2000 CASES
Although as to the amount of the bond, respondent in its resolution of
A Prime Security Services, Inc. v. NLRC
PR had been working for a year as a security guard with the Sugarland Security Services, Inc., a sister company of petitioner. He
was hired on January 1, 1988 as he was among those absorbed by petitioner when it took over the security contracts of its sister
company, Sugarland, with the U.S. Embassy. He was forced by petitioner to sign a new probationary contract for 6 mos; and on
August 1, 1988, his employment was terminated. Labor Arbiter found for the petitioner. Whether PR’s employment with A’
Prime Securities was just a continuation of his employment with Sugarland. Whether PR is a regular employee and thereby
illegally dismissed.
HELD:
1. Yes. The allegations of respondent that Sugarland and A’ Prime were sister companies were never denied nor controverted
by petitioner before the Labor Arbiter. It belatedly contended that they were distinct juridical entities, but such fact lacks
any legal basis. The Court cannot sanction the practice of companies that effects the transfer of its employees to another
entity whose owners are the same, in order to deprive subject employees of the benefits he is entitled to under the law.
2. Yes. PR became a regular employee upon completion of his six-month period of probation. He started working on January
30, 1988; and the end of the period of probation was on July 27, 1988. When he was dismissed on August 1, he was already
a regular employee with a security of tenure. PR’s alleged violations of sleeping on post and quarrelling with a worker
were first infractions and do not amount to valid grounds for terminating employment.
Golden Donuts, Inc. v. NLRC
Private respondents were the complainants in three consolidated cases submitted with the Labor Arbiter. Complainants were
members of the KMDD-CFW whose CBA with the corporation expired. During the negotiations, the management panel arrived
late causing the union panel to walk out. The management addressed a letter of apology to the union and requested for
negotiations to resume. The union panel did not show up despite letters from management advising the former of the CBA
meetings. The union struck. A complaint was filed by Golden Donuts to declare the strike illegal. Counsel for the union and
strikers pleaded for a compromise whereupon both parties would desist from continuing their cases against each other. The
Labor Arbiter rendered a decision upholding the dismissal of private respondents and ruling that they were bound by the
compromise agreement entered into by the union with petitioners. Private respondents appealed to the NLRC, claiming that the
union had no authority to waive or compromise their individual rights and they were not bound by the compromise agreement
entered into by the union with petitioners.
Whether or not a union may compromise or waive the rights to security of tenure and money claims of its minority members,
without the latter’s consent.
HELD: No. Absent a showing of the union’s special authority to compromise the individual claims of private respondents for
reinstatement and backwages, there is no valid waiver of the aforesaid rights. The judgment of the Labor Arbiter based on the
compromise agreement does not have the effect of res judicata upon private respondents who did not agree thereto since the
requirement of identity of parties is not satisfied. A judgment upon a compromise agreement has all the force and effect of any
other judgment and is conclusive only upon parties thereto and their privies. Private respondents have not waived their right to
security of tenure nor can they be barred from entitlement of their individual claims. Since there was no evidence that private
respondents committed any illegal act, petitioner’s failure to reinstate them after the settlement of the strike amounts to illegal
dismissal.
Alemar’s Sibal & Sons, Inc. v. NLRC
Private Respondent NLM Katipunan filed with the DOLE a notice of strike raising charges of ULP and illegal dismissal against
petitioner. The charges were elevated to NLRC for compulsory arbitration. The Labor Arbiter ordered petitioner to pay private
respondent separation pay of ½ month pay for every year of service. Private respondent filed a motion for execution of the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. The Rehabilitation Receiver of petitioner submitted a Manifestation with Motion, alleging that
petitioner was not yet in a position to comply with the directive of the Labor Arbiter as it was still under Rehabilitation
Receivership by virtue of the order of the SEC. The Labor Arbiter granted the motion for execution. Petitioner contends that
public respondent should have denied the order of the LA for the immediate payment of separation pay because of the order of
the SEC suspending all claims against petitioner pending before any court, tribunal or body. However, the NLRC emphasized
that the order of execution made by the LA had reached finality and that petitioner’s succeeding motions had been filed out of
time. At the time this petition had been filed on May 4, 1994, petitioner had been placed under rehabilitation receivership.
Whether or not the order of the SEC can stay the execution of judgment against petitioner.
HELD: No. A stay of execution may be warranted by the fact that a petitioner corporation has been placed under rehabilitation
receivership. However, the SEC issued an order approving the rehabilitation plan of petitioner and placing it under liquidation
pursuant to PD 902-A. Since receivership proceedings have ceased and petitioner’s rehabilitation receiver and liquidator,
Ledesma, Saludo and Associates has been given the imprimatur to proceed with corporate liquidation, the cited order of the SEC
has been rendered functus oficio. Petitioner’s monetary obligation to private respondent is long overdue and thus cannot delay
the satisfaction of private respondent’s claim. However, due to events subsequent to the filing of this petition, private rules and
consider there was substantial compliance.
November 7, 1991deleted the phrase “exclusive of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees” in determining
the amount of the bond, it provided a safeguard against the imposition of excessive bonds as the Commission was given the
power to reduce the amount of the bond in meritorious cases and upon motion of the appellant.
1. No. To warrant an award of moral damages, it must be shown that the dismissal of the employee was attended to by
bad faith, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy. As there was ULP, it was proper to impose moral and exemplary damages; however the damages
awarded by the labor arbiter were excessive.
Permex Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Emmanuel Filoteo, an employee of Permex, was dismissed by the latter for allegedly falsifying his daily time record. The
case arose from the company-tolerated practice of employees indicating on their time records the time they left work at
the same time as when they logged in for work. The company tolerated this because by the time the workers' shifts ended,
they were usually tired and in a hurry to go home; hence, the practice saved them the trouble of queuing and logging out.
On a particular day, Filoteo did this, but left early, upon permission granted by management, since there was no work to
be done for that day. He was subsequently dismissed from his employment. He then filed an illegal dismissal case against
Permex. Was Filoteo illegally dismissed?
HELD: Yes. Given that management knew of and tolerated the practice of logging out in advance, it cannot hold the same
against Filoteo. The rule is that where a violation of company policy or breach of company rules and regulations was found
to have been tolerated by management, then such violation cannot serve as the basis for termination.
Aklan Electric Cooperative Incorporated (AKELCO) v. NLRC
On January 22, the Board of AKELCO allowed the temporary transfer holding of office at Kalibo, Aklan. Nevertheless,
majority of the employees continued to work at Lezo Aklan and were paid of their salaries. An unnumbered resolution was
passed by AKELCO withdrawing the temporary designation of office at Kalibo, Aklan and that daily operation be held again
at the main office of Lezo, Aklan. From June 1992 to March 1993, complainants who reported at Lezo were not paid their
salaries. From March up to the present, complainants were allowed to draw their salareis, with the exception of a few who
were not paid their salaries for April and May 1993. The respondents allege that the complainants voluntarily abandoned
their work assignments and that they defied the lawful orders by the General manager and thus the Board of Directors
passed a resolution resisting and denying the claims of these complainants under the principle of “no work, no pay.” NLRC
held that private respondents are entitled to unpaid wages from June 1992 up to March 1993. Whether or not private
respondents are covered by the “no work, no pay” principle and thus not entitled to the claim for unpaid wages from June
1992 to March 1993
HELD: Yes. Petitioner was able to show that private respondents did not render services during the stated period. Also,
private respondents in their position paper admitted that they did not report at the Kalibo office, as Lezo remained to be
their office where they continuously reported. Their excuse that the transfer to Kalibo was illegal; however it was not for
private respondents to declare the management’s act of transferring the AKELCO office to Kalibo as an illegal act as there
was no allegation of proof that such was made in bad faith or with malice. The unnumbered resolution returning the office
from Kalibo to Lezo was not a valid act of petitioner’s legitimate board and was never implemented. Private respondents
were dismissed by petitioner effective January 1992 and were accepted back, subject to the condition of “no work, no
pay” effective March 1993 which is why they were allowed to draw their salaries again. Since the burden of evidence lies
with the party who asserts the affirmative allegation, the plaintiff or complainant has to prove his allegations in the
complaint.
Abbot Laboratories Philippines Inc. vs. Abbott Laboratories Employees Union
Abbott Laboratories Employees Union (ALEU) filed an application for union registration with DOLE. The Bureau of Labor
Relations approved the petition and issued the corresponding certificate of registration, thereby transforming ALEU into a
legitimate labor organization. Abbott Laboratories Philippines Inc., the company in which ALEU sought to operate, sought
to cancel ALEU's certificate of registration, on the grounds that the latter's application was not signed by at least 20% of the
rank and file employees of Abbot, and that it failed to submit copies of its books of account. Subsequently, the Regional
Director of the BLR upheld the said petition and cancelled ALEU's certificate of registration. On appeal, the BLR reversed
the judgment of the Regional Director, and upheld ALEU's legitimacy. Abbot appealed the BLR's decision to the Secretary of
Labor. The latter refused to act on Abbott's appeal, citing the fact that the SOLE has no jurisdiction to review the decision
of the BLR on appeals in cancellation cases emanating from the BLR Regional Office. The decision of the BLR in such cases
is final and executory, and any appeal on the same must be filed with the BLR as a motion for reconsideration. Does the
Secretary of Labor have jurisdiction to review the decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations in such a case?
HELD: No. The appellate jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor is limited to a review of cancellation proceedings decided by
the BLR in the exercise of its (BLR) exclusive and original jurisdiction. In this case, the BLR exercised its appellate power to
1
review the decision of the Regional Director in a petition to cancel a union's certificate of registration. The Secretary of Labor
has no jurisdiction over such a case, since the BLR's decision in the same is final and not appealable.
Serrano v. NLRC
Petitioner was hired by Respondent Isetann Department Store as a security checker to apprehend shoplifters. As a cost-cutting
measure, private respondent decided to phase out its security section and engage the services of an independent security
agency. Petitioner was then terminated prompting him to file a complaint for illegal dismissal. NLRC ordered petitioner to be
given separation pay holding that the phase-out of the security section was a legitimate business decision. However, respondent
was denied the right to be given written notice before termination of his employment. What is the effect of violation of the
notice requirement when termination is based on an authorized cause?
HELD: The Wenphil doctrine stated that it was unjust to require an employer to reinstate an employee if, although termination is
made with cause, if due process was not satisfied. The remedy was to order the payment to the employee of full backwages
from the time of his dismissal until the court finds that the dismissal was for a just cause. But his dismissal must be upheld and
he should not be reinstated. This is because the dismissal is ineffectual. In termination of employment under Art. 283, the
violation of notice requirement is not a denial of due process as the purpose is not to afford the employee an opportunity to be
heard on any charge against him, for there is none. The purpose is to give him time to prepare for the eventual loss of his job
and the DOLE to determine whether economic causes do exist justifying the termination of his employment. With respect to Art.
283, the employer’s failure to comply with the notice requirement does not constitute a denial of due process but a mere failure
to observe a procedure for the termination of employment which makes the termination of employment merely ineffectual.
If the employee’s separation is without cause, instead of being given separation pay, he should be reinstated. In either case,
whether he is reinstated or given separation pay, he should be paid full backwages if he has been laid off without written notice
at least 30 days in advance.
With respect to dismissals under 282, if he was dismissed for any of the just causes in 282, he should not be reinstated.
However, he must be paid backwages from the time his employment was terminated until it is determined that the termination
is for a just cause because the failure to hear him renders the termination of his employment without legal effect.
Condo Suite Club Travel, Inc. v. NLRC
Private respondent was employed as “housekeeper” with monthly compensation of P8,000. After two months, he signed a new
employment contract with petitioner Condo Suite Club Travel, Inc. under the same terms of employment. Both firms belong to
the ARCON group of companies. His salary was reduced. He also owned a car-for-hire which he rented to Joselito Landrigan who
operated the car as a taxi with himself as driver. Landrigan approached the front desk clerk at petitioner’s hotel requesting a
collectible of P2000 be added to a certain Korean guests, Mr. Hu’s bill. Mr. Hu later complained that he was overbilled. Private
respondent explained his side being the front desk supervisor and owner of the car. Eventually, petitioner’s staff confirmed the
error and refunded the amount to the Korean. Petitioner terminated the services of private respondent on the ground of loss of
confidence for the latter’s malicious intent to defraud a guest of the hotel.
W/N private respondent was illegally dismissed.
HELD: Yes. Petitioner failed to prove by ample evidence that private respondent intended to defraud Mr. Hu. The front desk
clerk admitted being the one responsible for entering the P2000 in Mr. Hu’s statement of account. Also, Landrigan admitted
approaching the front desk clerK to demand payment of the transportation fee as he was hired by Mr. Hu’s group for two days
believing in good faith that Mr. Hu owed him P2000. Also, there is no indication that petitioner was afforded due process as, in
fact, it was only upon service of termination that private respondent realized that the complaint of Mr. Hu was directed at him.
As there is no valid and just cause, he is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights plus full backwages and other
benefits withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
Lapanday Agricultural Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
Commando Security Service Agency provided security guards to Lapanday Agricultural Development Corporation under a contract
of service. Subsequently, a wage order was issued, with the stipulation that the increase in wages for security services would be
borne by the client/principal, in this case Lapanday. The latter refused to amend the contract to conform to the wage order, and
the said contract ran through its natural life and expired, without the required adjustments having been made. The security
agency then filed a case for the collection of a sum of money with the Regional Trial Court that had jurisdiction over the case.
Lapanday opposed, stating the NLRC was the proper forum for the case. Where is the proper venue of the case, the RTC or the
NLRC?
HELD: The RTC. There was no employer-employee relationship in this case, since Commando simply sought to collect a sum of
money and damages for breach of contract. The service contract had long since expired. Hence, reference must be made to the
Civil, not Labor Code.
respondent must present its claim with the rehabilitation receiver and liquidator in the SEC, subject to the rules on
preference of credits.
VH Manufacturing, Inc. v. NLRC
Private respondent was employed as a quality control inspector with the duty of inspecting LPB cylinders for any possible
defects. He was dismissed when he was allegedly caught by petitioner’s company President for sleeping on the job,
thereby violating Company Rule 15-b. He was asked to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him, to
which he promptly replied. Notwithstanding his reply, he was terminated. The Labor Arbiter found for the company. The
NLRC reversed the decision ordering petitioner to reinstate petitioner with full backwages.
Whether or not private respondent was illegally dismissed.
HELD: Yes. In termination disputes, the burden of proof is always on the employer to show that dismissal was for a just and
valid cause. Petitioner’s claim that private respondent slept on the job was not substantiated by any evidence. In other
cases, sleeping on the job was found as a valid ground for dismissal because such cases involved security guards whose duty
necessitates that they be awake and watchful at all times. While an employer is allowed a wide discretion in the
promulgation of company policies, such should always be fair and reasonable. In this case, the dismissal meted out on
private respondent for sleeping on the job appears to be too harsh a penalty.
Association of Trade Unions, v. Abella
Respondent company is a domestic corporation engaged in road construction projects of the government. It engaged the
services of certain workers to work on various projects on different dates. The workers joined petitioner union as
members. Petitioner union filed a motion for certification election with the regional office. Respondent company opposed
stating that the workers were project employees and not qualified to form part of the rank and file collective bargaining
unit. The Med-Arbiter dismissed the PCE. On appeal, the Secretary of Labor reversed the Med-Arbiter’s decision and
ordered the immediate holding of a certification election. Later, respondent company terminated the employment of the
workers due to the completion of its projects or the expiration of worker’s contracts. The affected workers claimed they
were dismissed because of their union activities; and thus staged a strike. The strike was declared illegal and certain
strikers were dismissed. The NLRC modified the decision by awarding monetary benefits to qualified workers.
Complainants herein were found to be validly dismissed. W/N Petitioners were validly dismissed.
HELD: Yes. Petitioners neither assail the jurisdiction of public respondent nor attribute any grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the labor tribunal. The petition must fail for lack of substantial requirements under Rule 65. Also, as
petitioners are project employees, their employment was coterminous with the completion of the project for which they
had been hired. They were informed in advance that said project or undertaking for which they were hired would end on a
stated or determinable date.
Nueve Ecija I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (NEECO I) Employees Association, v. NLRC
Petitioners were permanent employees of respondent NEECO I. They were members of the NEECO I Employees Association.
The Board of Directors adopted Policy No. 3-33, which set the guidelines for NEECO I’s retirement benefits. All regular
employee’s were ordered to accomplish Form 87, which were applications for either reinstatement, resignation, or
separation from service. Also, certain union officers were promoted to supervisory rank. These events caused apprehension
in the labor organization and deemed as harassment threatening union members and circumventing employees’ security of
tenure. The union held a snap election of officers. Petitioner union passed a resolution withdrawing the applications for
retirement of all its members. Petitioners Marin, Fajardo and Carillo were compulsory retired and received their
separation pay under protest. Javate was terminated for allegedly misappropriating funds and dishonesty. Petitioners and
Javate filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on December 21, 1992 declaring
NEECO I guilty of illegal dismissal. Private respondents elevated the case to the NLRC. They filed their appeal on
December 28 and posted a surety bond on January 5, 1993. Petitioners were reinstated by NEECO I pending appeal. Javate
withdrew his complaint and opted to receive his retirement benefits.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or Not the appeal was perfected within the 10 day reglementary period.
2. Whether or not NLRC should have deleted en toto moral and exemplary damages.
HELD:
Yes. Petitioners contend that the appeal should have been completed with the filing of the supersedeas bond by January
4, 1993. However, in a number of cases, the Court has relaxed the rule to resolve controversies on the merits when there
are special circumstances, such as when there was a substantial compliance with the rule, so that on balance, technical
considerations could give way to equity and justice. Private respondent filed their appeal within the reglementary period.
The bonding company issued the bond on January 4, but it was forwarded to the NLRC only on the following day, January 5.
Since it was the holiday season, the Court found it equitable to ease the
2
Elizabeth Sublay v. NLRC
Elizabeth Sublay was employed as Chief Accountant for Euro-Swiss Food Inc. until her termination on December 31, 1994. In
filing a case for illegal dismissal, she claimed that she was unjustly dismissed as there was not just and valid cause for her
dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ordered private respondent to pay petitioner her separation pay. She appealed the decision to the
NLRC; however petitioner filed her appeal seven days late. The NLRC dismissed her appeal.
W/N NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the appeal on a mere technicality.
HELD: No. The perfection of appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and
failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and executory, and deprives the appellate court the legal authority to alter
the final judgment to entertain the appeal.
Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Moldex Products, Inc. v. NLRC
Petitioners and private respondents were faced with a bargaining deadlock. Petitioners then filed a notice of strike with the
NCMB. Later, the union conducted a strike vote among its members and the results were submitted to the Alliance of Nationalist
and Genuine labor Organization for submission to the NCMB, but which was not made. Petitioners went on strike without the
report of the strike vote submitted to the NCMB. Private respondents filed a petition to declare the strike illegal alleging that
petitioners barricaded gates of private respondent and committed acts of violence, threats and coercion. Trial on th merits was
conducted wherein Private respondent presented witnesses and evidence, Petitioners did not present any witness but instead
relied on their Memorandum contending that respondent’s evidence are inadmissible. The NLRC remanded the case to the Labor
Arbiter.
W/N the case was properly remanded and whether petitioner’s strike was illegal.
HELD: The Court is of the opinion that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in remanding the case as the facts are
already clear and complete. The records of the case and the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter confirm that the strike was
illegal for failure to submit the strike vote to the NCMB and due to the acts of violence, threats and coercion committed during
the strike. The requirements of procedural due process were complied with as both parties were allowed to present their
witnesses and evidence, although petitioner opted instead to file a memorandum.
