Army Audit Report A 2010 0169 20100819 PDF

U.S.
Army Audit Agency

Service • Ethics • Progress
Followup Audit of Forward

Operating Base Closures
United States Forces - Iraq
Audit Report: A-2010-0169-ALL 19 August 2010

Executive Summary
Audit Report A-2010-0169-ALL
19 August 2010
Followup Audit of Forward Operating Base Closures
United States Forces - Iraq
Results Recommendations
At the request of United States Forces – Iraq (USF-I), we conducted this We recommended that the
followup audit to determine whether the recommendations from Audit Commander, USF-I:
Report: A-2010-0044-ALL, Forward Operating Base Closures in Iraq,
dated 26 January 2010, were implemented and if the corrective actions • Establish and implement a
fixed the problems identified during the initial audit. The recommen- Quality Assurance
dations were aimed at assisting USF-I streamline the base closure Surveillance Plan to monitor
process. the Base Closure Assistance
Teams contract to ensure
The initial audit showed that USF-I needed to improve how it personnel are sufficiently
monitored and documented base closures in Iraq. Command didn’t advising and assisting the
have reliable methods to monitor compliance with the base closure base closure process. Provide
process and ensure commanders complied with established guidance. metrics and surveillance
Further, Command didn’t have oversight of the document submission methods/formats to division
process and wasn’t able to enforce compliance with established commanders for reporting
requirements. The audit also showed that USF-I could improve teams’ accomplishments and
guidance and document retention for property transfers during base conduct site visits to measure
closures as well as overall property accountability in Iraq. Command contractors’ performance.
issued confusing guidance for foreign excess personal property, and
units didn’t fully comply with orders to perform inventories on all • Create a document repository
bases in Iraq. We made 11 recommendations to address these portal, similar to the basing
deficiencies and assist command in streamlining the base closure portal, to ensure property
process. accountability inventories are
accurately reported.
During our followup audit, we found that USF-I implemented 4 of
our 11 recommendations and was implementing the remaining USF-I concurred with our
7 recommendations. Subsequent to our draft report, USF-I took recommendations. The Office
additional actions to implement five more recommendations. In May of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4
2010, we revisited USF-I and verified that the subsequent actions fixed provided the official Army
the problems for the five of the recommendations. As of the date of position and agreed with the
this report, nine of the recommendations were implemented and two report.
were being implemented.
The actions took by USF-I helped improve how base closures were
monitored and documented. Further, the actions clarified confusing
guidance for all levels of command.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. ARMY AUDIT AGENCY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY AUDITOR GENERAL
ACQUISITION AND LOGISTICS AUDITS
3101 PARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VA 22302-1596
19 August 2010
Commander, United States Forces -Iraq
This is our report on the followup audit of forward operating base closures in Iraq. We
performed this followup effort at the request of your command.
This report addresses whether recommendations were implemented as agreed to in

U.S. Army Audit Agency Report A-2010-0044-ALL, Forward Operating Base Closures
in Iraq, dated 26 January 2010. The report had 11 recommendations for strengthening
controls over base closures in Iraq, and this followup report has 2 additional
recommendations addressed to you.
We conducted this followup audit in accordance with generally accepted government

auditing standards.
The Army’s official position on the conclusions, recommendations, and command

comments is in Annex D. For additional information about this report, contact the
Expeditionary Support Audits Division at 910-643-6204.
I appreciate the courtesies and cooperation extended to us during the audit.
FOR THE AUDITOR GENERAL:
WILLIAM E. JENKINS
Program Director
Expeditionary Support Audits
CONTENTS
Page
Introduction
What We Audited ............................................................................................................ 2
Background ....................................................................................................................... 2
Objective, Conclusion, Recommendations, and Comments
Implementing the Recommendations ........................................................................... 4
Annexes
A — General Audit Information .................................................................................. 17
B — Abbreviations Used in This Report..................................................................... 20
C — Prior recommendations ........................................................................................ 21
D — Official Army Position and Verbatim Comments by Command .................. 23
Followup Audit of Forward Operating Base Closures, United States Forces – Iraq (A-2010-0169-ALL) Page 1
INTRODUCTION
WHAT WE AUDITED
We reviewed actions taken by United States Forces – Iraq (USF-I) to implement

recommendations in audit report A-2010-0044-ALL. The report had 11 recommen-
dations to improve controls over forward operating base closure procedures. We
focused on whether command took actions to implement agreed-to recommendations
and whether the corrective actions fixed the reported problems. Recommendations
from the previous report are in Annex C.
BACKGROUND
In October 2009, Multi-National Force - Iraq (MNF-I) and Multi-National Corps – I

