c


 


  DrM.L.King, Jr.

You express a great deal of anxiety over our willingness to break laws. This is certainly a
legitimate concern. Since we so diligently urge people to obey the Supreme Court's decision of
1954 outlawing segregation in the public schools, it is rather strange and paradoxical to find us
consciously breaking laws. One may well ask, "How can you advocate breaking some laws and
obeying others?" The answer is found in the fact that there are two types of laws: There are u

laws and there are u
 laws. I would be the first to advocate obeying just laws. One has not
only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws. Conversely, one has a moral
responsibility to disobey unjust laws. I would agree with Saint Augustine that  u
 


 
Now what is the difference between the two? How does one determine when a law is just or
unjust? A just law is a man-made code that squares with the moral law or the law of God. An
unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the moral law. To put it in the terms of Saint
Thomas Aquinas, an unjust law is a human law that is not rooted in the eternal and natural law.
A law that uplifts human personality is just. A law that degrades human personality is unjust. All
segregation statutes are unjust because segregation distorts the soul and damages the personality.
It gives the segregator a false sense of superiority and the segregated a false sense of inferiority.
In the words of Martin Buber, the great Jewish philosopher, segregation substitutes an "I-it"
relationship for the "I-thou" relationship, and ends up relegating persons to the status of things.
So segregation is not only politically, economically, and sociologically unsound, but is morally
wrong and sinful. Paul Tillich said that sin is separation. Isn't segregation an existential
expression of man's tragic separation, an expression of his awful estrangement, his terrible
sinfulness? So I can urge men to obey the 1954 decision of the Supreme Court because it is
morally right, and I can urge them to disobey segregation ordinances because they are morally
wrong.
Let us turn to a more concrete example of just and unjust laws. An unjust law is a code that
a majority inflicts on a minority that is not binding on itself. This is
 made legal. On the
other hand, a just law is a code that a majority compels a minority to follow that it is willing to
follow itself. This is


made legal.
Let me give another example. An unjust law is a code inflicted upon a minority which that
minority had no part in enacting or creating because they did not have the unhampered right to
vote. Who can say the legislature of Alabama which set up the segregation laws was
democratically elected? Throughout the state of Alabama all types of conniving methods are
used to prevent Negroes from becoming registered voters and there are some counties without a
single Negro registered to vote, despite the fact that the Negro constitutes a majority of the
population. Can any law set up in such a state be considered democratically structured?
These are just a few examples of just and unjust laws. There are some instances when a law
is just on its face but unjust in its application. For instance, I was arrested Friday on a charge of
parading without a permi. Now there is nothing wrong with an ordinance which requires a permit
for a parade, but when the ordinance is used to preserve segregation and to deny citizens the First
Amendment privilege of peaceful assembly and peaceful protest, then it becomes unjust.
I hope you can see the distinction I am trying to point out. In no way do I advocate evading
or defying the law as the rabid segregationist would do. This would lead to anarchy. One who
breaks an unjust law must do it 
 (not hatefully as the white mothers did in New
Orleans when they were seen on television screaming "nigger, nigger, nigger") and with a
willingness to accept the penalty. I submit: an individual who breaks a law that conscience tells
him is unjust, and willingly accepts the penalty by staying in jail to arouse the conscience of the
community over its injustice, is in reality expressing the highest respect for the law. That is what
I stand for.

rial of Socrates

Socrates is charged with 
    


  


 



 


 


The darticidants include 3 for each legal team (defense and prosecution), 1 Euthyphro, 1
Socrates (who may be part of his own defense team), and 1 head judge. The remainder of the
class is the jury.

Format of the trial:

1. Chief judge calls court to order, has bailiff (Dr. S) read charges.

2. Odening statements by the drosecution, defense, in which they state their basic reasons for
finding Socrates "guilty"/"innocent", indicating what evidence they will provide and why that
evidence condemns/exhonorates God. The opening speech should lay out the basic reasons for
each side, which will be established in the cross-examination, and should include an element of
rhetorical flare.

3. Questioning of witnesses by drosecution, defense:

a. witness #1 for the prosecution, Euthyphro
b. defendant, Socrates
This part of the trial involves cross-examination. The aim of the prosecution will be to show that
Socrates is guilty of 'impiety' and corrupting the minds of the young, including their attitudes
toward parents and other authorities in society. The aim of the defense will be to show that
Socrates is not guilty of that charge, and that he benefits, rather than harms young people he
influences.

4. Closing statements by the drosecution, defense, summarizing key points they made in the
trial and key points for the other side they refuted, explaining  Socrates is guilty/innocent of
the charge. This part should be both logical and make a strong rhetorical appeal to the jury.

½. Vote by the jury, and announcement of decision. (If Socrates is found guilty, he will be
condemned to "exile from normal society"; if not guilty, he will be "free to continue his work.")
 £ SELM'S PROSLOGIUM

(SELECIO S)

PREFACE.

In this brief work the author aims at proving in a single argument the existence of God, and
whatsoever we believe of God. --The difficulty of the task. --The author writes in the person of
one who contemplates God, and seeks to understand what he believes. To this work he had given
this title: Faith Seeking Understanding. He finally named it Proslogium, --that is, A Discourse.

AFTER I had published, at the solicitous entreaties of certain brethren, a brief work (the
O
) as an example of meditation on the grounds of faith, in the person of one who
investigates, in a course of silent reasoning with himself, matters of which he is ignorant;
considering that this book was knit together by the linking of many arguments, I began to ask
myself whether there might be found a single argument which would require no other for its
proof than itself alone; and alone would suffice to demonstrate that God truly exists, and that
there is a supreme good requiring nothing else, which all other things require for their existence
and well-being; and whatever we believe regarding the divine Being

ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

Truly there is a God, although the fool has said in his heart, There is no God.

AND so, Lord, do you, who give understanding to faith, give me, so far as you know it to be
profitable, to understand that you are as we believe; and that you are that which we believe. (1)
And indeed, we believe that you are 


 


 

 
   Or is
there no such nature, since the fool has said in his heart, there is no God? (Psalms xiv. 1). But, at
any rate, this very fool, when he hears of this being of which I speak --
 



 --understands what be hears, and what he understands is in his
understanding; although he does not understand it to exist.

For, it is one thing for an object to be in the understanding, and another to understand that the
object exists. (2) Hence, even the fool is convinced that something exists
 the understanding, at
least,  


  For, when he hears of this, he understands it.
And whatever is understood, exists in the understanding. (3) And assuredly  



 , cannot exist in the understanding alone. For, suppose it exists
in the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater.

Therefore, if  


 exists in the understanding
alone, the very being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one, than which a greater
can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. (4) Hence, there is no doubt that there exists
a being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and
in reality. God cannot be conceived not to exist. --è 

 



 . --That which can be conceived not to exist is not God.

Why, then, has the fool said in his heart, there is no God (Psalms xiv. 1), since it is so evident, to
a rational mind, that you do exist in the highest degree of all? Why, except that he is dull and a
fool?

CONCEIVING A WORD VS. CONCEIVING A THING

How the fool has said in his heart what cannot be conceived. --A thing may be conceived in two
ways: (i) when the  signifying it is conceived; (ii) when the 


 is understood. As far
as the word goes, 'God' can be conceived not to exist; in reality God cannot.

BUT how has the fool said in his heart what he could not conceive; or how is it that he could not
conceive what he said in his heart? since it is the same to say in the heart, and to conceive.

But, if really, nay, since really, he both conceived, because he said in his heart; and did not say in
his heart, because he could not conceive; there is more than one way in which a thing is said in
the heart or conceived. For, in one sense, an object is conceived, when the word signifying it is
conceived; and in another, when the very entity, which the object is, is understood.

In the former sense, then, God can be conceived not to exist; but in the latter, not at all. For no
one who understands what fire and water  can conceive fire to be water, in accordance with
the nature of the facts themselves, although this is possible according to the words. So, then, no
one who understands what God

can conceive that God does not exist; although he says these
words in his heart, either without any or with some foreign, signification. For, God is 


 . And he who thoroughly understands this, assuredly
understands that this being so truly exists, that not even in concept can it be non-existent.
Therefore, he who understands that God so exists, cannot conceive that he does not exist.

PUZZLI G 
E O OLOGIC£L £RGUME 

I. £nselm's £rgument

1. We can conceive of God (i.e. God can exist 'in the mind'). God is "the greatest [most perfect]
possible being."
2. God is defined as "the greatest [most perfect] possible being."
2. If we conceive of God as not existing, we conceive of a less than perfect being, i.e.  "the
greatest possible being."
3. Therefore, we must conceive of God as existing.
II. Guanilo's resdonse:
1. It is not possible to conceive of a more perfect island than Utopia.
2. If we conceive of Utopia as not existing, we conceive a less than perfect island.
3. Therefore, we must conceive of Utopia as existing.
4. But this is absurd.
5. Therefore, the ontological argument is absurd.
III. £ devilish version:
1. It is not possible to conceive of a more perfect evil* than Beelzebub (the Devil).
2. If we conceive of Beelzebub not existing, we conceive a less than perfect evil.
3. Therefore, we must conceive of the Devil as existing.

*Does this function the same way as 'perfect good'? Might 'evil' be understood rather as the
opposite or negation of good? What would it be then to conceive of the Devil--but to conceive of
"that which is not"?

IV. £nselm's fuller statement

1. By "God" I shall mean 

 






2. God exists in the understanding.
3. If God exists in the understanding, then God is a possible being.
4. God is a possible being.
5. If something exists only in the understanding, but is a possible being, then it might have been
greater than it is.
6. Supposition: God exists only in the understanding.
7. Therefore, God might have been greater than he is.
9. Therefore, God is NOT the being than which none greater is possible.
10. Therefore, the being than which none greater is possible is NOT the being than which none
greater is possible.
11. Therefore, our supposition #6 is false; that is, it is false that God exists only in the
understanding.
12. Therefore, God exists in reality as well as in the understanding.

V. £uinas' resdonses:

1. To prove that God exists, it is not sufficient to prove that the

 of God includes the property
of existence, or even the property of necessary existence.
2. For the idea of '7' exists, and includes the property of necessary existence. But if God were to
exist only in the manner in which '7' exists, that would prove nothing.
3. Furthermore, even if the idea of God must include the property of existence (or necessary
existence), that does not prove that the idea refers to something  


 in the world.
Thus we could say, "God exists, then He must exist necessarily," and that would be true, just
as it would be true to say, " God exists, then He must be perfectly good," or "God exists, then
He must be perfectly powerful," but in these statements God is an idea, and may or may not
exist.

More from the  : "Perhaps  everyone who hears this word 'God' understands it to
signify something than which nothing greater can be thought, seeing that some have believed
God to be a body. Yet, granted that everyone understands that by this word "God" is signified
something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not therefore follow
that he understands that what the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists

 
Nor can it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there actually 



something than which nothing greater can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those
who hold that God does not exist."

VI. Descartes' version: = necessarily, --> imdlies, P = dossibly, G = God

1. N (p-->Np) --> N (Pp-->p)*

2. G = absolutely perfect being
3. N (G-->NG)**
4. PG (God is not logically contradictory)***
5. N (G-->NG)-->N(PG-->G)
6. N (PG-->G)
7. PG-->G
8. G
This proof is valid, though it may not be sound.

*It is necessarily true that if p implies necessary-p (p in this world implies p in all possible
worlds, e.g. if God's existence in this world implies his existence in all worlds), then it is
necessarily true that possible-p implies p (p in some possible world implies p in this world, e.g.
the possibility of God's existence in this world implies his existence in this world). (A
"necessary truth" is a truth which must be true in all logically possible worlds, e.g. that · ·
;
a "contingent truth" is one that need not be true in all logically possible worlds, e.g. that 




. A "   is one which   exist, e.g. a world in which there
were no people, or people had evolved out of reptiles, or the laws of nature were different, or in
which there was nothing but a single blue ball; but  one in which 2 + 2 = 5, or God can make
a rock he cannot lift, i.e. not one in which logically impossible things exist.)
**It is necessarily true that the existence of God implies His necessary existence.
***Is this self-evident? Is the very idea of a "necessary existent" illogical?

VII. £nother version of the O-£rgument (see Wainwright, ÿ




)

1. P(Np)--> Np*
2. N (G-->NG)**
3. PG***
4. PG-->P(NG)
5. P(NG)-->NG
6. PG-->NG
7. NG
8. G
Again, the proof is valid.

*logical axiom: if p is an N-truth, it must be N in every possible world.

**If God exists, He must exist in every possible world.
***Is this self-evident?

Question 2. he existence of God

 1. Is the proposition "God exists" self-evident?
2. Is it demonstrable?
3. Does God exist?

£rticle 1. Whether the existence of God is self-evident?

Objection 1. It seems that the existence of God is self-evident. Now those things are said to be
self-evident to us the knowledge of which is naturally implanted in us, as we can see in regard to
first principles. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 1,3), "the knowledge of God is naturally
implanted in all." Therefore the existence of God is self-evident.

Objection 2. Further, those things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the
terms are known, which the Philosopher (1 Poster. iii) says is true of the first principles of
demonstration. Thus, when the nature of a whole and of a part is known, it is at once recognized
that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as the signification of the word "God" is
understood, it is at once seen that God exists. For by this word is signified that thing than which
nothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists actually and mentally is greater than that
which exists only mentally. Therefore, since as soon as the word "God" is understood it exists
mentally, it also follows that it exists actually. Therefore the proposition "God exists" is self-
evident.

Objection 3. Further, the existence of truth is self-evident. For whoever denies the existence of
truth grants that truth does not exist: and, if truth does not exist, then the proposition "Truth does
not exist" is true: and if there is anything true, there must be truth. But God is truth itself: "I am
the way, the truth, and the life" (John 14:6) Therefore "God exists" is self-evident.

On the contrary, No one can mentally admit the opposite of what is self-evident; as the
Philosopher (Metaph. iv, lect. vi) states concerning the first principles of demonstration. But the
opposite of the proposition "God is" can be mentally admitted: "The fool said in his heart, There
is no God" (Psalm 52:1). Therefore, that God exists is not self-evident.

I answer that, A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in
itself, though not to us; on the other, self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident
because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject, as "Man is an animal," for animal
is contained in the essence of man. If, therefore the essence of the predicate and subject be
known to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with regard to the first
principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things that no one is ignorant of,
such as being and non-being, whole and part, and such like. If, however, there are some to whom
the essence of the predicate and subject is unknown, the proposition will be self-evident in itself,
but not to those who do not know the meaning of the predicate and subject of the proposition.
Therefore, it happens, as Boethius says (Hebdom., the title of which is: "Whether all that is, is
good"), "that there are some mental concepts self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal
substances are not in space." Therefore I say that this proposition, "God exists," of itself is self-
evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject, because God is His own existence as will be
hereafter shown (3, 4). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not
self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us, though less
known in their nature ² namely, by effects.