Sugbuanon Rural Bank, Inc. vs. Laguesma
Sugbuanon Rural Bank employed some 5 supervisory employees. APSOTEU-TUCP, a legitimate labor organization, then filed a
petition for certification election of the said supervisory employees. The bank opposed the petition on the ground that the
supervisory employees were actually managerial/confidential employees. In addition, the union was represented in the petition
by ALU-TUCP, and since according to the Bank the latter also sought to represent the rank and file members, granting the
petition would violate the principle of separation of unions. Should the petition for certification election be granted, or denied?
HELD: It should be granted. For one, the supervisory employees cannot be considered managerial or confidential employees.
While the nature of the employees' work (evaluating borrowers' capacity to pay, approving loans, scheduling terms of repayment
of the latter, and endorsing delinquent accounts to legal counsel for collection) indeed constituted the core of the bank's
business, their functions did not fall within the definition of either a managerial employee (lay down and execute management
policies related to labor relations) or a confidential employee (they did not act in a confidential capacity to persons who
formulate and execute management policies related to labor relations). Secondly, granting the petition would not be
violative of the separation of union doctrine. The petition for certification election was filed by APSOTEU-TUCP, a legitimate
labor organization. True, it was assisted to some extent by ALU and the national federation TUCP. However, APSOTEU-TUCP had
a separate legal personality from ALU and TUCP, under the principle that a local union maintains its separate legal personality
despite affiliation with a national federation.
Laureano vs. Court of Appeals
Petitioner, a Filipino citizen, was a Singapore Airlines pilot, hired by the latter as an expatriate pilot with a fixed term contract
through its Manila Area Manager. Due to a recession that hit the airline industry, Singapore Airlines retrenched several pilots,
including petitioner, giving him three months salary in lieu of notice. The plaintiff, needing more time to relocate his family,
asked for three months notice. He was given two months notice and one month's salary. He then filed an illegal dismissal
complaint against the airline.
ISSUES:
1.) Can an employee with a fixed period of employment be retrenched?
2.) Can retrenchment be valid if the employer merely fails to realize the expected profits, even if it is not suffering actual
losses?
HELD:
1.) Yes. The petitioner's employment contract allowed for pre-termination of employment. Since he agreed to the employment
terms and conditions of Singapore Airlines, he was bound by such a clause.
OSS Security and Allied Services, Inc. v. NLRC
Private respondent is a lady Security Guard of OSS Security Agency. He was last assigned at Vicente Madrigal Condominium
II located in Ayala Avenue, Makati. In a memorandum, the Building Administrator of VM Condomunium II complained of the
laxity of the guards in enforcing security measures and requested to reorganize the men and women assigned to the
building to induce more discipline and proper decorum. Petitioner was then transferred to Minami International
Corporation in Taytay, Rizal. Private respondent filed a complaint alleging that her transfer amounted to an unjust
dismissal. The NLRC ruled that transfer of private respondent was illegal. W/N the transfer of private respondent was
illegal.
HELD: No. Service-oriented enterprises adhere to the business adage that, “the customer is always right.” In the
employment of personnel, the employer has management prerogatives subject only to limitations imposed by law. The
transfer of an employee would only amount to constructive dismissal when such is unreasonable, inconvenient, or
prejudicial to the employee, and when it involves a demotion in rank or diminution of salaries, benefits and other
privileges. In this case, the transfer was done in good faith and in the best interest of the business enterprise. Evidence
does not show that petitioner discriminated against private respondent in effecting her transfer as such was done to comply
with a reasonable request. Also, the mere inconvenience of a new job assignment does not by itself make the transfer
illegal.
Cheniver Deco Print Technics Corporation v. NLRC
Petitioner is printing business in Sta. Cruz Makati. Petitioner informed its workers that it was going to transfer its site in
Makati to Batangas. It gave its employees time to inform the management of their willingness to go with petitioner,
otherwise, they would find replacements. The union advised petitioner that its members were not willing to transfer to
the new site. Private respondents herein filed a complaint for ULP, illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, non-payment
of holiday pay, 13th month pay, SIL and separation pay. The Labor arbiter directed petitioner to pay separation pay and
attorney’s fees. The NLRC affirmed the decision, but deleted the award of attorney’s fees.
W/N private respondents are entitled to separation pay by virtue of their refusal to transfer to the business in Batangas.
HELD: Yes. Although there is no complete dissolution of petitioner’s undertaking, but a mere relocation; the phrase,
“closure or cessation of operation of an establishment not due to serious business losses or reverses,” under Article 283 of
the Labor Code includes the cessation of only part of a company’s business. Petitioner did have legitimate reason to
relocate its plant due to the expiration of the lease contract in Makati; however, petitioner is still required to pay its
workers separation pay. Cessation of operation not due to serious business losses is an authorized cause for termination;
but the Labor Code provides that the terminated employees are entitled to separation pay of 1 month pay or at least ½
month for every year of service, whichever is higher.
Manila Electric Company v. Secretary of Labor
Meralco and its union MEWA renegotiated its 1992-1997 CBA insofar as the last two-year period was concerned. The
Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction and granted the arbitral awards. There was no question that these arbitral awards
were to be given retroactive effect. However, the parties dispute the reckoning period when retroaction shall commence.
Meralco claims that the award should retroact only from such time that the Secretary of Labor rendered the award. The
union argues that the awards should retroact to such time granted by the Secretary who has plenary and discretionary
power to determine the effectivity of the arbitral award. The union cited the case of St. Luke’s and Mindanao Terminal
where the Secretary ordered the retroaction of the CBA to the date of expiration of the previous CBA. When should the
arbitral award retroact?
HELD: Labor laws are silent as to when an arbitral award in a labor dispute where the Secretary has assumed jurisdiction by
virtue of Art. 263 (g) shall retroact. Despite the silence of the law, teh Court ruled that the CBA arbitral awards granted
after six months from the expiration of the last CBA shall retroact to such time agreed upon by both the employer and the
employees or their union. Absent such agreement as to retroactivity, the award shall retroact to the first day after the six-
month period following the expiration of the last day of the CBA should there be one. In the absence of a CBA, the
Secretary’s determination of the date of effectivity as part of his discretionary powers over arbitral awards shall control.
Jardin v. NLRC
Petitioners were drivers of private respondent driving the latter’s taxicabs every other day on a 240 hour work schedule
under the boundary system where petitioners earn an average of P400 daily and private respondent regularly deducts an
amount for the washing of the taxi units. Petitioners decided to form a labor union. Later, private respondent refused to
let petitioners drive their taxicabs. Petitioners filed with the labor arbiter a complaint for ULP, illegal dismissal, and
illegal deductions. The labor arbiter dismissed the complaint. The NLRC reversed the judgment stating that dismissal must
be for just cause and after due process. Private respondent’s first motion for reconsideration was denied. It filed another
MR, which was then granted.
W/N an ee-er relationship exists, thereby making the dismissals illegal.
3
HELD: Yes. The relationship between jeepney-owners and jeepney drivers under the boundary system is that of employee-
employer and not that of lessor-lessee. The fact that the drivers do not receive fixed wages is not sufficient to withdraw the
relationship from that of employee & employer. The termination of employment must be effectuated in accordance with law.
With regard to the amount deducted for washing, such was not illegal as such is indeed a practice in the taxi industry and is
dictated by fair play.
Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield (MSMG0UWP) v. Ramos
, NLRC
Petitioner MSMS, (local union) is an affiliate of ULGWP (federation). A local union election was held under the action of the
federation. The defeated candidates filed a petition for impeachment. The local union held a general membership meeting.
Several union members failed to attend the meeting. The local union requested the company to deduct the union fines from the
wage of those union members who failed to attend the general membership meeting. The Secretary General of the federation
disapproved the resolution imposing the P50 fine. The company then sent a reply to petitioner’s request stating it cannot deduct
fines without going against certain laws. The imposition of the fine became the subject of a bitter disagreement between the
Federation and the local union culminating in the latter’s declaration of general autonomy from the former. The federation
asked the company to stop the remittance of the local union’s share in the education funds. The company filed a complaint of
interpleader with the DOLE . The federation called a meeting placing the local union under trusteeship and appointing an
administrator. Petitioner union officers received letters from the administrator requiring them to explain why they should not be
removed from their office and expelled from union membership. The officers were expelled from the federation. The
federation advised the company of the expulsion of the 30 union officers and demanded their separation pursuant to the Union
Security Clause in the CBA. The Federation filed a notice of strike with the NCMB to compel the company to effect the
immediate termination of the expelled union officers. Under the pressure of a strike, the company terminated the 30 union
officers from employment. The petitioners filed a notice of strike on the grounds of discrimination; interference; mass dismissal
of union officers and shop stewards; threats, coercion and intimidation; and union busting. The petitioners prayed for the
suspension of the effects of their termination. Secretary Drilon dismissed the petition stating it was a intra-uion matter. Later,
78 union shop stewards were placed under preventive suspension. The union members staged a walk-out and officially declared
a strike that afternoon. The strike was attended by violence.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the company was of illegal dismissal.
2. W/n the strike was illegal.
3. W/n petitioners can be deemed to have abandoned their work.
HELD:
1. Yes. The charges against respondent company proceeds from one main issue -- the termination of several employees upon
the demand of the federation pursuant to the union security clause. Although the union security clause may be validly
enforced, such must comply with due process. In this case, petitioner union officers were expelled for allegedly
committing acts of disloyalty to the federation. The company did not inquire into the cause of the expulsion and merely
relied upon the federation’s allegations. The issue is not a purely intra-union matter as it was later on converted into a
termination dispute when the company dismissed the petitioners from work without the benefit of a separate notice and
hearing. Although it started as an intra-union dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the BLR, to remand the same to
the BLR would intolerably delay the case and the Labor Arbiter could rule upon it. As to the act of disaffiliation by the
local union; it is settled that a local union has the right to disaffiliate from its mother union in the absence of specific
provisions in the federation’s constitution prohibiting such. There was no such provision in federation ULGWP’s
constitution.
2. No. As to the legality of the strike; it was based on the termination dispute and petitioners believed in good faith that in
dismissing them, the company was guilty of ULP. A no-strike, no lockout provision in the CBA can only be invoked when the
strike is economic. As to the violence, the parties agreed that the violence was not attributed to the striking employees
alone as the company itself hired men to pacify the strikers. Such violence cannot be a ground for declaring the strike
illegal.
3. As to the dismissal of the petitioners; respondents failed to prove that there was abandonment absent any proof of
petitioner’s intention to sever the employee-employer relationship.
Coral Point Development Corporation v. NLRC
The LA ordered petitioner to pay respondents the sum of P655, 866.41. Petitioner appealed to the NLRDC and a motion for the
reduction of the supersedeas bond to the NLRC and a motion for the reduction of the supersedeas bond to P100,000 and
thereafter posted a cash bond of P100,000. The NLRC dismissed the appeal for insufficiency of the bond. Petitioner said the
Star Angel doctrine should apply where the appeal may be perfected after that period upon posting of a cash or surety bond.
However, the NLRC disagreed stating that in this case, the petitioner did not file a motion for reduction of bond within the
period but instead posted a bond in an amount not equivalent to the monetary award.
2.) No. There must be actual losses (expenses are greater than income on the balance sheet). However, in this case,
Singapore Airlines proved that it suffered actual losses.
Hence, the petitioner's termination was for an authorized cause.
Jo vs. NLRC
Peter Mejila was a barber employed by a barbershop. The owners of the shop attempted to mediate in the incessant
squabbling between Mejila and a fellow employee. Mejila then unilaterally demanded his separation pay and other
benefits, despite his employers' assurances that he was not being dismissed. He then turned over the duplicate keys of the
shop (which he held as caretaker) to the cashier and took all his personal belongings from his workplace, and found similar
employment in another shop. He then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
Was Mejila dismissed, or did he abandon his employment?
HELD: He abandoned his work. This was manifested by: His having bragged to fellow workers his intention to quit his work
in the shop; his surrender of the shop's keys and his taking all of his personal belongings from the said place; his failure to
report for work and not giving any valid reason for such; he acquired employment in another shop immediately, despite
reassurances that he could stay in his old place of work; and finally, his complaint for illegal dismissal did not include a
prayer for reinstatement. All of these show concurrence of the intent to abandon his work and overt acts that show
his lack of interest in continuing his work.
Vinoya v. NLRC
Petitioner Vinoya was hired by RFC as sales representative. He avers that he was transferred by RFC to PMCI, an agency
which provides RFC with additional contractual workers. In PMCI, he was reassigned to RFC as sales representative and
then later informed by the personnel manager of RFC that his services were terminated. RFC maintains that no employer-
employee relationship existed between petitioner and itself. Petitioner filed complaint for illegal dismissal. RFC alleges
that PMCI is an independent contractor as the latter is a highly capitalized venture.
W/N petitioner was an employee of RFC and thereby, illegally dismissed.
HELD: Yes. PMCI was a labor-only contractor. Although the Neri doctrine stated that it was enough that a contractor had
substantial capital to show it was an independent contractor, the case of Fuji Xerox clarified the doctrine stating that an
independent business must undertake the performance of the contract according to its own manner and method free from
the control of the principal. In this case, PMCI did not even have substantial capitalization as only a small amount of its
authorized capital stock was actually paid-in. Also, PMCI did not carry on an independent business or undertake the
performance of its contract according to its own manner and method. Furthermore, PMCI was not engaged to perform a
specific and special job or service, which is one of the strong indicators that it is an independent contractor. Lastly, in
labor-only contracting, the employees supplied by the contractor perform activities, which are directly related to the main
business of its principal. It is clear that in this case, the work of petitioner as sales representative was directly related to
the business of RFC. Since due to petitioner’s length of service, he attained the status of regular employee thus cannot be
terminated without just or valid cause. RFC failed to prove that his dismissal was for cause and that he was afforded
procedural due process. Petitioner is thus entitled to reinstatement plus full backwages from his dismissal up to actual
reinstatement.
Cruz vs. NLRC
Petitioner was an employee of Norkis Distributors. In the course of her duties, she collapsed and was subsequently
diagnosed as suffering from meningitis. Norkis then terminated her, citing health reasons as basis. It also cited the
petitioner's supposedly unexplained absence for three months,
which allegedly constituted abandonment. Petitioner then filed an illegal dismissal case against Norkis. Was petitioner
illegally dismissed?
HELD: Yes. Under the Labor Code, for disease to serve as the basis for dismissal of an employee, the latter's continued
employment while suffering from the disease must either be prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or that of his co-
employees. Furthermore, there must be a certification by a competent public health authority that the disease is such that
it cannot be cured within a six-month period, even with proper medical treatment. In the case at bar, Norkis failed to
overcome the burden of proof incumbent upon it as the employer that it had complied with the aforesaid provisions.
Furthermore, in order to constitute abandonment, there must be: 1.) failure to report for work/absence
without justifiable reason, and 2.) clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship. The second element is the
more determinative factor. In the case at bar, the petitioner was absent because she was confined in the hospital for
treatment for three months. Norkis could not have been unaware of her medical condition, since she had collapsed within
company premises. Furthermore, in its termination letter, Norkis specifically stated her "ill-health" as the ground for her
dismissal. Hence, there was no abandonment.
4
W/N there was a motion for reduction filed within the reglementary period.
HELD:
Yes. Basically, that petitioner did file a motion within the period is supported by the following:
1. The motion for reduction was stamped with the “received” rubber stamp marker of the NLRC and indicated the date of
filing as 6.7.96.
2. Both the motion and the appeal memorandum were sent to respondents in one envelope and sent by registered mail under
Reg. Receipt 3576.
3. The same person notarized both the motion and the appeal on the same date.
4. On the last page of their comments, respondents stated that “the motion for reduction should be founded on meritorious
grounds.” This was found by the SC to be an implied admittance of the receipt of the motion. Besides, respondents could
just as well have stated in their comments that no motion was filed.
Navarro v. NLRC
Petitioners were jeepney driver of private respondent Cornejo on the boundary system. Due to a change in schedule, they did
not report to work as protest. They were then replaced. Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal asking for separation
pay and other benefits. On November 26, 1991, the labor arbiter rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. Private respondents
were served a copy of the decision on April 3, 1992. They filed their memorandum on appeal on April 13, 1992; however the
appeal bond was only filed on April 30, 1992. Also, such bond was found to be spurious. It was only on July 20, 1993 that a
substitute bond was issued by another company. W/N the NLRC has jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
HELD: No. The perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional, and
noncompliance with such legal requirement is fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. Perfection
of an appeal includes the filing, within the prescribed period of the memorandum of appeal and posting of the appeal bond. In
cases where the judgment involves a monetary award, as in this case, the appeal may be perfected only upon posting of a cash
or surety bond to the NLRC. Since the private respondents received the LA’s decision on April 3, they had only until April 13 to
file their appeal. The bond was posted only on April 30; beyond the reglementary period. The requirement of posting the bond
has only been relaxed on grounds of substantial justice and special circumstances which are not attendant in this case.
Furthermore, the bond posted was not genuine. The decision can no longer be amended nor altered by the labor tribunal.
National Federation of Labor v. NLRC
Petitioners are members of the NFL, employed by private respondents in the Patalon Coconut Estate in Zamboanga City.
Pursuant to RA 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the Patalon Cocount Estate was warded to the Patalon Estate
Reform Association, of which petitioners are members and co-owners. As a result of this acquisition, the Patalon Estate shut
down operations and the employment of the petitioners were severed. Petitioners did not receive separation pay. Petitioners
became co-owners of the land and subsequently filed complaints for illegal dismissal. The Regional Arbitration Branch of the
NLRC dismissed the charge for illegal dismissal but ordered the payment of separation pay. The NRLC reversed the decision.
W/N an employer that was compelled to cease its operation because of compulsory acquisition by the gov’t of its land for
purposes of agrarian reform is liable to pay separation pay to its affected employees.
HELD: No. The peculiar circumstance in the case at bar involves neither the closure of an establishment nor a reduction in
personnel as contemplated in Article 283. The closure contemplated in 283 is a voluntary act on the part of the employer as may
be gleaned for the wording, “the employer MAY also terminate,” denoting that it is directory in nature. The Labor Code does not
contemplate a situation where the closure is forced upon the employer. As such, petitioners are not entitled to separation pay
as private respondents did not voluntary shut down operations as they even sought to be exempted from the coverage of RA
6657.
Diamonon v. DOLE, Laguesma
Petitioner was National Executive VP of the NACUSIP and VP for Luzon of the PACIWU. He later learned of his removal from the
positions he held in both unions in a resolution approved during a meeting of the National Executive Boards of both unions.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the resolution on his removal; at the same time, he initiated a complaint before the DOLE
against the National President of NACUSIP and PACIWU questioning the validity of his removal. He filed a second complaint
accusing officers of the NACUSIP and PACIWU of violation of the C/BL, illegal disbursement of union funds and abuse of authority.
The first case was decided declaring his removal null and void. The Med-arbiter dismissed the second complaint for lack of
personality. Petitioner appealed the dismissal of the second complaint to public respondent DOLE who issued the order holding
that petitioner’s failure to show that the administrative remedies have been exhausted was fatal to his cause. Petitioner alleges
that public respondents “switched” the ground for dismissal from that of “lack of personality to file the complaint” to “non
exhaustion of administrative remedies.” Thereby by going outside the issued and purporting to adjudicate on something upon
which the parties were not heard.
W/N public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal interposed.
W/N the union may check-off attorney’s fees.
HELD: No. Article 241 has 3 requisites for the validity of the special assessment for union’s incidental expenses, attorney’s
fees and representation expenses. They are:
1. authorization by a written resolution of majority of all the members at the general membership meeting called for
the purpose
2. secretary’s record of the minutes of the meeting
3. individual written authorization for check-off duly signed by the employees concerned.
