Political violence create terrorism

Case study of Pakistan

Hira Arshad
 POLITICAL VIOLENCE
“ARMED REVOLUTION, CIVIL STRIFE, TERRORISM, WAR
AND OTHER SUCH CAUSES THAT CAN RESULT IN INJURY
OR LOSS OF PROPERTY IS CALLED POLITICAL VIOLENCE.”

INTRODUCTION
Political violence is generally a legitimate, justifiable means to wage a long-term ideological
battle against a hostile government. Political violence has been ubiquitous throughout human
history. Many governments have met with their demise through the means of coup d’etat, by
which the rulers of the government are overthrown by violent means. Numerous kings of
England ascended to the throne as a result of regicide or other acts of treachery. Acts of political
violence led to the American Revolution and the overthrow of British colonial rule. Numerous
world leaders today ascended to power as a result of insurrection and violence, including Fidel
Castro in the 1959 Cuban Revolution. Recently, rebels assassinated Sri Lanka’s foreign minister,
Lakshman Kadirgamar, who had sought to have the international community declare the
country’s Tamil Tiger rebels a terrorist group. The ethnic Tamils have waged a violent campaign
since 1983, in which 64,000 have been killed, to form an independent state in the north. In
Mauritania, troops recently seized power after overthrowing President Maaouyia Ould Taya.
And in Iran, dozens of activists were recently arrested, seventeen people were killed, and 200
people were injured in political violence in the country’s northwestern region of Kurdistan,
where Kurdish rebels have been seeking autonomy and protesting government restrictions on
cultural freedoms. In these and many other situations involving internal strife, the international
community generally takes the position that such matters pertain to domestic sovereignty. This
view is implied in the United Nations Charter, Article 2(7), which states, “Nothing in the present
Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”

DIFFERENT SCHOOL OF THOUGHT ABOUT POLITICAL

VIOLENCE

 The major champion of utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill, argued that political violence
may be justified based on what the balance of reason says is morally right in the
circumstances in question. Violence may be a prima facie evil, but “If good is to come of
evil it must be practised with an awareness of the need to curtail its general tendency to
produce yet more evil.” Mill argued that if a government has taken away freedoms of
press and of speech, it has taken away a principal means by which the public may express
its dissent, and in such circumstances, protestors are released from the normal duty to
change society by nonviolent means. He wrote,
 “A government cannot be blamed for defending itself against insurrection. But it
deserves the severest blame if to prevent insurrection it prevents the promulgation of
opinion. If it does so, it actually justifies insurrection in those to whom it denies the use
of peaceful means to make their opinions prevail. Who can blame persons who are
deeply convinced of the truth and importance of their opinions, for asserting them by
force, when that is the only means left them of obtaining even a hearing? When their
mouths are gagged, can they be reproached for using their arms?”

 In contrast to the utilitarians’ justification of political violence, philosopher Immanuel

Kant is known for his view that participation in revolutionary violence is always wrong.
However, some Kantian scholars believe that there is wiggle room in Kant’s moral
philosophy to consider political violence as morally justified under some circumstances,
subject to certain constraints.For instance, one might argue consistent with Kant that
political violence is morally justified to avert threats to the rational agency of an
oppressed people. In this case, people would be defending themselves from a
fundamental violation of Kant’s Categorical Imperative. Moreover, an act of political
violence could be justified as an act of self-respect and an assertion of human dignity. If
violence were deployed in an insurrection against an oppressive regime, then under
Kant’s moral philosophy, the violence must be proportional; that is, no more violent than
that which is sufficient to accomplish the end.

 Commentator Robert Audi argues that political violence may be deployed as a last resort,
that is, only after “all channels of nonviolent protest have been exhausted.”

Political Violence, Political Conflict and War

Political violence is defined as an episodic interaction between social identity groups engaged in
an ongoing, iterative (i.e., processual) relationship in which instrumental force is used and results
in death and/or injury to humans. Political violence is intrinsically political, in that it involves
concerted, affective actions by individuals in a social context, but this broadened concept of the
primary security issue (i.e., war victimization) relaxes the strict legal and institutional
assumptions pervasive in previous studies of war and security. For this purpose, "war" is defined
as the institutional/legal form of political violence; "warfare" is the general conduct of political
violence.