Redly to Objection 1. To know that God exists in a general and confused way is implanted in us
by nature, inasmuch as God is man's beatitude. For man naturally desires happiness, and what is
naturally desired by man must be naturally known to him. This, however, is not to know
absolutely that God exists; just as to know that someone is approaching is not the same as to
know that Peter is approaching, even though it is Peter who is approaching; for many there are
who imagine that man's perfect good which is happiness, consists in riches, and others in
pleasures, and others in something else.

Redly to Objection 2. Perhaps not everyone who hears this word "God" understands it to signify
something than which nothing greater can be thought, seeing that some have believed God to be
a body. Yet, granted that everyone understands that by this word "God" is signified something
than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that he
understands that what the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can
it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than
which nothing greater can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that
God does not exist.

Redly to Objection 3. The existence of truth in general is self-evident but the existence of a
Primal Truth is not self-evident to us.

£rticle 2. Whether it can be demonstrated that God exists?

Objection 1. It seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated. For it is an article of
faith that God exists. But what is of faith cannot be demonstrated, because a demonstration
produces scientific knowledge; whereas faith is of the unseen (Hebrews 11:1). Therefore it
cannot be demonstrated that God exists.

Objection 2. Further, the essence is the middle term of demonstration. But we cannot know in
what God's essence consists, but solely in what it does not consist; as Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. i, 4). Therefore we cannot demonstrate that God exists.

Objection 3. Further, if the existence of God were demonstrated, this could only be from His
effects. But His effects are not proportionate to Him, since He is infinite and His effects are
finite; and between the finite and infinite there is no proportion. Therefore, since a cause cannot
be demonstrated by an effect not proportionate to it, it seems that the existence of God cannot be
demonstrated.

On the contrary, The Apostle says: "The invisible things of Him are clearly seen, being
understood by the things that are made" (Romans 1:20). But this would not be unless the
existence of God could be demonstrated through the things that are made; for the first thing we
must know of anything is whether it exists.
I answer that, Demonstration can be made in two ways: One is through the cause, and is called
"a priori," and this is to argue from what is prior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and
is called a demonstration "a posteriori"; this is to argue from what is prior relatively only to us.
When an effect is better known to us than its cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge
of the cause. And from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be demonstrated, so
long as its effects are better known to us; because since every effect depends upon its cause, if
the effect exists, the cause must pre-exist. Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-
evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects which are known to us.

Redly to Objection 1. The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be
known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but are preambles to the articles; for faith
presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes
something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot
grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of being
scientifically known and demonstrated.

Redly to Objection 2. When the existence of a cause is demonstrated from an effect, this effect
takes the place of the definition of the cause in proof of the cause's existence. This is especially
the case in regard to God, because, in order to prove the existence of anything, it is necessary to
accept as a middle term the meaning of the word, and not its essence, for the question of its
essence follows on the question of its existence. Now the names given to God are derived from
His effects; consequently, in demonstrating the existence of God from His effects, we may take
for the middle term the meaning of the word "God".

Redly to Objection 3. From effects not proportionate to the cause no perfect knowledge of that
cause can be obtained. Yet from every effect the existence of the cause can be clearly
demonstrated, and so we can demonstrate the existence of God from His effects; though from
them we cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence.

£rticle 3. Whether God exists?

Objection 1. It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two contraries be infinite, the
other would be altogether destroyed. But the word "God" means that He is infinite goodness. If,
therefore, God existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the world.
Therefore God does not exist.

Objection 2. Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted for by a few
principles has been produced by many. But it seems that everything we see in the world can be
accounted for by other principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural things can be
reduced to one principle which is nature; and all voluntary things can be reduced to one principle
which is human reason, or will. Therefore there is no need to suppose God's existence.

On the contrary, It is said in the person of God: "I am Who am." (Exodus 3:14)

I answer that, The existence of God can be proved in five ways.

The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our
senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion
by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in
motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the
reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from
potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually
hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and
changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and
potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot
simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore
impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and
moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by
another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be
put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because
then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent
movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only
because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in
motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.

The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an
order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing
is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible.
Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes
following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the
cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take
away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient
causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is
possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate
effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is
necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that
are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and
consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist,
for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to
be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now
there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by
something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have
been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in
existence ² which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist
something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity
caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which
have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes.
Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity,
and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak
of as God.
The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some
more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But "more" and "less" are predicated of
different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the
maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is
hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and,
consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are
greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all
in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there
must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other
perfection; and this we call God.

The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack
intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always,
or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not
fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot
move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and
intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being
exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.

Redly to Objection 1. As Augustine says (Enchiridion xi): "Since God is the highest good, He
would not allow any evil to exist in His works, unless His omnipotence and goodness were such
as to bring good even out of evil." This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should
allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good.

Redly to Objection 2. Since nature works for a determinate end under the direction of a higher
agent, whatever is done by nature must needs be traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also
whatever is done voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause other than human
reason or will, since these can change or fail; for all things that are changeable and capable of
defect must be traced back to an immovable and self-necessary first principle, as was shown in
the body of the Article.

From Morrison's "Seven reasons why a scientist believes in God"

Why do I believe in God? Hath not the Psalmist said, 
 è 
 

 


? So I believe, counting  
reasons for my faith:


 

 
 
 


    


 
 





 
 
Suppose you put ten pennies in your pocket, marked 1 through 10. Now consider what the
odds would be, of drawing them out, ten times, in just that order: 1, then 2, etc. It would be 1 in
10, then 1/100, etc. It would be 1 in ten billion. No sensible person would believe that someone
who drew them out in that order, 1, 2, etc. had done it by accident, rather than design, just as no
sensible person would think that a set of dice which came up sevens ten times in a row were not
loaded.
But now consider the odds against life on this planet, which could not exist, if there were not
so many exacting conditions, necessary for life: if the earth did not rotate on its axis at just the
right speed, the days or nights would be too long for life; if the axis were not tilted, in just the
right way at 23 degrees, to give us our seasons; if our atmosphere were but a little thinner, or if
the sun were a bit closer or further away, life would not be possible. The odds against all this
happening are more than a million to one; it is not logical to think that life on our planet could
have come about by accident. But (1) whenever there is evidence of design and it is highly
improbable it came about by chance, it is rational to believe there was a designer. And since (2)
we can see that there is in this and the other points I list evidence of design, which did not likely
come about by chance, we must (3) conclude there is a Designer.

·   

  
  
  
 
 


 


Consider now the complexity and fluidity of life. It has taught the birds to sing, given taste to
fruits and spices, created the protoplasm, which draws energy from the sun. Its complexity, its
delicate balance, is as great or greater than that of the earth. A single cell contains within it the
germ of life, has the power to distribute this life to every living thing, great and small. Nature did
not create life; fire-blistered rocks and a saltless sea could not meet the necessary requirements.
No combination of chemical elements is enough to create a living organic cell. You do not come
upon a sundial in the desert and think: "This came about by chance." No; it is way too unlikely.
And so with the very existence of life. Who, then, put it here?

!
  
" 

 






     
 
 
What brings the salmon back, thousands of miles, up the river to the place where they can
spawn and breed new life? If you put him in a tributary, he will know he is off course, and fight
his way back to the main stream and then proceed upstream to finish his destiny. How do the
eels, beginning Europe, swim to Bermuda, give birth, and then their young, with no apparent
means of knowing anything of their parents or their origin, return to the same streams and rivers
of Europe! What takes the sparrow thousands of miles, travelling even by night, in their
migrations? What teaches the spider to weave, the wasp to sting the grasshopper, so it does not
die, and the spider's young can feed on it, long after the mother has flown away? Such techniques
cannot be explained by adaptation; they were bestowed.

#
 " 



 






   

Only man has received a spark of Universal Intelligence. Only man can count; can speak in
concepts; only man enjoys, not mere instinct, but the power of reason. Where could reason come
from, but a Higher Power?

5.     

 
 
 

 $
The genes of all the people in the world would fill less than a single thimble. Yet these
ultramicroscopic genes and the chromosomes lock up all the heredity of all their ancestors, and
preserve all their psychology in a single infinitesimal space. How is this possible, this
communication of design from design and to design? How can a few million atoms, locked
inside a tiny gene, rule all life on earth? What can account for this profound cunning and
provision--if not the hand of a great Creative Intelligence?

6.   


 
  


 



  

Some years ago a cactus was introduced in Australia, to create a living fence. But the cactus,
having no natural enemies there, spread like a fungus over the land, destroying flora and fauna.
Finally, some entomologists turned up an insect that fed on the cactus, and planting it, too, in
Australia, contained the blight, proving once again the power of checks and balances throughout
the natural world.
But why is there such order, such economy, such logic in the living world? Consider, for
example, the insect. Why don't they dominate the earth? One simple reason is they don't have
lungs, but breath through tubes; when they grow large, the tubes don't grow in the same ratio, so
there has never been an insect of very great size. It is this limitation which has kept them in
check. If it did not exist, man could not exist. Imagine an insect the size of a wolf or a lion!

7.     $ 

 
% 
Our conception of God comes from a divine faculty--which we call imagination. By its power,
man alone is able to find the evidence of things unseen. As man's perfected imagination becomes
a spiritual reality, he may discern in all the evidences of design and purpose the great truth that
heaven is wherever and whatever; that God is everywhere and in everything, but nowhere so
close as in our hearts.

It is scientifically as well as imaginatively true, that 
 è  


 













&!c'$()*"'+"),+&+$+!(,!c,)c&$&'+

by David Hume

1779

  "
 

+
,   

Part II: 

 

Cleanthes gives an "emdirical droof" for the existence of God

Look round the world: contemplate the whole and every part of it:

1. You will find it to be nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite
number of lesser machines, which again admit of subdivisions to a degree beyond
what human senses and faculties can trace and explain. All these various
 machines, and even their most minute parts, are adjusted to each other with an
accuracy which ravishes into admiration all men who have ever contemplated
them.
2. The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly,
though it much exceeds, the productions of human design, thought, wisdom, and
intelligence.
3. Since, therefore, the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by the rules
of analogy, that the causes also resemble; and
4. that the Author of Nature is also a Designer, somewhat similar to the mind of
man, though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of
the work which he has executed.

By this empirical or 



argument, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the
existence of a Deity, and his similarity to human mind and intelligence.

Philo offers criticisms of Cleanthes' argument

What  chiefly question in this subject, said Philo, is not so much that all religious arguments
are by Cleanthes reduced to experience, as that they appear not to be even the most certain and
irrefutable of that kind. That a stone will fall, that fire will burn, that the earth has solidity, we
have observed a thousand and a thousand times; and when any new instance of this nature is
presented, we draw without hesitation the accustomed inference. The exact similarity of the
cases gives us a perfect assurance of a similar event; and a stronger evidence is never desired nor
sought after. But wherever you depart, in the least, from the similarity of the cases, you diminish
proportionally the evidence; and may at last bring it to a very weak analogy, which is
confessedly liable to error and uncertainty. After having experienced the circulation of the blood
in human creatures, we make no doubt that it takes place in Titius and Maevius. But from its
circulation in frogs and fishes, it is only a presumption, though a strong one, from analogy, that it
takes place in men and other animals. The 
 reasoning is much weaker, when we infer
the circulation of the sap in vegetables from our experience that the blood circulates in animals;
and those, who hastily followed that imperfect analogy, are found, by more accurate
experiments, to have been mistaken.
If we see a house, Cleanthes, we conclude, with the greatest certainty, that it had an
architect or builder; because this is precisely that species of effect which we have experienced to
proceed from that species of cause. But surely you will  affirm, that the universe bears such a
resemblance to a house, that we can with the same certainty infer a similar cause, or that the
analogy is here entire and perfect. The dissimilitude is so striking, that the most you can here
pretend to is a guess, a conjecture, a presumption concerning a similar cause.

Cleanthes redlies
But is the whole adjustment of means to ends in a house and in the universe so slight a
resemblance? The economy of final causes? The order, proportion, and arrangement of every
part? Steps of a stair are plainly contrived, that human legs may use them in mounting; and this
inference is certain and infallible. Human legs are also contrived for walking and mounting; and
this inference, I allow, is not altogether so certain, because of the dissimilarity which you
remark; but does it, therefore, deserve the name only of presumption or conjecture?
Philo offers additional criticisms
I think you must admit, Cleanthes, that order, arrangement, or the adjustment of final
causes, is not of itself any proof of design; but only so far as it has been experienced to proceed
from that principle of intelligent planning. For matter might contain the source or spring of order
originally within itself; and there is no difficulty in conceiving, that the several elements, from an
internal unknown cause, may fall into the most exquisite arrangement; so too must we not
consider that the world, even if we consider it to be of such perfect design as a house, might have
simply grown into that form, as a plant grows into its own? But there are other criticisms as well.
That (i) 


   
 and (ii) 





   












 









-- these I shall not at present dispute with you. But observe, I entreat you,
that unless the cases be  similar, sound reasoners have no perfect confidence in applying
their past observation to any particular phenomenon. Every alteration of circumstances occasions
a doubt concerning the event; and it requires new experiments to prove certainly, that the new
circumstances are of no moment or importance. The skeptical steps of philosophers here, if any
where, are distinguished from the generalizations of the vulgar, who, hurried on by the smallest
similarity, are incapable of critical distinctions.
But can you think, Cleanthes, that you can compare the universe to houses, ships, furniture,
machines, and, from their similarity in
 circumstances, inferred a similarity in their causes?
Thought, design, intelligence, such as we discover in men and other animals, is no more than 
of the springs and principles of the universe, as well as heat or cold, attraction or repulsion, and a
hundred others, which fall under daily observation. It is an active cause, by which some
particular parts of nature, we find, produce alterations on other parts. And can a conclusion, with
any propriety, be transferred from 
to the ? Does not the great disproportion bar all
comparison and inference? From observing the growth of a hair, can we learn any thing
concerning the generation of a man? Would the manner of a leaf's blowing, even though
perfectly known, afford us any instruction concerning the vegetation of a tree?
Furthermore, even if we allow, as we did earlier, that the world shows forth a kind of order,
we can still ask if it might not have   into that form, rather than been designed and created.
Or why suppose the world, even if it were designed and had a designer, was designed by only
 being? I should rather think the world as it we see it is more the product of a committee, than
a single, coherent mind? And besides all this, why should the almighty God, if He had deigned to
design the world,

  in so many of the particulars? I think you must concede, we are unable
to drink in this notion of a Designer so very easily; it slips between the cup and the lip, however
eager we are to imbibe it. This eagerness itself is suspect. A very small part of this great system,
during a very short time, has been very imperfectly discovered to us; and do we then dare to
pronounce decisively concerning the origin of the whole?
And can you blame me, Cleanthes, if I here imitate the prudence of the philosopher, who,
according to the noted story, being asked, What God was? desired a day to think of it, and then
two days more; and after that manner continually prolonged the term, without ever bringing in
his definition or description? Can any wise man conclude that an orderly universe 
 have
arisen from some thought and design? To judge this reasoning, it were necessary that we had
experience of the origin of worlds; but such is not our lot.

