
hosting CDM projects, South Africa is the only country from
the African continent represented on the list. Africa in its
entirety only hosts two per cent of all CDM projects. One of
the reasons for this is that CDM project cycles are complex
and require extensive knowledge on project design and
formulation, validation, registration, project financing,
monitoring, verification and certification. Because India
and China have made substantial progress in this regard
they could assist South Africa and the African continent
more broadly, with technical expertise and capacity
building experience – to realise similar opportunities from
this flexible mechanism.41
39 | According to the Brazilian Embassy in London, “it was Brazil

that took the initiative to introduce the CDM as part of the
Kyoto Protocol”.
40 | Clean Development Mechanism, United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)’s Executive Board
Annual Report, 2010, “Registered project activities by host
party and region”.
41 | European Union Sixth Framework Programme. The Potential
of Transferring and Implementing Sustainable Energy Techno-
logies through the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto
Protocol: CDM State of Play, November 2008.
Critics of the CDM note that it is not in the interest of the

environment to grant CDMs to large developing countries
with a particular stage of economic development. For
example, cuts in emissions due to current CDM projects
contribute, albeit a small amount, to China’s energy-saving
goals, but does not decrease its coal emissions and reliance.
With China and India, which together host 90 per cent
of the entire global CDM wind energy project pipeline42,
improving the geographical distribution is also on the
agenda. It has also been shown that in some countries a
few technologies are clearly dominant (e.g. hydro, wind
power and ‘energy efficiency own generation’ in China;
biomass energy and wind energy in India;
landfill gas capture in Brazil), whereas these The distribution of projects among
technologies are lagging behind in other host countries is largely determined
by the potential for (large-scale) GHG
countries. Generally, it is assumed that the emission reductions at relatively low
distribution of projects among host countries costs.
is largely determined by the potential for
(large-scale) GHG emission reductions at relatively low
costs and by how smoothly a country’s CDM institutional
procedures function. Clearly countries with smooth DNA
procedures and efficient project activities are more
attractive to do CDM business with.43
Western partners cannot be excluded
A successful global climate change regime post-2012 is

dependant on the inclusion of all big emitters and all those
experiencing climate change impacts. In terms of global
mitigation action, political clout and developing country
collaboration is necessary to take up more stringent
mitigation commitments.
The importance of North-South partnerships cannot be

ignored as the developed world’s initial experience on pro-
moting energy efficiency can provide valuable background
for countries attempting to reform their energy policies.44
Many technologies based on resource endowments of
developing countries (e.g. biomass) do not yet exist, or are
too expensive. Collaborative research and development
42 | European Union’s Sixth Framework Programme, “CDM State

of Play,” ENTTRANS, November 2008.
43 | Ibid.
44 | Juma, Gitta, DiSenso and Bruce, “Forging New technology
alliances: the role of South South cooperation,” 2005, 59.
(R&D) between developing and developed country R&D

institutions is necessary to address this gap.
Conclusion
The IBSA member states face similar challenges when

it comes to their vulnerability to the impacts of climate
change, the challenge of addressing mitigation while
ensuring economic development (especially considering
the drivers for energy demand are economic growth,
population growth and technological changes), as well as
re-focusing their industrial policy and investment strategy
on low- and zero-carbon sectors of the economy – while
at the same time retaining their competitiveness in the
global economy. The question then is how IBSA countries
redefine their competitive advantage from
IBSA countries’ “development plans” attracting energy-intensive sectors on the
under a conventional, fossil-fuel ener- basis of cheap but dirty electricity, to building
gy path must be deviated from a ‘Busi-
ness as Usual’ approach. a new advantage around climate-friendly
technologies and systems. In order for this
to be successfully achieved, IBSA countries’ “development
plans” under a conventional, fossil-fuel energy path must
be deviated from a ‘Business as Usual’ approach. However,
this needs to be done without jeopardizing the growth
trajectories of countries still dealing with substantial devel-
opment challenges. A practical example is how member
states prevent deforestation in the light of extreme
poverty and limited land usage, or how individual countries
expand their energy mix to include more energy efficient
technologies, in light of an abundance of cheap coal.
The IBSA dialogue pillar on climate change could focus on

sectors in which developing countries would see significant
benefits from emissions cuts, such as in the energy
conservation of building, transport and industry, technical
progress in agriculture and reforestation. There should
also be more substantial research and development on the
potential economic scenarios of transferring from cheaper
fossil fuels to low-carbon/carbon-neutral energy sources.
Cooperation on practical projects would also be advan-
tageous in order to initiate momentum between IBSA
member countries – at all levels – including the buy-in
from local communities. This could involve, for example,
replacing traditional stoves in African and Asian countries
with low-soot varieties that do not pose health and

environmental risks. Studies in India have shown that new
stoves cost around 20 U.S. Dollar to make and produce 90
per cent less soot.45
IBSA members have all made progress on particular areas

of climate change and energy policy and should therefore
lead the discussion and technical expertise in this regard.
Brazil, for example, has made headway on the promotion
of renewable energy sources for fuel mix with ethanol,
which has great potential to grow and be transferred to
others with a similar emissions profile. 46
Brazil also has
large hydro energy sources which is a model that can be
studied by South African and India. It has
also made headway in terms of reducing India’s disaster relief actions are a
deforestation and preserving its indigenous model others can follow. India has
also made headway in the renewables
rainforests. India’s disaster relief actions are sector, particularly on wind and solar
a model others can follow. India has also energy.
made headway in the renewables sector,
particularly on wind and solar energy. South Africa on the
other hand is vocal on adaptation and has taken the lead in
its region in producing economic scenarios for a low-carbon
trajectory. It also has been proactive on research and
development of CCS technologies, as well as in gathering
climate data for the southern hemisphere through the
development of a coupled global climate model.
Other arenas of potential cooperation between developing

countries are in building and implementing CDM projects.
The key lies in building capacity in host countries to design
and implement effective CDM project, and in improving
rules and incentives for developed countries to invest
in key sectors and regions. China and India have seen
exponential growth in CDM projects since 2005, and their
experience clearly indicates that capacity building is the
45 | “Climate salvation from low-soot stoves?”, International

Herald Tribune, April 17, 2009.
46 | However, it is important to note that Brazil’s bio-fuel industry
is not necessary applicable to India or South Africa – Brazil,
for example, can support a viable bio-fuel industry without
taxpayer subsidies. In contrast, most others countries cannot.
According to Runnalls from the International Institute for
Sustainable Development ‘Bio-fuels are not the answer’ (May
2009) bio-fuels require subsidies of between 50-70 cents per
litre to replace a litre of fossil fuel, almost as much as the
cost of a litre of regular gasoline.
key to jumpstarting CDM projects and that extensive

investment is important in realizing CDM benefits. These
experiences are key to South Africa (and its broader
region), as well as to Brazil.
Despite access to the actual technology, developing

countries need to invest in the access to skills, know-how
and capital that can help them use, reproduce and adapt to
clean technologies. This would mean that dialogue should
extend beyond researchers and government officials to
include engineers, technical experts, and representa-
tives from commercial firms in the private sector. More
collaboration is needed at all levels, and scientists must
work more closely with utilities, steelmakers, and others
to ensure that design meshes with function.
Another area of potential IBSA cooperation is on the

adaptation agenda. IBSA states are still grappling to
understand the full impact of climate change on their
communities and therefore need to undertake vulnera
bility assessments at the national and regional level, as
well as to promote evidence-based analysis and research.
However this could also be done as a collective study,
showing the vulnerability of poor nations. There is also a
lack of exchange of information on disaster preparedness
and extreme events between Southern countries, as well
as a lack of exchange of meteorological data and climate
information. IBSA countries need to cooperate further on
this, by attracting focused financial resources in this regard
and in sharing information and data.
The UNFCCC negotiations provide IBSA with a perfect

opportunity for mutual consultation in climate change.
IBSA (whether alone of through the BASIC alliance) needs
to make use of their political weight and collective position
to push certain key issues in the negotiations forward
(including the two-track approach), for the developing
world in general, but most specifically for the LCD’s in
their respective regions. South Africa’s role as the Chair
of the Conference of Parties meeting also presents various
opportunities for Africa and the developing world at large.
Indonesia’s Role in Inter-

national Climate Policy
Financial Incentives to Preserve the Rainforest –
An Effective Model?
Marc Frings
In 1986 the United Nations General Assembly (UN) passed

a resolution on the “right to development”.1 It reads like
the developing world’s reaction to the mandatory catalogue
of human rights which had previously been canonised by
the industrialised nations. It emphasises the collective
dimension of these “third-generation human rights” which
are meant to be bolstered by this resolution. For the first
time, peace, security and the environment became the Marc Frings is a
focus of international debate on the topic of development. Trainee at the Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung’s
The international community’s struggle to agree on a Jakarta office.
successor to the Kyoto Protocol (which came into force in
1997 and expires in 2012) demonstrates the complexities
involved in bringing to life the principle of solidarity
outlined in the right to development declaration. Does the
right to increased well-being as set out in Article 2 III of
the resolution contradict international commitments in the
area of climate change?
The example of Indonesia throws light on the political, social

and legal challenges which are faced by developing and
emerging countries which have to take their right to devel-
opment seriously in order to meet demographic forecasts
but which also want to play their part in protecting the
environment. Faced with these challenges, Indonesia has
become one of the main supporters of the REDD initiative
over the last few years.
1 | In the text of the resolution, “development” is defined as a

“comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political pro-
cess” (UN-GA Res A/41/128).
An Environmental Sinner Who

is Often Overlooked
When it comes to the question of who are the world’s worst

environmental sinners, the finger is usually pointed accu-
singly at the USA and China, countries which are accele-
rating global warming by respectively churning out 5.95 and
5.06 billion tonnes of greenhouse gases every year. But in
third place, although some way behind, comes Indonesia.
This south-east Asian archipelago with more than 17,000
islands and 240 million people releases 2.05 billion tonnes
of greenhouse gases every year. So two emerging nations –
China and Indonesia – are high on the list of countries
which are chiefly responsible for climate change. What
leverage can now be used to persuade countries which are
in the process of modernising to play their part in the fight
against global warming? It is illuminating in this respect
to compare the causes of greenhouse gas emissions in
Germany and Indonesia. In Germany 81 per
In Indonesia 80 to 85 per cent of cent of greenhouse gases are due to energy-
greenhouse gas emissions are a result related emissions, followed by emissions
of deforestation or the destruction of
peatland. from industrial processes (10 per cent) and
agriculture (5 per cent).2 In Indonesia on the
other hand 80 to 85 per cent of greenhouse gas emissions
are a result of deforestation or the destruction of peatland.3
Although by comparison emissions from industry, vehicles
or energy seem low,4 over the past few years the country
has achieved breathtaking rates of economic growth, with
2 | German Federal Environmental Agency (ed.), “Presseinforma-

tion Nr. 13/2010. Treibhausgasemissionen in 2009 um 8,4
Prozent gesunken,” 3, http://umweltbundesamt.de/uba-info-
presse/2010/pdf/pd10-013_treibhausgasemissionen_grafiken.
pdf (accessed February 14, 2011). Figures given are based
on estimates for 2009 but to a large extent correspond to the
2008 figures.
3 | Harvard Kennedy School, Ash Center for Democratic Gover-
nance and Innovation, “From Reformasi to Institutional
Transformation: A Strategic Assessment of Indonesia’s Pros-
pects for Growth, Equity and Democratic Governance,” April
2010, 52, http://ash.harvard.edu/extension/ash/docs/
indonesia.pdf (accessed February 14, 2011); Jeff Neilson,
“Who owns the carbon? Indonesia’s carbon stores spark
international attention,” Inside Indonesia, July-September
(2010), http://insideindonesia.org/stories/who-owns-the-
carbon-05091343 (accessed February 14, 2011).
4 | In 2005 the overall energy, construction and infrastructure
sector produced 312 million tonnes of CO2, corresponding to
a 15 per cent share.
2010 figures hitting 6.5 per cent.5 Along with China and
India, Indonesia is one of the three countries with the
fastest growth rates of all the G20 countries (the Group of
20 major advanced and emerging economies).
Indonesia’s industrialisation process is barely limping along

and can be largely disregarded from a climate change point
of view. This is because so far the country has not succeeded
in creating an infrastructure to process its wealth of natural
resources (particularly ore, oil and gas). The destruction of
the Indonesian rainforest has much wider-reaching conse-
quences for the global climate on general and for biodi-
versity in particular. In 1966, 77 per cent of the country
was still covered with rainforest. Since then, 80 per cent
of the forest has disappeared,6 though Indonesia still has
the third-largest covering of rainforest in the world, behind
Brazil and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Rates of
deforestation peaked immediately after 1998 when the
Suharto era came to an end and the democratic process
of transformation took hold. Political decentralisation led
to more power for provincial leaders, and
together with landowners they developed No other country in the world destroys
a lucrative source of income with legal and more forest per day than Indonesia.
The rainforest in Sumatra and Kali-
illegal logging.7 This resulted in 3.5 million mantan has been almost completely
hectares of forest being destroyed between stripped.
2000 and 2005, particularly in Sumatra and
Kalimantan. No other country in the world destroys more
forest per day than Indonesia.8 Traditional structures of
society, economic interests and environmental protection
are now wrestling with the consequences: the rainforest
in Sumatra and Kalimantan has been almost completely
5 | Forecasts predict a medium-term annual growth rate of more

than six per cent. Cf. Helmut Hauschild, “Asiens nächste
Erfolgsstory,” Handelsblatt, November 22, 2010,
http://handelsblatt.com/politik/konjunktur/laenderanalysen/
indonesien-schreibt-asiens-naechste-erfolgsstory/3645102.html
6 | Cédric Gouverneur, “Biosprit aus Palmen. Indonesien opfert
seine Wälder,” Le monde diplomatique, December 11, 2009,
http://monde-diplomatique.de/pm/2009/12/11/a0044.text.
name,asks (accessed February 14, 2011).
7 | Gaby Herzog, Sungai Luar, “Nach dem ‘Holzrausch’ in Kali-
mantan”, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, December 21, 2010,
http://nzz.ch/nachrichten/politik/international/nach_dem_
holzrausch_in_kalimantan_1.8789101 (accessed February
14, 2011).
8 | Harvard Kennedy School, n. 3, 53.
stripped, so fresh, remote provinces such as the thinly-

populated Papua are now becoming the focus of the
logging industry. Some sections of the population view
both environmental activists and the central government
in Jakarta as the enemy, because they both cause local
exploitable areas and sources of income to dry up in the
name of international climate protection. These internal
conflicts also have an international dimension, as the
emissions mentioned earlier resulting from logging and
peatland destruction have effects on global climate change.
Indonesia has five per cent of the world’s peatland, which
is particularly effective at storing carbon dioxide (CO2). 40
per cent of Indonesia’s emissions are due to the drying-out
and destruction of this peatland and in 2006 this caused
more CO2 to be produced in Indonesia than in Germany,
the UK and Canada combined during the same period.9
Between Growth Potential And Gaps In The Law
Attempts to clear land by chopping down and burning

forest are predominantly due to the rocketing demand for
palm oil. This is mainly used in the food industry but is also
becoming an increasingly important energy source. Palm
oil’s particular composition makes it a more
Indonesia and neighbouring Malaysia popular form of biodiesel than other products
have turned themselves into world’s such as rapeseed oil. Over the last few years,
biggest oil palm growers, between them
supplying around 85 per cent of all Indonesia and neighbouring Malaysia have
world palm oil. turned themselves into the world’s biggest
oil palm growers, between them supplying around 85
per cent of all world palm oil (current annual production
about 40 million tonnes). At the moment the Indonesian
government can scent an opportunity to consolidate their
position still further. Since 1998 they have more than
doubled the amount of land available for the cultivation of
oil palms from three to nine million hectares, and by 2025
they plan to have a total of 26 million hectares under oil
palm cultivation.10
9 | Ibid.
10 | Half of the plantations will be in Kalimantan and a quarter in
Papua. Cf. Gouverneur, n. 6; Marianne Klute, “Schall und
Rauch. Umweltprobleme und Umweltpolitik,” in: Genia Find-
eisen, Kristina Großmann, Nicole Weydmann (eds.), Heraus-
forderungen für Indonesiens Demokratie. Bilanz und Pers-
pektiven, (Berlin: regiospectra, 2010), 225.
The “biodiesel” label which is viewed so positively in the

west as an alternative to carbon-intensive energy sources
cannot hide the fact that palm oil planta-
tions are having a negative impact on the The CO2 emissions which are necessary
environment. The CO2 emissions which are to create the infrastructure for the
palm oil industry are currently higher
necessary to create the infrastructure for the than the energy savings made by using
palm oil industry are currently higher than biofuels.
the energy savings made by using biofuels.
The Indonesian environmental organisation Walhi points
out that the central government is not able to generate
anywhere near as much income from the forestry sector
as it can from the growth of its subsidiary industries. For
example, the government makes between one and 2.50
Euro per 100 hectares on permits to operate mines in
primary forests. And in any case, 70 per cent of logging is
carried out illegally.11
In the area of environmental and climate policy it is clear

