From the "Power of the Norm" to "Flexible Normalism": Considerations after Foucault

Author(s): Mirko M. Hall and Jürgen Link

Source: Cultural Critique, No. 57 (Spring, 2004), pp. 14-32
Published by: University of Minnesota Press
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FROMTHE"POWEROFTHENORM"
TO"FLEXIBLE
NORMALISM":
AFTERFOUCAULT
CONSIDERATIONS
TRANSLATED
BY MIRKOM. HALL

JIr!In inkl

One of the most frequently quoted and thereby well-known

dicta of Foucault is that his theory is a "toolbox"-this remark will
certainly not be entirely perverted if I simply relate it, as it so often
happens, to tinkering with theory. Even so, I would not like to spare
you its rather cultural-revolutionary wording:

All my books, be it Madnessand Societyor this one here [Disciplineand

Punish], are-if you like-little toolboxes. If people want to open them,
and use this or that sentence, this or that idea or analysis as a screw-
driver or wrench [dessere-boulon] to short-circuit,dismantle, or explode
the systems of power, including perhaps those systems from which
these books of mine have emerged-all right, all the better.1

Unfortunately, it appears to me that the subdued message of this pas-

sage is considerably less practiced than quoted. I say this right at the
beginning, because this paper will deal less with the impressions of a
(so-called) "study of Foucault" and more with the results of a "work-
ing with Foucault."
Now and then, there are views that see in Foucault a "philosophy
of the norm"-or also of "normalization" or of "the normative." I will
leave open the question of whether Foucault felt any pleasure in this
"devenir-philosophe"-in any case, during his lifetime, he protected
himself against such a pleasure. I am more interested in the genitive
attribute: What is "norm," "normalization" (herein, it appears, also

CulturalCritique57-Spring 2004-Copyright 2004 Regents of the Universityof Minnesota

 FROMTHE "POWEROF THE NORM"TO "FLEXIBLENORMALISM" 15

hide "normal" and "normality") and "normative"? Are they syn-

onyms (if only approximately)? Is "normal" (outside of a purely for-
mal etymological understanding) the appropriate adjective for "norm"?
Is "the normal," therefore, in conformity with a "norm"? And does
"normalization" mean "to make normal" in the sense of "to make
according to a norm"? But is "to make normal" (in German anyway)
at all the same as "to make according to a norm"? If I were to repeat
all these questions in French (in which Foucault writes), English, and
other languages, your head would surely spin, if it does not already.
However, I believe that we cannot avoid first mapping out this sem-
antic labyrinth more precisely. This became clear to me as of late, when
I looked up the term normalisation in the Bibliotheque Nationale in
advance of my studies on normalization: more than 95 percent of the
titles applied to industrial norms; most were publications related to
the AFNor, the French equivalent of the German Industry Norm
[DIN]. The corresponding term in German would have to be Nor-
mung [standardization]-Normalisierung [normalization], clearly stated,
would be an erroneous translation, a contre-sense. Dictionaries con-
firm this semantic nonidentity between normalisation and Normal-
isierung.2 After checking these entries, I asked myself if Foucault
really means, when he speaks of normaliseror normalisation,what cor-
responds to most German translations: "to make people normal" or
"to make normal people," or rather, what in my opinion would not
be at all the same, "to standardize people" (like industrial products),
"to make standardized people." That Foucault's German translator
Walter Seitter must have repeatedly arrived at the same doubt is
shown quite clearly in the following (extremely important) passage
from Discipline and Punish. I will give first the original, then the Ger-
man version:

Lapenaliteperpetuellequi traversetous les points,et contr1letous les

instants des institutions disciplinaires compare, diff rencie, hierarchise,
homogendise, exclut. En un mot elle normalise.3

Das hickenlose Strafsystem, das alle Punkte und alle Augenblicke der
erfa.I
Disziplinaranstalten t und kontrolliert, wirkt vergleichend, dif-
ferenzierend, hierarchisierend, homogenisierend, ausschlielend. Es
wirkt normend, normierend, normalisierend.4
16 i JURGEN LINK

[The perpetual quality that transverses all points and supervises every
instant in the disciplinary institutions compares, differentiates, hierar-
chizes, homogenizes, excludes. In short, it standardizes, normativizes,
normalizes.]5

Here three German terms, which are absolutely not synonymous,

serve to convey the one French term normalise.This is nice and intel-
ligent-but the translator probably provides these meanings for Fou-
cault instead of simply translating them. The context in Foucault's
original calls for "to standardize" or at the most "to normativize."
In the course of this consideration, I hope to convince you that
we are not dealing with word splitting. Foucault, as a theorist of
"normalization," appears to have indeed struck a crucial nerve of
contemporary cultures. Where do we postmodern westerners live,
then, if not in a culture of "normalities" and "normality," of "normal-
izations" and "normalization." But is this identical with a hypotheti-
cal assertion that we live in the culture of the "norm"? Hardly, I
would like to think: but what exactly, then, is the difference? To
answer this question, I would like to first allow our culture to speak
for itself. Here are several exemplary contexts:

"I tick quite normal." (WAZ discussion with swimming star Franziska
van Almsick [Westdeutsche AllgemeineZeitung,February13, 1993])

