Cases Rape

Problem Areas in LEGAL ETHICS
Defenses
CHAPTER VII
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents,
grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the abovenamed persons, as the case may be.
In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit
the penalty already imposed upon him. The provi sions of this paragraph shall also be applicable to the coprincipals, accomplices and accessories after the fact of
the above-mentioned crimes (Art. 84, Revised Penal Code).
In General
Generally speaking, there are only two possible defenses in rape: denial of copulation or admission of the fact of copulation, but with the legal consent of the
partner (People vs. Doman, 120 SCRA 486).
Specifically, however, a number of defenses can be raised by the accused. Among these are pardon, marriage, lack of jurisdiction, consent, insufficient resistance,
incredibility, impotency) intoxication, testimonial discrepancy, act contrary to human nature and experience, alibi and delay in reporting or filing of complaint.
Pardon, marriage and lack of jurisdiction are built-in defenses enumerated in the above legal provision. The first two are expressly cited, while the third is
deducible.
Marriage
The marriage of the offender with the offended party in rape extinguishes the criminal action or remits the penalty already imposed. This benefit extends to co-
principals, accomplices, and accessories after the fact. This applies even if the principal or accomplice is already serving sentence (Laceste vs. Santos, 56 Phil.
472).
The marriage referred to is one that is valid or made in good faith, and not one resorted to only to escape criminal liability (People vs. Santiago, 51 Phil. 68).
Where, however, multiple rape is committed, marriage of the offender with the offended party does not extinguish the criminal acts committed by the others. This is
so because each carnal access amounts to a separate and independent crime of rape (People vs. Bernardo, 58/36 OG 3479).
Pardon
The offense of rape shall not be prosecuted if the offended party or her parents, grandparents or guardian has expressly pardoned the offender (Section 5, Par. 3,
Rule 110, Rules of Court; Art. 344, supra). To be effective, pardon must be bestowed before the institution of the criminal prosecution (People vs. Avila, 192 SCRA
635). In other words, pardon given after the filing of the complaint would be unavailing.
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"It is settled that the pardon of the offended party, to operate as a bar to a criminal prosecution for any of the crimes mentioned in Article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code, xxxxx must be given before the institution of the criminal action."(People vs. Infante, 57 Phil. 138; People vs. Miranda, 57 Phil. 274; SCRA 480). People vs.
Suliao, 194 SCRA 250; People vs. Urn, 206 SCRA 176).
Pardon or condonation must be clear and unequivocal and not a mere inference (U.S. vs. Luna, 1 Phil. 368). It must be expressed, not implied (People vs. Eagle
and Price, 43 OG 3739).
If the offended party is a minor, the pardon extended by her must be complemented by the concurrence of her parents (People vs. Lacson, Jr., 55 OG 5468, citing
Oras vs. Evangelista, et al., L-8558, September 28, 1955). However, if she has sufficient discretion or she has no parents who could concur on the pardon, she
may extend the pardon alone (People vs. Inciong, CA-G.R. No. 8946, October 26, 1942).The parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party cannot
extend a valid pardon without the concurrence of the latter, even if she is a minor (U.S. vs. Luna, 1 Phil. 360; Peoplevs. Lacson, 55 OG 9460).
Lack of Jurisdiction
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code mandates that a complaint for rape should be filed by the offended party,or her parents, grandparents or guardian. This
requirement is jurisdictional (People vs. Quitalag, 49 OG 5456; People vs. Manaba, 58 Phil. 665; People vs. Santos, No. L-8520, June 29, 1952) and mandatory
(Tolentino vs. Dela Cruz, 66 Phil.97; People vs. Ocampo, 150 SCRA 607; People vs. Mandia,60 Phil. 372). Noncompliance with it is a proper basis for a motion to
quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused (Section 3, par (b), Rule 117, Rules of Court).
Consent
No act shall be deemed a crime if done with the consent of the party injured, but one who gives consent must be capable of doing so (Haddan vs. People, 25 N.Y.
373). Thus, if the carnal act took place under circumstances of mutual consent of the parties, there is no rape (People vs. Quiazon, 78 SCRA 513).
Where the accused had intercourse with a girl, but no one witnessed how the intercourse took place and no violence or intimidation was shown, it cannot be
inferred that the accused raped the girl. The intercourse might have taken place with the girls consent (People vs. Fortin, 97 Phil. 983; 56 SCRA 459; People vs.
Reyes, 68 SCRA 126).
In a line of cases, it was held there was no rape where although carnal acts did take place, the same happened only under circumstances of mutual consent.
Hence, whatever moral disapprobation may be visited on the mode or conduct of the accused, conviction under such an indictment cannot be justified (People vs.
Alvarez, 55 SCRA 73; People vs. Barbo, 56 SCRA 495; People vs. Castro, 58 SCRA 73; People vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 126; People vs. Ramirez, 69 SCRA 144;
People vs. Gadoy, 72 SCRA 69).
The circumstances that Virginia admitted that she and Genaro embraced and kissed each other in a motel room long before the alleged rape, that she did not
tenaciously resist the alleged ravishment, that there was no external injuries on her body to show that actual physical violence was used against her, that she did
not shout, that she did not run or escape, that she continued to have sexual intercourse with Genaro in the house where his wife was staying and that she did not
leave that house when her father fetched her, point to the conclusion that the sexual intercourse was induced by the chemistry and electricity of mutual attraction
and desire."(People vs. Mendiguarin, 92 SCRA 679).
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Consent, to constitute a good defense in rape must be given before penetration. If the woman consents after the offense had been committed, it is no defense
(Steele vs. State, 189 Team 474, 225 SW ed 260).
"Even though a man may not be guilty of the crime of rape, due to the fact that the woman consented before the intercourse, yet if, before the consent was given, it
appears that the defendant used such force as to evidence an intention to commit rape, the defendant may be convicted of an assault with au intent to commit
rape"(State vs. Hartgan, 32 Vt 607; Taylor vs. State, 180 Wis 577, 993 NW 353)
G.R. No. L-46132 May 28, 1991
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FELIPE SANTIAGO, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Rogelio A. Vinluan for defendant-appellant.
MEDIALDEA, J.:p
The accused, Felipe Santiago, was charged with the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 1048 before the Court of First Instance, Branch I, Nueva Ecija. The
criminal complaint filed by Mabini Garcia in the said case reads as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of May, 1975 in Cabanatuan City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, by means of force or intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have sexual intercourse with the
undersigned complainant against the latter's will.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 3, Rollo)
Upon being arraigned, the accused entered the plea of not guilty to the offense charged. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision on February
23, 1977, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Felipe Santiago guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape defined and penalized
under Art. 335, pars. 1 and 2 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, civil interdiction
for life and perpetual absolute disqualification. He will also pay the costs of the case (sic).