that the Indonesian government is responsible for ensuring
the rule of law and legal certainty.12 This does not only
mean the fight against endemic corruption,13 but in the
area of the environment and climate in particular it means
enforcing existing regulations. This was to some degree
made more difficult by the decentralisation of adminis-
trative and legal processes in 1998. According to the latest
version of the Forestry Law (41/1999), companies have to
obtain a permit from the Indonesian Ministry of Forestry
before they can exploit the forest for commercial purposes.
Local administrative departments can also issue licenses to
smaller companies, as long as an additional permit is then
also obtained from Jakarta. This little-known regulation
11 | Klute, n. 10, 225. It has recently been reported in the Indo-

nesian media that the 6.3 million Euro received so far in
revenues from mining concessions are counterbalanced by
540 million Euro in losses due to corruption. The newspaper
referred to statements by the environmental organisation
Walhi. Cf. Fidelis E. Satriastanti, “Choosing Money Over Nature
Will Cost Us Dearly: Activists,” The Jakarta Globe, January 13,
2011, A7.
12 | Winfried Weck, “Korruption und Kollusion. Indonesiens
schwere Bürden auf dem Weg zum demokratischen Rechts-
staat,” KAS-Länderbericht, October 14, 2010, http://kas.de/
wf/doc/kas_20833-1522-1-30.pdf (accessed February 14,
2011).
13 | Freedom House, “Freedom in the world – Indonesia 2010,”
http://freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=
2010&country=7841 (accessed February 14, 2011).
has certainly contributed to the fact that at present less

than eight per cent of plantation and mining companies
in the province of Central Kalimantan have a legal permit.
This is why there have recently been loud demands for the
law to be tightened up.14
Of the eco-crimes recorded in 2010, Political decentralisation must go hand in

only 20 per cent of perpetrators were hand with a desire to act. In a recent study,
prosecuted. And these were not trivial
offences. the impact of Environmental Management
and Protection Law (32/2009) which gave
the Ministry of the Environment more power in the fight
against operators with poor environmental practices was
judged to be minimal. Of the eco-crimes recorded in 2010,
only 20 per cent of perpetrators were prosecuted. And
these were not trivial offences – they were causing the
sort of environmental damage which leads to floods and
landslides and puts the lives of local people in danger.15
Indonesia’s Contribution
to Climate Protection
As a member of the G20 and by far the biggest economic

power in ASEAN, Indonesia sees itself on the international
stage as being the voice of those countries which are
currently in the development phase. Criticisms that the
government would not follow up on its international goals
with concrete actions have proved to be unfounded if we
take a look at the Indonesian government’s commitments
in this area. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has
placed the environment at the centre of his government’s
policy-making. Under his leadership, Indonesia has hosted
several major international conferences such as the 13th
UN Climate Change Conference in Bali in 2007 and the
first World Ocean Conference in Sulawesi in 2009. In April
2011 the capital, Jakarta, will host the fifth Business for
Environment summit, the most important global conference
on business and the environment.16
14 | 76 of 967 companies hold appropriate licenses; in the palm

oil sector 67 of 325 companies are operating illegally. Cf.
Adianto P. Simamora, “967 forestry firms under govt scrutiny,”
The Jakarta Post, February 2, 2011, 4.
15 | Satriastanti, n. 11, A7
16 | The summit was organised by the Indonesian government,
the Regional Representatives Council (DVD) and WWF. Cf.
Fidelis E. Satriastanti, “Chaos Awaits if Nothing Happens,”
The Jakarta Globe, January 10, 2011, A1.
The government has voluntarily taken on a leadership role

in this area for other developing and emerging nations.
Indonesia has pledged to reduce its carbon emissions by 26
per cent in the next ten years, even without international
assistance.17 With international support it hopes to achieve
a target of 41 per cent but to do this it will have to make
better use of existing support mechanisms. The Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM), set up in 1997, allows
developed countries which are required to reduce their
emissions in compliance with Kyoto Protocol
commitments to improve their environmental Of the 2,803 CDM projects which deve-
record by investing in projects in developing loping countries have registered at the
UNFCCC Secretariat, only two per cent
countries (“Certified Emission Reductions”). come from Indonesia.
Of the 2,803 CDM projects which developing
countries have registered at the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Secretariat,
only two per cent come from Indonesia (56 projects),
while other countries are making much better use of this
ecopolitical sale of indulgence between the industrialised
and developing world (e.g. Malaysia has 88 projects,
Mexico 125 and Brazil 184).18 This is why the Indonesian
government is predicting a possible five-fold increase in
registered projects.19
REDD: An Economic Approach

to Forest Protection
It is also thanks to Indonesia’s efforts that the REDD initia-

tive (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degra-
dation) is now part of the international approach to climate
protection. The CDM does not take forest protection into
account, while the REDD specifically targets this area and
is an initiative which holds a lot of promise for countries
like Indonesia with large stands of tropical rainforest.
17 | President Yudhoyono first stated this figure of 26 per cent at

the G20 summit in Pittsburgh. He re-stated this goal at the
15th World Climate Conference in Copenhagen.
18 | Cf. UNFCCC-CDM, “Registered project activities by host party,”
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Registration/NumOfRegistered
ProjByHostPartiesPieChart.html (accessed February 14, 2011).
19 | Ministry of Finance (ed.), Ministry of Finance Green Paper:
Economic and Fiscal Policy Strategies for Climate Change
Mitigation in Indonesia (Jakarta, 2009), 4, http://www.fiskal.
depkeu.go.id/webbkf/siaranpers/siaranpdf%5CGreen%20
Paper%20Final.pdf (accessed February 14, 2011).
In his report on the economic aspects of climate change,

Nicholas Stern discussed the benefits in terms of global
warming which would arise from the more active protection
of natural forests. 18 per cent of greenhouse gases are
caused by deforestation, a figure which – according
to Stern – can be quickly reduced without the need for
expensive new technology.20 According to the country’s
National Council for Climate Change, Indonesia should be
able to achieve a 22 per cent reduction in carbon emissions
in this way. At the 2007 UN Climate Change Conference in
Bali the Rainforest Alliance presented REDD as a possible
framework to assist developing and emerging countries in
protecting their forests. The basic principle is that forests
can be seen from a commercial point of view as carbon
sinks, and developing countries can be given incentives
in the form of offset payments to preserve their forests
and thus contribute to the reduction or capture of carbon
emissions. It will serve to compensate for
Bilateral agreements have been struck the expenses incurred by forest protection
between donor and recipient countries and for the loss of income which these
within the REDD initiative to take
account of international human rights countries will have to absorb if they are no
instruments. longer able to turn their forested areas into
profits.21 Bilateral agreements have been struck between
donor and recipient countries within the REDD initiative to
take account of international human rights instruments.
This aspect was taken further during the 2009 Copenhagen
Conference: in order to counter criticisms that the REDD
initiative falls short in the area of sustainability, additional
paragraphs were added and it was renamed “REDD+”. The
“plus” stands for the inclusion of factors such as nature
conservation, sustainable forestry and reforestation.22
The framework outlined by REDD provides an initial point

of reference for deliberations on how to protect the world’s
forests in a way which benefits both the environment and the
economy. To date there have been no binding agreements
20 | Nicholas Stern, Stern Review on the Economics of Climate

Change (London, 2006), particularly Chapter 25 (Reversing
Emissions from Land Use Change), 537-538.
21 | WWF Germany, “Politische Maßnahmen: REDD. Industrielän-
der finanzieren Stopp der tropischen Entwaldung, um Emissi-
onen zu verringern,” http://wwf.de/themen/kampagnen/
waelder-indonesiens/rettungsplan/redd (accessed February
14, 2011).
22 | Marianne Klute, “Die Geheimsprache der Klimapolitiker‟,
Suara, 3 (2010), 20-22.
which could be called “REDD regulations”. Delegates at the

last Climate Change Conference in Cancún were in favour
of the REDD initiative23, making it more likely that they
will sign up to an internationally-binding successor to the
Kyoto Protocol. But until this point, the success of the
REDD initiative is in the hands of those countries which are
making bilateral agreements and creating precedents for
sustainable forest protection.
Green Light for REDD in Indonesia
Indonesia comes out top amongst all recipient countries

when measured against the 3.3 billion Euro24 which have
resulted from bilateral or multilateral REDD agreements
worldwide. The 40 REDD projects which are currently in
existence are mainly financed in one of three ways.25 On
a multilateral level, through the United Nations’ partici-
pation in the REDD’s pilot phase26 and on a bilateral level
through agreements between the Indonesian government,
Australia and Norway.
Last year’s announcements by the Australian Norway will give one billion U.S. dol-
government that it would provide the Indo- lars if the Indonesian government can
provide evidence that they have achie-
nesian government with a further 55 million ved reductions in greenhouse gases.
Euro to assist in reducing emissions,27 is
still chicken-feed when compared to the pledges made by
the Norwegian government. Over the next seven to eight
years the Norwegians will give the Indonesian government
23 | J. Jackson Ewing and Irene A. Kuntioro, “Cancún, Shifting goals

of climate talks,” The Jakarta Post, December 27, 2010, 7.
24 | Keya Acharya, “Top leaders see the green in REDD+,” The
Jakarta Post, 3.
25 | David Gogarty and Olivia Rondonuwu, “Indonesia chooses
climate pact pilot province,” Reuters, December 30, 2010,
http://reuters.com/article/2010/12/30/us-indonesia-climate-
idUSTRE6BT0NP20101230 (accessed February 14, 2011).
26 | UN-REDD pilot countries include Bolivia, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Indonesia, Panama, Papua New Guinea,
Paraguay, Zambia, Tanzania and Vietnam. In October 2010
Central Sulawesi was selected to be Indonesia’s pilot province.
Cf. also “UN-REDD lauds C.Sulawesi’s active support for
forests,” The Jakarta Post, January 22, 2011,
http://thejakartapost.com/news/2011/01/22/unredd-lauds-
c-sulawesi’s-active-support-forests.html (accessed February
14, 2011).
27 | Neilson, n. 3; Fidelis E. Satriastanti, “Indonesia Sees Small
Victories At Cancún Talks,” The Jakarta Globe, December
11/12, 2010, 6.
one billion U.S. dollars (around 740 million Euro) if they

can provide evidence that they have achieved reductions
in greenhouse gases by preserving their forests. There is a
vital difference between the Australian and the Norwegian
approach. The Australian government is using REDD as a
carbon trading instrument like the CDM and will credit the
Indonesian CO2 reductions to its own emissions account.
The Norwegians, on the other hand, are not trying to
side-step their own responsibilities. As a Norwegian diplo-
mat said: “We are helping Indonesia, but haven’t forgotten
that we still have our own homework to do.”28
REDD-plus Roadmap for Indonesia and

Norway Enters a Critical Phase
In May 2010 the governments of Norway and Indonesia

agreed on a three-phase plan to protect the Indonesian
forests. This letter of intent is now in the implementation
stage.29 In the first phase, a framework is to be drawn
up for future work, to include institutions and content.
Along with developing a REDD-plus strategy, a government
agency is needed which reports directly to the president
and which will coordinate future REDD actions. Other tasks
include establishing an independent MRV (monitoring,
reporting, verification) body and selecting a pilot province.
The second phase involves the creation and
The most sensitive issue is Indonesia’s strengthening of existing regulations and
obligation not to grant any new con- capacity building. A funding instrument also
cessions in peatland or natural forest
areas in the next two year period. needs to be set up to funnel the Norwegian
government’s payments. However the most
sensitive issue at the moment is Indonesia’s obligation
not to grant any new concessions in peatland or natural
forest areas in the next two year period. While Norway will
recompense Indonesia for introducing and implementing
political reforms in the first two phases, higher payments
will be made from 2014, upon the commencement of the
third phase and when payments will be based on emission
28 | Interview by the author with diplomats at the Norwegian

Embassy, Jakarta, January 21, 2011.
29 | The Letter of Intent was signed by both governments on
May 26, 2010 in Oslo, with the title “Cooperation on reducing
greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest
degradation”.
reductions.30 The Norwegian government has already paid

out 22 million Euro to the Indonesians before the first
target has been met.
At present a working group has the task of setting up a

REDD agency reporting to the president.31 To show their
commitment, the government has invited high-profile
experts to join this working group.32 At the end of December
Central Kalimantan was named as the pilot province for the
agreement. The decision was made by means of a trans-
parent selection process. Of the 33 Indonesian provinces,
Central Kalimantan produces the second-highest volume
of greenhouse gases. With one million hectares of palm
oil plantations and a fast-growing coal mining industry it
is clear that the province is important in terms of national
climate protection policies.33 Indonesian environmental
organisations declared themselves satisfied with the
selection process and its result, as it can be
assumed that useful lessons can be learned Central Kalimantan, named as the pilot
for the expansion of the REDD-plus model province, is the most politically stable
province, which was an important se-
and the potential conflicts between palm oil lection criterion for the Indonesians.
and mining companies and environmental
interests in Central Kalimantan.34 This province is also the
most politically stable, which was an important selection
criterion for the Indonesians.35 The runners-up in the
selection process, the province of Papua, were left empty-
handed. The central government in Jakarta had reserva-
tions about this province in the far east of the country
because of existing political and social tensions and its
weak administrative structures.
30 | Emissions mechanisms are calculated in line with the “contri-

butions-for-verified emissions reductions mechanism”. For
details on the three phases cf. “Letter of Intent between the
Government of the Kingdom of Norway and the Government
of the Republic of Indonesia on ‘Cooperation on reducing
greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest
degradation’”, http://norway.or.id/PageFiles/404362/Letter_
of_Intent_Norway_Indonesia_26_May_2010.pdf (accessed
February 14, 2011).
31 | Fitrian Ardiansyah und Aditya Bayunanda, “A critical year for
REDD in Indonesia,” The Jakarta Post, January 10, 2011, 7.
32 | N. 28.
33 | Gogarty and Rondonuwu, n. 25.
34 | Interview by the author with Nyoman Iswarayoga, Director
for Climate and Energy, WWF Indonesia, Jakarta, January 10,
2011.
35 | N. 28.
REDD plus in Practice
The required two-year moratorium to protect the areas

of primary forest, swamps and peatland is a bone of
contention. At the moment President Yudhoyono has on his
desk two proposals from the opposing sides.36 The REDD
working group led by Kuntoro Mangkusubroto is pushing for
wide-ranging protection which includes all primary forests,
moorland and peatland. The Forestry Ministry on the other
hand is taking a commercial standpoint in the debate and
is arguing that the country’s economic development will
be affected if the forest protection measures are too strict.
As a result the Ministry’s proposal for the
Environmental activists claim that if moratorium only includes the protection of
the moratorium only protected primary primary forest and moorland. Environmental
forest, then only three per cent of Indo-
nesian forests would be protected from activists were already complaining that this
commercial exploitation. did not go far enough, claiming that if the
moratorium only protected primary forest,
then only three per cent of Indonesian forests would be
protected from commercial exploitation.37 And the peatland
forests which are not covered by the Ministry’s proposal
are rich in biodiversity. In November 2010 the Forestry
Ministry was the angry target of green activists and experts
when it emerged that it had declared 41 million hectares
of forest to be “special forest areas” and hence available
for concessions. They made the declaration just in time to
avoid the possible enforcement of the moratorium.38
The “ambitious” timetable has been delayed right at the

start by the fact that the moratorium did not come into
effect on January 1, 2011 as originally planned.39 President
Yudhoyono is under increasing pressure as he has to
36 | Adianto P. Simamora, “SBY still pondering planned forest

moratorium,” The Jakarta Post, http://thejakartapost.com/
news/2011/02/07/sby-still-pondering-planned-forest-
moratorium.html (accessed February 14, 2011).
37 | Criticism by But Nordin, Director of the Non-Governmental
Organisation Save Our Borneo, in: Fidelis E. Satriastanti,
“Moratorium Won’t Save Indonesia’s Forests: Activists,” The
Jakarta Globe, January 7, 2011, A6.
38 | For example, an open letter from scientists to the govern-
ments of Norway and Indonesia (November 18, 2010) can
be read at http://redd-monitor.org/2010/12/01/scientists-
letter-to-norway-and-indonesia-natural-forests-even-when-
not-in-their-primary-state-may-have-high-conservation-value
39 | N. 28.
approve the moratorium by presidential decree.40 And at

the same time attention is turning to the next, equally
thorny questions such as how to monitor reductions in
carbon emissions.
Conflicts, Risks and Responsibilities:

The Unresolved Issues
Up to now, it seems Indonesia has been determined to

profit from REDD both economically and ecologically.
Indonesia was not too concerned that the 2010 conference
in Cancún produced no binding agreement on a framework
for the successor to the Kyoto Protocol. Before departing for
Mexico, the Indonesian delegation stressed that bilateral
agreements could be the way forward.41 Indeed, this
position was in line with the demands made by environ-
mental organisations that REDD should be independent of
international agreements and still carry on
even if there is no post-Kyoto agreement.42 Giving individual countries stronger
But would this actually contribute to interna- negotiating powers would only serve to
weaken the coordinating and unifying
tional climate and environment protection? function of international conferences in
Giving individual countries stronger negoti- the long-term.
ating powers would only serve to weaken
the coordinating and unifying function of international
conferences in the long-term and at worst could actually
render them obsolete. It remains to be seen whether
the Norwegian-Indonesian REDD agreement will prove
to be a model for bilateral climate and forest protection
programmes in the face of all the potential conflicts which
are emerging.
1. Conflict Between Economic and