(MNC-I) were in the process of transitioning to USF-I. MNC-I C7 had fully transitioned
into USF-I J7, and the remaining elements were due to officially transition in January
2010. In this report, we only refer to USF-I instead of the separate MNF-I and MNC-I
that were in place during our initial audit.
Our initial audit report (Audit Report A-2010-0044-ALL) answered these two objectives:
• Were theater base closure processes at forward operating bases sufficiently

communicated and monitored, and properly documented to ensure bases were
closed or returned in accordance with United States and Government of Iraq
guidelines?
• Did the theater establish sufficient guidance, coordinate resources, and document
real and personal property transactions appropriately during the base closure
process?
USF-I established base closure processes that were well communicated to subordinate
units. However, command needed to improve how it monitored and documented base
closures in Iraq. Specifically, command:
• Didn’t have reliable methods to monitor compliance with the base closure process
and ensure commanders complied with established guidance.
• Didn’t have oversight of the document submission process and wasn’t able to
enforce compliance with established requirements.
Because of these conditions, USF-I didn’t have full assurance that U.S. Forces closed
bases in Iraq in accordance with established United States and Government of Iraq
guidelines. In addition, without documentation, USF-I wouldn’t have support to refute
possible claims by the Government of Iraq and its citizens against the United States.
Command needed to improve guidance and document retention for property transfers
during base closures as well as overall property accountability in Iraq. Specifically:
• USF-I issued confusing guidance for foreign excess personal property transfers.
• Units didn’t fully comply with orders to perform inventories on all bases in Iraq.
IMPLEMENTING THE RECOMMENDATIONS
OBJECTIVE
Did command implement recommendations from the prior report and did the actions
fix the problems?
CONCLUSION
Yes and no. Command implemented 4 of our 11 recommendations, didn’t implement

1 recommendation, and was implementing the remaining 6 recommendations.
Three of the recommendations that Command implemented fixed the problem we

identified in our initial effort. Specifically, Command:
• Developed a base closure reporting portal to standardize the method for gathering
base closure documentation which allowed MNC-I to develop base closure reports
that were more accurate and less subjective than the ones we reviewed during our
initial effort.
• Published Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 832 requiring units to turn in missing base
closure documentation from base closures dating back to October 2008. As a
result, USF-I gained accountability for 97 percent of the documentation, which was
archived on the portal.
• Clarified the guidance for leaving bases and property “functional” at the
sustainment conference held on 15 August 2009. This updated guidance was also
discussed and clarified periodically during the Base Management Operations
Planning Team (BMOPT), giving units a better understanding of real versus
personal property.
Due to these actions, Recommendations A-4, A-5, and B-1 can be closed.
Command also implemented Recommendation B-2, but the actions taken didn’t fix the
problem. The process that allows the Theater Property Book Office (TPBO) to review
excess properties inventories before property is declared as foreign excess personal
property was still not working properly resulting in the potential for unauthorized
equipment being transferred to the Government of Iraqi. In addition, USF-I didn’t
implement Recommendation B-3 which required that Command determine the
information necessary on the Financial Liability Investigation of Property Loss (FLIPL)
forms and the correct routing of the form to ensure proper review, approval, and
retention. We coordinated with auditors working on the Audit of Forward Operating
Base Closures-Government of Iraq Property Transfers (Foreign Excess Personal
Property) (Project A-2010-ALL-0232) that was ongoing at the same time as our
followup. Since that project covered processes for Foreign Excess Personal Property
(FEPP) transfers in Iraq, the team agreed to include these recommendations in their
audit work. Further actions for these recommendations will be included in the audit
report for Project A-2010-ALL-0232.
USF-I was implementing the remaining six recommendations. Four of those

recommendations were on track to fix the problems we identified our initial audit.
Specifically:
• Command coordinated with Army Central Command (ARCENT) to transfer base

closure documentation for long-term retention. But since the process wasn’t fully
formalized, there was no assurance ARCENT was retaining base closure
documentation in accordance with AR 405-45 (Real Property Inventory
Management).
• USF-I personnel were planning a sustainment conference for November 2009 and a
base closure synchronization meeting for January 2010 to bring together the key
players in the base closure process.
• USF-I personnel developed a system to track base closures in Iraq that was capable
of providing base closure status on a red/green/amber status to the leadership and
were making it fully functional.
As a result, Recommendations A-1, A-3, A-6, and B-5 will remain open until USF-I
completes the actions necessary to fully implement the recommendations.
Two recommendations were being implemented, but USF-I will have to take additional
actions to fully fix the problems. Specifically:
• USF-I acquired a contract instead of using service members to fill the Base Closure
Assistance Teams (BCATs) discussed in Recommendation A-2. Command was
developing a training program for the team for when they would arrive in theater
around mid-November 2009. Because the teams would consist of contract
personnel and would be under the control of the division commanders, the USF-I
contracting officers representative will need to develop and implement a Quality
Assurance Surveillance Plan and conduct site visits to ensure that the teams
effectively assist with the base closure process.
• USF-I published MNC-I FRAGO 373 (formerly FRAGO 217) directing all units to
submit monthly property accountability inventories to command so that
inventories could be monitored. Because of technical difficulties, not all units
could upload their inventory memos to the portal, and documents were in multiple
locations making the task of property accountability difficult. As a result, there
was no assurance that property inventories were correctly tracked or reported.
Command needs to establish an automated reporting form for property
accountability so that units have efficient means of uploading documents and
Command has a better method of retaining monthly inventory memos in
accordance with FRAGO 373.
Our detailed discussion of these conditions begins below. Our recommendations to