"The naked truth is-I am normal!" (Interview with TV journalist

FriedrichKiippersbusch [Unicum,April 1997])

A normal vacationer. The chancellor enjoys the intimate surroundings

of St. Gilgen. (Westdeutsche
AllgemeineZeitung,July 29, 1995)

Quite normal German careers. Why the Federal President invited the
rising generation of East Germans to coffee. Modesty as virtue. (Frank-
furterAllgemeineZeitung,November 2, 1996)

A normal life was not possible for Princess Diana, photographers were
constantly following her. (Die Tageszeitung,September 1, 1997)

Does "normal" in these instances mean something like "in con-

formity with norms" or "standardized"? My thesis, supported by
comprehensive material, is the following: there is practically no-
where where "normal" could be substituted by "in conformity with
 FROMTHE "POWEROF THE NORM"TO "FLEXIBLENORMALISM" 17

norms" or "standardized" without semantic turbulence. Moreover,

there is almost no difference between the German use of the word
in everyday language and, for example, that of the French or the Eng-
lish. In my own study, Versuch fiber den Normalismus, I was able to
show in detail, both historically and systematically, that this usage
in contemporary everyday speech is the result of a more than two-
hundred-year development-in the course of which the discursive
complexes of the normal and the normative have developed in two
completely different directions. For its part, this drifting apart is
simply the symptom of the emergence of new combinations of dis-
positives that have, above all, created entirely new cultural objects,
and specifically, what we call "normalities." I call this combination of
dispositives modern "normalism." I further claim that, regarding
"normality" and "normativity," we are dealing with, in the former, an
ultramodern and, in the latter, an ancient and already antediluvian
(in a literal sense) phenomenon. In order to better situate Foucault's
considerations (as well as those of Canguilhem, Castel, Donzelot,
Ewald, and Guillaume) on "norme," "normal," and "normalisation"
(which I will leave for now in the French original), I find the follow-
ing semantic prolegomena useful, which succinctly summarizes
several conclusions of my Versuchfiberden Normalismus.6
According to concurrent interpretations of ethnology, anthropol-
ogy, and sociology, all human societies possess and have possessed
"norms" and "normativity." Explicit and implicit regulatives, which
are reinforced through sanctions, pre-scribe a specific action to mate-
rially or formally determined groups of people. "Norms," therefore,
always pre-exist (social) action: they are already known to at least a
few professionals of the norm before such action. In the large major-
ity of the above relevant discourses, "normativity" is used as a gen-
eral abstract category for the entire field of the above understood
"norms." Here, in a further sense, "normativity" has a legal overtone.
I say this because Georges Canguilhem's use of "pouvoir normatif"
and "normativitede la vie" deviates considerably from this interna-
tional common usage. From this deviation, additional difficulties of
translation and understanding arise, to which I will return in the
course of my paper.7
On the other hand, according to my thesis, "normality" is a his-
torically specific "achievement" of modern western societies, which
18 JiRGEN LINK

never before existed, and even today does not exist in numerous soci-
eties or cultures, or is only in its beginning stages. Furthermore, in
my thesis, "normality," which incidentally is contradicted in neither
Canguilhem nor Foucault, presumes-quite fundamentally-statisti-
cal dispositives and is defined in relation to "averages" and other
statistical sizes. If one takes this defining criterion seriously, there
are (now formulated differently) "normalities" only in strictly data-
processing societies: only in cultures that continuously, routinely,
comprehensively, and institutionally make themselves statistically
transparent. This kind of statistical transparency, which Foucault in
many ways had also in mind, is surely related to panoptic trans-
parency but is not identical to it: they can be as different as the secret
police [Stasi] and public opinion polls. If a "normal" action is statisti-
cally constituted as "average" (or is situated on a distribution curve
within a "normal" distance from the average), then "normality," in
contrast to "normativity," is essentially postexistent to action (instead
of pre-existent). If an action is to be valid as "normative" (i.e., corre-
sponding to a "norm" in the "normative" sense), it is, as previously
stated, already known beforehand-if it were "normal," on the other
hand, it is certainly capable of being first established retrospectively
through its positioning on the concrete-empirical statistical distribu-
tion curve. This difference is absolutely fundamental for the func-
tioning mode of contemporary western societies (that is, those that I
have suggested, within this corresponding parameter, naming "nor-
malistic.") In such societies, there is in effect, namely, a final func-
tional dominance of "normality" over "normativity" (which, of course,
does not foreclose conflicts, but rather presumes them outright. One
thinks of such topics as abortion, traffic offenses, and drugs. A recent
example is the sensational court ruling in Aachen against specific
vocal mannerisms of the mentally handicapped. Although the major-
ity of the media, and presumably of the entire population, now views
these mannerisms as "normal," they should now be sanctioned as
"normative").
Whereas my suggestion for understanding "normativity" corre-
sponds to the dominant language use of the relevant sciences, this
is only partly the case for "normativity," which I must now address.
Admittedly, the operational praxis of all the sciences relevant to
normalism (particularly medicine, psychiatry, psychology, sociology,
 FROMTHE "POWEROF THE NORM"TO "FLEXIBLENORMALISM" 19