Conflict is a contention between individuals in a social context; it carries no assumption of

inherent hostility. Political conflict is simply conflict that has been politicized, or brought into
the public domain for deliberation, usually through the agency of mobilized identity groups.
Most political conflict is managed successfully by various political processes and procedures
without resort to violence. There is, perhaps, no greater source of confusion, and conditional
bias, in security studies than that arising from the indiscriminate use of the term "conflict" to
connote, and thereby conflate, generic social conflict and armed conflict.
Conflict is not invidious, in and of itself. Political conflict within or between groups may be
either dissociative or sociative, in either case it provides a stimulus for purposive social action.
(Simmel 1908/1971b; see also Coser 1956 1973). This presents the basis for rational choice
between alternative strategies and acts of enmity and amity in group responses to a conflict
situation. (Buzan 1991, 168) This basic choice is crucial to a full understanding of the relative
utility of cooperative and coercive actions and strategies in the management and resolution of
political conflict. In political science there is a strong inference that conflict is synonymous with
the use of militant force; this has been brought about by the conventional use of "conflict" to
mean any military action. This equivocation of one possible (i.e., contingent) outcome with a
general social process predisposes our inquiry to look for determinate causes; the broadened
concept exhorts us to look for conditions which affect the probability that one conflict
management strategy will be preferred over the other.

Six points are important to the present discussion:

1. Violence is an extreme behavior that is very dramatic, strongly emotive, and, so, highly
visible; it tends to distort general perceptions by "flooding" the senses and sensibilities of
observers.

2. The decision to use violence directly involves only a subset of the mobilized population;
even in the most extreme situations, only a minority of any population is actively
engaged in violent action.

3. Violent action is extremely consumptive and, so, requires a relatively large support
group; the majority of the mobilized population is indirectly involved in the violence
through such acceptance and support activities.

4. The most insidious aspect of protracted violence is the increasing scope and range of
violent affect; victims of violence (the survivors) and others who are directly affected by
violence are very strongly imprinted by the experience and such imprint will often
stimulate a will to revenge the violence and will remain as lifelong physical and
psychological impairments.

5. The non-violent (normal) infrastructure of the mobilized group is retained throughout the
conflict process, is directly supported by the majority of the population, and remains the
preferred alternative to violence. 6. A group that has repeated experiences with violence
will tend to institutionalize and glorify its capacity to engage in violence; in such
situations, the conflict process becomes "overgrown" with stylized ornamentation and
ritual (the culture of violence) and, so, becomes increasingly less transparent.

6. It is this last aspect that most seriously impedes security studies. As you recall, political
violence Is Considered To Be The "Fundamental Problem" Of The Present Inquiry.
 TERRORISM
WHAT IS TERRORISM?
 “Terror” comes from a Latin word meaning “to frighten”.

 Terrorism is a criminal act that influences an audience beyond the immediate victim.
The strategy of terrorists is to commit acts of violence that draws the attention of the
local populace, the government, and the world to their cause.

 The terrorists plan their attack to obtain the greatest publicity, choosing targets that
symbolize what they oppose.

 The effectiveness of the terrorist act lies not in the act itself, but in the public’s or
government’s reaction to the act.

 Terrorism can be seen as a social problem and therefore requires a social solution.

HISTORY OF TERRORISM WORLDWIDE

BACKGROUND TO TERRORISM POOLS
 The majority of terrorism pools have been created through co-operation between local
insurance associations and their respective government

 Such pools have in many cases been a direct response to the World Trade Centre
disaster.

 Prior to 9/11 terrorism cover was often included without additional premium.

 After 9/11, Insurers reacted by withdrawing terrorism from a significant number of

policies being issued.

 Retraction acted as a catalyst for government involvement in the formation of

terrorism pools to ensure that terrorism cover was still available on reasonable terms.

WHICH COUNTRIES OPERATE TERROR POOLS?

