Kantian Ethics Review

by Matthew Mosdell

Immanuel Kant is one of the the most sophisticated thinkers in the history of philoso-
phy. His sophistication, however, often makes him difficult to understand. In this review,
I want to try to clear up some potential areas of confusion while retaining the profound
insight Kant brought to moral philosophy. To do this, we’re going to proceed much as we
did with our discussion of utilitarianism. First, however, I want to get some terminology
out on the table. (I’ll be using these concepts below, so you might want to take a moment
to familiarize yourself with them.)

Maxim: A rule or principle for living. For example, I might hold the maxim that when
it is in my best interest, I will lie.

Hypothetical Imperative: Conditional ‘ought’ statements. In other words, a hypo-

thetical imperative tells the individual what they should do if they want something
else. For example, if I want to be a chef, then I ought to go to culinary school.

Categorical Imperative: Unconditional ‘ought’ statements. In other words, a categor-

ical imperative tells the individual what they should do categorically–that is, in all
cases. For example, one ought not lie is a categorical imperative.

Will: the aspect of a mind capable of forming an intention.

Volition: the act of willing.

Now that we have these terminological points in hand, we can begin the task of trying
to understand Kant. As I mentioned above, I’m going to sketch the basics of Kant’s
ideas much as I did those of utilitarianism. Hence, I’ll start by offering a brief thought
experiment that will help you (hopefully) get hold of the distinction between deontology
and consequentialism. Once that’s out of the way, we’ll then proceed to the descriptive
aspect of Kant’s moral philosophy. Next we will turn to the prescriptive component, and
finally, I’ll briefly sketch one formidable criticism that has been leveled against Kantian
moral philosophy.
First, let’s look at a thought experiment. Suppose you are walking through the jungles
of Panama (for example, the Dorian Gap) and stumble across a prison camp. The prison-
ers are a group of twenty nuns who were captured during a humanitarian-aid mission to
local children—that is, the prisoners are innocent, they haven’t done anything to deserve
punishment. Unfortunately for the prisoners, however, the leader of the camp is a vicious
man who gets pleasure out of seeing people die, and on the day you stumble into camp he
just happens to be looking for entertainment. Of course, once you’re spotted wandering
through the camp, he immediately captures you, and due to his twisted mind, presents
you with the following problem. After lining the nuns up against a wall he tells you that
you have two options. On the first option, you don’t have to do anything. However, on

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this option, your abstaining from action means he will kill all twenty nuns, after which
he will let you go free. On the second option, you have to do something you don’t want
to do. Specifically, you have to kill one of the nuns. If you take this option and kill one
of the nuns yourself, he will let you and the remaining nineteen nuns go free. So what
should you do? More specifically, what are you morally obligated to do, or what is the
right ethical choice?
If you think you are morally obligated to kill one of the nuns so you and the other
nineteen can go free, then you’re thinking like a consequentialist. If you think you’re
morally obligated to refrain from action, even though that means all twenty nuns will
die, then you’re thinking like a deontologist—that is, you’re thinking as Kant would have
you think. So what’s the difference? Well, the consequentialist thinks we are morally
obligated to do whatever leads to the best consequences, and clearly killing one nun leads
to the best consequences. On the other hand, the deontologist thinks we are morally
obligated to do (or avoid doing, as the case may be) whatever we have a duty to do, and
since most people think they have a duty not to kill innocent people, moral obligation
demands they not kill the innocent nun. So the question we need to ask is, “How do
deontologists go about figuring out what they have a duty to do/avoid doing?”
To answer that question, we’re best off turning to Kant’s moral philosophy. Recall
that moral propositions need something to make them true. For example, the moral
proposition, “It is wrong to kill innocent children,” needs something by which it is made
true. For the consequentialist, the thing that makes that proposition true is its conse-
quences, but Kant rejects consequentialism. Hence, he needs something that can make
moral propositions true, but does not rest on consequences. In other words, Kant needs
to find something which is good in itself—that is, he needs something by which “The
Good” is constituted. Looking around at possibilities, Kant settles on the Will; for Kant,
the only thing capable of being good in itself is a Good Will, the goodness of everything
else seems to rest on how the will is exercised. Here’s that argument:1

1. The will is the only thing that can impart value. (P)

2. We value things. (P)

3. The value of all these things depends on the will. (1, 2)

4. If x depends for its goodness on y, then y is more basically good than x. (P)

5. The goodness of the will is more basic than the sundry things we value. (3, 4)

Central to this argument is the notion of a ‘Will’. Recall from above that the Will is an
aspect of the mind by which intentions are formed. This means that a Good Will is going
to be the ability of a mind to form good intentions. But how do we know what makes an
intention good? To answer this question, we need to understand Kant’s commitment to
1
In the argument, the parenthetical P’s mean premise (something for which we are not ar-
guing). The parenthetical numbers tell you from where that step was derived. So, for example,
step 3 in this argument was derived from steps 1 and 2.