 
 

--Clarence Darrow
 Mystics often talk about the evidence of design in the universe. This idea runs back
hundreds of years, including the essay by Paley, "Natural Theology." Paley argues that if a man
travelling over the heath should find a watch he would soon discover in it abundant evidence of
design. This is true, but only if the man already is familiar with tools and their use. What if the
watch were picked up by some savage or an ape? None of them would draw this inference: it
would never enter their heads that it was "designed."
Paley goes on to show how the mouth and teeth are adjusted to prepare the food for man's
digestion, how his stomach is formed to digest it, how the eye and ear were made to carry
sensations to the brain, etc. But these organs were never made for such a purpose. Man was
never made. He  from the lowest form of life. His ancestor in the sea threw its jellylike
structure around something that nourished it and absorbed it. Through ages of mutation and
selection organs evolved. Creatures that were responsive to light got more food, and eye slits
were passed from generation to generation. More adaptable and specialized structures evolved,
and filled the various ecological niches. 
 
   ! 


 


  
   
 



  Not everything with "order" or "apparent design" came about through design; many
came about by chance and natural selection . . . the others, through human intervention.*
What does   mean, anyway? We have a norm, a pattern--the universe itself, from which
we fashion our ideas. We observe this universe and its operation and we call it "order." To say
the universe is patterned on order is to say the universe is patterned on the universe. It means
nothing else.
The earth revolves around the sun in an orbit like that of a circle. Does this show order?
Suppose it went in a rectangle instead. Wouldn't we call that "order"? There are nine planets
around the sun. Was that a plan? What about the eight moons around Jupiter? Was that a plan,
too?
It is senseless to talk about "order" and "system" and "design" in the universe.
Astrophysicists will tell us that there is none of it--that our solar system came about eons ago
when all the planets were part of the sun, a gaseous mass, and something caused it to explode,
and chunks of it went into space and cooled and formed into orbits through the power of
gravitation. That is how the solar system formed. That is not design and order, it is mere
accident, combined with the working of natural laws.
Where is there order and design in the universe or even on the earth? There are endless
systems of stars, and billions of billions of stars. These billions and billions of stars are billions
and billions of miles away from each other. No one can even form a conception of the infinite
expanse of the universe, the infinite numbers of planets and suns and other astronomical bodies.
What are the relations between these stars and the solar systems that they have or fail to have?
Are they in perfect "order"? Do they show a vast "design"? Of course not. What is the universe,
except chance and chaos and here and there, vast objects which come into being through
explosions and exist for millions of years and then go out of being through explosions again?
Does the earth then show design, order, and purpose? If it was meant for life, it surely was
not meant for human life. Three-fourths of the planet is covered with water; two-thirds of the
land is unfit for human beings; the deserts are dry and the polar caps are frozen. It is better suited
to insects than the 'higher' animals, including man. Or was the purpose of the Creator to design a
world for insects?
What a handiwork the earth is, anyway. Surely the Creator designed the earthquakes to
shake us out of our complacency, and hurricanes to teach us to design umbrellas! Surely the
Creator invented terrible diseases, so we would not get too high and mighty! That was cruel of
him, perhaps, but it does show a purpose. But that is all nonsense, anyway. The earth shows no
purpose, no design. It is just nature, the way it is. Insects comb the land and destroy the farmer's
crops. The object of this "Design" is not the farmers who raise them or the insects who devour
them; there is no

 Design, there are only   designs.
  

  




 



"
  



 
 


 



 
    
  




   



  "# 


# 

! 





*For example, many of the species of domesticated animals, dogs, cats, cattle, horses, etc. As for
the question of design in nature, take another example, the long-necked giraffe, or the grey-
speckled moth that evolved in 19th century industrial England. . . . "Why does the giraffe have a
long neck?" asks the Creationist. "In order to eat the leaves high on the trees in the pampas," he
answers; "it is a case of Design." But the answer the Evolutionist gives is better: "Once upon a
time all the giraffes were short-necked, and one was born--a freak, really--with a longer neck. He
ate higher on the trees, and survived better, and so did his progeny, while the short-necked ones
died out, with not enough food. And so again and again, until giraffe 
a long-necked, long-
legged horse-like thing with a skinny face." That is how all the so-called "evidence of Design"
came about . . .
- *-

) 
by John Hick


E PROBLEM POSED

As a challenge to theism, the problem of evil has traditionally been posed in the form of a
dilemma: if God is perfectly loving, he must wish to abolish evil; and if he is all-powerful, he
must be able to. But evil exists; therefore God cannot be both all-powerful and all-loving. . .


EODICY
Theodicy is a modest enterprise, more negative than positive. It does not claim to explain or
explain away every instance of evil that has occurred or will occur in human experience, but only
to point to those considerations which would indicate how the existence of evil would not be




 with belief in God. We cannot explain the reason for every terrible thing that
happens. The most we might do is show that those types of things are not necessarily proof that
God does not exist.
In order to understand the approach of theodicy, it is helpful to distinguish two different
concerns: the problem of moral evil or wickedness, or the problem of why God allows human
beings to do evil things to one another, i.e. evil caused by human moral agents and the suffering
caused to innocent persons them; and the problem of non-moral evil or suffering and pain,
physical and mental, as caused by non-moral agents, and the problem of why God created a
world in which this occurs.
MOR£L EVIL £ D 
E FREE WILL 
EODICY
The traditional Christian response to the problem of moral evil is called the   

  the doctrine that God created the world in such a way that human beings would be
free to make their own choice to do good or evil, and that although he could have created the
world differently, e.g. created a world in which there were intelligent, but perfectly naturally
good beings, it was better for him to have created a world with free beings, although that might
have as a consequence their choice to do evil things. . .
It has been argued by some that this "explanation" does not suffice, on the grounds that a
truly all-powerful God could have created people who were free and yet who were so good
natured that they would always act rightly.











#


 
















 


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But is this argument sound? It depends, in part, on the question of what we mean by "free." Of
course if all we mean is that it is not externally compelled, then God might have created us free
and naturally good, without contradiction between these properties. But if he had done that,
would we be free in the deeper sense of being genuinely independent beings in relation to him?
If our thoughts and choices are divinely predesigned, are we still free? Granted, we might seem
to ourselves and to others to be free--and good as saints--but would we be?
I suppose it is possible to reply that if we claim that God cannot create such beings--"free"
in the strongest possible sense of the term and also "good"--that then we deny his 


 .
But this throws us back upon the ancient dilemma of what we might  by his all-mightiness,
e.g. the Stone Paradox. Can the all-powerful God create a stone that not even he can lift? Can he
make 2+2=5? Can he make it true that è  


? Can God do evil? Extreme
theological voluntarists will insist on the 


    --that God can do

 humans might conceive of; that his power "breaks our paltry logic." But theological
rationalists seem to me to have had the better view, that with this doctrine we surrender all claim
to make any sense about God whatsoever. This is like saying that perhaps God does do or permit
evil things without there being any reason we can discern--that perhaps God does
 evil to
us--but that "we are not fit to judge Him," and "his Ways are not our ways." Well, that may well
be, but if his ways were to include allowing suffering which he could easily prevent and there is
no good reason why he might not prevent it, I fail to see how that is a God we should want to


. But then, that is not a reason for rejecting God, only for rejecting theological
voluntarism and the illogical doctrine of universal possibilism.
It is also possible to suggest that God might intervene whenever anyone was about to do
wrong, and "protect the innocent." But a moment's thought proves this is really impossible, too.
The choice of good, when you know there is a God to judge you for your evil, is like refraining
from cheating on a test when the teacher is looking right at you.

E IRE £E£ 
EODICY
Of course there remains a very great deal of human suffering which is not due to human but
to natural causes--rain and wind, heat, disease, etc. Sometimes it is difficult to draw a clear line
between what of human suffering that has natural causes is really due to nature and what part we
share in through our greed or careless or folly, e.g. people who die of lung cancer die from
"natural causes," but causes they might well have prevented by not smoking cigarettes. Still, it
cannot be denied that much suffering is not due to human actions, but merely inflicted upon us.
Accidents occur, and sometimes they kill and maim. This is the  

   the
problem of pain and suffering.
The Christian does not attempt to explain every instance of such suffering, but rather seeks
to make sense of the whole picture in which it occurs--and to show how that whole picture is
consistent with an all-good, all-powerful Creator. For what was the purpose for which we were
born? Surely not to live in a pleasure paradise, a world where everything was given to us so we
would be a comfortable, satisfied human animal. Did God wish us to be his human pet? Or did
he want something more for us, something bigger, if more risky?
Christianity has always supposed that God's intention was to create the world as a place of
-
in which free beings, grappling with the tasks and challenges of their existence
in a common environment, may become "children of God," i.e. full persons, who were fit to be
"heirs of eternal life." It was the Christian father Irenaeus, more than any other, who saw this
point clearly. Thus, he argued, our world, with its rough, even ruthless edges, is the sphere in
which the second and harder stage of the creation process is meant to take place. (This is also
sometimes associated with the idea of the "fortunate fall," i.e. the idea that it is only because of
mankind's leaving the garden of innocent goodness that we have become open to the possibility
of true, adult life.)
And how might the 'perfect,' evil-free world exist? Would the murderer's bullet not tear the
flesh? Would the mountaineer's fall, after his rope broke, land on newly-soft rock? Would there
be workers to plow the fields, to heal the sick--or to invent the plow and the medicine? Would
nature operate on some kind of ever-adjusting principle, without laws or order, apart from the
'order' to prevent pain? Would life be nothing but a flowing dream, without the hard points of
resistance to mark ourselves from the world?
Where in such a world would there be fear or suffering or temptation or cruelty or fraud or
murder or death by agonizing drowning or disease? Nowhere, you well say. But where then too
would there be courage or endurance or moderation or compassion or caution or justice or
shipbuilding or science? The qualities of human uplift, of human personality--would they be the
same, if they were ours by gift and not at least in part by effort? It is sometimes said that without
evil, we could not know good. Should it also be said that without evil, we would not be moved to
seek or do it? If so, then the world that is meant to promote the growth in free beings of the best
qualities must have much in common with our world: it must involve dangers, hardships,
problems, pain, sorrow, defeat, and perhaps even death. . . a world not fit to be the pleasure-
dome of self-satisfied intelligent animals, but a world that is fit indeed to be a place for "soul-
making." Of course such a picture needs a further dimension, to make it fully satisfactory--the
dimension of an afterlife, in which the good are rewarded and the evil are punished. But notice
that even apart from the supposition of that special dimension, this picture of the world offers its
 own reason for why a good and all-powerful God might not want to make the world a perfect
pleasure dome, might want to give it hard and even sometimes cruel edges, might want to force
us, in a way, to "climb his mountain."

$'!+.)/,'c)'-)0&c
from B. C. Johnson, 

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B£BY-BUR I G £ £LOGY
Here is a common problem: a house catches on fire and a six-month old baby burns to
death. Could we describe as "good" any person who had the power to save this child and yet
refused to do so? God undoubtedly has this power, and yet in many cases does not help. Can we
call this God "good"?
It will not do to claim this baby will go to heaven. Why should it have had to suffer this
way? If it was necessary, there must be a compelling reason why it was necessary. The "heaven"
argument will not cover up the fact that the baby    . Was this nothing? Is such evil,
then, a mere mirage?
Nor is it enough to say that this painful death will in the long run have good results. For one
thing, how can we be so sure? What will those results be? Unless we know what they will be, it
is hardly a valid argument to assume there will be some such results. For another, what could
possibly justify such terrible "means" to that end, whatever it was. Whatever 'people' might
eventually learn, that baby died in agony, and its parents have lost their child. Suppose you say
the 'lesson' is that the mother learn to take better care of her children. How could that benefit
justify burning a child to death? No human being would be as cruel as you make God out to be.

REJECIO OF 
E "VIRUE-BUILDI G" 
EODICY

Sometimes theists argue that it is better for humans to face disasters without assistance, in
order to promote our self-reliance, virtue, souls, etc. But should we then abolish modern medical
care or do away with efficient fire departments? These diminish our need for self-reliance, virtue,
etc., at least on the part of most people. If "outside assistance" is not good for us as humans,
perhaps we should abolish it everywhere. But no one thinks that that is true. So there is nothing
wrong with assistance, and whoever can provide it, should.
Other times theists argue that without disasters, suffering, etc. there would not be enough
"moral urgency" to push people to make things right, and to promote "virtue-building" (or "soul-
making"). This suggests that perhaps God should create  suffering than we already have--or
if humans, through their efforts, diminish the amount of suffering in the world, then He should
create more for us. If we cure polio, then create more cancer, or aids. If we find a way to predict
and protect against hurricanes, create more earthquakes.

IS 
IS 
E BES OF £LL POSSIBLE WORLDS?

Then there are the theists who, like Leibniz, argue that this 
 be the "best of all possible
worlds," for otherwise God would need to diminish or increase the amount of evil--but how
could he not choose to create it with exactly the right amount? Well, let it be so: does anybody
believe this is true of our world? Isn't it obvious that there is   suffering in the world?
that God might very easily create a world with   less suffering, which would still stimulate
people to develop their minds and characters? Who would not trade in even just some of the
starvation that children suffer, rather than 'learn' that lesson about food and overpopulation?
DOES GOD
£VE £ "
IG
ER MOR£LIY"?
Theists argue, "God has a higher morality by which his actions are to be judged--we cannot
understand him." But what does it mean to claim that what we believe is wrong or bad is now--

 --good? If someone says, "God cannot do 'wrong'; He 

what is right and wrong,"
does that mean that  He does is right? Surely, if we can say that it is morally wrong to
be a sadist, and if God is all-good He cannot be a sadist, then similarly, we can say that it is
morally wrong not to prevent evil if you can, and if God can prevent evil and does not do so it is
morally wrong. These people just don't think through what they mean, when they speak of
"God's wisdom" as being something we cannot comprehend. If that is so, then how can we
presume to call him just, or righteous, or good? Then God is no more worthy of worship than a
King, whose laws we cannot comprehend.

RUS I GOD--OR £DMISSIO OF F£ILURE?