correct them begin on page 13.
DISCUSSION
In this section, we these two areas:
• Base closure process.
• Property transactions.
Base Closure Process
We previously reported that the theater had suficient base closure processes in place
and effectively communicated guidance to major subordinate commands. However,
some units requested additional training in base closure processes. Command also
needed to improve the methods used to monitor and document base closures. We
found only 33 percent of required documentation on hand for recent base closures. As
a result, USF-I didn’t have full assurance that bases were closed in accordance with
established guidance or that U.S. Forces were in line to meet timelines and expectations
set by the United States and Government of Iraq.
We made six recommendations to improve the USF-I base closure process. At the time
of our followup audit, Command had either implemented or was implementing the six
recommendations.
Communication of Base Closure Process
Our initial audit showed that some units expressed a desire to have more training in the
beginning stage of the base closure process. In Recommendation A-1, we recom-
mended that command hold semiannual base synchronization conferences to
consistently clarify and update base closure guidance in. In Recommendation A-2, we
recommended that command take actions to ensure the BCATs were used effectively to
assist commanders in the base closure process. Our followup audit showed that
command was implementing both recommendations.
USF-I hosted a sustainment conference on 15 August 2009, which included a session on

lessons learned from prior base closures. Command personnel took this time to discuss
the findings from our initial audit and the initiatives put in place to correct the
problems we identified. Command personnel were planning another sustainment
meeting scheduled for late November 2009 to bring the key players in the base closure
process together again. In addition, a basing synchronization meeting was planned for
January 2010 that would coordinate with upcoming rotations in the three Multi-
National Divisions (MNDs) and provide new personnel with the latest base closure
information. The audience for the January conference would be division engineers,
logistics personnel, environmental personnel, and basing officers. Some of the
tentatively scheduled discussion topics included:
• BCATs.
• Real versus Personal Property.
• Security Agreement Issues.
• The Government of Iraq Receivership Secretariat.
• Environmental Requirements.
• Foreign Excess Personal Property.
• Defense Reutilization Management Office and Transportation.
USF-I took corrective actions to ensure that base closure personnel were provided
sufficient guidance and training as required in the recommendation. However, because
the base closure process is ongoing and the need for synchronization conferences will
extend into the future, Recommendation A-1 will remain open.
Since our initial audit, Command personnel made some progress on the standup of the
BCATs. Because of a shortage of service members with the correct skills, USF-I
acquired BCAT personnel through a Logistics Civil Augmentation Program contract,
and those personnel were due to arrive in Iraq in mid-November 2009. The
$10.3 million contract will provide 30 personnel to fill 6 teams to assist with base
closures. The teams will consist of five personnel each as follows:
• 1 Logistics Management Specialist.
• 1 Logistics Management Specialist.
• 1 Transportation Specialist.
• 2 Property Analysts.
The contracting officers representative will be an USF-I representative, but the BCAT
personnel will be under the operational control of the various divisions in Iraq. While
the division commanders will be able to position BCAT personnel according to their
needs, the contracting officers representative will not have direct supervision or contact
with contract personnel on a regular basis.
Because the BCATs aren’t yet operational, Recommendation A-2 will remain open and
we have made an additional recommendation to ensure the success of the BCAT
mission. Because the BCATs will consist of contractors as opposed to Service members,
we recommend that USF-I establish and implement a Quality Assurance Surveillance
Plan for the BCAT contract. This plan should include metrics for the division
commanders to use for monitoring BCAT contract personnel as well as surveillance
reports that should be submitted by commanders to the contracting officers
representative. The representative must be proactive in the BCAT mission by reviewing
these weekly reports and conducting site visits to ensure that the contractors effectively
assist in the base closure process. This recommendation will remain open and
Recommendation 1 in this report addresses additional action necessary to ensure that
the BCATs effectively assist with the base closure process.
Monitoring of Base Closure Process
During our initial review, we found that theater personnel didn’t sufficiently monitor
the base closure process in Iraq and consequently may not have had an accurate picture
of the base closure posture in Iraq. At that time, we couldn’t validate the accuracy of
information used to assess the progress of base closures in Iraq and found that
personnel were using subjective methods to gauge the status of base closures. This
occurred because the theater didn’t have an effective tracking and reporting tool in
place to monitor base closures and ensure that units complied with established
guidance or timelines. As a result, some units closed bases without following
established guidelines and/or obtaining approvals. Command had no assurance that
the transactions and agreements some units entered into with the Government of Iraq
were legally sound or in accordance with established guidance.
In Recommendation A-3, we recommended that Command develop a system to

