2 STATE SAFETY PROGRAMME Manual v1

Manual
for the creation of the
GENERIC
STATE SAFETY PROGRAMME
State Safety Programme generic Manual
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Contents
Foreword
Definitions
Acronyms and Abbreviations
Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 2 Safety Oversight Arrangements
1. Introduction
2. Responsibilities of Civil Aviation Authority
3. Air Accident Investigation Department
4. Responsibilities of the Air Navigation Service Providers
5. Search and Rescue
Chapter 3 Safety Policy and Objectives
1. Safety legislative framework

Safety Policy Statement
2. Safety responsibilities and accountabilities for SSP
3. Accident and incident investigation
4. Enforcement policy in the
Enforcement Policy
Chapter 4 Safety Risk Management
1. Safety requirements for service providers SMS

2. Agreement on service provider’s safety performance
Chapter 5 Aviation Safety Assurance
1. Safety oversight
2. Safety data collection, analysis and exchange
3. Safety data driven targeting of oversight by CAA on areas of
greater concern or need
Chapter 6 Aviation Safety Promotion
1. Internal training, communication and dissemination of safety

information
2. External training, communication and dissemination of safety
information
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Attachment 1 Aviation Safety Legislative Framework
Attachment 2 Acceptable Level of Safety
1. Introduction
2. Definition of an Acceptable Level of Safety
3. Safety Indicators
Attachment 3 Safety Risk Management Process
Attachment 4 SSP Implementation Plan
1. Gap Analysis
2. SSP Implementation Plan
Appendix to SSP Gap Analysis Table

Attachment 4
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FOREWORD
Newly introduced International Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) into the
ICAO Annex 1 – Personnel Licensing, Annex 6 — Operation of Aircraft, Annex 8 —
Airworthiness of Aircraft, Annex 11 — Air Traffic Services, Annex 13 — Aircraft Accident
and Incident Investigation and Annex 14 — Aerodromes require ICAO Contracting States
to develop, under their safety management, the State Safety Programme (SSP). As
signatory of the ICAO Convention States must act in accordance with Article 37 which
states:
Each contracting State undertakes to collaborate in securing the highest

practicable degree of uniformity in regulations, standards, procedures, and
organization in relation to aircraft, personnel, airways and auxiliary
services in all matters in which such uniformity will facilitate and improve
air navigation.
Additionally, the States, in its efforts to integrate into the European Civil Aviation
development projects of which the Single European Sky (SES) is the most important
one, was among the other States included under the European Common Aviation Area
(ECAA) agreement project. The ECAA agreement was introduced with the intent to
speed up the process of harmonization of the European Community civil aviation
legislation within the contracting ECAA States.
To facilitate implementation of ICAO SARPs related to the State Safety Programme,

ICAO developed and published Safety Management Manual (SMM), Doc 9859, Second
Edition. The manual describes basic safety concepts, as the foundation upon which to
understand the need for both a Safety Management System (SMS) and a State Safety
Programme (SSP) as well as how these safety concepts are embodied into the ICAO
SARPs contained in Annexes 1, 6, 8, 11, 13 and 14. The manual thereafter outlines a
principled approach to the implementation of an SMS by service providers and the
progressive implementation and maintenance of an SSP, with emphasis on the role civil
aviation authority plays in supporting SMS implementation by service providers under its
supervision responsibility.
In a State is the regulatory and supervisory authority responsible for the safety of air
transportation within the area of its responsibility. In that respect the Ministry (most
cases the Ministry od Transport) agreed that the CAA be involved in coordination during
the development of the SSP.
The intent of developed SSP will be to emphasize, among the other elements, the
structure and organization of aviation safety in the State through the different
responsible authorities, starting from the regulators and including different service
providers. It will also provide guidelines that would assist the implementation and
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maintenance of the SSP as well as many suggestions for the improvements in the
existing safety oversight system. As the programme must be developed in accordance
with ICAO and European regulations as well as in line with the basic Civil Aviation Act,
that at the moment of the drafting of this document is in its final preparation before it is
released for adoption process, it is the assumption of the contractor that this basic law
will be properly aligned with international standards.
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DEFINITIONS
Acceptable level of safety. Minimum degree of safety that must be assured by a

system in actual practice.
Accident. An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place
between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such
time as all such persons have disembarked, in which:
a) a person is fatally or seriously injured as a result of:

— being in the aircraft, or
— direct contact with any part of the aircraft, including parts which have
become detached from the aircraft, or
— direct exposure to jet blast, except when the injuries are from natural
causes, self-inflicted or inflicted by other persons, or when the injuries
are to stowaways hiding outside the areas normally available to the
passengers and crew; or
b) the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure which:
— adversely affects the structural strength, performance or flight
characteristics of the aircraft, and
— would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected
component, except for engine failure or damage, when the damage is
limited to the engine, its cowlings or accessories; or for damage limited to
propellers, wing tips, antennas, tires, brakes, fairings, small dents or
puncture holes in the aircraft skin; or
c) the aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible.
Note 1.— For statistical uniformity only, an injury resulting in death within thirty days of
the date of the accident is classified as a fatal injury by ICAO.
Note 2.— An aircraft is considered to be missing when the official search has been
terminated and the wreckage has not been located.
Aerodrome certificate. A certificate issued by the appropriate authority under

applicable regulations for the operation of an aerodrome.
Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP). A publication issued by or with the

authority of a State and containing aeronautical information of a lasting character
essential to air navigation.
Air operator certificate (AOC). A certificate authorizing an operator to carry out

specified commercial air transport operations.
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Approved maintenance organization. An organization approved by a Contracting

State, in accordance with the requirements of Annex 6, Part I, Chapter 8 — Aeroplane
Maintenance, to perform maintenance of aircraft or parts thereof and operating under
supervision approved by that State.
Note.— Nothing in this definition is intended to preclude that the organization and its
supervision be approved by more than one State.
Approved training. Training conducted under special curricula and supervision

approved by a Contracting State that, in the case of flight crew members, is conducted
within an approved training organization.
Approved training organization. An organization approved by a Contracting State in

accordance with the requirements of Annex 1, 1.2.8.2 and Appendix 2 to perform flight
crew training and operating under the supervision of that State.
Certification, A process performed by the appropriate authority in order to approve an

established provider of Aviation related services.
Certified aerodrome. An aerodrome whose operator has been granted an aerodrome

certificate.
Flight data analysis. A process of analysing recorded flight data in order to improve
the safety of flight operations.
Hazard. A condition or an object with the potential to cause injuries to personnel,

damage to equipment or structures, loss of material, or reduction of ability to perform a
prescribed function.
Incident. An occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of an

aircraft which affects or could affect the safety of operation.
Note.— The types of incidents which are of main interest to the International Civil
Aviation Organization for accident prevention studies are listed in the Accident/Incident
Reporting Manual (ADREP Manual) (Doc 9156).
Investigation. A process conducted for the purpose of accident prevention which

includes the gathering and analysis of information, the drawing of conclusions, including
the determination of causes and, when appropriate, the making of safety
recommendations.
Level of safety. Degree of safety of a system, representing the quality of the system,
safety-wise, expressed through safety indicators.
Licensing Authority. The Authority designated by a Contracting State as responsible

for the licensing of personnel.
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Note.— In the provisions of Annex 1, the Licensing Authority is deemed to have been
given the following responsibilities by the Contracting State:
a) assessment of an applicant’s qualifications to hold a licence or rating;
b) issue and endorsement of licences and ratings;
c) designation and authorization of approved persons;
d) approval of training courses;
e) approval of the use of flight simulation training devices and authorization for
their use in gaining the experience or in demonstrating the skill required for the
issue of a licence or rating; and
f) validation of licences issued by other Contracting States.
Maintenance. The performance of tasks required ensuring the continuing airworthiness

of an aircraft or ground based equipment in the service of the Aviation sector including
any one or combination of overhaul, inspection, replacement, defect rectification, and
the embodiment of a modification or repair.
Maintenance organization’s procedures manual. A document endorsed by the

head of the maintenance organization which details the maintenance organization’s
structure and management responsibilities, scope of work, description of facilities,
maintenance procedures and quality assurance or inspection systems.
Maintenance programme. A document which describes the specific scheduled

maintenance tasks and their frequency of completion and related procedures, such as a
reliability programme, necessary for the safe operation of aircraft or ground based
equipment in the service of the Aviation sector to which it applies.
Maintenance release. A document which contains a certification confirming that the

maintenance work to which it relates has been completed in a satisfactory manner,
either in accordance with the approved data and the procedures described in the
maintenance organization’s procedures manual or under an equivalent system.
Operations specifications. The authorizations, conditions and limitations associated

with the air operator certificate and subject to the conditions in the operations manual.
Performance criteria. Simple, evaluative statements on the required outcome of the

competency element and a description of the criteria used to judge whether the required
level of performance has been achieved.
Quality assurance. Part of quality management focused on providing confidence that

quality requirements will be fulfilled.
Quality control. Part of quality management focused on fulfilling quality requirements.
Quality management. Coordinated activities to direct and control an organization with

regard to quality.
Quality system. Documented organizational procedures and policies; internal audit of

those policies and procedures; management review and recommendation for quality
improvement.
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Safety. The state in which the possibility of harm to persons or of property damage is
reduced to, and maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a continuing
process of hazard identification and safety risk management.
Safety indicators. Parameters that characterize and/or typify the level of safety of the
system.
Safety management system. A systematic approach to managing safety, including

the necessary organizational structures, accountabilities, policies and procedures.
Safety programme. An integrated set of regulations and activities aimed at improving

safety.
Safety risk. Assessment, expressed in terms of predicted probability and severity, of

the consequences of a hazard, taking as reference the worst foreseeable situation.
Note. — Typically, safety risks are designated through an alphanumeric convention that
allows for their measurement.
Safety risk management. A generic term that encompasses the assessment and
mitigation of the safety risks of the consequences of hazards that threaten the
capabilities of an organization, to a level as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).
Safety risk probability. The likelihood that an unsafe event or condition might occur.
Safety risk severity. The possible consequences of an unsafe event or condition,

taking as reference the worst foreseeable situation.
Safety targets. Concrete safety objectives to be achieved.
State of Manufacture. The State having jurisdiction over the organization responsible
for the final assembly of the aircraft.
State of Registry. The State on whose register the aircraft is entered.
Note.— In the case of the registration of aircraft of an international operating agency on

other than a national basis, the States constituting the agency are jointly and severally
bound to assume the obligations which, under the Chicago Convention, attach to a State
of Registry. See, in this regard, the Council Resolution of 14 December 1967 on
Nationality and Registration of Aircraft Operated by International Operating Agencies
which can be found in Policy and Guidance Material on the Economic Regulation of
International Air Transport (Doc 9587).
Target level of safety (TLS). A generic term representing the level of risk which is
considered acceptable in particular circumstances.
Value of a safety indicator. Quantification of a safety indicator.
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Value of a safety target. Quantification of a safety target.
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ADREP Accident/incident data reporting (ICAO)

AEP Aerodrome emergency plan
AIRPROX Aircraft proximity
ALARP As low as reasonably practicable
ALoS Acceptable level of safety
AMJ Advisory material joint
AMO Approved maintenance organization
AOC Air operator certificate
ASDE Airport surface detection equipment
ASR Air safety report
ATC Air traffic control
ATCO Air traffic controller
ATM Air traffic management
ATS Air traffic service(s)
CAA Civil aviation authority
CAD Civil Aviation Directorate
CDA Constant descent arrivals
CEO Chief executive officer
CFIT Controlled flight into terrain
CIP Commercially important person
Cir Circular (ICAO)
CMC Crisis management centre
CRDA Converging runway display aid
CRM Crew resource management
CVR Cockpit voice recorder
DCA
DME Distance measuring equipment
Doc Document (ICAO)
EC European Commission
ECCAIRS European Co-ordination Centre for Aviation Incident Reporting Systems
ERP Emergency response plan
ESARR EUROCONTROL Safety Regulatory Requirement
EU European Union
FDA Flight data analysis
FDM Flight data monitoring
FDR Flight data recorder
FOD Foreign object (debris) damage
ft Feet
GPS Global positioning system
ILS Instrument landing system
IMC Instrument meteorological conditions
ISIS Implementation of Single European Sky in South East Europe
ISO International Organization for Standardization
JAA Joint Aviation Authority
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JAR Joint Aviation Regulation
Kg Kilogram(s)
LOFT Line-oriented flight training
LOSA Line operations safety audit
m Metre(s)
MDA Minimum descent altitude
MEL Minimum equipment list
MOR Mandatory occurrence report
MRM Maintenance resource management
NM Nautical mile(s)
NSA National Supervisory Authority
OJT On-the-job training
PC Personal computer
QA Quality assurance
QC Quality control
QMS Quality management system
RCC Rescue Co-ordination Centre
RVSM Reduced vertical separation minimum
SA Safety assurance
SAG Safety action group
SARPs Standards and Recommended Practices (ICAO)
SDCPS Safety data collection and processing systems
SES Single European Sky
SHEL Software/Hardware/Environment/Liveware
SMM Safety management manual (ICAO Doc 9859)
SMS Safety management system(s)
SMSM Safety management systems manual
SOPs Standard operating procedures
SRB Safety review board
SRM Safety risk management
SSP State safety programme
TLH Top level hazard
TRM Team resource management
USOAP Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (ICAO)
VIP Very important person
VMC Visual meteorological conditions
VOR Very high frequency omni directional range
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 This chapter is a short introduction to the process of the establishment of a State
Safety Programme.
1.2 The project aims at improving the State’s relevant administration’s capacities in
the areas covered by the SSP. Through a project the following aspect will be
facilitated:
a. Continuation of the alignment of the State’s transport/aviation legislation to