and economics) corresponds to my postulated regime of data pro-

cessing and the determination of "normalities" through statistical
distribution. However, there is the custom of an ahistorical, pan-
chronological concept of "normality" in ethnological sociology. Ac-
cording to this custom, "normality" is similar to "everydayness" in a
historically all-encompassing sense, which affects all ages and cul-
tures. One can thus talk about "normality" in both shamanistic soci-
ety and in antiquity and the Middle Ages. I have already explained
why I suggest restricting this concept to data-processing societies.
Theoretically, this disagreement concerns different views regarding
the constitution of socio-cultural objectivities: we can certainly
assume that there must have also been "objective" distributions of
behaviors and "averages" in antiquity. Since these objectivities do not
exit "subjectively" in the form of data-collecting dispositives, the
process of data processing does not create any condition of possibil-
ity for constituting specific "everydays." Phrased more sharply, using
a tool from Foucault's toolbox: data processing is certainly a histori-
cal a priori of modern, but not of classical cultures. Therefore, we
can discover only with difficulty how an ancient "everyday" may
have possibly generated other types through interferences (of what
kind?) between normative (especially religious customs) and "spon-
taneous" factors. We can say with certainty, however, that statistical
dispositives did not play any role in an ancient "everyday": the
agents of (social) action just did not possess any "knowledge" of data
processing-they did not know how many beatings a slave was dealt
on a yearly average in Athens, Attica, or Magnia Graecia, or which
"value" could be seen as "normal." Therefore, if one takes seriously
Foucault's insights into the fundamental role of discursive factors in
the constitution of social objectivities, then this is also valid for the
social objectivity of the "everyday." If "normality" cannot be thought
of as specifically and meaningfully separate from data processing,
and if "normality" presumes data processing as its historical a priori,
then the concept must be restricted to the modern "everyday," and
consequently "normality" and "everydayness" are not synonymous.
This ahistorical retrospective projection of "normality" and its his-
torical a priori, data processing, into a pan-chronology is also found
in Foucault's most important informant in the field of normality,
Georges Canguilhem. This retrospective projection is in a certain
20 I 30RGENLINK

way even more radical in Canguilhem, because it extends into phys-

iology and biology. Again, of course, we can assume that the median
pulse frequency of Homo sapiens ten thousand years ago would
have objectively corresponded to the frequency of today. But again,
this objectivity was not subjectively apparent to itself because it was
not measured, averaged, and compared, because therapy could not
have been understood at the time as the adjustment of deviating val-
ues or practiced as such. Accordingly, one must carefully differentiate
the underlying biological objectivity from the objectivity of data-
based medicine: the latter is cultural and not biological, and only the
latter can constitute corresponding "normalities," which can there-
fore, as Canguilhem admits, never be treated as synonymous with
"naturalness."
The principal orientation of Canguilhem toward the biological
paradigm now produces even more important consequences for our
problematic, namely, that "normality" and "normativity" appear to
actually interfere in the field of biology, if one discounts my previ-
ously suggested differentiation of terms. If one retrospectively pro-
jects "normality," then the long-lasting, stable biological objectivities
can be characterized as both "normal," in the descriptive sense of
being near the statistical mean, and "in conformity with norms" (i.e.,
"normative"), in the sense of adhering to a postulate that must be
fulfilled lest life be endangered. Canguilhem (and following him,
Henning Ritter) has thematized this quid pro quo as the alternative of
"descriptive vs. normative," but does not advance, I think, into a
satisfactory analysis.8 In my opinion, it is advisable to generally ex-
clude quasi-postulates (and, therefore, normativities) from biology.
One could ask how Canguilhem came to this quid pro quo: I think
that it could be linked to the specifically French meaning of normali-
sation as "standardization," as mentioned earlier in the sense of
industrial standardization. With this meaning, Canguilhem obvi-
ously suggested an analogy between the "normative activities of life"
and the "standardizing/normalizing" [normalisatrice] activities of mod-
ern industry. Just as the industrial norm, after FrederickTaylor,searches
out the technical adaptation of the "one best way," so is nature sup-
posed to search for the optimal "norm" on the path of evolutionary
adaptation. The inherent anthropomorphism can hardly be over-
looked here. Thus, Canguilhem's concept of the "norm" produces a
 FROMTHE "POWEROF THE NORM"TO "FLEXIBLENORMALISM" 21