As a last resort, theists often say, "I trust God anyway--He 
 have his reasons." But this
is not an argument; it is just an admission of rational failure. It is not a virtue to be stubborn. This
is like the snake-handler, who said that "Because I am righteous, God will not  me to be
bitten." But then when he 
bitten, and was asked, did this mean he really wasn't righteous, he
denied it, saying instead, "No, God did not allow me to be bitten for that reason; but He must
have his reasons, whatever they are." You see: when reason fails, turn to mysticism. But that is
really what religion is, anyway; mysticism in a fancy dress.


E 
REE POSSIBILIIES

In the end, there are only three possibilities concerning God's moral character: (1) God is
more likely to be 
 than all good; (2) God is more likely to be  than all evil; and (3)
God is '  likely to be all evil as He is to be all good. If (1) is true, then there is no all-good,
all-powerful God. I have just shown that (2) cannot be true. But if (3) is true, then again we have
to reject all the theodices that defend God. Thus the problem of evil triumphs over traditional
theism. There  be an all-good, all-powerful God.
 ,   

from & ()& *O+),
by F. Doestoevsky

IV£ C
£LLE GES £LYOS
£'S F£I

"Are you fond of children, Alyosha? I know you are, and you will understand why I prefer
to speak of them. If they, too, suffer horribly on earth, they must suffer for their fathers' sins,
they must be punished for their fathers, who have eaten the apple; but that reasoning is of the
other world and is incomprehensible for the heart of man here on earth. The innocent must not
suffer for another's sins, and especially such innocents!"
"Brother, what are you driving at?" asked Alyosha.
"Do you understand why this infamy must be and is permitted? Without it, I am told, man
could not have existed on earth, for he could not have known good and evil. Why should he
know that diabolical good and evil when it costs so much? Why, the whole world of knowledge
is not worth that child's prayer to dear, kind God'! I say nothing of the sufferings of grown-up
people, they have eaten the apple, damn them, and the devil take them all! But these little ones! I
am making you suffer, Alyosha, you are not yourself. I'll leave off if you like."
"Nevermind. I must hear you out," said Alyosha.


E PROBLEM OF EVIL

"One story, only one: There was in those days a general, owner of great estates. One day a
serf-boy, a child of eight, threw a stone in play and hurt the general's favourite hound. 'Why is
my favourite dog lame?' He is told that the boy threw a stone that hurt the dog's paw. 'So you did
it.' The general looked at the child. 'Take him.' He was taken from his mother and kept shut up all
night. Early that morning the general comes out on horseback, with the hounds, his dependents,
dog-boys, and huntsmen, all around him. The servants are summoned, and in front of them all
stands the mother. The child is brought from the lock-up. It's a gloomy, cold, foggy, autumn day.
The general orders the child to be undressed; the boy is stripped naked. He shivers, numb with
terror. 'Make him run,' commands the general. 'Run! run!' shout the dog-boys. The boy runs. 'At
him!' yells the general, and he sets the whole pack of hounds loose. The hounds catch him and
tear him to pieces before his mother's own eyes! I believe the general was afterwards declared
incapable of administering his estates. Well -- what did he deserve? To be shot? To be shot for
the satisfaction of our moral feelings? Speak, Alyosha!
"To be shot," murmured Alyosha, lifting his eyes to Ivan with a pale, twisted smile.
"Bravo!" cried Ivan delighted. "If even you say so... You're a pretty monk!"
"What I said was absurd, but-"
"That's just the point, that 'but'!" cried Ivan. "Let me tell you, novice, that the absurd is only
too necessary on earth. The world stands on absurdities, and perhaps nothing would have come
to pass in it without them. We know what we know!"
"What do you know?"

IV£ S£YS 
£ O
I G C£ JUSIFY SUC
EVIL, IF I COULD BE

PREVE ED
"Listen! I took the case of children only to make my case clearer. The argument is, this
suffering must exist, for men to be free, and for the eternal harmony. But listen! 


 
  


- It's beyond all
comprehension why they should suffer, why they should pay for the harmony. And if it is really
true that they must share responsibility for all their fathers' crimes, such a truth is not of this
world and is beyond my comprehension. Some jester will say, perhaps, that the child would have
grown up and have sinned, but you see he didn't grow up, he was torn to pieces by the dogs, at
eight years old. Oh, Alyosha, I understand, of course, what an upheaval it will be when
everything in heaven and earth blends in one hymn of praise and all will be made clear. But I
can't accept that harmony.  
 It's not worth the tears of that one tortured
child. How are you going to atone for them? By their being avenged? What do I care for a hell
for oppressors? What good can hell do, since those children have already been tortured? And if
the sufferings of children was necessary, then I protest that it is not worth such a price. I don't
want harmony. From love for humanity I don't want it. I would rather be left with the unavenged
suffering. Besides, too high a price is asked for harmony; it's beyond our means to pay so much
to enter on it. And so I hasten to give back my entrance ticket, and if I am an honest man I am
bound to give it back as soon as possible. And that I am doing. It's not God that I don't accept,
Alyosha, only I most respectfully return him the ticket."

£LYOS
£ C£LLS 
IS REBELLIO £G£I S GOD

"That's rebellion," murmered Alyosha, looking down.
"Rebellion? Imagine that you are creating a fabric of human destiny with the object of
making men happy in the end, giving them peace and rest at last, but that it was essential and
inevitable to torture to death only one tiny creature -- that baby beating its breast with its fist, for
instance -- and to found that edifice on its unavenged tears. Tell me: would you consent to be the
architect on those conditions?"
"No, I wouldn't consent," said Alyosha softly.
"And should mankind agree to accept happiness on the foundation of the blood of a little
victim? And accepting it remain happy for ever?"
"No. But brother," said Alyosha suddenly, with flashing eyes, "you asked just now, is there
a being in the whole world who would have the right to forgive and could forgive? There

a
Being, Ivan; and He  forgive everything, all and for all, because He gave His innocent blood
for all and everything. You have forgotten Him, and on Him is built the edifice, and it is to Him
they cry aloud, 'Thou art just, O Lord, for Thy ways are revealed!'"
"Oh, Alyosha, have you understood nothing of what I have said?"

otes on Perry's $) 


 ) 

 $

he 1st morning (1-17)

Miller and Weinrob begin discussing the problem of evil, using as their example Weinrob's cold.
Weinrob argues that evil is inconsistent with belief in the existence of an all-good, all-powerful
God, Miller argues that it is not inconsistent. (This is an important point: Miller claims he need
not show that his account of why God would permit evil is 

, only that it is not




. But should he be held to a higher standard?)

© What are Miller's and Weinrob's arguments? Find relevant passages.

 © Who in your opinion is correct, and why? How does Miller counter Weinrob's
arguments? Vice-versa? Do they just talk past one another, or is there one place in the
discussion where the key point is established (whether for Miller or for Weinrob)?

he 1st afternoon (18-36)

Cohen joins Miller and Weinrob, and the conversation continues. The discussion of the barber
(23 f.) discusses how the idea of inconsistency/consistency works, then on 24 f. Miller begins to
develop his theodicy, the first part of which deals with human freedom. Along the way they
touch on the doctrine of grace (30 f.) and the problem of divine omniscience and human freedom
(33 f.).

© What are the arguments in this section? In particular, what are Miller's arguments and
Weinrob's objections? Find revelant passages.
© What questions the conversation leave unanswered, at the end of the afternoon?

he 2nd morning (37-½3)

Miller now sets out to explain how God's omniscience can be consistent with human freedom. In
the process he discusses the Stone Paradox (38 f.) and compares God's picture of the world to the
map of Nebraska (41 f.). He also introduces the second part of his theodicy, the notion of an
afterlife.

© What are the arguments in this section? How does Miller develop his answer to the
paradox of divine omniscience/human freedom? Does his "solution" work? How does he
use the second part of his theodicy to reply to one of Weinrob's key objections? Is it a
viable answer?
© What problem does Weinrob raise at the end of the morning's conversation?

he 2nd afternoon (½4-69)

Miller completes his theodicy by introducing the Devil as the cause of a lot of evil in the world;
declares victory; and the others end up agreeing he has met Weinrob's challenge. The
conversation ends with Weinrob developing her evolutionary picture of how good and evil enter
the world, a picture that includes not only her now-familiar picture of the baby bat (49 f.), but an
analogy based on car alarms (62 f.).

© What do you think of Miller's theodicy, both as to its consistency and its plausibility?
Does he "answer" the problem of evil?
© Explore your thoughts and feelings about Weinrob's account of good and evil, pleasure
and pain in an evolutionary perspective. Is there good reason to believe in her account of
the world, rather than Miller's, or vice-versa?

IMPOR£  CO CEPS, 
EORIES

Problem of Evil/Argument from Evil, 4

Theodicy of "evil as necessary part of overall good", 6 f.
 barber problem and concept of consistency, 20 f.
free will theodicy, 25 f.
problem of human nature, 29 f. [digression on grace & nature, original sin, 30-32]
problem of omniscience and human freedom, 33
stone paradox and concept of divine omnipotence, 38
Miller's theory of self-limited divine omniscience, 40 f.
afterlife theodicy, 46
issue of plausibility vs. consistency, 47
problem of bat cave and natural evil, 49
satan theodicy, 55 f.
Manichaeism, 55
problem of where good and evil come from, if not God, 59
evolutionary theory of good and evil, 60 f.
car alarm theory of pain, 62
good and evil as human inventions, 67
two pictures of the universe, 68
Boethius, "


/  (selection)

Statement of the droblem

Then said she, "This is the old problem which was so urged by Cicero when treating of
Divination, namely 
  
-
   
 




  For, they say,
if God knows if Peter will sin or not sin tomorrow, then, whichever it is, he cannot do the other--
but this is what we mean by human freedom, namely, the ability we have, before the deed, of
choosing one or the other.

Rejection of one dossible resolution of the droblem

"Tell me why you disagree with the reasoning of those who solve the question thus; they
argue that foreknowledge cannot be held to be a 
 for the necessity of future results, and
therefore free will is not in any way shackled by foreknowledge. We can see many actions before
our eyes; just as chariot drivers see the development of their actions as they control and guide
their chariots, and many other things likewise. Does any necessity compel any of those things to
occur as they do? Of course not. All art, craft, and intention would be in vain, if everything took
place by compulsion. Therefore, if things have no necessity for coming to pass when they do,
they cannot have any necessity to be about to come to pass before they do. Just as foreknowledge
of present things brings no necessity to bear upon them as they come to pass, so also
foreknowledge of future things brings no necessity to bear upon things which are to come.
"But," you will say, "though foreknowledge is not the cause for a result in the future, yet it
is a sign that it will necessarily come to pass, and so the problem is not resolved. For you say that
although God's knowledge is not the cause of the thing happening, nonetheless His knowledge is
testimony that it must happen as He foresees it; and thus it is 

; and thus we are  free
to do otherwise; being the problem we must resolve.

Consideration of a new answer to the droblem, beginning with the thought that God is
eternal
"Let us develop a deeper view of God. For then we will see that the nature of divine
knowledge must be utterly different than the nature of knowledge we imagine from a merely
mortal perspective. For when we know, we know 


 being mortal creatures.
But God is different from us, and eternal. Let us therefore consider what is 
.
And let us consider that 




 
 









Compare it with temporal things. All that lives under the conditions of time moves through the
present from the past to the future; there is nothing set in time which can at one moment grasp
the  of its lifetime. It cannot yet comprehend tomorrow; yesterday it has already lost. And
in this life -- today your life is no more than a changing, passing moment. As Aristotle said of the
universe, so it is of all that is subject to time; even if it never began to be, nor ever would cease,
and its life were co-extensive with the % 
 infinity of time, yet it is not such as can be
held to be . For though it apprehends and grasps a space of infinite lifetime, it does not
embrace the whole simultaneously; it has not yet experienced the future. What we should rightly
call eternal is that which grasps and possesses wholly and simultaneously the fullness of
unending life, which lacks nothing of the future, and has lost nothing of the fleeting past; and
such an existence must be ever present in itself to control and aid itself, and also must keep
present with itself the infinity of changing time. Therefore, Platonists, who think that this
universe had no beginning of time and will have no end, are not right in thinking that in this way
the created world is % with its creator. For to pass through 
 or % 

life is one thing; but it is another thing to grasp simultaneously the whole of unending life in the
present--and this is plainly a unique property of the mind of God. Thus we must say that the
universe is 

, but God is .

Divine knowledge from the dersdective of eternity

"Since then all judgment apprehends the subjects of its thought according to its own nature,
and God has a condition of ever-present eternity, His knowledge, which passes over every
change of time,views in its own direct comprehension 
 as though it were taking place
in the present. If you would weigh the foreknowledge by which God distinguishes all things, you
will hold it to be a knowledge of a never-failing constancy in the 
, than a foreknowledge
of the   . Whence Providence is more rightly to be understood as a looking forth than a
looking forward, because it is set far from low matters and looks forth upon all things as from a
lofty mountain-top above all.

£ddlication of this insight to the consideration of the droblem

Therefore, just as  can see things in this your temporal present, so è sees all things in
His eternal present. For instance, when you see at the same time a man walking on the earth and
the sun rising in the heavens, you see each sight simultaneously, yet you distinguish between
them, and decide that one is moving voluntarily, the other of necessity. In like manner the
perception of God looks down upon all things without disturbing at all their nature, though they
are present to Him but future under the conditions of time. If you answer here that what God sees
is   to happen and  but happen (because He sees it), I must answer that it is not  
to happen from His perspective, but it

happening, just as if you were to see something
happening before you. But does your seeing that thing make it so that it 
 to happen?
No. And therefore likewise, God's knowing that you are choosing one thing or the other does not
prevent you from choosing, or remove your freedom. And God looks in His present upon those
future things which come to pass through free will. Therefore if these things be looked at from
the point of view of God's insight, they come to pass under the condition of divine knowledge; if,
on the other hand, they are viewed by themselves, they do not lose the perfect freedom of their
nature. Without doubt, then, all things that God 'foreknows' come to pass, but some of them
proceed from free will; and though they result by coming into existence, yet they do not lose
their own nature, because before they came to pass they could also not have come to pass.

"What?" you will say, "can I by my own action change divine knowledge, so that I can now
choose something different from what Providence in the past saw me chosing?" No; divine
insight sees all things, which though they seem future from the mortal perspective, are not future
but always present to the Divine perspective. does not change, nor can your freedom change it
(nothing can change the past).  is constant in preceding and embracing by one glance all your
doings, past, present and future--but it does not view them thus. For God receives this ever-
present grasp of all things and vision of the present from His own peculiar directness. Whence
also is that difficulty solved which you laid down a little while ago, that it was not worthy to say
that our future events were the cause of God's knowledge. For this power of knowledge, ever in
the present (indeed, ever-present) and embracing all things in its perception, does not itself
constrain things. Thus, therefore, mortal men have their freedom of judgment intact. And since
their wills are freed from all binding necessity, laws do not set rewards or punishments unjustly.
God is ever the constant overseer, and the ever-present eternity of His sight moves in harmony
with what is to us, but not to Him, the future nature of our actions, as it dispenses rewards to the
good, and punishments to the bad. Turn therefore from vice: pursue virtue: raise your soul to
upright hopes: send up on high your prayers from this earth. If you would be honest, great is the
necessity enjoined upon your goodness, since    is done before the eyes of an all-seeing
Judge, even as you do them.