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It is here to be observed that while the accused is said to have pointed a gun to the side of the victim while riding the tricycle and in going
up the Driftwood Hotel, the crime of rape was not actually committed with the use of the gun, hence, the death penalty is not; reposed on
the accused.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 39-40, Rollo)
Not satisfied with the decision, the accused appealed.
The antecedent facts as summarized in the People's brief are as follows:
The accused, Felipe Santiago, and the victim herein, Mabini Garcia, were officemates at the time of the incident in question. Felipe
Santiago was the head of the GSIS Branch Office in Cabanatuan City. He was the superior officer of Mabini Garcia who was an employee
in the Investment Unit of the said branch office.
The incident in question transpired in the late afternoon of May 26, 1975, while Mabini Garcia was on her way to see her dressmaker in
Cabanatuan City. She took a tricycle and was proceeding in the direction of the Development Bank Building when she heard the accused,
Felipe Santiago, call her from another tricycle. She stopped her tricycle and Santiago approached her. He told her that he wanted to
discuss some office matters with her, and he asked her to join him for a snack at the Manrio Restaurant. Mabini Garcia answered that she
would proceed to the Manrio immediately after seeing her dressmaker. She then went to her dressmaker and, as agreed, proceeded to
the Manrio. She saw Felipe Santiago there sitting at a table drinking beer. Only a few people were present. When she went to his table,
she found a chicken sandwich and a glass of lemon juice already on the table. She told him she was full. However, she was thirsty and so,
she drank the lemon juice, about half of its contents at first, but as they conversed, continued drinking little by little until she consumed the
glassful. (pp. 4-12, t.s.n., April 2, 1976)
After conversing for a few minutes, Santiago professed his feelings for Mabini Garcia. He told her that he was in love with her. The latter
was surprised and taken aback. She reminded him that he was a married man and she had no future with him. At this answer, the
accused wrinkled his brow and looked angry. Mabini Garcia bade him goodbye soon afterwards because she started to feel dizzy. The
accused stopped her from leaving and held her thigh while she was still seated. She stood up and told him not to molest her (bastusin).
She sat down again in order not to arouse the attention of the other people. After a while, Santiago went to the comfort room. Mabini
Garcia took advantage of his absence and went out from the Manrio to go home. She called for a tricycle and was about to board it when,
all of a sudden, Felipe Santiago appeared and pushed her into the tricycle. He sat beside her inside the tricycle and warned not to make
an outcry or scandal, otherwise, he would shoot her. Santiago put his left arm around her, while his right hand pointed a gun, covered with
a jacket, at her right side. He ordered the tricycle to go straight ahead in the direction of the Driftwood Hotel. Mabini Garcia was afraid and
nervous but unable to shout because she was dizzy. (pp. 12-20, t.s.n., April 2, 1976).
When the tricycle stopped, Mabini Garcia saw that they were inside the compound of the Driftwood Hotel Santiago alighted from the
tricycle, pulling Mabini Garcia with him The victim resisted and held onto the side of the tricycle with her two hands. However, because of
her weak, nervous and dizzy condition, Santiago succeeded in pulling her out. He warned her again not to create any scandal or else, he
would shoot her. Santiago then brought her to a room in the hotel and quickly closed the door. (pp. 21-30, t.s.n., April 2, 1976).
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Inside the room, Santiago held her by the shoulders and began to kiss her with the gun still pointed at her side. She pleaded with him not
to pursue his evil intentions, and to have pity on her as she had not done him any wrong. Santiago continued to kiss her while she
struggled to avoid contact with his body. Then Santiago slapped her and she fell. She managed to rise up but Santiago boxed her in the
stomach and she became unconscious. (pp. 31-35, t.s.n., April 2, 1976).
When Mabini Garcia came to, she found herself on the bed totally naked, her vagina bleeding, her thighs painful, and she felt that
Santiago had succeeded in abusing her. Santiago was also in bed, embracing and kissing her. She felt weak, then, she cried and cursed
Felipe Santiago. Although she felt weak, she kicked him. (pp. 4-11, t.s.n., June 4, 1976)
After a few minutes, Santiago stood up and told Mabini Garcia to dress up. He threw her clothes to her and she got up, still crying, and
started to dress. The accused warned her not to report the matter to anybody or he would kill her. Mabini Garcia was afraid, because she
had known the accused to have been involved before in a murder case. She knew he was not joking. The accused told her to go with him.
Mabini Garcia obeyed because she was afraid of the accused and she felt weak. They rode on a tricycle. Again, the accused warned her
not to report the matter to anybody or he would kill her. Mabini Garcia continued to cry softly in the tricycle, taking care not to make the
driver notice her condition. When the tricycle reached the intersection of the highway, and Mabini Street, the accused went down and told
the victim to proceed home. (pp. 14-18, t.s.n., June 16, 1976).
Mabini Garcia reached her house at around 8:00 P.M. and her mother, brother and sister were already resting. Only the household helper
was in the sala, She informed Mabini that supper was ready, but Mabini answered she will not eat supper anymore. She went to her room
right away because she did not want the helper to notice that anything was wrong. She cried the whole night over the injustice committed
upon her by Felipe Santiago. (pp. 6-11, t.s.n., July 19, 1976)
Mabini Garcia went as usual to office the following day because she did not want anyone to know what had happened to her. Besides, she
thought that Felipe Santiago would not report for work because earlier, she heard him announce at a Division Meeting that he would be
out on official business for two weeks starting that day. However, at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, Felipe Santiago suddenly arrived
in the office. Mabini Garcia was surprised and disturbed but she concealed her feelings. She frequented the comfort room to give vent to
her crying. (pp. 11-18, t.s.n., July 19, 1976).
The following day, Santiago did not come to office, He reported again only on the following Friday. Mabini Garcia continuously reported to
the office from May 27, 1975 until the end of the week, keeping her shame to herself. She tried to conceal her sadness, but sensed that
her officemates must have noticed, after some time, that she was not her usual self (pp. 19-20, July 19, 1976).
The GSIS Cabanatuan Office celebrated its office anniversary on May 31, 1975, with a dinner-dance at the La Parilla. Mabini Garcia did
not want to attend the affair but she was prevailed upon by Mrs. Benjamina de Vera, their Chief in the Salary Loan and Policy Section,
who fetched her from her house. At the La Parilla, she joined her companions in the Investment Unit of the GSIS. She noticed that some
of the employees did not attend, but she was the only one fetched from her house. Mabini Garcia did not feel like dancing but an
officemate kept approaching her for a dance, so, finally she agreed to dance with him. While they were dancing, Felipe Santiago, whose
presence she had not noticed until that time, tapped her partner's shoulder, and took his place in dancing with her. She pushed him away,
but Santiago held her tight, and said in a low, but firm voice that he would slap and humiliate her if she tried to leave him in the middle of
the dance hall. After the piece, Mabini Garcia wanted to go home. She went back to her seat and asked for Mrs. de Vera, but she was
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nowhere to be found. Pretending that she had a headache, she told the person sitting beside her to inform Mrs. de Vera that she left
because she was not feeling well. (pp. 20-30, t.s.n., July 19, 1976)
Mabini Garcia continued going to office regularly, still ashamed to reveal her misfortune because it might bring dishonor to her family.