Environmental Interests
From an environmental perspective, it must be asked how

the parties to the agreement will interpret the scope of
40 | Fidelis E. Satriastanti, “NGOs Appeal To Govt to Enact

Logging Moratorium,” The Jakarta Globe, February 8, 2011,
http://thejakartaglobe.com/nvironment/ngos-appeal-to-govt-
to-enact-logging-moratorium/421320 (accessed February 14,
2011). At the time of writing, the president had still not made
his decision. For the current status see http://redd-monitor.org.
41 | JG/Agencies, “Indonesia Took Home a Little Money, But
Cancun Had Little to Shout About,” The Jakarta Globe,
December 13, 2010, A1.
42 | N. 34.
forest protection. For example, there is the danger that the

reforestation programme will be dominated by monoculture
in the form of plantations for commercial use rather than
the planting of secondary forest.43 Environmental organi-
sations in Indonesia recognise that they cannot completely
ignore the need for economic growth. WWF Indonesia has
proposed that the private sector should also benefit from
the Norwegian REDD payments if it is foreseen that it can
no longer develop under normal conditions.44
The palm oil industry in particular also has an obligation to

invest in research, efficiency and innovation. The country
may be the market leaders in the palm oil industry, but
Indonesian companies are not as productive
The west has to take a balanced posi- as their Malaysian counterparts, who make
tion in the palm oil debate. The use of higher profits per hectare of oil palms.45 Up
biodiesel from palm oil can no longer
compensate for the carbon emissions to now the government has not been in a
caused by deforestation. position to create investment-friendly condi-
tions as there is a shortage of processing industries for the
wealth of crude ore which is mined in Indonesia. The west
also has to take a balanced position on the economical and
environmental aspects of the palm oil debate. The use of
biodiesel from palm oil can no longer compensate for the
carbon emissions caused by deforestation to plant oil palm
plantations.
2. Conflict Between Political and Social Interests
Another challenge is presented by the need for the REDD

coordinators in Indonesia to take into account social
(special) interests. In a recent study, the Indonesian Peace
Building Institute came to the conclusion that in the past
two years there has been no increase in religious or tribal
conflicts, whereas conflicts in the area of natural resources
have accelerated significantly.46 There are regular conflicts
43 | Frank Priess, “People with Low Expectations are Seldom

Disappointed. Climate Summit in Cancún Did not Fail, but
Was it Successful Enough?,” KAS International Reports,
2/2011, 84.
44 | N. 34.
45 | To date in Indonesia only one third of this land is actually
being used for oil palm cultivation. Cf. n. 28.
46 | For the purposes of this study, the Peace Building Institute
investigated local media reports. In 2009 the media reported
54 conflicts relating to natural resources. In 2010 the total
was 74. Tifa Asrianti, “Swelling mining, plantation lead to
conflicts, damages,” The Jakarta Post, January 13, 2011, 4.
between palm oil companies and the local population who

refuse to move off their land for the sake of the national
development goals. There has also been an increase in the
number of conflicts between the centre and those provinces
where the government has not managed to harmonise
national policies with the needs of the local people.
It is important for everyone involved in Indigenous minorities in developing

the REDD programme to have a compre- countries are often not sufficiently
integrated into the land use process
hensive approach with good communications and become victims of decisions made
between all parties and with responsibilities elsewhere.
shared out as widely as possible. Commit-
ments should be based on a sense of responsibility towards
society rather than on obligations to contract partners such
as Norway or Australia.47 In a country like Indonesia where
48 million people live in the forests (and as a consequence
may be deeply affected by decisions made by the plantation
and mining sectors), the potential for conflict is high. In
addition, indigenous minorities in developing countries are
often not sufficiently integrated into the land use process
and become victims of decisions made elsewhere.48
The principle of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC)

can be seen as an important contribution to any agreement
between the political, economic and social groups involved.
It means that a community can make joint decisions on
projects which affect land ownership and use.49 The United
Nations also argue that the “right to development” encom-
passes the rights of all, including indigenous peoples.50 This
is why the REDD+ idea has taken up the FPIC principle.
Norway has expressed its interest in involving all relevant
players and has declared itself satisfied with the imple-
mentation of the multi-stakeholders process thus far.51
47 | “Indonesia has to make it clear that the government will not

do what Norway says but will act in its own right,” Nyoman
Iswarayoga, Director for Climate and Energy, WWF Indonesia;
n. 34.
48 | Priess, n. 43, 84.
49 | Cf. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, Article 10, http://un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/drip
50 | UN-REDD Programme (ed.), Perspectives on REDD+ (Geneva,
2010), 4 et sqq.
51 | This process brings together the Indonesian government,
representatives of civil society and local communities, for
example in workshops which provide a platform for an
exchange of views. N. 28.
3. Policy Requirements
The debate about the presidential decree for the two-year

moratorium proves that environmental protection is
ineffective without binding regulations. Otherwise how can
illegal loggers be brought to justice or indigenous peoples
make their land-ownership claims? In parallel to taking the
necessary legal actions, there has to be a paradigm shift
in the minds of the decision-makers. Where Indonesian
businesses have in the past seen felling trees as a way to
make profit, now they have to see forest protection and
management as a new and lucrative way forward.52
Political reforms, the adoption of new Indonesia will only profit financially from
legal regulations and the strengthe- the agreement with Norway if the political
ning of existing laws are conditions set
out at the beginning of the Norwegian institutions and agencies on a national and
road map. local level act in a transparent and respon-
sible manner.53 Political reforms, the adoption of new legal
regulations and the strengthening of existing laws are
conditions set out at the beginning of the Norwegian road
map – with good reason.
A process of transformation was set in motion in 1998

(Reformasi) to turn the former dictatorship into a democracy.
This process is responsible for introducing democratic and
constitutional reforms in every area of policy and at all
levels of decision-making. It also has the task of checking
the effectiveness of existing legislation. The political and
administrative decentralisation which has taken place over
the last few years has also had an impact on environmental
protection, as important decisions on land use and forest
management are now made by local officials.54 In order to
protect the forests from the bulldozers there needs to be
a pact between local and national institutions which will
provide for the provinces having a financial share in the
country’s (REDD) payments from abroad.
In developing and emerging countries the question also

arises of the geographic limits of political power. In areas
where the government has little influence there can be
52 | Call made by Kuntoro Magkusubroto, head of the Indonesian

REDD plus working group. Cf. Keya Acharya, “Top leaders see
the green in REDD+,” The Jakarta Post, 3.
53 | Harvard Kennedy School, n. 3.
54 | Ministry of Finance, n. 19, 12.
additional challenges when it comes to implementing

decisions.55 In 2011 the Indonesian Environment Ministry
will run fire prevention campaigns to highlight the dangers
of forest fires. It is also planned to pass new legislation to
strengthen the existing laws on environmental protection
and management (from 2009) and waste water (from
2008).56 This begins to tackle the problem of limited
governmental power, at least from an environmental
perspective.
Conclusion
Fighting poverty and economic development have been

identified by both Norway and Indonesia as the priority
goals of the REDD-plus letter of intent. In this
respect it follows in the footsteps of the UN If the industrialised countries want to
resolution on the “right to development”. If win over developing nations to stand
with them in the battle against clima-
the industrialised countries want to win over te change, then they need to provide
developing nations to stand with them in the incentives.
battle against climate change, then they need
to provide incentives which tie in the scientists’ climate
predictions with the southern hemisphere’s demands for
increased prosperity. The Green Climate Fund (GCF) which
was agreed in Cancún with a view to helping developing
countries to cope with the consequences of climate change
could be a significant step in the right direction.57 The GCF
should be ratified at the next Climate Change Conference
in Durban, South Africa, in December 2011.
Over the next few years the Indonesian government

will be in a position to prove that its own initiatives and
commitments deserve more than just adaptation and
compensation payments. If their initiatives succeed, other
developing and emerging countries may also demonstrate
more commitment towards protecting the climate and the
environment. This process needs to be monitored closely,
both internationally and domestically. The international
community is responsible for supporting countries in their
efforts to fight climate change. In Indonesia’s case it is also
55 | Priess, n. 43, 84.

56 | Fidelis E. Satriastanti, “Indonesia Eyes Spot on Green Climate
Fund Committee,” The Jakarta Globe, January 6, 2011, A7.
57 | Between 2010 and 2012 30 billion U.S. dollars should flow
into the coffers of the GCF, with a further 100 billion dollars
planned in the period to 2020. Cf. Ewing and Kuntioro, n. 23, 7.
a matter of promoting environmentally-friendly growth

markets. In terms of demographics, Indonesia currently
has the problem of how to satisfy a demand for energy
which is growing at a rate of seven to nine per cent each
year.58 Coal-fired power stations are still the cheapest
source of energy from an Indonesian point of view,
although the island archipelago actually contains more
than 40 per cent of the world’s geothermal energy, a very
green way to produce electricity. Indonesia is dragging its
feet in realising this potential. By 2025 the percentage of
electricity produced from geothermal energy is set to rise
from 8 per cent to 20 per cent.59 Knowledge and research
transfers can also help to make it cheaper to utilise
geothermal energy, so that new carbon-intensive coal-
fired power stations cease to be a viable alternative. CDM
projects are another source of revenue which Indonesia
has not really exploited so far, but it is unclear how the
government proposes to increase CDM projects five-fold.60
On the domestic front, the government finds itself increas-
ingly under fire from local environmental organisations.
They are demanding less international posturing and more
domestic reforms and are particularly critical of Indone-
sia’s quest to win a seat on the GCF steering committee. 61
They also believe priority should be given to an action plan

which sets out how the government are going to reduce
greenhouse emissions by between 26 and 41 per cent over
the coming years.
President Yudhoyono’s initiative to reduce emissions on a

voluntary basis seems ambitious in the face of the legis-
lative reforms and revisions which still need to be carried
out. He will only be able to count it a success if the letter of
intent with Norway is followed by a partnership agreement
with all the central players in the political and business
spheres, along with environmental groups and the indi-
genous population. The government has to succeed in this
if it wants to justify Indonesia’s image of itself as a strong
developing country (not only in the G20 and ASEAN)
which can take the lead and provide a role model for other
emerging nations.

59 | Nieke Indrietta, “Suspended Ambition,” TEMPO, January 25,
2011, 49.
61 | N. 34.
Climate Policy in the

People’s Republic OF CHINA –
Groundwork for
sustainable growth?
Andreas Dittrich
China is often characterised in the media as being the

“spoilers” during international climate talks. Western
politicians are often trying to blame Beijing for the lack
of progress on climate change. It’s true that China is the
biggest producer of greenhouse gases and up to now has
not been prepared to accept binding targets for reducing
emissions. But it is not always sufficiently recognised in
the international debate that China is actually pursuing an Andreas Dittrich is a
ambitious climate policy on a domestic level. China has Research Assistant at
invested billions in the promotion of alternative energy Stiftung in Shanghai.
sources and in increasing energy efficiency and it has
already seen some significant results. Instead of using
China as its scapegoat, the West should rather offer more
support in terms of advice and technology transfers in
order to help China shift its economy towards a model
which is more sustainable and resource-efficient.
Facts and Forecasts
China is one of the countries which is most affected by

climate change. According to estimates, the average
temperature rise by 2020 compared to the period 1961
to 1990 could be 1.1 to 2 degrees. Serious consequences
of this include droughts and reduced rainfall in Northern
China, while Southern China will suffer more flooding due
to increased rainfall. This in turn could lead to a serious
decline in food production. A decline of five to ten per cent
is forecast for the period to 2030, with the second half of
the century seeing an estimated 37 per cent drop in the
production of rice, maize and wheat unless something is

done to prevent it.1 Every year the lives of 200 to 400
million Chinese people are already affected by extreme
weather events, and around ten million farmers are falling
below the poverty line as a result.2
The glaciers on the Qinghai plateau are continuing to melt

and the permafrost in Tibet is becoming ever-thinner.
Glaciers in China have already retreated by 21 per cent
and the permafrost has become four or five metres thinner
over the last 50 years. This has the short-term effect of
increasing the likelihood of flooding and in the long-term
could lead to a shortage of water resources. Rising sea
levels mean coastal regions in China, including Shanghai
and the Yangtse Delta, are threatened by flooding. And
it is feared that several species of animals and plants will
become extinct, to the detriment of biodiversity.3
China bears an increasingly high responsibility for global

climate change because of its rapid economic growth which
has until now been largely based on energy-intensive
production methods. It is estimated that China has been
the biggest producer of CO2 emissions since 2007 and is
responsible for 48.5 per cent of the worldwide
In 2008 China was responsible for 19 increase in emissions between 1990 and
per cent of global CO2 emissions, and 2007.4 It is particularly difficult for China to
this share is expected to reach 27 per
cent by 2030. reduce its greenhouse gas emissions because
of its reliance on coal as its primary energy
source (over 70 per cent). In 2008 China was responsible
for 19 per cent of global CO2 emissions, and this share
is expected to reach 27 per cent by 2030. So it is crucial
that Beijing plays an active role if the global temperature
rise is to be limited to less than two degrees compared
1 | Cf. Lin Erda et al., Synopsis of China National Climate Change

Assessment Report (II) – Climate Change Impacts and Adap-
tion, 2007, 4, http://law.berkeley.edu/centers/envirolaw/
capandtrade/Lin%20Erda%202-5-07.pdf (accessed January
4, 2010).
2 | Cf. Thomas Heberer and Anja D. Senz, Regionalexpertise –
Destabilisierungs- und Konfliktpotential prognostizierter
Umweltveränderungen in China bis 2020/2050, 2007, 3-4.
3 | Cf. NDRC, China’s National Climate Change Programme,
2007, 17.
4 | Cf. Andreas Oberheitmann and Eva Sternfeld, “Climate
Change in China – The Development of China’s Climate Policy
and its Integration into a new Post-Kyoto Climate Regime,”
Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 3/2009, 137.
to the pre-industrial era. The International Panel on

Climate Change (IPCC) has calculated this figure as being
necessary to keep the consequences of climate change at
a manageable level.5
As far as per-capita emissions levels are concerned, China

is still well behind the USA and Europe, which is why Beijing
has spoken out at international climate talks
against absolute and binding reduction tar- China’s argument is that the developed
gets. China’s argument is that the developed countries have to bear a historic res-
ponsibility for the greenhouse effect
countries have to bear a historic responsi and so should be obliged to set ambi-
bility for the greenhouse effect and so tious reduction targets.
should be obliged to set ambitious reduction
targets. Beijing has invoked the principle of “common
but different responsibility” which was stipulated in the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC). China signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1998 and
ratified it in 2002 but belongs to the Annex II countries
which are not obliged to reduce their emissions. China was
in fact able to benefit from the Kyoto Protocol, as it gave
Annex I countries the opportunity to improve their own
carbon footprint through CO2 reduction projects in Annex II
countries in the framework of Clean Development Mecha-
nisms (CDM). By 2008 more than 1,500 CDM actions had
been approved in China, and with a share of 34 per cent
it is by far the most important location for these kinds of
projects.6 During negotiations on a successor agreement
to Kyoto, which expires in 2012, Beijing has been keen
to extend the Protocol without any change to the system
which differentiates between Annex I countries which have
to abide by binding targets and emerging and developing
countries that can at most – if they wish – set voluntary
goals. In China’s position papers sent to the UNFCCC
Secretariat in February and May 2009 it requested the
industrialised countries to reduce their carbon emissions
by 40 per cent by 2020 as compared to 1990 levels and
suggested they should contribute 0.5 to one per cent of
their GDP to help developing countries adapt to climate
change.7
5 | Cf. Cheng Qian, Ein Portrait der Klimapolitik Chinas,

Germanwatch Positionspapier, 2009, 4.
6 | Cf. Oberheitmann and Sternfeld, n. 4, 139-140.
7 | Cf. Gudrun Wacker, “Caught in the Middle: China’s Crucial but
Ambivalent Role in the International Climate Negotiations,”
in: Susanna Dröge, International Climate Policy – Priorities of
Key Negotiating Partners, SWP, 2010, 60.
China has already sets its own targets for the reduction
of CO2 emissions. In November 2009 its government
announced that it would reduce CO2 levels by 40 to 45
per cent by 2020 compared to 1990. This target was also
recorded in the Copenhagen Accord of January 2010. At
the climate conference in Cancún in December 2010, China
even hinted that it might allow international monitoring of
its carbon emissions.8 These are the first signs that China
is ready to play a more active role in international climate
protection. Other positive signs are the growing numbers
of delegates sent to take part in international climate talks
and the fact that in October 2010 China hosted its first UN
climate conference in Tianjin.
In general, China is still reluctant to play a more active role

in international climate talks, but on a domestic level it has
long been aware of the need to reduce energy consumption
and CO2 levels in order to achieve important development
goals in the areas of the environment and energy security.
The long-term effects of climate change have less bearing
on political decisions than more immediate environmental
problems such as air and water pollution. And in face of
the growing reliance on imports of primary
Beijing is also aware that promoting energy sources there is a growing sense that
alternative energy sources and green increased energy efficiency and the use of
technologies can help Chinese busines-
ses to gain a footing in these markets new energies could make a critical contri-
of the future. bution to China’s energy security. Beijing is
also aware that promoting alternative energy sources and
green technologies can help Chinese businesses to gain
a footing in these markets of the future and become an
important pillar in China’s future economic development
and the structural change that will be necessary. So
reducing greenhouse gases is seen more as a side-effect
of protecting the environment, improving energy efficiency
and achieving domestic development goals.
8 | Cf. Shi Jiangtao, “China’s Bid to Break Climate Deadlock,”

South China Morning Post, December 8, 2010, http://topics.
scmp.com/news/china-news-watch/article/China-bid-to-
break-climate-deadlock1 (accessed February 15, 2010).
The Main Institutions Involved in

China’s Policies on Climate, Energy
and the Environment
High levels of coordination are required to deal with climate

policy in a multi-faceted way which integrates governmen-
tal, private, domestic and international interests. Formu-
lating a coherent climate policy seems to be particularly
difficult in China, because responsibilities are still in a state
of flux. Energy policy in particular is very fragmented and
weak on an institutional level.
The major players in Chinese climate policy can be found

in the Foreign Ministry and the National Development and
Reform Commission (NDRC). Under the chairmanship
of the NDRC, the National Coordination Committee on
Climate Change (NCCCC) has already been in existence
since 1988. This is the most important institution in the
area of Chinese climate policy. It comprises 17 ministries
and bodies and is responsible for formulating a cohesive
climate policy in China and leading provincial
and local governments in the fight against In 2005 the National Leading Group on
climate change. The NDRC is the most influ- Climate Change was created, headed
up by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, with
ential body within the NCCCC and is China’s the goal of integrating climate policy
main representative at international climate still further.
conferences. In 2005 the National Leading
Group on Climate Change was created, headed by Prime
Minister Wen Jiabao, with the goal of further integrating
climate policy. This Group includes all ministers who are
involved in the areas of energy and environmental policy.9
The NDRC also plays a prominent role in energy policy.