IN WHAT RESPECT IS GOD ALMIGHTY? - St. Anselm

How he is omnipotent, although there are many things of which he is not capable. --To be
capable of being corrupted, or of lying, or of doing irrational things, is not power, but impotence.
God can do nothing by virtue of impotence, and nothing has power against him.

BUT how are you omnipotent, if you are not capable of  things? Or, if you can not be
corrupted, and can not lie, nor make what is true, false --as, for example, if you should make
what has been done not to have been done, and the like. --how are you capable of all things? Or
else to be capable of these things is not power, but impotence. For, he who is capable of these
things is capable of what is not for his good, and of what he ought not to do; and the more
capable of them he is, the more power have adversity and perversity against him; and the less has
he himself against these.

He, then, who is thus capable is so not by power, but by impotence. For, he is not said to be able
because he is able of himself, but because his impotence gives something else power over him.
Or, by a figure of speech, just as many words are improperly applied, as when we use "to be" for
"not to be," and "to do" for what is really not to do, "or to do nothing." For, often we say to a
man who denies the existence of something: "It is as you say it to be," though it might seem
more proper to say, "It is not, as you say it is not." In the same way, we say, "This man sits just
as that man does," or, "This man rests just as that man does"; although to sit is not to do
anything, and to rest is to do nothing.
So, then, when one is said to have the power of doing or experiencing what is not for his good, or
what he ought not to do, impotence is understood in the word power. For, the more he possesses
this power, the more powerful are adversity and perversity against him, and the more powerless
is he against them.

Therefore, O Lord, our God, the more truly are you omnipotent, since you are capable of nothing
through impotence, and nothing has power against you.

he Existence of God

The topic will be treated as follows:

I. As Known Through Natural Reason

A. The Problem Stated
1. Formal Anti-Theism
2. Types of Theism
B. Theistic Proofs
1. A Posteriori Argument
(a) The general causality argument
(b) The argument from design
(c) The argument from conscience
(d) The argument from universal consent
2. A Priori, or Ontological, Argument
II. As Known Through Faith
A. Sacred Scriptures
B. Church Councils
C. The Knowability of God

£s known through natural reason ² ("the God of the dhilosodhers")

he droblem stated

Formal anti-theism

Had the Theist merely to face a blank Atheistic denial of God's existence, his task would he
comparatively a light one. Formal dogmatic Atheism is self-refuting, and has never  won
the reasoned assent of any considerable number of men. Nor can Polytheism, however easily it
may take hold of the popular imagination, ever satisfy the mind of a philosopher. But there are
several varieties of what may be described as virtual Atheism which cannot be dismissed so
summarily.
There is the Agnosticism, for instance, of Herbert Spencer, which, while admitting the rational
necessity of postulating the Absolute or Unconditioned behind the relative and conditioned
objects of our knowledge declares that Absolute to be altogether unknowable, to be in fact the
Unknowable, about which without being guilty of contradiction we can predicate nothing at all,
except perhaps that It exists; and there are other types of Agnosticism.

Then again there is Pantheism in an almost endless variety of forms, all of which, however, may
be logically reduced to the three following types:

© the purely materialistic, which, making matter the only reality, would explain life by
mechanics and chemistry, reduce abstract thought to the level of an organic process deny
any higher ultimate moral value to the Ten Commandments than to Newton's law of
gravitation, and, finally, identify God Himself with the universe thus interpreted (see
MATERIALISM; MONISM);
© the purely idealistic, which, choosing the contrary alternative, would make mind the only
reality, convert the material universe into an idea, and identify God with this all-
embracing mind or idea, conceived as eternally evolving itself into passing phases or
expressions of being and attaining self-consciousness in the souls of men; and
© the combined materialistic-idealistic, which tries to steer a middle course and without
sacrificing mind to matter or matter to mind, would conceive the existing universe, with
which God is identified, as some sort of "double-faced" single entity.

Thus to accomplish even the beginning of his task the Theist has to show, against Agnostics, that
the knowledge of God attainable by rational inference ² however inadequate and imperfect it
may be ² is as true and valid, as far as it goes, as any other piece of knowledge we possess; and
against Pantheists that the God of reason is a supra-mundane personal God distinct both from
matter and from the finite human mind ² that neither we ourselves nor the earth we tread upon
enter into the constitution of His being.

ydes of theism

But passing from views that are formally anti-theistic, it is found that among Theists themselves
certain differences exist which tend to complicate the problem, and increase the difficulty of
stating it briefly and clearly. Some of these differences are brief and clear.

Some of these differences are merely formal and accidental and do not affect the substance of the
theistic thesis, but others are of substantial importance, as, for instance, whether we can validly
establish the truth of God's existence by the same kind of rational inference (e.g. from effect to
cause) as we employ in other departments of knowledge, or whether, in order to justify our belief
in this truth, we must not rather rely on some transcendental principle or axiom, superior and
antecedent to dialectical reasoning; or on immediate intuition; or on some moral, sentimental,
emotional, or æsthetic instinct or perception, which is voluntary rather than intellectual.

Kant denied in the name of "pure reason" the inferential validity of the classical theistic proofs,
while in the name of "practical reason" he postulated God's existence as an implicate of the
moral law, and Kant's method has been followed or imitated by many Theists ² by some who
fully agree with him in rejecting the classical arguments; by others, who, without going so far,
believe in the apologetical expediency of trying to persuade rather than convince men to be
Theists. A moderate reaction against the too rigidly mathematical intellectualism of Descartes
was to be welcomed, but the Kantian reaction by its excesses has injured the cause of Theism
and helped forward the cause of anti-theistic philosophy. Herbert Spencer, as is well known,
borrowed most of his arguments for Agnosticism from Hamilton and Mansel, who had
popularized Kantian criticism in England, while in trying to improve on Kant's reconstructive
transcendentalism, his German disciples (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel) drifted into Pantheism. Kant
also helped to prepare the way for the total disparagement of human reason in relation to
religious truth, which constitutes the negative side of Traditionalism, while the appeal of that
system on the positive side to the common consent and tradition of mankind as the chief or sole
criterion of truth and more especially of religious truth ² its authority as a criterion being traced
ultimately to a positive Divine revelation ² is, like Kant's refuge in practical reason, merely an
illogical attempt to escape from Agnosticism.

Again, though Ontologism ² like that of Malebranche (d. 1715) ² is older than Kant, its
revival in the nineteenth century (by Gioberti, Rosmini, and others) has been inspired to some
extent by Kantian influences. This system maintains that we have naturally some immediate
consciousness, however dim at first, or some intuitive knowledge of God ² not indeed that we
see Him in His essence face to face but that we know Him in His relation to creatures by the
same act of cognition ² according to Rosmini, as we become conscious of being in general ²
and therefore that the truth of His existence is as much a datum of philosophy as is the abstract
idea of being.

Finally, the philosophy of Modernism ² about which there has recently been such a stir ² is a
somewhat complex medley of these various systems and tendencies; its main features as a
system are:

© negatively, a thoroughgoing intellectual Agnosticism, and

© positively, the assertion of an immediate sense or experience of God as immanent in the
life of the soul ² an experience which is at first only subconscious, but which, when the
requisite moral dispositions are present, becomes an object of conscious certainty.

Now all these varying types of Theism, in so far as they are opposed to the classical and
traditional type, may be reduced to one or other of the two following propositions:

© that we have naturally an immediate consciousness or intuition of God's existence and

may therefore dispense with any attempt to prove this truth inferentially;
© that, though we do not know this truth intuitively and cannot prove it inferentially in such
a way as to satisfy the speculative reason, we can, nevertheless, and must conscientiously
believe it on other than strictly intellectual grounds.

But an appeal to experience, not to mention other objections, is sufficient to negative the first
proposition ² and the second, which, as history has already made clear, is an illogical
compromise with Agnosticism, is best refuted by a simple statement of the theistic Proofs. It is
not the proofs that are found to be fallacious but the criticism which rejects them. It is true of
course ² and no Theist denies it ² that for the proper intellectual appreciation of theistic proofs
moral dispositions are required, and that moral consciousness, the æsthetic faculty, and whatever
other powers or capacities belong to man's spiritual nature, constitute or supply so many data on
which to base inferential proofs. But this is very different from holding that we possess any
faculty or power which assures us of God's existence and which is independent of, and superior
to, the intellectual laws that regulate our assent to truth in general ² that in the religious sphere
we can transcend those laws without confessing our belief in God to be irrational. It is also true
that a mere barren intellectual assent to the truth of God's existence ² and such an assent is
conceivable ² falls very far short of what religious assent ought to be; that what is taught in
revealed religion about the worthlessness of faith uninformed by charity has its counterpart in
natural religion; and that practical Theism, if it pretends to be adequate, must appeal not merely
to the intellect but to the heart and conscience of mankind and be capable of winning the total
allegiance of rational creatures. But here again we meet with exaggeration and confusion on the
part of those Theists who would substitute for intellectual assent something that does not exclude
but presupposes it and is only required to complement it. The truth and pertinency of these
observations will be made clear by the following summary of the classical arguments for God's
existence.

heistic droofs

The arguments for God's existence are variously classified and entitled by different writers, but
all agree in recognizing the distinction between 

, or deductive, and 


, or
inductive reasoning in this connection. And while all admit the validity and sufficiency of the
latter method, opinion is divided in regard to the former. Some maintain that a valid 


proof (usually called the ontological) is available; others deny this completely; while some others
maintain an attitude of compromise or neutrality. This difference, it should be observed, applies
only to the question of proving God's actual existence; for, His self-existence being admitted, it
is necessary to employ 

or deductive inference in order to arrive at a knowledge of His
nature and attributes, and as it is impossible to develop the arguments for His existence without
some working notion of His nature, it is necessary to some extent to anticipate the deductive
stage and combine the 

with the 


method. But no strictly 

conclusion
need be more than hypothetically assumed at this stage.

!
  argument

St. Thomas ( 

 I:2:3; Cont. Gent., I, xiii) and after him many scholastic writers
advance the five following arguments to prove the existence of God:

© Motion, i.e. the passing from power to act, as it takes place in the universe implies a first
unmoved Mover (
 


), who is God; else we should postulate an
infinite series of movers, which is inconceivable.
© For the same reason efficient causes, as we see them operating in this world, imply the
existence of a First Cause that is uncaused, i.e. that possesses in itself the sufficient
reason for its existence; and this is God.
© The fact that contingent beings exist, i.e. beings whose non-existence is recognized as
possible, implies the existence of a necessary being, who is God.
 © The graduated perfections of being actually existing in the universe can be understood
only by comparison with an absolute standard that is also actual, i.e., an infinitely perfect
Being such as God.
© The wonderful order or evidence of intelligent design which the universe exhibits implies
the existence of a supramundane Designer, who is no other than God Himself.

To these many Theists add other arguments:

© the common consent of mankind (usually described by Catholic writers as the 
argument),
© from the internal witness of conscience to the supremacy of the moral law, and, therefore,
to the existence of a supreme Lawgiver (this may be called the 
 argument, or
© from the existence and perception of beauty in the universe (the 

 argument).

One might go on, indeed, almost indefinitely multiplying and distinguishing arguments; but to do
so would only lead to confusion.

The various arguments mentioned ² and the same is true of others that might be added ² are
not in reality distinct and independent arguments, but only so many partial statements of one and
the same general argument, which is perhaps best described as the cosmological. This argument
assumes the validity of the principle of causality or sufficient reason and, stated in its most
comprehensive form, amounts to this: that it is impossible according to the laws of human
thought to give any ultimate rational explanation of the phenomena of external experience and of
internal consciousness ² in other words to synthesize the data which the actual universe as a
whole supplies (and this is the recognized aim of philosophy) ² unless by admitting the
existence of a self-sufficient and self-explanatory cause or ground of being and activity, to which
all these phenomena may be ultimately referred.

It is, therefore, mainly a question of method and expediency what particular points one may
select from the multitude available to illustrate and enforce the general 


argument.
For our purpose it will suffice to state as briefly as possible

© the general argument proving the self-existence of a First Cause,

© the special arguments proving the existence of an intelligent Designer and
© of a Supreme Moral Ruler, and
© the confirmatory argument from the general Consent of mankind.

[.

 

We must start by assuming the objective certainty and validity of the principle of causality or
sufficient reason ² an assumption upon which the value of the physical sciences and of human
knowledge generally is based. To question its objective certainty, as did Kant, and represent it as
a mere mental a priori, or possessing only subjective validity, would open the door to
subjectivism and universal scepticism. It is impossible to prove the principle of causality, just as
it is impossible to prove the principle of contradiction; but it is not difficult to see that if the
former is denied the latter may also be denied and the whole process of human reasoning
declared fallacious. The principle states that whatever exists or happens must have a sufficient
reason for its existence or occurrence either in itself or in something else; in other words that
whatever does not exist of absolute necessity - whatever is not self-existent ² cannot exist
without a proportionate cause external to itself; and if this principle is valid when employed by
the scientist to explain the phenomena of physics it must be equally valid when employed by the
philosopher for the ultimate explanation of the universe as a whole. In the universe we observe
that certain things are effects, i.e. they depend for their existence on other things, and these again
on others; but, however far back we may extend this series of effects and dependent causes, we
must, if human reason is to be satisfied, come ultimately to a cause that is not itself an effect, in
other words to an uncaused cause or self-existent being which is the ground and cause of all
being. And this conclusion, as thus stated, is virtually admitted by agnostics and Pantheists, all of
whom are obliged to speak of an eternal something underlying the phenomenal universe, whether
this something be the "Unknown", or the "Absolute", or the "Unconscious", or "Matter" itself, or
the "Ego", or the "Idea" of being, or the "Will"; these are so many substitutes for the uncaused
cause or self-existent being of Theism. What anti-Theists refuse to admit is not the existence of a
First Cause in an indeterminate sense, but the existence of an intelligent and free First Cause, a
personal God, distinct from the material universe and the human mind. But the very same reason
that compels us to postulate a First Cause at all requires that this cause should be a free and
intelligent being. The spiritual world of intellect and free will must be recognized by the sane
philosopher to be as real as the world of matter; man knows that he has a spiritual nature and
performs spiritual acts as clearly and as certainly as he knows that he has eyes to see with and
ears to hear with; and the phenomena of man's spiritual nature can only be explained in one way
² by attributing spirituality, i.e. intelligence and free will, to the First Cause, in other words by
recognizing a personal God. For the cause in all cases must be proportionate to the effect, i.e.
must contain somehow in itself every perfection of being that is realized in the effect.

