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Toward Sexual Realism: From Bisexuality as a Biological

Reality to Gender-Neutrality as a Social Reality

James Michael Iddins

“Sexuality...is a pathway into the mystery of the cosmos...it is a manifestation of the sacred,

revealing to us what is beyond our rational comprehension.”

-James Nelson
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More often than not, we live life trying to impose on reality our haphazardly acquired

beliefs and assumptions. Let it be said that daily we make mountains out of molehills. Luckily

interaction with the world throws truth in our faces. Lay men, holy men, and scholars have all

speculated about the true nature of human sexuality. Scientists, often influenced by these men,

have promoted extremely biased notions of the body, particularly where sex is concerned.

Seldom have those who are curious about the nature of human sexuality explored the relatively

basic biological evidence present in our bodies. In this paper, I hope to explore the potential for

laying down our accustomed metaphysical and theoretical tools and experiencing the body anew.

I argue that once we can do this, we will see how obvious it is that humans are biologically

bisexual. Once we draw this conclusion, we see that we are not far at all from the now growing

realization that gender is socially constructed, that in fact each conclusion entails the other. Both

of these aspects of sexual realism should be extremely liberating to those who feel compelled to

repress aspects of themselves. Many things may fall into place. Undoubtedly though, these

conclusions will prove threatening to those unable to lay down their metaphysical and theoretical

tools.

Several scholars have already begun to lay a firm foundation where biological evidence

of bisexuality is concerned. The first one we will look at is Cultural Critic Marjorie Garber, who

examines several different issues surrounding contemporary bisexuality in her work Vice Versa:

Bisexuality and the Eroticism of Everyday Life. Particularly of interest to us at this juncture is her

chapter titled “The Return to Biology”, where she outlines a number of approaches to the

biological argument. She covers Freud’s description of “the bisexual disposition”, which she

explains entailed a variety of evidence including blatantly biological facts such as “the
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undifferentiated tissues of the embryo” and the presence of vestigial tissues and organs which

were previously thought to reside exclusively in one “sex” (272). Garber also necessarily covers

the issue of hermaphrodites and notes how their very presence brings the norm of heterosexuality

(and even homosexuality) into question.

She gives adequate space to a discussion of the range of physical options known to exist

besides male and female, and notes the evidence in favor of acknowledging the existence of a

sexual continuum, rather than attempting to keep up the current dualistic understanding of human

sexuality. In her chapter “Standard Deviations”, detailing attempts at discovering what a

continuum might actually look like, she covers Alfred Kinsey’s famous studies. Garber then

compares these to a number of other important studies including the work of Fritz Klein who

fine-tuned the idea that sexual orientation was best described by means of a continuum which

took into account the dynamic criteria present in human sexuality and identity.

Garber spends some time on the area of brain research and its potential to offer clues

about the true nature of sexuality. Among the studies mentioned was one by Simon LaVey in

which he correlated the size of the hypothalamus (the part of the brain thought to produce sexual

feelings) with sexual identity. Also cited was genetic research carried out Dean Hamer and

associates, which examined the X chromosomes of twins that were self-proclaimed

homosexuals. Garber explains the pitfalls of each of these studies and uses them to make a very

practical point: “Some people are only attracted to redheads, or to people with muscular bodies,

or to rich people. Do we call them russophiles, or biceptophiles, or plutophiles? Do we examine

their brains or their genes for the cause?” (277-278). Garber seems to be saying that even in our

research, our quest to illuminate biological reality, we are placing undue emphasis on categories

which themselves have been socially constructed. Based on this conclusion, it seems safe to
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assume that Garber sees bisexuality as interchangeable with the concept of sexuality itself, not

simply another sub-category of sexuality. Such a conclusion also points us in the direction of a

more practical, easily observable criterion for understanding the sexual nature of our biological

reality.