Such requirements were not complied with as there were no individual written check off authorizations; thus, the employer
cannot legally deduct thus the assessment. The union should be made to shoulder the expenses incurred for the services of
a lawyers and accordingly, reimbursement should be charged to the union’s general fund or account. No deduction can be
made from the salaries of the concerned employees other than those mandated by law.
PAL v. NLRC
Private respondents Pescante and another PAL employee, Vcente were employed by Pal as load controller and check-in
clerk, respectively. On January 19, 1993, a passenger by the name of Cominero checked in for the flight. It appears that
Vicente reflected a lighter weight of baggage on Cominero’s ticket to make it appear that the same was within the
allowable level. When the anomaly was later discovered, Vicente went to the cashier to pay the excess baggage fee.
Cominero further paid the sum representing the excess baggage fee. Vicente implicated private respondent in the
anomaly. Private respondent and Vicente were charged with “fraud against the company” and were found guilty and
meted with the penalty of dismissal. The NLRC found that the alleged defrauding of petitioner’s excess baggage revenue
was not the handiwork of private respondent and that petitioner failed to show it suffered loss in revenues as a
consequence of private respondent’s questioned act.
W/N private respondent was validly dismissed.
HELD: Yes. The core of petitioner’s evidence against private respondent included the report of Vicente. It was erroneous
for the NLRC to have discredited Vicente’s testimony because he appeared guilty as well. There is substantial evidence
showing that private respondent had direct involvement in the illegal pooling of baggage. Private respondent’s act is
inexcusable as it constitutes a serious offense under petitioner’s Code of Discipline. The fact that petitioner failed to show
it suffered losses in revenue is immaterial as private respondent’s mere attempt to deprive petitioner of its lawful remedy
is already tantamount to fraud. Therefore, private respondent was validly dismissed and as such was for a just cause, he is
not entitled to backwages nor separation pay.
New Pacific Timber Supply Co. v. NLRC
the NFL was the sole and exclusive bargaining representative for the rank and file employees of petitioner. NFL started to
negotiate for better terms and conditions of employment; which were met with resistance by petitioner company. The NFL
filed a complaint for ULP on the ground of refusal to bargain collectively. LA issued an order declaring the company guilty
of ULP and ordering the CBA proposals submitted by the NFL as the CBA between the parties. Later, 186 of private
respondents claiming they were wrongfully excluded from the benefits under the CBA filed a petition for relief. Petitioner
asserts that private respondents are not entitled to the benefits under the CBA because employees hired after the term of
a CBA are not parties to the agreement and may not claim benefits thereunder. As for the CBA, petitioner maintains that
the force and effect of the CBA’s terms are limited to only three years and cannot extend to terms and conditions which
ceased to have force and effect.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the terms of an existing CBA as to its economic provisions can be extended beyond the period stipulated therein,
even beyond the three year period prescribed by law, in the absence of a new agreement.
2. W/N the rank and file employees hired after the term of the CBA, considering their subsequent membership in the
bargaining unit, are parties to the agreement and may claim benefits thereunder.
HELD:
1. Yes. It is clear from Art. 253 that until a new CBA has been executed by and between the parties, they are duty
bound to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing
agreement. In the case at bar, no new agreement was entered between the parties pending appeal of the decision in
the NLRC. Consequently, the employees from to the year 1985 (after expiration of the CBA) onwards would be
deprived of a substantial amount of monetary benefits if the terms and conditions of the CBA were not to remain in
force and effect which runs counter to the intent of the Labor Code to curb labor unrest and promote industrial
peace.
2. Yes. When a CBA is entered into by the union representing the employees and the employer, even the non-union
members are entitled to the benefits of the contract. A laborer can claim benefits from a CBA entered into the
company and the union of which he is a member at the time of the conclusion of the agreement even after he has
5
 resigned from said union. Therefore, the benefits under the CBA should be extended to those who only became such after
it expired, to exclude them would constitute undue discrimination.
Imbuido v. NLRC
Petitioner was employed as a date encoder by private respondent. From 1988 until 1991, she entered into 13 employment
contracts with private respondent, each contract for a period of 3 months. In September 1991, petitioner and 12 other
employees allegedly agreed to the filing of a PCE of the rank and file employees of private respondent. Subsequently, petition
received a termination letter due to “low volume of work.” Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter
found in favor of petitioner ruling that she was a regular employee. The NLRC reversed the decision stating that although
petitioner is a regular employee, she has no tenurial security beyond the period for which she was hired (only up to the time the
specific project for which she was hired was completed). Petitioner filed the present appeal.
W/N petitioner is a regular employee entitled to tenurial security and was therefore unjustly dismissed.
HELD: Yes. Even though petitioner is a project employee, as in the case of Maraguinot, Jr. v. NLRC, the court held that a project
employee or member of a work pool may acquire the status of a regular employee when the following concur:
1. there is continuous rehiring of project employees even after the cessation of a project
2. the tasks performed by the alleged “project employee” are vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual business and
trade of the employer.
Private respondent was employed as a data encoder performing duties, which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer, continuously for a period of more than 3 years. Being a regular employee, petitioner is
entitled to security of tenure and could only be dismissed for a just and authorized cause; low volume of work is not a valid
cause for dismissal under Arts. 282 or 283. Having worked for more than 3 years, petitioner is also entitled to service incentive
leave benefits from 1989 until her actual reinstatement since such is demandable after one year of service, whether continuous
or broken.
Lagera v. NLRC
Petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC and immediately filed a special civil action for certiorari. An
MR is indispensable for it affords the NLRC an opportunity to rectify errors or mistakes it might have committed before resort to
the courts can be had. Certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law against acts of public respondent. As the MR was not filed within the 10 day reglementary period, the
questioned order of the NLRC has become final and executory.
Torres v. NLRC
Petitioner was employed as a security guard by E & R Security agency. During a routinary meeting of the security guards,
petitioner stood up and shouted at the presiding officer. She was then suspended for 15 days. Later, she received a letter that
she was reassigned and required to report to respondent’s Manila office. Her services were terminated for abandonment when
she failed to report for work in her new assignment. The Labor Arbiter found for petitioner. Private respondent appealed to the
NLRC, which denied the appeal. The decision having become final, the LA issued a writ of execution on the reinstatement
aspect, but it was not implemented as the monetary aspect remained to be determined. Later, NLRC sheriff issued a notice of
Garnishment served on private respondent’s deposit account with the PNB. The LA directed the PNB to release the amount.
Meanwhile, respondent security agency filed with the LA a motion to quash the writ of execution on the ground that there has
been a change in the situation of the parties which makes the execution inequitable. It contends that petitioner accepted
employment from another security agency without previously resigning from respondent’s agency. The NLRC then ordered the LA
to resolve respondent’s urgent motion to quash the writ of execution.
W/N the Labor Arbiter should have ordered the release of the judgment award
HELD: Yes. Execution is the final stage of litigation, the end of the suit. It cannot be frustrated except for serious reasons
demanded by justice and equity. IT is the ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of execution to enforce the judgment.
The respondent agency’s contention that there has been a change in the situation of the parties is without merit. It has been
held that back wages awarded to an illegally dismissed employee shall not be diminished or reduced by the earnings by him
elsewhere during the period of his illegal dismissal. The decision is final and the total amount representing the salary
differentials and back wages awarded to the petitioner has been garnished from the account of respondent agency with no
opposition or resistance. Therefore, it is the ministerial duty of the LA to release the money to petitioner.
De la Salle University v. De La Salle University Employees Association
On December 1986, De La Salle University and De La Salle University Employee’s Association, which is composed of regular non-
academic rank and file employees entered into a CBA. During the freedom period of such CBA, the Union initiated negotiations,
which turned out to be unsuccessful. After several conciliation meetings, 5 out of 11 issues were resolved by the parties. A
partial CBA was executed. The parties then entered into a Submission Agreement identifying the remaining issues for
arbitration. The VA resolved the issues regarding: (1) scope of the bargaining unit; (2) union security clause; (3) security of
tenure, (4) salary increases; (5) indefinite union leave, reduction of the union president’ s workload, special leave, and (6)
HELD: No. An appellate court may only pass upon errors assigned, but such is not without exceptions. An appellate court,
as well as those in administrative bodies, are given broad discretionary powers to waive the lack of assignment of errors
and consider errors not assigned. In this case, not only did petitioner fail to comply with the IRR of the Labor Code, but he
also did not exhaust the remedies set forth by the C/BL of both unions. A party with an administrative remedy must not
merely initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief, but also to pursue it to its appropriate conclusion
before seeking judicial intervention to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to said bodies.
Medenilla vs. Philippine Veterans Bank
Philippine Veterans Bank was liquidated under the auspecies of the Monetary Board. As a result, petitioners were
terminated but immediately rehired. However, their new employment contracts stipulated that their employment was
strictly temporary, for the duration of the undertaking for which the employee was hired. The Liquidator also had the right
to terminate the employee any time, if the latter was found to be incompetent, unqualified, etc. Subsequently, the
petitioners were dismissed. The reason given for the dismissal was to reduce costs inherent to the liquidation process. The
petitioners then filed an illegal dismissal case.
Was there an illegal dismissal?
HELD: Yes. True, the employees were employed under the new contract for a fixed period, as seen in the various
stipulations of the agreement. A fixed term contract is valid, provided: (1) The fixed period was knowingly and voluntarily
agreed upon by the parties, with no vitiation of consent, particularly in relation to the employee, and (2) The employer and
employee dealt with each other on more or less equal bargaining terms, with no moral compulsion exercised by the former
on the latter.
Both were present in this case. However, the reason given by the Liquidator for termination was inadequate. It was a mere
allegation of the need to cut costs, with no concrete proof of actual losses to substantiate the same. Since the employer in
this case did not meet the burden of proving that the dismissal was in fact valid, the conclusion is that it was an illegal
dismissal.
Millares v. NLRC
Petitioners were employed by ESSO International Shipping Company. Petitioner Millares applied for a leave of absence and
informed the Operations Manager of his intention to avail of the optional retirement plan under the Consecutive Enlistment
Incentive Plan (CEIP). Such was denied. Petitioner Lagda also applied for a leave of absence and informed the Operations
Manger of his intention to avail of the optional early retirement plan in view of his 20 years of service which was likewise
denied. Both petitioners requested for extension of their leaves of absence. But later, they discovered that they were
dropped from the roster of crew members.
ISSUE:
1. W/N petitioners are contractual employees whose employment are terminated every time their contracts expire and
were thus validly dismissed.
2. Whether they should have been granted the retirement benefits under the optional early retirement policy.
HELD:
1. No. The primary standard to determine a regular employment is the reasonable connection between the activity
performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer. In this case it is undisputed
that petitioners were employees of private respondents. Also, as they had been in the employ of private respondents
for 20 years as they were repeatedly re-hired after the expiration of their respective contracts, it is clear that their
service was necessary and indispensable to private respondent’s business. Therefore, they could only be dismissed for
just and valid cause. There is no showing that they abandoned their job as there was no showing of their unjustified
refusal to resume employment.
2. No. The evidence of petitioners regarding the announcement by Captain Estaniel of the controverted optional
retirement plan consisted merely of affidavits of petitioners and their witnesses which was successfully rebutted by
the evidence of private respondents. Nowhere in the CEIP is there reference to an optional retirement plan, nor a
provision for retirement for service of 20 years. There are clear provisions on retirement benefits.
Gabriel, et al v. Secretary of Labor
Petitioners comprise the Executive Board of the Solidbank union, the collective bargaining agent for the Solidbank
corporation. Private respondents are members of said union. The union’s EB decided to retain the services of their counsel
in connection with negotiations for a new CBA. A general membership meeting was called where majority of union
members approved a resolution confirming the decision to engage the services of the union’s counsel, Atty. Lacsina. The
resolution provided that 10% of the total economic benefits that may be secured be given to the counsel at attorney’s fees.
Also it contained an authorization for Solidbank Corporation to check-off said attorney’s fees from the first lump sum of
payment of benefits under the new CBA. Private respondents issued a complaint for illegal deduction.
6
duration of the agreement. Subsequently both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration and then this petition
for certiorari assailing the decision of the VA.
ISSUES:
1. W/N VA properly included the computer operators from the scope of the CBA and whether the employees of the College of
St. Benilde were properly excluded.
2. Whether the VA correctly upheld the union shop clause
3. Whether or not the VA correctly denied the union’s proposal for the use of the “last in-first out” method in the case of lay-
off, termination due to retrenchment and transfer of employees.
4. Whether the VA correctly ruled that the university can no longer be required to grant a second round of wage increases.
5. W/n the VA correctly denied the union’s proposals on the deloading of the union president, improved leave benefits and
indefinite union leave with pay.
HELD:
1. Yes. The express exclusion of the computer operators in the past does not bar any re-negotiation for future inclusion of
the said employees in the bargaining unit. Also, as to the employees of the CSB, they were properly excluded at the two
education institutions have their own separate juridical personality.
2. Yes. The right to refrain from joining labor organizations is limited. The legal protection granted to such right is
withdrawn by operation of law where a labor union and an employer have agreed on a closed shop.
3. Yes. As an exercise of management prerogative, the University has the right to adopt valid and equitable grounds for
terminating or transferring employees.
4. No. The financial capability of a company cannot be based on its proposed budget as such does not reflect the true
financial condition of a company.
5. Yes. There was no justifiable reason for granting the same.
Catubay v. NLRC
Private respondent Fishwealth is a company engaged in the manufacture of canned sardines. The petitioners’ job was to handle
and process these frozen sardines in preparation for canning. Petitioners went on unpaid sick leave with the approval of private
respondents. When they returned to work after their leave, respondents refused to take them back unless they applied with an
employment agency and accept new terms of employment. Petitioners filed a complaint for payment of salary differentials and
separation pay. Private respondents allege that petitioners are piece-rate workers and not entitled to minimum wage. LA ruled
in favor of petitioners. Private respondents filed a manifestation and motion to admit appeal fee; while petitioners moved for
execution of the judgment. Although the respondent’s payment of the appeal fee and posting of the surety bond was late, the
NLRC still took cognizance of their appeal and rendered a decision in favor of private respondents remanding the case to the
labor arbiter. In the last 2 scheduled hearings, respondents did not submit any memorandum in support of their stand. Also they
failed to appear at the hearings set by the labor arbiter.
WN private respondents were denied due process.
HELD: No. They were afforded more than an adequate chance to present their evidence. Private respondents failed to appear
at the last hearing set by the labor arbiter, neither did they submit their memorandum. Also, this case has been pending for
more or less 7 years. To remand the case to the labor arbiter for further proceedings would be the height of injustice.
Samson v. NLRC
Petitioner Samson received a letter calling the attention of petitioner’s conduct during a Sales and Marketing Christmas gathering
where Samson allegedly made utterances of obscene, insulting and offensive words towards the SPC’s Management Committee.
Complainant was given two days to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him and he was thereafter placed
on preventive suspension. Samson replied stating that such utterances were only made in reference to a decision taken by the
management committee on the Cua Lim Case and not to any specific person. Petitioner was thereafter informed in a letter that
his employment was terminated. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the dismissal of petitioner illegal. Both parties
appealed the decision; petitioner filed a partial appeal of the denial of his claim for holiday pay and the cash equivalent of the
rice subsidy; respondent company sought the reversal of the labor arbiter’s ruling of illegal dismissal. The NLRC found that
dismissal was made for just cause. W/N Petitioner was validly dismissed.
HELD: No. Petitioner’s dismissal was brought about by utterances made during an informal Christmas gathering. For misconduct
to warrant dismissal, it must be in connection with the employee’s work. In this case, the alleged misconduct was neither in
connection with employee’s work, as such utterances of petitioner is expected in informal gatherings; also, such conduct was not
even of such serious and grave character. Furthermore, petitioner’s outburst was in reaction to the decision of the management
in a certain case and was not intended to malign on the person of the respondent company’s president and general manager.
Respondent company itself did not seem to consider the offense serious to warrant an immediate investigation. It is also
provided in respondent company’s rules and regulations that for conduct such as that of petitioner, a first offense would only
warrant a “verbal reminder” and not dismissal. Petitioner’s position does not fall within the definition of a managerial
employee; and even assuming that he is, the ground for loss of confidence is without basis as it was not clearly established.
Therefore, there was no just cause for petitioner’s dismissal and thus was unlawful.
dismissed because they were not afforded due process because they failed to prove retrenchment due to losses. The NLRC
reversed the ruling saying that the dismissal was justified because it was due to redundancy and not retrenchment. The
NLRC however did not rule on whether the 30 day pay was a sufficient substitute for the 30 day notice. The petitioner
argues further that they should be given the chance to present his side.
Whether or not the 30 days pay is sufficient replacement for 30 day notice.
HELD: The Court ruled that since the dismissal is due to an authorized cause only notice is required and that the
employee has no right to present his side. The 30 day notice is needed in order to afford the employee enough time to look
for work and to give the DOLE time to look into the validity of the authorized cause. 30 days pay is not enough to replace
the notice requirement because it would not serve the purpose of the notice. Additionally, backwages are not a severe
punishment because it is a consequence of the employer’s failure to give notice and due process and the employee is
therefore not deemed terminated so he should be compensated for that period.
Industrial Management International Devt Corp v. NLRC
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision awarding separation pay and backwages to the respondents and no appeal was filed
therefore the decision became final and executory. The LA then issued a writ of execution but it was returned unsatisfied.
He then issued an alias writ of execution to which the petitioner filed a motion to quash, arguing that the writs changed
the liability by making the petitioners solidarily liable instead of joint by adding and/or to the writ. The NLRC upheld the
validity of the writ saying that according to the facts, they are solidarily liable and that they may waive any error, defect
or irregularity in any proceeding before them.
Whether or not the liability of the petitioner is solidary or joint.
HELD: The Court held that since the dispositive portion of the LA’s decision failed to state that the liability was
solidary, it should be joint. Solidary liability cannot be lightly inferred. Once the decision becomes final and executory it is
removed from the jurisdiction of the body rendering the decision. The LA can no longer amend the decision. The liability
is only joint.
Villar v. NLRC
Petitioners filed a petition for certification election. Their petition was granted but they lost in the election as majority of
the employees voted for “no union”. The next day, they failed to report for work. They claim that they were barred from
entering the premises. They filed a suit for illegal dismissal and backwages. The company denied these allegations and
alleged that the workers refused to return to work despite their attention being called. The labor arbiter ruled that they
were illegally dismissed and that they should be reinstated with full backwages. The NLRC however ruled that there was no
illegal dismissal but that they voluntarily abandoned their work so they shouldn’t be awarded backwages but they can
return to work if they want to.
Whether or not there was illegal dismissal and whether or not they are entitled to backwages.
HELD: The Court ruled that an immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is incompatible with abandonment.
Abandonment is a matter of intention. There must be proof of deliberate and unjustified intent to sever the employer-
employee relationship. This burden rests on the employer. In this case, the employer failed to do so. There was illegal
dismissal.
As to the second issue, the Court ruled that since they were illegally dismissed, the employees are entitled to
reinstatement with full backwages, undiminished by their earnings elsewhere.
International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing
The school had two kinds of employees, the local-hire and the foreign-hire. The foreign-hire teachers were given an added
25% in their salary and some benefits like transportation and housing, shipping costs etc. These were given based on two
things: dislocation and limited tenure. The added compensation was the school’s way of remaining competitive on an
international level in terms of attracting competent teachers. The local-hire teachers, part of the union contested the
difference, a deadlock resulted so the teachers went on strike. The acting secretary of DOLE assumed jurisdiction and said
that there was a valid discrimination so the teachers cannot ask for equal protection. He said that “equal pay for equal
work” does not apply in this case.