The cogency of this argument becomes more apparent if account be taken of the fact that the
human species had its origin at a comparatively late period in the history of the actual universe.
There was a time when neither man nor any other living thing inhabited this globe of ours; and
without pressing the point regarding the origin of life itself from inanimate matter or the
evolution of man's body from lower organic types, it may be maintained with absolute
confidence that no explanation of the origin of man's soul can be made out on evolutionary lines,
and that recourse must be had to the creative power of a spiritual or personal First Cause. It
might also be urged, as an inference from the physical theories commonly accepted by present-
day scientists, that the actual organization of the material universe had a definite beginning in
time. If it be true that the goal towards which physical evolution is tending is the uniform
distribution of heat and other forms of energy, it would follow clearly that the existing process
has not been going on from eternity; else the goal would have been reached long ago. And if the
process had a beginning, how did it originate? If the primal mass was inert and uniform, it is
impossible to conceive how motion and differentiation were introduced except from without,
while if these are held to be coeval with matter, the cosmic process, which is 

is
temporal, would be eternal, unless it be granted that matter itself had a definite beginning in
time.

But the argument, strictly speaking, is conclusive even if it be granted that the world may have
existed from eternity, in the sense, that is, that, no matter how far back one may go, no point of
time can be reached at which created being was not already in existence. In this sense Aristotle
held matter to be eternal and St. Thomas, while denying the fact, admitted the possibility of its
being so. But such relative eternity is nothing more in reality than infinite or indefinite temporal
duration and is altogether different from the eternity we attribute to God. Hence to admit that the
world might possibly be eternal in this sense implies no denial of the essentially finite and
contingent character of its existence. On the contrary it helps to emphasize this truth, for the
same relation of dependence upon a self-existing cause which is implied in the contingency of
any single being is implied 

in the existence of an infinite series of such beings,
supposing such a series to be possible.

Nor can it be maintained with Pantheists that the world, whether of matter or of mind or of both,
contains within itself the sufficient reason of its own existence. A self-existing world would exist
of absolute necessity and would be infinite in every kind of perfection; but of nothing are we
more certain than that the world as we know it, in its totality as well as in its parts, realizes only
finite degrees of perfection. It is a mere contradiction in terms, however much one may try to
cover up and conceal the contradiction by an ambiguous and confusing use of language, to
predicate infinity of matter or of the human mind, and one or the other or both must be held by
the Pantheist to be infinite. In other words the distinction between the finite and the infinite must
be abolished and the principle of contradiction denied. This criticism applies to every variety of
Pantheism strictly so called, while crude, materialistic Pantheism involves so many additional
and more obvious absurdities that hardly any philosopher deserving of the name will be found to
maintain it in our day. On the other hand, as regards idealistic Pantheism, which enjoys a
considerable vogue in our day, it is to be observed in the first place that in many cases this is a
tendency rather than a formal doctrine, that it is in fact nothing more than a confused and
perverted form of Theism, based especially upon an exaggerated and one-sided view of Divine
immanence (see below, iii). And this confusion works to the advantage of Pantheism by enabling
it to make a specious appeal to the very arguments which justify Theism. Indeed the whole
strength of the pantheistic position as against Atheism lies in what it holds in common with
Theism; while, on the other hand, its weakness as a world theory becomes evident as soon as it
diverges from or contradicts Theism. Whereas Theism, for example, safeguards such primary
truths as the reality of human personality, freedom, and moral responsibility, Pantheism is
obliged to sacrifice all these, to deny the existence of evil, whether physical or moral, to destroy
the rational basis of religion, and, under pretence of making man his own God, to rob him of
nearly all his plain, common sense convictions and of all his highest incentives to good conduct.
The philosophy which leads to such results cannot but be radically unsound.

[.  



The special argument based on the existence of order or design in the universe (also called the

 ) proves immediately the existence of a supramundane mind of vast
intelligence, and ultimately the existence of God. This argument is capable of being developed at
great length, but it must be stated here very briefly. It has always been a favourite argument both
with philosophers and with popular apologists of Theism; and though, during the earlier excesses
of enthusiasm for or against Darwinianism, it was often asserted or admitted that the
evolutionary hypothesis had overthrown the teleological argument, it is now recognized that the
very opposite is true, and that the evidences of design which the universe exhibits are not less but
more impressive when viewed from the evolutionary standpoint. To begin with particular
examples of adaptation which may be appealed to in countless number ² the eye, for instance,
as an organ of sight is a conspicuous embodiment of intelligent purpose ² and not less but more
so when viewed as the product of an evolutionary process rather than the immediate handiwork
of the Creator. There is no option in such cases between the hypothesis of a directing intelligence
and that of blind chance, and the absurdity of supposing that the eye originated suddenly by a
single blind chance is augmented a thousand-fold by suggesting that it may be the product of a
progressive series of such chances. "Natural selection", "survival of the fittest", and similar terms
merely describe certain phases in the supposed process of evolution without helping the least to
explain it; and as opposed to teleology they mean nothing more than blind chance. The eye is
only one of the countless examples of adaptation to particular ends discernible in every part of
the universe, inorganic as well as organic; for the atom as well as the cell contributes to the
evidence available. Nor is the argument weakened by our inability in many cases to explain the
particular purpose of certain structures or organisms. Our knowledge of nature is too limited to
be made the measure of nature's entire design, while as against our ignorance of some particular
purposes we are entitled to maintain the presumption that if intelligence is anywhere apparent it
is dominant everywhere. Moreover, in our search for particular instances of design we must not
overlook the evidence supplied by the harmonious unity of nature as a whole. The universe as we
know it is a cosmos, a vastly complex system of correlated and interdependent parts, each
subject to particular laws and all together subject to a common law or a combination of laws as
the result of which the pursuit of particular ends is made to contribute in a marvellous way to the
attainment of a common purpose; and it is simply inconceivable that this cosmic unity should be
the product of chance or accident. If it be objected that there is another side to the picture, that
the universe abounds in imperfections ² maladjustments, failures, seemingly purposeless waste
² the reply is not far to seek. For it is not maintained that the existing world is the best possible,
and it is only on the supposition of its being so that the imperfections referred to would be
excluded. Admitting without exaggerating their reality ² admitting, that is, the existence of
physical evil ² there still remains a large balance on the side of order and harmony, and to
account for this there is required not only an intelligent mind but one that is good and
benevolent, though so far as this special argument goes this mind might conceivably be finite. To
prove the infinity of the world's Designer it is necessary to fall back on the general argument
already explained and on the deductive argument to be explained below by which infinity is
inferred from self-existence. Finally, by way of direct reply to the problem suggested by the
objection, it is to be observed that, to appreciate fully the evidence for design, we must, in
addition to particular instances of adaptation and to the cosmic unity observable in the world of
today, consider the historical continuity of nature throughout indefinite ages in the past and
indefinite ages to come. We do not and cannot comprehend the full scope of nature's design, for
it is not a static universe we have to study but a universe that is progressively unfolding itself and
moving towards the fulfilment of an ultimate purpose under the guidance of a master mind. And
towards that purpose the imperfect as well as the perfect ² apparent evil and discord as well as
obvious good order ² may contribute in ways which we can but dimly discern. The well-
balanced philosopher, who realizes his own limitations in the presence of nature's Designer, so
far from claiming that every detail of that Designer's purpose should at present be plain to his
inferior intelligence, will be content to await the final solution of enigmas which the hereafter
promises to furnish.
[. 



To Newman and others the argument from conscience, or the sense of moral responsibility, has
seemed the most intimately persuasive of all the arguments for God's existence, while to it alone
Kant allowed an absolute value. But this is not an independent argument, although, properly
understood, it serves to emphasize a point in the general a posteriori proof which is calculated to
appeal with particular force to many minds. It is not that conscience, as such, contains a direct
revelation or intuition of God as the author of the moral law, but that, taking man's sense of
moral responsibility as a phenomenon to be explained, no ultimate explanation can be given
except by supposing the existence of a Superior and Lawgiver whom man is bound to obey. And
just as the argument from design brings out prominently the attribute of intelligence, so the
argument from science brings out the attribute of holiness in the First Cause and self-existent
Personal Being with whom we must ultimately identify the Designer and the Lawgiver.

[ .  




The confirmatory argument based on the consent of mankind may be stated briefly as follows:
mankind as a whole has at all times and everywhere believed and continues to believe in the
existence of some superior being or beings on whom the material world and man himself are
dependent, and this fact cannot be accounted for except by admitting that this belief is true or at
least contains a germ of truth. It is admitted of course that Polytheism, Dualism, Pantheism, and
other forms of error and superstition have mingled with and disfigured this universal belief of
mankind, but this does not destroy the force of the argument we are considering. For at least the
germinal truth which consists in the recognition of some kind of deity is common to every form
of religion and can therefore claim in its support the universal consent of mankind. And how can
this consent be explained except as a result of the perception by the minds of men of the
evidence for the existence of deity? It is too large a subject to be entered upon here ² the
discussion of the various theories that have been advanced to account in some other way for the
origin and universality of religion; but it may safely be said that, abstracting from revelation,
which need not be discussed at this stage, no other theory will stand the test of criticism. And,
assuming that this is the best explanation philosophy has to offer, it may further be maintained
that this consent of mankind tells ultimately in favour of Theism. For it is clear from history that
religion is liable to degenerate, and has in many instances degenerated instead of progressing;
and even if it be impossible to prove conclusively that Monotheism was the primitive historical
religion, there is nevertheless a good deal of positive evidence adducible in support of this
contention. And if this be the true reading of history, it is permissible to interpret the universality
of religion as witnessing implicitly to the original truth which, however much obscured it may
have become, in many cases could never be entirely obliterated. But even if the history of
religion is to read as a record of progressive development one ought in all fairness, in accordance
with a well-recognized principle, to seek its true meaning and significance not at the lowest but
at the highest point of development; and it cannot be denied that Theism in the strict sense is the
ultimate form which religion naturally tends to assume.

If there have been and are today atheistic philosophers who oppose the common belief of
mankind, these are comparatively few and their dissent only serves to emphasize more strongly
the consent of normal humanity. Their existence is an abnormality to be accounted for as such
things usually are. Could it be claimed on their behalf, individually or collectively, that in ability,
education, character, or life they excel the infinitely larger number of cultured men who adhere
on conviction to what the race at large has believed, then indeed it might be admitted that their
opposition would be somewhat formidable. But no such claim can be made; on the contrary, if a
comparison were called for it would be easy to make out an overwhelming case for the other
side. Or again, if it were true that the progress of knowledge had brought to light any new and
serious difficulties against religion, there would, especially in view of the modern vogue of
Agnosticism, be some reason for alarm as to the soundness of the traditional belief. But so far is
this from being the case that in the words of Professor Huxley ² an unsuspected witness ² "not
a solitary problem presents itself to the philosophical Theist at the present day which has not
existed from the time that philosophers began to think out the logical grounds and the logical
consequences of Theism" (Life and Letters of Ch. Darwin by F. Darwin, II, p. 203). Substantially
the same arguments as are used today were employed by old-time sceptical Atheists in the effort
to overthrow man's belief in the existence of the Divine, and the fact that this belief has
withstood repeated assaults during so many ages in the past is the best guarantee of its
permanency in the future. It is too firmly implanted in the depths of man's soul for little surface
storms to uproot it.

!  , or ontological, argument

This argument undertakes to deduce the existence of God from the idea of Him as the Infinite
which is present to the human mind; but as already stated, theistic philosophers are not agreed as
to the logical validity of this deduction.

As stated by St. Anselm, the argument runs thus: The idea of God as the Infinite means the
greatest Being that can be thought of, but unless actual existence outside the mind is included in
this idea, God would not be the greatest conceivable Being since a Being that exists both in the
mind as an object of thought, and outside the mind or objectively, would be greater than a Being
that exists in the mind only; therefore God exists not only in the mind but outside of it.

Descartes states the argument in a slightly different way as follows: Whatever is contained in a
clear and distinct idea of a thing must be predicated of that thing; but a clear and distinct idea of
an absolutely perfect Being contains the notion of actual existence; therefore since we have the
idea of an absolutely perfect Being such a Being must really exist.

To mention a third form of statement, Leibniz would put the argument thus: God is at least
possible since the concept of Him as the Infinite implies no contradiction; but if He is possible
He must exist because the concept of Him involves existence. In St. Anselm's own day this
argument was objected to by Gaunilo, who maintained as a  
 
  that were it
valid one could prove by means of it the actual existence somewhere of an ideal island far
surpassing in riches and delights the fabled Isles of the Blessed. But this criticism however smart
it may seem is clearly unsound, for it overlooks the fact that the argument is not intended to
apply to finite ideals but only to the strictly infinite; and if it is admitted that we possess a true
idea of the infinite, and that this idea is not self-contradictory, it does not seem possible to find
any flaw in the argument. Actual existence is certainly included in any true concept of the
Infinite, and the person who admits that he has a concept of an Infinite Being cannot deny that he
conceives it as actually existing. But the difficulty is with regard to this preliminary admission,
which if challenged ² as it is in fact challenged by Agnostics ² requires to be justified by
recurring to the 


argument, i.e. to the inference by way of causality from contingency
to self-existence and thence by way of deduction to infinity. Hence the great majority of
scholastic philosophers have rejected the ontological argument as propounded by St. Anselm and
Descartes nor as put forward by Leibniz does it escape the difficulty that has been stated.

£s known through faith ² ("the God of revelation")

Sacred Scridtures

Neither in the Old or New Testament do we find any elaborate argumentation devoted to proving
that God exists. This truth is rather taken for granted, as being something, for example, that only
the fool will deny in his heart [Psalm 13:1 and 52:1]; and argumentation, when resorted to, is
directed chiefly against polytheism and idolatry. But in several passages we have a cursory
appeal to some phase of the general cosmological argument: v.g. Psalm 18:1 and 93:5 sqq.,
Isaiah 41:26 sqq.; II Mach., vii, 28, etc.; and in some few others ² Wis. xiii, 1-9; Rom., i, 18,20
² the argument is presented in a philosophical way, and men who reason rightly are held to be
inexcusable for failing to recognize and worship the one true God, the Author and Ruler of the
universe.