Finally, she felt that her problem was too much to bear, alone. On June 30, 1975 she revealed to her brother Rufino the abomination
committed upon her by Felipe Santiago. He suggested that they inform their other brothers and their mother about the incident. After
revealing the incident to their eldest brother, Atty. Mario T. Garcia, he advised them to report the incident to the operatives of the
Philippine Constabulary, which they did. (pp. 34-49, t.s.n., July 19, 1971). (pp. 29, Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, p. 126, Rollo)
On the same day, the victim was examined by Dr. Leonides Soriano, the senior resident physician at the Paulino J. Garcia Memorial Medical and Research Center
in Cabanatuan City. Her findings were as follows:
Breast—epherical, popilla brownish pink
Pubic hair—moderate in amount
Labia majora and minora—pinkish in color
Hymen—laceration old healed at 1:00, 5:00 & 9:00 o'clock facing the clock
Vagina—admits 1 finger with ease, 2 fingers with difficulty SMEAR FOR SPERMATOZOA . . . NEGATIVE." (p. 23, Rollo)
In this appeal, the accused-appellant assigned eight (8) errors committed by the lower court, to wit:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE UNCORROBORATED STORY OF THE COMPLAINANT AND
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED ON THE BASIS THEREOF.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THERE WAS AN ABSENCE OF ANY OPPOSITION, STRUGGLE OR
TENACIOUS RESISTANCE ON THE PART OF THE COMPLAINANT AND THAT NO FORCE, VIOLENCE OR INTIMIDATION WAS
EMPLOYED BY THE ACCUSED.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A DELAY OF THIRTY-FIVE (35) DAYS IN REPORTING THE ALLEGED RAPE IS NOT
OVERLY LONG AND THAT COMPLAINANT'S EXPLANATION FOR THE DELAY HAS THE SEMBLANCE OF TRUTH.
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FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CONDUCT AND BEHAVIOR OF THE COMPLAINANT AFTER THE
ALLEGED RAPE BELIE AND NEGATE HER CHARGE OF RAPE.
FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE COMPLAINANT LIED IN RESPECT OF HER CLAIM OF VIRGINITY AT THE
TIME OF THE ALLEGED RAPE AND THAT THIS LIE DESTROYED HER CREDIBILITY ON OTHER MATERIAL MATTERS.
SIXTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT NOTHING IN THE SUBSTANTIAL ALLEGATIONS OF THE PROSECUTION HAS
BEEN REFUTED.
SEVENTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED NOT UPON THE STRENGTH OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION BUT UPON THE ALLEGED WEAKNESS OF THE EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE,
EIGHTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO MEET THE QUANTUM OF PROOF—WHICH
IS EVIDENCE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT—NECESSARY TO OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE, (pp. 21-24,
Brief for Appellant, p. 100, Rollo)
The appellant contends that the testimony of the victim, Mabini Garcia is doubtful as it is uncorroborated, aside from the fact that it contains serious inconsistencies
and contradictions as follows: Firstly, the alleged abduction of the victim could not have happened in a busy thoroughfare outside the Manrio Hotel, considering
that the meeting between the accused and the victim appears to have been accidental. Secondly, the victim failed to state in her affidavit submitted to the
Philippine Constabulary that she was raped at the Driftwood Hotel. Thirdly, in her testimony in court, the victim stated that she was pushed into the tricycle by the
accused after she left the Manrio Hotel but in her affidavit before the Philippine Constabulary, she stated nothing of this incident. Fourthly, the complainant's earlier
testimony upon direct examination that she felt the gun poked at her side all the way from Manrio Hotel to the Driftwood Hotel is inconsistent with her latter
testimony that the first time she saw the gun was after she had been allegedly abused by the accused.
The main question raised by appellant is credibility of the prosecution's main witness the—victim herself. It is well-settled that the lone testimony of the victim in the
prosecution for rape, if credible, is sufficient to sustain a verdict of conviction, the rationale being that owing to the nature of the offense, the only evidence that can
oftentimes be adduced to establish the guilt of the accused is the offended party's testimony (People v. Lor, L-47440-42, September 12, 1984, 132 SCRA 41).
Hence, if the testimony of the offended party is not improbable, a defendant may be convicted on the lone testimony of the victim. We have perused the long
testimony of the victim and We found nothing improbable about it. On the contrary, the victim has testified clearly and logically as to events which happened on
that fateful day. Her narration of events even included details which she could not have supplied if they were not true.
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Based on the victim's testimony, the incident happened at 6:00 in the evening when there were only few persons passing by. She also stated that she felt weak
and dizzy after drinking the lemon juice offered to her by the appellant at the Manrio Hotel. It is therefore not impossible for the appellant to easily force the victim
into the tricycle without much resistance and bring her to the Driftwood Hotel where he would consummate his evil intentions.
The failure of the victim to state certain details in her affidavit before the PC, i.e., the name of the hotel where she was raped and the fact that the appellant pushed
her into the tricycle refer merely to minor details which do not destroy her credibility. The victim's statements in her affidavit and her testimony in court are
substantially the same, the latter being more accurate as the victim had ample opportunity to clearly narrate the incident in court.
The victim's alleged contradictory statements concerning her perception of the gun held by the appellant is of little importance. In fact, We could not find any
inconsistency therein. The facts are clear that she felt the gun poked at her while she and appellant were riding in the tricycle but she saw the gun only after she
was abused. Inconsistency on matters of minor details do not detract from the actual fact of rape. Testimonial discrepancies would have been caused by the
natural fickleness of memory which tend to strengthen rather than weaken credibility as they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony (People v Cayazo, L-
47398, March 14, 1988, 158 SCRA 586).
A reading of the assailed decision will reveal that the trial court has carefully analyzed and discussed not only the victim's testimony but also her conduct while in
the witness stand. Said the trial court:
. . . On the other hand, the whole gamut of the statements made by Mabini Garcia cannot be assailed anywhere as a prevarication. She
has not stated anything that is in itself an impossibility or an improbability. Her story is complete in long and numerous details covering an
expanse of so many days. Had she just invented the story of the rape, she could not have just as easily invented all the details she gave
and in fact, it would have been safer for her not to tell such a long story. She even mentioned a part played by Mrs. Benjamina de Vera,
Chief of Salary Loan and Policy Section of the GSIS office and subordinate of the accused. In fact, this part she mentioned does not touch
on the rape itself, but what this Court sees is that had Mabini Garcia fabricated the rape incident, she would not have mentioned the name
of Mrs. de Vera at all. Her manner of declaring, her demeanor, her straight-forwardness all mark her as a reliable witness, telling the whole
truth as she saw it. This Court does not even take into account her occasional outbursts of weeping, except to say that they did not appear
to be in the way of acting or, as is said in the vernacular, mere "arte." Nothing has ever been said, nor can it be in any manner deduced,
that Mabini Garcia had an axe to grind against the accused or that she was bent on extracting money from him. She was his subordinate
employee and she was never threatened with removal, demotion or punishment of any kind. There was never any previous incident by
which one could say that she wanted money. There was a lapse of thirty-five days between the incident and the time she reported the
matter to any member of her family for the purpose of a complaint. This delay is not overly long and her explanation on how and why she
kept the secret to herself for a while has every semblance of truth. (pp. 37-39, Rollo)
As can be gleaned from the above quoted discussion, the trial court upheld on justifiable grounds the testimony of the victim as to the truth of the perpetuation of
the crime charged. Where the issue is credibility of the witnesses, the findings and conclusions of the trial court are binding upon this Court.