the ICAO regulation standards supporting liberalisation of market access,
traffic rates and fares (including competition and state aid);
b. Support adoption of the Air Traffic Management (ATM) and the Single
European Sky (SES) aspects of the Acquis in coordination with the
Implementation of Single European Sky;
c. Support the airport ground handling and slot allocation
procedures/regulatory framework;
d. Support the airport safety and security regulations/procedures;
e. Support and assist in the implementation of environmental standards and
consumer rights in relation to the aviation industry; and
f. Support Aviation Safety and Aircraft Accident Investigation.
1.3 If an external project is engaged in the preparation of this State obligation Terms
of Reference (ToR) should be established and agreed.
1.4 During the analysis process guided by the ToR, main requirements should be
identified for the support of the development of the State Safety Programme
(SSP) for the State. Developed SSP should be seen as a way of organizing the
safety responsibilities and accountabilities of the State in a principled and
structured manner, and measuring the effectiveness with which safety
responsibilities are discharged and safety accountabilities are fulfilled. The long-
term, strategic objective of the SSP is the improvement of safety in the State
while the short-term tactical objective is the organization of the SSP in such a
manner to ensure efficient and effective delivery of safety responsibilities and
accountabilities and efficient auditing of safety responsibilities and
accountabilities by the State.
1.5 In practice, the SSP is an integrated set of regulations and activities aimed at
assisting CAA in its delegated role it plays in improving aviation safety in the
State. In accordance with relevant ICAO SARPs and associated guidance
material, the SSP consists of four components and eleven elements and it also
includes an Acceptable Level of Safety (ALoS) to be achieved by the SSP. ALoS is
an essential element of an SSP as it establishes condition for one performance-
based regulatory environment in which performances of the SSP are monitored
in order to determine whether the system is truly operating in accordance with
the design expectations.
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1.6 Developed SSP is broad in its scope and includes many safety activities and
measures aimed at fulfilling the safety programme’s objectives by securing safe
conduct and performance measurements of operations carried out by Serbian
aircraft operators, air navigation services provider, airports, maintenance and
manufacturing organizations and training institutes. To implement such safety
activities and measures in an integrated manner, development and
implementation of a coherent Safety Management System (SMS) within each
organisation oversighted by the SSP, is mandatory.
1.7 A State’s safety oversight function is also a necessary part of a State’s safety
programme. The objectives of the State’s safety oversight function are satisfied
through administrative controls (inspections, audits and surveys) carried out
regularly by the civil aviation authority. The critical elements of a State’s safety
oversight function do not, in themselves, constitute safety risk controls. The
State’s safety programme is necessary to turn the safety oversight critical
elements into safety risk controls. The State’s safety programme considers
regulations as safety risk controls requiring, through its safety risk management
component, that the process of rulemaking be done using principles of safety risk
management (identify specific hazards, conduct risk analysis, develop rules that
provide acceptable mitigation of the hazards’ effects), and monitoring, through
its safety assurance component, the effectiveness and efficiency of regulations as
safety risk controls.
1.8 Clear articulation of the difference between regulations as administrative controls

and regulations as safety risk controls underlies the shift from prescriptive
regulation to performance based regulation. The State’s safety programme is a
first enabling step in such a shift. Furthermore, the integration into the State’s
safety programme, as appropriate, of the principles underlying the role of the
critical elements of a State’s safety oversight function will yield a more robust
and effective State safety programme. The hazard addressed by both the SMS
and the State’s safety programme frameworks is the lack of standardization
regarding the components of a service provider’s SMS or a State’s safety
programme. The risk is the inability by a State to organize its safety programmes
or develop national regulations regarding SMS. The SSP and SMS frameworks are
provided as mitigation strategy to this risk.
1.9 The establishment of a Quality Management System (QMS) in the CAA shall be
concidered was made. This subject might not be the part of the project
establishing the SSP although it is recognized that if QMS and specifically Quality
Assurance (QA) is properly implemented it ensures that procedures are carried
out consistently and in compliance with applicable requirements, that problems
are identified and resolved, and that the organization continuously reviews and
improves its procedures, products and services. QA, however, can not by itself,
as proposed by quality dogma, “assure safety”. It is the integration of QA
principles and concepts into an SSP under the safety assurance component that
will assists the CAA in ensuring the necessary standardization of processes to
achieve the overarching objective of identification and control of hazards and risk
assessment of the consequences of hazards on safety of operations in the State.
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1.10 This includes the establishment of requirements, specific operating regulations

and implementation policies which will govern management of safety by the CAA
and rules and/or regulations which will govern how service provider’s SMS
operates including the agreement on safety performance of service provider’s
SMS. The requirements, specific operating regulations and implementation
policies will require periodic review by a CAA’s Safety Regulation Board (SRB) to
ensure they remain relevant and appropriate to the service providers in the
State. Those are all shared commonalities between the SSP and QMS; however,
there are important differences between both, as well as shortcomings in the
effectiveness of QMS to achieve by itself the overarching objective of managing
the safety risks of the consequences of the hazards. For the above reasons, the
SSP would accept and provide adequate “quality control” and adequate
management of safety by the CAA, if appropriately implemented.
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Chapter 2 Safety Oversight Arrangements
1. Introduction
1.1 The State as signatory of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (ICAO
Doc 7300) has agreed on the obligations of Contracting States concerning
compliance with the Convention as well as with Standards and Recommended
Practices (SARPs) contained in Annexes to the Convention issued by the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
1.2 Other agreements (like the ECAA agreement) will extend the internal aviation
sector and the air transport market and this will lead to an adoption of the
aviation-related agreements and a comprehensive sector restructuring at the
State’s national level. Furthermore implementation of such agreements are
expected to act as an important catalyst for broader regional integration to the
benefit of the State.
1.3 To implement such agreements, the State can plan to pass, amend and
harmonise with wider standards several air transport laws. In that respect in
accordance with an adopted “Strategy and Policy of Transport Sector
Development in the State most likely priority will be given to changes in the legal
framework and full implementation of wider legislation and other relevant
international regulations, as well as the membership in international
organizations, since they are necessary for the further development of air
transportation sector in the State. The specific goals, important for definition of
strategies and action plans of subjects in the air transport sector in the State are
the adoption of complementary law on air traffic and related regulations and
norms, as established by the Joint Aviation Authority (JAA) and in some cases
the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) .
2. Responsibilities of Civil Aviation Authority
2.1 In the State and in most of the cases, the Ministry of Transport and its
Department for Air Transport, Air Traffic and Airports represent the ultimate
aviation body which main objective is to ensure regulated, safe, secure and
orderly air transportation. In compliance with ICAO and European Community
Legislation related to safety oversight functions in civil aviation, the Ministry of
Transport designated Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) as the State’s national
regulatory and supervisory authority.
2.2 Besides the obligations of the State to comply with ICAO SARPs and if the State
is not yet member of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the CAA can
establish Working Arrangements with EASA. The Working Arrangements can
cover all aspects of regulation of civil aviation safety and environmental
protection of products, personnel and organizations subject to Regulation (EC)
No. 216/2008 and its Implementing Rules. Through Working Arrangements EASA
also can assist the CAA in implementing the relevant provisions of the ECAA
Agreement.
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2.3 Concerning aviation safety aspect, CAA can create its Safety Department which
has to be managed by the Acting Director Safety. Main activities of the
department are regulations, issuance of licences and certificates, inspection and
supervision of service providers and cooperation with aviation industry. In
respect of regulations, presently, the primary aviation legislation in the State is
the Aviation Act and the act shall be adopted by the Parliament. A new Aviation
Act can, in accordance with international and European standards, establish clear
objective, organization, role and responsibility of the CAA concerning safety,
security, regulation and environmental protection of air transportation in the
State.
3. Air Accident Investigation Department
3.1 An Air Accident Investigation Department shall be established as an independent

part of the CAA and consist of sufficient number of employees. Head of the
Department shall be directly responsible to Director General (DG) of the CAA.
When the occurrence of an accident or serious incident is reported, CAA DG
establishes an Air Accident Investigation Commission which consists of an
Investigator-in-Charge and members from the List of Experts. CAA DG
establishes on annual basis the list of independent experts which are not CAA
employees. The list encompasses experts from Flight Operations, Air Traffic
Services, Meteorology, Airframe Structure, Engines, Systems, Flight Recorders,
Maintenance, Human Factors, Evacuations, Search and Rescue and Fire Fighting
specialties. Investigations are performed on the basis of the Civil Aviation Act of
the State and SARPs contained in ICAO Annex 13 – Accident Investigation.
3.2 Investigation of accidents and serious incidents shall be done by the commission
chaired by a Chief Inspector and the commission members will be appointed by
the minister responsible for air transport activities from the list of experts. The
commission will submit to the government its investigation report, proposing, as
necessary, actions for preventing new accidents or serious incidents and will also
notify CAA of the actions proposed.
3.3 No one can affect the contents or the scope of accidents or serious incidents
investigation, nor the contents of the final report or the Commission proposed
actions. The Commission final report shall be made available to public, but not
the identity of persons involved in an accident or a serious incident.
3.4 The main objective of the proposed changes in respect of an accident and
incident investigation organization and processes is to support management of
safety by preventing accidents and incidents in the State and not the
apportioning of blame and liability. As proposed to have Chief Inspector, Chief
Inspector Service and the Commission designated and responsible to the
government and not to CAA Director General as it, in most cases, is today
establishes conditions for independent investigations and reporting the results of
such investigations directly to the government of the State.
4. Responsibilities of the Service Providers
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4.1 Interstate agreements need to be established and not only the agreements
between Service providers.
4.2 Besides the management of air traffic service, the Service Provider also
communication, navigation and surveillance (CNS), meteorological (MET) and
aeronautical (AIS) information services for the State as well as training ATS
personnel.
4.3 Airports shall be included in the management regulated by the State Safety
programme.
4.4 The national airline operator active in schedule-, charter- and cargo- air traffic
and other operators registered in the State such as a domestic charter company
and several charter air cargo, taxi and business aviation companies shall all be
embraced by the State Safety Programme.
4.5 In the State institutes dealing with aircraft design and numerous technical
organizations responsible for aircraft construction, testing and maintenance and
aircraft parts production shall be embraced by the State Safety Programme.
5. Search and Rescue (SAR)
5.1 Search and Rescue (SAR) operations in the State is in most cases under the
responsibility of Civil Aviation Authority and they are set up in line with Annex 12
– Search and Rescue to the ICAO Convention and the official Civil Aviation Act.
In that respect CAA undertakes planning of the system and prepares SAR
programme and according to Annex 12, it established one Rescue Co-ordination
Centre (RCC).
5.2 According to an established SAR plan and programme and agreements between
the parties concerned and CAA, in SAR operations ministries for defence,
internal affairs and health, ATS as well as appropriate local municipal
organizations and physical persons participate, in addition to the permanent staff
members of the CAA SAR Department shall be covered bu the State Safety
programme.
5.3 Efficiency of the SAR organization depends on time required to locate the place
of an aircraft accident as well as how fast rescue operations of persons involved
in an accident are effected regardless of terrain conditions. CAA is responsible for
the preparation of the SAR plan and programme and their execution including
training of personnel and planning of necessary equipment. RCC is independent
in conducting search and rescue operations and is directly responsible to Director
General of the CAA.
5.4 In its operations RCC of the State coordinates actions and exchanges
information with centres of the surrounding States on the bases of bilateral
agreements signed as well as with the COSPAS-SARSAT Organization and its
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Mission Control Centre (MCC) in Bari, Italy for receiving information obtained
from satellites over the State’s territory. In SAR operations timely identification of
correct location of aircraft and sharing of such information with those parties
directly involved in the operations is of the highest importance. This aspect is
hindered if the RCC still uses analog charts instead of one digital system, such as
Geographic Information System (GIS), that would allow for much more efficient
location of aircraft position as well as sharing of such electronic information with
other parties involved in SAR operations.
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Chapter 3 Safety Policy and Objectives
1. Safety legislative framework
1.1 Convention on International Civil Aviation (Convention) by Article 43 established

the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The ICAO objective is to
develop principles and techniques of international air navigation and to foster
planning and development of international air transport so as to ensure safe and
orderly growth of it that will meet the needs of the people of the world for the
safe, regular, efficient and economical air transportation (Article 44 of the
Convention). Therefore, aviation safety has been and remains the highest
objective of ICAO.
1.2 The State, as signatory of the Convention and in accordance with Article 37 of
the Convention, agreed to collaborate in securing the highest practicable degree
of uniformity in regulations, standards, procedures and organization in relation to
aircraft, personnel, airways and auxiliary services in all matters in which such
uniformity will facilitate and improve air navigation. Civil Aviation Act of the State
defines the roles, duties and responsibilities of Ministry of Transport, Department
for Air Transport, Air Traffic and Airports and of Civil Aviation Authority.
1.3 According to the proposed new Aviation Act, Ministry of Transport, Department
for Air Transport, Air Traffic and Airports will be tasked with the management of
governmental policy in civil aviation, development of civil aviation strategy,
organization of the air transportation system as well as supervision of the work
of the CAA. According to the Aviation Act the government, through its Executive
Board consisting of members (Minister responsible for Air Transportation,
Minister responsible for Internal Affairs, Minister responsible for Defence, Minister
responsible for Finance and Minister responsible for Environmental Protection)
among the other tasks will be assigned the task to supervise the work of the
CAA, thus establishing one important safety oversight condition for one
independent mechanism for monitoring continued competency of CAA.
1.4 Another very important aspect from the Aviation Act is change in respect of the
aviation inspection function that at the moment resides with the CAA. Namely,
according to the Aviation Act, inspection duties will be resting with the Ministry of
Transport, Department for Air Transport, Air Traffic and Airports.
1.5 Consequently, the CAA duties will be development of regulatory material as