Whether or not there is discrimination in terms of wages.
HELD: The Court ruled that there was discrimination. It is public policy and also an international principle that
inequality and discrimination are abhorred. All the more in the workplace where relations between capital and labor are
often skewed in favor of capital are inequality and discrimination all the more reprehensible. Discrimination in terms of
wages is frowned upon by the Labor Code. The principle “equal pay for equal work” should apply in this case. Persons who
work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar
salaries. It is the policy of the State to provide equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon
substantive differences in duties and responsibilities and qualification requirements of the positions. If an employee is paid
less it is upon the employer to explain why the employee is treated differently. Dislocation and limited tenure cannot
7
serve as adequate or valid bases for the difference in the salary rates. The other benefits are enough to make up for these two
factors. There is no reasonable distinction between the work of a local-hire and a foreign-hire that will justify the difference.
The foreign-hires cannot join the bargaining unit nor do they belong to the same bargaining unit. The factors in
determining the appropriate bargaining unit are (1) will of the employees; (2) affinity and unity of the employees’ interests; (3)
prior collective bargaining history; (4) similarity of employment status.
Workers of Antique Electric Cooperative v. NLRC
Respondents were found to have underpaid their employees and did not pay the 13 th month pay on a routine inspection
conducted by DOLE. The regional director ordered the company to pay the deficiency. Subsequently, the NLRC affirmed the
order. A waiver was signed by 108 of the workers where they reduced by half the amount that was due. DOLE approved the
waiver saying that it was not contrary to law, good customs and public policy. Later, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration alleging undue influence, coercion, intimidation, and no assistance of counsel. The motion was denied. Eduardo
Nietes, claiming that he represented the workers, filed a position paper with the same argument. The NLRC dismissed the case
for failure to acquire jurisdiction. He again filed an appeal but the appeal was denied for being filed out of time. The appeal
was filed 9 days late along with the appeal fee and research fee.
Whether or not the appeal was filed out of time.
HELD: The Court ruled that the appeal was filed out of time. The perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period
and in the manner prescribed by law is mandatory and jurisdictional. Non-compliance renders the judgment appealed final and
executory. An appeal is perfected when there is proof of payment of the appeal fee and in cases of the employer appealing and
there is a monetary award, payment of the appeal bond. A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites
shall not stop the running of the period for perfecting an appeal. Sometimes though, in the interest of justice, late appeals have
been allowed. An instance is a class suit. In this case there is no evidence that there is a class suit. There is no evidence that
the workers chose Nietes to represent them. There is no showing that the workers are joined by a common interest. As there is
no basis to invalidate the waiver the workers signed, the waiver is valid.
Seagull Ship management and Transport Inc. v. NLRC
Respondent was a radio operator on board a ship, he had a contract for 12 months. He was required to submit himself to a
medical examination. Prior to this he had a pacemaker inserted but he was declared fit to work. On board the vessel, he had
bouts of coughing and he needed open heart surgery. He filed for sickness and disability benefits with the POEA and these were
awarded to him. The NLRC affirmed the decision. Petitioners appealed the decision under Rule 45 but asked that it be
considered under Rule 65. Respondent claims that the petition should not prosper for failure to exhaust all administrative
remedies. Petitioners also claim that respondents’ sickness was not sustained during work and should not be compensable.
Whether or not the sickness is compensable and whether or not administrative remedies were exhausted.
FACTS: The Court ruled that he filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non to the institution of a special
civil action for certiorari, subject to exceptions. Certiorari cannot be resorted to as a shield from the adverse consequences of
ones’ omission to file the required motion for reconsideration.
The Court also ruled that the petitioners’ own physicians certified him as fit for work. What matters is that work has
contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease. Previous physical condition is unimportant.
Escario v. NLRC
Petitioners are merchandisers of respondent company. They withdraw stocks from the warehouse , fix the prices, price-tagging,
displaying the products and inventory. They were paid by the company through an agent to avoid liability. They claim that they
were under the control and supervision of the company. They asked for regularization of their status. They were then gven
notice of their termination. The company denied any employer-employee relationship. They claim that they used an agent or
independent contractors to sell the merchandise. The LA ruled that there was an employer-employee relationship. The NLRC
set aside the decision and said that there was no such relationship. The agent was a legitimate independent contractor.
Whether or not the petitioners are employees of the company.
HELD: The Court ruled that there is no employer-employee relationship and that petitioners are employees of the agent.
The agent is a legitimate independent contractor. Labor-only contractor occurs only when the contractor merely recruits,
supplies or places workers to perform a job for a principal. The labor-only contractor doesn’t have substantial capital or
investment and the workers recruited perform activities directly related to the principal business of the employer. There is
permissible contracting only when the contractor carries an independent business and undertakes the contract in his own manner
and method, free from the control of the principal and the contractor has substantial capital or investment. The agent, and not
the company, also exercises control over the petitioners. No documents were submitted to prove that the company exercised
control over them. The agent hired the petitioners. The agent also pays the petitioners, no evidence was submitted showing
that it was the company paying them and not the agent. It was also the agent who terminated their services. By petitioning for
regularization, the petitioners concede that they are not regular employees.
Aparente, Sr. v. NLRC
Petitioner was employed by Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils. Inc., as assistant mechanic. Petitioner drove private respondent’s
truck to install a panel sign and accidentally sideswiped a ten year old girl whose injuries incurred hospitalization expenses
of up to P19,534.45. Such amount was not reimbursed by insurance as petitioner had no driver’s license at the time of the
accident; therefore private respondent shouldered the expenses. Private respondent conducted an investigation where
petitioner was given the opportunity to defend himself. Petitioner was then dismissed for violating the company rules and
regulation for blatant disregard of established control procedures resulting in company damages. W/N Petitioner was
validly dismissed.
HELD: Yes. Although petitioner contends that he was investigated simply for the offense of driving without a valid driver’s
license, it was clear that he was fully aware that he was being investigated for his involvement in the vehicular accident.
It was also known to him that the accident caused the victim to suffer serious injuries leading to expenses which the
insurance refused to cover. Due process does not necessarily require a hearing, as long as one is given reasonable
opportunity to be heard. Despite petitioner’s 18 years of satisfactory service and that the infraction committed by him was
his first offense; petitioner’s dismissal is justified by the company rules and regulations. In order to constitute willful
disobedience, the employee’s conduct must have been willful or intentional and the order violated must have been
reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge.
Such elements are attendant in the present case. Although an employee who is dismissed for just cause is not entitled to
any financial assistance, due to equity considerations as this is petitioner’s first offense in 18 years of service, he is to be
granted separation pay by way of financial assistance of ½ month’s pay for every year of service.
Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporatoin v. NLRC
Private respondent was a company nurse for the Philippine Aeolus United Corporation. A memorandum was issued by the
personnel manager of petitioner corporation to respondent Cortez asking her to explain why no action should be taken
against her for (1) throwing a stapler at plant manager William Chua; (2) for losing the amount of P1,488 entrusted to her,
(3) for asking a co-employee to punch in her time card one morning when she was not there. She was then placed on
preventive suspension. Another memorandum was sent to her asking her to explain why she failed to process the ATM
applications of her co-employees. She submitted a written explanation as to the loss of the P1,488 and the punching in of
her time card. A third memorandum was sent to her informing her of her termination from service for gross and habitual
neglect of duties, serious misconduct, and fraud or willful breach of trust.
ISSUE:
1. W/N petitioner was illegally dismissed.
2. If such dismissal was illegal, W/N petitioner should be entitled to damages.
HELD:
1. Yes. The grounds by which an employer may validly terminate the services of an employee must be strictly
construed. As to the first charge, respondent claims that plant manager William Chua had been making sexual
advances on her since her first year of employment and that when she would not accede to his request, he
threatened that he would cause her termination from service. As to the second charge, the money entrusted to her
was not lost, but given to the personnel-in charge for proper transmittal as evidenced by a receipt signed by the
latter. As to the third charge, she explains that she asked someone to punch in her card as she was doing an errand
for one of the company’s officers and with the permission of William Chua. As to the fourth charge, she asserts that
she had no knowledge thereof. To constitute serious misconduct to justify dismissal, the acts must be done in
relation to the performance of her duties as would show her to be unfit to continue working for her employer. The
acts complained of did not pertain to her duties as a nurse nor did they constitute serious misconduct. However due
to the strained relations, in lieu of reinstatement, she is to be awarded separation pay of one month for every year of
service until finality of this judgment.
2. Yes. Private respondent admittedly allowed four years to pass before coming out with her employer’s sexual
impositions; but the time to do such varies depending upon the needs, circumstances and emotional threshold of the
employee. It is clear that respondent has suffered anxiety, sleepless nights, besmirched reputation and social
humiliation by reason of the act complained of. Thus, she should be entitled to moral and exemplary damages for the
oppressive manner with which petitioner’s effected her dismissal and to serve as a warning to officers who take
advantage of their ascendancy over their employees.
Serrano v. NLRC
Respondent Isetann Dept Store dismissed petitioner due to retrenchment. However instead of giving the required 30 day
notice, respondents gave 30 days pay arguing that this is effective notice. They made the dismissed employees sign
quitclaims so that there would be no more claims from them. The Labor Arbiter ruled that the employees were illegally
8
PGA Brotherhood Association, et al., v. NLRC
Petitioners were officers and members of the PGA Brotherhood Association, a duly registered LO, operating as security guards
employed by PSVSIA, GVM and ASDA. Prior to their dismissal, they were assigned and posted with three different companies of
the Roces Group of Companies. On March 21, 1989, petitioners were informed that their services were being terminated. They
contended that prior to such dismissal, they were harassed by PSVSIA officers to withdraw their membership from the PGA
Brotherhood Association. Although PSVSIA denied the charge of illegal dismissal, the Labor Arbiter declared PSVSIA and its
responsible officers guilty of ULP and declared that petitioners were constructively dismissed, thereby ordering respondent to
reinstate petitioners to their former positions with backwages up to the time of actual reinstatement. PSVSIA failed to submit
any evidence to rebut the charges leveled against them. Petitioners then filed a motion to execute the reinstatement. Such
motion was not enforced due to the manifestation filed by PSVSIA that petitioners were already “payroll-reinstated,” which the
latter denied.
On July 9, 1993, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA; but modified the amount of backwages to three years. Also, since
complainants Rodolfo Dacanay and Alfredo Tapel did not claim for non-payment of backwages, they were not included among
those who were to receive backwages. The NLRC did not delve on the issue of “payroll reinstatement” which was the subject of
the motion for contempt.
Petitioner filed a motion for clarification of the resolution reiterating their prayer for the inclusion of their backwages from time
they were termianted up to the present (until actual or payroll reinstatement). Petitioners were paid monetary award for
bakcwages pursuant to the July 9, 1993 decision of the NLRC.
Are petitioners entitled to the collection of their earned salaries, wages and other benefits as payroll-reinstated employees?
HELD: No. Petitioners claim that as early as February 25, 1991, PSVSIA had opted to reinstate petitioners in the “payroll”.
However, the July 9, 1993 decision has become final and executory. Neither a motion for reconsideration nor appeal was ever
taken by petitioners on this point. This procedural lapse is fatal. A final and executory decision cannot be altered nor amended
except where a supervening cause transpires which renders its execution unjust or impossible, or in cases of special and
exceptional nature, where it becomes imperative in the highest interest of justice to direct the suspension of its execution.
Also, petitioners actively participated in the enforcement of the execution by garnishing the supersedeas bond and the bank
deposits of PSVSIA. Petitioners, in fact, assented to the computation made by the NLRC showing the backwages of three years
and filed a motion to release the remaining balance to satisfy the judgment awards. Also, the Joint Manifestation dated 29
September 1995 executed between petitioners and PSVSIA, stating that “further garnishments on respondent’s bank account are
no longer appropriate and necessary” shows that petitioners consented to the amount agreed upon.
Leonardo vs. NLRC
Petitioner was a mechanic employed by Reynaldo's Marketing Corporation. He was transferred to another plant of the company,
and his supervisor's allowance correspondingly withdrawn, allegedly due to his failure to meet his sales quota. He then filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal, alleging constructive dismissal. Reynaldo's denied the charge; it was simply carrying out a policy
designed to encourage work efficiency and competitiveness by giving out extra allowances and choice assignments to employees
who met the required quota. Failure to maintain such a quota simply means loss of the assignment and extra allowances.
Was petitioner constructively dismissed?
HELD: No. Constructive dismissal is an involuntary resignation resorted to by an employee when his continued employment
becomes impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely; or when there is demotion in rank or diminution in pay, or when a clear
discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by the employer becomes unbearable.
In the case at bar, there was a demotion and corresponding decrease in pay, but it was for cause (failure to meet the
required quota). The right to demote falls within the employer's prerogative, since an employer may set employment standards
and appropriate sanctions for failure to meet the latter.
Icawat v. NLRC
Private Respondent Jose Yape was working for petitioner as driver of their passenger jeepneys. On December 27, 1994, private
respondent lost his driver’s license and asked for permission to go on vacation leave to secure a new one. After obtaining his
license, he returned to work but was informed that another driver had already taken his place. Private Respondent filed for
illegal dismissal. Petitioners contend that private respondent is only an alternate driver; driving the jeepney only on a half day
shifting basis on certain days of the week, and that when he went on vacation and came back to work after three months,
petitioners told him that they have already hired regular drivers. Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of private respondent stating that
Yape started as regular driver and cannot be dismissed without due process of law. Petitioners assert that there was no
employer-employee relationship; the private respondent is not a regular employee; and that as spare driver, he is a redundancy.
NLRC modified LA’s decision by deleting the award representing 13 th month pay and the award of attorney’s fees. Petitioners
argue that the prolonged absence of Yape constituted abandonment. W/N Petitioners absence constituted abandonment.
HELD: No. To constitute abandonment, two elements must concur:
(1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and
(2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship.
The assailed resolution stated since labor laws are silent as to when an arbitral award in a labor dispute upon which the
Secretary had assumed jurisdiction shall retroact. The Court thus ruled that the CBA arbitral awards granted after six
months from the expiration of the last CBA shall retroact to such time agreed upon by the employer and the employees or
their union. Absent an agreement as to retroactivity, the award shall retroact to the first day after the six-month period
following the expiration of the last day of the CBA; in the absence of a CBA, the Secretary shall have plenary discretionary
powers to determine the date of retroactivity. Petitioner also alleges that the retroactive application of the arbitral
award will cost it no less than P800 million. When should an arbitral award retroact?
HELD: The cases cited by petitioner involve articles 253-A in relation to Article 263 (g). The case of Union of Filipro
Employees, it was ruled that since the resolution was outside the six month period from the expiration of the past CBA, the
NLRC could give prospective effect to the CBA and that the two-year arbitral award should be given prospective effect.
There is Nothing that says the arbitral awards or renewals of collective bargaining agreements shall always have retroactive
effect. Although respondent MEWA (union) cites the St. Lukes case, stating that the Secretary of Labor has plenary and
discretionary power to determine the effectivity of arbitral wards.
The Court therefore issued the resolution that: where an arbitral awards granted beyond six months after the expiration of
the existing CBA, and there is no agreement between the parties as to the date of effectivity thereof, the arbitral award
shall retroact to the first day after the six month period following the expiration of the last day of the CBA.
In resolving the motions for reconsideration in this case, the Court took into consideration the fact that petitioner belongs
to an industry imbued with public interest and cannot ignore the enormous cost in case of full retroaction of the arbitral
award. Balancing this with the interests of social justice; the arbitral award in this case would retroact to the first day
after the six-month period following the expiration of the last day of the CBA. Parenthetically, during the period between
the expiration of the economic provisions and the date of effectivity of the arbitral award, the hold-over principle shall
govern.
Vinoya v. NLRC
This case involves a motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent Regent Food Corporation (RFC), of the decision
ordering RFC to reinstate petitioner Alexander Vinoya to his former position and pay him backwages. The Court found that
RFC was the rightful employer of petitioner under the four-fold test of employer-employee relations, contrary to RFC’s
claim that Vinoya was actually an employee of the PMCI. RFC now claims that reinstatement is no longer feasible due to
the parties’ strained relations.
Whether or not petitioner Vinoya is entitled to reinstatement?
HELD: No. As a general rule, strained relations is an issue factual in nature and should be raised and proved before the
Labor Arbiter. In this case, the strained relations arose only after the filing of the case. The issue of strained relations was
never dealth with in the decision being reconsidered. The Court finds that it would be impractical to reinstate petitioner
to his former position as such position as sales representative involves the handling of accounts and other property of RFC.
Therefore, in lieu of reinstatement, payment of separation pay equivalent to one month’s salary for every year of service is
granted.
The Learning Child, Inc. vs. Lazaro
This is a review of the compromise agreement arrived at between The Learning Child school and its employees in an illegal
dismissal case. Since both parties had agreed to settle the case amicably, the school agreed to pay an amount slightly less
than what the illegally dismissed employees were demanding. The employees in turn agreed not to institute any case or
suit against the school over the matter. The Court held that since the agreement was not contrary to law, good
morals, public order, or public policy, it approved the same and enjoined the parties to abide by all its terms and
conditions.
Philippine Carpet Employees Association vs. Philippine Carpet Manufacturing
Corporation.
Jonathan Barquin was the only employee of the Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation receiving minimum wage (all
other employees were paid above the minimum wage). Wage Orders were issued, and the company refused to implement
them, claiming that no one in the company was receiving the minimum wage; hence, the company was not covered by such
Wage Orders. As it turned out, the company had dismissed Barquin on grounds of retrenchment, so by the time the union
made the demand for compliance with the Wage Orders, there really was no employee receiving the minimum wage. The
voluntary arbitrator then ruled that Barquin had been illegally dismissed so the company could avoid compliance with the
Wage Order, but was not entitled to reinstatement since he had received separation pay and had signed a quitclaim.
Was Barquin illegally dismissed, and if yes, is he entitled to reinstatement?
HELD: Yes, he was illegally dismissed and is entitled to reinstatement. The company cannot claim retrenchment, since it is
highly improbable that laying off one minimum wage worker would help stem the losses of the company. The latter's
9
motive in terminating Barquin was to avoid compliance with the Wage Orders, since doing so would cause a wage distortion, and
require the
company to raise all the workers' salaries.
Since Barquin was misled by the company that he was being retrenched, his consent to the quitclaim was vitiated by
mistake, and thus the quitclaim was invalid.
Colegio De San Juan De Letran v. Assoc. of Employees and Faculty of Letran
Salvador Abtria, President of respondent union initiated renegotiations of its CBA with petitioner for the last two years of the
CBA’s 5 year lifetime from 1989-1994. On the same year, the union elected a new set of officers with private respondent Eleanor
Ambas as the newly elected President. Ambas wanted to continue renegotiation, but petitioner claimed that the CBA was
already prepared for signing. The CBA was submitted to a referendum which was rejected by the union members. Later, the
union notified the NCMB of its intention to strike due to petitioner’s refusal to bargain. Thereafter, the parties agreed to
disregard the unsigned CBA and to start negotiation on a new five-year CBA. The union submitted its proposals to petitioner,
which notified the union that the same was submitted to its Board of Trustees. Meanwhile, Ambas’ work schedule was changed,
which she protested and requested to be submitted to a grievance machinery under the old CBA. Due to petitioner’s inaction,
the union filed a notice of strike. Later, the Ambas was dismissed for alleged insubordination. Both parties again discussed the
ground rules for the CBA renegotiations; however petitioner stopped negotiations after allegedly receiving information that a
new group of employees had filed a PCE. The union struck and the Secretary assumed jurisdiction ordering all striking workers to
return to work. All were readmitted except Ambas. Public respondent declared petitioner guilty of ULP and directed
reinstatement of Ambas with backwages.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the union when it unilaterally suspended
the ongoing negotiations for a new Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) upon mere information that a petition for
certification has been filed by another legitimate labor organization?