confusing interference between biological quasi-constants, statistical

normality, industrial norms, and normative postulates.
The quid pro quo of Canguilhem is, therefore, ultimately based
on a real fundamental problem of our culture: the role of the indus-
trial norm within modern normalism. Intuitively, it appears highly
probable that the industry norm belongs to the field of modern "nor-
malism" rather than that of the juridical-normative. With regard to
both the industrial and juridical norm, we are dealing with a struc-
tural arbitrariness and we are dependent upon decisions. Actually,
the industrial norm must be distinguished from both normativity
and normality-however, it has historically positioned itself along-
side normality, which I cannot address here in detail.
Michel Foucault at first "inherited" Canguilhem's complex of
norme/normal/normalization.In this sense, he uses "norm" in the
chapter on the human sciences in The Order of Things.9 But already
symptomatic here is the opposition between loi and norme, which
Foucault-in the sense of my introductory semantic cartography-
basically uses to distinguish the normative field (juridical and jurido-
analogous) from the normalistic and to place them in opposition.
Unlike in Canguilhem, this originality continues strongly in Fou-
cault's later texts, although his main model appears to be the in-
dustry norm. Conversely, Foucault's use of the categories, which are
related at least etymologically with norme, remains dependent on
Canguilhem to the extent that Foucault's concepts of a pouvoir de la
norme and a socidtdde normalisation represent the decisive, concrete
"realization" of bio-pouvoir.This concept remains peculiarly fuzzy, in
my opinion, despite its great career. Bio-pouvoiris supposed to char-
acterize that modern type of power that manifests itself, for example,
in intervening, stimulating, and regulating population policies (and
also in racisms); here, the dispositives of sexuality are also seen to
be linked. Francois Ewald has expanded this parameter around the
dispositives of social security, that is, around the "social net."10 Is
bio-pouvoir,therefore, the same as pouvoirde la norme?And what does
the following mean? "It (bio-power) effects distributions around the
norm."11Is the adjustment of statistical values meant, or rather quasi-
industrial standardization? The mix-up with normativity, which occurs
in Canguilhem, is avoided by Foucault-but not with regard to in-
dustrial standardization. The following typical binary oppositions arise:
22 LINK
JUORGEN

* sovereignty/bio-power [souverainetd/bio-pouvoir]
* law/norm [loilnorme]
* right/technique [droit/technique]
* law/normalization [loi/normalisation]
* punishment/control [chdtiment/contr6ler12

Nevertheless, the question remains whether, in a considerable sub-

field of the dispositive of so-called bio-power, industrial profitability
(industrial work, if you will) is not more likely to be stimulated as
"life." Here, Canguilhem's poor differentiation between biological,
medical, and industrial norms appears to continue. Bio-politics ap-
pears as a second, cultural biology, which guarantees something
like second-degree adaptations (by analogy with the biological) by
means of the industry norm and analogous psychological and social
standardizations or "normativizations." To me, Foucault appears to
both reproduce (for example, when he speaks of "a society's 'thresh-
old of modernity"' in the first volume of the History of Sexuality)13 and
explode Canguilhem's framework.
Let us take as a concrete example Foucault's term sanction nor-
malisatrice, which is, after all, an entire subchapter of Discipline and
Punish. Seitter avoided the contre-sens "normalizing sanction" [nor-
malisierendeSanktion]and went the middle road with "normativizing
sanction" [normierendeSanktion].4 I will be more precise and claim
that the correct translation would have to be "normendeSanktion"or
"standardizing sanction" [standardisierendeSanction]. The German
Normung and the French normalisation mean "standardization" in
English. Therefore, I am inclined to assume that Foucault, like Can-
guilhem, thinks that the normalisationof individuals is, in the field of
influencing human behavior, something analogous to the industry
norm: i.e., a standardizing, industrial-like subjectivation, which par-
allels the industrial standardization of objects. This analogy is in no
way far-fetched; after all, there is a broad discursive trend in the
twentieth century based on this analogy that was extremely well
known by both Canguilhem and Foucault-that is, behaviorism.
Foucault's typical, contextualized concepts of "discipline" match this
trend, especially disciplinedu corps,dressage,and manipulation,wherein
the "machine" model of such trained bodies is stressed.15 On the
other hand, from the beginning on, the aspect of subjectivization has
 FROMTHE "POWEROF THE NORM"TO "FLEXIBLENORMALISM" 23

also been thematized in this connection. As you know, we must

read out the double meaning of this wordplay, subjectivation:"subjec-
tivizing through subjection" and, conversely, "subjection through
subjectivizing." In subjection, there hides the industry norm, stan-
dardization, and "other-direction" [AufJenlenkung]-in subjectivizing,
there also tends to hide self-adjustment and "inner-direction" [Innen-
lenkung]. At the end of this essay, I will turn again, through Foucault,
to the paradox of the rejection of the "repression hypothesis." Fou-
cault's predominant interest in the complex norme/normal/normaliza-
tion in his investigations is, therefore, the interest in historically
specific types of subjectivization. Just as he historicizes the a prioris
(in brazen contradiction to Kant), he also historicizes the subject,
including the core of the subject (in brazen contradiction not merely
to Kant, but also the neo- and ultraneo-Kantians like Habermas).
Obviously, he sees in the discursive complex of normalisation an
essential factor for the production of modern subjects. This connec-
tion is among Foucault's most exciting questions, and surely it is also
highly topical for us all. What, therefore, characterizes normalistic
subjectivities and how are they produced? To answer this fundamen-
tal question, Foucault offers, in a heuristic manner, several not al-
ways congruent categories and thought configurations [Denkfiguren]
or models, from which we could develop a theory of normalism as
well as both reconstruct and critically analyze and expand such a the-
ory. While he still follows, above all, Canguilhem with categories like
and so on, his concrete
pouvoirde la norme,socidtdde normalisation,
examples-especially those in the field of sexuality-appear to me to
generally explode this framework.
I would like to illustrate this with a concrete example of the Fou-
cauldian theses of sexuality: the four dispositives of sexuality-
the hysterization of women's bodies, the pedagogization of children's
sex, the socialization of procreative behavior, and the psychiatrization
of perverse pleasure16-deal with completely normalistic parameters:
sexual and psychiatric limits of normality, as well as demographic
statistics and birth control. In all these cases, Foucault is above all
interested in the "training," disciplining, and "outer-directing" quasi-
industrial standardization. As is well known through the so-called sex-
ual revolution after World War II, all of this now appears to have been
passed over. Foucault considers this revolution now also normalisatrice:
24 I 30RGENLINK