The appellant's submission that the victim failed to raise an outcry or offer serious resistance when she was abducted and later raped has no merit. The
suggestion of the victim that she was drugged after drinking the lemon juice given by the appellant explains why the victim was unable to resist the accused
effectively or make an outcry. While no chemical test was undertaken to concretely prove that the juice she drank actually contained drugs, the fact remains
uncontroverted as appellant did not even take the witness stand in order to deny that after the victim drank the lemon juice already prepared for her, she began to
feel weak and dizzy. Even the driver of the tricycle where she and appellant rode towards the Driftwood Hotel observed that she was very pale (TSN, Dec. 2, 1975,
p. 20, Records). Further, where appellant succeeded in bringing her to the Driftwood Hotel, he boxed her in the stomach which rendered her unconscious and
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allowed appellant to satisfy his beastly desires (TSN, June 16, 1976, p. 117, Records). It is clear that the acts of appellant were deliberately done to deprive the
victim of reason and the will to resist his sexual assault. The effect is thus similar to that of violence in overcoming resistance with which she could very well have
successfully thwarted the lustful act. Appellant undoubtedly had clearly committed the crime charged by depriving complainant of reason to be able to have carnal
knowledge of her without the latter having in the least shown any sign of consent (People v. Bautista, No. L 49778, January 27, 1981, 102 SCRA 483). In a rape of
a woman deprived of reason or who is unconscious, the victim has no will. In that case, it is not necessary that she should offer real opposition or constant
resistance to the sexual intercourse.
Records show that it took the victim thirty-five (35) days before finally reporting the crime to the police authorities. The lapse of the said period cannot be
considered as unreasonably long to render the victim's testimony doubtful. In her testimony in court, she related how she suffered emotionally and psychologically
in trying to keep to herself the outrage done to her; that at first, she did not want to reveal what had happened to her because of the shame it will bring to her
family, aside from the fact that her brothers might take the law into their own hands and create trouble; that she finally told her family about the rape because she
felt aggrieved by the incident (TSN, July 19, 1976, pp. 160-165, Records). Where the complainant or victim has fully explained her failure to report the sexual
abuse immediately after the rape, there is no reason to cast doubt on the veracity of her testimony (People v. Cabradilla, L-33788, November 29, 1984, 133 SCRA
413). The delay in reporting the crime to the authorities may be due to fear of the malefactor or the shame that would result from the disclosure of the dishonor
done to the offended woman (People vs. Tano, 109 Phil. 912; People vs. Castillo, 111 Phil. 1024).
Appellant contends that the victim lied when she testified that she was a virgin at the time of the rape incident, since the doctor-witness for the defense stated that
the round edges in the lacerations found in the hymen of the victim show that the victim had sexual intercourse at least six months previously long before the
alleged rape.
We agree with the conclusions of the trial court that virginity is not a necessary element in the crime of rape and that the time in which wounds heal differ among
people, in addition to the fact that methods of treatment of a wound may result in differences in the period of healing. We have held in one case that lack of fresh
lacerations does not negative sexual intercourse where medical examination was conducted 16 days after alleged assault (People v. Deus, No. 63729, May 31,
1985, 136 SCRA 660). Moreover, the fact that hymenal lacerations were found to be "healed round edge" and no spermatozoa were found do not necessarily
negate rape (People v. Malabad, No. 63219, November 28, 1984, 133 SCRA 392).
Furthermore, the appellant has not shown any improper motive on the part of the victim for her to testify as she did (People v. Mañago, No. 90669, November 21
1990). It has long been held that no young Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit that she had been criminally abused and ravished, unless that is the truth.
For it is her natural instinct to protect her honor (People v. Avero, No. 76483, August 30, 1988, 165 SCRA 130).
Unfortunately, the accused did not take the witness stand to explain his side. We cannot hold to against him, for an accused has the right to remain silent and no
adverse inference should be drawn from that silence. In view thereof, in order to gain conviction, the prosecution must rely on the strength of its evidence rather
than on the weakness of the defense (People v. de Dios y Exconde, G.R. No. 58174, July 6, 1990). Considering the totality of the evidence on record in the instant
case, We find that the guilt of the accused has been established with proof beyond reasonable doubt. However, We find on the basis of the evidence that the
offense was committed with the use of a deadly weapon. The applicable provision is Article 335, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that
whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death (People v. Orita, G.R. No. 88724, April
3, 1990). No aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the offense. Hence, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua upon
the accused but failed to impose an indemnity for the victim.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision of the trial court dated February 23, 1977 is AFFIRMED. The accused, Felipe Santiago is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the victim in the amount of P40,000.00.
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SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-48727 September 30, 1982
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOSEPH LEONES y DUCUSIN alias JESSIE, defendant-appellant.
GUERRERO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch I, convicting the accused-appellant, Joseph Leones y Ducusin, of the crime of
rape charged in the following information, to wit:
The undersigned offended party after having been duly sworn to an oath in accordance with law hereby accuses JOSEPH LEONES y
DUCUSIN alias Jessie of the crime of RAPE, committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1973, in the Municipality of San Fernando, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused Joseph Leones y Ducusin alias Jessie, by means of violence and use of force compelled
the offended party to swallow tablets and consequently thereafter while she fell into semi-consciousness the said accused wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant Irene Dulay against her will in the house of the accused.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence.
San Fernando, La Union, May 8,1973.
(SGD.) IRENE DULAY Offended Party
WITH MY CONFORMITY:
(SGD.) GAUDENCIO DULAY
10
(Father of the Offended Party)
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the cost.
The facts are narrated in the People's brief as follows:
Complainant Irene Dulay was a salesgirl employed in the store of Mr. & Mrs. Pepito Leones at San Fernando, La Union where she
resided.
On April 22, 1973, the complainant who had headache stayed in her room. Earlier that day, the members of the Leones family, including
the accused-appellant Joseph Leones and his sister Elizabeth, had gone to nearby beach resort for a picnic.