monitor base closures in Iraq and use this system to hold commanders accountable for
completing base closure requirements on time and adhering to established policy.
During our followup effort, we found that Command was developing a system to
monitor base closures in Iraq. Specifically, USF-I established and tested a system
commonly referred to as the CUBE, between 15 and 30 June 2009. As of 31 October
2009, the CUBE was functional and could produce charts that assessed base closures
from the macro theater level to the micro individual base level.
USF-I personnel demonstrated the capabilities of the system and showed that:
• At the theater level, base closure was assessed on a chart that compares the actual
number of open bases during a certain period to previously established goals.
• At the division level, each division was assessed on a red/green/amber metric

based on a rollup of the bases in that division.
• At the individual level, each base was assessed on a base closure matrix for each
base. The base closure matrix assigned red/green/amber status to each base for
each of the 13 documents required for submission by the base closure reporting
form.
During followup, we found that the CUBE wasn’t fully functional and that it suffered
from quality control problems. Specifically, we found that USF-I needed to perform a
significant cleanup of the base closure data on the basing portal. Additionally, we
identified some disagreement between the USF-I functional divisions regarding the
exact location from which base closure data was pulled for use in the CUBE
assessments. As a result, USF-I basing personnel were manually compiling data for
inclusion in reports to higher command while working to make the CUBE more
accurate. Based on our followup assessment, Recommendation A-3 was being
implemented and will remain open until the CUBE is fully functional.
Support for Recent Base Closures
Our initial audit showed that USF-I subordinate units didn’t sufficiently document
recent base closures in Iraq. In addition, we found that major subordinate command
and unit commanders didn’t fully understand the effect of not submitting documents
because command leadership didn’t emphasize the need for long-term document
retention. Without sufficient base closure documentation, command had no assurance
that base closures were executed in accordance with established guidelines. In
addition, the United States had no documented support to provide to the Government
of Iraq or Iraqi citizens should claims or questions regarding base closures arise later.
We made three recommendations to improve the documentation of base closures in
Iraq:
• Standardize methods for gathering base closure documentation and use this
documentation to track base closure progress.
• Retrieve missing base closure documentation.
• Formalize the process for long-term document retention.
During the followup audit, we found that USF-I published FRAGO 712 directing the
establishment of the Base Closure Reporting Portal no later than 8 July 2009. The
FRAGO also directed major subordinate commands to use the base closure portal to
upload select base closure documents so that leadership could track the closure/return
process by base, task, and MND/Force. We verified that USF-I ensured regular
compliance with the reporting requirements in FRAGO 712 by reporting each MND’s
base closure status to the Joint Sustainment Integration Board in a red/green/amber
status. We also verified that USF-I personnel used the Battle Update Assessment
meetings to report base closure issues to the USF-I Chief of Staff. Because of these
actions, Recommendation A-4 can be closed.
We also found that command conducted an internal base closure documentation audit
for all bases closed since October 2008 to locate the missing base closure documentation
we noted in our initial report. In July 2009, command published FRAGO 832 directing
units to turn in missing base closure documentation to USF-I. If documentation
couldn’t be found or tasks hadn’t been conducted at some sites, units were required to
submit a memorandum for record signed by their Division Chief of Staff indicating this
information. As a result of the FRAGO, USF-I obtained 97 percent of recent base
closure and property transaction documentation - a significant increase over the 25-33
percent rate we recorded during our initial audit. As a result, Recommendation A-5 can
be closed.
USF-I was also formalizing the process used to transfer base closure documents to
Army Central Command for long-term retention. Although ARCENT had the ability to
download information from the basing portal, there was no formal process in place to
ensure documents were consistently archived. Recommendation A-6 will remain open
until the process for long-term document retention has been fully formalized with
ARCENT.
Property Transactions
We previously reported that most guidance for property disposition and/or transfer to
the Government of Iraq during the base closure process was clear; however, theater
personnel needed to provide some additional clarification to assist units. In addition,
we found that theater personnel needed to improve the coordination of resources for
property accountability and documentation of property transactions during base
closures. These conditions occurred because command had previously issued some
confusing guidance for property transactions; theater commanders hadn’t emphasized
the importance of accurate property accountability in Iraq; and command didn’t have
an effective method to retain documentation for property transactions related to base
closures.
Guidance for Property Transfers
Most guidance for property disposition and transfer to the Government of Iraq during
the base closure process was clear; however, command needed to provide some
additional clarification to assist units with the process. Units were specifically confused
with guidance on returning functional bases and facilities and with guidance on FEPP
reviews and documentation. We recommended that command clarify the guidance in
Recommendations B-1 and B-3 in our initial audit report.
During our followup audit, we verified that Command personnel clarified the guidance
for leaving bases and property “functional.” Personnel used the Sustainment
Conference held in August 2009 and the weekly BMOPT meetings to explain and
discuss the meaning of a functional base and the property transfers associated with a
functional base. We interviewed Headquarters - and Division-level personnel about the
guidance and found that they understood the guidance and weren’t confused over
what property to leave. Based on this information, Recommendation B-1 can be closed.
However, Command didn’t determine the information necessary for the FLIPL forms or
the correct routing of the form to ensure proper review, approval, and retention as was
required in Recommendation B-3. According to the initial audit Command Comments,
dated 10 July 2009, the FLIPL instructions were included in Appendix D-1, Tab J:
Foreign Excess Personal Property of Operations Order (OPORD) 09-02.1. However,
during our followup audit, we reviewed the document and found that the appendix
wasn’t updated with the FLIPL information. In addition, we were unable to verify that
the FLIPL process was ever discussed during the weekly Base Management Working
Group (BMWG) meetings. As a result, FLIPLs still might not be routed properly and
items may not be properly removed from theater property book. Recommendation B-3
will remain open and Command should include FLIPL guidance in OPORD 10-1, which
was due to be published in January 2010.
We found that Command was working to implement Recommendation B-2 which