Some of the most practical and easily accessible biological arguments come from

ethicists in search of a morality that will support the healthy possibilities of bodily pleasure,

which these people know and experience as good. Christian scholar Patricia Beattie Jung, after

establishing the incompetence of tradition in matters of sexual pleasure, goes on to argue for an

ethic in which the body plays a central role. Perhaps one of the most notable parts of her

biological argument concerns the clitoris. She quotes Susan A. Ross: “Unlike the penis, the

clitoris has one function only: exquisite female sexual pleasure. It is not at all connected with

procreation” (90). So the very existence of the clitoris, regardless of what “sex” it is associated

with brings into question traditional sexual morality. If our bodies are constructed in such a way

that sexual pleasure is independent of procreation, as Jung and others prove, and both procreation

and pleasure are acknowledged as possible goods, the old heterocentric dualism is effectively

shattered. If sexual pleasure is a parallel or even higher good than procreation, then it does not

matter one bit which sex is involved with which sex or if one pleasures themselves, so long as

there is mutual concern or self concern.

Ethicist Christine Gudorf, writing eleven years prior to Jung, travels a similar path by

grounding sexuality in the body rather than in tradition and external patriarchal commands. She

also uses the clitoris as evidence in favor of sexual pleasure as inherently good. Perhaps Jung

was familiar with Gudorf’s argument: “A contemporary physicalist appraoch to natural law on

sexuality must take into account that the female clitoris has no function save sexual pleasure – it
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has no reproductive, urological, or other function in the body” (65). She goes on to refute in

advance the argument that the clitoris was intended to ensure that women reproduce, noting that

“the procreative act does not itself stimulate pleasure sufficient to act as reinforcement for

engaging in sex for the majority of women” (65).

Later on in her work, Gudorf lays out some biological evidence in favor of looking at

masturbation as support for sexual pleasure as a biological reality, noting that it is a natural

occurance in infants. She relates to us:

The fact that the vast majority of humans masturbate, even the fact that infants long
before “the age of reason” masturbate, does not constitute proof that masturbation is a
moral good. However, it does tell against the claim that masturbation is inherently
sinful...Rather than finding that solitary sex is an obstacle to shared sex, research suggests
that solitary sex is helpful to women in later partnered sex in a variety of ways” (92).

All signs seem to suggest that masturbation is helpful to men as well, though men must often

learn to slow down and incorporate fourplay where shared sex is concerned. Contrary to what

Gudorf claims, it seems the instinctual move toward bodily pleasure does speak in favor of this

pleasure as morally good. We are experiencing our bodies and their inborn capacity to

experience the sexual aspect of life as good.

Another biological fact that supports our conclusion of bisexuality as biological reality is

the fact of anal pleasure. John Ince, lawyer, journalist and founder of a sexuality center in

Vancouver addresses this issue among many others in his book The Politics of Lust. Ince begins:

“The anus is rich in nerve endings. Stimulating it by fingers, lips, tongue, and penis can elicit

powerful emotional and erotic feelings. When the anus is clean and healthy, and when the

stimulation is gentle, lubricated and relaxed, no harm results” (107). Through this statement, Ince

has taken Jung’s argument one step further. Not only are there parts of the “female” body that
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serve no other purpose than to induce pleasure in that individual (the clitoris), but there are nerve

endings in and around the anus of every human being which are erotic pleasure centers.

Ince discusses the psychology behind the phobias that unnecessarily limit one’s sexuality.

He cites several reasons for the virtual invisibility and/or distortion of anal sexuality in our

culture. The first is negative associations, which we acquire through sight and smell. Though we

often expel waste and foul odors from our mouths as well, the social climate still permits us to

use that body part for pleasurable purposes. As such, the role social and legal prohibitions play in

neglecting this aspect of our sexuality becomes fairly obvious. Adding to the stigma has been the

absence of scientific literature on the subject until recently (largely a result of the social and legal

prohibitions). Also relevant to the neglected reality of anal pleasure is the popular aversion to

sexuality and sexual pleasure or lust in general. If one has been brought up to fear their sexuality

or sexual pleasure, he or she will definitely carry these fears over to anal sexuality. Lastly, Ince

notes our attachment to certain categories and how these attachments play into neglecting this

biological reality:

Homophobia also plays a role. Anal sex is an important part of gay male sexuality, and
hostility toward homosexuality can transfer to the anal sex act. Further, homophobic
heterosexual men inhibit their anal sexuality because they associate it with being gay.
Because anal sexuality bears a rough similarity to vaginal receptivity, some men link it to
a feminine sexual role, and men who harbor negative attitudes toward women will
eschew anal sex for that reason as well (108).