The NDRC’s environment department is responsible for
energy consumption and energy efficiency. In 2005 the
National Leading Group for Energy was created, which
was also headed up by the prime minister. This group is
responsible for coordinating the work of the main minis-
tries and governmental bodies in the area of energy. In
accordance with the restructuring plans of the eleventh
National Peoples’ Congress (NPC) in March 2008, a National
Energy Commission is also to be set up to develop energy
9 | Cf. Dirk Rommeney, Climate and Energy Policy in the People’s

Republic of China (Heinrich Böll Stiftung China, 2008), 15.
strategies, along with the State Energy Bureau under the

auspices of the NDRC. The State Energy Bureau should then
be responsible for the administration and supervision of
the energy sector. The Centre for Renewable Energy Devel-
opment is in charge of research into new technologies and
political concepts in the area of renewable
The responsibilities of the Ministry of energy sources. This centre reports to the
Environmental Protection are restricted Energy Research Institute, which is also part
to planning green projects and drawing
up and monitoring environmental spe- of the NDRC. The Ministry of Environmental
cifications. Protection is in favour of pro-active climate
policies on both a domestic and international level but has
little influence on climate policy. Its responsibilities are
restricted to planning green projects and drawing up and
monitoring environmental specifications.10
Goals and Actions of China’s Climate Policy
Since the end of the 1990s, the Chinese government

has ramped up its efforts in the areas of environmental
protection and climate action. This has manifested itself in
the passing of a multitude of laws and resolutions and the
publication of plans, guidelines and reports. Of particular
note are the Energy Conservation Law of 1998, the China
Medium and Long-Term Energy Conservation Plan of 2004,
the Renewable Energy Law (REL) of 2005 and China’s
National Climate Change Programme (CNCCP) of June
2007, which listed the effects of climate change in China,
and concrete actions which have already been taken or
are to be taken in the future to fight climate change. The
programme has made these plans more specific by setting
concrete targets for the reduction of carbon emissions. The
Medium and Long-Term Development Plan for Renewable
Energy initiated in 2007 is also important in this context.
In this plan the NDRC has laid out guidelines, targets and
the political actions which need to be taken in order to
expand renewable energies in China in the period to 2020.
The eleventh Five Year Plan (2005 to 2010) stipulated a
reduction in energy consumption by 20 per cent in relation
to GDP, which proved to be an extremely ambitious and
difficult target. For the first time, this last Five Year Plan
also made the goal of reducing energy consumption a top
priority.11
10 | Cf. ibid., 11-15.

11 | Cf. ibid., 10.
Renewable Energies
The promotion of renewable energy sources deserves

special attention. In 2005 they made up around 7.5 per
cent of China’s primary energy consumption. According
to the Medium and Long-Term Development Plan for
Renewable Energy in China should increase this share to
ten per cent by 2010 and to 15 per cent by 2020. The
share of renewables of electricity production shall be 20
per cent by then.12
Hydropower is by far the most important By 2007 hydropower projects were al-
alternative energy source for electricity ready providing 16 per cent of energy
supply. These projects, though, inclu-
production in China. By 2007 hydropower ded mega-projects that were heavily
projects were already providing 16 per cent criticised for their environmental im-
pact.
of the energy supply. These projects, though,
include mega-projects such as the Three
Gorges Dam which has been heavily criticised for its detri-
mental effect on the environment and the fact that it forced
millions of people from their homes. However, smaller,
more environmentally-friendly hydropower projects13 are
providing five per cent of the electricity supply, making
them the second-largest renewable source for electricity
production. In comparison, other renewable energy
carriers have so far played a minor role, with photovoltaics
still being very marginal.14
China’s Renewable Energy Law which came into force on

January 1, 2006 forms the main legal foundation in this
area. It is very similar to Germany’s Renewable Energy
Law. The Law obliges grid operators to buy all available
electricity from renewable sources and to provide electricity
producers using renewable energies with a connection to
the grid. It also guarantees feed-in subsidies for electricity
from renewable energies which are individually set by the
State Council pricing authorities, depending on the type
of renewable energy, the region or even the particular
project. The higher costs are borne by all end consumers
across the whole country. Prices are regularly adjusted in
line with advances in technology. At the moment there
12 | Cf. ibid., 18.

13 | The definition of a small hydro project varies around the world.
In the EU it means hydro plants with a capacity up to 10 MW,
whereas in China it includes plants up to 30 MW.
14 | Cf. Rommeney, n. 9, 43.
is only one fixed, national subsidy – for electricity from

biomass, which is set at 0.25 Renminbi (RMB) (0.03 Euro)
per kilowatt hour and is available for the first 15 years of
a biomass power plant’s operating period. Subsidies for
other renewable energy carriers are set on an individual
project basis.15
In the event that grid operators refuse to connect renewable

sources of electricity to the grid, the REL stipulates that
compensation has to be paid to the electricity producer
for loss of income. If the connection is not set up within
a certain period of time, the law stipulates a fine. It also
provides for preferential loans and tax relief for renewable
energy projects, for example, the normal VAT rate of 17
per cent has been reduced to 6 per cent for small hydro
projects and to 13 per cent for biogas plants. The REL also
requires the establishment of a renewable energy fund
to finance investments in renewable energies, tax relief
and guaranteed subsidies.16 As a result of these actions,
by 2009 China was already the world’s biggest investor in
renewable energies, with investments totalling 34.6 billion
U.S. dollars (25.3 billion Euro).17
Wind Power
China has significant wind resources which can be used

to produce electricity. However, it faces some major
challenges when it comes to distributing
On the east coast, there is the grea- these resources via the grid. The electricity
test demand for energy. But the only grid on the east coast is well-developed as
suitable areas to build wind farms are
in the north west of the country and this is where there is the greatest demand
offshore. for energy, but the only suitable areas to
build wind farms are in the north west of the country and
offshore. Despite these challenges, wind power has huge
potential, something which the NDRC massively underesti-
mated in the EER in 2005 when it set an installed capacity
target of just five gigawatts (GW) of power by 2010. This
target was already reached by 2007, and the 30 GW goal
set for 2020 is likely to be hit by 2012 at the latest, which
15 | Cf. ibid., 41-42.

16 | Cf. ibid., 41.
17 | Cf. Xinhua, “Cancun Delegates praise China’s Green Energy
Push,” China Daily Online, http://chinadaily.com.cn/china/
2010cancunclimate/2010-12/02/content_11645342.htm
(December 4, 2010).
is why the NDRC is considering raising it to 100 GW.18 Over

the past four years installed capacity in the wind sector has
doubled each year and in 2009 it had already reached 25.8
GW. In that same year China overtook Germany in terms
of cumulative capacity, lying second only to the USA. In
terms of newly-installed capacity, China came out at the
top of the pile. Up to now wind farms have mainly been
built on the mainland and the development of offshore
wind farms is a recent phenomenon. The first offshore
project was completed off the coast of Shanghai in 2010,
with a capacity of 100 MW. Chinese coastal provinces are
now planning a major drive in the area of offshore wind
farms and are aiming for a total installed capacity of 33
GW by 2020.
In order to promote wind power the NDRC regularly

announces major projects with a capacity of at least 100
MW which are awarded to the contractors with the lowest
feed-in fees and the highest proportion of locally-manufac-
tured components. Until 2010, local content for major
public projects was set at a minimum of 70 per cent in
order to boost the growth of Chinese manufacturers.19 But
now that three of the world’s seven largest manufacturers
come from China and have increasingly started to focus
on the export trade, the government has stopped this
practice in order to avoid other countries in turn restricting
market access for Chinese producers. This strong support
for domestic manufacturers allowed the three largest wind
power companies, Sinovel, Xinjiang Goldwind and Dongfang
Electric, to increase their share of the Chinese market from
40 to 60 per cent between 2006 and 2009. During the
same period the number of international contractors fell
from 53 per cent to 11 per cent.20 During the first phase
of these wind power projects the government guarantees
a fixed subsidy, then after 30,000 hours of operation the
normal electricity price is applied. Local grid operators are
obliged to buy all the electricity produced and to provide
the necessary connections to the grid. 21
18 | Cf. The China Greentech Report 2009, 2009, 6, http://china-

greentech.com/sites/default/files/CGTR2009-REIndividual.pdf
(accessed January 11, 2011).
19 | Cf. Li Junfeng et al., China Wind Power Outlook 2010, 2010,
3-6.
20 | Cf. “Wind in China sails for Clean Energy Race,” South China
Morning Post, October 1, 2010.
21 | Cf. The China Green Tech Report 2009, n. 18, 11.
Even a target of 100 GW by 2020 may prove to be too low.

Various estimates suggest that total installed capacity will
reach up to 250 GW by 2020 and 680 GW by 2030, on
condition that by then the problems of grid integration,
forecasting and the storage of wind power
China still faces challenges in expan- have been resolved. This would mean that
ding its wind power sector. The grid by 2020 ten per cent of China’s total energy
infrastructure is insufficiently develo-
ped, making it difficult to connect wind needs could be supplied by wind power, with
turbines to it. the figure rising to 16.7 per cent by 2030.22
China still faces challenges in expanding its wind power

sector. The grid infrastructure is insufficiently developed,
making it difficult to connect wind turbines to it. Feed-in
fees are often too low to guarantee wind farm operators
a reasonable profit. And the government’s goals are all
focused on installed capacity, despite the fact that targets
for actual electricity production would make much more
sense.23 On top of this, state-owned companies tend to
offer ridiculously low prices at tender, meaning that private
and international contractors who would probably carry out
the projects in a more sustainable way are often driven out
of the market.24
Solar Power
In view of the fact that two thirds of China’s total surface

area enjoys more than 2,200 hours of sunshine per year,
the country has huge potential for the use of solar power. Up
to now the use of solar energy in the form of solar thermal
or photovoltaic installations remains under-developed and
is mainly decentralised. By 2005 the total capacity of all
PV installations was 70 MW whereas only three MW were
connected to the grid. However, photovoltaics already play
an important role in connecting remote regions to the grid.
One example is the Township Electrification Programme
2002-2004, which provided PV installations with a capacity
of 19 MW, bringing electricity to 700 villages and around
22 | Cf. Junfeng et al., n. 19, 83.

23 | In China many wind farms have already been built but cannot
supply electricity because they are not connected to the grid.
Often grid operators just buy shares in wind farms in order to
pay lip-service to government regulations but do not follow
up on their obligation to actually integrate the wind farms
into the grid. Cf. The China Greentech Report 2009, n. 18, 7.
24 | Cf. The China Greentech Report 2009, n. 18, 7.
a million people in the western regions of China.25 Solar

power is also used intensively for producing hot water:
more than 60 per cent of all rooftop solar collectors to
provide hot water worldwide can be found in China. The
total surface area of these panels is due to be expanded
from 80 million m² today to 300 million m² by 2020.26
With a market share of around 40 per cent, China is

already the worldwide market leader in the manufacture
of photovoltaic installations. However, most of these
installations are produced for the export market: In 2009
more than 90 per cent of the produced solar cells with a
total capacity of 3.6 GW were exported. An incentive was
needed to encourage greater domestic use of photovoltaic
technology, so in June 2009, as part of the Golden Sun
project, it was decided to provide subsidies
for the installation of solar panels. 50 per The Solar Roofs Programme is subsidi-
cent of the costs would be subsidised for sing building-integrated systems and
roof systems. Further subsidies are
open-space installations connected to the also being made available.
grid and 70 per cent for installations not
connected to the grid. The Solar Roofs Programme is also
subsidising building-integrated systems in the amount
of 15 RMB (1.66 Euro) per watt and roof systems with a
minimum capacity of 50 KW by 20 RMB (2.22 Euro) per
watt.27 Further subsidies are also being made available
on an individual project basis. So for example a PV power
plant in Dunhuang has a tariff rate of 1.09 yuan (0.12
Euro), more than three times higher than coal-fired power
stations. However this rate is still considered to be too low
to guarantee a profitable operation.28
Beijing is pressurising local governments to set up their

own initiatives to encourage solar installations, but so far
these have been slow to materialise. Shanghai kicked off its
100,000 Solar PV Roof Plan whereby 10,000 three KW solar
25 | Cf. Rommeney, n. 9, 46-47.

26 | Cf. Xing Xiaowen, “Xin nengyuan yuanchanye de caizheng
butie zi lu” (The development of subsidies for manufacturers
in new energies sector), Nanfengchuang (South wind window)
02/2011, 79.
27 | Cf. Claudia Wittwer, “Erste Sonnenstrahlen durchbrechen
Wolkendecke,” China Kontakt 01/2011, 22.
28 | Cf. Zhang Qi, “China hikes 2011 solar power target,” China
Daily Online, July 3, 2009, http://chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/
2009-07/03/content_8350947.htm (accessed January 17,
2011).
panels were to be installed on Shanghai’s roofs between

2006 and 2010, with another 90,000 to follow in the years
between 2011 and 2015.29 But in light of the fact that
up to 2009 the city council did not provide any financial
incentives to install small, private PV systems, by July
2009 there was just one private roof-mounted solar instal-
lation in the whole of Shanghai. For the period 2009 to
2012 Shanghai has still only planned to provide financial
assistance for larger solar roof installations.30
By 2019 China is planning to build the world’s largest solar

power station in the Qaidam basin in Qinghai province in
north-western China, with a projected initial capacity of
one gigawatt. By 2020 this capacity should rise to 20 GW
and the government is aiming to increase
International companies are faced with solar power’s contribution to total energy
the question of whether they will be consumption to five per cent by 2050. It will
largely excluded from public contracts
as happened in the wind sector. require a massive effort to achieve these
targets, but at the same time they present
domestic and international solar technology manufacturers
with huge opportunities for growth. However, international
companies are faced with the question of whether they will
be largely excluded from public contracts as happened in
the wind sector.31
Reduction CO2 Emissions from Vehicles
In 2009 China overtook the USA as the world’s largest car

market.32 The transport sector’s energy consumption is still
relatively low in global terms, at just 9 per cent, but this
will increase rapidly in the next few years due to rapid
growth in private car use. Vehicle CO2 emissions are on
course to more than triple by 2055. China is making efforts
29 | Cf. NDRC, Shanghai shiwan ge taiyangneng wuding jihua

(Shanghai’s 100,000 Solar Roofs Plan), December 28, 2005,
http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/nyjt/dcyyj/t20051228_55008.htm
(accessed January 25, 2011).
30 | Cf. Deng Li, “Taiyangneng de wuding minyong zhi lu” (The
development of the private use of solar roofs), 21 Shiji Jingji
Baodao (Business China), July 16, 2009, http://news.163.com/
09/0716/08/5EB38VFG000125LI.html (accessed January 25,
2011).
31 | Cf. Henrique Schneider, “Vorbereitung auf grünes Zeitalter,”
China Kontakt 01/2011, 18.
32 | In 2009 a total of 13.6 million vehicles were sold in China.
Cf. “Beijing hints further subsidies for alternative-fuel vehicles”,
South China Morning Post, September 10, 2010.
to limit emissions and so far is the only emerging country

that has introduced fuel consumption standards. These
standards for new cars are being progressively tightened:
In 2008 the limit was at the EU-3 level and by the end of
2010 a standard in line with EU-4 is to be implemented.
This standard is 40 per cent more strict than the one used
in the USA. An additional tax will also be levied on particu-
larly large cars.33
China is also trying to encourage the use of alternative

drivetrains in vehicles. Beijing is planning to invest up to
300 billion RMB (33.3 billion Euro) in order to become
global market leaders in the production of electric and
hybrid cars. The NDRC estimates that by 2015 there will
already be 3 million hybrids and 1.5 million purely electric
cars on China’s roads.34
In 2010 five cities were chosen to run pilot projects encour-

aging private households to buy electric cars. Beijing
granted a subsidy of 60,000 RMB (6,600 Euro) on every
electric vehicle purchased, and this amount could be even
higher in future. The first of these pilot projects has been
running in Shenzhen since May 2010, using 50 electric taxis
to show what future mobility could look like. Alongside the
assistance provided by the central government, the city
council is also subsidising the purchase of electric taxis
and taxi drivers are exempted from paying
their annual license fees. It is still expensive In order to massively expand the use
to buy an electric taxi, costing 80,000 RMB of electric vehicles, Shenzhen is plan-
ning to build 25 large charging stations
(8,800 Euro) more than a conventional taxi and equip 10,000 public car parks with
with a combustion engine, but this extra cost chargers by 2012.
is supposed to be offset within five years
through fuel savings. In order to massively expand the
use of electric vehicles, Shenzhen is planning to build 25
large charging stations and equip 10,000 public car parks
with chargers by 2012. By then, it is expected the city will
already have 35,000 electric and hybrid cars in use.35
33 | Cf. Rommeney, n. 9, 29-30.