At about past noon the appellant and Elizabeth returned to their house. While there, the appellant and Elizabeth entered the room where
complainant was lying down and forced her to take three tablets dissolved in a spoon which according to them were aspirin. The
complainant refused to take the tablets but was forced to do so when the appellant held her mouth while his sister pushed the medicine.
Then the appellant and Elizabeth left the room and after a while the complainant felt dizzy.
Later, the appellant returned to the complainant's room and took of her panty. Then the appellant went on top of her. The complainant
tried to push him but as she was weak and dizzy, the appellant succeeded in abusing her (pp. 2-8,15-16, tsn, June 27, 1975).
At about 4:30 P.M. of the same date, Natividad Leones, the stepmother of the appellant, found the complainant unconscious near her
room without any panty on. She was then taken to the La Union Provincial Hospital by the driver of the Leones family (pp. 3-5, tsn, June
10, 1976).
When admitted to the hospital at about 6:00 P.M. of the same date (April 22, 1973), the complainant was semiconscious, incoherent and
hysterical. She refused to talk and to be examined by the doctors. She was irritated when approached by a male figure (Exhibit "B",
Records, pp. 280-281). The complainant was first attended to by Dr. Antonino Estioco who found out that she had vaginal bleeding
(Exhibit "2", Records, p. 786). The complainant was then referred to Dr. Fe Cayao who was informed by Dr. Estioco that she might have
been a victim of rape (p. 28, tsn, May 15, 1974). In the presence of the complainant's father, Dr. Cayao examined her on April 26, 1973
after which she issued a medical certificate with the following findings:
1. Presence of erythema of the vestibular portion of external genitalia;
2. Healing lacerations of the hymen at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock;
3. Easily admit one finger with pain;
4. Unclotted blood at the vaginal cavity;
11
5. Smear exam for sperm cell-negative;
6. D'plococci-negative
7. Florence test-reagent not available.
(Exhibit "A", Records, p. 3).
Because of the lack of facilities in the hospital, Dr. Cayao was not able to make any examination to determine whether drug was given to
the complainant. (pp. 23- 24, tsn, May 15, 1974. 1
The accused-appellant denied the charge imputed to him, claiming that at the time of the alleged rape between 2:00 o'clock and 3:00 o'clock p.m. on April 22,
1973, he was at the beach resort with the other members of the family, namely his sister Elizabeth, his stepmother Natividad Leones, his younger brothers and
sisters named Marivic, Theresa, Carol, Pinky and Bongbong together with other companions, for a picnic and had lunch thereat, swimming and picture-taking.
As indicated earlier, the trial court, holding that "viewed from all legal aspects of this case, in the light of the recorded evidence, ... is fully convinced that the crime
of rape charged in the criminal complaint was committed by the accused. The evidence presented by the prosecution is not only clear and convincing but has
established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt."
From this sentence, the accused appeals to Us, strongly submitting that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of the crime charged since the evidence presented
against him did not prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
At the outset, We note a number of significant facts from the recorded evidence of the prosecution which materially and substantially debunks and derails the
theory of the Government and correspondingly impresses considerable merit to the defense.
1. The clinical case record of Irene Dulay's admission and confinement at the Provincial Hospital of La Union, marked Exhibit "2", contain entries which totally and
completely belle the claim of the complainant that she was raped by the accused in the afternoon of April 22, 1973. The same is reproduced hereunder:
LA UNION PROVINCIAL HOSPITAL
San Fernando, La Union
CLINICAL CASE RECORD
Fiscal Physician: Physician:

Yr.:
1973
12
Adm. Admitted Dr.
No.: by: Estioco
275
File Approved
No. by:
or
Rec.
No.
Ped.: City
Free:
Surg.: Transient
free:
Dept. Obs.: Govt.

Classif. free;
Med.: Prvt.
free:
EENT: Hosp.
pay:
C.U. Off.
Hosp.
pay:
Dental: Off. Prvt.

pay:
Name of Patient: Irene Dulay
Maiden name: ____________________
Residence: San Fernando, La Union
In case of accident or death notify Natividad Leones, (employer)
Charge Hosp. Acct. to: _______________________________________

13
Age: 16 yrs. Single: Married; Widowed: Nationality Fil.
Admitted: 6:00 P.M. 4-22-1973 Assgd PR: I Bed by Dr. Estioco
Transf: P.M.____19____ to Dept: PR Ward #: ______ Bed # ______
Complaints: Vaginal bleeding
Diagnosis in full:
Healing lacerated wide at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock hymen.
Results: Rec.: Disposition:, Disch:
Imprv: Disd:
Unimprov: Abcond: 3:45

P.M.
Died: Transf 5-
Hosp. 12-
73
Operation: _____________________________________
Anesthesia: _____________________________________
History written by: APPROVED:
(SGD.) ESTIOCO (unintelligible)
(Resident Physician) Dept. Head
The entry written in the above clinical record when Irene Dulay was admitted under the item "Complaints" reads: Vaginal Bleeding, and below this entry appears
the Diagnosis-Healing lacerated wide at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock hymen. Assuming that the victim was raped between 2 and 3 o'clock p.m., April 22, 1973 (the
same day she was admitted in the hospital), then the lacerations of the hymen at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock would not have been described and indicated to be
Healing in the clinical case record. It would be described as "laceration fresh" or by similar words like "bloody or new lacerations." There is no instant formula,
technique or process known to medical science or by human experience to hasten the healing of a lacerated hymen within three (3) hours or so after defloration.
14
Citing from the book, Legal Medicine by Pedro P. Solis, M.D., Ll B Medico Legal Officer, National Bureau of Investigation, Department (now Ministry) of Justice,
We have the following comment on:
Healing time of laceration of the hymen:
Superficial laceration of the hymen may heal in two or three days.
More extensive tear may require longer time, usually seven to ten days.
Complicated types and those with intervening infection may cause delay in the healing depending upon the extent of the involvement of the surrounding tissue and
the degree of infection. Complicated laceration may even require surgical intervention." (p. 302, Emphasis supplied.)
Since there was found laceration, wide, at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock of the hymen which was then already healing on April 22, 1973, it follows reasonably that the
defloration occurred several days before, which may have happened when Irene Dulay took a week-long vacation to her hometown in Pugo, La Union (tsn, p. 10,
June 27, 1975) and there is evidence that she had a suitor named Ferdinand Sarmiento who is from nearby Agoo, La Union. And when she returned to the house
of her employer in San Fernando, La Union, she had already chest and stomach pains and a headache.
The written entries in the clinical case record, Exh. "2", showing the date of her admission in the hospital on April 22, 1973, her complaint of vaginal bleeding and
the diagnosis of "Healing lacerated wide at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock hymen" are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, the said entries having been made
in official records by a public officer of the Philippines in the performance of his duty especially enjoined by law, which is that of a physician in a government
hospital. (Rule 130, See. 38, Rules of Court). In the case at bar, Dr. Antonino Estioco was the admitting physician but unfortunately, he was not presented as a
witness for the government.