authorised to do so, performing its safety oversight function by conducting audits
of national service providers, participate in the work of international
organizations and institutions and their respective working bodies, and any other
duty assigned to it by the ministry. The CAA will be authorized to issue operator’s
certificates to national service providers on the basis of performed audits and to
conduct periodic regular and ad hoc audits to confirm that operators maintain
their capability to provide services, as certified.
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1.6 Besides the Aviation Act, the CAA participates in preparation and contributes to
the promulgation of numerous by-laws that provides for issuance of licences,
certificates and regulates national air transportation system. These by-laws and
the Aviation Act are the main regulatory instruments on which basis CAA
exercises its safety oversight function and responsibility. According to the
Aviation Act, by-laws prepared by CAA could refer to international laws and
regulations, international standards and recommended practices which, in such
case, will be directly applied. When in the case of inability to comply and
implement ICAO Standards and in accordance with Article 38 of the Convention,
CAA will advise Ministry of Transport prior to notification of differences to the
ICAO Council and publishing them in the Aeronautical Information Publication
(AIP) of the State.
1.7 All by-laws published in the Official publications shall be prepared on the basis of
ICAO SARPs, Joint Aviation Regulations (JARs) and in some cases
EUROCONTROL Safety Regulatory Requirements (ESARRs) and they cover all
areas of safety oversight functions of CAA and in particular flight crews,
dispatchers, aerodromes, airline operators and air navigation. The majority of
safety oversight responsibilities presently are laid down within the CAA Safety
Sector which goal should be to achieve and maintain the highest standards of
safety in the State. To achieve this requirement, the CAA must ensure that it has
sufficient human resources qualified to perform safety oversight duties and that
it is properly equipped for carrying out these duties.
1.8 New ICAO Standards introduced in Annexes 1, 6, 8, 11, 13 and 14 require that
States establish programme that is directly related to the safety of air navigation
and called it, State Safety Programme (SSP). New ICAO SSP requirements came
as a consequence of the growing awareness that safety management principles
have direct effect on civil aviation authority’s activities related to the safety
rulemaking, policy development and oversight. Under an SSP, safety rulemaking
element is based on the comprehensive analysis of State aviation system; safety
policies are developed on the basis of identified safety hazards while safety risk
management and safety oversight focus on the areas of higher safety risks and
significant safety concerns. This created conditions and means to combine the
prescriptive and performance-based approaches to safety rulemaking, safety
policy development and safety oversight and the establishment of acceptable
level of safety (ALoS) by States.
1.9 In the State, according to the Civil Aviation Act, aviation safety policy and
strategy including conditions for achieving acceptable level of safety (ALoS) will
be defined by the government on the basis of recommendations by Ministry of
Transport, department responsible for air transportation. However, the CAA as
the national supervisory body will use SSP as a management system for the
management of safety in the State. The SSP is commensurate with the size,
nature and complexity of the operations in the air transportation system of the
State.
1.10 The Aviation Safety Policy statement, as guided by the ICAO, has been
developed and is reproduced below setting up the safety policy from the highest
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level of civil aviation of the State. From the European Community Legislation
perspective, establishment of the safety policy statement is in line with the ECAA
Agreement and is a pre-requisite for the implementation of the Single European
Sky (SES) regulations by the State. SES would result in restructuring of the
European airspace on the basis of air traffic flow and not national borders, thus
increasing capacity and improving the overall efficiency and management of air
transportation system in Europe, of which the State is one component building
block.
1.11 To achieve the objectives defined in a policy statement together with the
commitment to comply with ICAO provisions and European regulations for safety
management, the CAA must carry out comprehensive planning of its safety
functions including safety monitoring and periodic review of safety legislative
framework and specific regulations to ensure they remain relevant and
appropriate. The planning will establish requirements, responsibilities and
accountabilities of all those organizations within CAA participating in SSP,
including definition of the Acceptable Level of Safety (ALoS) to be achieved by
the SSP.
1.12 The safety policy and objectives component provides management and personnel
explicit policies, procedures, management controls, documentation and corrective
action processes that will keep the safety management efforts of the CAA on
track. This component is also essential in generating confidence in the CAA’s
ability to provide safety leadership in an increasingly complex and constantly
changing air transportation system of the State.
________________________
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SAFETY POLICY STATEMENT
The management of civil aviation safety is one of the major responsibilities of the State
and the State is committed to developing, implementing, maintaining and constantly
improving strategies and processes to ensure that all aviation activities that take place
under its oversight will achieve the highest level of safety performance, while meeting
both national and international standards.
The holders of Operator´s certificates issued by the State shall be required to

demonstrate that their management systems adequately reflect a Safety Management
System (SMS) approach. The expected result of this approach is improved safety
management, and safety practices, including safety reporting within the civil aviation
industry.
In the State, all levels of management are accountable for the delivery of the highest
level of safety performance within the State.
The Governmental level of the State will appoint a State Accountable Executive who will
be representing the State regarding commitments made in the name of the State.
The sate is committed to:
a) develop general rulemaking leading to specific operational policies that

build upon safety management principles, based on a comprehensive
analysis of the State’s aviation system;
b) consult with all segments of the aviation industry on issues regarding

regulatory development;
c) support the management of safety in the State through an effective

safety reporting and communication system;
d) interact effectively with service providers in the resolution of safety

concerns;
e) ensure that within the Civil Aviation Authority, sufficient resources are
allocated and personnel have the proper skills and are trained for
discharging their responsibilities, both safety related and otherwise;
f) conduct both performance-based and compliance-oriented oversight

activities, supported by analyses and prioritized resource allocation based
on safety risks;
g) comply with and, wherever possible, exceed international safety

requirements and standards;
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h) promote and educate the aviation industry on safety management
concepts and principles;
i) oversee the implementation of SMS within Service Providers;
j) ensure that all activities under oversight achieve the highest safety
standards;
k) establish provisions for the protection of safety data, collection and

processing systems (SDCPS), so that people are encouraged to provide
essential safety-related information on hazards, and that there is a
continuous flow and exchange of safety management data between the
State representation and service providers;
l) establish and measure the realistic implementation of the State Safety

Programme (SSP) of the State against safety indicators and safety targets
which are clearly identified; and
m) promulgate an enforcement policy that ensures that no information

derived from any SDCPS established under the SSP or the SMS will be
used as the basis for enforcement action, except in the case of gross
negligence or wilful deviation.
This policy must be understood, implemented and observed by all staff involved in
activities related to the Civil Aviation Authority as the safety oversight authority of the
State.
__________________________________
Name and Function
State
Ministry of Transport
________________________
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2. Safety responsibilities and accountabilities for SSP in the State
2.1 In the State, the CAA as the regulatory and supervisory authority is responsible
and accountable for the safety oversight of air transportation within the area of
its liability. In that respect, the Ministry of Transport (Department for Air
Transport, Air Traffic and Airports) being cognizant of the requirements,
responsibilities and accountabilities regarding the establishment and maintenance
of the SSP for the State, agreed that the CAA be involved in coordination during
the SSP development under the ECAA agreement implementation support
provided by the Delegation of the European Commission.
2.2 The SSP is a fairly new safety material introduced by ICAO and supported by the
European regulations and would require a certain period of time, after the
inception of this SSP document, for the CAA to implement the programme. As
the first step, one Safety Regulation Board (SRB) within the CAA should be
established, initially to manage implementation of the SSP. The board should
consist of the Safety Accountable Executive (CAA Director General), Director
Safety, Director Air Navigation Services, Director International Relations and
Legal Division, Head of Air Accident Investigation Department and Director Legal
and General Services.
2.3 As a first step, the SSP requires that the CAA SRB conduct a gap analysis of its
safety system to determine which components and elements of an SSP are
currently in place and which components and elements must be added or
modified to meet the implementation requirements. The gap analysis, in checklist
format, involves comparing the SSP requirements against the existing resources
in the State and it provides information to assist in the evaluation of the
components and elements that comprise the ICAO SSP framework and to identify
the components and elements that need to be developed. Completed and
documented gap analysis is used as a basis of the SSP implementation plan.
2.4 Once the implementation of SSP of the State is completed, the CAA SRB will
assume responsibilities and accountabilities to plan, organize, develop, maintain,
control and continuously improve the SSP in a manner that meets the safety
objectives and policy of the State. Attachment 4 to this document contains the
SSP detailed implementation plan for the State including Gap Analysis tables.
3. Accident and incident investigation in the State
3.1 As indicated in Chapter 2 of this document according to the Aviation Act of the
State, accident investigation shall be established as one independent body
responsible directly to the Ministry of Transport, (Department for Air Transport,
Air Traffic and Airports), following provisions of the Directive 94/56/EC. The main
objective of the proposed changes in respect of an accident and incident
investigation organization and processes is a creation of one independent
organization that would support management of safety by preventing accidents
and incidents in the State. This aspect is covered by Aviation Act. Investigations
of accidents and serious incidents in the State must therefore be considered as
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one indispensable part of the safety management system that would result in
identification of causes and on that basis taking the appropriate measure to
prevent similar accidents and serious incidents in the future, and not the
apportioning of blame and liability.
3.2 The State, in compliance with Annex 13 – Accident Investigation adopted

definitions of Accident and Incident as follows:
Accident. An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes

place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight
until such time as all such persons have disembarked, in which:
a) a person is fatally or seriously injured as a result of:

— being in the aircraft, or
— direct contact with any part of the aircraft, including parts which have
become detached from the aircraft, or
— direct exposure to jet blast, except when the injuries are from natural
causes, self-inflicted or inflicted by other persons, or when the injuries
are to stowaways hiding outside the areas normally available to the
passengers and crew; or
b) the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure which:
— adversely affects the structural strength, performance or flight
characteristics of the aircraft, and
— would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected
component, except for engine failure or damage, when the damage is
limited to the engine, its cowlings or accessories; or for damage limited to
propellers, wing tips, antennas, tires, brakes, fairings, small dents or
puncture holes in the aircraft skin; or
c) the aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible.
Incident. An occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation

of an aircraft which affects or could affect the safety of operation.
3.3 In accordance with the Aviation Act, in the State further defines a Serious
Incident as an occurrence that includes circumstances which indicate that an
accident could almost have happened. As per the same proposed Article, upon
receiving information about the occurrence classified as accident or serious
incident, CAA must immediately inform the Chief Inspector.
3.4 Organization and investigations of accidents and serious incidents in the State
shall be conducted by the Chief Inspector. The Chief Inspector shall be appointed
by the Government for five years period under the competency and experience
conditions for the position prescribed by the Government, at the proposal of the
minister competent for air transport activities.
3.5 The Chief Inspector shall have its service that assists him in his work, and
performs professional, administrative and technical duties for his needs and the
needs of the Commission for investigating the causes of accidents and serious
incidents. The Chief Inspector Service shall be formed by the Government.
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Resources for the Chief Inspector and the Chief Inspector Service activities shall
be provided by the budget of the State.
3.6 For investigating each accident and serious incident a Commission for
investigating accidents and serious incidents shall be established. The
Commission members shall be appointed by the minister competent for air
transport activities from the List of experts made for each year by the Chief
Inspector. The Chief Inspector shall, as a rule, chair the Commission.
3.7 The Commission shall investigate the causes of accidents and serious incidents,
effects and all the facts related to accidents and serious incidents, in the manner
laid down by the Aviation Act and by-laws passed thereon. The Commission shall
make the final report of the investigation findings and submit the report to the
government, and shall propose, if necessary, actions for preventing new
accidents and serious incidents and shall notify the State Accountable Executive
Directorate on the actions proposed.
3.8 The Commission shall notify also the persons and organizations to which these
actions are referred to and those person and organizations shall consider these
actions and notify the Commission and the Directorate of the actions undertaken.
No one can affect the contents or the scope of accidents or serious incidents
investigation, nor the contents of the final report or the Commission proposed
actions. The Commission final report shall be made available to public, but not
the identity of persons involved in an accident or a serious incident.
4. Enforcement policy in the State
4.1 Civil Aviation Authority, in line with Civil Aviation Act and the European
Community Legislation, holds within its organisation also the function of the
National Supervisory Authority (NSA) for air transportation. The CAA issues
individual licences to pilots, air traffic controllers, aircraft maintenance engineers
and certificates to air navigation service providers, commercial aircraft operators,
etc. All the licences/certificates are issued by CAA on the basis of the Civil
Aviation Act and CAA makes periodic or random audits to identify if
licence/certificate holders are operating in accordance with their permissions.
The CAA may on the basis of audit findings, revoke or suspend licences or
certificates.
4.2 Every service provider in the State must institute, maintain and adhere to a
Safety Management System (SMS) within their own organization that is
commensurate with the size, nature and complexity of the operations authorized
to be conducted under its operator’s certificate and to the hazards and safety
risks related to these operations. SMS must be audited and certified by the CAA.
Within the SSP, a notion of enforcement policy is identified and the policy
statement concerning the enforcement and its procedures is provided below. The
policy establishes conditions under which the service providers are permitted to
deal with and resolve events involving certain safety deviations, internally, within
the context of the service provider’s safety SMS, and to the satisfaction of CAA.
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4.3 In order to develop an enforcement policy that supports the implementation of
SMS, the CAA auditors must maintain an open communication with service
providers. When a service provider operating under an SMS unintentionally
contravenes Civil Aviation Act or by-laws, specific review procedures will be used.
These procedures will allow the CAA auditors responsible for the oversight of the
service provider the opportunity to engage in dialogue with the SMS-governed
organization. The objective of this dialogue is to agree on proposed corrective
measures and an action plan that adequately addresses the deficiencies that led
to the contravention and to afford the service provider a reasonable time to
implement them.
4.4 This approach aims to nurture and sustain effective safety reporting, whereby
service providers’ employees can report safety deficiencies and hazards without
fear of punitive action. A service provider can therefore, without apportioning
blame, and without fear of enforcement action, analyse the event and the
organizational or individual factors that may have led to it, in order to
incorporate remedial measures that will best help prevent recurrence.
______________
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ENFORCEMENT POLICY AND ENFORCEMENT

