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Precluding the Same Claim: Efficiency

Case: Frier v. City of Vandalia (7th, 1985) [CB 658-667]


770 F.2d 699

Facts:
○ Action #1: Pl's cars were towed by the city and placed in a garage. He
didn’t want to pay the fine, so he sue to city for replevin in state court. The
state court concluded that the city properly took Pl's cars, and declined Pl's
writ of replevin, b/c the city had a right to remove the cars from the street.
○ Action #2: Pl then tried to sue in federal court, invoking the 14th
amendment (Right to due process) and 42 USC 1983 (Didn't give enough process
before they keep car, prompt hearing, etc.), and sought $100k in compensatory and
$100k in punitive damages. Federal court found that Pl had notice of each tow and
knew how to get his cars back, so they dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a claim (the motion to dismiss should have been a summary judgment, but this
7th circuit court looks at the decision as a summary judgment).
§ Pl then appealed that decision to the 7th circuit.

Issue: Whether a resolution in state court precludes a claim in federal court,


when the new claim, although based on the same facts, is invoking a different
legal theories. -Yes.

Holding: Federal court's dismissal affirmed.

Reasoning:
○ Question to answer is whether the Illinois courts which rendered the 1st
judgment in the preclusion action, would bar the 2nd civil rights claim.
§ Yes, Illinois would have because of claim preclusion.
□ The parties and causes of action are identical (b/c it arises
from the same core of operative facts), therefore there is claim preclusion from
Pl bringing the 2nd claim in.
□ Claim preclusion is meant to impel parties to consolidate all
closely related matters for efficiency, consistency and to prevent the oppression
of Df's with costly lawsuits that may be difficult to defend.
® 7th circuit court says that Pl already had a "full and
fair opportunity to litigate" all the issues. He could have filed the claims from
the 2nd suit along with his suit for replevin, nothing would have stopped him from
doing so.
○ 7th said affirmed based on res judicata.
○ Why is fed court looking at Illinois law, if it is a federal question
claim.
§ If the 2nd claim would have been precluded in Illinois state court,
then it will be precluded in fed court
□ [28 USC §1738 Full Faith and Credit - governs preclusive
effects and requires that a federal ruling follow the state ruling].
® Says a prior judgment in state court is entitled to same
credit in fed court as it would have in the state court. This is the full faith
and credit.
® Also, a fed judgment will have same credit in state court
b/c of supremacy clause

Concurrence: Says claim preclusion doesn’t apply here because the earlier
judgment wasn’t conclusive; instead the city is entitled to summary judgment b/c
Pl's claims have no merits. There was no due process violation after looking at
the facts.
○ Says Illinois adheres to a cause of action test. Cause of action in
replevin action is not the same as cause of action for due process even if they
arise from the common nucleus of operative fact.
§

RULE: One suit precludes a second where the parties and causes of action are
identical. Causes of action are identical where the evidence necessary to sustain
a second verdict would sustain the first (based on the same common core of
operative fact).

A suit is barred by claim preclusion when the parties and causes of action
involved are identical to those of a prior suit.

Notes:
• 2nd Rest. seeks to summarize the common law of claim and issue preclusion. Sets
forth a broad definition of "claims":
○ (1) When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes a
plaintiff's claim…, the claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to
remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction,
or series of connected transactions, out of which the claim arose.
○ (2)What factual grouping constitutes a "transaction," and what groupings
constitute a "series," are to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such
considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or
motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment
as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding or
usage.
§ Expectations - what did parties expect?
• Forcing a Pl to combine all the claims arising out of a transaction does not
force the court to try all those claims in a single suit.
○ Rule 42(b) gives the trial court authority to sever parts of a complaint
for trial
○ So, in Frier, the court would have wanted to separate the claims (replevin
and unconstitutionality). This questions whether the two claims should then be
treated as one for preclusion purposes.
§ Rest above notes specifies that "whether [the claims] form a
convenient trial unit" is one of the factors to be considered in deciding whether
they ought to be precluded.
• Courts may say that the precluded Pl is trying to split her claim between 2
lawsuits. Most "splitting" cases are analyzed as involving
○ (a) diff theories of recovery,
§ Ex. Attempting to recover under contract in one action, and quasi-
contract in another
§ Frier probably not splitting b/c he sought diff remedies (replevin
vs. damages)
○ (b) arithmetical splitting, or
§ When a Pl tries to recover for separate damages from the same
incident in separate actions
○ (c) splitting of relief.
§ When a Pl asserts one remedy in one action and seeks an alternative
or supplemental remedy in a separate action.
§ Frier had elements of such splitting - Pl sought one remedy
(replevin) in 1st suit, and sought constitutional theories in 2nd suit, sought
damages for the same acts of allegedly unlawful towing
• Before a claim can be precluded by a lawsuit, it must be a claim at the time of
that suit.
○ Not limited to issues of a claim's ripeness - may involve 1st tribunal's
competency
§ Ex. Claims for equitable relief would not be precluded if the 1st
court had no power to grant equitable relief
• Transactional def of claims does not extend to claims by diff parties but
arising from the same episode.

Notes
• Turns on requisite (b)(v) above. Does Illinois apply the traditional cause of
action test (CB 662-63) or the more modern transactional test exemplified by the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments (CB 664 n. 2(c))?
○ What is the difference between these tests, in general and as applied to
the facts here?
○ Why does this federal court adjudicating a federal civil rights claim
under Section 1983 care which one Illinois would use?

• On a jurisdiction that bases claim preclusion on the common nucleus of operative


fact

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