In connection with Exhibit "2", there is one piece of damaging evidence which not only derogates the theory of the prosecution but also cannot be explained by the
government, and that is the frank testimony of Dr. Fe Cayao herself, thus:
Q — The question is: did you not discover through reading the clinical history of the patient that the woman was not
complaining of alleged rape?
A — It was not indicated here that she was complaining of an alleged rape.
Q — There was not a single word in the clinical record of the victim that she was the victim of an alleged rape, is that
correct?
A — Yes. (tsn, pp. 27-28, May 15,1974)
2. From the same clinical case record, Exhibit "2", it appears clearly that the alleged victim, Irene Dulay, was having her menstrual period when she was
supposedly raped for the Complaint indicated that she had vaginal bleeding. She herself admitted in her testimony that on April 22, 1973, she was having her
menstruation. (tsn, p. 9, June 27, 1975).
15
It is quite abnormal and unnatural, almost unheard of in human experience and behavior that a man would have sexual intercourse with a woman then having her
menstrual period, as was the admitted condition of the complainant when she was allegedly abused by the accused. And because of this universal abhorrence,
taboo and distaste to have sexual contact with a menstruating female and this is so however passionate and lustful the man way be unless he is depraved or
demented. We cannot believe that the accused-appellant, a young fourth year college student of civil engineering studying in Baguio City, would break or violate
such a taboo by drugging the complainant girl with the help of her sister and afterwards have sex relations with her in her menstrual condition.
3. When the complainant was investigated by the police, she declared in her affidavit, Exhibit "5", the following answers to these questions:
5. Q — Why are you in this office?
A — I came here with the purpose of giving my voluntary statement in connection with the incident that happened to me in
the house of my employer and I want to file a formal complaint against the persons who offended me, sir.
6. Q — Who are those persons who offended you, if you know?
A — They are Joseph alias Jessie and Elizabeth both surnamed Leones, the son and daughter of Mr. Pepito Leones, my
employer.
7. Q — When did that incident happened?
A — At about between the hours of 2:00 & 3:00 in the afternoon of April 22, 1973, sir.
8. Q — What did these Joseph and Elizabeth do against you?
A — Because I was suffering headache at that time because it was the first day of my menstrual period, they were inviting
me to go with them to Wallace and I told them that I have a headache then later they forced me to take in aspirin tablets,
three (3) tablets then after a few seconds, I begun to feel dizzy and halfconscious.
9. Q — Do you know if what you have forcely taken and given by the two, Joseph and Elizabeth were really aspirin
tablets?
A — I do not know, but they were white in color similar to aspirin tablets but after I have taken them I felt dizzy then
unconscious.
10. Q — In what manner did Joseph Leones and Elizabeth Leones force you to take in the tablets?
A — At about that time and date I mentioned above, I was then lying on my bed in my room at their residence, then Jessie
and Elizabeth came in. Joseph alias Jessie took hold of my throat with one hand and pressed it hard that I was almost
choked up, his other hand held my both cheeks his thumb and forefinger pressed hard to forcely. open my mouth while
16
Elizabeth held a spoon containing the three (3) tablets then I was told by them to swallow the pills. I could not resist so I
swallowed the pills then later I felt dizzy as if the world was turning around.
Thus, it would appear from the above recorded evidence that the accused Joseph Leones and his sister Elizabeth, helped and conspired with each other in the
commission of the crime of rape against the offended party, an assumption that is hardly believable for it would lead to the absurb conclusions that Elizabeth was a
principal by cooperation and that both Joseph and Elizabeth had planned the rape for they conveniently provided themselves beforehand with the necessary drug.
It further appears in the record that the Philippine Constabulary in La Union did not believe the existence of rape when Felicidad Boado reported the incident (tsn,
p. 25, June 18, 1974), which disbelief may reasonably be attributed to the unnatural and unusual version of the complainant that another of her own sex had
conspired and confabulated in the commission of the alleged defilement.
4. The complainant, Irene Dulay, had declared in her affidavit, Exhibit " 5 ", in answer to question No. 9 that after she had taken the tablets that were white in color
similar to aspirin tablets, she felt dizzy, then unconscious. In her testimony at the trial, however, she testified that after she had taken the tablets, she felt dizzy and
felt the removal of her panty and that when he went on top of her, he inserted his private parts into her private parts (tsn, pp. 6-7, June 27, 1975), but on cross-
exmination, she said that she became unconscious when Joseph Leones was already on top of her (tsn, p. 22, June 27, 1975). If she became unconscious when
Leones was on top of her and yet she felt pain when he placed his private parts into hers, then this is incredible for how could she have known what was done to
her and how she felt when she was already unconscious as admitted by her.
5. The record is replete with testimonies of the very witnesses of the prosecution itself revealing the irrational, if not immoral behavior and conduct of the
complainant which cuts deep into the morality, character and credibility of the complaining witness. To cite a few of her immoral acts, when the police came to visit
her, Irene Dulay took hold of the penis, of the policeman (Testimony of Felicidad Boado, tsn, p. 20, June 18, 1974). Whenever she sees a man, she goes after him
and takes hold of his hand and places it in her private part (Testimony of Leonida Dulay, p. 5, tsn, Sept. 20, 1974). Sometimes she is seated, sometimes she is
standing and there are moments that she goes around and whenever she sees a man, she calls for him and says "darling Jessie" (Cross-examination of Leonida
Dulay, tsn, p. 14, Sept. 20, 1974). She even said "have sexual intercourse with me," making particular mention of the person who wanted to do that to her as
Joseph Leones (Cross-examination of Leonida Dulay, tsn, pp. 27-28, Sept. 20, 1974). There are times when she gets a pillow and imitates the sexual act (tsn, p.
29, Sept. 20, 1974). There are moments when she takes hold of a pillow, embraces it, and makes movements imitating the sexual act (tsn, Testimony of Leonida
Dulay, p. 5, Sept. 20, 1974).
6. The circumstances of persons, time and place attendant in the commission of the crime do not build up the case for the People. On the contrary, We find facts
and circumstances which contradict and contravene the theory of the prosecution, rendering it highly improbable and questionable. Thus, the room of the
complainant where the alleged rape was committed was at the ground floor of the house where her employer lives with his family and maintains a canteen at the
premises, the room being very near the washing place and had a door with only wooden jalousies. There were several persons present in the house at the time of
the alleged rape and they were Evelyn Estigoy, the secretary of Natividad Leones, the cook Inocencia Gangad and her daughter, Mantes. With the presence of
these persons at the premises and the complainant's room was not secluded nor completely closed, the opportunity to commit the rape is hardly present. More
than that the alleged time being between 2:00 o'clock and 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon and with the supposed attendance of the perpetrator's elder sister,
Elizabeth the element of secrecy had been totally ignored or disregarded which is quite unbelievable and incredible in such a crime as rape.