34 | Cf. “300b yuan earmarked to develop green cars,” South
China Morning Post, January 13, 2010.
35 | Cf. “Electric-car dreams short-circuited by hype,” South China
Morning Post, January 10, 2011; “So who is winning the electric
car race?”, South China Morning Post, November 12, 2010.
Increasing Energy Efficiency
Beijing is trying to increase energy efficiency by enforcing

stricter regulations and offering energy-saving incen-
tives. These efforts are based on the Energy Conservation
Law which came into force in 1998 and the Medium and
Long-Term Energy Conservation Plan of 2004. The Energy
Conservation Law is aimed at improving industry regulation,
promoting structural changes in industry, reducing the
economy’s energy consumption and encouraging techno-
logical advances in energy conservation. It stipulates that
obsolete plant and products must be phased out and sets
specific industry standards for energy conservation.36
The Top 1,000 Energy-Consuming Enterprises Programme

sets concrete consumption reduction targets for the coun-
try’s 1,000 biggest energy consumers. These companies
are responsible for 33 per cent of China’s total energy
consumption and for 47 per cent of all industrial energy
consumption. It was planned to reduce consumption from
673 million tonnes of coal equivalent (TCE) by 100 million
TCE between 2005 and 2010. In order to hit this target,
information and training workshops were run, and the
companies taking part were obliged to regularly report
back on their energy consumption. Targets for improving
their energy efficiency were also set for certain industries
which require large amounts of energy such as the cement
and steel industries and the construction sector.37
Energy-efficient construction is an important area for

energy conservation. Experts estimate that buildings in
northern China require three times as much energy for
heating compared to buildings in similar climate conditions
in Europe. The eleventh Five Year Plan has pointed out that
120 million TCE could be saved in buildings. To this end,
the Ministry of Construction introduced energy efficiency
standards for buildings and is currently working on
restructuring heating costs. The central government was
also expected to set a good example by reducing energy
consumption in government buildings by ten per cent in
the period 2002 to 2010.
36 | Cf. “Energiespargesetz,” in: Robert Heuser and Jan De Graaf,

Umweltschutzrecht der VR China – Gesetze und Analysen, 519.
37 | Cf. Rommeney, n. 9, 23-24.
Alongside the implementation of new energy conservation

standards, small, inefficient factories are being shut down.
This also applies to coal-fired power stations, which have
undergone a massive programme of closures. By 2010 all
power stations with a capacity of less than 50 MW were to
be closed, along with all power stations with a capacity of
less than 100 MW which were more than 20 years old and
all other plants which were too far from meeting national
or regional standards.38 This resulted in around 7,500
coal-fired power stations being shut down between 2006
and 2009 alone.39 These enforced closures were met with
strong resistance from both operators and local govern-
ments as they feared cuts in revenues and job losses.
Future Challenges and Perspectives

for China’s Climate Policy
China is faced with the difficult task of uncoupling eco-

nomic growth from greenhouse gas emissions. Despite all
the efforts mentioned here, in the medium-term China’s
CO2 emissions will continue to grow. The
Director-General of the NDRC’s Department Despite all the efforts, in the medium-
of Climate Change, Su Wei, believes that term China’s CO2 emissions will conti-
nue to grow. By 2030 China will pro-
realistically an absolute reduction in CO2 bably have reached European levels in
emissions will only be achieved in 2050. terms of per-capita CO2 emissions.
By 2030 China will probably have reached
European levels in terms of per-capita CO2 emissions40,
which will lead to ever-stronger demands for the country
to reduce its emissions. But if China is to be motivated to
accept binding and absolute CO2 reduction targets through
reduced energy consumption, western countries will have
to step up their own efforts and the USA will have to set
reduction targets in line with those of European countries.
The west will also need to support China in its efforts
to build a low-carbon economy by assisting with advice
and technology transfers. In the future technologies for
carbon capture and storage (CCS)41 could be particularly
important. In the medium-term China will continue to be
38 | Cf. ibid., 28 and 34.

39 | Cf. Deborah Seligsohn et al., Fact Sheet: Energy and Climate
Policy Action in China, 2009, 2.
40 | Cf. Wacker, n. 7, 60.
41 | CCS refers to the capture of carbon dioxide from fossil fuel
emissions and its injection and permanent storage in deep
geological formations.
highly dependent on coal-fired power stations for electricity

production and to date has hardly made any moves in the
area of CCS. This support would also take into account that
around one fifth of Chinese greenhouse gases are produced
by companies manufacturing for the export market.
The People’s Republic must also make investment and

technology transfer more attractive. In particular it needs
to guarantee that intellectual property rights will be
protected and stop giving domestic manufacturers such
high levels of preferential treatment.
In order to drive forward the growth of renewable energies,

the government should set national, fixed subsidies in order
to allow operators to run their businesses in a profitable
way. This would give investors a more reliable basis for
planning and increase the incentive to build power plants
using alternative forms of energy. In adapting its legal
framework a cooperation with Germany is conceivable, as
China has already worked out its Renewable Energy Law
on the basis of the German one as an example. Existing
regulations such as the requirement for grid integration
must also be implemented more effectively. Financial
incentives or fines need to be used in order to encourage
grid operators to connect power stations which use wind
power, solar power or other new energies to the grid.
There also need to be other incentives to encourage energy

conservation such as further increases in electricity, gas and
fuel prices or state subsidies for conversion
At provincial and local level, concerns to green technologies. The implementation of
about the environment and energy ef- national climate policies seems to be particu-
ficiency generally come well behind
short-term considerations such as eco- larly difficult at provincial and at the local
nomic growth and jobs. level. Here, concerns about the environment
and energy efficiency generally come well behind short-
term considerations such as economic growth and jobs.
In an attempt to counter this, the central government has
announced that promotion opportunities for government
officials will be linked to the results they achieve in the
areas of environmental protection and energy efficiency.42
42 | Cf. Rommeney, n. 9, 52-54.

Civil society also has a significant role to play. The growing

environmental problems in the country have served
to mobilise large numbers of people to get involved in
protecting the environment. The number of green NGOs is
growing by the day, and these organisations help to raise
awareness of the environment and energy conservation
and encourage people to join the fight against climate
change. The environment and climate change now have
a much higher profile in the Chinese media, making these
topics much more mainstream within Chinese society. The
Ministry of Environmental Protection is now increasingly
pursuing its goals by working with the media and NGOs. It
is to be hoped that in future civil society will have a louder
voice in the national climate policy debate.43
Despite all these challenges, China is on the right path

when it comes to climate change. The country has moved
with the times and set itself ambitious goals, some of which
are even stricter than those set by certain industrialised
countries. The twelth Five Year Plan will probably provide
for the establishment of local pilot schemes for a national
step in combating climate change.44 Even if we cannot
expect to see a radical change in China’s position at the
climate conference in Durban at the end of the year, it will
continue to move forward on a domestic level. The People’s
Republic success will have to be measured upon whether it
will manage to achieve the self set goals.
43 | Cf. ibid., 16.

44 | Cf. Xinhua, “Shouquan fabu: Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu
zhiding guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge wuniangui-
hua de jianyi” (Authorised publication: Central government
proposals for a twelfth Five Year Plan for the development of
the nation’s economy and society), http://news.xinhuanet.com/
politics/2010-10/27/c_12708501_6.htm (accessed January
20, 2010).
Harmony as a
national mission
Singapore’s way of dealing with
Immigration and Integration
Paul Linnarz is head of

Paul Linnarz
the Media Programme
Asia of the Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung
based in Singapore.
The “Year of the Tiger”, according to the Chinese calendar,
ended beginning of February. What a relief for superstitious
Asians, who have now one problem less to worry about
with their offspring. Children born in the “Year of the Tiger”
are expected to have serious partnership problems later on
as this particular zodiac allegedly forms rather taxing and
dominating characters. These attributes are not necessarily
welcome, especially for girls. Subsequently many Asian
couples postpone having children during the tiger years.
In Singapore, where three quarters of the population have
Chinese roots, the birth rate dropped to a historical low.
In 2010 the women in the city state gave birth to 1.16

children on average. Among the Chinese population the
birth rate was 1.02 children and therefore considerably
below average, beating now even Japan (1.3) and South
Korea (1.2). In order to keep the inhabitants’ number and
age constant, each woman in Singapore should have at
least 2.1 children. Following the experience of previous
tiger-years in 1974, 1986 and 1998, where the birth rate
in the “Tiger City” dropped by up to ten per cent, 2011, the
“Year of the Rabbit”, should again produce more babies.
However, nobody expects a significant trend reversal as the
birth rate has fallen for years, independent of the zodiac.
The main problems for young couples in Singapore could
well be the costs for care and education of their children
as well as combining family and careers. The required
birth rate of 2.1 children per woman was last recorded in
Singapore in 1976. After that the birth rate fell more or

less continuously. In the eighties, the government thus
founded the “Social Development Unit” (SDU) and the
“Social Development Services” (SDS). They were estab-
lished to motivate the singles to marry and, of course, have
children. A few years ago both institutions merged to form
the “Social Development Network” (SDN), falling under
the control of the Ministry for Sports and Youth. Singapore
may well be one of the few countries worldwide, where
“Dating Parties”, and internet dating agencies (“lovebyte”)
are under the responsibility of a state department.
The idea for this marriage policy was initiated Today the state’s founder Lee Kuan
by the then prime minister Lee Kuan Yew Yew is emphatically promoting to wel-
come young immigrants now and in fu-
in 1983. He engaged himself vehemently ture. They are the remedy for an ageing
to make marriage and motherhood really society.
attractive for the well educated women. Today
the state’s founder, by now 87 years old, is emphatically
promoting to welcome young immigrants now and in future.
They are the remedy for an ageing society. “Otherwise, our
economy will slow down, like the Japanese economy. We
will have a less dynamic and less thriving Singapore. This
is not the future for our children and grandchildren.”1 In his
speech in January, in front of more than 1,000 members of
the “Chinese Clan Associations”, Lee emphasised that the
first generation of new immigrants will need some time for
the integration, however, their children would already be
“completely Singaporean”.
Expensive “Top Destination” for Immigrants
The old state founder’s appeal touches a sensitive subject:

Despite its falling birth rate, Singapore more than doubled
its population during the past thirty years. However, not
the dating agencies and the organised flirting were the
decisive factors, but the immigration from abroad. If every
adult, who wants to emigrate to and who is longing for
a life in Singapore, would then find somewhere to live in
the city, the population would increase by 219 per cent.
This makes the small island state at the Malacca Strait
world wide the “top destination” for migrants, according to
an analysis by the American Gallup Institute, presented in
1 | The Straits Times, January 19, 2011.

August 2010.2 Distinctly behind, on second place lies New

Zealand (+184 per cent).
However, many Singaporeans also watch the immigration

situation with worries. According to a recent telephone
survey by REACH, being a mixture of a governmental
opinion research institute and a discussion forum in the
internet, only 56 per cent of the questioned people were
convinced that the present restrictions for immigration at
the local job market really protects against applicants from
abroad. 18 per cent of those questioned, were against
Singapore recruiting foreign talents. It is only a minority
with an attitude like that, but in a press release about
the survey results, REACH had to admit that “a sizeable
number of respondents remain anxious
Apart from worries about an increase about competition from foreigners or are not
in competition on the job market, the convinced that such a policy will expand the
keyword “immigration” is also mentio-
ned in connection with the develop- pie for all despite repeated assurances from
ment on the housing market. the Government.”3
Apart from worries about an increase in competition on the

job market, the keyword “immigration” is also mentioned
in connection with the development on the housing market.
The prices there rose by 3.8 per cent in the second half
of 2010. The Department of Statistics of the Citiy State
registered an increase of 5,3 percent for private house-
holds with low income. The higher increase affects 20
percent of the total number of private households. This is
a development with far reaching consequences, says Davin
Chor, Economist at the Singapore Management University,
“as a high cost of housing can certainly affect when young
couples decide to marry and have children”.4
However, it is the inflation and not the demands on the

housing market or the immigration of foreigners that
pushes prices up. In December 2010 inflation reached a
2 | Cf. Neli Esipova, Julie Ray, “Migration Could Triple populations

in Some Wealthy Nations”, gallup.com, August 20, 2010,
http://gallup.com/poll/142364/Migration-Triple-Populations-
Wealthy-Nations.aspx (accessed February 16, 2011).
3 | REACH, “Reactions to PM’s National Day Rally 2010,” Media
Release, September 13, 2010, http://www.reach.gov.sg/
portals/0/MediaRelease/Reactions_to_NDR_2010.pdf
4 | The Straits Times, February 8, 2011.
two-year peak. Immigrants and local people are equally

affected. According to a survey by ECA International,
Singapore is on eighth place amongst the most expensive
cities in Asia, nearly at the same level as Hong Kong and
Shanghai.5 Seen from abroad, however, this does not seem
to compromise Singapore’s attraction for migrants.
The Singapore government has chosen two Immigration is controlled not only
strategies in order to manage the influx and with regard to demographics but also
depending on the situation of the eco-
utilise it for its own development purposes at nomy. Where integration is concerned,
the same time: Immigration is controlled not Singapore leaves nothing to chance.
only with regard to demographics but also
depending on the situation of the economy and above all,
where integration is concerned, Singapore leaves nothing
to chance. Freedom of religion, the housing market,
education policy and the media are the cornerstones of a
system that reaches out into all cracks and crevices of life.
The “Right Mixture”
Since 2010 more than five million people are living in

Singapore. That is a million people more than in 2000. 3.2
million people are Singapore citizens, eight per cent more
than at the beginning of this millennium. There are 541,000
“permanent residents” (PR) with a foreign passport. Their
percentage increased significantly by 88 per cent during
the last decade. Roughly 1.3 million foreigners work and
live in Singapore for a limited period. The number of these
“non-residents” increased by 73 per cent. Thus every third
(36 per cent) of Singapore’s inhabitants is a foreigner.
According to the published information of the department

for statistics, in January 2011, the number of residents
(with and without citizenship) comprises of 74.1 per cent
Chinese, 13.4 per cent Malaysians, 9.2 per cent Indians
and 3.3 per cent people of other nationalities.6 The group of
5 | Cf. ECA International, “Singapore climbs to 8th most

expensive Asian city,” Media Release, December 2, 2010,
http://www.eca-international.com/news/press_releases/7278
6 | Cf. Department of Statistics, “Demographic Characteristics,
Education, Language and Religion,” Census of Population 2010 –
Statistical Release 1 (Singapur 2010), http://www.singstat.gov.
sg/pubn/popn/C2010sr1/cop2010sr1.pdf (accessed February
16, 2011).
“permanent residents” comprises of 61.4 per cent Chinese,

three per cent Malaysians, 20.4 per cent Indians and 15.2
per cent migrants from other world religions.
The terms “Chinese”, “Malaysian” or “Indian” in statistics

as well as in ordinary language refer not only to the
country of origin but also to the affiliation with a certain
“ethnic group”. Cultural, linguistic and religious criteria are
the factors for grouping people as well as the nationality.
Each of Singapore’s citizens (“resident”), independent from
whether immigrant or local, belongs to one of the different
ethnic groups in the register of residents. Therefore
there are 2.2 million citizens called “Chinese”, although
they were born in Singapore. From the nearly 590,000
Chinese of foreign origin, 340,000 come from Malaysia and
only 175,000 from China, Hong Kong and Macao. 2,278
Chinese living in Singapore were born in Europe. About
470,000 of the nearly half a million “Malaysians”, or better
“Malays”, were born in Singapore. Nearly 11,000 citizens of
Indonesian origin also belong to this group. The “Indians”
include also Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.
Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong hold For several decades Singapore has already
his speech at the occasion of the natio- been a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society.
nal holiday in August in three different
languages: Malayan, Mandarin and It is for that reason that the Prime Minister,
English. Lee Hsien Loong, hold his speech in three
different languages at the occasion of the national holiday
in August: Malayan, Mandarin and English. A decisive factor
for the immigration policy of his government is not to shift
the “mixing ratio” in the population in favour of or at the
expense of an ethnic group. This does not only apply to a
percentage of the overall population but for example also
to the affiliation with the different religions. The anxiety
especially amongst the “minority communities” for a
“foreign infiltration” was picked up in a reassuring remark
in Lee’s speech at the occasion of the national holiday last
year: “The current mix is stable, and contributes to our
racial and religious harmony.”7
7 | Text and video on http://www.channelnewsasia.com/nd2010