PROCEDURES IN AN SMS ENVIRONMENT
ENFORCEMENT POLICY
1. Introduction
This enforcement policy is promulgated by Civil Aviation Authority under the

statutory authority in the Civil Aviation Act of the State.
2. Principles
2.1 This enforcement policy is the culmination of a comprehensive review by

Civil Aviation Authority of its capacity and regulations for evaluating safety
activities undertaken by service providers.
2.2 The implementation of safety management systems (SMS) requires that

Civil Aviation Authority develop a flexible enforcement approach to this evolving
safety framework while at the same time carrying out enforcement functions in
an equitable, practical and consistent manner. A flexible enforcement approach
in an SMS environment should be based in two general principles.
2.3 The first general principle is to develop enforcement procedures that

allow service providers to deal with, and resolve, certain events involving safety
deviations, internally, within the context of the service provider’s SMS, and to the
satisfaction of the authority. Intentional contraventions of the Civil Aviation Act of
the State and the State regulations will be investigated and may be subject to
conventional enforcement action, if appropriate.
2.4 The second general principle is that no information derived from safety
data collection and processing systems (SDCPS) established under SMS shall be
used as the basis for enforcement action.
3. Scope
3.1 The principles underlying this enforcement policy statement and

associated enforcement procedures apply to service providers operating in
accordance with ICAO Annex 1 — Personnel Licensing; Annex 6 — Operation of
Aircraft, Part I — International Commercial Air Transport — Aeroplanes, and Part
III — International Operations — Helicopters; Annex 8 — Airworthiness of
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Aircraft; Annex 11 — Air Traffic Services; and Annex 14 — Aerodromes, Volume I
— Aerodrome Design and Operations.
3.2 Within the context of this policy the term “service provider” refers to any
organization providing aviation services. The term includes approved training
organizations that are exposed to safety risks during the provision of their
services, aircraft operators, approved maintenance organizations, organizations
responsible for type design and/or manufacture of aircraft, air traffic service
providers and certified aerodromes, as applicable.
4. General
4.1 Each Service Provider of the State will establish, maintain and adhere to
an SMS that is commensurate with the size, nature and complexity of the
operations authorized to be conducted under its operations certificate and to the
hazards and safety risks related to these operations.
4.2 In order to develop an enforcement policy that supports the

implementation of SMS, Civil Aviation Authority’s auditors will maintain an open
communication with service providers.
4.3 When a service provider operating under an SMS unintentionally

contravenes Civil Aviation Act State, specific review procedures will be used.
These procedures will allow the Civil Aviation Authority’s auditors responsible for
the oversight of the service provider the opportunity to engage in dialogue with
the SMS-governed organization. The objective of this dialogue is to agree on
proposed corrective measures and an action plan that adequately addresses the
deficiencies that led to the contravention and to afford the service provider a
reasonable time to implement them. This approach aims to nurture and sustain
effective safety reporting, whereby service providers’ employees can report
safety deficiencies and hazards without fear of punitive action. A service provider
can therefore, without apportioning blame, and without fear of enforcement
action, analyse the event and the organizational or individual factors that may
have led to it, in order to incorporate remedial measures that will best help
prevent recurrence.
5. Remedial Measures
Civil Aviation Authority, through the auditor responsible for the oversight of the
service provider, will evaluate the corrective measures proposed by the service
provider, and/or the systems currently in place to address the event underlying
the contravention. If the corrective measures proposed are considered
appropriate and likely to prevent recurrence and foster future compliance, the
review of the violation will then be concluded with no enforcement action. In
cases where either the corrective measures or the systems in place are
considered inappropriate, Civil Aviation Authority will continue to interact with the
service provider to find a satisfactory resolution that would prevent enforcement
action. However, in cases where the service provider refuses to address the
event and provide effective corrective measures, Civil Aviation Authority will
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consider taking enforcement action or other administrative action regarding the
certificate.
6. Enforcement Procedures
Breaches of aviation regulations may occur for many different reasons, from a
genuine misunderstanding of the regulations, to disregard for aviation safety.
Civil Aviation Authority has a range of enforcement procedures in order to
effectively address safety obligations under the Civil Aviation Act State in light of
different circumstances. These procedures may result in a variety of actions such
as:
a) counselling;
b) remedial training; or
c) variation, suspension and cancellation of authorizations.
7. Impartiality of Enforcement Actions
Enforcement decisions must not be influenced by:
a) personal conflict;
b) considerations such as gender, race, religion, political views or
affiliation; or
c) personal, political or financial power of those involved.
8. Proportionality of Responses
Enforcement decisions must be proportional to the identified breaches and the

safety risks they underlie, based on two principles:
a) Civil Aviation Authority will take action against those who

consistently and deliberately operate outside Civil Aviation
Regulations; and
b) Civil Aviation Authority will seek to educate and promote training
or supervision of those who show commitment to resolving safety
deficiencies.
9. Natural Justice and Accountability
Enforcement decisions must:
a) be fair and follow due process;

b) be transparent to those involved;
c) take into account the circumstances of the case and the
attitude/actions of the service provider when considering action;
d) be consistent in actions/decisions for like/similar circumstances;
and
e) be subject to appropriate internal and external review.
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10. Exceptions
10.1 This policy is not applicable if there is evidence of a deliberate effort to

conceal non-compliance.
10.2 This policy is not applicable if the service provider fails to provide
confidence in its means of hazard identification and safety risk management.
10.3 This policy is not applicable if the service provider is a recurrent violator.
A recurrent violator is a violator who, in the past four years, has had the same or
closely related violations.
10.4 In such circumstances, the penalty matrix (or applicable measurement) of

the established enforcement procedures will be applicable.
______________________________
Accountable Executive
Director General, Civil Aviation Authority
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Chapter 4 Safety Risk Management
1. Safety requirements for service providers SMS
The existing ICAO standards and European regulations call for the establishment of
the Safety Management System (SMS) for service providers. Civil Aviation Act of the
State prescribes that every service provider in the State must establish their own SMS
which will include organization, procedures and accountabilities and establish and
maintain an ALoS and that this must be documented in the SMS Manual. Approval of
established SMS or of any changes made to it by service provider is done by CAA.
Additionally, according to the Aviation Act one of the conditions for the issuance of the
certificate for the provision of air navigation service is to have established SMS.
The Aviation Act defines that aviation safety is a condition in which risk of
endangering lives and causing injuries to people and creating damage to equipment and
structure is reduced and maintained at the acceptable level of safety (ALoS) by
continuous identification of hazards and management of risk. The Aviation Act further
prescribes that service provider is responsible for continuous identification of hazard and
evaluation and reduction of risk while performing its operations in order to eliminate
hazard and manage risk at the established ALoS. Evaluation and elimination of risk
procedures are applicable to all operational processes and procedures, human resources,
equipment and working environment.
Safety management principles affect most CAA activities, starting with rulemaking
and policy development. The SSP principles are based on comprehensive analyses of the
aviation system in the Republic of Serbia and regulations must be based on identified
hazards and analysis of the safety risks of the consequences of identified hazards. The
regulations, when developed, will provide frameworks for risk control, once they are
integrated into the service provider’s SMS.
CAA Safety Regulation Board (SRB), among the other tasks within its work
programme, will have to develop in the shortest period of time of Civil Aviation Act
adoption detailed description how in State identification and control of hazards and risk
assessment of the consequences of hazards on safety of operations are going to be
done. This will include the establishment of requirements, specific operating regulations
and implementation polices which will govern management of safety by CAA and rules
and/or regulations which will govern how service provider’s SMS operates including the
agreement on safety performance of service provider’s SMS. The requirements, specific
operating regulations and implementation policies will require periodic review by CAA
SRB to ensure they remain relevant and appropriate to the service providers in the
State.
Implementation of SSP and in particular the SMS and their impact on regulations
oversight will require detailed considerations by the CAA staff tasked with safety
oversight duties. The CAA staff directly involved with oversight of service providers SMS
require to have thorough knowledge and understanding of the SMS principles and CAA
SRB will within its work programme include training of CAA staff in SMS. Guidance and
training material on SMS provided by ICAO should be used by CAA for these purposes.
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CAA SRB may consider establishment of one small group of CAA experts that would
be tasked specifically with the oversight of the aviation safety risks and comprising of
experts from operations (OPS), aerodromes and air traffic management (ATM). The
group could be named the Safety Risk Group (SRG) and this group would coordinate
and, when necessary, participate in the safety risk management processes and provide
advice, on basis of the quality of collected information, to the SRB. Specifically, SRG may
be tasked to do the following duties:
a) identify risk through utilization of different evaluation processes;

b) assess identified risks and supporting data;
c) identify new and potential safety data sources and data handling
methods;
d) assess mitigation actions;
e) share and coordinate safety information among CAA SRB and other CAA
safety auditors;
f) propose guidance and direction to the CAA SRB on safety risk matters;
and
g) contribute to and where possible improve the SSP of the State.
2. Agreement on service provider’s safety performance
To complete the safety management cycle, safety risk management requires

feedback on safety performance by service provider. ICAO Annexes 1, 6, 8, 11, 13 and
14 establish that a service provider’s SMS shall ensure remedial action to maintain safety
performance and shall continuously monitor and shall regularly assess such safety
performance.
Safety performance and monitoring information comes from a variety of sources,

including formal auditing and evaluation, investigations of safety-related events,
continuous monitoring of day-to-day activities related to the delivery of services, and
input from employees through hazard reporting systems. Each of these types of
information sources may exist to some degree in every organization and it is left at an
individual organization to tailor them to the scope and scale appropriate for the size and
type of organization. Information sources for safety performance monitoring and
measurement include:
a) hazard reporting;
b) safety studies;
c) safety reviews;
d) audits;
e) safety surveys; and
f) internal safety investigations.
The safety performance is an essential component in the effective operation of an

SMS as well as progressing towards a performance-based regulatory environment. It
assists in monitoring actual performance of the SMS and it is necessary for an SMS to
define a set of measurable performance outcomes in order to determine whether the
system is truly operating in accordance with design expectations (not simply meeting
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regulatory requirements) and to identify where action may be required to bring the
performance of the SMS to the level of design expectations. These measurable
performance outcomes permit the actual performance of activities critical to safety to be
assessed against existing organizational controls so that necessary corrective action is
taken and safety risks can be maintained as low as reasonably practicable.
CAA SRB will have to agree with each individual service provider in the State on the
safety performances of their SMS. In practice, the safety performance of an SMS will be
expressed by safety performance indicator values and safety performance target values
and will be implemented through action plans. Action plans will be the tools and means
needed to achieve the safety performance indicator values and safety performance
target values of an SMS. They will include the operational procedures, technology,
systems and programmes to which measures of reliability, availability, performance
and/or accuracy will be specified.
The safety performance indicator values are short-term, measurable objectives

reflecting the safety performance of an SMS expressed in numerical terms. Since the
safety performance of each SMS will be agreed separately between CAA SRB and
individual aviation organizations, the safety performance indicator values will therefore
differ between segments of the aviation industry, such as aircraft operators, certified
aerodrome operators and ATS providers.
Safety performance target values are long-term, measurable objectives reflecting the
safety performance of an SMS expressed in numerical terms. They should be obvious,
measurable and acceptable to stakeholders and linked to the safety performance
indicator (short-term objective) of an SMS.
All the SMS safety performances agreed between the CAA and individual service
providers in the State and reflected in individual action plans will be periodically
reviewed by CAA SRB to ensure that they remain relevant and appropriate to each
individual service provider.
—————————
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Chapter 5 State Aviation Safety Assurance
1. Safety oversight
The notion of SSP, as recently introduced by ICAO and supported in Annexes