Indeed, rape is a most detestable crime. It should be severely and impartially punished. But a rape charge is easy to make, hard to prove and harder to defend by
the party accused, though innocent. Experience has shown that unfounded charges of rape have frequently been preferred by women actuated of rape have
frequently been preferred by women actuated by some sinister, ulterior or undisclosed motive. Convictions for such crime should not be sustained without clear
and convincing proof of guilt. On more than one occasion, it has been pointed out that in crimes against chastity, the testimony of the injured woman should not be
17
received with precipitate credulity. When the conviction depends on any vital point upon her uncorroborated testimony, it should not be accepted unless her
sincerity and candor are free from suspicion. A little insight into human nature is of utmost value in judging matters of this kind. (Cornelio Flores, 26 Phil. 262, 268;
Ignacio Landicho, 8 ACR 580; Rafael Lacson, CA 53 O.G. 1823; Francisco Salvador, CA 52 O.G. 7290; Lago, CA 45 O.G. 1356; Barbo, 56 SCRA 459; Bay, 27
Phil. 495; Pantaleon Ramos, 35 Phil. 671; Brocal, CA 36 O.G. 857; Topacio, CA 36 O.G. 1358; Fernando Fausto, 51 Phil. 852; cited in Aquino, The Revised Penal
Code, 1977 Ed., Vol. III, pp. 1679-1680).
After carefully analyzing and weighing the evidence presented by the prosecution in the light of the legal principles above outlined and now well-established in Our
jurisprudence and guided by a little insight into human nature, We are persuaded and convinced that the guilt of the accused has not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. That moral certainty or degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind (Rule 133, Section 2, Rules of Court) has not been
established by the prosecution. The constitutional mandate that the accused is presumed innocent must prevail and, therefore, the accused-appellant, Joseph
Leones, is entitled to an acquittal.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of conviction is hereby REVERSED and the accused Joseph Leones y Ducusin is ACQUITTED
of the crime charged.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 104947 June 30, 1994

vs.
GILBERT DELA PEÑA y PONCE, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellants.
KAPUNAN, J.:
At the time of the alleged rape, Erly Rose P. Marasigan was a nine (9) year old third-grade student of a public elementary school in Mayasan, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila. On school days, she would take a shortcut using an alley between her school and her home in order to attend her classes between 12:00 noon and 5:00
18
p.m. On July 18, 1991, the day of the alleged incident, while traversing this route, she noticed a man standing at a corner of the alley, whom she later on identified
as the defendant-appellant, Gilbert de la Peña. As she passed by, he grabbed her left arm with both of his hands, pulled her towards a grassy area and threatened
bodily harm if she would not keep quiet. 1
The accused-appellant ordered Erly Rose to lie down. He then pulled his pants and briefs down, removed her panties and raised her skirt. He kissed her and
attempted to insert his penis into her vagina to no avail. According to the testimonies of both the complainant and the accused-appellant, he did not have an
erection and was unable to insert his penis into her vagina. Failing in this, the accused-appellant instead fondled his victim's vagina and inserted his finger into the
vaginal orifice. 2
During the process, de la Peña hit his victim in the stomach and on both cheeks with his fist. Erly Rose cried, then tried to play dead. The accused appellant
thereafter hurriedly fled the scene. 3
The complainant pretended to be dead for another five minutes. When she was finally sure that her attacker was no longer around, she pulled up her panties,
gathered her belongings and staggered away from the area towards her home. On her way home, Romeo Brojas, a neighbor and friend of her father noticed that
her clothes were caked with mud and that she was crying. 4 Informed about the incident he and some neighbors immediately looked for the accused-appellant and
found him in Rincon Road, Valenzuela. Erly Rose identified her attacker when he was found. Accompanied by her father and some neighbors, she thereafter
narrated the details of the attack to the Valenzuela Police on the same day. 5
Pursuant to a written request for a medical examination by the Valenzuela Police, she was subsequently examined by Dr. Lowella Nario of the National Bureau of
Investigation who found no physical evidence of penetration during her examination of the victim. According to Dr. Nario, there was no sign
of injury on the victim's private parts. The vagina was normal, without a reddening. 6
An information signed by the state prosecutor, dated 30 July 1991, charged the accused with the crime of ATTEMPTED RAPE based on the complaint affidavit of
the victim. 7 However, a criminal complaint signed by the state prosecutor subsequently charged the accused with STATUTORY RAPE, committed as follows: 8
That on or about the 18th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie
with and have sexual intercourse with ERLY ROSE P. MARASIGAN, a minor, 9 years old, against the latter's will and without her consent.
Contrary to law.
Following trial in the court below, and after assessing the evidence of the accused, Judge Teresita D. Capulong of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, found de la Peña guilty as charged and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the costs. 9
In his brief, the appellant contends that a surfeit of the evidence presented at trial negates a finding of Statutory Rape. He avers that the victim, Erly Rose
Marasigan, during direct examination, herself testified that no penetration had occurred, that the medico-legal examination conducted by the National Bureau of
Investigation yielded negative results, and that there was an attempt, but that no carnal knowledge had actually occurred. 10
We agree.
19
Settled is the rule that full penetration of the vaginal orifice is not an essential ingredient in the commission of the crime of rape. 11 The mere touching of the
external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating the sexual act constitutes carnal knowledge. 12 When accomplished together with the other elements
defined in the Revised Penal Code, the offense constitutes rape.
It is likewise settled that the absence of physical findings on medical examination does not negate a finding that carnal knowledge had actually occurred. The
absence of seminal, fluid, spermatozoa, abrasions, lacerations, hematoma etc., around the genital area or the presence of an intact hymen does not automatically
lead to a conclusion that no act of rape had occurred or that the act was in fact consensual. In fact, the absence of a medical certificate is not indispensable in the
crime of rape. 13 However, our decisions finding a case for rape even if the attacker's penis merely touched the external portions of the female genitalia were made
in the context of the presence of the existence of an erectile penis capable of full penetration. The physiologic impossibility of penetration absent an erection-
complete or otherwise-cannot be gainsaid. If, because of the victim's vigilant attempts at warding off her attacker's sexual advances an accused in a case of rape
is unable to accomplish the act of completely penetrating his victim's vaginal orifice, a charge for rape under existing jurisprudence can be sustained anyhow,
because full penetration would have been accomplished if the penis were erect, were it not for the victim's vigilance or the occurrence of other circumstances
which might have frustrated the accomplishment of complete penetration. That is not the case here.
In the case at bench, the victim, Erly Rose P. Marasigan categorically stated on at least two occasions that the accused-appellant was unable to consummate the
act of rape. On direct examination she admitted: 14
Fiscal:
Q Why were you not able to reach the school on July 18, 1991?
A Because I happened to pass by that man, sir.
Q What place did you pass by that man?
A In a curve of a shortcut area, sir.
Q When you saw the man when you were able to turn to this area what was he doing?