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reason. For Kant, morality is a function of reason, and this means that it is by the powers
of reason that one determines what is and is not good. So to determine if an intention is
good, we need to investigate the powers of reason. Doing so is going to move us into the
prescriptive aspect of Kant’s moral philosophy.
Because Kant thinks the dictates of morality can be derived strictly from reason, he
needs to figure out what moral obligations one is committed to in virtue of being a rational
creature. To put this point a bit differently, Kant thinks that it is only creatures with the
power to reason that have the capacity to understand abstract concepts like the concept
‘Good’. If that’s right, then figuring out what the concept ‘Good’ is will need to be done
by our faculty of reason. Moreover, since only rational creatures will be able to reason
to the ‘Good’, it is only to these kinds of creatures that morality will apply. And this
means that anything that is capable of having a Good Intention is something that has the
capacity to reason. Notice that this move by Kant to the level of shared reasons moves us
out of the domain of subjective reason and into the domain of reasons as such. In other
words, we move to a domain of thinking where we are looking at what would count as a
reason for anything that is a rational creature.
Let’s pause for a moment and think about where we are in Kant’s thinking. So far
we’ve denied that consequences can be good in themselves and looked at an argument
for why we should locate the goodness of right actions in the Will. Next, we wondered
what it is that makes a Will good, and saw that it must be some principle of reason. Now
we need to look at different principles of reason and see which, if any, of those principles
apply across the board—that is, which principles of reason are categorical.
When we start to think about the reasons for action, we notice that some reasons are
hypothetical. In other words, we notice that some of our reasons for action depend on the
ends we want to achieve. These reasons take the form of conditional ‘ought’ statements
and are known as hypothetical imperatives. For example, if I want to be a philosopher, I
should read a bunch of philosophy books and take some courses. Or, again, if I want to
get my car working, I should take it to a good mechanic. Of course, many of our actions
are going to be governed by reasons of this hypothetical kind, but some of our actions
will be governed by reasons based on categorical principles. The idea here is that some
of our actions will be in accord with specific principles of living—that is, maxims—which
are not motivated by any specific end. For example, I might have the fun maxim—that
is, a principle of living that tells me to have fun. This principle is not directed to some
other end, but is, rather, an end in itself. This means that how I live is going to be
influenced by the categorical imperatives I adopt. Again, there’s going to be a lot of
different maxims for a lot of different people (both of the hypothetical and categorical
variety), but what Kant is interested in is seeing if there are any principles of action that
apply to rational creatures as such. What I’m suggesting, then, is that Kant is going to
try figuring out if there are categorical imperatives—that is, principles of living that are
ends in themselves—that everyone should adopt because they’re rational.
To figure out if there are any such principles, Kant designs a universalizability test.
Take any maxim that you think is of the categorical variety, apply the universalizability
test to the maxim, and if it passes the test, you can be sure that you have a principle of
living that applies to all rational creatures. In order to see how the universalizability test

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works, let’s step our way through it.

• Take any maxim and ask yourself the following two questions, in order:

1. Can I conceive of my maxim as a universal law?

This is conceptual test. What we’re looking for is to see if making the maxim
a universal law creates a contradiction. For example, take the maxim “When
convenient, I will make false promises.” In this case, the answer is that such
a maxim is conceptually contradictory; we can’t make lying a universal law of
action without creating a contradiction. So, because of that fact, we have a
perfect duty not to lie. If there is no conceptual contradiction, then we move
on to question 2.
2. Can I will my maxim to be universal law?
This is a volitional test. What we’re looking for here is to see if willing such
an action to be universal law would cause the will to contradict itself. For
example, take the maxim “I will be lazy.” In this case, such a maxim is
volitionally contradictory. This is so because the very act of willing to be lazy
requires one to not be lazy. So, because of this fact, we have an imperfect duty
not to be lazy.

• If we can think of a maxim that passes both of these tests, then we have a principle
of living that can be universally applied. So, for example, take the maxim, “Tell
the truth.” Will such a maxim lead to a conceptual contradiction? No. Will such
a maxim lead to a volitional contradiction? No. This means that the maxim, “Tell
the truth,” is a universal principle of living—that is, it’s a principle of living that
we have a moral obligation to live by.