Internationally, the following are some territories where terrorism pools operate:

 UK – Pool Re (1993)

 France – GAREAT (2002)

 Germany – EXTREMUS (2002)

 The Netherlands – NHT (2003)

 Australia – Australian Reinsurance Pool Corp (ARPC) (2003)

 South Africa – South African Special Risk Insurance Association (SASRIA)

 India – Indian Market Terrorism Risk Insurance Pool

 Sri Lanka – Sri Lankan Strike, Riot & Civil Commotion and Terrorism Fund (SRCC)

TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN
 Two of the main causal factors contributing to terrorism in Pakistan are
sectarian/religious violence.

 Other causes, such as political rivalry and business disputes, also take their toll.

 Terrorism in Pakistan since the 1980s began primarily with the Soviet-Afghan War,
and the subsequent war against Afghan communists that continued for at least a
decade.
  In 2009 of the 20 Major Terrorism losses worldwide (55%) occurred in Pakistan
resulting in 453 casualties and 770 injuries.

 In 2008 of the 17 major Terrorism losses worldwide, 11 occurred in Pakistan.

 The 61 suicide attacks caused 899 casualties in 2072 injuries (including the deadly
Marriott Bomb Blast).

LIST OF LOSSES IN 2009

AVAILABILITY OF TERRORISM COVERAGE IN PAKISTAN

TODAY
The availability of Property cover against the peril of Terrorism in Pakistan can be segmented
into cover for large, high value risks (e.g. USD 10m +) and small, low value risks.

 Large Risks

• There are a number of reinsurers, particularly in Lloyds, who are prepared to

provide coverage.

• Each risk is considered on its merits and rated accordingly. E.g. Hotels chains
remain difficult.
 • Some brokers have facilities for these larger risks though these facilities need the
consent of one or all of the participants.

 Small Risks

• For small industrial and commercial property, terrorism coverage is often

unavailable.

• Reason for its lack of availability is that Pakistani insurers cannot lay this risk off
easily in the global reinsurance market.

• Two or three of the larger companies have obtained treaties.

• Limits are low and the premium volumes restricted due to the high rates charged.

• There is currently one major leader for these treaties.

• If they exited the market there may be no reinsurance cover at all!

• The lack of coverage available, with few insurers supplying and supported by
even fewer global reinsurers, for small everyday risks, is a major problem in
Pakistan.

WHY PAKISTAN NEEDS TO CONSIDER A MARKET POOL

SOLUTION?
 Terrorism is a national issue which has a major impact on the social and economic
activities of the country.

 Terrorism Pools are not uncommon and successfully operate in many countries from
United Kingdom, France and Germany in Europe to India, Australia and Sri Lanka in
Asia Pacific.

 Without available Terror Cover – Foreign Investment is impeded.

 Local investment is stunted as companies manage the terrorism risk alone.

WHAT ARE THE KEY INGREDIENTS IN CREATING A TERROR

POOL AND DOES PAKISTAN HAVE THESE KEY INGREDIENTS?
 Is there a critical need for the cover?

Yes, in Pakistan all the insurance companies are being pressured by their clients to
provide this coverage. People are concerned that random acts of terrorism could damage
 the buildings they own resulting in huge financial hardship. The last twelve months have
seen a serious increase in the number of terrorist acts in Pakistan.

 Do the insurance companies want a pool?

Yes, all the insurance companies we have spoken to said they would support a pool. Even
the major companies such as Adamjee and New Jubilee who currently have their own
cover, said they would support the introduction of a pool facility.

 Is there a need to be government financial support and or regulation?

No and Yes. It is not essential for governments to financially support pools although it
does help if they can offer some guarantees should the claims in any one year exceed the
coverage or premium. However it is essential that a tariff rate or series of rates be
imposed across all companies.

It is important that insurers do not charge different terms. The only way this can be
achieved in a "non tariff" market is through government decrees.

It is possible that the SECP in Pakistan can pass a regulation to enable this to happen.

 Is there a need for a Managing Committee?

Yes, there needs to be a single body that can drive the process and be responsible for the
pooling arrangement. The single body can range from the National Reinsurer (in Pakistan
this would be PRCL) or a seperate operation could be formed by the insurance
companies.