The most important elements of an erotic art linked to our knowledge

about sexuality are not to be sought in the ideal, promised to us by med-
icine, of a healthy sexuality, nor in the humanist dream of a complete
and flourishing sexuality, and certainly not in the lyricism of orgasm
and the good feelings of bio-energy (these are but aspects of its normal-
izing utilization), but in this multiplication and intensification of plea-
sures connected to the production of the truth about sex.17

The tone of this representation is, without doubt, polemic, per-

haps even unfair. It is similar to the talk of a "normalizing impulse in
Freud."'18Certainly, the question being posed here is whether we are
dealing with the same kind of normalisation of subjects, whether it
regards the previously mentioned four basic types of disciplining sex
or rather the "lyricism of orgasm." Foucault admits at least that it
could be the question of a "tactical shift."19
This paradox in Foucault, which is inherited from Canguilhem,
consists of roughly equating des sujets normalisis-i.e., standardized
or "other-adjusted" subjects ("other-directed" in Riesman)-with
self-normalizing subjects in the German sense of normalizing ("inner-
directed" in Riesman). This paradox is even more heightened by Fou-
cault's younger peers Robert Castel, Francois Ewald, and Jacques
Donzelot (as well as by Marc Guillaume). This is because they con-
cern themselves explicitly and thoroughly with the development of
the twentieth century. As an example, I chose Robert Castel's path-
breaking representation of the development of the psychotherapeutic
complex.20 In several relevant publications, he set Foucault's grand
enfermement(the forced internment in the asylum of all those judged
"abnormal") in opposition to the grand d6senfermement(the "open-
ing" of the doors of the asylum) after World War II:just like he set the
symbolic year 1838-the year in which France adopted the first sys-
tematic modem insane-asylum law, and the state act of obligatory
psychiatrization, by way of hospital internment and the deprivation
of the right to decide, became regulated by law-in opposition to
the symbolic years 1968 and 1975, when, through legislation for the
handicapped, the largest possible portion of the previously commit-
ted population was integrated into the open and ambulant "therapy
for the normal." Castel coined the term "therapy for the normal" to
describe the so-called therapy culture in the United States, which
serves more to stimulate the creativity of "normal" individuals than
 FROMTHE "POWEROF THE NORM"TO "FLEXIBLENORMALISM" 25

to heal the sick in a traditional sense. Castel sees the leading proce-
dure of this therapy culture as psychoanalysis, within which he
refuses to differentiate among degrees of "revisionism," as, for exam-
ple, in the case of Lacan. In this respect, his view of psychoanalysis
is even more critical than Foucault's. Castel both recognizes and
relativizes the innovative character of psychoanalysis through the
criterion of "normalization" when he describes the contemporary
condition as follows:

At the end of this range [of an all-encompassing therapeutization of

society], there is still, then, the administration of "risky" populations,
which is still always conducted directly by the state apparatus on the
basis of a profileof socialschemataof actionthat one is compelledto
adopt. This is social risk management. On another pole, innovations of
a play-like type flourish: intensity training for "human potential,"
development techniques for "relationship capital," and the production
of a psychological mass culture, which are devoured by craving con-
sumers like analogues of a lost sociability. This is the management of
individual frailties.21

In developing the second pole of this range, psychoanalysis has

played the role of forerunner:

Psychoanalysis becomes, thereby, the most important vehicle for the

propagation of a psychological culture--which, as will be shown, points
into the still barely measured fields of the "therapy for the normal,"
beyond the dividing line between the normal and the pathological.22

The ambivalence of the new situation is sharply stressed: for one,

the forces of the old "psychiatric order" should have been moderated
through the new, flexible dispositives--but instead psychosocial ther-
apy has tended to extend into the entire society, so that, essentially, it
is (merely) a question of an "adjustment to modernity" [aggiornamento].
Therefore, we have to deal with a kind of paradox in both
Foucault himself and in his students: on the one hand, considerable
innovations are established and are excellently presented, in part, by
discourse analysis-on the other hand, a fundamental continuity of
"normalisation,"indeed an increase of this "normalisation,"is claimed.
In conclusion, I once again would like to not merely interpret Fou-
cault, but rather change him. But in doing so, I will also make use of
26 JORGENLINK

a tool from the Foucauldian box. When he admits a "tactical shift" for
the newer developments in the second half of the twentieth century,
he sees possible innovations in the field of strategy and tactics. In
Foucault's concept of strategy and tactics, there is also a provocation
in the disavowal of an origin of the subject [Subjektorigo]:

Power relations are both intentional and nonsubjective ... there is no

power that is exercised without a series of aims and objectives. But this
does not mean that it results from the choice or decision of an individ-
ual subject; let us not look for the headquarters that presides over its
rationality;neither the caste which governs, nor the groups which con-
trol the state apparatus ... the rationality of power is characterizedby
tactics that are often quite explicit at the restricted level where they are
inscribed (the local cynicism of power), tactics which, becoming con-
nected to one another, attractingand propagating one another,but find-
ing their base of support and their condition elsewhere, and by forming
comprehensive systems: the logic is perfectly clear, the aims decipher-
able, and yet it is often the case that no one is there to have invented
them, and few who can be said to have formulated them: an implicit
characteristicof the great anonymous strategies, often unspoken ...23

Obviously, this passage discusses a trans-subjective and "implicit"

intentionality of strategies. I believe to be able to confirm this argu-
ment to a higher degree by developing the example of the two main
normalistic strategies, which I would like to now address. I have
even asked myself if at least the category of "intention," regarding
the major strategies, must not also be relativized or modified (for
example, through the strategies of "direction"). I have attempted the
following formulation:
I thereby use the concept of [discursive] "strategy" in the sense of a
"directed"combination of individual "tactics,"whereby "direction,"as
a rule, is not predetermined in a teleological, subjective-intentional,and
completely conscious manner-but is rathertrans-subjectively"adjusted"
through variations in the course of "tactical"processes, like an "evo-
lution" that is "generally provoked" through the structure of milieus
and ecological niches. It is, therefore, those respective situations and
conjunctures (analogous to military or play-like contexts) in special
and integrative fields of the normal, which additionally (and always
in a cairological manner) determine, specify, and adjust the always
already adopted "basic direction" through the "challenge"of a specifi-
cally historical "need for normalization" [Normalisierungsbedarf]. Such
 FROMTHE "POWEROF THE NORM"TO "FLEXIBLENORMALISM"I 27

correctionsto the courseof strategies,thereby"offerthemselvesup,"

becauseof situationsand conjecturesin the field of normalism.They
can, then, be both "exploited" and "given away."24

In this sense, accordingto an importantconclusionof my Versuchiiber

den Normalismus,two diametrically opposed normalistic strategies
can be distinguished, which can be derived from the "Principleof
Broussais and Comte" that is constitutive of normalism.According
to this principle, which Canguilhem properly stressed, the limits of
normality are always dynamically adjustable on a continuum. Put
differently,the transitions between normality and abnormality are
quantitativelyfluid; there is no difference and distinction of being.
This is the result of statisticalmethodology.If a "population"is data
processed under a specific viewpoint, it becomes thereby homoge-
nized. Its distributioncurve aroundthe average is continuous;hence,
it never knows anything like intrinsic,"qualitative"breaksor discon-
tinuities. Where the border between "normal"and "abnormal"is
located, there one is always subjected to discussion. If "soft drugs"
(becauseof their statisticaldistribution)can qualify as "normal,"then
where exactly is the border with "hard" (i.e., not normal) drugs?
When a somewhat "relaxed"monogamy appears statistically "nor-
mal,"then where does "abnormalsex-addiction"begin? (I will return
to this at the end of the paper in order to pay tributeto the topicality
of "Zippergate.")
The establishmentof the principalcontinuity between "normal"
and "abnormal,"through the "Principleof Broussais and Comte"
(already in the first half of the nineteenth century), provoked from
the startan enormous fear,which I describeas the "fearof denormal-
ization."If there are no essential limits, then we can all be or become
"abnormal"-and if not ourselves, then our children. In this way,
the (often secretly and silently asked) question "Am I still normal?"
became the question of fate in the past two centuries. This continu-
ing structureand fear now make two entirely different "strategies"
possible, with regardto the fixing of the limits of normality:the first
strategy (which prevailed in the nineteenthand first half of the twen-
tieth century) attempts to secure itself against the fear of denormal-
ization through the establishment of the borders of normality that are
as fixed as possible for the longest possible span of time, and through
28 LINK
JUORGEN