“Muscular Secularism”
Due to a controlled residence and working permit strategy,

the percentages of the various ethnic groups in relation to
the total population has only changed insignificantly over
the past decade. More significant are the results of the
last census in 2010, which show deviations
concerning religious affiliations: over the The percentage of Christians rose con-
past decade the percentage of Buddhists fell siderably from 14.6 to 18.3. It has
overtaken the Islam in Singapore today
from 42.5 to now 33.3 per cent. Taoism has with 14.7 per cent. Hinduism has also
risen to a percentage of now 10.9 compared risen.
to 2000, where the percentage was 8.5.
The percentage of Christians rose considerably from 14.6
to 18.3. It has overtaken the Islam in Singapore today
with 14.7 per cent (2000: 14.9 per cent). Hinduism has
also risen from 4 per cent 10 years ago to 5.1 per cent at
present.8
Freedom of religion is guaranteed in the Constitution of the

city state. That means that the religions with the largest
number of followers in Singapore have a right to a certain
number of statutory holidays. Christmas is therefore
celebrated as well as the Buddhist Vesak celebrations,
the Chinese New Year or the Hari Raya for Muslims. The
holidays affect the whole population. Schools, offices
and authorities for example stay closed on those days.
At the same time the government is, however, watching
very closely that no fundamentalist influences are spread.
Also authorities react very sensitively to public criticism
of other religions and missionary activities and publica-
tions that could disturb the “religious harmony” are legally
prohibited.9
Muslim women are not allowed to wear a head scarf

(“tudung” in Singapore) at state schools. Each breach
of this regulation for obligatory school uniform can have
consequences going as far as being excluded from lessons.
However, male Sikhs are allowed to wear their turban in
school. At the end of the eighties the religious education
(“Religious Knowledge Curriculum”) at schools was replaced
8 | Cf. The Straits Times, January 13, 2011.

9 | Cf. inter alia “Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act,”
http://statutes. agc.gov.sg/non_version/cgi-bin/cgi_retrieve.
pl?actno=REVED-167A (accessed February 16, 2011).
by a “Civic and Moral Education Programme”. In 2009 Sin-

gapore’s Vice President, Wong Kan Seng reasoned the
principle of “muscular secularism” with the words: “We
are not a Christian Singapore, or a Muslim Singapore, or a
Buddhist or Hindu Singapore. We are a secular Singapore,
in which Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus and others
all have to live in peace with one another.”10
Tower without Babel
There is hardly another country in the world, where

“communication” plays a larger role than in Singapore,
where more than every third inhabitant is of foreign origin.
For that reason English became the first teaching language
back in the sixties. The reason behind this was to ensure
that the different population groups in Singapore are able
to communicate with each other “neutrally”. On the other
hand the lingua franca dominates every day life even
today, because it promotes the international competition
for Singapore, which depends on export and international
financial service providers.
With its declared aim “to integrate new arrivals into our
society, so that over time they will become Singaporean in
their outlook and identity”,11 the government promotes not
only the mutual English language but also the
The “mother tongue” policy dictates mother tongues of other ethnical groups. The
a school education with at least two so-called “mother tongue” policy dictates a
languages. Originally this was imple-
mented with a view to the economic school education with at least two languages.
development. Originally this was implemented with a view to
the young state and its economic development. Promoting
and maintaining the knowledge of Mandarin for example
meant that trading with China became easier. Apart from
that, teaching in the mother-tongue of various different
ethnic groups today is also supposed to encourage cultural
roots and traditions.
English is already taught in Kindergarten to about half of

the three to six year olds, alongside with the three main
languages Chinese (Mandarin), Tamil and Malay (Bahasa).
10 | Kumar Ramakrishna, “‘Muscular’ versus ‘Libera’. Secularism

and the Religious Fundamentalist Challenge in Singapore,”
RSIS Working Paper, No. 202 (Singapore, 2010), 9 et seq.
11 | Cf. n. 7.
Starting with primary school, most subjects are taught in

English. During the first to fourth school year (“foundation
stage”) Tamil is offered together with non-Tamil languages
such as Hindi, Bengali, Gujarati, Punjabi and Urdu. The
“orientation stage” during the fifth and sixth school year
divides the mother-tongue lessons into basic, standard and
raised levels. Primary school ends after the sixth year with
an exam. The result decides, whether the child prepares
for a “special”, “express”, “normal (academic)” or “normal
(technical)” career during the following years.
“Special” and “express” have been designed for four years

until year 10. Both categories finish with an exam, the
so-called “O-Level”. The difference mainly consists of the
teaching of languages. Besides English, Chinese, Tamil
and Malay are taught; however “special” means that the
teaching is based on a higher level. Students who do not
fulfil the minimum requirements (defined by the State)
for the mother-tongue at “O-Level” have to stay on for
another year.
Instead of or in addition to the above three most important

languages, many schools have a choice – apart from
the obligatory English – of French, German, Arabic and
Japanese. Some international schools also offer Spanish
or Korean. They are sometimes preferred as substitute
mother-tongue (even by Chinese, Malaysians
and Indians, respectively the ethnic groups Students who are neither Chinese nor
described as such), when children and youths Malaysian are allowed to choose Chi-
nese or Malay respectively as third
who lived in these countries for several years language. This is taught outside regu-
and come or return to Singapore with the lar school hours.
start of their school education. Students who
are neither Chinese nor Malaysian are allowed to choose
Chinese or Malay respectively as third language. This is
taught outside regular school hours.
Both “normal” branches are more directed towards

technical or business management (book-keeping, admin-
istration) teaching. They finish after five years with an
“O-Level” exam. On a higher level, the school career ends
after altogether twelve years either with an “International
Baccalaureate IB Diploma” resp. “IB Certificate” or with
the so-called “A-Level”.
“Language” as a means for integration in Singapore is

not an “either, or”, but an “as well as” of English (plus
third foreign language) and mother-tongue. As from next
year, the teaching and learning methods for
More and more primary school pupils mother-tongue lessons is going to be impro-
speak English either exclusively or ved, due to an analysis by the “language
most of the time at home with their
parents, siblings and relatives. review committee”, presented in January,
according to which more and more primary
school pupils speak English either exclusively or most of
the time at home with their parents, siblings and relatives.
Amongst the school starters of Chinese origin, the

percentage increased from 28 per cent twenty years ago
to 59 per cent today. Amongst school starters of Indian
origin English dominates now with 58 per cent (1991:
49 per cent). 37 per cent of the Malaysian class mates
mainly communicate in English with their parents. Twenty
years ago it was only 13 per cent. “If you want to keep the
language, (…) you have to teach them (the pupils) to use
it”, Education Minister Ng Eng Hen urged, when presenting
the report to the teachers. He continued with regard to
homes and society; “homes will have to support that kind
of environment, and the community will have to support
that kind of environment.”12 Hence, the government
explicitly intents a lively manifold of languages.
There are two measures, which are supposed to stop

the decrease: By 2015 there are going to be another
500 teachers for mother-tongue lessons, in addition to
the already existing 6,666 teachers. More important
however is the news, that teaching methods are changing.
With reference to examples from the U.S., China, India,
Malaysia and Australia, exams will in future test the ability
of “active and interactive” communication, and students
will no longer have to put up with materials of “archaic
scenarios”, old-fashioned subjects and content.
Percentages against Enclaves
The greater part of Singapore’s population lives in blocks

of flats, which normally consist of several hundred apart-
ments. Since the late sixties the houses are part of the pub-
lic housing construction. The “Housing and Development
12 | The Straits Times, January 19, 2011.

Board” (HDB), part of the Ministry for National Deve-

lopment, is in charge. The flats are of different sizes and
interior and are generally not rented but bought and sold
again when moving. Only people who have a monthly
income of not more than 8,000 Singapore Dollars (at
present about 4,600 Euro) are entitled to purchase a HDB
flat. The upper limit refers to the family income of each
household.
Even on the housing market the government of this

immigration country does not leave anything to chance.
With the aim to promote the “racial integra-
tion and harmony”, to avoid “racial enclaves”, Singapore’s “Ethnic Integration Policy”
and to ensure a “balanced ethnic mix among dictates who is entitled to purchase
and sell HDB flats and in which buil-
the various ethnic communities”, Singapore ding they are allowed to live.
has subscribed to the so-called “Ethnic Inte-
gration Policy” EIP.13 It dictates who is entitled to purchase
and sell HDB flats and in which building they are allowed
to live.
Singapore citizens and the groups of Malaysian origin

“permanent residents”, are partly excluded from these
regulations. The common culture and history between
Singapore and Malaysia are given as reason. “Permanent
residents”, who belong to another ethnic group, are only
allowed to occupy eight per cent of all flats in a block
and only five per cent of all flats in the immediate neigh-
bourhood. Is this quota fulfilled, potential purchasers of a
flat can be refused to buy in this particular building and
they have to try another block of flats. Sellers also have to
submit to this quota. The question, whom to sell the flat
to, is therefore not only depending on the offer but also on
the ethnic origin of the interested people.
Despite their common history and culture, care is taken that

with respect to the Singapore citizens and the “permanent
residents” of Malaysian origin, one ethnic group does not
occupy all flats in one block of flats. The upper limit for
citizens of Chinese origin with or without passport, is 84 per
cent of all flats in the immediate neighbourhood and not
13 | Housing and Development Board, “Ethnic Integration Policy &

SPR Quota,” http://www.hdb.gov.sg/fi10/fi10321p.nsf/w/Buy
ResaleFlatEthnicIntegrationPolicy_EIP?OpenDocument
more than 87 per cent of all apartments in one building.

The quota for Malaysians is 22 respectively 25 per cent,
for “Indians and Others” 12 respectively 15 per cent.14 The
remaining flats are to be occupied by citizens with other
ethnic origin. The EIP quota for each block of flats corre-
sponds roughly to the percentage of the different ethnic
groups in the total population.
“Permanent residents” as well as Singapore citizens receive

financial support when buying a HDB-flat. It is a maximum
of 30000 Singapore Dollars. This is another incentive to
promote integration, because since last year, perspective
flat owners who have citizenship receive 10,000 Singapore
Dollars more than a “permanent resident”. Since couples
who are younger than 35 are only allowed to buy HDB-flats
if they are married, the regulation “citizens come first”
refers to both partners. Even in a mixed marriage between
a citizen and a “permanent resident”, the State cuts the
allowance to a maximum of 20,000 Singapore Dollars.
The remaining 10,000 Singapore Dollars are paid retro-
spectively to those who decide to apply for a Singapore
passport after having bought the flat or who have at least
a child with Singapore citizenship.
Jobs arranged by Quotas
The present benchmark figures for the immigration policy

were fixed in the “Manpower 21 Plan” by the Singapore
Government in 1999, thus strengthening its
Singapore heavily relies on less or even position internationally as “city of talents”,
hardly qualified people from abroad. powered by the knowledge and innovation
Since the late sixties, the city state has
repeatedly eased the regulations for an of the “New Economy”. Biomedicine, chemis-
influx of foreign workers. try, electronics and environmental techno-
logy as well as financial service providers and health care
were identified as being the most promising growing
markets. Well trained foreign specialists, scientists and
engineers with special knowledge in these areas were and
still are welcome to the country. Apart from that Singapore
heavily relies on less or even hardly qualified people from
14 | Housing and Development Board, “Policy changes to support

an inclusive and cohesive home,” Media Release, March 5, 2011
http://www.news.gov.sg/public/sgpc/en/media_releases/
agencies/hdb/press_release/P-20100305-4/AttachmentPar/
0/file/Press_Release-SC_SPR-EIP-SPR_Q.pdf (accessed March
28, 2011).
abroad. Since the late sixties, the city state has repeatedly
eased the regulations for an influx of foreign workers,
especially for the construction sector, transport industry,
shipbuilding as well as nurses for hospitals and old peoples’
homes. Many less qualified female foreigners are employed
as domestic workers.
Residence and work permits are granted in a staggered

manner, depending on the monthly income, qualifica-
tions and the area of employment respectively the area
of activity (type of business). The question how many
low skilled foreign workers with a so-called “R” pass are
allowed to work for which economy sector
in Singapore is organised according to fixed All enterprises are dictated to how
quotas. The country of origin is an important many foreign workers they are allo-
wed to have altogether and how many
deciding factor.15 All enterprises, depending from certain countries, in relation to
on the kind of business, are dictated to how the total number of employees.
many foreign workers they are allowed to
have altogether and how many from certain countries,
in relation to the total number of employees. For every
“R” pass owner, employers have to make a contribution to
the state. The monthly income of a “R” pass owner must
not exceed 1,800 Singapore Dollars (about 1,000 Euro at
present).
Employees who earn at least 7,000 Singapore Dollars a

month (about 4,000 Euro at present) qualify for a “P1”
work permit. Work permit owners are allowed to bring
their next of kin into the country (partner and children
under 21). Partners and children, however, fall under a
special status “Dependant’s Pass”, which must be applied
for separately. Foreigners with a “P1”-work permit are also
entitled to apply for a “Personalised Employment Pass”.
This pass increases the residence permit to five years
maximum. People who lose their job within this period
are allowed to stay in Singapore up to six months without
income, in order to find a new job. “P1” work permit or
“PEP” permit give foreigners the chance to apply for the
status of “permanent resident” and citizenship.
15 | For the building industry e.g. workers from Malaysia, China,

India, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Philippines,
Pakistan, Hong Kong, Macao, South Korea and Taiwan can be
recruited at present. For the manufacturing industry only
workers from Malaysia, China, Hong Kong, Macao, South
Korea and Taiwan are permitted.
A “P2”-work permit requires a monthly salary of at least

3,500 Singapore Dollars (at present 2,000 Euro). A “P2”
owner can also become a “permanent resident”, should
however wait at least about two years. The rest of the
regulations correspond to the “P1” status.
The “Q1” work permit is issued with a monthly salary of at

least 2,500 Singapore Dollars (approx. 1,450 Euro). Only
when reaching this salary level, foreign workers are allowed
to bring their next of kin into the country. Below this level,
starting with a salary from 1,800 Singapore Dollars, the
so-called “S” pass is issued. For this group the employers
have to make a monthly contribution. Occuption quota also
apply. The foreign owner of an “S” pass is also entitled to
the status of “permanent resident” and citizenship. As a
rule, however, applying for this will only be successful after
a residence of four to five years.
Work permits of a P, Q or S status are normally issued for

one to two years. A repeated extension can be applied for,
as long as the applicant has a regular income. The status
of “permanent resident”, however, will be granted for five
years initially, followed by an extension of a further five
years and more. Losing a job and regular income does not
e.g. force a “permanent resident”, to leave the country,
contrary to the “non-residents”. “PRs” can already apply
for citizenship after two years. They pay a monthly contri-
bution to the “Central Provident Fund” (CPF), just the same
as Singapore citizens. This saving will provide security
for old age. The money from the CPF may also be used,
under certain conditions, to purchase a HDB-flat. They are
considered a provision for old age in Singapore.
The “Employment Pass”, in its different stages, controls

immigration not only under demographic but also under
economic aspects. If some sectors in the
If sectors in the economy are not per- economy are not performing well, then fewer
forming well, then fewer foreigners foreigners are allowed into the country and
are allowed into the country. Work
permits for migrants are sectorally in- vice versa, work permits for migrants are
creased during booming phases. sectorally increased during booming phases.
The proportion of “non-residents”, compared
to the growth in population in 2008, was 4.2 per cent, while
only 0.6 per cent respectively 0.7 per cent of the growth
was “permanent residents” and new citizens. When in 2009
the global economy and financial crisis reached Singapore,

the percentage of new “non-residents” compared to the
population growth sank to one per cent last year. The
percentage of new “permanent residents” sank to 0.2 per
cent.
On the whole especially the number of low earners was

reduced. In June the number of fully employed workers
with a monthly income of 1,200 Singapore Dollars (at
present about 690 Euro) and less was 262,000, about
five per cent below the level of the previous year. Last
year 77.1 per cent of all citizens between 25 and 64 were
employed. The employment rate in Singapore is as high as
it used to be in 1991.16
Successes like these are picked up and According to the “Maintenance of Reli-
reported in length by the media in the gious Harmony Act″, publications crea-
ting “feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-
South-East Asian city state. They, too, are will, or hostility between different reli-
part of the integration policy. Press and gious groups″ are prohibited.
radio produce in various languages of the
largest ethnic groups (English, Chinese, Malay and Tamil).
According to the “Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act”,
publications creating “feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-will, or
hostility between different religious groups” are prohibited
for press and radio.17
Despite an impressive economic development and

immense efforts with regard to integration, the subject
remains sensitive: “I do not deceive myself for one moment
that our differences of race, culture, language, religion,
have disappeared”, Singapore’s state founder warned in
January at the presentation of the book Lee Kuan Yew:
Hard Truths to Keep Singapore Going,18 published by the
“Singapore Press Holdings”. According to the state founder,
the present and future generations have to take responsi-
bility “to understand the vulnerability, the fragility of our
society and keep it in cohesion, keep it united and keep it
16 | The Straits Times, December 1, 2010.