1,6,8,11,13 and 14, brought in a principled and structured manner one way of
organizing the safety responsibilities and accountabilities of a State and measuring the
effectiveness with which safety responsibilities are discharged and safety accountabilities
are fulfilled by the State. The organization of the safety responsibilities and
accountabilities of a State by observing certain principles and following a standard
structure allows regulations and activities aimed at improving safety to be documented,
explicit and traceable. While the long-term, strategic objective of an SSP is the
improvement of safety in the State, the organization of an SSP aims at two short-term,
tactical objectives: efficient and effective delivery of safety responsibilities and
accountabilities by the State, and efficient auditing of safety responsibilities and
accountabilities by the State.
The importance of the second SSP short-term objective, efficient auditing of safety
responsibilities and accountabilities by the State should be carefully considered by CAA
SRB. At the present time, the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme
(USOAP) audits States’ safety responsibilities in a comprehensive manner following a
basic architecture prescribed by the relevant Annexes to the Convention. Accordingly,
each State must implement eight critical elements of safety oversight and USOAP audits
verify the status of implementation of the elements and functions, on a compliance/non-
compliance basis. Once the SSP concept is implemented throughout States, USOAP will
audit the SSP through an approach based on a continuous monitoring concept, rather
than on the elements and functions of the safety oversight.
The third, medium-term objective of the SSP concept aims at the transition from a
presently predominantly prescriptive regulatory environment to an integrated regulatory
environment with combined prescriptive and performance-based regulatory approaches.
In this transition, the concept of ALoS of an SSP and of the safety performance of an
SMS, building upon the safety assurance component of both an SSP and an SMS is
fundamental. This transition, however, must start by clearly establishing the role of the
State’s safety oversight function within the SSP, and their mutual relationship.
The State’s safety oversight function will be part of the SSP and a fundamental
component of its safety assurance. Traditionally, the objectives of the State’s safety
oversight function have been satisfied through administrative controls (inspections,
audits and surveys) carried out by the CAA regularly, however, not comprising of safety
risk controls. The State by the mean of SSP plans to turn the outcomes of safety
oversight into safety risk controls. It considers regulations as safety risk controls and will
require, as a first step, through its safety risk management component that the process
of rulemaking be done using principles of safety risk management (identify hazards,
assess the safety risks of the consequences of the hazards, and develop regulations that
provide acceptable mitigation/control of the consequences of the hazards). In a second
stage, the SSP monitors, through its safety assurance component, the effectiveness and
efficiency of regulations as safety risk controls.
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The State considers the SSP as a first enabling step in such a shift. Clear articulation
of the difference between regulations as administrative controls and regulations as
safety risk controls underlies the shift from solely prescriptive regulation to the combined
prescriptive and performance-based regulation. Furthermore, the integration into the
SSP, as appropriate, of the principles underlying the role of the eight critical elements of
the State’s safety oversight function is expected to yield a more robust and effective the
SSP.
2. Safety data collection, analysis and exchange
According to Annex 13 to the Convention, paragraph 8.1, “a State shall establish a

mandatory incident reporting system to facilitate collection of information on actual or
potential safety deficiencies.” Annex 13, in paragraph 8.2 further recommends that “a
State should establish a voluntary incident reporting system to facilitate the collection of
information that may not be captured by a mandatory incident reporting system.” One
very important aspect of the recommended voluntary reporting system is covered in
Annex 13, paragraph 8.3 by providing that “a voluntary incident reporting system shall
be non-punitive and afford protection to the sources of the information.” A non-punitive
environment is fundamental to voluntary reporting and ICAO encourages States to
facilitate and promote the voluntary reporting of events that could affect aviation safety
by adjusting their applicable laws, regulations and policies, as necessary. In line with
ICAO State letter AN 12/52.1-08/70, system of collection, analysis and exchange of
safety information must be established since such a system is a pre-requisite for
implementation of SSP that combines prescriptive and performance-based approaches to
safety rulemaking, policy development and safety oversight.
The Civil Aviation Act of the State addresses the safety reporting by specifying that
service providers must report to CAA every safety event in line with its SMS. According
to the same Civil Aviation Act the CAD is responsible for the development and
establishment of database where safety reported information will be stored and used
and collected safety information will also be exchanged, as necessary, with foreign
aviation authorities and international organizations.
According to the proposed Aviation Act the CAA will have to develop detailed
regulation coherent with European Legislation (namely Directive 2003/42/EC) on which
basis data reporting, collection, manipulation, analysis, protection, use and exchange as
well as establishment and management of database will be done.
In ICAO State letter AN 12/52.1-08/70, it is stated that the collection, analysis and
exchange of safety information is essential to implement an SSP combining prescriptive
and performance-based approaches to safety rulemaking, policy development and
oversight by States. In order to assist States in developing safety data collection,
analysis and exchange capabilities, ICAO has also developed a safety data management
training course. The course is based on the European Co-ordination Centre for Aviation
Incident Reporting Systems (ECCAIRS) suite of applications, and is aimed at officials
from civil aviation authorities with responsibilities regarding safety data analysis and
exchange as well as the technical administration of ECCAIRS. The objectives of the
safety data management training course are to provide hands-on experience with
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ECCAIRS as a tool to code, enter, analyse and extract safety data, as well as set up,
configure and supply basic ECCAIRS user support. Ministry for Infrastructure,
Department for Air Transportation will analyse this ICAO offer and develop a training
plan in ECCAIRS suite of applications for Accident Investigation personnel, including the
technical personnel tasked with the establishment and maintenance of the system. In
developing the training plan, Ministry will closely coordinate with ICAO for the detailed
schedule.
Effective safety reporting is a cornerstone of the management of safety and the gate
for safety data acquisition. Once acquired, safety data must be analysed to turn data
into information and finally mitigation or response activities to hazards by the
organization as a consequence of the safety information developed. One of the most
influential aspects of an organizational culture in terms of the management of safety is
that it shapes safety reporting procedures and practices by operational personnel.
Identification of hazards is a fundamental activity underlying the management of safety.
Nobody is in a better position to report the existence of hazards, and what works the
way it is supposed to and what does not, than operational personnel, who have to live
with and face hazards on an everyday basis. An operational environment in which
operational personnel have been trained and are constantly encouraged to report
hazards is the prerequisite for effective safety reporting.
Effective safety reporting goes further by also seeking out and identifying the causes
of those operational errors so that they may be eliminated before they happen or
mitigated. This led to voluntary reporting systems that also include the reporting of
hazards. The systematic identification of hazards and other safety deficiencies may
therefore pay a much higher dividend for safety management than error reporting alone.
However, the difference between error and hazard reporting is fundamental and may
lead to implementation issues that need to be acknowledged and addressed. A
significant difference is that while hazard reporting is predictive and should be objective
and neutral, error reporting is reactive and may incriminate the reporter or the reported,
which may lead to blame and punishment.
Effective safety reporting relies upon voluntary error and hazard reporting by mainly
operational personnel who coexist with or encounter hazards. However because a
hazard may also be more obvious to a person who is unfamiliar or unconnected with an
operation (and the circumstances in which it is undertaken) there should not be any
restriction on who may report and on what. The protection of reporters and sources of
safety information was, and is, a key and often contentious issue in establishing both
types of reporting systems, and could be a significant obstacle for the progress and
success of safety management.
The attempts to protect safety information and the reporter from punishment were
developed using the term “just culture”, the context in which safety practices are
fostered within an organization. These safety practices include a series of organizational
processes, procedures and policies that aim to achieve a specific outcome, the
identification of hazards. The processes (effective safety reporting), procedures (hazard
reporting system) and policies (safety policy, fair treatment of reporters, etc.) are
complex, specific ideas and behaviours that can be packaged in such a way as to make
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them easily understandable to a wide audience and therefore easier to apply on a large
scale.
The safety policy should actively encourage effective safety reporting and, by
defining the line between acceptable performance (often unintended errors) and
unacceptable performance (such as negligence, recklessness, violations or sabotage),
provide fair protection to reporters. A safety or just culture may not however preclude
the “criminalization of error”, which is legally, ethically and morally within the sovereign
rights of any State, provided established international agreements are observed. A
judicial investigation, and consequences of some form, may be expected following an
accident or serious incident especially if a system failure resulted in lives lost or property
damaged, even if no negligence or ill-intent existed. A potential issue could therefore
exist if voluntary hazard reports, which relate to latent deficiencies of a system or its
performance, are treated in the same way as those concerning accident and serious
incident investigations. The intent of protecting hazard reports should not challenge the
legitimacy of a judicial investigation or demand undue immunity. However, legal
argument does usually take precedence over any technical or safety-related argument.
The State and service providers within its responsibility will take into consideration
the advantages and disadvantages of the adoption of safety and “just culture”, and any
cultural and legal implications. For purposes related to the management of safety, the
process that needs to be promoted, nurtured and defended is effective safety reporting;
the “criminalization of error” is of lesser relevance. Service providers managements in
their SMS’s will have to cover this aspect and make a commitment to introduce, nurture
and encourage in addition to mandatory incident reporting scheme, the voluntary
reporting system under the “just culture” conditions. The CAA’s audits of SMSs will pay
particular attention to this matter during providers’ auditing.
The protection of safety information from inappropriate use is essential to ensure its
continued availability, since the use of safety information for other than safety-related
purposes may inhibit the future availability of such information, with an adverse effect
on safety. This fact was recognized by the 35th Assembly of ICAO, which noted that
existing national laws and regulations in many States may not adequately address the
manner in which safety information is protected from inappropriate use. In that respect,
in the Safety Policy Statement, the Accountable Executive, Director of the CAA, in sub-
paragraphs k) and m) stated that the State commitment is to:
.........
“k) establish provisions for the protection of safety data, collection and
processing systems (SDCPS), so that people are encouraged to provide
essential safety-related information on hazards, and that there is a
continuous flow and exchange of safety management data between the
Civil Aviation Authority and service providers;
.........
m) promulgate an enforcement policy that ensures that no information
derived from any SDCPS established under the SSP or the SMS will be
used as the basis for enforcement action, except in the case of gross
negligence or wilful deviation.”
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2.12 In addition to the Safety Policy Statement and in order to make obligatory
mandatory incident reporting and encourage establishment of the voluntary
incident reporting that will facilitate the collection of information that may not be
captured by a mandatory incident reporting system, the State will consider Legal
Guidance for the Protection of Information from Safety Data Collection and
Processing Systems, as provided in Annex 13, Attachment E. The outcome of the
consideration will be one internal legal document concerning the protection of
safety information from inappropriate use and encouragement for establishment
of voluntary incident reporting system in the State.
3. Safety data driven targeting of oversight by CAD on areas of greater

concern or need
Once the mandatory and confidential (voluntary) incidents and hazards reporting
systems are sat in place and operational, on the basis of collected data and their
analysis with respect to hazards and potential safety risks on operations, CAD
SRB will review existing and, if necessary, define new procedures that will
prioritize auditing of those identified areas of greater safety concern or need.
Review of occurrences must be embedded and detailed into the processes of
safety oversight management system.
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Chapter 6 State Aviation Safety Promotion
1. Internal training, communication and dissemination of safety

information
Internal training
In accordance with the ECAA Agreement implementation support project in the

State, training activity is intended to develop a detailed plan and programme of training
for the CAA and service providers staff involved in different duties related to safety
management. Additionally, technical Assistance, specifies the training of National
Administration staff and inspectors on aviation safety issues.
The CAA has, in most cases, highly skilled technical personnel that are well educated
and trained. Training of National Administration staff and inspectors has been an
ongoing issue and training has always received importance it deserves. Nevertheless, it
is the intention of the CAA management to develop plans and proposals for training
programme for the next two years and that plan will then form the part of this SSP. In
developing the plan the CAA should give priority and particular interest to the training of
staff in respect of implementation and use of SSP and SMS.
Internal communication and dissemination of safety information
Collected safety information through the established mandatory and confidential

(voluntary) incidents and hazards reporting systems should be communicated to the
respective CAA staff responsible for safety oversight of service providers. Communicated
information may be used for investigation or for information only. When action was
taken on the communicated information this should be documented and stored for
traceability, history and should be reflected in the periodic reports.
CAA SRB must be informed of all serious incidents and SRG will communicate to
them any changes in the risk assessments that result from different evaluation
processes. SRG will also share and coordinate safety information among CAA SRB and
other CAA safety auditors. Additionally, the CAA would promote two-way communication
of safety-related information within organization and support development of an
organizational culture that promotes an effective and efficient SSP.
2. External training, communication and dissemination of safety

information
To foster effective SMSs among service providers under the CAA responsibility,
provide education and support development of an overall organizational culture,
the CAA in line with this SSP will promote awareness of safety risks and two-way
communication of safety-relevant information. All the annual or periodic reports
produced by the CA that address safety will be communicated to the service
providers for their information and education. Any changes in the objectives or
safety risk evaluation methods or any similar taken safety-related action or
activity by the CAA will also be communicated to service providers.
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Attachment 1 Aviation Safety Legislative Framework of the Republic of