(2) Whether the termination of the union president amounts to an interference of the employees’ right to self-organization?
HELD:
1. No. The duty to bargain collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in
good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement. Petitioner failed to make a timely reply to the union’s proposals,
thereby violating the proper procedure in collective bargaining as provided in Article 250. In order to allow the employer
to validly suspend the bargaining process, there must be a valid PCE raising a legitimate representation issue. In this case,
the petition was filed outside the 60-day freedom period; therefore there was no legitimate representation issue and the
filing of the PCE did not constitute a bar to the ongoing negotiation.
2. Yes. The dismissal was in violation of the employee’s right to self-organization. The dismissal must be made pursuant to
the tenets of equity and fair play; wherein the employer’s right to terminate the services of an employee must be
exercised in good faith; furthermore, it must not amount to interfering with, restraining or coercing employees in their
right to self-organization. The factual backdrop of the Ambas’ termination reveals that such was done in order to strip the
union of a leader. Admittedly, management has the prerogative to discipline its employees for insubordination. But when
the exercise of such management right tends to interfere with the employees’ right to self-organization, it amounts to
union-busting and is therefore a prohibited act.
Narzoles v. NLRC
In this case, petitioner-employees received the adverse NLRC decision on July 23, 2998; and filed a motion for reconsideration on
August 3, 1998. On September 1, 1998, Section 4, Rule 65, was amended by Circular No. 39-99 providing that the 60-day period
for filing a petition for certiorari shall be interrupted by the filing of a motion for reconsideration; and in the event of a denial,
petitioner only has the remaining period within which to file the petition. the aforementioned amendment took effect. Previous
to this amendment, a petitioner was given 60 days from notice of judgment within which to file the petition.
On October 19, 1998, petitioners received a copy of the NLRC resolution denying their motion for reconsideration; petitioners
filed a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court on December 17, 1998. Such was referred to the CA; and denied due to late
filing. Petitioner’s last day to file their petition for certiorari is December 8, 1998. The amendments brought about by Circular
No. 39-98 were already in force as statutes regulating the procedure of the courts are applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense. The CA correctly deducted the 16
days it took for petitioners to file their MR. Whether or not the petition was filed out of time.
HELD: No. Due to the tremendous confusion brought about by the amendments of Circular 39-98; further amendments have been
made to Section 4, Rule 65. The Court resolved in A.M. No 00-2-03-SC, to further amend Section 4, Rule 65 to the effect that in
case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, the 60 day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said
motion. The latest amendments took effect on September 1, 2000. Yet since curative statutes are enacted to cure defects in a
prior law to validate legal proceedings which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain legal requirements.
Such is disputed by the fact that private respondent immediately reported back for work and lost no time in filing a case for
illegal dismissal against petitioners. Additionally, petitioners failed to serve written notice of respondent’s termination,
thus constituting illegal dismissal. Private Respondent is entitled to payment of backwages; however, the determination of
such is subject to determination by the Labor Arbiter due to lack of evidence presented by respondent to warrant such
award.
Nokom v. NLRC
Petitioner Carmelita Nokom was employed as manager by private respondent Rentokil for its Healthcare Division. In April
1996, fictitious invoices were sent to clients made to inflate the gross revenues of the Healthcare Division; and Nokom was
placed on preventive suspension as initial findings showed her to be involved in such anomaly. Similar anomalies were
discovered in the Pest Control Division, whose head was also placed on preventive suspension. Petitioner admitted the
irregularities and made no explanation. Petitioner failed to appear during the hearing. After the investigation, petitioner’s
employment was terminated in a letter. Framie Ong-dela Luna of the Pest Control Division was likewise terminated.
Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal and non-payment of salaries. The
Labor Arbiter found for Petitioner. The NLRC reversed and set aside such decision finding that Nokom was directly involved
in the fraudulent activities and had waived her right to due process for failing to explain her side either in writing or in
hearing. Nokom was found to have been dismissed for “‘fraud or willful breach’ of the trust reposed on her by her
employer or duly authorized representative.” Petitioner appealed to the CA, which was dismissed for lack of merit.
W/N petitioner was legally dismissed.
HELD: Yes. To constitute valid dismissal, two requisites must concur: the dismissal must be for any of the causes provided
in Art 282 of the Labor Code; and the employee must be given due notice and the opportunity to be heard and present his
side. In the case at bar, petitioner’s position demanded a high degree of responsibility, including the unearthing of
fraudulent and irregular activities. Petitioner failed to do such and her bare denials did not disprove her guilt. The
ordinary rule is that one who has knowledge peculiarly within his control, and refuses to divulge it, cannot complain if the
court puts the most unfavorable construction upon his silence, and infers that a disclosure would have shown the fact to be
as claimed by the opposing party. Findings of fact of the CA, affirming those of the trial court, are not to be disturbed on
appeal. Loss of confidence is one of the just causes for a valid dismissal; and it is enough that there be “some basis” for
such loss of confidence. The guidelines for the application of the doctrine of loss of confidence as enunciated in Midas
Touch Food Corporation, are:
a.....loss of confidence should not be simulated;
b.....it should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified;
c.....it may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary; and
d.....it must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith.
An employer enjoys a wide latitude in the promulgation of company rules; and in this case, the policies of respondent were
fair and reasonable.
Rubberworld v. NLRC
Petitioner Rubberworld, Inc. filed with the DOLE a notice of temporary shutdown of operations; but even before the
effectivity of such, was forced to prematurely shutdown its operations. Private Respondents filed with the NLRC a petition
for illegal dismissal and non-payment of separation pay. Rubberworld then filed with the SEC a petition for declaration of
suspension of payments with a proposed rehabilitation plan. SEC then ordered an order, stating that, “all actions for
claims against Rubberworld Philippines, Inc. pending before any court, tribunal, office, board, body, Commission or sheriff
are hereby deemed SUSPENDED.” Petitioner submitted to the labor arbiter a motion to suspend to suspend the proceedings
invoking the SEC order. The Labor arbiter ignored the motion and thereafter rendered a decision finding Rubberworld
guilty of illegal shutdown, ordering it to pay separation pay; and moral and exemplary damages. On appeal, the NLRC
affirmed the decision with modification deleting the award for moral and exemplary damages.
W/N the DOLE, Labor arbiter, or NLRC may legally act on claims despite an order of the SEC suspending all actions against a
company under rehabilitation by a management committee.
HELD: YES. PD 902-A is clear that “"all actions for claims against corporations, partnerships or associations under
management or receivership pending before any court, tribunal, board or body shall be suspended accordingly." The law did
not make any exception in favor of labor claims. The justification for such to enable the management committee to
exercise its powers free from interference that might hinder or prevent the “rescue” of the debtor company. To allow the
labor case to proceed would open the defeat the rescue effort of the management committee. Even if an award is given,
the ruling could not be enforced as long as petitioner is under management committee.
Manila Electric Company v. Secretary of Labor
This is a motion for partial modification regarding the ruling in the Meralco case of February 22, 2000 wherein it ruled that
the arbitral award would retroact to the date after the expiration of the previous CBA.
Curative statues, therefore, by their very essence, are retroactive. Such conclusion was made bearing in mind that the
substantive aspects of this case involves the rights and benefits, even the livelihood, of petitioner-employees.
1

2001 CASES
People v. dela Piedra
Appellants assail the constitutionality of the definition of “illegal recruitment” in Section 13 (b) of PD 442, the Illegal
Recruitment Law alleging it violates due process for being vague and that it violates the right to equal protection of the law.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the law.
Due process requires that terms of the penal statute be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what
conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties. That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant apparently
considers as customary and harmless acts such as “labor or employment referral” does not render the law overbroad. The
interpretation of the section should be given more force to campaign against illegal recruitment and placement. The absence of
records to shed light on the meaning of the proviso does not prevent the Court from arriving at a reasonable interpretation of the
proviso by applying principles in criminal law and drawing from the language and intent of the law itself. A statute may be said
to be overbroad where it operates to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively guaranteed by the Constitution,
such as the freedom of speech or religion. The appellant in this case did not specify what constitutionally protected norms are
embraced by the definition of recruitment and placement that would render the same constitutionally overbroad.
As to the claim that the section violates equal protection cannot be sustained either. The prosecution of one guilty person
while others equally guilty are not prosecuted is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws unless there is an
element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. But a discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there must be a clear
showing of “clear and intentional discrimination.” Likewise, if the failure of prosecutors to enforce criminal laws as to some
persons should be converted into a defense for others charged with the crime, the enforcement of laws would suffer a complete
breakdown.
Security and Credit Investigation, Inc. v. NLRC
Private respondents M, S and O were employed as security guards be petitioner and assigned to CHR which was petitioner’s
client. About 18 of petitioner’s security guards detailed at CHR, including M, S and O filed a complaint for money claims against
petitioner. Upon petitioner’s request that the security guards withdraw the complaint, each except for M, S and O signed a
release and quitclaim in favor of petitioner. M, S and O averred that he was being pressured by petitioner to sign a release and
quit claim so he went on leave from work. He was later informed that he was suspended from work. They filed complaints for
illegal dismissal and underpayment of backwages against petitioner. Petitioner claims that M, S and O abandoned their
employment. Petitioner filed a third party complaint against the CHR claiming the latter failed to effect the increase in the
minimum wage of respondent security guards from July 1, 1989 to March 31, 1990 pursuant to RA 6727. The CHR denied that it
had the obligation to pay the increase in the wage rates as it had been paying more than P100 a day even before the effectivity
of said law. The Labor Arbiter found that there was neither dismissal nor abandonment. Also, it ruled that there was
underpayment of respondent guards’ salaries.
ISSUES:
1) W/N there was illegal dismissal or abandonment.
2) W/N there was underpayment.
HELD:
1) No. There was no clear proof that petitioners had in fact dismissed respondent security guards. None of the respondents
exerted efforts to confirm from petitioner’s office whether they ha din fact been dismissed. Absent any showing of an
overt of positive act proving that petitioner had dismissed M, S and O, their claim of illegal dismissal cannot be sustained.
As to the claim of abandonment, they must have failed to report for work without justifiable reason and there must have
been a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by some overt acts. The filing by M, S and
O of their complaints negates the existence of any intention on their part to abandon their employment.
2) The discrepancy between the minimum wage prevailing for the periods concerned and the wages and other benefits
received served as basis for underpayment. In cases of payment of wages in construction projects, security, janitorial
services; the contractor and principal or client are jointly and severally liable. Thus, CHR is the party liable for the wage
increase; while petitioner is solidarily liable for the payment of wages, including wage increases.
ordinarily received by or strictly due the recipient. Thus, it is not a demandable and enforceable obligation, except when it is
made part of the wage, salary or compensation of the employee.
The conservator was justified in reducing the mid-year and Christmas bonuses of petitioner’s employees.
Ultimately, it is to the employee’s advantage that the conservatorship achieve its purposes otherwise, the closure of the
company would result in the employees losing their jobs.
PD 851 requires all employees to pay their employees a basic salary of not more than P1,000 a 13th month pay.
However, employers already paying their employees a 13th month pay are not covered by the law. The term “equivalent”
shall be construed to include Christmas bonus, mid year bonus, cash bonuses and other payments amounting to not less
than 1/12 of the basic salary. The intention was to grant relief to those not actually paid a bonus, by whatever name
called. Thus, petitioner is justified in crediting the mid year bonus and Christmas bonus as part of the 13th month pay.
The divisor used by petitioner in arriving at the employee’s daily rate for the purpose of computing salary
related benefits is 314 days. This finding was not disputed by the NLRC. However, the divisor was reduced to 303 by virtue
of an inter-office memorandum. The reduction of the divisor was for the sole purpose of increasing the employee’s
overtime pay and was not meant to replace the use of 314 as the divisor in the computation of the daily rate for salary-
related benefits.
Felix v. Enertech Systems Industries, Inc.
Y Company is engaged in the manufacture of boilers and tanks. X worked as a welder in respondent company. X and 3
other employees were assigned to install a smokestack at the Big J Feedmills in Bulacan. X and his co-workers
accomplished daily time records on the basis of which their wages were computed. The work was estimated to be
completed in one week, but it took them two weeks to finish. Thus, X and his co employees were given notice to explain
why they should not be dismissed for reporting at the jobsite at 11am and leaving the site at 2pm in violation of company
rules, in view of reports that came to the office. Thus, the employees were placed under preventive suspension pending
investigation. After investigation, the petitioner’s were dismissed on grounds of dishonesty by falsifying time cards which
allowed them to collect full salary and for insubordination. X filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter
who ruled for X. The NLRC reversed the decision. The CA affirmed the NLRC. W/N there was illegal dismissal.
HELD: No. The CA, taking into account the findings of the NLRC, correctly concluded that there was substantial evidence
showing that petitioner did not really work 8 hours a day. The validity of petitioner’s dismissal is a factual question and
the rule is well settled that the findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, like the NLRC, are accorded not only respect, but
finality if they are supported by substantial evidence. Furthermore, the omnibus motion filed by Y Co. during the pendency
of the appeal is not an admission that it is liable for reinstatement or separation pay.
People v. Chua
Chua was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment committed in large scale for recruiting and promising
work in Taiwan to 9 people, without a license. According to Chua, she received a call from Taiwan informing her that some
people were needed so she called several people and collected money but the placement in Taiwan never materialized.
The POEA issued a certification that Chua was not licensed to recruit persons/workers for overseas employment. Chua
argues that she had an approved application for a service contractor's authority. But the records show that she failed to
comply with post-licensing requirements.
Whether or not Chua was licensed to recruit workers for overseas work
HELD: The SC held that Chua wasn’t licensed to perform recruiting activities. The records show that the license was not
issued due to her failure to comply with post-licensing requirements. It is the issuance of the license which makes the
holder thereof authorized to perform recruitment activities. The law specifically provides that "every license shall be valid
for at least 2 yrs from the date of issuance unless sooner cancelled or revoked by the Secretary. Chua admitted herself that
she wasn’t licensed when she replied to the Taiwan company.
Philsa International Placement v. Secretary of Labor
Petitioner Philsa is a domestic corporation engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment. Private
respondents were recruited by petitioner for employment in Saudi Arabia and were required to pay placement fees then
they began work for Al-Hejailan Consultants A/E, the foreign principal of petitioner. While in Saudi Arabia, private
respondents were allegedly made to sign a second contract which changed some of the provisions of their original contract
resulting in the reduction of some of their benefits and privileges. They were then allegedly forced to sign a third contract
which increased their work hours from 48 hours to 60 hours a week without any corresponding increase in their basic
monthly salary. When they refused to sign this third contract, their services were terminated. Upon their arrival in the
Philippines, private respondents demanded from petitioner Philsa the return of their placement fees and for the payment
of their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contract. Petitioner refused so they filed a case before the POEA for
illegal dismissal, payment of salary differentials, illegal deduction/withholding of salaries, illegal exactions of placement
fees and contract substitution. Under the POEA rules, complaints involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by
virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, including money claims, are adjudicated
1
by the Workers' Assistance and Adjudication Office (WAAO) thru the POEA Hearing Officers and may be appealed to the NLRC. On
the other hand, complaints involving recruitment violations warranting suspension or cancellation of the license of recruiting
agencies are cognizable by the POEA through its Licensing and Recruitment Office (LRO), which may be appealed to the DOLE. In
cases where a complaint partakes of the nature of both an employer-employee relationship case and a recruitment regulation
case, the POEA Hearing Officer shall act as representative of both the WAAO and the LRO and both cases shall be heard
simultaneously. In such cases, the Hearing Officer shall submit two separate recommendations for the two aspects of the case. In
this case, the first two causes of action were in the nature of money claims arising from the employer-employee relations and
were properly cognizable by the WAAO. The last two causes of action were in the nature of recruitment violations and may be
investigated by the LRO. The third cause of action, illegal deduction/withholding of salary, is both a money claim and a violation
of recruitment regulations and is thus under the investigatory jurisdiction of both the WAAO and the LRO. Philsa was found guilty
of illegal exactions and contract substitution.
Whether or not PHILSA is guilty of illegal exactions and contract substitution.
HELD: The SC held that as to the illegal exactions, it was a question of fact so the SC would not inquire into those matters
anymore and that in any case, it is clear that Philsa was guilty of illegal exactions as supported by evidence. The fees were in
excess of those allowed by the POEA. As to contract substitution, the SC also said that this is a question of fact which may not be
disturbed if the same is supported by substantial evidence. There was definitely a contract of substitution in the first count. The
first contract was duly approved by the Administration therefore the parties are bound by the terms and condition thereof until
its expiration. The mere intention of respondents to increase the number of hours of work, even if there was a corresponding
increase in wage is a clear violation of the contract as approved by the Administration, and notwithstanding the same, the
amendment is evidently contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy and hence, must be shunned. As to the second
contract substitution, a third contract was emphatically intended, which, however, was not consummated due to the adamant
refusal of complainants to sign thereon. Mere intention of the respondent to commit contract substitution for a second time
should not go unpunished. It is the duty of this Office to repress such acts.
Sevillana vs. I.T. Corp.
Petitioner Sevillana was contracted to work as a driver by I.T. for its foreign accredited principal, Samir Maddah in Saudi Arabia.
He argues however, that only 1/3 of his salary was received. After working 12 months, he said that he was repatriated without
any valid and justifiable reason. He filed a complaint with the POEA for underpayment of salaries and illegal dismissal against
I.T., and Samir Maddah. The company argued that his blood pressure was considered critical and when his blood pressure did not
stabilize and begun affecting his work as driver due to frequent headaches and dizziness, he was repatriated to avoid further
injury and complication. I.T. claimed that after he had received all the benefits accorded to an employee consisting of full
salaries and separation pay, he refused to be repatriated and instead decided to run away and since then, his whereabouts were
unknown and I.T. only heard about him when he reported to their office in the Philippines and later on filed the complaint. The
POEA Adjudication Office, held the private respondents herein jointly and severally liable to the petitioner. The NLRC reversed
this saying that I.T. is a recruitment agency and is not the employer itself and at most it is an agent of the employer.
Whether or not Sevillana was illegally dismissed.
HELD: The SC held that there was illegal dismissal. I.T. cannot be considered as an agent of its foreign principal. The NLRC
disregarded the rule regarding the solidary liability of the local employment agency with its foreign principal in overseas
employment contracts. Private employment agencies are held jointly and severally liable with the foreign-based employer for
any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment. The solidary liability imposed is to assure the aggrieved
worker of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due him. Also the Labor Code puts the burden of proving that the
dismissal was for a valid or authorized cause on the employer. For a dismissal to be valid it must be for a valid cause and there
must be due process. The record shows that neither of the 2 conditions were shown to have been complied with. All I.T. did was
to rely on its claim that petitioner was repatriated by its foreign principal. Under Section 8, Rule I, Book VI of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Labor Code, for a disease to be a valid ground for dismissal, the continued employment of the
employee is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or the health of his co-employees, and there must be a certification by
a competent public health authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period
of 6 months, even with proper medical treatment.
LMG Chemicals Corporation v. Sec. Of the DOLE
LMG has three divisions and there are two unions within one of the divisions. One union represents the daily paid employees and
the other union represents the monthly paid employees. Chemical Workers Union, respondent, a duly registered labor
organization acts as the collective bargaining agent of all the daily paid employees of petitioner's Inorganic Division. Negotiations
for a new CBA took place as the old CBA was about to expire. They were able to agree on the political provisions of the new CBA,
but no agreement was reached on the issue of wage increase and economic issues were also not settled so with the negotiations
at a deadlock, the union filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB and despite several conferences and efforts of the conciliator-
mediator, the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement so the union staged a strike. In an attempt to end the strike early,
petitioner made an improved offer. Another conciliation meeting was held and petitioner reiterated its improved offer but the
union rejected it. The Secretary of Labor found the labor dispute impressed with national interest and assumed jurisdiction.