called for the formalization of the process with the TPBO that allowed for the review of
excess property inventories before it was declared as foreign excess personal property.
Since our initial audit, USF-I personnel updated MNC-I OPORD 09-02 to direct that
personal property inventory lists be provided to the TPBO before property being
declared FEPP. However, the OPORD listed two individual points of contact instead of
an organizational or static e-mail account for the receipt of inventory lists. During
followup, we found that one of the individuals listed in the document had already
rotated out of the theater and the other individual stated that they still hadn’t received
any inventory lists unless they specifically requested them from the unit.
Therefore, the actions taken by Command didn’t fix the problem and the process hadn’t
changed since our initial audit. As a result, TPBO wasn’t able to screen inventories
before base closures and unauthorized property may have been transferred to the
Government of Iraq. We coordinated with auditors working on the Audit of Forward
Operating Base Closures-Government of Iraq Property Transfers (Foreign Excess
Personal Property) (Project A-2010-ALL-0232) that was ongoing at the same time as our
followup. Since that project covered processes for FEPP transfers in Iraq, the team
agreed to include these recommendations in their audit work. Recommendation B-2
will remain open and further actions for these recommendations will be included in the
audit report for Project A-2010-ALL-0232.
We also found that Command was implementing Recommendation B-4 that called for
USF-I to hold semiannual property synchronization meetings. Command hosted a
sustainment conference on 15 August 2009, which included a session on property
guidance. In addition, property transfers were scheduled to be discussed at a basing
synchronization meeting planned for January 2010. The synchronization meeting is
coordinated with the rotation of units in January, new units will be informed of base
closure and property accountability processes at the beginning of their deployment. As
with Recommendation A-1, because the base closure process is ongoing and the need
for synchronization conferences will extend into the future, Recommendation B-4 will
remain open.
Coordination of Resources
In our prior report, we concluded that Command effectively coordinated resources for
property accountability and movement but needed to improve methods for ensuring
units participated in inventory reporting. Without improvements, Command wouldn’t
have an accurate assessment of the total amount of property that must be disposed of,
transferred to other units, transferred to the Government of Iraq, or transported out of
Iraq as bases closed. To improve property accountability in Iraq, in Recommendation
B-5 we required command to:
• Make property accountability a command priority and monitor compliance with

property accountability issues at the executive level and hold commanders
responsible for updating inventories.
• Continue to monitor the monthly inventories required by FRAGOs 217 and 09-252
and provide regular updates to commanders.
• Reiterate the availability of the property assistance teams to account for property at
any time or stage of a unit’s mission in theater.
During our followup audit, we found that command was implementing this
recommendation but that additional actions would be needed to fix the problem.
Command published MNC-I FRAGO 373 (formerly FRAGO 217) directing all units to
submit monthly property accountability inventories to MNC-I C4. Although Command
continued to monitor these monthly inventories, not all documentation was uploaded
onto the basing portal because of technological difficulties that prevented units from
uploading their inventory memos. To abide by the FRAGO, units instead sent their
inventories to one individual; however, many of the documents never got uploaded to
the portal due to the extensive time it took to upload the forms onto the portal. Instead,
the documents were scattered throughout the points of contact’s e-mail and in his
personal files and, as a result, there was no assurance that property inventories were
correctly tracked or reported. To prevent this confusion in the future, in Recommen-
dation A-2 of this report, we recommend that Command establish an automated
reporting form similar to the one used for uploading the base closure documents
discussed in Recommendation A-4 of the initial audit report. This would give USF-I a
more efficient means of uploading and retaining monthly inventory memos in
accordance with FRAGO 373.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMMENTS
This section contains specific recommendations and a summary of command comments