Thus it becomes clear just how much our biological reality has been obscured by our social

reality. Jung, Ross, and Ince have done well in mapping out accessible paths to our biological

reality. Surely there are others as well. Although there are both political and economic power

structures that attempt to maintain the current heterocentrism, the seeds are now sewn for an

entirely different type of social reality: gender-neutrality.


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Embracing the Continuum

Another ethicist, James Nelson, begins his discussion of male sexuality and masculine

spirituality with a few comments on our biological reality as it relates to our social reality. He

quotes Beverly Wildung Harrison:

...We must begin by rejecting the notion that there is any fundamental dimorphism in
human nature/being...If there are any statistically significant psychological or
physiological differences between men and women, the moral question is, ‘What are we
to make of these differences in human history and society?’ No conceivable biological or
psychological differences can justify gender-based distinctions in social power, prestige,
and wealth (As cited in The Intimate Connection, 21).

Later in this work, Nelson points out that while our biology definitely influences our

development, the interaction of this biology with our social environment seems to have much

more bearing over how we come to see ourselves. Nelson argues, however, that our biology

supports a spectrum of sexual experience rather than hard and fast categories.

In the chapter “Embracing Masculinity”, Nelson reviews Mark Gerzon’s five popular

notions of what it means to be a man, many of them on their way out thanks to the sexual

revolution and late feminism: The Frontiersman, The Soldier, The Breadwinner, The Expert, and

The Lord. He then reviews Gerzon’s suggestions of the emerging masculinities, which he says

are actually emerging humanities because they are independent of biological sex: Healer,

Mediator, Companion, Colleague, and Nurturer. These conceptions of sexual identity are all

gender-neutral and consequently support acknowledgement of the bisexual nature of our

biological reality.

Nelson does list a few reservations about going all the way to gender neutrality, stating

that there is something distinctive about being male (and presumably female) which we lose or
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suppress if we adopt this conception of gender neutrality, a deeply seated “wild man” attribute or

masculine energy. While I disagree with the polarized notions of “masculine” and “feminine”

that Nelson employs, I do believe that he is getting at something very real and important to

recognize. I believe that Nelson is attempting to salvage the particularity of the individual. It just

seems that he cannot finds the words with which to break out of the traditional social categories,

but at the same time maintain the biological particularity of his sexuality. I see no reason why

biological particularity should be at odds with gender neutrality. There is no doubt that those at

one end of the biological spectrum will have energies very different from those at the other end

of the spectrum, regardless of the gender neutrality of the social roles they choose to occupy. As

of right now, we use the terms “masculine” and “feminine” to refer to the ends of the spectrum,

but perhaps in time we will develop better labels.

One field that has the potential to lead the way in this area is the field of personality

studies. Rather than focusing on the ambiguous categories of “masculine” and “feminine”, many

scholars of personality have attempted to create more relevant categories that address more of the

particularities with which Nelson is concerned. One notable personality expert is psychologist

David Kiersey, who argues that “People are different from each other...no amount of getting after

them is going to change them, because the differences are probably good”. Perhaps the greatest

achievement on the part of individuals such as Kiersey is this acknowledgement that people are

inherently different regardless of their biological sex, that in fact these personality differences

play a greater part in the ongoing business of life than do the relatively haphazard categories of

male and female. Kiersey’s categories include Guardians, Idealists, Rationals, and Artisans. Each

of these categories includes various subcategories to account for individual differences. The

popularity of such experts is encouraging and definitely helps people begin to think in terms of a
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spectrum of personality. Once people free themselves from the old dualisms, we may very well

witness the acknowledgement of our bisexual reality and the compatible social ideal of gender

neutrality.