What we see, then, is that applying the universalizability test gives us a means of
figuring out what principles of living apply to all rational creatures. And from this we
can tell what we are morally obligated to do. If a maxim forces us to go against our
own rationality or our own volition as rational creatures, then we are morally required to
abstain from that maxim. On the other hand, if a maxim is consistent with our nature as
both rational and volitional creatures, then it is acceptable to live in accord with such a
maxim. What Kant assumes is that we are rational creatures, and what he shows is that
our conception of “The Good” is what creatures of our kind find to be rational.
Now, we can generalize the ideas characteristic of the universalizability test to formu-
late a general principle that can serve to govern all other principles of living: this general
principle is known as The Categorical Imperative. Let me explain. We have first-order
principles of living that tell us, as individuals, what to do on any particular occasion.
Once we think of those principles categorically, as applying to all rational creatures—that
is, once we run our principles of living through the universalizability test—these principles
serve to govern all our first-order maxims. The idea here can be generalized to capture the
content of any maxim applied categorically, and this generalization just is the Categorical
Imperative. In its most familiar form, the Categorical Imperative says, ”Act only on that

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maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it would become a universal law.”
In other words, the Categorical Imperative is a second-order principle of reason designed
to govern all first-order principles of reason. What Kant thinks, then, is that any rational
principle by which all rational agents must act will conform to the Categorical Imperative.
Alright, so let’s again step back and trace the picture that is before us. Instead of
reiterating what I’ve already said, let me start the sketch in a different place. Kant
assumes human beings to be rational creatures with the power to form intentions—that
is, with the power of volition. From this assumption, Kant then looks to the kinds of
rational principles that motivate us to act. Another way of putting this is to say that
Kant looks to see what kinds of reasons are given for action. Sometimes these reasons
turn out to be of the hypothetical imperative variety: these are reasons for action directed
toward some end. Other reasons for action, however, are not directed towards satisfying
any particular ends, but are, instead, adopted as general principles of living: these are
ends in themselves and apply categorically. Of these general principles of living, Kant
thinks the only rational ones—the only ones a rational person will take on board as
principles to govern his actions—must be conformable to the universalizability test. Of
course, if the maxims are consistent with such a test, then we can be sure that they will
result in a proper exercise of the will—that is, they will result in a good will. Now, in
order to guarantee a maxim’s goodness by its conformity to reason, Kant formulates the
Categorical Imperative, which is a principle to govern all other principles. If a maxim is
consistent with the Categorical Imperative, then we can be sure that it is good, and thus,
in acting from such maxims, the individual can be sure that his will is good. To restate,
then, moral obligation is derived from principled reasons for acting only if those reasons
for acting are consistent with the Categorical Imperative.
Now I know that’s a lot to digest, so let’s return to our thought experiment and see
what Kant thinks in that context. Recall that we are confronted with two options, either
kill one nun or do nothing. If we do nothing they all die and we go free. Now, we know
that Kant thinks that of these two options, we should choose to do nothing. Why? Well,
let’s take the maxim “Don’t kill innocent people.” Is that maxim conceptually univer-
salizable? Yes. Is that maxim volitionally universalizable? Yes. So all rational creatures
have a duty as rational creatures not to kill innocent people. Again, recall that it is only
the Will that can make the consequences of action good, and that to have a Good Will
is to have a Will that conforms to the dictates of reason. Moreover, reason dictates that
you don’t kill innocent people, so if you are to act morally (good) in this situation, you
can’t kill any of the innocent nuns.

Finally, let me just quickly give you one argument against the Kantian project. Here’s
the argument:

1. When thinking about reasons for action, I cannot abstract away from the I of my
deliberations. (P)

2. Deliberations that are essentially first-personal do not need to consider the reasons
others have for acting. (P)

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 3. When thinking about reasons for action, I don’t need to consider the reasons others
have for acting. (1, 2)

4. If other people’s deliberations don’t matter to my reasons for acting, then there’s
no reason to think the results of my practical deliberations will be consistent with
theirs. (P)

5. There’s no reason to think the results of my practical reasoning—that is, reasoning

about what to do—will be consistent with the reasoning of others regarding what
to do. (3, 4)

6. But Kant’s entire project of morality rested on the idea that the results of my
practical reasoning and the results of another rational agent’s practical reasoning
will be consistent. (P)

7. Kant got things wrong. (5, 6)

This line of thinking is taken from another great philosopher, Bernard Williams. I’m
not sure if I’m fully convinced that Williams has successfully undermined Kantian think-
ing, but it is certainly a good objection, one worth taking seriously. Particularly worri-
some in the argument above are premises 3 and 4. The reason we should be worried about
them is because they don’t seem obviously true, and since we haven’t seen an argument
for them, we don’t have any reason to believe them. If that’s right, then Williams’s ob-
jection doesn’t go through. That being said, Williams devotes a lot of time arguing for
those two steps in the argument and if you’d like to see how he does that, I encourage
you to read his book Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.