for each recommendation. The official Army position and verbatim command
comments are in Annex D.
For the Commander, U.S. Forces - Iraq
Recommendation 1
Establish and implement a Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan to monitor the BCAT
contract to ensure personnel are sufficiently advising and assisting the base closure
process. Provide metrics and surveillance methods/formats to Division Commanders
for reporting teams’ accomplishments and conduct site visits to measure contractors’
performance.
Command Comments
USF-I J4 concurred with our recommendation and will coordinate with the Logistics
Civil Augmentation Program to implement metrics ensuring that BCATs are advising
and assisting the Division Commanders for base closures and returns. Target date for
implementation is July 2010.
Recommendation 2
Create a document repository portal, similar to the USF-I J7 basing portal to ensure
property accountability inventories are accurately reported.
Command Comments
USF-I J4 partially concurred with our recommendation. On 24 March 2010, Command
agreed that all transfer property inventories in conjunction with base closure or return
must be accurately accounted for and reported. USF-I stated that personnel must not
post all transfer property inventories in conjunction with base closures into the USF-I J7
portal. USF-I nonconcurred with establishing another portal for property documents
because units commanders would be burdened with posting base closure documents at
multiple portals.
Agency Evaluation of Comments

USF-I met the intent of the recommendation by ensuring that the property
accountability inventories are posted to the J7 portal.
Agency Evaluation of USF-I Comments on Status of Original Recommendations

USF-I provided comments on the status of our original audit recommendations on
24 March 2010 and updated those comments on 21 April 2010. The comments indicate
that USF-I concurred with the status of Recommendations A-1, A-4, A-5, B-1, and B-5.
Therefore, Recommendations A-1 and B-5 will remain open and Recommendations A-4,
A-5, and B-1, will be closed.
USF-I nonconcurred with our conclusion that Recommendations A-2, A-3, A-6, B-2, B-3,
and B-4 were being implemented and recommended that the status of the
recommendations be changed to implemented. This occurred because USF-I took
significant actions to implement the remaining recommendations after we finished
fieldwork in November 2009 and before comments were issued in March and April
2010. On 10 May 2010, we revisited USF-I at Camp Victory in Iraq and validated that
appropriate actions were taken since the end of our fieldwork. We evaluated the
comments and subsequent actions as follows:
• Recommendation A-2: On 24 March 2010, USF-I provided additional information

stating that all actions regarding the BCATs were completed in November 2009
after we completed our fieldwork. In May 2010, we verified that these actions had
corrected the problem. This recommendation can now be closed.
• Recommendation A-3: The recommendation called for USF-I to develop a system

to monitor base closures in Iraq and use this system to hold commanders
accountable. On 24 March 2010, USF-I informed us that base closure status is
being monitored through the J7 reporting portal and not the CUBE. In addition,
Commanders are being held responsible for timely submission of base closure
documents through biweekly BMOPT meetings. On 10 May 2010, we verified that
these actions were completed and that they corrected the problem. This
recommendation can be closed.
• Recommendation A-6: While the process for transferring base closure documents
to ARCENT for long-term retention hasn’t been formalized, USF-I continues to
provide documents to ARCENT through an informal process that appears to be
working. USF-I’s actions meet the intent of the recommendation and therefore it
can be closed.
• Recommendation B-2: The review process for excess property inventory before it
is declared excess and placed on a Foreign Excess Personal Property list will be
covered under Army Audit Agency project A-2010-ALL-0232. This
recommendation can be closed.
• Recommendation B-3: On 21 April 2010, USF-I informed us that FEPP FLIPL

procedures had been finalized. USF-I FRAGO 0969-SS-0099-2, Change 1 was
released on 14 April 2010 to clarify FLIPL processing procedures to include FEPP
to the field. On 10 May 2010, we verified that USF-I completed the actions
necessary to close this recommendation.
• Recommendation B-4: On 24 March 2010, USF-I indicated that J4 had conducted

transfer property synchronization training in November 2009 and in February
2010. In addition, J4 has conducted specialized property training with each
division and major subordinate command. On 10 May 2010, we meet with USF-I
personnel and verified that these actions met the intent of the recommendation and
therefore it can be closed.
Official Army Position

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4 provided the official Army position and
agreed with our recommendations.
ANNEX A
A — GENERAL AUDIT INFORMATION
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
We conducted the audit from October 2009 through January 2010 under project A-2010-ALL-
0105.000.
The audit covered transactions representative of base closures at the time of our audit. We
performed our audit at Camp Victory, Iraq and worked with United States Forces – Iraq
personnel, as well as their subordinate commands.
We conducted this followup audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our finding and conclusion based on our
audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objective.
We didn’t base our conclusions on data processed by automated systems. Consequently, we

didn’t need to access the reliability of computer-processed data but rather based our
conclusions on documents maintained by command.
To determine whether the recommendations were implemented, we:
• Reviewed the prior audit report (A-2010-0044-ALL, dated 26 January 2010) and the
associated workpapers to identify audit recommendations and related audit concerns.
• Interviewed key personnel from USF-I, MND-North, MND-South, MND-Bagdad, MNF-