zones of tolerance that are as restricted as possible. I call this first

strategy protonormalistic. To this strategy belongs the semantic and
(in particular) symbolic reinforcement of the borders of normality
and their conversion into "stigma borders," which once again tend to
materialize in the form of, for example, walls. This is the "birth of the
prison" or of the insane asylum, as described by Foucault. Likewise,
another example, analyzed by Foucault, would be the dispositives of
sexual abnormalities in the nineteenth and early twentieth century.
Here, the protonormalistic strategy, in the interest of the semantic
protection of borders, tends constantly toward a "dependence" [An-
lehnung] on prenormalistic, qualitative delimitations and exclusions,
especially toward a redependence on normativities-for example,
toward juridical normativities, which, in the case of criminality, is
now constituted normalistically as abnormality.
The risk of this strategy lies in blocking the modern dynamic of
growth and in crises of "gridlock" with "breaches" and, subsequently,
catastrophic denormalizations. A second oppositional strategy, which
I call "flexible-normalistic," attempts to both take into account and
secure such risks. Unlike the protonormalistic strategy, the limits
of normality are managed here in the most flexible manner possible
and are fixed for the shortest possible span of time. Zones of toler-
ance and transition are established to be as "broad" as possible, so
that short-term adjustments remain possible, despite the unforeseen
dynamic of statistical values. Whereas the protonormalistic limits of
normality are structured to be as "restricted" as possible (i.e., to be-
have, symbolically, as walls), there is within flexibility-normalism
"broader" limits, so that specific modes of behavior (located within
the "field of the limit") can still be tolerated de facto. The specific risk
of this strategy lies in the threatening "dissolution of borders,"
through which, under certain circumstances, catastrophic denormal-
izations could be evoked. In protonormalism, the stabilization of
fixed limits of normality presupposes other-directed subjectivity, dis-
cipline, training, and repression. Here, we find ourselves entirely on
the terrain of Discipline and Punish. Individuals must be frequently
"normalized" against their will and wishes along established guide-
lines-in the French sense of normalisis,that is "standardized." Hence,
they need a "strong super-ego," a psycho-terroristic conscience. Such
other-direction is incompatible with flexibility-normalism. In order
 FROMTHE "POWEROF THE NORM"TO "FLEXIBLENORMALISM" 29

that this normalism can function, subjects must be capable of "nor-

malizing" themselves (that is, in the German sense of flexiblem
Einpendeln,or "to reach one's equilibrium, or 'normal swing' in a flex-
ible manner"). They must be able to "freely" chose their "locations"
in the respective fields of the normal (if near the average in the "mid-
dle," or more or less removed in the zones of tolerance, or even on the
border of normality) by making tactical calculations, especially risk
calculations, but also frequently with a certain "spontaneity" (i.e., the
just-for-fun principle)-but above all, always under the considera-
tion of the totality of normality, which it should not endanger. This
ability of self-normalization (in the sense of dynamic self-adjustment)
presupposes a new type of inner-direction, which I have newly
defined in addition to Riesman. This flexible-normalistic kind of
inner-direction is acquired, in particular, through psychotherapeutic
training programs in the widest sense (counseling, self-experience,
creativity, and so on). Here again, we find ourselves on terrain that
Foucault-especially in places like sexuality-and his younger col-
league Castel-have systematically and thoroughly investigated.
My thesis is now this: behind the overdrawn, far-reaching equa-
tion of other- and inner-directed normalism in Foucault hides the
correct insight into the continuity of normalism. Actually, with regard
to both strategies, we are dealing with normalistic strategies that con-
cern the fabrication and maintenance of normalities. Despite this fun-
damental solidarity, however, these strategies are indeed in concreto
oppositionally directed. I am surely not the only one not convinced
by Foucault's remarks about the so-called "repression hypothesis" in
sexuality: how could one also deny the massive repression of sexual-
ity in Victorianism? Now and then, Foucault himself appears to
explicitly acknowledge the fact of this repression,25 but then, in the
next moment, it appears to be already relativized. In my view, this
back-and-forth is easily explained, because of the missing differenti-
ation between both normalistic strategies: flexible normalism, then,
either becomes subsumed under protonormalism or the sexual revo-
lution after World War II becomes reduced to normalisation (in the
sense of "standardization"). Or, an absence (or, at least a subdomi-
nance) of "repression," within the dominance of creative stimula-
tion, becomes-contrary to the facts-retrospectively projected from
flexibility-normalism into Victorianism, that is, into protonormalism.
30 I 30RGENLINK

For my conclusion, I announced the prospect of a topical event

for you: here it is. The case of "Zippergate"allows me simultaneously
to concretize,to some extent, my analyticalcategoriesand to outline
its necessarilydifferentiatingusage. I am assumingthat with "Zipper-
gate" we are definitely not dealing with a case of Clinton,but rather
with a case of U.S. mediaculture.For some considerable time, the
flexible-normalisticculture of the United States has been searching
for the limits of its brilliant upward swing following World War II.
From the beginning,the protonormalisticcounterstrategyhas warned
against the blurring of all the borders of normality. This strategy
rages on, not only in religious fundamentalism,where the consider-
able weight of juridical normativity (legal action) has structurally
supported it. (A more exact analysis, for which there is no space here,
must-additionally and above all-show that the strong position of
the law, and thereby a specific normativity in the United States, is
in no way always antagonistically related to normalism.) Without
doubt, the media image of "BillClinton"lives with connotations of
flexible normalism: saxophone player, swing rhythm, pot smoker,
draft dodger, an emancipated wife, a double careercouple, and sig-
nals of an open marriage.Clinton's popularity is supported by such
signals, which at times are difficultto understandin Europe,because
his concretedomestic and foreign policies appear difficult to distin-
guish from those of George H. Bush. According to all opinion polls,
such flexibilityis also held to be "normal"by the majorityof the U.S.
population. The problemof the flexible-normalisticstrategies,as rep-
resented above, is the necessity of both exploringthe limits of flexible
normalitiesand of implementing them throughthe play of "reaching
equilibrium."Under normalisticpremises, every kind of normality,
including flexible normality,will end somewhere-and those proto-
normalisticsubjectsonly wait for the failureof the flexible strategyin
this game of "reachingequilibrium."The limit of normality of "soft
drugs" lies in "drugaddiction,"that is, "addiction"in general-cor-
respondingly,the limit of normalityof "sexbased on open marriage"
lies in "sex addiction," that is, the addiction to sex (of which the
female accusers indict the president).When is a man a "sex addict,"
and is Bill Clinton a "sex addict"? This is the question that the
U.S. media culture must have put on the table. And, implicit therein,
one finds a still more exciting question: on its home turf, does the
 FROM
THE"POWER TO"FLEXIBLE
OFTHENORM" NORMALISM" 31