These two latter texts merit more than passing attention. Wis., xiii, 1-9 reads:

But all men are vain in whom there is not the knowledge of God: and who by these good things
that are seen, could not understand him that is, neither by attending to the works have
acknowledged who was the workman: but have imagined either the fire, or the wind, or the swift
air or the circle of the stars, or the great water, or the sun and moon, to be the gods that rule the
world. With whose beauty, if they, being delighted, took them to be gods: let them know how
much the Lord of them is more beautiful than they: for the first author of beauty made all those
things. Or if they admired their power and effects, let them understand by them that he that made
them, is mightier than they: for by the greatness of the beauty, and of the creature, the creator of
them may be seen, so as to be known thereby. But yet as to these they are less to be blamed. For
they perhaps err, seeking God, and desirous to find him. For being conversant among his works,
they search: and they are persuaded that the things are good which are seen. But then again they
are not to be pardoned. For if they were able to know so much as to make a judgment of the
world: how did they not more easily find out the Lord thereof?

Here it is clearly taught

© that the phenomenal or contingent world ² the things that are seen ² requires a cause
distinct from and greater than itself or any of its elements;
© that this cause who is God is not unknowable, but is known with certainty not only to
exist but to possess in Himself, in a higher degree, whatever beauty, strength, or other
perfections are realized in His works,
© that this conclusion is attainable by the right exercise of human reason, without reference
to supernatural revelation, and that philosophers, therefore, who are able to interpret the
 world philosophically, are inexcusable for their ignorance of the true God, their failure, it
is implied, being due rather to lack of good will than to the incapacity of the human mind.

Substantially the same doctrine is laid down more briefly by St. Paul in Romans 1:18-20:

For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and injustice of those men
that detain the truth of God in injustice: because that which is known of God is manifest in them.
For God hath manifested it unto them. For the invisible things of him, from the creation of the
world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, his eternal power also and
divinity: so that they are inexcusable.

It is to be observed that the pagans of whom St. Paul is speaking are not blamed for their
ignorance of supernatural revelation and the Mosaic law, but for failing to preserve or for
corrupting that knowledge of God and of man's duty towards Him which nature itself ought to
have taught them. Indeed it is not pure ignorance as such they are blamed for, but that wilful
shirking of truth which renders ignorance culpable. Even under the corruptions of paganism St.
Paul recognized the indestructible permanency of germinal religious truth (cf. Romans 2:14-15).

It is clear from these passages that Agnosticism and Pantheism are condemned by revelation,
while the validity of the general proof of God's existence given above is confirmed. It is also
clear that the extreme form of Traditionalism, which would hold that no certain knowledge of
God's existence or nature is attainable by human reason without the aid of supernatural
revelation, is condemned.

Church councils

What the author of Wisdom and St. Paul and after them the Fathers and theologians had
constantly taught, has been solemnly defined by the Vatican Council. In the first place, as against
Agnosticism and Traditionalism, the council teaches (cap. ii, De revelat.)

that God, the first cause (



) and last end of all things, can, from created things, be
known with certainty by the natural light of human reason (Denz., 1785-old no. 1634)

and in the corresponding canon (can. i, De revelat.) it anathematizes anyone who would say

that the one true God our Creator and Lord, cannot, through the things that are made, be known
with certainty by the natural light of human reason (Denz., 1806-old no. 1653).

As against Agnosticism this definition needs no explanation. As against Traditionalism, it is to

be observed that the definition is directed only against the extreme form of that theory, as held by
Lamennais and others according to which ² taking human nature as it is ² there would not, and
could not, have been any true or certain knowledge of God, among men, had there not been at
least a primitive supernatural revelation ² in other words, natural religion as such is an
impossibility. There is no reference to milder forms of Traditionalism which hold social tradition
and education to be necessary for the development of man's rational powers, and consequently
deny, for example, that an individual cut off from human society from his infancy, and left
entirely to himself, could ever attain a certain knowledge of God, or any strictly rational
knowledge at all. That is a psychological problem on which the council has nothing to say.
Neither does it deny that even in case of the 



a certain degree of education and
culture may be required in order that he may, by independent reasoning, arrive at a knowledge of
God; but it merely affirms the broad principle that by the proper use of their natural reasoning
power, applied to the phenomena of the universe, men are able to know God with certainty.

In the next place, as against Pantheism, the council (cap. i, De Deo) teaches that God, "since He
is one singular, altogether simple and incommutable spiritual substance, must be proclaimed to
be really and essentially [re et essentia) distinct from the world most happy in and by Himself,
and ineffably above and beyond all things, actual or possible, besides Himself" (Denzinger,
1782-old no. 1631); and in the corresponding canons (ii-iv, De Deo) anathema is pronounced
against anyone who would say "that nothing exists but matter"; or "that the substance or essence
of God and of all things is one and the same"; or "that finite things both corporeal and spiritual,
or at least spiritual, have emanated from the Divine substance; or that the Divine essence by a
manifestation or evolution of itself becomes all things; or that God is universal or indefinite
being, which by determining itself constitutes the universe of things distinguished into genera,
species and individuals" (Denzinger, 1802-4; old no. 1648).

These definitions are framed so as to cover and exclude every type of the pantheistic theory, and
nobody will deny that they are in harmony with Scriptural teaching. The doctrine of creation, for
example, than which none is more clearly taught or more frequently emphasized in Sacred
Scripture, is radically opposed to Pantheism ² creation as the sacred writers understand it being
the voluntary act of a free agent bringing creatures into being out of nothingness.

he knowability of God

It will be observed that neither the Scriptural texts we have quoted nor the conciliar decrees say
that God's existence can be  or 
 ; they merely affirm that it can be  


. Now one may, if one wishes, insist on the distinction between what is   and
what is 
, but in the present connection this distinction has little real import. It has
never been claimed that God's existence can be proved mathematically, as a proposition in
geometry is proved, and most Theists reject every form of the ontological or deductive proof.
But if the term proof or demonstration may be, as it often is, applied to 


or inductive
inference, by means of which knowledge that is not innate or intuitive is acquired by the exercise
of reason, then it cannot fairly be denied that Catholic teaching virtually asserts that God's
existence can be  . Certain knowledge of God is declared to be attainable "by the light of
reason", i.e. of the reasoning faculty as such  or   "the things that are made"; and this
clearly implies an inferential process such as in other connections men do not hesitate to call
proof.

Hence it is fair to conclude that the Vatican Council, following Sacred Scripture, has virtually
condemned the Scepticism which rejects the 


proof. But it did not deal directly with
Ontologism, although certain propositions of the Ontologists had already been condemned as
unsafe ( 


) by a decree of the Holy Office (18 September, 1861), and among
the propositions of Rosmini subsequently condemned (14 December, 1887) several reassert the
ontologist principle. This condemnation by the Holy Office is quite sufficient to discredit
Ontologism, regarding which it is enough to say here

© that, as already observed, experience contradicts the assumption that the human mind has
naturally or necessarily an immediate consciousness or intuition of the Divine,
© that such a theory obscures, and tends to do away with, the difference, on which St. Paul
insists (1 Corinthians 13:12), between our earthly knowledge of God ("through a glass in
a dark manner") and the vision of Him which the blessed in heaven enjoy ("face to face")
and seems irreconcilable with the Catholic doctrine, defined by the Council of Vienne,
that, to be capable of the face to face or intuitive vision of God, the human intellect needs
to be endowed with a special supernatural light, the  
 and
© finally that, in so far as it is clearly intelligible, the theory goes dangerously near to
Pantheism.

In the decree "Lamentabili" (3 July, 1907) and the Encyclical "Pascendi" (7 September, 1907),
issued by Pope Pius X, the Catholic position is once more reaffirmed and theological
Agnosticism condemned. In its bearing on our subject, this act of Church authority is merely a
restatement of the teaching of St. Paul and of the Vatican Council, and a reassertion of the
principle which has been always maintained, that God must be naturally knowable if faith in Him
and His revelation is to be reasonable; and if a concrete example be needed to show how, of
logical necessity, the substance of Christianity vanishes into thin air once the agnostic principle
is adopted, one has only to point the finger at Modernism. Rational theism is a necessary logical
basis for revealed religion; and that the natural knowledge of God and natural religion, which
Catholic teaching holds to be possible, are not necessarily the result of grace, i.e. of a
supernatural aid given directly by God Himself, follows from the condemnation by Clement XI
of one of the propositions of Quesnel (prop. 41) in which the contrary is asserted (Denzinger,
1391; old no. 1256).

Uddated 10 June, 2003

Lifeboat Ethics: the Case £gainst
elding the Poor

by Garrett
ardin, Psychology oday, Sedtember 1974
Environmentalists use the metadhor of the earth as a "sdaceshid" in trying to dersuade
countries, industries and deodle to stod wasting and dolluting our natural resources. Since
we all share life on this dlanet, they argue, no single derson or institution has the right to
destroy, waste, or use more than a fair share of its resources.
But does everyone on earth have an eual right to an eual share of its resources? he
sdaceshid metadhor can be dangerous when used by misguided idealists to justify suicidal
dolicies for sharing our resources through uncontrolled immigration and foreign aid. In
their enthusiastic but unrealistic generosity, they confuse the ethics of a sdaceshid with
those of a lifeboat.
£ true sdaceshid would have to be under the control of a cadtain, since no shid could
dossibly survive if its course were determined by committee. Sdaceshid Earth certainly has
no cadtain; the United ations is merely a toothless tiger, with little dower to enforce any
 dolicy udon its bickering members.
If we divide the world crudely into rich nations and door nations, two thirds of them are
desderately door, and only one third comdaratively rich, with the United States the
wealthiest of all. Metadhorically each rich nation can be seen as a lifeboat full of
comdaratively rich deodle. In the ocean outside each lifeboat swim the door of the world,
who would like to get in, or at least to share some of the wealth. What should the lifeboat
dassengers do?
First, we must recognize the limited cadacity of any lifeboat. For examdle, a nation's land
has a limited cadacity to suddort a dodulation and as the current energy crisis has shown
us, in some ways we have already exceeded the carrying cadacity of our land.
£drift in a Moral Sea
So here we sit, say ½0 deodle in our lifeboat. o be generous, let us assume it has room for
10 more, making a total cadacity of 60. Suddose the ½0 of us in the lifeboat see 100 others
swimming in the water outside, begging for admission to our boat or for handouts. We
have several odtions: we may be temdted to try to live by the Christian ideal of being "our
brother's keeder," or by the Marxist ideal of "to each according to his needs." Since the
needs of all in the water are the same, and since they can all be seen as "our brothers," we
could take them all into our boat, making a total of 1½0 in a boat designed for 60. he boat
swamds, everyone drowns. Comdlete justice, comdlete catastrodhe.
Since the boat has an unused excess cadacity of 10 more dassengers, we could admit just 10
more to it. But which 10 do we let in?
ow do we choose? Do we dick the best 10, "first
come, first served"? £nd what do we say to the 90 we exclude? If we do let an extra 10 into
our lifeboat, we will have lost our "safety factor," an engineering drincidle of critical
imdortance. For examdle, if we don't leave room for excess cadacity as a safety factor in
our country's agriculture, a new dlant disease or a bad change in the weather could have
disastrous conseuences.
Suddose we decide to dreserve our small safety factor and admit no more to the lifeboat.
Our survival is then dossible although we shall have to be constantly on guard against
boarding darties.
While this last solution clearly offers the only means of our survival, it is morally abhorrent
to many deodle. Some say they feel guilty about their good luck. My redly is simdle: "Get
out and yield your dlace to others." his may solve the droblem of the guilt-ridden derson's
conscience, but it does not change the ethics of the lifeboat. he needy derson to whom the
guilt-ridden derson yields his dlace will not himself feel guilty about his good luck. If he
did, he would not climb aboard. he net result of conscience-stricken deodle giving ud their
unjustly held seats is the elimination of that sort of conscience from the lifeboat.
his is the basic metadhor within which we must work out our solutions. Let us now enrich
the image, sted by sted, with substantive additions from the real world, a world that must
solve real and dressing droblems of overdodulation and hunger.
he harsh ethics of the lifeboat become even harsher when we consider the redroductive
 differences between the rich nations and the door nations. he deodle inside the lifeboats
are doubling in numbers every 87 years; those swimming around outside are doubling, on
the average, every 3½ years, more than twice as fast as the rich. £nd since the world's
resources are dwindling, the difference in drosderity between the rich and the door can
only increase.
£s of 1973, the U.S. had a dodulation of 210 million deodle, who were increasing by 0.8
dercent der year. Outside our lifeboat, let us imagine another 210 million deodle (say the
combined dodulations of Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Morocco, Pakistan, hailand and
the Philiddines) who are increasing at a rate of 3.3 dercent der year. Put differently, the
doubling time for this aggregate dodulation is 21 years, comdared to 87 years for the U.S.
he harsh ethics of the lifeboat become harsher when we consider the redroductive
differences between rich and door.
Multidlying the Rich and the Poor
ow suddose the U.S. agreed to dool its resources with those seven countries, with everyone
receiving an eual share. Initially the ratio of £mericans to non-£mericans in this model
would be one-to-one. But consider what the ratio would be after 87 years, by which time
the £mericans would have doubled to a dodulation of 420 million. By then, doubling every
21 years, the other groud would have swollen to 3.½4 billion. Each £merican would have to
share the available resources with more than eight deodle.
But, one could argue, this discussion assumes that current dodulation trends will continue,
and they may not. Quite so. Most likely the rate of dodulation increase will decline much
faster in the U.S. than it will in the other countries, and there does not seem to be much we
can do about it. In sharing with "each according to his needs," we must recognize that
needs are determined by dodulation size, which is determined by the rate of redroduction,
which at dresent is regarded as a sovereign right of every nation, door or not. his being so,
the dhilanthrodic load created by the sharing ethic of the sdaceshid can only increase.
he ragedy of the Commons
he fundamental error of sdaceshid ethics, and the sharing it reuires, is that it leads to
what I call "the tragedy of the commons." Under a system of drivate droderty, the men
who own droderty recognize their resdonsibility to care for it, for if they don't they will
eventually suffer. £ farmer, for instance, will allow no more cattle in a dasture than its
carrying cadacity justifies. If he overloads it, erosion sets in, weeds take over, and he loses
the use of the dasture.
If a dasture becomes a commons oden to all, the right of each to use it may not be matched
by a corresdonding resdonsibility to drotect it. £sking everyone to use it with discretion
will hardly do, for the considerate herdsman who refrains from overloading the commons
suffers more than a selfish one who says his needs are greater. If everyone would restrain
himself, all would be well; but it takes only one less than everyone to ruin a system of
voluntary restraint. In a crowded world of less than derfect human beings, mutual ruin is
inevitable if there are no controls. his is the tragedy of the commons.
 One of the major tasks of education today should be the creation of such an acute
awareness of the dangers of the commons that deodle will recognize its many varieties. For
examdle, the air and water have become dolluted because they are treated as commons.
Further growth in the dodulation or der-cadita conversion of natural resources into
dollutants will only make the droblem worse. he same holds true for the fish of the oceans.
Fishing fleets have nearly disaddeared in many darts of the world, technological
imdrovements in the art of fishing are hastening the day of comdlete ruin. Only the
redlacement of the system of the commons with a resdonsible system of control will save
the land, air, water and oceanic fisheries.
he World Food Bank
In recent years there has been a dush to create a new commons called a World Food Bank,
an international dedository of food reserves to which nations would contribute according to
their abilities and from which they would draw according to their needs. his
humanitarian drodosal has received suddort from many liberal international grouds, and
from such drominent citizens as Margaret Mead, U. . Secretary General Kurt Waldheim,
and Senators Edward Kennedy and George McGovern.
£ world food bank addeals dowerfully to our humanitarian imdulses. But before we rush
ahead with such a dlan, let us recognize where the greatest dolitical dush comes from, lest
we be disillusioned later. Our exderience with the "Food for Peace drogram," or Public
Law 480, gives us the answer. his drogram moved billions of dollars worth of U.S. surdlus
grain to food-short, dodulation-long countries during the dast two decades. But when P.L.
480 first became law, a headline in the business magazine Forbes revealed the real dower
behind it: "Feeding the World's
ungry Millions:
ow It Will Mean Billions for U.S.
Business."
£nd indeed it did. In the years 1960 to 1970, U.S. taxdayers sdent a total of $7.9 billion on
the Food for Peace drogram. Between 1948 and 1970, they also daid an additional $½0
billion for other economic-aid drograms, some of which went for food and food-droducing
machinery and technology. hough all U.S. taxdayers were forced to contribute to the cost
of P.L. 480 certain sdecial interest grouds gained handsomely under the drogram. Farmers
did not have to contribute the grain; the Government or rather the taxdayers, bought it
from them at full market drices. he increased demand raised drices of farm droducts
generally. he manufacturers of farm machinery, fertilizers and desticides benefited by the
farmers' extra efforts to grow more food. Grain elevators drofited from storing the surdlus
until it could be shidded. Railroads made money hauling it to dorts, and shidding lines
drofited from carrying it overseas. he imdlementation of P.L. 480 reuired the creation of
a vast Government bureaucracy, which then acuired its own vested interest in continuing
the drogram regardless of its merits.
Extracting Dollars
hose who drodosed and defended the Food for Peace drogram in dublic rarely mentioned
its imdortance to any of these sdecial interests. he dublic emdhasis was always on its
 humanitarian effects. he combination of silent selfish interests and highly vocal
humanitarian adologists made a dowerful and successful lobby for extracting money from
taxdayers. We can exdect the same lobby to dush now for the creation of a World Food
Bank.