Curaza v. NLRC
Petitioner was employed by PCBCP, they were later absorbed by PCDPI then PCPPI when the companies were all sold one
after the other. He claims that he was dismissed without any valid legal cause then his office was padlocked to prevent him
from entering. PCPPI alleges that he was continually absent without explaining why so they had to lock the office because
the office contained many confidential documents. The LA dismissed the complaint. Then Curaza filed a manifestation that
he be counsel along with his attorney. On appeal, the NLRC dismissed the petition. 3 months later, Curaza filed his motion
for reconsideration, which was denied for being filed beyond the 10 day period. He now argues that he only received the
notice of the decision a few days before he filed his motion and since he is also counsel he is entitled to notice and that the
10 day period starts from when he received the notice. W/N he is entitled to notice and when does the 10 day period start
HELD: The SC ruled that Curaza is not entitled to notice. He was still represented by his lawyer and since the NLRC
Rules of Procedure have no specific rule, the Rules of Court apply suppletorily and it provides that where a person is
represented by more than one counsel, service upon one is considered service to all unless personal notice is ordered by
the Court. Also since his lawyer received the notice 3 months earlier the 10 day period starts from this date. The NLRC
Rules of Procedure provide that notices of decisions shall be served upon the counsel of record. The failure of the counsel
binds the client and is not a ground for setting aside a judgment that is valid and regular on its face.
Fleischer Company vs NLRC
Respondents were hired as security guards and had licenses to carry firearms. Later on they were terminated because the
positions had either become redundant or because they lost their licenses. They filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The
LA ruled that there was illegal dismissal but the NLRC reversed the decision and ruled that there was no illegal dismissal. It
is now argued that there is no employer-employee relationship and that they have already settled. W/N there is an
employer-employee relationship and was there settlement
HELD: The SC ruled that the questions raised by the parties were questions of fact. The NLRC found that there was an
employer-employee relationship and this finding is accorded great respect and even finality when supported by substantial
evidence. As to the settlement, the SC ruled that since the NL:RC ruled that there was a settlement then this will stand as
review in the SC concerning factual findings is confined to determining allegations of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion and there was no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the NLRC.
Unicraft Industries International Corporation v. Galvez
Petitioner opened a branch in Lapu-lapu City to which Private respondents (employees of petitioner) were transferred. Due
to failure to comply with some legal requirements for its business operation, that branch was rendered closed and private
respondents were dismissed. A complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of benefits was filed and submitted for
voluntary arbitration. For failure of petitioners to appear and present evidence, the voluntary arbitrator rendered a
decision in favor of respondents. Petitioners elevated the case to the CA and the case was remanded to the voluntary
arbitrator to give petitioners a chance to prove their case. The voluntary arbitrator claimed that he lost jurisdiction over
the case upon rendition of the judgment. The CA rendered a resolution allowing an execution of the award of separation
pay and attorney’s fees. Hence this petition.
ISSUES:
1) Can the voluntary arbitrator review its judgments?
2) Was the decision of the voluntary arbitrator void?
HELD:
1) Yes. When there is a violation of due process, judgments of voluntary arbitrators may be reviewed. It is clear that
the petitioners were unable to present evidence as evident from the stipulation entered into by the parties and
submitted to the CA. Such was an acknowledgment that the proceedings before the VA had not been completed.
While under the law, decisions of voluntary arbitrators are accorded finality, the same may still be subject to review,
such as here where there was a violation of petitioner’s right to due process and to be heard.
2) Yes. The decision of the voluntary arbitrator in this case was void in this case for the petitioners were not given
notice to appear at the scheduled hearing until it was too late. Such was a violation of their constitutional right and
has the effect of rendering the judgment null and void. It is a cardinal rule in law that a decision or judgment is
fatally defective if rendered in violation of a party-litigant’s right to due process. Even the Procedural Guidelines in
the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings requires that the arbitrator should provide the parties adequate
opportunities to be heard. Thus, it was grave abuse of discretion for the CA to order the execution of the award of
separation pay without giving the petitioners opportunity to present evidence.
Producer’s Bank of the Philippines v. NLRC
An employer cannot be forced to distribute bonuses which it can no longer afford to pay. A bonus is an amount granted
and paid to an employee for his industry and loyalty which contributed to the success of the employer’s business and made
possible the realization of profits. It is an act of generosity and is a management prerogative, given in addition to what is
1
Then petitioner stated that it could no longer afford to grant its previous offer due to serious losses of the division so they made
a lower offer. The union claims it has a positive performance in terms of income. The Secretary ordered the company to increase
the wages but all other economic demands of the union were rejected. Also since the new CBA wasn’t signed within 6 months
after the old one expired and the parties could not agree as to the retroactivity, the Secretary fixed the date of retroactivity.
W/N the company should be made to pay increased wages despite losses and whether or not the Secretary of Labor could fix the
date of effectivity.
HELD: The SC ruled that the wage increases were justified. It is the income from all sources that determines financial condition.
A particular division may have lost money, but other divisions may make up for it so there will be net income as a whole. Also,
the company granted an increase to its’ supervisory employees so it’s unfair to deny a wage increase to the rank and file
workers.
On the second ground, the SC ruled that the Secretary’s authority to assume jurisdiction carries with it the power to determine
the retroactivity of the CBA. The authority of the Secretary to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute includes and extends to
all questions and controversies arising therefrom. The power is plenary and discretionary in nature for an effective and efficient
disposal of the primary dispute. To deprive the Secretary of such power and discretion runs counter to the well-established rule
that all doubts in the interpretation of labor laws be resolved in favor of labor. The SC is only giving meaning to this rule as the
labor authorities should be helped in providing workers immediate benefits, without being hampered by arbitration or litigation
processes that prove to be nerve-wracking and financially burdensome.
People v. Gonzales-Flores
Gonzalez-Flores was found guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale for recruiting as seamen three different people at the same
time and collecting money from them without the necessary license. The complainants filed a complaint after they tried to
follow-up their applications and nothing happened for three months and they found out from the POEA that the accused wasn’t
licensed. The evidence consisted of the complainants’ testimonies and testimonies of other witnesses. Accused now argues that
the Court didn’t have enough evidence to convict her.
W/N the Court had enough evidence to convict the accused.
HELD: The SC upheld the conviction. The elements of illegal recruitment in large scale are: (1) the accused engages in acts
of recruitment and placement of workers; (2) the accused has no license or an authority to recruit and deploy workers, either
locally or overseas; and (3) the accused commits the unlawful acts against three or more persons, individually or as a group. All
the conditions are present. The evidence shows that she sought out complainants and promised them overseas employment and
led them to believe that she could do something to get their applications approved. Accused contends that all she did was to
refer the complainants but the Labor Code, recruitment includes "referral," which is defined as the act of passing along or
forwarding an applicant for employment after initial interview of a selected applicant for employment to a selected employer,
placement officer, or bureau. Also she did more than just make referrals, she actively and directly enlisted complainants for
employment abroad, even promising jobs as seamen, and collected money.
MSMG-UWP v. Ramos
The petitioners were terminated by the company but the NLRC upheld the dismissal. Later on, the SC reversed the decision and
ordered all of them reinstated and paid full backwages but it also held that the officers of the company shouldn’t be held liable.
This is the subject of this motion for partial recon as the union argues that it was the officers who made the decision to
terminate the employees. Petitioners further contend that while the case was pending, the company began removing its
machineries and equipment from its plant and began diverting jobs intended for the regular employees to its sub-
contractor/satellite branches.
W/N the officers should be held liable for the illegal dismissal.
HELD: The SC ruled that the officers cannot be held liable bec a corp has a personality separate and distinct from those acting in
its behalf. The rule is that obligations incurred by the corp, through its directors, officers and employees, are its sole liabilities.
In labor cases, corporate directors and officers are solidarily liable with the corporation for the termination of employment of
corporate employees done with malice or in bad faith. Bad faith does not connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it means breach of a known duty thru some motive or
interest or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. In this case, there is nothing on record to show that the officers acted in
patent bad faith or were guilty of gross negligence in terminating the services of petitioners so as to warrant personal liability.
Shangri-la Hotel vs. Dialogo
Respondent, a receptionist of petitioner, went on sick leave for 3 days. When she received her salary for that month she received
overtime pay for one of the sick days without rendering overtime work. For this, respondent was dismissed from the service for
alleged dishonesty. She filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, she argues that she signed the list, subsequently attached to the
overtime authorization form, before she went on sick leave and that she did not know then that her salary included the overtime
pay for work supposedly rendered. The LA didn’t agree but the NLRC did, ruling that she could not be held guilty of dishonesty
precisely because she didn’t know that the blank form she signed was an overtime authorization form and she also had no
legitimate labor organization. The union filed an MR which the Secretary of Labor treated as an appeal and dismissed it.
The CA ruled that the union had become a legitimate labor org (llo) 3 days before the petition for certification election and
that there was no proof of supervisors being members of the union.
whether or not the union had supervisory employees.
HELD: The SC upheld the decision of the CA. There was no persuasive evidence to show that there were supervisory
and confidential employees in appellant union who under the law are disqualified to join the same. Also, petitioner only
raised this issue on appeal so it could not be considered. The determination of such factual issues is vested in the
appropriate Regional Office of the DOLE and pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the Court should refrain from
resolving such controversies. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to abrogate unto itself the
authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence.
PIGLAS-KAMAO vs. NLRC
The union filed complaints for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal. They argue that the company closed down to
prevent the formation of a union, but still a union was formed despite the interference of the company’s president. When a
petition for certification election was filed, the company told the DOLE that they were shutting down due to business losses
so the workers were given notices of termination. The LA ruled that there was no illegal dismissal instead it was a lawful
retrenchment and that there was no proof that the closure was done for union-busting. Also a CBA was already signed so
the company can’t be said to be anti-union. The NLRC affirmed the decision. The CA dismissed the union’s appeal due to
their failure to follow the Rules of Court. The union now contends that technicalities have no room in labor cases, where
the Rules of Court is only applied to effectuate the objectives of the Labor Code. May the case be dismissed based on mere
technicalities?
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the union and remanded the case back to the CA. The CA dismissed the case due to the
failure to submit copies of the Amended and Supplemental Complaints, the Notice and Memorandum of Appeal based on
Sec 3 Rule 46. The SC held that since certified true copies of the decision were attached to the petition, it obviated the
need for the other documents that the CA found fatally omitted The attached LA Decision laid down the substance of the
Amended and Supplemental Complaints and the NLRC Resolutions discussed the grounds for the appeal and the arguments
raised therein, thereby negating the need for the Notice and Memorandum of Appeal. The SC held that the policy is to
encourage full adjudication on the merits.
De Leon v. NLRC
Fortune Tobacco (FTC) and FISI had a contract for security services and petitioners were among those engaged as guards.
Later all FISI stock was sold and its name changed to MISI. FTC then terminated the contract so 582 guards were released.
Later on, the union of FTC sent a notice of strike to FISI/MISI, claiming to represent the guards who were released. It
argues that FISI/MISI and FTC are one and the same as both use the name Fortune and that they were terminated because
FTC wanted to bust their union-forming activities. FTC argues that it is distinct from FISI/MISI and that it had no employer-
employee relationship with the guards. FISI argues that the guards were not illegally dismissed but they were on floating
status due to FTC’s termination of the contract. The LA ruled in favor of the guards saying that FTC and FISI are one as they
had the same shareholders and shared the same address so there was illegal dismissal and union busting. The NLRC reversed
it bec when the guards were terminated, MISI was handling them and it had a different set of shareholders and they were
released bec FTC terminated the contract so FISI could not be faulted. W/N there was illegal dismissal and union-busting.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the guards. There is sufficient ground to conclude that there was ULP as the company
interfered with the self-organization of the guards. FISI had no other clients except FTC and other companies controlled by
Lucio Tan, so it was a mere instrumentality of FTC. When the stocks of FISI were sold and when FTC terminated the
contracts it was a concerted effort to remove the guards from the company and abate the growth of the union and block its
actions to enforce their demands as this was all done soon after the guards started organizing themselves. The test of
whether an employer has interfered with and coerced employees is whether he has engaged in conduct which may
reasonably be said to interfere with the free exercise of employees' rights and it is not necessary that there be direct
evidence that any employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by statements of threats of the employer if there is a
reasonable inference that anti-union conduct of the employer does have an adverse effect on self-organization and
collective bargaining.
Suan v. NLRC
Petitioner was employed on board Irma Inc’s vessel. He suffered a stroke while on board and had to disembark. He applied
for and was granted sick leave to enable him to recover. When he reported for work, he was refused work and was told to
secure a med cert attesting to his physical condition. He got one but still he wasn’t allowed to work. He was told to just
accept separation pay because he was too old and sickly so he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The company argues
that when he reported he didn’t look alright so they told him to get a med cert but he said that he wanted to work and
asked that he be assigned a different station. Permission from management still had to be obtained so either he accept
1
separation pay or wait for further word. While they were waiting, he filed the case and while the case was pending, he received
a letter declaring him AWOL and asking him to explain his absence. He claims that this was just strategy of the corp to counter
his claim. The LA, NLRC, and CA all dismissed his claims. W/N Suan was illegally dismissed.
HELD: The SC ruled that there was no illegal dismissal. They said that the question of his illegal dismissal was a question of fact
and that these cannot be entertained unless the findings of fact are not supported or are glaringly erroneous. Records show that
his ailment was not to be taken lightly and it normally took a yr to recover but he reported back in only 6 months while looking
sickly so decisions had to be made and while management was still thinking he filed the case so there was no dismissal. Since
there was none he may either be reinstated w/o backwages or paid in lieu of reinstatement, separation pay at 1 month's pay or
½ month's pay per year of service whichever is higher, a fraction of 6 months being considered as 1 whole year pursuant to Art
294 of the Labor Code. An employer may terminate an employee found suffering from any disease and whose continued
employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-employees provided that he is paid
separation pay of at least 1 month salary or ½ month salary for every year of service, whichever is greater, a fraction of at least
6 months being considered as 1 whole year.
EDI Staff Builders International, Inc. vs. Magsino
EDI is a duly licensed recruitment agency and respondent Magsino was a supervisor until she was dismissed. One of the things she
was to do was the remit the premium payments made by the contract workers on their repatriation bonds. It was discovered that
over one year of payments were missing so she was asked to explain this and to show reason why no disciplinary action shouldn’t
be taken but respondent resigned but her resignation was not acted upon because of the investigation, later she was notified of
her termination. She filed a case for illegal dismissal argued that she wasn’t afforded due process because there was no cause
and no notice of termination. The LA and the NLRC ruled that there was illegal dismissal because there wasn’t enough proof to
terminate respondent. The NLRC ruled that the company couldn’t appeal because it didn’t conform to the NLRC Rules of
Procedure and that the issues raised were raised for the first time on appeal. The CA upheld the decision.
W/N there was illegal dismissal.
HELD: The SC ruled that the NLRC should have allowed the company to present its evidence as it is in the best interest of justice
that all facts come out. However, the evidence is still insufficient to terminate respondent. In illegal dismissal cases, the burden
of proof is on the employer but the company failed to show enough evidence proving and justifying the dismissal.
Hyatt Taxi Services, Inc. v. Catinoy
Catinoy was a taxi driver of Hyatt Taxi Services, Inc. He is also a member and officer of Hyatt Taxi Employees Association, a
legitimate labor organization registered with the DOLE and is the exclusive bargaining representative of all taxi drivers of the
company. One day he found out that his desk was forcibly opened and he found out that it was the acting union president who
opened it so an argument began that ended in blows where he was injured so he filed a criminal complaint against the president.
The union asked the company to suspend them both for fighting and a memo was issued. It said that company rules and the
union’s by-laws had been violated so they were put on indefinite suspension. Catinoy then filed a complaint for illegal
suspension. After 30 days of suspension, he reported for work but he was not allowed to because of the 2 cases he filed. He then
amended his complaint to constructive dismissal. The LA ruled that there was illegal dismissal and the NLRC affirmed it but did
not award backwages because there was no concrete showing of illegal dismissal and it was only constructive illegal dismissal.
The CA reversed it and ruled that there was illegal dismissal and awarded full backwages.
W/N there was illegal dismissal or constructive dismissal.
HELD: The SC ruled that there was illegal dismissal, not merely constructive dismissal. There was no justification for the deletion
of the award of backwages. The factual findings of the LA, which the NLRC initially adopted, show that respondent was not taken
back after the 30-day suspension. The LA appreciated the events as badges of constructive dismissal. Constructive dismissal is
when the employee wants to work but cannot due to the prevailing conditions. But here, what made it impossible or
unacceptable for respondent to resume work was an insistence that he first desist from filing his complaints before he be allowed
to return. He refused and amended his complaint to include constructive dismissal. His refusal to yield is understandable for he
has every right not to bargain away his right to prosecute his complaints in exchange for the employment to which he was in the
first place rightfully entitled.
Jo Cinema v. NLRC
Petitioner is in the movie business. Respondent was a theater porter. A memo was issued saying that no checks should be
encashed but respondent, for her friend, encashed without permission 4 checks with the ticket seller. The checks bounced so she
was asked to show cause why she shouldn’t be disciplined but she didn’t answer so she was preventively suspended. An
investigation was held where she participated in. During the investigation she filed a case for illegal dismissal bec when she was
suspended, she was allegedly terminated also. The LA and NLRC ruled that there was illegal dismissal or at least constructive
dismissal and ordered separation pay and full backwages. The LA ruled that since the company insisted on making her pay the
amount she couldn’t come back to work even if she wanted to. The NLRC ruled that even though respondent had no cause of
action against the company as she was merely placed on preventive suspension she was still illegally dismissed.
knowledge that her salary included the overtime pay. The hotel was ordered to reinstate her and pay backwages. The CA
upheld the NLRC.
W/N respondent was illegally dismissed
HELD: The SC ruled that the respondent didn’t commit any act of dishonesty. She did not deliberately make petitioner
believe that she rendered overtime work. She only affixed her name and signature on a blank piece of paper which was not
the official overtime authorization form used by petitioner. There is no basis therefore for the conclusion of that
respondent knew that the blank piece of paper she signed served as the overtime authorization form. It was just a case of
an ordinary employee expecting to earn more by rendering overtime work but who got sick during the designated time. The
policy of the company was to require the preparation of the overtime authorization form before the designated date the
overtime work was supposed to be rendered. The overtime work must first be authorized before it could be rendered.
Food Terminal Inc. v. NLRC
Petitioner is a GOCC and respondents are its’ rank-and-file employees seeking their salary differentials, traveling allowance
differentials, 13th month pay, 14th month pay and other incremental increases as a result of an increase in their gross pay,
plus interest, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs of the litigation. The facts show that Special Orders upgrading
their positions and correspondingly adjusting their salaries were issued but despite several representations from
respondents, petitioner’s new board refused to implement the Special Orders. Respondents filed a complaint before the LA
praying for the implementation of the Special Orders which the LA granted. The NLRC and the CA both upheld the decision.
Petitioner claims that the officer who issued the orders was not authorized by the Board to issue the subject Special
Orders, so the Special Orders had no binding force and effect. It also claims that only 21 out of the 65 complainants signed
the verification attached to the complaint filed with the LA, hence, only they have legal personality to prosecute the case
and as for the rest, the complaint was dismissible as to them for lack of legal personality.