 Does Pakistan have all the key ingredients for a Pool?

Currently Pakistan has all the key ingredients to set up a pool. These ingredients are:

• An immediate need for terror cover.

• Insurance companies support for such a scheme.

• The ability to impose government regulation. (Tariff Rate).

• The ability to form an independent Management Committee.

It is clear that nearly all the key ingredients to the successful implementation of a pool are
currently present. The Pakistani market should consider acting now in order to ensure the
soonest completion of the terror pool project.
EXAMPLE WHERE POLITICAL VIOLENCE LEADS TO
TERRORISM
Yugoslavian Political Violence Experience

The situation in the territories formerly comprising the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
is illustrative of the complexities of protracted social warfare. The first generally recognized
outbreak of hostilities was a low-level violence episode which occurred between the Yugoslavian
state and the breakaway republic of Slovenia over the issue of Slovenian statehood. A more
serious outbreak of violence occurred when the Yugoslavian state24 attempted to assert control
over the breakaway republic of Croatia. This led to an inter-state war of control or domination
between Serbia (acting as the rump Yugoslavian state) and Croatia. A corollary to this interstate
war was an irredentist/civil war between resident Serbs and the Croatian state. The intensity of
enmity between ethnic Croats and Serbs in Croatia escalated and spread to include reciprocal
politicides (i.e., politically-motivated mass murders-position 5-see Harff and Gurr 1988).

The violence in Croatia was duplicated in the neighboring republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina as,
first, ethnic Serbs and, then, ethnic Croats attacked the political integrity of the fledgling Bosnian
state. The civil warfare in Bosnia was intensified by, mostly covert, interventions by both the
Serbian-Yugoslavian and the Croatian states in the Bosnian situation. As the fighting in Bosnia
escalated, reciprocal genocides and forced relocations ("ethnic cleansing") were initiated
between Serbs and Muslims and Croats and Muslims (position 9). The deteriorating conditions
wrought by the pervasive violence in Bosnia and Croatia stimulated a peace-keeping intervention
by the United Nations. The violence in Bosnia continued to escalate, expand, and spread and the
structural conditions of that society continued to deteriorate and disintegrate until the very
existence of the Bosnia state and society came into jeopardy (i.e., total war against Bosnia-
position 10). The Bosnia situation finally prompted threats from NATO forces led by the United
States and eventually an intervention by NATO and Russia , posing a very serious threat of
violence expansion to the many, powerful member states of the recently defunct Cold War
system.

EXAMPLE IN PAKISTAN
Pakistan is facing the menace of terrorism in multiple forms. Pakistan at present is facing the
most unique, difficult and gruesome faces of terrorism. No other country in the world is so
deeply entangled in this problem as the Pakistan of today. All text book categories of terrorism
confront Pakistan.
 Pakistan had the first taste of ethnicity in the very early period of its being when the
whole eastern wing agitated on the question of one national language - Urdu. The
discontent established itself into a political movement and led ultimately to the
unfortunate events of 1971 resulting in dismemberment of the state. The political struggle
organized on ethnic lines gave a harrowing display of ethnic terrorism when militant
organization like Mukti Bahni started eliminating West Pakistanis and specially the
Punjabis. In the recent history of 'New' Pakistan, ethnicity emerged again in the wake of
language riots. This time in the province of Sindh where Urdu speaking urbanites of
Karachi and Hyderabad clashed with native Sindhis. The quest of Mohajirs - migrants in
the wake of partition - for a parallel political identity as the fifth sub nationality along
with the native Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashtuns and Balochs lead to large scale bloodshed and
terrorist activities. The ethnic terrorism took hold of major urban cities for nearly a
decade in late 80s and 90s but it has subsided for the time being partly due to rejuvenated
economic activity and mainstreaming of the ethnic groups but mostly due to political
stability giving enough economic and political space to the major players.