Serbia
1. The State safety legislative framework consists of national and international

regulations. Even national regulations were as much as practicable based on
international and regional standards and regulations. The basic aviation
regulation of the State is the Civil Aviation Act. At the moment of the preparation
of this SSP, the Civil Aviation Act shall be in the process of adoption through
coordination and comments period.
2. The Aviation Act will be applicable for all civil aircraft flying in and over the
territory of the State and only when specifically prescribed in the Aviation Act, to
the national military aircraft and military aerodromes. The proposed Aviation Act
addresses further air navigation safety, airspace protection, air navigation,
services in air navigation, air transportation, aerodromes and their use, aircraft
and their production and use, air navigation personnel, noise and environmental
protection, aircraft accidents and serious incidents, facilitations, security,
governmental organizations involved in air transportation and auditing and
inspection in air transportation.
3. The State as a member of the Joint Aviation Authority (JAA) has been applying
different JAA regulations as national regulations.
4. In addition to the Civil Aviation Act, there are numerous by-laws prepared and
issued by the CAA under the authority delegated to it by the government. Those
by-laws cover the areas of air navigation, aerodromes, flight operations, pilots,
flight crew members other than pilots and personnel other than flight crew
members. The complete updated list of all by-laws will eventually be a part of
this document and this task will be on the CAA SRB to arrange for the
preparation and provision of the list update of civil aviation by-laws in force in
the State.
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Attachment 2 Acceptable Level of Safety
1. Introduction
1.1 ICAO Annexes 1, 6, 8, 11, 13 and 14 require States to establish a State Safety
Programme (SSP) so to achieve an acceptable level of safety (ALoS) in the
operations and maintenance of aircraft, provision of air traffic services and
operation of aerodromes. ALoS is an essential component for the effective
operation and monitoring of actual performance of an SSP. Unless the concept of
ALoS is understood and properly developed and implemented, it will be difficult
to progress to a performance-based regulatory environment, and to monitor the
actual performance of an SSP.
1.2 Regulatory compliance alone cannot improve safety and more proactive
performance-based approach is now required. To achieve this, regulator of the
State and service providers under the responsibilities of CAA are all required to
establish and monitor safety performance indicators on which basis the safety
performance targets will be established and, when proven necessary during the
monitoring of these elements, set up mitigation to improve aviation safety.
1.3 To establish an ALoS by the State as required by ICAO, close coordination

between the regulator and service providers must be established so that ALoS
established in SSP and the one established in the SMS of each service provider
should not differ. Within each State service providers when developing their own
SMS will have to define their own ALoS and these will have to be agreed to by
the State safety oversight authority. It is recommended by ICAO that ALoS
developed by service providers are reviewed periodically so that they remain
relevant and appropriate to the service provider’s system design expectations.
2. Defining an Acceptable Level of Safety
2.1 To move to the SSP and SMS ALoS, it is necessary to define a set of measurable
performance outcomes in order to determine whether the system is truly
operating in accordance with design expectations, as opposed to simply meeting
regulatory requirements. The definition of a set of measurable performance
outcomes also allows identifying where action may be required to bring
operational performance of the system to the level of design expectations. Thus,
measurable performance outcomes permit the actual performance of activities
critical to safety to be assessed against existing organizational controls, so that
safety risks can be maintained as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) and
necessary corrective action may be taken.
2.2 There is a hierarchy inherent to the basic concepts of systems theory underlying
ALoS. The way these concepts must be sequenced in progression when
developing ALoS and understanding of the concepts and their inherent hierarchy
is an essential foundation for the development of ALoS regarding an SSP. The
concepts involved and their hierarchy are as follows:
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1) Safety. The state in which the possibility of harm to persons or of
property damage is reduced to, and maintained at or below, an
acceptable level through a continuing process of hazard identification and
safety risk management;
2) Level of safety. Degree of safety of a system, representing the quality
of the system, safety-wise, expressed through safety indicators;
3) Safety indicators. Parameters that characterize and/or typify the level
of safety of the system;
4) Safety targets. Concrete safety objectives to be achieved;
5) Acceptable level of safety. Minimum degree of safety that must be
assured by a system in actual practice;
6) Value of a safety indicator. Quantification of a safety indicator; and
7) Value of a safety target. Quantification of a safety target.
2.3 The selection of appropriate safety indicators is the key to the development of
ALoS. Such selection should be a function of the detail to which the level of
safety of the system is intended to be represented. If the level of safety is to be
represented in broad, generic terms, the selection of safety indicators
representing high-level/high-consequence system outcomes (quantitative) and/or
high-level system functions (qualitative) is appropriate. If the level of safety of
the system is to be represented in specific, narrow terms, then the selection of
indicators representing low-level/low-consequence system outcomes and lower-
level system functions is required. In both cases, meaningful safety indicators
must be representative of the outcomes, processes and functions that
characterize system safety.
2.4 In order to properly develop ALoS regarding the SSP, it is fundamental to

understand the difference between two closely interrelated — and therefore
sometimes confusing — yet quite distinct concepts; safety measurement and
safety performance measurement.
2.5 Safety measurement refers to the quantification of the outcomes of selected

high-level, high-consequence events, such as accident and serious incident rates.
Safety measurement can also be applied to reflect the quantification of selected
high-level State functions, such as the status of development/implementation of
primary aviation safety legislation or the absence thereof, the status of
development/implementation of specific operating regulations or the absence
thereof, and the level of regulatory compliance within the State. Safety
measurement is not a continuous process, but is rather a spot check,
normally conducted following pre-specified time frames, annually, semi-annually
or quarterly. Safety measurement is associated with the SSP and reflects the
extent to which the high-level safety objectives of the safety interventions of
mitigation strategies have been achieved.
Safety indicator and target values based on safety measurement (example)

Safety indicator value Safety target value
1. [Number] CFIT approach and landing 1. Reduce by [number] the number of /
accidents per [number] departures Maximum of [number] CFIT approach and
landing accidents per [number] operations
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2. [Number] runway excursions per 2. Reduce by [number] the number of /
[number] operations Maximum of [number] runway excursions
per [number] operations
3. [Number] ground collision accidents per 3. Reduce by [number] the number of /
year on a [x-year] rolling average Maximum of [number] ground collision
accidents per year on a [x-year] rolling
average
4. [Number] high-severity events captured 4. Minimum of [number] high-severity
through the State Mandatory Occurrence events captured through the State MOR
Report (MOR) yearly yearly
5. [Number] inspections of operators 5. Minimum of [number] inspections of
completed quarterly operators completed quarterly
6. [Number] AIS facilities with QMS 6. [Number] AIS facilities with QMS
implemented implemented by [time]
7. Electronic filing of differences completed 7. Electronic filing of differences completed
within [number] months/weeks within [revised number] months/weeks
2.6 Safety performance measurement refers to the quantification of the

outcomes of selected low-level, low-consequence processes, such as the number
of foreign object debris (FOD) events per specified number of ramp operations,
or the number of unauthorized ground vehicle events on taxiways per a specific
number of airport operations or during a specified period of time. Safety
performance measurement is a non-stop activity, involving continuous
monitoring and measurement, by an organization, of selected operational
activities that are necessary to deliver the services the organization was
constituted to deliver (provision of aerodrome services, air traffic control,
training, etc.). Safety performance measurement is mostly, but not exclusively,
associated with an SMS, and provides a measure of the actual operational
performance of a safety management system, such as an SSP or an SMS, beyond
the absolute measures resulting from safety measurement (including regulatory
compliance). It also applies to the safety interventions and mitigation strategies
established as part of an SSP, as applicable.
Safety indicator and target values based on safety performance measurement

(example)
Safety indicator value Safety target value
1. [Number] level busts per [number] 1. Reduce by [number] the number of /
operations Maximum of [number] level busts per
[number] operations by [date]
2. [Number] Cat B and C runway 2. Reduce by [number] the number of /
incursions at international [State] airport Maximum of [number] Cat B and C runway
per [number] operations incursions at international [State] airport by
[date]
3. [Number] TCAS/airprox events per 3. Reduce by [number] the number of /
[number] operations Maximum of [number] TCAS/airprox events
per [number] operations by [date]
4. [Number] non-conforming approaches 4. Reduce by [number] the number of /
(NCA) at international [State] airport per Maximum of [number] non-conforming
[number] operations approaches (NCA) at international [State]
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airport by [date]
5. [Number] apron FOD events at 5. Reduce by [number] the number of /
international [State] airport per [number] Maximum of [number] apron FOD events at
operations international [State] airport by [date]
2.7 The ALoS related to an SSP must be developed based upon a well-judged
combination of safety measurement and safety performance measurement. The
extent to which ALoS represents safety measurement or safety performance
measurement depends upon the maturity of the SSP. Initially, immediately
following development and implementation of an SSP, the safety indicator values
and the safety target values related to ALoS will likely be expressed through
quantitative action statements on selected high-level/high-consequence
outcomes (safety measurement).
As the SSP matures and safety data collection and analysis capabilities are developed
through the safety assurance component of the SSP, the safety indicator values and the
safety target values related to ALoS will be modified and expressed through a
combination of quantitative action statements on selected high-level/high-consequence
events (safety measurement) and quantitative action statements on selected low-
level/low-consequence outcomes (safety performance measurement). As the SSP
achieves maturity, the safety indicator values and the safety target values related to
ALoS will be expressed through quantitative action statements on selected low-level/low-
consequence outcomes (safety performance measurement).
Two generic aspects must be considered when assessing whether the specific safety
target values of ALoS should represent improvement with respect to, or rather
maintenance, of the related safety indicator values. First, consideration must be given to
the availability of resources within the State to achieve the improvement considered.
Second, consideration must be given to how expensive the action plan(s) deemed
necessary to achieve the improvement is. A third consideration, applicable only to safety
target values based upon safety performance measurement, is whether the safety risks
assessment of the consequences of the hazards addressed by the improvement falls in
the tolerable region of the safety risk management process. The safety target value may
at one point reflect a safety risk assessment that falls in the tolerable region under
prevailing circumstances. However, changes in the system, growth and so forth may
render such safety risk assessment invalid. The safety target value must, in this case,
reflect an improvement with respect to its associated safety indicator value to be valid in
the changed environment.
ALoS is delivered through action plans. These are the tools and means needed to
achieve the safety target values of ALoS related to the SSP. Action plans include the
operational procedures, technology, systems and programmes to which measures of
reliability, availability, performance and/or accuracy can be specified. The
implementation of an ALoS goes above and beyond regulatory compliance with national
and international requirements. Establishing an ALoS for an SSP does not replace legal,
regulatory or other established requirements, nor does it relieve States from their
obligations regarding the Convention on International Civil Aviation (ICAO Doc 7300)
and its related provisions contained in the Annexes to the Convention.
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3. Safety indicators of the State
3.1 The first step in developing an ALoS related to the SSP is to decide on the detail
to which the level of safety of the whole aviation system in the State is intended
to be represented, and then select meaningful safety indicators that characterize
or typify the level of safety of the Serbian aviation system commensurate with its
size and complexity.
3.2 The availability of the safety data is a determinant factor in the decision
regarding the detail of representation and the consequential selection of
quantitative or qualitative safety indicators. The State is yet to develop safety
data collection and analysis capabilities and it is not in a position to represent the
level of safety in greater details. Therefore, it must elect to initially favour
qualitative safety indicators. Following the safety indicators definition, next step
will be to define associated safety targets, which are considered as objectives of
improvement.
3.3 Typical examples of safety indicators in the aviation system include, among
others:
a) fatal airline accidents;

b) serious incidents;
c) runway excursion events;
d) ground collision events;
e) technical failures;
f) development/absence of primary aviation legislation;
g) development/absence of operating regulations; and
h) level of regulatory compliance.
3.4 Typical examples of safety targets in the aviation system include, among others:
a) reduction in fatal airline accidents;

b) reduction in serious incidents;
c) reduction in runway excursion events;
d) reduction in ground collision events;
e) reduction in technical failures;
f) development of operating regulations; and
g) the number of inspections completed quarterly.
3.5 The above typical indicators and targets could be the starting point for the
development of ALoS for the State SSP. The review of the above and, if
necessary, inclusion of additional safety indicators and safety targets must be
done at the CAA SRB level in close coordination with the service providers. Once
safety indicators and safety targets have been selected, the level of safety
representing the particular aviation system of the State could be established.
Once this is established, the State will be ready to progress to the development
of ALoS, the minimum degree of safety in civil aviation that must be assured by
the SSP in actual practice. In order to develop ALoS, values must be attached to
the safety indicators, and objectives of improvement and/or maintenance of such
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values must be attached to the safety targets. Further consideration when
establishing ALoS must be given to:
a) the level of safety risk that applies;

b) the safety risk tolerance;
c) the cost/benefits of improvements to the aviation system; and
d) public expectations about the civil aviation system
3.6 Once the safety data collection system comprising of mandatory and voluntary
reporting is established, on the basis of collected data and data analysis it would
be possible to further progress towards the refinement of the safety indicators
selected as well as in defining better the safety target values. This whole process
is well dependent on the timely setting up of the collection system and database
by the CAA and even more importantly on the development and establishment of
the reporting culture from the top down, managers to operational personnel that
would be based on a voluntary non-punishable reporting of hazard occurrences.
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Attachment 3 State Safety Risk Management Process
1.1 Safety is defined as the outcome of the management of a number of

organizational processes that has the objective of keeping safety risks under
organizational control. Key in this perspective is the notion of safety as an
outcome while safety risk management as a process.
1.2 Closely associated with risk is hazard identification as one of the two core
activities supporting the management of safety. Safety risk management is the
other core activity that supports the management of safety. Both hazards and
safety risk contribute to other, indirectly related organizational processes
indirectly related to the management of safety.
1.3 Once sources of danger or harm are identified, and their consequences analysed
and agreed, mitigation strategies to protect against the consequences can be
deployed. Before the mitigation deployment, however, it is necessary to evaluate
the seriousness of the consequences, so as to define priorities for the allocation
of resources when proposing mitigation strategies.
1.4 To be able to manage safety, it is essential to try to measure the seriousness of