17 | Cf. “Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act,” http://statutes.
agc.gov.sg/non_version/cgi-bin/cgi_retrieve.pl?actno=
REVED-167A (accessed February 16, 2011).
18 | AFP, “Preserve racial, religious unity: Lee Kuan Yew,” asiaone
news, January 21, 2011, http://news.asiaone.com/News/
AsiaOne%2BNews/Singapore/Story/A1Story20110121-2596
11.html (accessed February 16, 2011).
as it is today, tolerant of each other, accommodating each

other”.19 Muslims as well as non-Muslims did not want to
let some remarks in the book pass uncommented. Lee,
who today carries the title “Minister Mentor”, and to whom
the press sometimes only refers to as “MM”, is quoted in
an online contribution of “Today” with the text: “I think
we were progressing very nicely until the surge of Islam
came, and if you asked me for my observations, the other
communities have easier integration – friends, intermar-
riages and so on, Indians with Chinese, Chinese with
Indians – than Muslims. That’s the result of the surge from
the Arab states.” It continues: “I would say, today, we can
integrate all religions and races except Islam. I think the
Muslims socially do not cause any trouble, but they are
distinct and separate.”20 Lee Hsien Loong, the son of the
state founder and present Prime Minister, reassures the
public end of January: “But my own perspectives on how
things are in Singapore based on my interaction with the
Malay community, the mosque and religious leaders and
the grassroots leaders, is not quite the same as MM’s.” The
opinions mentioned in his father’s book are, so the Prime
Minister, of personal nature.21
19 | Ibid.
20 | S. Ramesh, “It’s a matter of perspective,” todayonline.com,
January 31, 2011, http://todayonline.com/Singapore/
EDC110131-0000092 (accessed February 16, 2011).
21 | S. Ramesh, “Muslims have done much to strengthen integra-
tion, says PM Lee,” channelnewsasia.com, January 30, 2011,
http://channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/
view/1107843/1/.html (accessed February 16, 2011).
Post-Election Slovakia
The First Half-Year of the Center-Right
Government
Grigorij Mesežnikov
The year 2010 was full of significant events in Slovakia.

The citizens decided about the new government for the
upcoming four years, about the quality of relationship with
its southern neighbor Hungary, the trends in relationships
between the majority Slovak population and minority
groups, especially ethnic Hungarians, and how the Slovak
Republic should act as a member state of EU in deciding
on participation in the eurozone bailout. It was the year of Grigorij Mesežnikov
complicated decisions for both citizens and politicians. is one of the most
influential analysts
of Slovakian politics.
Results and context of the 2010 He is co-founder
Slovak parliamentary elections and president of the
Institute for Public
Affairs (IVO) in
In the year 2010 there was a major political power Bratislava.
shift in the country. After the parliamentary elections in
June, the new ruling coalition has been formed, having
an absolute majority of mandates in parliament (79 out
of 150). Four parties have created the coalition, two of
which had had seats in parliament in 2006-2010 term as
opposition parties (Slovak Democratic and Christian Union,
SDKÚ-DS and Christian Democratic Movement, KDH), one
party (Most-Híd, Bridge) was created by fragmentation of
another opposition parliamentary party (Party of Hungarian
Coalition, SMK), and one party was founded in 2009 as
a brand new political formation (Freedom and Solidarity,
SaS).
The fundamental agreement regarding the formation of the

new ruling coalition has been reached by the representa-
tives of the four center-right parties SDKÚ-DS, SaS, KDH
and Most-Híd virtually instantly after the announcement
of the election results. For confirmation of the solidity
and constancy of this position the leading representatives

of these parties have unanimously refused not only to
negotiate with Smer-Social Democracy party (Smer-SD,
Direction) about possible coalition cooperation, but also
just to meet with its delegates. The reasons for this
refusal have not been only program- and ideology-based
differences between Smer-SD and center-right parties.
The reasons have been much deeper, having origins in
previous election terms: an unacceptable authoritarian
attitude of Smer-SD to execution of power, attempts of
this party to de-legitimize and criminalize center-right
opposition parties and their representatives in the years
2006-2010, the conflictual-type-personality
Smer-SD was actually founded as a of Robert Fico, who has been oriented on
power-political project of certain entre- a constant evocation of political confronta-
preneurs, which during its administra-
tion was building a system, based on tions and last but not least the incriminating,
party cronyism. suspicious background behind creation and
activities of Smer-SD. This party was actually founded
as a power-political project of certain entrepreneurs with
unclear, dubious financing, which during its administration
was building a system, based on party cronyism, creating
spawn for corruption. Possible coalition alliance with
Smer-SD, therefore, might have been discrediting for the
center-right parties.
For many citizens of SR four years of nationalist-populist

government of Smer-SD, SNS and ĽS-HZDS led by Fico
had symbolized an era of arrogance of power, breaching
of the basic rules of law, deepening of the state debt,
confrontational anti-minorities politics and primitive
aggressive nationalism. The election confirmed that this
politics had been disliked by a substantial part of the
society, and even the good share of the popular vote
for Smer-SD, which has been forced to step down, has
not changed anything about it. Four years of Smer-SD
government have clearly shown that this party had never
been a standard social-democratic formation, for which it
has been presenting itself. It is a political project, based
on personal power ambitions of Fico, former deputy of the
post-communist Party of the Democratic Left (SDĽ), and
economic interests of a narrow group of entrepreneurs,
who had become wealthy during Vladimír Mečiar’s era
thanks to the wild privatization and generous state orders.
It has always been, in fact, a typical populist formation,
whose ideological quintessence has been the combination

of etatist rhetoric in the form of declaring “strong social
(welfare) state” and an old-fashioned ethnic nationalism,
presenting defense of “national state” interests and
resistance to “Great Hungary’s politics”.
Table 1
Results of parliamentary elections in Slovakia,
June 12, 2010
Total ballots Share of the Seats in

Party cast popular vote (%) parliament
European Democratic Party (EDS) 10,332 0.40 —

Union – Party for Slovakia (Únia) 17,741 0.70 —
Party of Romani Coalition (SRK) 6,947 0.27 —
Paliho Kapurková 14,576 0.57 —
Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) 307,287 12.14 22
Party of Democratic Left (SDĽ) 61,137 2.41 —
Party of Hungarian Coalition (SMK) 109,638 4.33 —
People’s Party – Movement for a
109,480 4.32 —
Democratic Slovakia (ĽS-HZDS)
Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS) 21,104 0.83 —
Slovak National Party (SNS) 128,490 5.07 9
New Democracy (ND) 7,962 0.31 —
Association of Slovak Workers (ZRS) 6,196 0.24 —
Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) 215,755 8.52 15
People’s Party Our Slovakia (ĽSNS) 33,724 1.33 —
Slovak Democratic and Christian Union –
390,042 15.42 28
Democratic Party (SDKÚ-DS)
AZEN – Alliance for Europe of Nations 3,325 0.13 —
Smer – Social Democracy (Smer-SD) 880,111 34.79 62
Most–Híd [Bridge] 205,538 8.12 14
Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, 2010
Program basis and activity

of the new government
In the beginning of July 2010, several days after the

signing of a new coalition agreement between four center-
right parties, president Ivan Gašparovič appointed Iveta
Radičová, deputy chairperson and election leader of
SDKÚ-DS, as Prime Minister of the government. For the first
time in the history of the country, the highest government
position has been assigned to a woman, for the first time
since the fall of the communist regime in 1989, there is not

a single person in the Slovak government, who would have
been a former member of the Communist Party (in Fico’s
government there were ten such people out of 16). These
two facts have also shown the nature of change that 2010
parliamentary election has brought to Slovakia.
The program of the new government, approved by the

parliament in August 2010, contains a set of measures
aimed at expanding the space for free market economy
mechanisms, strengthening the democratic character of
the state, keeping the institutions of public
The new government has unequivo- power stable and functioning, strengthening
cally taken over the political legacy the genuine independence of judiciary and
of the second government of Mikuláš
Dzurinda that had implemented the increasing transparency in public life. The
series of deep structural, especially new government has unequivocally taken
social-economic, reforms.
over the political legacy of the second
government of Mikuláš Dzurinda from
2002-2006 electoral term, when that conservative-liberal
cabinet had implemented the series of deep structural,
especially social-economic, reforms. Those, in return, had
transformed Slovakia to the Central-European “reform
tiger”, with their top accomplishment, integrating the
country into EU and NATO. After four years of nationalist
leftist government led by Fico, that had been promoting
the model of “strong social state” and had been trying
to amend some of Dzurinda’s reforms, the exceptional
position of Slovakia as a successful transforming country
became history.
After the first six-month of the new government, some

changes in several areas are worth noticing. The main
slogans of the new politics have become consolidation
of public finances, increase in the transparency in public
life, fight with corruption and cronyism, restoring the
feel of justice and trust of citizens towards the state.
The atmosphere in the society has changed quickly. The
tension in Slovak-Hungarian relations has decreased, both
inter-ethnic and inter-state. Radical nationalist discourse,
which had been fed for several years by nationalist SNS
with an active assistance of Smer-SD, has perished almost
completely. Also those aggressive attacks on independent
media and NGOs that Fico’s government had been regularly
practicing have vanished into history.
Government priorities: transparency and

consolidation of the economy
In the very initial period of its administration, the new

government has focused not only on the implementation
of its program declaration, but also on summarizing
the current state of affairs, which Fico’s cabinet had
bequeathed. It was important to elucidate to the general
public the real results of “building of the social state” in
the version of Smer-SD, which thanks to the compelling
“social” rhetoric has been persistently disposing with
the high support from the general public. Ministers of
Radičová’s cabinet have released information about the
cronyist or openly corrupt background of many previous
government’s projects, about suspicious, non-transparent
circumstances of public procurement and about numerous
cases of uneconomical treatment with state resources. It
has been referring to several ministries – Defense, Labor,
Social Affairs and Family, Transportation, Economy, Culture,
Education, Foreign Affairs, Justice, and Finance. In some
cases, criminal charges have been filed to the prosecutor’s
office for the suspicion of offence. In these cases the inves-
tigation has begun. Unprecedented release of information
about misuse by the former government representatives
with strong, in some cases, even macroeconomic impact,
has been significant in two aspects: first, the
new government’s commitment to fight with The new government virtually imme-
corruption and cronyism, and second, the diately after its onset has begun to rea-
lize the program of increasing trans-
depth and extent of cronyism and corruption parency and strengthening control in
achieved in the previous election term. handling the public resources.
The new government virtually immediately after its onset

has begun to realize the program of increasing trans-
parency and strengthening control in handling the public
resources. Here its effort has had a concrete, tangible
form. Central register of contracts has been made available
on the internet to the general public after parliament had
approved the distinct novel of Civil Code. These contracts
were signed by state organs in purchasing of goods and
services.
As Slovakia’s economy is feeling negative impacts of global

economy crisis as well as impacts of problematic social-
economical politics of the former government, the cabinet
of Radičová has concentrated its efforts first and foremost

on public finances stabilization. It has managed to pass
the collection of austerity economical measures, aimed at
decreasing the state budget deficit. Whereas during Fico’s
cabinet this deficit had increased from three per cent in
2006 to almost eight per cent in 2010, Radičová’s cabinet
has planned its decrease to less than five per cent in 2011.
Although current coalition parties had promised before the
elections not to increase taxes, after revelation of the real
state of the state budget and after a long discussion they
have made one exception – to temporarily increase the
value added tax (VAT) about one per cent – from former 19
to 20 per cent. Increased VAT, however, would have been
valid only during the time, when the state budget deficit
would have exceeded three per cent, as soon as the deficit
would have been less, the original tariff of VAT would be
restored.
Correction of Fico’s deformations
There has been recently some progress in stabilizing the

political democracy, the institutions of the constitutional
system and the principles of rule of law. In an era of pursuing
the methods of “tyranny of the majority”, the coalition of
Smer-SD, SNS and ĽS-HZDS had openly marginalized
opposition parties in parliament, making its MPs mere
political extras, had weakened the controlling function of
parliament and had negatively influenced the quality of
legislation. In contrast, the new majority has been pursuing
its will in parliament without breaching the principles of
procedural consensus and has not been jeopardizing the
parliament’s basic functions. Proposals and
Despite the conflicting relations, the remarks of opposition MPs have not been a
opposition is not marginalized in parlia- priori rejected only because they have been
ment, whereas the new coalition is set
to negotiate legitimate request from made by opposition delegates. Despite the
opposition. conflicting relations between opposition
and ruling coalition, the opposition is not marginalized in
parliament, whereas the new coalition as a whole as well
as its individual parties are set to negotiate and accept
legitimate request from opposition.
The new government has developed a remarkable effort

in order to correct legislative and political deformations
inherited by Fico’s government. In the legislation area, it
has involved mainly laws related to the status of minority

groups, even though the correction has been up until now
rather partial. For instance, parliament has passed the
amendment of State Language Act, which softened several
regulations of the amendment of this same law adopted
during Fico’s rule which had had distinctly restrictive
character towards the rights of minority groups’ members
to use their mother tongue. The new amendment, however,
has kept the most controversial regulation –
fines for breaching the law, even though it The overall status from the perspec-
has canceled its mandatory character and tive of execution of rights of minority
groups’ members to use their mother
has lowered the limits of fines. The case of tongue today is still worse than before
the amendment of a State Language Act is amendments initiated by Fico’s ruling
coalition.
an illustrative example of how complicated
the restoration to the original state is that
had existed before inappropriate legislative changes.
Although some problematic regulations of the amendment
adopted during Fico’s rule have been finally removed, the
overall status from the perspective of execution of rights
of minority groups’ members to use their mother tongue
today is still worse than before amendments initiated by
Fico’s ruling coalition.
Also the amendment of the State Citizenship Act has been

submitted to parliament. In case of being passed, it would
eliminate the possibility to be involuntary deprived of the
Slovak citizenship for those citizens of Slovakia who acquired
the citizenship of a foreign state. With this legislation Fico’s
government in summer 2010 reacted to the amendment
of a State Citizenship Act passed by the Hungarian
parliament. The proposal for the Hungarian amendment
was made by the ruling party Fidesz. The amendment of
Radičová’s cabinet should have annulled the validity of the
Hungarian law on the Slovakia’s territory and should have
revoked the fees for not informing the authorities about
acquiring of foreign state citizenship introduced by Fico’s
government. Alongside the positive effect on inter-ethnic
relations in Slovakia and status of members of Hungarian
minority, the aforementioned amendment might, in case of
being passed, contribute to the continuing improvement of
bilateral relationship between Slovakia and Hungary.
Ruling coalition vs. opposition: showdown
The situation in the new ruling coalition was relatively

stable in the second half of 2010. No serious conflicts were
registered. Relations between the ruling parties were well-
balanced, no party aspired for dominance. Although the
leader of opposition Fico was continuously repeating that
the ruling coalition was in fact zlepenec (an-organic glued-
together bunch of things), held together only by the desire
of power, in reality the program-based accordance of the
four parties in the fundamental issues of practical politics
proved to be a very strong bond, which made it possible to
pass 53 laws and amendments of laws in parliament during
four months from August to December 2010 virtually
without any hesitations.
Due to the inexperience of some political newcomers,

especially from the SaS party, information about compli-
cated negotiations on reaching a coalition consensus
sometimes was leaked into the media before an agreement
had been reached. This was making an impression as if
there was a chaos in coalition. After reaching the principle
agreement about support of submitted legislation
proposals, however, these were then passed smoothly in
parliament. The only exception was the amendment of the
excise tax on beer, when four MPs from KDH, surprisingly
even to their own party, abstained during the voting. The
amendment thus was not passed. Coalition cooperation,
however, was not weakened by this minute hesitation.
The special case has been the situation within SDKÚ-DS