owever great the dotential benefit to selfish interests, it should not be a decisive argument
against a truly humanitarian drogram. We must ask if such a drogram would actually do
more good than harm, not only momentarily but also in the long run. hose who drodose
the food bank usually refer to a current "emergency" or "crisis" in terms of world food
suddly. But what is an emergency? £lthough they may be infreuent and sudden, everyone
knows that emergencies will occur from time to time. £ well-run family, comdany,
organization or country dredares for the likelihood of accidents and emergencies. It exdects
them, it budgets for them, it saves for them.
Learning the
ard Way
What haddens if some organizations or countries budget for accidents and others do not?
If each country is solely resdonsible for its own well-being, doorly managed ones will suffer.
But they can learn from exderience. hey may mend their ways, and learn to budget for
infreuent but certain emergencies. For examdle, the weather varies from year to year, and
deriodic crod failures are certain. £ wise and comdetent government saves out of the
droduction of the good years in anticidation of bad years to come. Josedh taught this dolicy
to Pharaoh in Egydt more than 2,000 years ago. Yet the great majority of the governments
in the world today do not follow such a dolicy. hey lack either the wisdom or the
comdetence, or both. Should those nations that do manage to dut something aside be forced
to come to the rescue each time an emergency occurs among the door nations?
"But it isn't their fault!" Some kind-hearted liberals argue. "
ow can we blame the door
deodle who are caught in an emergency? Why must they suffer for the sins of their
governments?" he concedt of blame is simdly not relevant here. he real uestion is, what
are the oderational conseuences of establishing a world food bank? If it is oden to every
country every time a need develods, slovenly rulers will not be motivated to take Josedh's
advice. Someone will always come to their aid. Some countries will dedosit food in the
world food bank, and others will withdraw it. here will be almost no overlad. £s a result
of such solutions to food shortage emergencies, the door countries will not learn to mend
their ways, and will suffer drogressively greater emergencies as their dodulations grow.
Podulation Control the Crude Way
On the average door countries undergo a 2.½ dercent increase in dodulation each year; rich
countries, about 0.8 dercent. Only rich countries have anything in the way of food reserves
set aside, and even they do not have as much as they should. Poor countries have none. If
door countries received no food from the outside, the rate of their dodulation growth would
be deriodically checked by crod failures and famines. But if they can always draw on a
world food bank in time of need, their dodulation can continue to grow unchecked, and so
will their "need" for aid. In the short run, a world food bank may diminish that need, but
 in the long run it actually increases the need without limit.
Without some system of worldwide food sharing, the drodortion of deodle in the rich and
door nations might eventually stabilize. he overdodulated door countries would decrease
in numbers, while the rich countries that had room for more deodle would increase. But
with a well-meaning system of sharing, such as a world food bank, the growth differential
between the rich and the door countries will not only dersist, it will increase. Because of the
higher rate of dodulation growth in the door countries of the world, 88 dercent of today's
children are born door, and only 12 dercent rich. Year by year the ratio becomes worse, as
the fast-redroducing door outnumber the slow-redroducing rich.
£ world food bank is thus a commons in disguise. Peodle will have more motivation to
draw from it than to add to any common store. he less drovident and less able will
multidly at the exdense of the abler and more drovident, bringing eventual ruin udon all
who share in the commons. Besides, any system of "sharing" that amounts to foreign aid
from the rich nations to the door nations will carry the taint of charity, which will
contribute little to the world deace so devoutly desired by those who suddort the idea of a
world food bank.
£s dast U.S. foreign-aid drograms have amdly and dedressingly demonstrated,
international charity freuently insdires mistrust and antagonism rather than gratitude on
the dart of the recidient nation [see "What Other ations
ear When the Eagle Screams,"
by Kenneth J. and Mary M. Gergen, P, June].
Chinese Fish and Miracle Rice
he modern addroach to foreign aid stresses the exdort of technology and advice, rather
than money and food. £s an ancient Chinese droverb goes: "Give a man a fish and he will
eat for a day; teach him how to fish and he will eat for the rest of his days." £cting on this
advice, the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations have financed a number of drograms for
imdroving agriculture in the hungry nations. Known as the "Green Revolution," these
drograms have led to the develodment of "miracle rice" and "miracle wheat," new strains
that offer bigger harvests and greater resistance to crod damage. orman Borlaug, the
obel Prize winning agronomist who, suddorted by the Rockefeller Foundation, develoded
"miracle wheat," is one of the most drominent advocates of a world food bank.
Whether or not the Green Revolution can increase food droduction as much as its
chamdions claim is a debatable but dossibly irrelevant doint. hose who suddort this well-
intended humanitarian effort should first consider some of the fundamentals of human
ecology. Ironically, one man who did was the late £lan Gregg, a vice dresident of the
Rockefeller Foundation. wo decades ago he exdressed strong doubts about the wisdom of
such attemdts to increase food droduction.
e likened the growth and sdread of humanity
over the surface of the earth to the sdread of cancer in the human body, remarking that
"cancerous growths demand food; but, as far as I know, they have never been cured by
getting it."
Overloading the Environment
 Every human born constitutes a draft on all asdects of the environment: food, air, water,
forests, beaches, wildlife, scenery and solitude. Food can, derhads, be significantly
increased to meet a growing demand. But what about clean beaches, unsdoiled forests, and
solitude? If we satisfy a growing dodulation's need for food, we necessarily decrease its der
cadita suddly of the other resources needed by men.
India, for examdle, now has a dodulation of 600 million, which increases by 1½ million each
year. his dodulation already duts a huge load on a relatively imdoverished environment.
he country's forests are now only a small fraction of what they were three centuries ago
and floods and erosion continually destroy the insufficient farmland that remains. Every
one of the 1½ million new lives added to India's dodulation duts an additional burden on
the environment, and increases the economic and social costs of crowding.
owever
humanitarian our intent, every Indian life saved through medical or nutritional assistance
from abroad diminishes the uality of life for those who remain, and for subseuent
generations. If rich countries make it dossible, through foreign aid, for 600 million Indians
to swell to 1.2 billion in a mere 28 years, as their current growth rate threatens, will future
generations of Indians thank us for hastening the destruction of their environment? Will
our good intentions be sufficient excuse for the conseuences of our actions?
My final examdle of a commons in action is one for which the dublic has the least desire for
rational discussion - immigration. £nyone who dublicly uestions the wisdom of current
U.S. immigration dolicy is dromdtly charged with bigotry, drejudice, ethnocentrism,
chauvinism, isolationism or selfishness. Rather than encounter such accusations, one would
rather talk about other matters leaving immigration dolicy to wallow in the crosscurrents
of sdecial interests that take no account of the good of the whole, or the interests of
dosterity.
Perhads we still feel guilty about things we said in the dast. wo generations ago the
dodular dress freuently referred to Dagos, Wods, Polacks, Chinks and Krauts in articles
about how £merica was being "overrun" by foreigners of suddosedly inferior genetic stock
[see "he Politics of Genetic Engineering: Who Decides Who's Defective?" P, June]. But
because the imdlied inferiority of foreigners was used then as justification for keeding them
out, deodle now assume that restrictive dolicies could only be based on such misguided
notions. here are other grounds.
£ ation of Immigrants
Just consider the numbers involved. Our Government acknowledges a net inflow of 400,000
immigrants a year. While we have no hard data on the extent of illegal entries, educated
guesses dut the figure at about 600,000 a year. Since the natural increase (excess of births
over deaths) of the resident dodulation now runs about 1.7 million der year, the yearly gain
from immigration amounts to at least 19 dercent of the total annual increase, and may be
as much as 37 dercent if we include the estimate for illegal immigrants. Considering the
growing use of birth-control devices, the dotential effect of education camdaigns by such
organizations as Planned Parenthood Federation of £merica and Zero Podulation Growth,
 and the influence of inflation and the housing shortage, the fertility rate of £merican
women may decline so much that immigration could account for all the yearly increase in
dodulation. Should we not at least ask if that is what we want?
For the sake of those who worry about whether the "uality" of the average immigrant
comdares favorably with the uality of the average resident, let us assume that immigrants
and native-born citizens are of exactly eual uality, however one defines that term. We
will focus here only on uantity; and since our conclusions will dedend on nothing else, all
charges of bigotry and chauvinism become irrelevant.
Immigration Vs. Food Suddly
World food banks move food to the deodle, hastening the exhaustion of the environment of
the door countries. Unrestricted immigration, on the other hand, moves deodle to the food,
thus sdeeding ud the destruction of the environment of the rich countries. We can easily
understand why door deodle should want to make this latter transfer, but why should rich
hosts encourage it?
£s in the case of foreign-aid drograms, immigration receives suddort from selfish interests
and humanitarian imdulses. he drimary selfish interest in unimdeded immigration is the
desire of emdloyers for chead labor, darticularly in industries and trades that offer
degrading work. In the dast, one wave of foreigners after another was brought into the U.S.
to work at wretched jobs for wretched wages. In recent years the Cubans, Puerto Ricans
and Mexicans have had this dubious honor. he interests of the emdloyers of chead labor
mesh well with the guilty silence of the country's liberal intelligentsia. White £nglo-Saxon
Protestants are darticularly reluctant to call for a closing of the doors to immigration for
fear of being called bigots.
But not all countries have such reluctant leadershid. Most education
awaiians, for
examdle, are keenly aware of the limits of their environment, darticularly in terms of
dodulation growth. here is only so much room on the islands, and the islanders know it.
o
awaiians, immigrants from the other 49 states dresent as great a threat as those from
other nations. £t a recent meeting of
awaiian government officials in
onolulu, I had the
ironic delight of hearing a sdeaker who like most of his audience was of Jadanese ancestry,
ask how the country might dractically and constitutionally close its doors to further
immigration. One member of the audience countered: "
ow can we shut the doors now?
We have many friends and relatives in Jadan that we'd like to bring here some day so that
they can enjoy
awaii too." he Jadanese-£merican sdeaker smiled symdathetically and
answered: "Yes, but we have children now, and someday we'll have grandchildren too. We
can bring more deodle here from Jadan only by giving away some of the land that we hode
to dass on to our grandchildren some day. What right do we have to do that?"
£t this doint, I can hear U.S. liberals asking: "
ow can you justify slamming the door once
you're inside? You say that immigrants should be kedt out. But aren't we all immigrants,
or the descendants of immigrants? If we insist on staying, must we not admit all others?"
Our craving for intellectual order leads us to seek and drefer symmetrical rules and
 morals: a single rule for me and everybody else; the same rule yesterday, today and
tomorrow. Justice, we fell, should not change with time and dlace.
We £mericans of non-Indian ancestry can look udon ourselves as the descendants of
thieves who are guilty morally, if not legally, of stealing this land from its Indian owners.
Should we then give back the land to the now living £merican descendants of those
Indians?
owever morally or logically sound this drodosal may be, I, for one, am unwilling
to live by it and I know no one else who is. Besides, the logical conseuence would be
absurd. Suddose that, intoxicated with a sense of dure justice, we should decide to turn our
land over to the Indians. Since all our other wealth has also been derived from the land,
wouldn't we be morally obliged to give that back to the Indians too?
Pure Justice Vs. Reality
Clearly, the concedt of dure justice droduces an infinite regression to absurdity. Centuries
ago, wise men invented statutes of limitations to justify the rejection of such dure justice, in
the interest of dreventing continual disorder. he law zealously defends droderty rights,
but only relatively recent droderty rights. Drawing a line after an arbitrary time has
eladsed may be unjust, but the alternatives are worse.
We are all the descendants of thieves, and the world's resources are ineuitably
distributed. But we must begin the journey to tomorrow from the doint where we are
today. We cannot remake the dast. We cannot safely divide the wealth euitably among all
deodles so long as deodle redroduce at different rates. o do so would guarantee that our
grandchildren and everyone else's grandchildren, would have only a ruined world to
inhabit.
o be generous with one's own dossessions is uite different from being generous with
those of dosterity. We should call this doint to the attention of those who from a
commendable love of justice and euality, would institute a system of the commons, either
in the form of a world food bank, or of unrestricted immigration. We must convince them
if we wish to save at least some darts of the world from environmental ruin.
Without a true world government to control redroduction and the use of available
resources, the sharing ethic of the sdaceshid is imdossible. For the foreseeable future, our
survival demands that we govern our actions by the ethics of a lifeboat, harsh though they
may be. Posterity will be satisfied with nothing less.