Whether or not the special orders were valid and could be implemented and whether or not the rest of the complainants
have legal personality in the suit.
HELD: The SC upheld all the decisions. On the first ground, petitioner failed to show evidence that the orders were issued
without authority. All their statements were self-serving therefore not given much weight. On the second ground the
complaint shows that complainants therein were being represented by their counsel of choice and in the verification
attached to the complaint, it is manifested that the 21 signatories were not only signing in their own behalf but also in
behalf of the other. And in the NLRC rules of procedure, sec 7 provides that attorneys and other representatives of parties
shall have authority to bind their clients in all matters of procedure; but they cannot, w/o a special power of attorney or
express consent, enter into a compromise agreement with the opposing party in full or partial discharge of a client's claim.
In this case no special power of attorney was needed because no compromise agreement was being entered into.
Moncielcoji Corp. v. NLRC
Respondent filed a complaint with the LA against petitioner for illegal dismissal, separation pay and non-payment of salary
and other benefits. She alleged that she was employed as a supervisor until she was told to take a vacation and report for
work after 1 month then when she reported back she was refused readmission. She kept returning to resume work but her
efforts proved futile. She was merely promised that she’d receive separation pay but none was given. Petitioner countered
that on the first 2 days of work she worked very well but then she was often absent or tardy and failed to properly monitor
the performance of her subordinates. Petitioner asserts that it called her attention and reprimanded her but then she did
not report for work anymore. The LA ruled for the respondent and ordered reinstatement without loss of seniority rights
and the payment of backwages. The NLRC affirmed the decision but granted separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. The
CA upheld the decision.
W/N respondent was illegally dismissed or if she abandoned her work.
HELD: The SC upheld the decisions. The dismissal was based on technicalities such as the failure to indicate the
material dates showing when the notice of judgment was received and failure to submit a certified true copy of the
decision and failure to submit a sworn certification against forum shopping as required by Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. As
a matter of clarification, the SC added that accdg to established jurisprudence when separation pay is awarded in lieu of
reinstatement, back wages shall be computed from the time compensation was withheld from the employee up to the
finality of the Decision of the Court.
Negros Cooperative I (NORECO) v. Secretary of DOLE
The employees of petitioner organized themselves into a local chapter of PACIWU-TUCP. The union submitted its charter
certificate and supporting documents on the same date. They filed a petition for certification election on behalf of the
NORECO chapter, seeking to represent the 77 rank-and-file employees of NORECO. PACIWU-TUCP alleged that it had
created a local chapter in NORECO which was reported to the DOLE Regional and that NORECO is an unorganized
establishment, and that there is no other labor organization presently existing at the said employer establishment. The
Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition saying that no certificate has been issued yet so it has not acquired the status of a
1
W/N respondent was illegally dismissed
HELD: It is clear that respondent was not dismissed but merely placed under preventive suspension. It cannot be construed as
dismissal since the cessation from work is only temporary. She could not have been dismissed because a formal investigation was
still being conducted. She even attended the investigation admitted the allegations. If she was indeed dismissed the investigation
wouldn’t have continued. There was also no constructive dismissal. Constructive discharge is quitting because continued
employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely. This does not hold. The demand for payment out of her own
pockets was reasonable as it was attributed to her. As she was not illegally dismissed, separation pay and backwages are not in
order.
UIC vs. U.I.C. Teaching and Non-teaching Personnel and Employees Union v. NLRC
Petitioner is a school and respondent UIC Teaching and Non-Teaching Personnel and Employment Union is the labor
representative of both the teaching and non-teaching employees of the UIC. A professor was terminated after he was found
guilty of improper conduct for soliciting money from students. The union filed a case for ULP and illegal suspension. He argues
that the charges were established long before he was terminated and he was terminated for his union activities. Other
employees were also dismissed as the school claims that their services had either become redundant or their work was
unsatisfactory. So they filed complaints for illegal dismissal and ULP. The LA ruled that only the teacher was illegally dismissed.
The NLRC ruled that there was no illegal dismissal and no ULP and declared all the terminations as legal, some for just cause, the
others for expiration of contracts. The CA affirmed the decision except for 2 employees , dismissed for redundancy, which it
ruled should be reinstated. W/N there was illegal dismissal and ULP.
HELD: The SC ruled that there was illegal dismissal. Factual findings are accorded great respect. In this case there was no reason
to overturn their findings. Redundancy is when an employee’s services are in excess of that reasonably demanded by the actual
requirements of the enterprise. A position is redundant when it is superfluous, which may be the outcome of a number of
factors, like overhiring, decreased volume of business, or the dropping of a particular product line or service activity previously
manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise. There was no claim that the position had become useless or redundant such that
it had to be abolished. In fact there was a replacement for the position, a student-trainee who would work for free.
Asuncion v. NLRC
Petitioner was an accountant/bookkeeper of the Mabini Medical Clinic. The NCR-Industrial Relations Division of the DOLE
conducted a routine inspection of the premises of the company and discovered upon petitioner’s disclosure that there were
violations of the labor standards law. Later a memo was issued charging petitioner with chronic absentism, habitual tardiness,
wasting time, getting money without a receipt, and disobedience and was asked to explain why she should not be terminated so
she submitted her response. She was dismissed on the same day so she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The LA ruled that
there was illegal dismissal. The NLRC set it aside saying that petitioner admitted that charges.
W/N there was illegal dismissal.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of petitioner. For a valid dismissal, not only must there be just cause supported by clear and
convincing evidence, there must also be an opportunity to be heard. The employer has the burden to prove that the dismissal
was with just or authorized cause. Failure to discharge this burden means that the dismissal is unjustified. Here, the evidence
submitted were merely unsigned handwritten records and print-outs. This is insufficient to justify a dismissal. The provision for
flexibility in administrative procedure does not justify decisions w/o basis in evidence having rational probative value. Here,
both the handwritten listing and computer print-outs being unsigned, so the authenticity is suspect and devoid of any rational
probative value. Nor was there due process. There is no showing that there was warning of the absences and tardiness. The 2 day
period given to answer the allegations is an unreasonably short period of time. The clinic can’t have given ample opportunity to
answer the charges filed. There are serious doubts as to the factual basis of the charges against petitioner. These doubts shall be
resolved in her favor in line with the policy under the Labor Code to afford protection to labor and construe doubts in favor of
labor. The rule is that if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice
must be tilted in favor of the latter.
Concorde Hotel v. CA
Petitioner engaged in a mass hiring through a manpower service agency. Respondent was one of those hired as assistant cook.
Petitioner discovered some missing and unaccounted stock so an inquiry was conducted. It was discovered that employees were
bringing home inventory. An in-house investigation was held and they were asked to explain such. The agency was given a list of
those involved. They were called and asked to explain in writing that same day. When nobody complied petitioner and the
agency issued separate notices of termination. Later on respondent was included and also terminated so he filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal. He argues that he was made to testify against those charged but he refused so he was terminated for allowing
the thefts to take place. He argues that it couldn’t be true because he complained to the police that he was threatened to keep
quiet by the employees stealing. Another reason for his dismissal was his failure to meet minimum company standards. The LA
dismissed the complaint but the NLRC and CA ruled that that the dismissal was without cause. The hotel argues that it was the
agency that dismissed him and not the hotel.
tremendous losses for 4 consecutive years. They further claimed that the retrenchment was done in good faith as it was
based on a number of criteria, namely, seniority, service record and performance. The LA and NLRC ruled that there was
illegal dismissal saying that the losses were unsubstantiated.
W/N there were actual losses and were the dismissals valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that there were in fact losses that justified the termination of the employees. Proof was also presented
that even prior to the dismissal of the 17, hundreds had already been retrenched to save on capital. The financial
documents audited by the CA is the normal and reliable method of proof of the profit and loss performance of aGOCC. Also,
management cannot be denied recourse to retrenchment if it can successfully prove the existence of the following: (a)
substantial losses which are not merely de minimis in extent; (b) imminence of such substantial losses; (c) retrenchment
would effectively prevent the expected additional losses; and, (d) alleged losses and expected losses must be proven by
sufficient and convincing evidence. As these were faithfully observed the retrenchment was justified.
Serrano v. CA
From 1974 to 1991, A Company., the local agent of foreign corporation B Company, deployed petitioner Serrano as a
seaman to Liberian, British and Danish ships. As petitioner was on board a ship most of the time, respondent Maersk
offered to send portions of petitioner’s salary to his family in the Philippines by money order. Petitioner agreed and from
1977 to 1978, he instructed respondent Maersk to send money orders to his family. Respondent Maersk also deducted
various amounts from his salary for Danish Social Security System (SSS), welfare contributions, ship club, and SSS Medicare.
Petitioner’s family failed to receive the money orders petitioner sent through respondent Maersk. Upon learning this in
1978, petitioner demanded that respondent Maersk pay him the amounts the latter deducted from his salary, which
requests were ignored. Whenever he returned to the Philippines, petitioner follow up his money claims but he would be
told to return after several weeks while respondent Maersk would hire him again to board another one of their vessels for
about a year.
Finally, in October 1993, petitioner wrote to respondent Maersk demanding immediate payment to him of the total amount
of the money orders deducted from his salary from 1977 to 1978. On November 11, 1993, B company replied to petitioner
that they keep accounting documents only for a certain number of years, thus data on his money claims from 1977 to 1978
were no longer available. Likewise, it was claimed that it had no outstanding money orders. B Company declined
petitioner's demand for payment. In April 1994, petitioner filed a complaint for collection of the total amount of the unsent
money orders and illegal salary deductions against the respondent Maersk in the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency
(POEA). The NLRC dismissed the case on the ground of prescription, based on Article 291 stating money shall be filed
within three years from the time the cause of action accrued, otherwise they shall be forever barred.
Did the money claim of petitioner prescribe?
HELD: No. Petitioner’s cause of action accrued only in 1993 when respondent A.P. Moller wrote to him that its accounting
records showed it had no outstanding money orders and that his case was considered outdated. Thus, the three (3) year
prescriptive period should be counted from 1993 and not 1978 and since his complaint was filed in 1994, he claims that it
has not prescribed. It is settled jurisprudence that a cause of action has three elements, to wit, (1) a right in favor of the
plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the
right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff. In October 1993, Serrano
finally demanded in writing payment of the unsent money orders. Then and only then was the claim categorically denied by
respondent A.P. Moller in its letter dated November 22, 1993. Following the Baliwag Transit ruling (1989), petitioner’s
cause of action accrued only upon respondent A.P. Moller's definite denial of his claim in November 1993. Having filed his
action five (5) months thereafter or in April 1994, we hold that it was filed within the three-year (3) prescriptive period
provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code.
2005 CASE DIGESTS
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK VS. ANASTACIO D. ABAD
Abad was the senior Assistant Manager (Sales Head) of petitioner PCI Bank, when he was dismissed from his work. Abad
received a Memorandum from petitioner Bank concerning the irregular clearing of PNB-Naval Check of Sixtu Chu, the Bank’s
valued client. Abad submitted his Answer, categorically denying that he instructed his subordinates to validate the out-of-
town checks of Sixtu Chu presented for deposit or encashment as local clearing checks. During the actual investigation
conducted by petitioner Bank, several transactions violative of the Bank’s Policies and Rules and Regulations were
uncovered by the Fact-Finding Committee. Consequently, the Fact-Finding Officer of petitioner Bank issued another
Memorandum to Abad asking the latter to explain the newly discovered irregularities. Not satisfied with the explanations of
Abad, petitioner Bank served another Memorandum, terminating his employment effective immediately upon receipt of the
same. Thus, Abad instituted a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal.
Whether or not awarding of separation pay equivalent to 1/2 month’s pay for every year of service to respondent is gross,
the same being contrary to law and jurisprudence.
1
Held: The award of separation pay is required for dismissals due to causes specified under Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor
Code, as well as for illegal dismissals in which reinstatement is no longer feasible. On the other hand, an employee dismissed for
any of the just causes enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code is not, as a rule, entitled to separation pay.
As an exception, allowing the grant of separation pay or some other financial assistance to an employee dismissed for just causes
is based on equity. The Court has granted separation pay as a measure of social justice even when an employee has been validly
dismissed, as long as the dismissal was not due to serious misconduct or reflective of personal integrity or morality.
BERNARDINO A. CAINGAT, vs. NLRC, STA. LUCIA REALTY & DEV’T., INC., R.S. MAINTENANCE &
SERVICES, INC., and R.S. NIGHT HAWK SECURITY & INVESTIGATION AGENCY, INC
Petitioner Benardino A. Caingat was hired by respondent Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. (SLRDI) as the General Manager
of SLRDI’s sister companies, R.S. Night Hawk Security and Investigation Agency, Inc., and R.S. Maintenance and Services Inc. both
organized to service the malls and subdivisions owned by SLRDI. In connection with this, he was allowed to use 10% of the total
payroll of respondent R.S. Maintenance to defray operating expenses. Later, the Finance Manager discovered that petitioner
deposited company funds in the latter’s personal account and used the funds to pay his credit card purchases, utility bills, trips
abroad and acquisition of a lot in Laguna. Thus, complainant received a memorandum stating that upon verification of financial
records, it was found that the latter have misappropriated company funds in the sum of about P5, 000,000.00 and is hereby
suspended from his duties as Manager of the stated companies. Without conducting any investigation, respondent R.S.
Maintenance filed a complaint for sum of money and damages with prayer for writ of preliminary attachment. Petitioner in turn
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the respondents. Did respondents illegally dismiss petitioner?
Held: As firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence, loss of trust and confidence as a just cause for termination of employment is
premised on the fact that an employee concerned holds a position where greater trust is placed by management and from whom
greater fidelity to duty is correspondingly expected. This includes managerial personnel entrusted with confidence on delicate
matters, such as the custody, handling, or care and protection of the employer’s property. The betrayal of this trust is the
essence of the offense for which an employee is penalized. Management’s loss of trust and confidence on petitioner was well
justified. Private respondents had every right to dismiss petitioner. Petitioner’s long period of disappearance from the scene and
departure for abroad before making a claim of illegal dismissal does not contribute to its credibility.
Nonetheless, while dismissal may truly be justified by loss of confidence, the management failed to observe fully the procedural
requirement of due process for the termination of petitioner’s employment. Two notices should be sent to the employee. The
respondents only sent the first notice, gleaned from the memorandum. There was no second notice.
JAKA FOOD PROCESSING CORP vs. DARWIN PACOT, ET AL.
(RETRENCHMENT; NOTICE REQUIREMENT;SEPARATION PAY)
Respondents were earlier hired by petitioner JAKA Foods Processing Corporation until the latter terminated their employment
because the corporation was “in dire financial straits”. It is not disputed, however, that the termination was effected without
JAKA complying with the requirement under Article 283 of the Labor Code regarding the service of a written notice upon the
employees and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date of termination.
Respondents filed complaints for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages and nonpayment of service incentive leave and 13th
month pay against JAKA. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the termination illegal and ordering JAKA to reinstate
respondents with full backwages, and separation pay if reinstatement is not possible. The Court of Appeals reversed said decision
and ordered respondent JAKA to pay petitioners separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary, the proportionate 13th month
pay and, in addition, full backwages from the time their employment was terminated.
What are the legal implications of a situation where an employee is dismissed for cause but such dismissal was effected without
the employer’s compliance with the notice requirement under the Labor Code?
Held: It was established that there was ground for respondents’ dismissal, i.e., retrenchment, which is one of the authorized
causes enumerated under Article 283 of the Labor Code. Likewise, it is established that JAKA failed to comply with the notice
requirement under the same Article. Considering the factual circumstances in the instant case, the Court deem it proper to fix
the indemnity at P50, 000.00. The Court of Appeals have been in error when it ordered JAKA to pay respondents separation pay
equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service. “In all cases of business closure or cessation of operation or
undertaking of the employer, the affected employee is entitled to separation pay. This is consistent with the state policy of
treating labor as a primary social economic force, affording full protection to its rights as well as its welfare. The exception is
when the closure of business or cessation of operations is due to serious business losses or financial reverses; duly proved, in
which case, the right of affected employees to separation pay is lost for obvious reasons.”
HACIENDA BINO/HORTENCIA STARKE, INC./HORTENCIA L. STARKE VS. CANDIDO CUENCA ET AL.
Hacienda Bino is a 236-hectare sugar plantation located at Negros Occidental, and represented in this case by Hortencia L.
Starke, owner and operator of the said hacienda. The 76 individual respondents were part of the workforce of Hacienda Bino
consisting of 220 workers, performing various works, such as cultivation, planting of cane points, fertilization, watering,
weeding, harvesting, and loading of harvested sugarcanes to cargo trucks. During the off-milling season, petitioner Starke issued
an Order or Notice which stated, that all Hacienda employees who signed in favor of CARP are expressing their desire to get out
W/N there was illegal dismissal by the hotel
HELD: The SC ruled that there was illegal dismissal. An employee may be terminated for loss of trust and confidence but
this can’t be used to justify every dismissal so the Court came up with guidelines for the application of the doctrine: (1)
loss of confidence should not be simulated; (2) it should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal
or unjustified; (3) it should not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary; and (4) it must
be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith. It applies only to employees who occupy
positions of trust and confidence or to situations where the employee is routinely charged with the care and custody of the
employer's money or property. It must be shown that there is reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible
for the misconduct or infraction and that the nature of his participation rendered him unworthy of the trust and confidence
demanded by his position. Loss of confidence must be based on a willful breach of trust, founded on clearly established
facts. As assistant cook, respondent is charged with the care of food preparation in the coffee shop and responsible for the
custody of food supplies and must see to it that there is sufficient stock in the kitchen. He should not permit food or other
materials to be taken out without the necessary order slip or authorization as these are hotel property. Thus, the nature of
his position as assistant cook is one charged with trust and confidence. In this case the burden of proof establishing the
charge wasn’t overcome and there was no due process as the 2-notice requirement wasn’t met and he was never given an
opportunity to explain his side.
ATCI Overseas Corporation vs. CA
ATCI and the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait entered into an agreement. ATCI would recruit medical professionals for
the latter. Respondents were hired for the Ministry. They underwent physical and medical exams in a POEA accredited
clinic and were declared fit. In Kuwait, they were subjected to another examination and, after 2 months, they were
dismissed for being physically unfit for their jobs and were repatriated so they filed a complaint in the POEA for illegal
dismissal, alleging that they weren’t given by their foreign employer copies of the results of their medical exam and
written notice of termination. ATCI claims that the Ministry has the right to dismiss them because they were found to be
physically unfit to work. It appears on record that they were just not allowed to work anymore, there was no notice nor
was there any opportunity given to allow them to defend themselves. The POEA ruled that there was illegal dismissal. The
NLRC reversed the decision saying that the labor code provides that in proceedings before the NLRC, they may use all
reasonable means to ascertain facts and they cannot simply disregard the certification of the Ministry of Health of Kuwait,
however, this was only presented in the appeal to the NLRC. The CA reversed the NLRC. ATCI claims that respondents were
merely probationary dismissed for failure to qualify since they were physically unfit.
W/N there was illegal dismissal.
HELD: The SC ruled that there was illegal dismissal. There was no proof that they were probationary. Being regular
employees, the dismissal must meet the requirements of Art 284 of the Labor Code. An employee may be terminated if
found to be suffering from a disease and the continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as
well as to the health of his co-employees but the dismissal may not be summarily carried out. The employer must meet
certain prerequisites contained in Sec. 8, Rule I, Book VI, of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. There must
be a certification by a competent public health authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot
be cured within a period of six (6) months even with proper medical treatment. If the disease or ailment can be cured
within the period, the employee can’t be terminated but must take a leave and he will be reinstated immediately upon the
restoration of his normal health. The letter from the Ministry falls short of the demands of the Omnibus Rules. There is no
finding that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6) months with
proper medical treatment. Also ATCI has not proven that the same was presented prior to the termination. Private
employment or recruitment agencies are jointly and severally liable with its principal, the foreign-based employer, for all
claims filed by recruited workers which may arise in connection with the service agreements or employment contracts.