West, and TPBO.
• Reviewed USF-I and Army guidance on base closures.
• Reviewed base closure documents retained on the basing portal.
RESPONSIBILITIES AND RESOURCES
The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4 leads the Army Logistics enterprise in sustaining,
preparing, resetting, and transforming the Nation’s Army in support of full spectrum
Followup Audit of Forward Operating Base Closures, United States Forces - Iraq (A-2010-0169-ALL) Page 17
ANNEX A
operations. The office’s mission is to deliver a ready Army by providing the best logistics
capabilities, policies, and programs.
USF-I is a merger initiated by MNF-I between five major commands including MNC-I Corps -
Iraq and Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq, Joint Area Support Group-
Central, Iraqi Assistance Group, and Task Force 134, into one single command underneath the
four-star commander in Iraq.
MNF-I is the U.S.-led military command in Iraq, managing strategic level issues to include
peace support, civil military operations, and strategic engagement operations with local Iraqis.
MNC-I is the tactical unit responsible for command and control of operations in Iraq, overseeing
divisions in the north, west, south, and Baghdad areas.
MNC-I C4 establishes sustainment plans, policies, and procedures for both tactical and
operational logistics support and services to sustain Joint and Coalition Forces within the
MNC-I Area of Responsibility. Within base closure, the major role of C4 is logistic reposturing,
involving drawing-down, storing, and redistributing equipment. C4 is also responsible for
forecasted planning for future draw-down and redeployment procedures. C4 is the lead in
developing the BCAT concept.
MNC-I C7 plans, resources, and synchronizes combat and general engineering operations in
support of Joint and Coalition Forces in the Iraqi Combined Joint Areas of Operations. C7
Basing serves as the focal point for MNC-I base management by centralizing all basing
requirements and issues to produce a holistic basing approach. Using their Secure Internet
Protocol Router Web Portal, C7 Basing facilitates the flow of base closure guidance and
documents between the responsible MNDs, major subordinate commands, and external sections
and agencies. MNC-I C7 has officially transitioned to USF-I J7.
The TPBO is to provide an accounting and visibility system to units in theater facilitated by
using Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced as an accounting software package. The TPBO
enforces Army regulations and implements systemic fixes, when necessary; sets policies;
provides guidance to the theater; establishes accountability procedure with sister Services and
coalition forces; and is ultimately responsible for all theater-provided equipment in the Iraq area
of operations.
ANNEX A
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
These personnel contributed to the report: Theresa R. Wilson (Audit Manager); and Amy Q.
Rogers (Auditor-in Charge); Trevor A. Strickland, and Aaron P. Brown (Auditors); and Faith
Pruett (Editor).
DISTRIBUTION
We are sending copies of this report to the:
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4

Commander, United States Forces - Iraq
We will also make copies available to others upon request.
ANNEX B
B — ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS REPORT
ARCENT Army Central Command

BCAT Base Closure Assistance Team
BMOPT Base Management Operations Planning Team
BMWG Base Management Working Group
FEPP Foreign Excess Personal Property
FLIPL Financial Liability Investigation of Property Loss
FRAGO Fragmentary Order
MNC-I Multi-National Corps – Iraq
MND Multi-National Division
MNF-I Multi-National Force – Iraq
OPORD Operations Order
TPBO Theater Property Book Office
USF-I United States Forces - Iraq
ANNEX C
C — PRIOR RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendations and status of implementation for audit report A-2010-0044-ALL.
Implementation
Number Recommendation Status
Host semiannual base closure synchronization conferences to
bring together the key players in the base closure process.
Update and clarify base closure guidance and processes
A-1 during these events. In-Process
Take the following actions to ensure the BCATs effectively
assist with the base closure process:
• Expedite the staffing, resourcing, and training of the

BCATs.
• Use the BMWG Meetings and the semiannual base

synchronization conferences to publicize and promote
the capabilities of the BCATs so that units will know
their capabilities.
• Use the teams to provide initial base closure training for

units that are beginning the process. This training
should include an introduction-type instruction that will
familiarize the units with the base closure process and
provide them with the tools and contacts necessary to
start the process.
A-2 Implemented
Develop a system to monitor base closures in Iraq and use
this system to hold commanders accountable for completing
base closure requirements on time and adhering to
A-3 established policy. Implemented
Standardize methods for gathering base closure
documentation. Use document submission as a method to
track the progress of base closures and to hold commanders
A-4 responsible for compliance with established policy. Implemented
Retrieve missing base closure documentation and post on the
A-5 MNC-I C7 Basing Portal. Implemented
Formalize the process for transferring base closure
documents to ARCENT for long-term retention.
ANNEX C
A-6 Implemented
Clarify the guidance for leaving bases and property
“functional.” Discuss the intent of the guidance at the
B-1 BMOPT meetings to ensure subordinate units understand. Implemented
Formalize the process with the Theater Property Book Office
that allows for review of excess property inventories before it
B-2 is declared as foreign excess personal property. Implemented
Determine the information necessary on the FLIPL forms and
the correct routing of the form to ensure proper review,
B-3 approval, and retention. Disseminate guidance to units. Implemented
Host semi-annual property synchronization conferences with
key players to update and clarify property guidance and
B-4 requirements necessary during the base closure process. Implemented
Take the following actions to improve property
accountability in Iraq:
• Make property accountability a command priority.