the consequences of hazards. This is the essential contribution of safety risk
management to the safety management process. By “putting a number” on the
consequences of hazards, the safety management process provides the
organization with a principled basis for safety risk decisions and the subsequent
allocation of organizational resources to contain the damaging potential of
hazards.
1.5 It is essential from the outset to establish a clear definition of safety risk and to
link such a definition to the concepts of hazards and consequences expressed in
operational terms. Safety risks are not tangible or visible components of any
physical or natural environment; it is necessary to think about safety risks to
understand or form an image of them. Safety risk is defined as the assessment,
expressed in terms of predicted probability and severity, of the consequences of
a hazard, taking as reference the worst foreseeable situation. Typically, safety
risks are designated through an alphanumeric convention that allows for their
measurement.
1.6 The State and specifically the CAA under the authority delegated to it by the
government, is in the process of organizing the safety oversight functions
through the development and deployment of SSP and SMSs at several service
providers within the CAA’s responsibility. In Chapter 4 of this document that
covers the safety risk management subject, it is recommended that the CAA
Safety Regulation Board (SRB) consider establishment of one small group of CAA
experts from operations (OPS), aerodromes and air traffic management (ATM),
named the Safety Risk Group (SRG). The group would be tasked specifically with
the oversight of the management of aviation safety risks. This group would
coordinate and when necessary participate in the safety risk management
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processes and provide advice to the CAA SRB. The SRG duties indicated in
Chapter 4 above should be performed in accordance with the guidance provided
in ICAO Safety Management Manual (SMM, Doc 9859) and the equivalent
European regulations.
1.7 The SRG would identify, in cooperation with appropriate service providers and on
the basis of information regarding the fatal accidents and serious incidents
worldwide and those that are high-risk hazard occurrences available nationally,
and analyse them with the views of identifying the safety hazard that could apply
in the State. Identified hazards will be analysed against the consequences to
safety and risk probability, severity and tolerability and when identified necessary
to reduce the risk as low as reasonably practicable, define mitigation. This could
only be possible once the data collection system and associated processes are
established in the CAA as part of an SSP.
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Attachment 4 SSP Implementation Plan for the State
1. SSP Gap analysis
1.1 The SSP implementation plan is a blueprint of how this SSP will be developed
and integrated into the Civil Aviation Authority safety management activities, as
delegated by the government to be the safety oversight authority in the state.
Given the potential magnitude of the effort, it is important to properly manage
the workload associated with the CAD activities underlying the implementation of
the SSP. Depending on the result of the gap analysis and in line with the
complexity and scope of the aviation system, the four components and eleven
elements of the ICAO SSP framework must be implemented by the CAA in a
sequential order that will allow for the achievement of specific deliverables.
1.2 The first step, overall, to be taken in implementing the SSP by the CAA is to
conduct a gap analysis, in order to ascertain the existence and status of
maturity, within the State, of the elements of an SSP. An SSP gap analysis table
is included in the Appendix to this Attachment. The gap analysis table is
structured according to the ICAO recommendations and enclosed to this
document closely following SSP framework that consists of four components and
eleven elements. Once the gap analysis is completed and documented, the
components or elements identified as missing or deficient will form together with
those already existing or effective, the basis for the SSP implementation plan.
Following the gap analysis, CAA will identify the need to draft the national
legislation and operating regulations governing the functioning of the SSP.
Included among these will be the SMS requirements for service providers.
1.3 One of the specific objectives of the SSP is to generate a context which is
supportive of the implementation of SMS by service providers. Therefore, within
the scope of the SSP activities, four specific steps that support SMS
implementation by service providers must be taken by the CAA. The first step is
the gap analysis, the second step is to develop an SMS training programme for
the CAA’s safety oversight staff. The third step is to develop SMS regulation for
service providers and development of guidance material for SMS implementation
and the fourth step is to establish the enforcement policy of the State.
2. SSP Implementation Plan
1. STATE SAFETY POLICY AND OBJECTIVES
1.1 State safety legislative framework
a) Review, develop and promulgate, as necessary, a national safety

legislative framework and specific regulations, in compliance with
international and national standards, that define how the State will
oversee the management of safety within its jurisdiction;
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b) Establish in the State a national-level group in the form of a Safety
Regulation Board (SRB) to ensure the coordinated participation of
aviation organizations in specific activities related to the management of
safety in the State, and the establishment of the roles, responsibilities
and relationships of such organization; and
c) Establish a time frame to periodically review the safety legislation and

specific operating regulations to ensure they remain relevant and
appropriate to the State.
1.2 CAA safety responsibilities and accountabilities
a) Identify, define and document the requirements, responsibilities and

accountabilities regarding the establishment and maintenance of the SSP
by the CAA. This includes the directives to plan, organize, develop,
maintain control of and continuously improve the SSP in a manner that
meets the State’s safety objectives. Include a clear statement about the
provision of the necessary CAA resources for the implementation of SSP;
b) The identified and appointed Accountable Executive of the State’s State

Safety Programme shall have inter alia:
1) ultimate responsibility and accountability, on behalf of the

Republic of Serbia, for the implementation and maintenance of the
SSP;
2) full authority on human resources issues related to CAA that has
been designated as placeholder for the SSP;
3) full authority on major financial issues related to CAA that has
been designated as placeholder for the SSP;
4) final authority over service provider’s certificate management
aspects; and
5) final responsibility for the resolution of all aviation safety issues of
the State;
c) Establish the SSP implementation team;
d) Assign the time required for each task associated with the
implementation of the SSP among the different CAA management levels;
e) Introduce all CAA staff to SSP concepts at a level commensurate with

their involvement in the SSP;
f) Develop and implement a State safety policy that includes but is not
necessarily limited to:
1) the commitment to develop and implement strategies and

processes to ensure that all aviation activities under oversight will
achieve the highest level of safety performance;
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2) the development and promulgation of a national safety legislative
framework and applicable operating regulations for the
management of safety in the State;
3) the commitment to allocate the necessary resources to CAA to
allow their personnel to discharge their responsibilities, both
safety-related and otherwise;
4) the support of the management of safety in the State through an
effective hazard reporting and communication system;
5) the establishment of provisions for the protection of safety data
collection and processing systems (SDCPS);
6) the commitment to effective interaction with service providers in
the resolution of safety concerns;
7) the commitment to communicate the State safety policy, with
visible endorsement, to all staff; and
8) an enforcement policy that reflects service provider’s operations in
an SMS environment; and
g) Establish the necessary means to ensure that the State safety policy is
understood, implemented and observed at all levels within State’s
aviation organizations.
1.3 Accident and incident investigation
a) Develop and establish the mechanisms to ensure an independent accident

and incident investigation process, the sole objective of which is the
prevention of accidents and incidents, in support of the management of
safety in the State, and not the apportioning of blame or liability; and
b) Develop and establish the necessary arrangements to ensure the

independence of the accident and incident investigation authority from
other aviation organizations of the State.
1.4 Enforcement policy
a) Develop and promulgate an enforcement policy that establishes the

conditions and circumstances under which service providers are allowed
to deal with, and resolve, events involving certain safety deviations,
internally, within the context of the service provider’s safety management
system (SMS), and to the satisfaction of the CAA. The enforcement policy
also establishes the conditions and circumstances under which to deal
with safety deviations through established enforcement procedures; and
b) The policy should also ensure that no information obtained from an

internal hazard reporting system or a flight data monitoring system
established under an SMS will be used for enforcement action.
1.5 SSP documentation
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Develop and establish the CAA safety library that documents the requirements,
responsibilities and accountabilities regarding the establishment and maintenance
of the SSP. The CAA safety library will maintain and update, as necessary, the
SSP documentation related to the national safety legislative framework, the State
safety policy and objectives, the SSP requirements, the SSP processes and
procedures, the accountabilities, responsibilities and authorities for processes
and procedures, and the State’s acceptable level of safety (ALoS) related to the
SSP.
Deliverables
1. State safety legislative framework promulgated.

2. State safety responsibilities and accountabilities established, documented
and published.
3. State safety and enforcement policies signed by the Accountable
Executive.
4. State safety and enforcement policies distributed within the aviation
organizations of the State and among service providers under the CAA
oversight.
5. Independent accident and incident investigation process in place.
6. CAA SSP organizational structure in place.
Milestones
1. CAA Accountable Executive identified.

2. Proposed safety policy drafted.
3. Lines of CAA safety responsibility and accountability established.
4. Proposed CAA SSP organizational structure approved.
5. Budget for CAA SSP processes approved.
2. CAA SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT
2.1 Safety requirements for the service provider’s SMS
a) CAA establish the requirements, specific operating regulations and

implementation policies for the service provider’s SMS (SMS regulatory
framework, advisory circulars, etc.) as the controls which govern how
service providers will identify hazards and manage and control safety
risks;
b) Establish a time frame for consultation by CAA with service providers on

those requirements; and
c) Establish a time frame to periodically review by CAA the requirements

and specific operating regulations to ensure they remain relevant and
appropriate to the service providers.
2.2 Agreement with CAA on the service provider’s safety performance
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a) Develop and establish a procedure for agreement with the CAA on the
safety performance of an individual service provider’s SMS based on:
1) safety performance indicator values;

2) safety performance target values; and
3) action plans;
b) Include within the agreed procedure that the service provider’s safety
performance should be commensurate with:
1) the complexity of the individual service provider’s specific

operational contexts; and
2) the availability of the individual service provider’s resources to
address safety risks;
c) Measure the safety performance of the service provider’s SMS through

periodic reviews by CAA of the agreed safety performance of the SMS to
ensure that safety performance indicators and safety performance targets
remain relevant and appropriate to the service provider;
d) Develop a means to assess by CAA lower-level outcomes and most

frequent processes among different service providers; and
e) Determine measurable performance outcomes within different SMS.
Deliverables
1. SMS regulations promulgated.

2. Guidance material on implementation of SMS distributed to service
providers by CAA.
3. First annual review by CAA of the agreed safety performance of service
providers completed.
Milestones
1. Draft proposal of SMS regulations distributed by CAA to service providers

for review.
2. Draft proposal of SMS guidance material distributed by CAA to service
providers for review.
3. Training of CAA technical personnel in hazard identification and safety risk
management completed.
4. Procedure for agreement on the safety performance of service providers
completed.
3. CAA SAFETY ASSURANCE
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3.1 CAA Safety oversight
a) Establish mechanisms to ensure an effective safety oversight function of

CAA;
b) Establish mechanisms in the CAA that guarantee that the identification of

hazards and the management of safety risks by service providers follow
established regulatory controls;
c) Establish mechanisms in the CAA that guarantee that safety risk controls
are integrated into the service provider’s SMS; and
d) Develop an internal CAA SSP audit.
3.2 Safety data collection, analysis and exchange
a) Develop and establish by the CAA a means of collecting, analysing and

storing data about hazards and safety risks at the State level:
1) establish a mandatory hazard reporting system;

2) establish a confidential hazard reporting system;
3) develop a State hazard database;
4) establish a mechanism to develop information from the stored
data;
5) establish a means to collect hazards at both the aggregate State
level and at the individual service provider’s level;
6) establish a means to implement corrective action plans; and
7) consider Legal Guidance for the Protection of Information from
Safety Data Collection and Processing Systems, as provided in
Annex 13, Attachment E for incorporation into national regulation;
b) Ensure that the service provider’s hazard identification and safety risk
management processes follow established regulatory requirements and
that safety risk controls are appropriately integrated into the service
provider’s SMS, including, but not necessarily limited to the CAA:
1) inspections;
2) audits; and
3) surveys;
c) Observe by CAA the following sequence for implementation:
1) regulatory safety risk controls integrated into the service

provider’s SMS;
2) oversight activities to ensure the service provider’s hazard
identification and safety risk management processes follow
established regulatory requirements; and
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3) oversight activities to verify that safety risk controls are practised
by service providers;
d) Establish by CAA the acceptable level of safety (ALoS) related to the SSP,
comprising a combination of safety measurement and safety performance
measurement:
1) Safety measurement includes the quantification of the outcomes

of high-level, high-consequence events or high-level State
functions, such as accident rates, serious incident rates and
regulatory compliance; and
2) Safety performance measurement includes the quantification of
the outcomes of low-level, low-consequence processes that
provide a measure of the realistic implementation of the SSP
beyond accident rates and/or regulatory compliance.
3.3 Safety-data-driven targeting of oversight by CAA of areas of greater

concern or need
Establish CAA procedures to prioritize inspections, audits and surveys, based on

analysis of hazards and safety risks.
Deliverables
1. State mandatory and confidential hazard reporting system in place.

2. First annual review by CAA of the safety policy and objectives conducted.
3. First annual review by CAA of the enforcement policy conducted.
4. ALoS established by CAA.
Milestones
1. Data storage and processing of hazards and safety risks at the State
level.
2. Information on hazards and safety risks at both the aggregate State level
and the individual service provider’s level collected.
4. CAA SAFETY PROMOTION
4.1 CAA Internal training, communication and dissemination of safety

information
a) Identify CAA internal training requirements;
b) Develop and provide generic safety training to all CAA staff;
c) Develop a training programme on key components of an SSP and an SMS

for CAA staff that includes:
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1) indoctrination/initial safety training;
2) on-the-job (OJT) safety training; and
3) recurrent safety training;
d) Establish a means to measure the effectiveness of the CAA staff training;

and
e) Develop a means to communicate safety-related issues internally within

CAA, including:
1) safety policies and procedures;

2) newsletters;
3) bulletins; and
4) a website.
4.2 External training, communication and dissemination of safety

information by CAA
a) Establish the means by CAA to provide two-way communication of safety-

relevant information to support SMS implementation among service
providers, including small operators;
b) Develop training and guidance material on implementation of SMS for

service providers; and
c) Establish the means to communicate by CAA safety-related issues

externally including:
1) safety policies and procedures;

2) newsletters;
3) bulletins; and
4) a website.
Deliverables
1. First cycle of generic safety training for CAA staff completed.