Even back in 1978, sociologist Janet Chafetz made the point that in order to help these

liberating changes along, we must begin to think creatively so as to incorporate these new

conceptions of what it means to be human (embracing our biological reality) into our social

reality. She articulates a valid concern: “...it is important to speculate about what it might be like

if indeed androgyny were to replace the gender role stereotypes and sexual caste system. If

nothing else, if utopia can be made to look good enough, it could spur more people to devote

more energies to helping create change” (249). Chafetz would agree with Nelson when he

defines the term androgyny as a term that “goes beyond the false dualism of the belief that there

are certain inherent personality traits of the male and the female”(97). Among this utopian vision

is an irony - that it must be a realistic acknowledgment of the body. We call this situation utopian

simply because it is not yet realized. In an odd twist, we see that sexual realism (something we

don’t currently have on a social or individual level) becomes a utopian ideal.

We must also address those who perceive these changes as threatening to what they

perceive as a well-ordered universe. We must give them new categories to which they can cling.

Perhaps personality studies may be of help here as well, by showing how an individual’s choice

of values is largely a function of his or her personality as it interacts with the environment. It can

then meet mental requirements by suggesting practical categories in which we can think. This

will be a challenging project, but it is not far out at all to think of it coming to pass. Chafetz

issues some powerful concluding remarks:

Evolving into a society of humans undoubtedly entails the breakdown of the traditional
division of labor and personality by sex, as the choices open to all are expanded...the
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progress in achieving a better society will only be made when and if all ascribed
characteristics, including sex, are irrelevant to the opportunities afforded people, the way
in which people spend their lives, the manner in which they are taught to view themselves
and others, and the kinds of emotional and intellectual responses deemed appropriate
(257).

Though this is a tall order, it seems that at the present moment there is a growing tolerance of

individual differences. Even if such sexual realism were only achieved regionally, this would be

a great victory.

Conclusion

While it seems obvious that the human person is more than biology, our review of the

biological arguments in favor of acknowledging our bisexuality accomplish a few things. The

biological arguments in favor of sexual pleasure as a moral good are biological evidence in favor

of the bisexual options our bodies provide. If sexual pleasure is an equal or greater good as

procreation, why should it matter with what biological “sex” we become involved, so long as we

keep in mind the ultimate reality of relationship dynamics. There do exist pretty definitely good

and bad relationships. We must still make a commitment to seek the good. The fact that our

biology supports bisexuality makes a strong case for the relevance of gender neutrality

(essentially androgyny) where social roles are concerned. These two related conclusions

mutually reinforce each other and serve to liberate us from our repressive past.
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Bibliography

Barnes, G.E., Malamuth, N.M., and Check, J.V.P. (1984). “Personality and Sexuality” in
Personality and Individual Differences, 5:2. Elsevier Science Ltd.
Chafetz, Janet Saltzman. (1978). Masculine Feminine or Human?: An Overview of the Sociology
of Gender Roles. Itasca, IL: F.E. Peacock Publishers.
Garber, Marjorie. (1995). Vice Versa:Bisexuality and the Eroticism of Everyday Life. New York:
Simon & Schuster.
Gudorf, Christine E. (1994). Body, Sex, and Pleasure: Reconstructing Christian Sexual Ethics.
Clevland, OH: The Pilgrim Press.
Ince, John. (2005). The Politics of Lust. New York: Prometheus Books.
Jung, Patricia Beattie. (2005). “Sanctifying Women’s Pleasure” in Good Sex: Feminist
Perspectives from the World’s Religions. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
Keirsey, David. (1998). Please Understand Me II: Temperament, Character, Intelligence. New
York: Prometheus Books.
Nelson, James. (1988). The Intimate Connection: Male Sexuality, Masculine Spirituality.
Philadelphia: The Westminster Press.

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