 Sub nationalists who like to call themselves nationalists have been fighting for a proper
identity and recognition within the federation. Their main fears and apprehensions
emanate from the pre-dominant role of Punjab in military and civil bureaucracy. They are
frustrated by the prospects of facing permanently the majority of one province. They feel
threatened about their value system, traditions and culture. They also agitate against the
use of their resources by other regions at cheaper costs. The poverty around them
frustrates them and the advantaged amongst them successfully point their fingers to the
other provinces to turn their gaze that way. The centre and its power corridor on the other
hand take this insistence on rights as a kind of revolt against the centre and the rejection
of federation. These strained relations have led the extremists amongst the
nationalists/sub nationalists to take up arm against the centre quite regularly and
sometimes against the state itself. The sub nationalists terrorism has been emerging
intermittently since military operations in Pakistan in 1960s.Governments of the day have
been pointing at the external backing of both these types of terrorism. Pakistan on the
whole has done fairly well to withstand the ethnic and sub nationalist terrorism even
when fanned by external hands and the state structures have been able to work regularly
and formally even in the face of these threats.

 Global economy took a nose dive especially after 9/11 and subsequent wars waged by the
United States and its allies in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since Pakistan was made to serve as
a frontline State in the U.S war in Afghanistan, naturally she was condemned to bear the
brunt of this war. So much so that according to Tommy Franks, former chief of Army
Staff of the United States, Pakistan suffered a net loss of $10 billion during the first round
of Afghan war. It may be underscored that this massive financial loss that shook the
foundations of our economy was never reclaimed by the Govt. of Pakistan nor was it
 recompensed or replenished by the United States or its allies. Immediate effect of this
catastrophic war—initially in our neighborhood and now in our own cities and streets—
was an ever increasing poverty and an incredible rise in violence in Pakistan. Basic goods
such as, atta, rice, oil, sugar, fruits and vegetables, meat and beef, etc. became virtually
unavailable or unmanageable by the poor solely because of their sky-rocketing prices.
This was not the whole story. Our situation was further aggravated by a series of other
crises such as, water crisis leading to a sharp decline in our agriculture sector; crisis of oil
and energy leading to a marked decline in our industrial sector; judicial crisis and the
crisis of law and order leading to the flight of money and manpower from the country;
crisis of far-sighted leadership and concomitant absence of wisdom and vision in our
national politics that could give hope to the people dismayed and depressed by the fast
deteriorating national unity and cohesion; and crisis of quality education especially of
vocational training that may produce skilled workers for various walks of life and boost
our economy. In brief the absence of job opportunities and disguised unemployment
have caused the per capita income to be at the lowest ebb. These and similar other
elements have imperceptibly driven the country towards grinding poverty, hunger and
deprivation. In fact, we are rapidly sliding towards bitter resentment, semi-civil war and
violence. Prolonged spells of repressive and oppressive military rules have created a
strange
psycho-moral and financial stress amongst the people so much so that the poor parents
are obliged to embrace death alongwith their own young ones, something that was never
heard before. Consequently more than 40% of population is crawling below the poverty-
line. A recent survey conducted by an international agency indicates that around 75%
people in Pakistan are struggling to survive with a nominal and paltry budget of Rs.
4000/- per month. If these unfortunate trends are not arrested and reversed in the near
future, we are afraid, the nation might be constrained to meet still more dire
consequences. It may be underlined that our main contention is that a hungry man is an
angry man. And if he somehow presumes, rightly or wrongly, that his hunger is caused
by an unjust and inequitable financial system of the country, he is likely to direct his
anger and vengeance towards that hostile and inimical social order.

Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter is to transform our perceptions of the war phenomenon and to so
inform the subsequent inquiry. It has described and delineated the primary problem under
consideration, political violence, and the relevant universe for research. It has proposed a simple
model of a general social conflict process so as to place the identified problem within its
appropriate processual context. It was argued that the initiation of the transformation to violence
is not caused in any meaningful sense but, rather, it is chosen by the leadership of a social group
from an array of conflict management options; it was further asserted that violence is a
substitutable and, therefore, more or less probable consequence in a social conflict interaction. In
short, this chapter has been concerned with problemation and, having expounded the problem, it
leads the inquiry to the greater issue of expounding the social context, human nature and social
construction, within which violence is the primary problem.
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