and relations between Iveta Radičová, Prime Minister and
deputy of this party, and Mikuláš Dzurinda,
Speculations have started to arise as chairman of the party and Minister of Foreign
to whether the different mutual sub- Affairs. After both of them have become
ordination, Dzurinda inside the party
and Radičová inside the government, members of the new cabinet, considerations
would have led to tension and conflicts. and speculations have started to arise as to
whether it would have caused “sparkling”
between two politicians and whether the different mutual
subordination, one inside the party and another inside
the government, would have led to tension and conflicts.
Nothing of that kind, however, has occurred yet. Radičová
has been repeatedly emphasizing that she has not been
having any ambitions to become the chairperson of the
party at this time and that she is fully supporting Dzurinda

in remaining in his post. Dzurinda, reciprocally, has been
continuously repeating that from his position of chairman
he is unconditionally supporting Radičová as Prime Minister
and that by doing so he is also expressing the position of the
entire party. Fico, though, claims that Radičová is a weak
prime minister in comparison to himself during 2006-2010
electoral term, since she is not chairperson of her party
as he has been. However the reality is quite different.
In certain situations Radičová has shown to her coalition
partners from SaS, KDH and Most-Híd and to the members
of the government that she has taken full responsibility for
being Prime Minister with all the competences that go with
it. She has been using these competences in such a way
that no one has had doubts as to who is being the leader
of coalition and government. She has several times sharply
revised ministers of her government when deciding about
concrete measures, and with no regard to these revisions
being always well justified, she has demonstrated her
strong political position very clearly.
Alongside the program-based accord among the current

coalition parties, there has been another strong bond
within the ruling coalition: the existence Smer-SD, the
common political rival with strong power-based ambitions.
The profile of this party and the results of
its rule are well known to the current ruling All of the center-right formations conti-
parties. All of the center-right formations nue to refuse any coalition cooperation
with Smer-SD. They also realize very
concordantly continue to refuse any possible well that any kind of enfeeblement in
coalition cooperation with Smer-SD. They also their unity would play out well for Fico.
realize very well that any kind of enfeeble-
ment in their unity would play out well for Fico who believes
in effectiveness of his own populist promises, being
compelling to his voters, and in case of some turbulences
within ruling coalition he would rely on his important ally –
President Gašparovič who was elected in 2009 with support
of Smer-SD and until now was always loyal to this party.
Since Fico’s initial expectations that the ruling coalition in

its current composition will not be able to last long have
not been fulfilled, the opposition leader has changed
rhetoric and started to openly express his preparedness to
create a “big coalition” with center-right parties, including
SDKÚ-DS. Despite the fact that SDKÚ-DS has adopted
the provision about refusal of coalition cooperation with

Smer-SD on its last congress in December 2010, it did
not discourage him from making such announcements,
whereas SDKÚ-DS chairman Dzurinda has labeled this
party as “a bunch of corrupted communists”.
Nobody in the current ruling coalition, obviously, is ready

to offer coalition cooperation to Smer-SD, so all of Fico’s
talks about a “big right-left coalition” are a mere bluff.
The only intention of these talks is to create an illusion
that Smer-SD is a standard program-based party with a
wide coalition potential. It has been shown that nationalist
and populist excesses of Smer-SD as a ruling party has
decreased its potential to make coalition alliances with
program-moderate parties to such an extent,
ĽS-HZDS did not reach five per cent that its only potential coalition allies might
threshold to get into parliament and have been parties like Mečiar’s authoritarian
SNS is fighting for political survival.
Fico’s Smer-SD thus is jeopardized to ĽS-HZDS or Slota’s radical-nationalist SNS,
stay alone in opposition also after the with whom Fico had ruled during 2006-2010
elections in 2014.
electoral term. Mečiar’s party, however, did
not reach five per cent threshold to get into parliament and
SNS is fighting for political survival on the background of
harsh intra-party conflicts and considerable drop in voters’
preferences almost under five per cent threshold. Fico’s
Smer-SD thus is jeopardized to stay alone in opposition
also after the elections in 2014.
The election of a prosecutor general:

coalition on the edge of downfall
Efficient politics of the new government, especially the

smooth passing of the laws in parliament, obviously does
not necessarily mean that the center-right coalition is not
exposed to real problems in its inner functioning. The test
of coalition unity was the problematic prosecutor general’s
election in parliament in December 2010. It was, from the
political point of view, an exceptionally significant case,
when quite unexpectedly and to the big surprise of the
new ruling coalition itself, the new cabinet came near its
own collapse due to the result of the election.
The electoral term for the incumbent general prosecutor

Dobroslav Trnka expired in February 2011. According to
the Constitution, the prosecutor general is to be elected
in parliament, then to be sworn in by the president. Due

to the differences between ruling coalition and opposition,
but also due to differing stances of ruling parties among
themselves about a candidate (ruling parties had proposed
two candidates at first) the prosecutor had not been elected
in parliament in the first round. He has not been elected in
the second round either, when ruling coalition has proposed
only one common candidate and parliamentary opposition
has pursued the reelection of the incumbent prosecutor
general Trnka, whereas for the successful reelection in the
ballot only one more vote has been needed. The results of
the ballot have revealed that at least six ruling coalition MPs
voted for the opposition candidate, whereas no delegates
of ruling parties neither before, nor after the ballot have
publicly presented the support for Trnka.
Unexpected result of the ballot was even more startling,

since Prime Minister Radičová publicly declared before
the election that she would have resigned if prosecutor
general Trnka had been reelected – which according to the
Constitution automatically means resignation of the entire
government. Trnka’s remaining in the post for another
electoral term would be according to Radičová in contra-
diction with the commitment to bring principal changes to
judiciary. According to the Prime Minister, the incumbent
prosecutor general who had demonstrated passivity in
investigation of certain politically sensitive
cases (or sometimes, conversely, had actively Without any obvious political reasons,
contributed to mar the investigation), cannot without the intra-coalition crisis, only
due to some hidden internal political
be the symbol of change. The fact, that only manipulations, the government of
one more vote was needed for the reelection Radičová could have ceased its exis-
tence.
of Trnka during the second round of the ballot
has shown that without any obvious political
reasons, without the intra-coalition crisis, only due to some
hidden internal political manipulations, the government of
Radičová and the new ruling coalition could have ceased
its existence.
Hardly anyone had doubted before the election that

Radičová would fulfill her promise to resign in case of
Trnka having been reelected. If that was the case after
all, the probability of forming a four parties’ center-right
coalition would be slim at best. Smer-SD leader Fico would
have certainly played the political game with his loyal ally,
President Gašparovič, goal of which would have been the

gradual return to power, in certain circumstances also via
premature elections.
Fico was, however, washing his hands during impatient

expectation of such a development little prematurely. After
the announcement of the results of the ballot
Fico had been calculating with Radi- he allegedly blanched. Probably on the basis
čová’s resignation. That did not happen. of clandestine internal information, he had
The ruling coalition’s failure, however,
paradoxically, has not undermined its been calculating with Radičová’s resignation.
unity. That did not happen. The ruling coalition’s
failure, however, paradoxically, has not undermined its
unity. Conversely, it has created an even stronger bond. It
has led the coalition to the decision to change the election
method and introduce the public voting instead of the
secret one. Although this decision has created various
reactions (opposition subjected it to harsh criticism),
representatives of ruling coalition have been claiming that
in parliamentary democracy based on principles of public
politics, the principle of public openness in executing
the MP’s mandate should not have had any exceptions,
especially not in electing the public officials. Government
representatives have stated that the ballot method should
have been without any reservations applicable for citizens
in executing their suffrage, but elected representatives
of citizens should have been executing their mandate
as transparently as possible and information about their
voting in laws passing and in electing officials should have
been publicly accessible, so that citizens would be able
to adequately evaluate the activity of their MPs. As the
reaction of opposition having been accusing the ruling
coalition that the change in election method to being
public is denying the principle of democracy, coalition
politicians have stated that introducing public voting in
electing officials in parliament does not limit MPs’ decision
in voting, as well as it does not limit the MPs’ public voting
in passing laws.
The case of unsuccessful election of the prosecutor general

has revealed the real risk of behind-the-scenes machina-
tions with corrupted background. Since the speculations
that the decision of the six coalition MPs to support the
candidate of opposition could be related to corruption have
been expressed by MPs themselves, then in this situation
the change from ballot to public voting may have a positive

anticorruption effect. Another potentially positive aspect of
the prosecutor general’s election may be the intention of
ruling coalition to amend his competences and to bring the
system of prosecution, built on inorganic – for the liberal
democracy – monocratic principle, closer to
modern constitutionalism, even though the The announced intention to reduce the
entire restructuring of the prosecution’s number of electoral terms for general
prosecutor to just one, thus making
system may probably need more time. The it less prone to politicizations, would
positive effect may also be the announced have to be anchored by the law.
intention to reduce the number of electoral
terms for general prosecutor to just one, thus making it
less prone to politicizations. This intention would have to
be anchored by the law.
The prosecutor general’s election has set the mirror not only
to ruling coalition, which possesses some disloyal MPs, but
also to parliamentary opposition, viewpoints of which have
been confirming that the constitutional framework scope
of the liberal democracy seems too narrow. The warning
signal that the most powerful opposition party Smer-SD
would have been able under certain circumstances to leave
the constitutional frame was the announcement of Fico that
in case of changing the method of the prosecutor general’s
election, Smer-SD might proceed in accordance with Article
32 of the Constitution: “The citizens shall have the right
to resist anyone who would abolish the democratic order
of human rights and freedoms set in this Constitution, if
the activities of constitutional authorities and the effective
application of legal means are restrained.” Announcement
of the intention to “activate” the aforementioned Article
of the Constitution in the situation, when there is no any
“abolishing of the democratic order of human rights and
freedoms”, but only due to the party’s disagreement with
submitted proposition for legitimate and legal change of
existing legislative standards is raising questions as to
what extent is the internal character and overall political
constellation of opposition Smer-SD in accordance with
values and principles of the liberal democracy.
Loan to Greece: Fico’s legacy traps
One of the most extraordinary steps of the new Slovak

government has been a rejection to provide the loan to
Greece in terms of European Union mechanism of eurozone
bailout. This entire case was the result of several factors
playing out, mostly of intra-political character.
Fico’s government had promised to The former government of Fico had promised
approve the loan to Greece, but before to approve the loan to Greece, it had even
the elections it had hesitated to sub-
mit the loan contract to parliament for negotiated the conditions with Brussels, but
ratification. before the elections in June it had hesitated
to submit the loan contract to parliament for ratification.
It had proceeded quite arrogantly towards the opposition,
which had demanded to release its conditions and had
insisted on calling a separate parliamentary session. This
session was, however, marred by the ruling coalition of
Smer-SD, SNS and ĽS-HZDS, since it had the majority in
parliament. When the polls showed that the general public
had not been supportive in helping Greece, Fico as an
authentic populist tried to sweep the whole problem under
the carpet in order not to unnecessarily irritate his voters.
He had claimed that the new government would have been
handling that after the elections. Who knows how things
would have wound up if the new government had been
consisting of Smer-SD? We will never find out.
After the elections, the government has been composed

by four center-right parties, and they rejected the loan for
Greece. They did so because during the pre-election race
they had put themselves into a big conflict with Smer-SD,
which they had accused of not negotiating with the
opposition about such a significant issue, hiding the actual
conditions of helping Greece from the general public. They
further criticised that during negotiations in Brussels, the
government had not utilized the opportunity to influence
the parameters of eurozone bailout mechanism.
According to the center-right parties, Fico had played the

dual role, as an opportunistic extras in Brussels and as a
buck passer then in Slovakia. The opposition had promised
before elections that, if they managed to take over the
power, they would reevaluate the conditions of helping
Greece and should they discover, that those conditions
were inconvenient for the country, they would refuse to

help. The economy experts of the opposition parties have
been showing that Slovakia as a less developed post-
communist country with weaker macroeconomic indicators
cannot fulfill the role of a donor to a more developed
country like Greece. After taking over the power by the
center-right parties, the new government has announced
that Slovak economy after four years of Fico’s populist
rule has been in worse state than the opposition had
been expecting before elections. The growth of GDP had
dramatically dropped in comparison to previous years
and had reached negative numbers. The deficit of state
budget had risen to almost eight per cent. Except that,
the representatives of the new government have claimed
that the EU had not taken into consideration all aspects
while deciding about the Greek bailout. According to them,
Greece had allegedly performed a moral hazard with its
public finances in previous years. Radičová’s government
thus adopted a resolution that the loan to Greece would
not have been provided. The government, however, has
joined the European Financial Stability Facility.
The cabinet has submitted the Greek loan contract to

parliament in August 2010, which Fico had at the very last
moment put in the drawer. As expected, the MPs of ruling
coalition have rejected the contract (with an exception of
one MP of KDH). However, the voting of Smer-SD MPs,
which had been accusing the new government of breaching
the agreement negotiated by the former
government with EU, has been symptomatic. Several experts claim that the poten-
Not a single MP of Smer-SD has voted for tial positive economical effect of the
decision to refuse to help Greece will
this contract: the entire fraction simply not be much weaker than the impact of
participated in voting. Slovak’s deteriorated image.
The decision of the new government to refuse to help

Greece has met with support of the majority of country’s
population. However, several experts and influential intel-
lectuals have pointed out its problematic sides. They claim
that the potential positive economical effect of this decision
will be much weaker than the possible negative impact of
country’s deteriorated image, refraining due to the intra-
political reasons from basic principles of solidarity on which
EU has been built.
What next?
What are the perspectives for future development? There

are indications that in 2011 the new ruling coalition should
be able to preserve the degree of internal consolidation
it achieved shortly after it took over power and adopted
initial practical measures. However, public support for this
administration will directly depend on its success in tackling
the most pressing social problems and its ability to explain
certain unpopular but inevitable measures to citizens.
Smer-SD is a formidable political rival that will undoubtedly

use all displays of discontent to undermine the pro-reform
government’s position and create favorable conditions
for its own return to power. But this tactic may not be
successful, provided that the new ruling coalition avoids
enervating internal conflicts, resists the temptation of
cronyism and prefers matter-of-fact solutions aimed at
improving socio-economic situation of those citizens the
opposition considers its potential voters.
Article current as at 7th February 2011.

KAS International Reports 04/2011

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

KAS International Reports 04/2011

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

4|11 4|11

KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS

The designated contributions do not necessarily

The subscription will be extended for a further

KAS International Reports holds the copyright

6 | From C limate EconomY to Gree n Econo my

19 | From K yoto to Dur ban –

36 | Emergi ng po wer s: Th e IBSA states as

59 | Indo nesia’s Role in Inter natio nal Climate

77 | Clim ate Policy in the People’s R epublic

94 | Harmony as a national mission –

109 | Post-Election Slovakia: Th e First

Participants at the global climate conference held in

It is now a matter of great urgency that an international

The European Union is taking the lead on climate pro-

What is now required is a binding and consistent regulatory

Environmental and climate protection is therefore not just

Dr. Gerhard Wahlers

From Climate EconomY

In its wake, the Convention for Climate Protection in

1 | Environmentally harmful emissions include, amongst others,

and that as of yet, it has not been managed to reduce

In light of this, it appears that the debate about a sustainable

Climate Change and Costs

Climate change is an extremely complex phenomenon

2 | The United Nations Environment Programme defines Green

and glaciers are melting faster than they previously were

The problem with society perceiving climate change as

At this point, economists try to present courses for action

3 | Cf. Ian Allison et al., The Copenhagen Diagnosis, 2009:

In greatly simplified terms, this can be done by resorting to

The differences in the calculation of the costs are mainly

5 | At an increase in average global temperature of 2.5 degrees

In addition to the studies that take a direct approach at

The “Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Report” (2005)

6 | Robert Costanza et al., “The value of the world’s ecosystem

In terms of adaptation to climate change, ecosystem

The study “The Economics of Ecology and Biodiversity”

Scientific and economic studies on the consequences of

8 | TEEB (2008), “The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity:

From an economic point of view, climate change also is a

In this context, the so-called Pigovian tax is mentioned

Currently asserting itself as an alternative, is the idea of the

9 | The Pigovian tax is named after the English economist Arthur

Certificates for these emissions are then distributed or

Besides the framework-setting capacity of the state to

Up to now, finite energy resources such as oil and

nuclear power. Alternatively, even more renewable energy

Against the background of climate change from an

Next to climate protection, states also have additional goals

The “German model” for the promotion of RE is anchored in

Besides the price-based EEG, there is the quantity-based

in England. This basically works like the previously des-

In principle both ways are suitable to support the use of

Climate change as a global phenomenon affects virtually

From an economic perspective, the problem is that many

change or other environmental pollution hardly ever filters

Politics therefore try to create an economic incentive to

Another economic approach and probably the most deve-

11 | TEEB (2010), “The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity:

ecosystems. They are offered to receive additional funding,

Another way to protect the ecosystem services is achievable

We already live with a human-induced climate change.

Politics, whose aim is the prevention of the global climate