NDC-GUTHRIE Plantations, Inc. v. NLRC
Petitioners are both GOCC’s. They hired hundreds of farm workers for their plantations and several supervisors to oversee
the workers. NGPI discovered that it was sustaining tremendous losses so they terminated the services of 279 field workers.
NGEI had a similar fate so it terminated 153 employees. Later several employees of the companies bonded together and
formed the NDC-GUTHRIE Staff Workers Union and after it had been issued a Certificate of Recognition by the DOLE, they
sent notice to NGPI and NGEI requesting that it be recognized as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all its member-
employees. The companies replied asking for proof confirming their claim that it represented the majority of the
employees covered by the proposed bargaining unit so the union presented its minutes. Since the documents submitted did
not constitute proof of majority representation, petitioners denied recognition of the Union. The Union filed a petition for
a certification election among all employees covered by the proposed bargaining unit. Then the companies informed the
DOLE of their losses and retrenched 17 more employees. Believing that their dismissal was because of their union activities
and in violation of their rights to self-organization and to collective bargaining, the 17 filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal
and unfair labor practice. Petitioners deny the claim of illegal dismissal and assert that it’s a prerogative to lay off
employees to prevent losses. They presented financial statements prepared by the Commission on Audit showing
1
of employment on their own volition. The respondents regarded such notice as a termination of their employment. As a
consequence, they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The respondents as complainants alleged that they are regular and
permanent workers of the hacienda and that they were dismissed without just and lawful cause. Whether the respondents are
regular or seasonal employees.
Held: The primary standard for determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity
performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer. There is no doubt that the respondents
were performing work necessary and desirable in the usual trade or business of an employer. Hence, they can properly be
classified as regular employees. For respondents to be excluded from those classified as regular employees, it is not enough that
they perform work or services that are seasonal in nature. They must have been employed only for the duration of one season.
While the records sufficiently show that the respondents’ work in the hacienda was seasonal in nature, there was, however, no
proof that they were hired for the duration of one season only.
ALABANG COUNTRY CLUB INC., ET AL. VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.
Petitioner Alabang Country Club Inc. (ACCI), is a stock, non-profit corporation that operates and maintains a country club and
various sports and recreational facilities for the exclusive use of its members. Sometime in 1993, Francisco Ferrer, then President
of ACCI, requested its Internal Auditor, to conduct a study on the profitability of ACCI’s Food and Beverage Department (F & B
Department). Consequently, report showed that from 1989 to 1993, F & B Department had been incurring substantial losses.
Realizing that it was no longer profitable for ACCI to maintain its own F & B Department, the management decided to cease from
operating the department and to open the same to a contractor, such as a concessionaire, which would be willing to operate its
own food and beverage business within the club. Thus, ACCI sent its F & B Department employee’s individual letters informing
them that their services were being terminated and that they would be paid separation pay. The Union in turn, with the
authority of individual respondents, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
Whether or not the club’s right to terminate its employees for an authorized cause, particularly to secure its continued viability
and existence is valid.
Held: When petitioner decided to cease operating its F & B Department and open the same to a concessionaire, it did not reduce
the number of personnel assigned thereat. It terminated the employment of all personnel assigned at the department.
Petitioner’s failure to prove that the closure of its F & B Department was due to substantial losses notwithstanding, the Court
finds that individual respondents were dismissed on the ground of closure or cessation of an undertaking not due to serious
business losses or financial reverses, which is allowed under Article 283 of the Labor Code. The closure of operation of an
establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses includes both the complete cessation of
operations and the cessation of only part of a company’s activities.
2004 CASES
AGABON VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the business of selling and installing ornamental and
construction materials. It employed petitioner Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon as gypsum board and cornice installers on
January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for abandonment of work. Petitioners then filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the dismissal illegal. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the
decision because it found that the petitioners had abandoned their work and were not entitled to backwages and separation pay.
The Court of Appeals in turn ruled that the dismissal of the petitioners was not illegal because they had abandoned their
employment.
Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed.
Held: The dismissal should be upheld because it was established that the petitioners abandoned their jobs to work for another
company. Private respondent, however, did not follow the notice requirements and instead argued that sending notices to the
last known addresses would have been useless because they did not reside there anymore. Unfortunately for the private
respondent, this is not a valid excuse because the law mandates the twin notice requirements to the employee’s last known
address. Thus, it should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process.
When the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or
ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory rights
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROSE DUJUA, ET AL.
(ELEMENTS OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE)
Ramon Dujua, his mother Rose, his aunt, Editha Singh, and his uncle, Guillermo Samson were charged with illegal recruitment in
large scale. Only Ramon was arrested. Four testified against Ramon Dujua. All of them were promised work abroad upon payment
of fees but they were not actually deployed. Ramon pleaded not guilty and denied the allegations that he was a recruiter.
Whether or not illegal recruitment in large scale was committed by Raon Dujua, et al.
Held: The essential elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale are: 1) The accused engages in acts of recruitment
the petitioners, a case for unfair labor practice against GSP which denied such averments. GSP countered that the BLR did
not list Apacible Enterprises Employee’s Union as a local chapter of PACIWU or TUCP. Thus, the strike that said union
organized after the GSP refused to negotiate with them was illegal and that they refused to return to work when asked.
The Third Case was filed for claims of the 50 employees dismissed in the second case. Petitioner corporations, however,
maintained that they have been paying complainants the wages/salaries mandated by law and that the complaint should be
dismissed in view of the execution of quitclaims and waivers by the private respondents.
The Labor Arbiter ordered the three cases consolidated as the issues were interrelated and the respondent corporations
were under one management.
First Case: The dismissal was illegal and Stamford was ordered to reinstate the complainants as well as pay the backwages
and other benefits claimed. It was held that the reassignment and transfer of the complainants were forms of interference
in the formation and membership of a union, an unfair labor practice. Stamford also failed to substantiate their claim that
the said employees abandoned their employment. It also failed to prove the necessity of the cash deposit of P2,000 and
failed to furnish written notice of dismissal to any complainants. Further, it failed to prove payments of the amounts being
claimed.
Second Case: The strike was illegal and the officers of the union have lost their employment status, thus terminating their
employment with GSP. GSP is however ordered to reinstate the complainants who were members of the union without
backwages, save some employees specified. It was established that the union was not registered, and thus had staged an
illegal strike. The officers of the union should be liable and dismissed, but the members should not, as they acted in good
faith in the belief that their actions were within legal bounds.
Third Case: GSP was ordered to pay each complainant their claims, as computed by each individual. All other claims were
dismissed for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter found petitioners liable for salary differentials and other monetary claims for
petitioners’ failure to sufficiently prove that it had paid the same to complainants as required by law. It was also ordered
to return the cash deposits of the complainants, citing the same reasons as in the First Case.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision in the First and Third Cases, but set aside the judgment of the Second Case for
further proceedings in view of the factual issues involved.
On May 14, 1996, a Petition to Declare the Strike Illegal was filed which was decided in favor of Stamford, upholding the
dismissal of the union officers. The officers made no prior notice to strike, no vote was taken among union members, and
the issue involved was non-strikable, a demand for salary increases
On elevation to the appellate court, it was ruled that the officers should be given separation pay, and that Jacina Burabod
and the rest of the members should be reinstated without loss of seniority, plus backwages. It provided for the payment of
the backwages despite the illegality of the strike because the dismissals were done prior to the strike. Such is considered
an unfair labor practice as there was lack of due process and valid cause. Thus, the dismissed employees were still entitled
to backwages and reinstatement, with exception to the union officers who may be given separation pay due to strained
relations with their employers.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the respondents’ union officers and members were validly and legally dismisses from
employment considering the illegality of the strike.
(2) Whether or not the respondents’ union officers were entitled to backwages, separation pay and reinstatement,
respectively.
Held: (1) The termination of the union officers was legal under Article 264 of the Labor Code as the strike conducted was
illegal and that illegal acts attended the mass action. Holding a strike is a right that could be availed of by a legitimate
labor organization, which the union is not. Also, the mandatory requirements of following the procedures in conducting a
strike under paragraph (c) and (f) of Article 263 were not followed by the union officers.
Article 264 provides for the consequences of an illegal strike, as well as the distinction between officers and members who
participated therein. Knowingly participating in an illegal strike is a sufficient ground to terminate the employment of a
union officer but mere participation is not sufficient ground for termination of union members. Thus, absent clear and
substantial proof, rank-and-file union members may not be terminated. If he is terminated, he is entitled to reinstatement.
The Court affirmed the ruling of the CA on the illegal dismissal of the union members, as there was non-observance of due
process requirements and union busting by management. It also affirmed that the charge of abandonment against Julian
and Tejada were without credence. It reversed the ruling that the dismissal was unfair labor practice as there was nothing
on record to show that Julian and Tejada were discouraged from joining any union. The dismissal of the union officers for
participation in an illegal strike was upheld. However, union officers also must be given the required notices for
terminating employment, and Article 264 of the Labor Code does not authorize immediate dismissal of union officers
participating in an illegal strike. No such requisite notices were given to the union officers.
The Court upheld the appellate court’s ruling that the union members, for having participated in the strike in good faith
and in believing that their actions were within the bound of the law meant only to secure economic benefits for
themselves, were illegally dismissed hence entitled to reinstatement and backwages.
(2) The Supreme Court declared the dismissal of the union officers as valid hence, the award of separation pay was
deleted. However, as sanction for non-compliance with the notice requirements for a lawful termination, backwages were
awarded to the union officers computed from the time they were dismissed until the final entry of the judgment.
1
2003 CASES
EVELYN TOLOSA VS. NLRC (JURISDICTION OF THE LABOR ARBITERS AND THE NLRC)
Captain Virgilio Tolosa was master of the vessel M/V Donna owned by Quana-Kaiun, and was hired through its manning agent,
Asia Bulk Transport Phils., Inc. (Asia Bulk). During channeling activities upon the vessel’s departure from Yokohama on November
6, 1992, Capt. Tolosa was drenched with rainwater. Subsequently, he contracted fever on November 11 which was later on
accompanied by loose bowel movement for the succeeding 12 days. His condition was reported to Asia Bulk and the US Coast
Guard Headquarters in Hawaii on November 15. However, before he could be evacuated, he died on November 18, 1992.
Evelyn Tolosa, the widow, filed a complaint before the POEA for damages against Pedro Garate, Chief Mate of the vessel, Mario
Asis, Second Mate, Asia Bulk and Quana-Kaiun. The case was transferred to the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the
widow, awarding actual damages plus legal interest, as well as moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. On appeal to
the NLRC, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was vacated and the complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action pursuant to the provisions of the Labor Code, as amended. Sustaining the NLRC, the CA ruled that the labor
commission had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action filed by petitioner. Her cause did not arise from an
employer-employee relation, but from a quasi-delict or tort. Under Article 217 (a)(4) of the Labor Code which allows an award of
damages incident to an employer-employee relation, the damages awarded were not proper as she is not an employee, but
merely the wife of an employee.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC had jurisdiction over petitioner’s action.
(2) Whether or not the monetary award granted by the Labor arbiter has already reached finality.
Held: (1) The Court affirmed that the claim for damages was filed not for claiming damages under the Labor Code but under the
Civil Code. The Court was convinced that the allegations were based on a quasi-delict or tort. Also, she had claimed for actual
damages for loss of earning capacity based on a life expectancy of 65 years, which is cognizable under the Civil Code and can be
recovered in an action based on a quasi-delict. Though damages under a quasi-delict may be recoverable under the jurisdiction
of labor arbiters and the NLRC, the relief must be based on an action that has reasonable casual connection with the Labor Code,
labor statutes or CBA’s. It must be noted that a worker’s loss of earning capacity and backlisting are not to be equated with
wages, overtime compensation or separation pay, and other labor benefits that are generally cognized in labor disputes. The loss
of earning capacity is a relief or claim resulting from a quasi-delict or a similar cause within the realm of Civil Law. In the
present case, Evelyn Tolosa’s claim for damages is not related to any other claim under Article 217, other labor statutes, or
CBA’s. She cannot anchor her claim for damages to Article 161 of the Labor Code, which does not grant or specify a claim or
relief. This provision is only a safety and health standard under Book IV of the same Code. The enforcement of this labor
standard rests with the labor secretary. It is not the NLRC but the regular courts that have jurisdiction over action for damages,
in which the employer-employee relation is merely incidental, and in which the cause of action proceeds from a different source
of obligation such as a tort.
(2) On the finality of the award, the Court ruled that issues not raised in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal. Thus, the issue being not brought to the attention of the Court of Appeals first, this cannot be considered by the
Supreme Court. It would be tantamount to denial of the right to due process against the respondents to do so.
SAMUEL SAMARCA VS. ARC-MEN INDUSTRIES, INC.
(ABANDONMENT OF WORK; REQUISITES)
Samuel Samarca was employed as a laborer by Arc-Men Industries, Inc. On September 26, 1993, petitioner filed an application for
an emergency leave of absence on account of his son’s hospitalization. Upon his return for work, petitioner was immediately
served with a notice of respondent’s order suspending him for 30 days. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal
suspension against respondent and its owner. During the pendency of the complaint, petitioner’s 30-day suspension ended.
Consequently, respondent, in a letter, directed petitioner to report for work immediately. However, he refused, prompting
respondent to send him a Notice to Terminate, directing him to submit, within 5 days, a written explanation why he should not
be dismissed from the service for abandonment of work. For his part, petitioner submitted a letter-reply explaining that because
of the pendency of his complaint for illegal suspension with the Labor arbiter, he could not report for work. Respondent, finding
the petitioner’s written explanation insufficient, decided to terminate his services via a Notice of Termination. Consequently,
petitioner filed an amended complaint for illegal dismissal.
Whether or not petitioner abandoned his work.
Held: To constitute abandonment, two elements must concur: (1) The failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by some overt acts. Mere
absence is not sufficient. It is the employer who has the burden of proof to show a deliberate and justified refusal of the
employee to resume his employment without any intention of returning.
The above twin essential requirements for abandonment to exist are not present in the case at bar. Petitioner’s absence is not
without a justifiable reason. It must be recalled that upon receipt of the Notice to Terminate by reason of abandonment,
petitioner sent respondent a letter explaining that he could not go back to work because of the pendency of his complaint for
illegal suspension. And immediately after he was dismissed for abandonment of work, he lost no time to amend his complaint to
and placement of workers defined under Article 13 (b) or in any prohibited activities under Article 34 of the Labor Code; 2)
the accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment particularly with
respect to the securing of a license or an authority to recruit and deploy workers either locally or overseas; and 3) the
accused commits the unlawful acts against three or more persons individually or as a group.
All three elements were established beyond reasonable doubt.
First, the testimonies of the complaining witnesses satisfactorily proved that Dujua promised them employment and
assured them of placement overseas. All of them identified Dujua as the person who recruited them for employment
abroad. As against the positive and categorical testimonies of the three complainants, Dujua’s mere denials cannot prevail.
As long as the prosecution is able to establish through credible testimonial evidence that Dujua has engaged in illegal
recruitment , a conviction for the offense can very well be justified.
Second, Dujua did not have any license or authority to recruit persons for overseas work, as shown by the Certification
issued by the POEA. Neither did his employer, World Pack Travel and Tours, possess such license or authority.
Third, it has been alleged and proven that Dujua undertook the recruitment of more than three persons.
GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
(CBA; REFUSAL TO RENEGOTIATE ECONOMIC PROVISIONS OF THE CBA BY THE MANAGEMENT CONSTITUTES ULP)
General Milling Corporation employed 190 workers. All the employees were members of a union which is a duly certified
bargaining agent. The GMC and the union entered into a collective bargaining agreement which included the issue of
representation that is effective for a term of three years which will expire on November 30, 1991. On November 29, 1991, a
day before the expiration of the CBA, the union sent GMC a proposed CBA, with a request that a counter proposal be
submitted within ten days. on October 1991, GMC received collective and individual letters from the union members stating
that they have withdrawn from their union membership. On December 19, 1991, the union disclaimed any massive
disaffiliation of its union members. On January 13, 1992, GMC dismissed an employee who is a union member. The union
protected the employee and requested GMC to submit to the grievance procedure provided by the CBA, but GMC argued
that there was no basis to negotiate with a union which is no longer existing. The union then filed a case with the Labor
Arbiter but the latter ruled that there must first be a certification election to determine if the union still enjoys the
support of the workers.
Whether or not GMC is guilty of unfair labor practice for violating its duty to bargain collectively and/or for interfering with
the right of its employees to self-organization.
Held: GMC is guilty of unfair labor practice when it refused to negotiate with the union upon its request for the
renegotiation of the economic terms of the CBA on November 29, 1991. the union’s proposal was submitted within the
prescribed 3-year period from the date of effectivity of the CBA. It was obvious that GMC had no valid reason to refuse to
negotiate in good faith with the union. The refusal to send counter proposal to the union and to bargain anew on the
economic terms of the CBA is tantamount to an unfair labor practice under Article 248 of the Labor Code.
Under Article 252 of the Labor Code, both parties are required to perform their mutual obligation to meet and convene
promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement. The union lived up to this obligation
when it presented proposals for a new CBA to GMC within 3 years from the effectivity of the original CBA. But GMC failed in
its duty under Article 252. What it did was to devise a flimsy excuse, by questioning the existence of the union and the
status of its membership to prevent any negotiation. It bears stressing that the procedure in collective bargaining
prescribed by the Code is mandatory because of the basic interest of the state in ensuring lasting industrial peace.
The Court of Appeals found that the letters between February to June, 1993 by 13 union members signifying their
resignation from the union clearly indicated that GMC exerted pressure on the employees. We agree with the Court of
Appeals’ conclusion that the ill-timed letters of resignation from the union members indicate that GMC interfered with the
right of its employee to self-organization.
STAMFORD MARKETING CORP., ET AL. VS. JOSEPHINE JULIAN, ET AL.
(UNIONS; UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE; STRIKES; ILLEGAL DISMISSAL)
On Nov 2, 1994, Zoilo de la Cruz, president of the Philippine Agricultural Commercial and Industrial Workers’ Union
(PACIWU-TUCP), sent a letter to Rosario Apacible, treasurer and general manager of Stamford Mkg Corp, GSP Manufacturing
Corp, Giorgio Antonio Mkg Corp, Clementine Mkg Corp and Ultimate Concept Phils., Inc. The letter informed her that the
rank-and-file employees of the said companies had formed the Apacible Enterprises Employee’s Union-PACIWU-TUCP and
demanded that it be recognized. After such notice, the following three cases arose:
In the First Case, Josephine Julian, president of PACIWU-TUCP, Jacinta Tejada and Jecina Burabod, a Board Member and a
member of the said union, were dismissed. They filed a suit with the Labor Arbiter alleging that their employer had not
paid them with their overtime pay, holiday pay/premiums, rest day premium, 13th month pay for the year 1994 salaries for
services actually rendered, and that illegal deduction had been made without their consent from their salaries for a cash
bond. Stamford alleged that the three were dismissed for not reporting for work when required to do so and for not giving
notice or explanation when asked.
In the Second Case, PACIWU-TUCP filed, on behalf of 50 employees allegedly dismissed illegally for union membership by
1
illegal dismissal. This alone negates any intention on his part to forsake his work. It is a settled doctrine that the filing of a
complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with the charge of abandonment, for an employee who takes steps to protest his
dismissal cannot by logic be said to have abandoned his work.