Monitor compliance with property accountability issues
at the executive level and hold commanders responsible
for updating inventories.
• Continue to monitor the monthly inventories required

by MNC-I FRAGO 217 and MNF-I FRAGO 09-252.
Provide regular updates to commanders.
• Reiterate the availability of the property assistance teams

to account for property at any time or stage of a unit’s
mission in theater, even if it is before the unit’s
involvement in a base closure.
B-5 In-Process
ANNEX D
D — OFFICIAL ARMY POSITION AND

VERBATIM COMMENTS BY COMMAND
ANNEX D
ANNEX D
ANNEX D
ANNEX D
ANNEX D
ANNEX D
Our Mission
To serve America’s Army by providing objective and independent auditing services.

These services help the Army make informed decisions, resolve issues, use resources
effectively and efficiently, and satisfy statutory and fiduciary responsibilities.
To Suggest Audits or Request Audit Support
To suggest audits or request audit support, contact the Office of the Principal Deputy
Auditor General at 703-681-9802 or send an e-mail to
AAAAuditRequests@conus.army.mil.
Additional Copies
We distribute each report in accordance with the requirements of Government Auditing

Standards, GAO-07-731G, July 2007.
To obtain additional copies of this report or other U.S. Army Audit Agency reports, visit
our Web site at https://www.aaa.army.mil. The site is available only to military domains
and the U.S. Government Accountability Office. Other activities may request copies of
Agency reports by contacting our Audit Coordination and Followup Office at 703-614-
9439 or sending an e-mail to AAALiaison@conus.army.mil.

Army Audit Report A 2010 0169 20100819 PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Army Audit Report A 2010 0169 20100819 PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

U.S.

Army Audit Agency

Followup Audit of Forward

United States Forces - Iraq

Audit Report: A-2010-0169-ALL 19 August 2010

Followup Audit of Forward Operating Base Closures

United States Forces - Iraq

Commander, United States Forces -Iraq

This report addresses whether recommendations were implemented as agreed to in

We conducted this followup audit in accordance with generally accepted government

The Army’s official position on the conclusions, recommendations, and command

I appreciate the courtesies and cooperation extended to us during the audit.

FOR THE AUDITOR GENERAL:

What We Audited ............................................................................................................ 2

Objective, Conclusion, Recommendations, and Comments

Implementing the Recommendations ........................................................................... 4

A — General Audit Information .................................................................................. 17

B — Abbreviations Used in This Report..................................................................... 20

C — Prior recommendations ........................................................................................ 21

D — Official Army Position and Verbatim Comments by Command .................. 23

We reviewed actions taken by United States Forces – Iraq (USF-I) to implement

In October 2009, Multi-National Force - Iraq (MNF-I) and Multi-National Corps – I

• Were theater base closure processes at forward operating bases sufficiently

Yes and no. Command implemented 4 of our 11 recommendations, didn’t implement

Three of the recommendations that Command implemented fixed the problem we

USF-I was implementing the remaining six recommendations. Four of those

• Command coordinated with Army Central Command (ARCENT) to transfer base

Our detailed discussion of these conditions begins below. Our recommendations to

In this section, we these two areas:

• Base closure process.

Base Closure Process

USF-I hosted a sustainment conference on 15 August 2009, which included a session on

• Real versus Personal Property.

• Security Agreement Issues.

• The Government of Iraq Receivership Secretariat.

• Foreign Excess Personal Property.

• Defense Reutilization Management Office and Transportation.

• 1 Logistics Management Specialist.

• 1 Logistics Management Specialist.

Monitoring of Base Closure Process

In Recommendation A-3, we recommended that Command develop a system to

• At the division level, each division was assessed on a red/green/amber metric

Support for Recent Base Closures

• Retrieve missing base closure documentation.

• Formalize the process for long-term document retention.

Guidance for Property Transfers

We found that Command was working to implement Recommendation B-2 which

• Make property accountability a command priority and monitor compliance with

RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMMENTS

This section contains specific recommendations and a summary of command comments

Agency Evaluation of Comments

Agency Evaluation of USF-I Comments on Status of Original Recommendations

• Recommendation A-2: On 24 March 2010, USF-I provided additional information

• Recommendation A-3: The recommendation called for USF-I to develop a system

• Recommendation B-3: On 21 April 2010, USF-I informed us that FEPP FLIPL

• Recommendation B-4: On 24 March 2010, USF-I indicated that J4 had conducted

Official Army Position

A — GENERAL AUDIT INFORMATION

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

We didn’t base our conclusions on data processed by automated systems. Consequently, we

To determine whether the recommendations were implemented, we:

• Interviewed key personnel from USF-I, MND-North, MND-South, MND-Bagdad, MNF-