flexible-normalisticstrategy prove itself incapable of establishing

functionally capable and flexible borders of normality, which can
again function in the future within the open game of "reachingequi-
librium"?Does it come to a toppling of both normalisticstrategies,
and does the protonormalisticstrategy again hold a chance for dom-
inance and hegemony? It is exactly for this reason that "Zippergate"
is fascinating,because it confrontsboth possible answers-"yes, that
is the limit" and conversely "in no way is that the limit; that is com-
pletely normal"-in a kind of stalemate, and because both answers
appear to fluctuate from day to day in their respective media domi-
nance. Can the flexible-normalisticstrategy be toppled? That would
be, moreand not less, a mega-eventat the end of the twentiethcentury.
In any case, I hope this analysis has shown how much my toolbox
presupposes Foucault'sown toolbox as its historicala priori.

Notes

Jiirgen Link, "Von der 'Macht der Norm' zum 'flexiblen Normalismus': Ober-
legungen nach Foucault," in Zeitgendrssische franzisische Denker:Eine Bilanz, ed.
Joseph Jurt (Freiburg:Rombach Verlag, 1998), 251-68. All translations of material
quoted within the text, unless otherwise noted, are by Mirko M. Hall.
1. Michel Foucault, "Des Supplices aux cellules (entretien avec R.-P.
Droit)," LeMonde9363 (February21, 1975):16.
2. Normalisation:"1. Action de normaliser. Standardization ... Definition
de specifications techniques, de normes, de performances, de methodes d'essais
requises pour un produit ... Associationfranqaisede normalisation(AFNor) ... 2.
Action de rendre normal, de r tablir (une situation) dans l'Ytatanterieur.Normal-
isationdes relationsdiplomatiques." Paul Robert, Le nouveaupetitRobert:dictionnaire
et
alphabitique analogique de la languefranqaise,eds. Josette Rey-Debove and Alain
Rey (Paris: Dictionnaires Le Robert, 2000), 1682. Compare the article "normalisa-
tion" in the Tr6sorde la languefranqaise:dictionnairede la languedu XIXeet du XXe
siecle,1789-1960, ed. Paul Imbs (Paris:Editions du Centre national de la recherche
scientifique, 1986), 12: 235-36.
3. Michel Foucault, Surveilleret punir. Naissancede la prison (Paris: Galli-
mard, 1975), 185.
4. Michel Foucault, Uberwachenund Strafen.Die Geburtdes Gefiingnisses,
trans. WalterSeitter (Frankfurt/Main:Suhrkamp, 1976), 236.
5. Michel Foucault, Disciplineand Punish:TheBirthof thePrison,trans. Alan
Sheridan (New York:Vintage, 1995), 183. Translationslightly modified.
6. JiirgenLink, VersuchfiberdenNormalismus.Wie produziertwird
Normalitait
(Opladen: Westdeutsche Verlag, 1996).
32 J1URGEN LINK

7. Georges Canguilhem, On the Normaland the Pathological,trans. Carolyn

R. Fawcett, ed. Robert S. Cohen, intro. Michel Foucault (Boston: D. Reidel Pub-
lishing, 1978).
8. Ibid. See also Henning Ritter, "Normal, Normalitiit," in Historisches
W6rterbuchder Philosophie,ed. Joachim Ritter et al. (Basel: Schwabe, 1984),
6:920-28.
9. Michel Foucault, The Orderof Things:An Archaeologyof the Human Sci-
ences(New York:Vintage, 1994).
10. Francois Ewald, L'Etatprovidence(Paris:B. Grasset, 1986).
11. Michel Foucault, TheHistory of Sexuality:An Introduction,trans. Robert
Hurley (New York:Vintage, 1990), 144.
12. Ibid., 88.
13. Ibid., 134.
14. Ibid., 177.
15. See, for example, ibid., 139.
16. Ibid., 104-5.
17. Ibid., 71.
18. Ibid., 119.
19. Ibid., 131.
20. RobertCastel, FranCoiseCastel, and Anne Lovell, ThePsychiatricSociety,
trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New York:Columbia University Press, 1982);Robert
Castel, Lagestion des risques:de l'anti-psychiatriea'l'apres-psychanalyse
(Paris: Edi-
tions de Minuit, 1981);RobertCastel, Lepsychanalysme: l'ordrepsychanalytiqueet le
pouvoir (Paris:Union gendrale d'6ditions, 1976).
21. Castel, Lagestiondes risques,14.
22. Ibid., 101.
23. Foucault, TheHistoryof Sexuality,94-95.
24. Link, Normalismus,77.
25. See, for example, Foucault, TheHistoryof Sexuality,45ff.