2. Training programme on key components of an SSP and an SMS for
technical and support CAA staff completed.
3. Guidance material on SMS distributed to service providers by CAA,
including small operators.
4. First cycle of training for service providers on implementation of SMS
completed.
5. Means to communicate safety-related information, internally and
externally, established by CAA.
Milestones
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1. Minimum knowledge and experience requirements for CAA technical
personnel performing safety oversight functions established.
2. Guidance material on SMS developed and published by CAA.
3. Training programmes on SMS for aviation organizations and service
providers in the State developed by CAA.
4. Newsletter and bulletins developed by CAA.
_____________________
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Appendix to Attachment 4
STATE SAFETY PROGRAMME (SSP) GAP ANALYSIS
Note. - Each question is designed for a “Yes” or “No” response. A “Yes” answer indicates that the State
already has the component or element of the ICAO SSP framework in question incorporated into its safety
system and that it matches or exceeds the requirement. A “No” answer indicates that a gap exists between
the component/element of the ICAO SSP framework and the safety system in the State.
ICAO
reference Aspect to be analysed or question to be Answer Status
(Doc 9859) answered of implementation
Component 1 — STATE SAFETY POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES
Element 1.1 — State safety legislative framework
Chapter 11 Has the State promulgated a national Yes
safety legislative framework and specific No
regulations that define the management of
safety in the State?
Chapter 11 Has the State defined the specific activities Yes
related to the management of safety in No
which each State aviation organization
must participate?
Chapter 11 Has the State established requirements, Yes
responsibilities and accountabilities No
regarding the management of safety in the
State by its aviation organizations?
Chapter 11 Are the legislative framework and specific Yes
regulations periodically reviewed to ensure No
that they remain relevant and appropriate
to the State?
Chapter 11 Are the State legislative framework and Yes
specific regulations periodically reviewed to No
ensure that they are up to date with
respect to international standards?
Chapter 11 Has the State established a safety policy? Yes
No
Chapter 11 Is the State safety policy signed by the Yes
State SSP Accountable Executive or a high No
authority within the State?
Chapter 11 Is the State safety policy reviewed Yes
periodically? No
Chapter 11 Is State safety policy communicated with Yes
visible endorsement to all employees in all No
State aviation organizations with the intent
that they are made aware of their
individual safety responsibilities?
ICAO
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Chapter 11 Has the State developed documentation Yes
that describes the SSP, including the No
interrelationship between its components
and elements?
Chapter 11 Does the State have a record system that Yes
ensures the generation and retention of all No
records necessary to document and
support the SSP activities?
Chapter 11 Does the record system provide the control Yes
processes necessary to ensure appropriate No
identification, legibility, storage, protection,
archiving, retrieval, retention time, and
disposition of records?
Element 1.2 — State safety responsibilities and accountabilities
Chapter 11 Has the State identified and defined the Yes
State requirements, responsibilities and No
accountabilities regarding the
establishment and maintenance of the
SSP?
Chapter 11 Do the requirements include directives and Yes
activities to plan, organize, develop, No
control and continuously improve the SSP
in a manner that meets the State’s safety
objectives?
Chapter 11 Do the requirements include a clear Yes
statement about the provision of the No
necessary resources for the
implementation and maintenance of the
SSP?
Chapter 11 Has the State identified and appointed an Yes
Accountable Executive as the qualified No
person having direct responsibility for the
implementation, operation and supervision
of the SSP?
Chapter 11 Does the State’s SSP Accountable Yes
Executive fulfil the required job functions No
and responsibilities?
Executive coordinate, as appropriate, the No
activities of the different State aviation
organizations under the SSP?
Executive have control of the necessary No
resources required for the proper
execution of the SSP?
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ICAO
Executive verify that all personnel of the No
State aviation organizations understand
their authorities, responsibilities and
accountabilities with regard to the SSP and
all safety management processes,
decisions and actions?
Chapter 11 Are safety responsibilities and Yes
accountabilities, at all levels, defined and No
documented?
Element 1.3 — Accident and incident investigation
Chapter 11 Has the State established, as part of the Yes
management of safety, an independent No
accident and incident investigation process,
the sole objective of which is the
prevention of accidents and incidents, and
not the apportioning of blame or liability?
Chapter 11 Does the State maintain the independence Yes
of the accident and incident investigation No
organization from other State aviation
organizations?
Element 1.4 — Enforcement policy
Chapter 11 Has the State promulgated an enforcement Yes
policy? No
Chapter 11 Does the enforcement policy establish the Yes
conditions and circumstances under which No
service providers are allowed to deal with,
and resolve, events involving certain safety
deviations internally, within the context of
the service provider’s safety management
system (SMS), and to the satisfaction of
the CAA?
Chapter 11 Does the enforcement policy establish the Yes
conditions and circumstances under which No
to deal with safety deviations through
established enforcement procedures?
Component 2 — STATE SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT
Element 2.1 — Safety requirements for the service provider’s SMS
Chapter 11 Has the State established the controls □ Yes
which govern how service providers will □ No
identify hazards and manage safety risks?
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ICAO
Chapter 11 Are requirements, specific operating □ Yes
regulations and implementation policies □ No
based on identified hazards and analysis of
the safety risks of the consequences of the
hazards?
Chapter 11 Are requirements, specific operating □ Yes
regulations and implementation policies □ No
periodically reviewed to ensure they
remain relevant and appropriate to the
service providers?
Chapter 11 Is there a structured process within the □ Yes
State to assess how the service providers □ No
will manage the safety risks associated
with identified hazards, expressed in terms
of probability and severity of occurrence?
Chapter 11 Is there a State’s policy in place that □ Yes
ensures effective safety reporting of safety □ No
deficiencies, hazards or occurrences?
Chapter 11 Does the State policy on reporting of □ Yes
safety deficiencies, hazards or occurrences □ No
include the conditions under which
protection from disciplinary and/or
administrative action applies?
Element 2.2 — Agreement on the service provider’s safety performance
Chapter 11 Has the State individually agreed with □ Yes
service providers on the safety □ No
performance of their SMS?
Chapter 11 Is the agreed safety performance □ Yes
commensurate with the complexity of the □ No
individual service provider’s specific
operational context?
Chapter 11 Does the agreed safety performance □ Yes
consider the individual service provider’s □ No
resources to address safety risks?
expressed by multiple safety indicators and □ No
safety targets, as opposed to a single one,
as well as by action plans?
periodically reviewed to ensure it remains □ No
relevant and appropriate to the service
provider?
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ICAO
Element 3.1 — Safety oversight
Chapter 11 Has the State established mechanisms to □ Yes
ensure an effective safety oversight □ No
function?
ensure that the identification of hazards □ No
and the management of safety risks by
service providers follow established
regulatory controls?
Chapter 11 Do established mechanisms include □ Yes
inspections, audits and surveys to ensure □ No
that regulatory safety risk controls are
appropriately integrated into the SMS of
service providers?
Chapter 11 Do established mechanisms ensure that □ Yes
regulatory safety risk controls are practised □ No
as designed?
Chapter 11 Do established mechanisms ensure that □ Yes
regulatory safety risk controls have the □ No
intended effect on safety risks?
Chapter 11 Are regular and periodic reviews conducted □ Yes
regarding the States’s ALoS? □ No
Chapter 11 Do reviews consider changes that could □ Yes
affect the State’s SSP and its ALoS, □ No
recommendations for improvement and
sharing of best practices across the State?
Chapter 11 Are regular and periodic reviews conducted □ Yes
to assess if the State’s SSP and its ALoS □ No
remain appropriate to the scope and
complexity of the aviation operations in the
State?
Chapter 11 Is there a process to evaluate the □ Yes
effectiveness of changes related to the □ No
SSP?
Element 3.2 — Safety data collection, analysis and exchange
ensure the capture and storage of data on □ No
hazards and safety risks at both the
individual and aggregate State level?
develop information from the stored data □ No
and to promote the exchange of safety
information with service providers and/or
other States, as appropriate?
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ICAO
Chapter 11 Has the State established an acceptable □ Yes
level of safety (ALoS) related to its SSP? □ No
Chapter 11 Does the State’s ALoS related to the SSP □ Yes
combine elements of safety measurement □ No
and safety performance measurement?
Chapter 11 Is the State’s ALoS commensurate with the □ Yes
complexity of aviation activities within the □ No
State?
Chapter 11 Is there a formal process within the State □ Yes
to develop and maintain a set of □ No
parameters to measure the realistic
implementation of the SSP?
Element 3.3 — Safety-data-driven targeting of oversight of areas of greater
concern or need
Chapter 11 Has the State developed procedures to □ Yes
prioritize inspections, audits and surveys □ No
towards those areas of greater safety
concern or need?
Chapter 11 Is the prioritization of inspections and □ Yes
audits the result of the analysis of data on □ No
hazards, their consequences in operations,
and the assessed safety risks?
Component 4 — STATE SAFETY PROMOTION
Element 4.1 — Internal training, communication and dissemination of safety
information
Chapter 11 Does the State provide internal training, □ Yes
awareness and two-way communication of □ No
safety-relevant information within the
State’s aviation organizations?
Chapter 11 Are there communication processes in □ Yes
place within the State to ensure that □ No
information about the SSP functions and
products is made available to the State’s
aviation organizations in a timely manner?
Chapter 11 Is there a process for the dissemination of □ Yes
safety information throughout the States’s □ No
aviation organizations and a means of
monitoring the effectiveness of this
process?
Chapter 11 Are communication processes (written, □ Yes
meetings, electronic, etc.) commensurate □ No
with the size and scope of the State’s
aviation organizations?
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ICAO
Chapter 11 Are safety information and information □ Yes
about the SSP functions and products □ No
maintained in a suitable medium?
Element 4.2 — External training, communication and dissemination of safety
information
Chapter 11 Does the State provide external education, □ Yes
awareness of safety risks and two-way □ No
communication of safety-relevant
information?
place within the State that allow the SSP to □ No
be promoted nationally and internationally?
Chapter 11 Is there a formal process for the external □ Yes
dissemination of safety information to the □ No
State’s service providers and a means of
monitoring the effectiveness of this
process?
place within the State to ensure that □ No
information about the SSP functions and
products is made available to the State’s
service providers in a timely manner?
Chapter 11 Are communication processes (written, □ Yes
meetings, electronic, etc.) commensurate □ No
with the size and scope of the State’s
service providers?
Chapter 11 Are safety information and information □ Yes
about the SSP functions and products □ No
established and maintained in a suitable
medium?
—————————
– END –
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Acronyms and Abbreviations

Chapter 2 Safety Oversight Arrangements

Chapter 3 Safety Policy and Objectives

1. Safety legislative framework

Chapter 4 Safety Risk Management

1. Safety requirements for service providers SMS

Chapter 5 Aviation Safety Assurance

Chapter 6 Aviation Safety Promotion

1. Internal training, communication and dissemination of safety

Attachment 1 Aviation Safety Legislative Framework

Attachment 2 Acceptable Level of Safety

Attachment 3 Safety Risk Management Process

Attachment 4 SSP Implementation Plan

Appendix to SSP Gap Analysis Table

Each contracting State undertakes to collaborate in securing the highest

To facilitate implementation of ICAO SARPs related to the State Safety Programme,

Acceptable level of safety. Minimum degree of safety that must be assured by a

a) a person is fatally or seriously injured as a result of:

Aerodrome certificate. A certificate issued by the appropriate authority under

Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP). A publication issued by or with the

Air operator certificate (AOC). A certificate authorizing an operator to carry out

Approved maintenance organization. An organization approved by a Contracting

Approved training. Training conducted under special curricula and supervision

Approved training organization. An organization approved by a Contracting State in

Certification, A process performed by the appropriate authority in order to approve an

Certified aerodrome. An aerodrome whose operator has been granted an aerodrome

Hazard. A condition or an object with the potential to cause injuries to personnel,

Incident. An occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of an

Investigation. A process conducted for the purpose of accident prevention which

Licensing Authority. The Authority designated by a Contracting State as responsible

Maintenance. The performance of tasks required ensuring the continuing airworthiness

Maintenance organization’s procedures manual. A document endorsed by the

Maintenance programme. A document which describes the specific scheduled

Maintenance release. A document which contains a certification confirming that the

Operations specifications. The authorizations, conditions and limitations associated

Performance criteria. Simple, evaluative statements on the required outcome of the

Quality assurance. Part of quality management focused on providing confidence that

Quality control. Part of quality management focused on fulfilling quality requirements.

Quality management. Coordinated activities to direct and control an organization with

Quality system. Documented organizational procedures and policies; internal audit of

Safety management system. A systematic approach to managing safety, including

Safety programme. An integrated set of regulations and activities aimed at improving

Safety risk. Assessment, expressed in terms of predicted probability and severity, of

Safety risk severity. The possible consequences of an unsafe event or condition,

Safety targets. Concrete safety objectives to be achieved.

State of Registry. The State on whose register the aircraft is entered.

Note.— In the case of the registration of aircraft of an international operating agency on

Value of a safety indicator. Quantification of a safety indicator.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADREP Accident/incident data reporting (ICAO)

a. Continuation of the alignment of the State’s transport/aviation legislation to

1.8 Clear articulation of the difference between regulations as administrative controls

1.10 This includes the establishment of requirements, specific operating regulations

Intentionally left blank

Chapter 2 Safety Oversight Arrangements

2. Responsibilities of Civil Aviation Authority

3. Air Accident Investigation Department

3.1 An Air Accident Investigation Department shall be established as an independent

4. Responsibilities of the Service Providers