A He was just standing by, sir.
Q To where was he looking when you saw him?
A He was looking at me, sir.
Q Now, what happened when you were already . . . was your path lighted on the side of the man?
A Yes, sir.
20
Q When you were already near this man who was standing what happened?
A As I passed by him he immediately held my arm, sir.
Q How did this man hold your arm?
A With his two hands, sir.
Q What arm did he hold you, left or right arm?
A Left, sir.
Q After than what did he do?
A He pulled me towards the grassy area, sir.
Q And then what did he do?
A He ordered me to keep quiet if not he will kill me, sir.
Q When he told you that what did you do?
A I kept quiet and cried, sir.
Q Now, this man who pulled you towards the grassy area can you still recognize him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you tell us if that man is here now?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you point to him?
A That man wearing white t-shirt, sir. (Person pointed to, when asked, gave his name as Gilbert de la Peña).
Q When he told you to keep quiet or he will kill you what did you do next?
21
A He ordered me to lie down, sir.
Q And did you lie down?
A Yes, sir.
Q And then what did you do next?
A He pulled down his pants and brief, sir.
Q When you said he pulled down he just pulled it down he did not remove it?
A Yes, sir.
Q What about you, you said you obeyed him when he told you to lie down. What did he tell you to do if any as you were
lying down?
A He removed my panty, sir.
Q You said you were wearing skirt which is your school uniform, what did he do with your skirt?
A He just raise (sic) it up, sir.
Q And then he personally removed your panty?
A Yes, sir.
Q And then what did he do next after that?
A Pinipilit niyang ipasok ang ari niya sa ari ko, sir.
Q When you said ari niya what do you mean by that?
A His penis, sir.
Q And when you said ari ko what do you mean by that?
A My vagina, sir.
22
Q How did he do that, how was he able to do that?
A He pressed his right hand on the ground and then he held his penis by his left hand and then tried to inset (sic) it to my
vagina, sir.
Q What was his position, you said you were lying down what about him, what was his position?
A He was kneeling with one of his hands pressed on the ground, sir.
Q And when he was kneeling are you saying both his knees were on the ground?
A Yes, sir.
Q And where are you in relation to his two knees?
A I was in front of him lying down, sir.
Q Under his knees?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, what happened, was he able to insert his penis?
A No, sir.
On cross examination she again repeated before the trial court that no carnal knowledge had actually occurred: 15
ATTY. PEREZ:
Q In this case you were asked on Page 12 of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes dated November 4, 1991 and I quote,
"Question: Where did it reach if any, his penis? Answer: Outside, your Honor. He was not able to insert it". Do you still
confirm this statement of yours?
A Yes, sir.
All throughout, the victim has been consistent in stating that no penetration had occurred because the accused-appellant (as he himself admitted) was too scared
to have or sustain an erection. In fact, immediately after the incident, in the afternoon of the attempt she stated the following in answer to investigating policeman's
question: 16
23
T: Naipasok ba nitong si Gilbert de la Peña and titi niya sa pekpek mo?
S: Hindi po.
Testifying in his own behalf, the accused had never actually denied that the attempt had been made: 17
ATTY. PEREZ:
Q You have heard the complaining witness Erly Rose Marasigan testified here that during the attempt on her by you, you
molested her to her private parts but your private parts did not enter her private part, what can you about this?
A Yes, sir.
Q She also testified that you did not experience any erection of your private part at that time that you molested her?
A Yes, sir.
It would be important to stress, in the context of our past decisions sustaining a charge of rape in cases where complete penetration had not occurred, of the
existence of an underlying assumption of a male sexual organ physiologically capable of accomplishing the act of full penetration at the time of the event, whether
or not the latter had actually occurred. In the instant case, both the victim and the accused-appellant were in agreement in their trial court testimonies that no
penetration had occurred. 18 There is doubt as to how far the accused's penis had been outside the victim’s external genitalia and there is equal doubt as to
whether or not the accused-appellant's penis had in any way touched the external pudenda or any part of the vaginal wall. In the absence of a conflict between the
statements made by the accused and that of his victim — made under oath — as to what actually occurred at the time of the incident, we see no reason why this
Court should sustain the trial court's conclusion finding the defendant guilty of rape. Moreover, the medical findings support our conclusion. 19
The trial judge's suggestion that the complainant's admission that there was no erection cannot be given weight because finding out whether the accused-
appellant's penis were erect "would be the last thing on the mind of the victim complainant," flies in the face of the consistent admissions by the complainant on
different occasions that the fact of carnal knowledge did not occur. Moreover, during the incident, she had the intelligence and the remarkable presence of mind to
take a grip of the situation she was in at the time of the attack and play dead. Given her presence of mind, it would have been impossible for her not to notice
whether or not the accused-appellant's penis had been erect. In spite of her age, her acts during and after the attempt provide no occasion for us to doubt the
veracity of her statements.
We note that, at least, on one occasion, during her salaysay (sworn statement) before the Valenzuela Police, the suggestion had been made by the complainant
that carnal knowledge had occurred during the incident. Using the vernacular she said: "(H)inubaran niya ako ng panty. Pagkatapos sinikmuraan niya ako.
Pagkatapos ay kinantot niya ako." However, following clarificatory questions by the policeman — without suggestion or prodding — she stated that the accused
appellant had been unable to insert his penis into her genital orifice. She narrated the same fact subsequently in her testimony before the trial court.
Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman. 20 The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape as provided for in Article 335, paragraph 3 of the
Revised Penal Code is carnal knowledge of a woman below 12 years old. In the case at bench, there was an attempt, which the accused-appellant does not deny,
but carnal knowledge did not actually occur.
24
Of course the failure by the appellant to consummate the act of rape does not make his attack on an innocent and defenseless girl less reprehensible, particularly
in the instant case where his nine year old victim has apparently not even reached her menarche yet. The psychological scar inflicted by the accused's despicable
act will remain with her forever, occasionally surfacing from the recesses of her own subconsciousness, in one way or another. If the scar runs deep, if it makes an
imprint into her own personality, its effects would define the way she would eventually deal with others, the way she would mother her future children. The potential
effects can then go beyond her own lifetime, scarring her children, as well as those whose lives are touched by her. The magnitude of evil wrought on an innocent,
defenseless child by an adult's sexual attack is far-reaching and its effects can never be restored by the punishments we mete on these, evil, sexual offenders.
However, it is incumbent upon us to impose the proper punishment for the proper crime.
We note that the original information filed by State Prosecutor Bernard S. Razon on July 30, 1991 charged the accused appellant with attempted rape. 21 The
accused himself in this case was willing to plead guilty to the charge of attempted rape. This case would not have proceeded this far, saving government money
and resources, had the charge been made consistent with the preliminary findings.
Given the evidence, and the essential absence of conflict between the victim’s and the appellant's testimonies in this case, a verdict finding the accused guilty of
ATTEMPTED RAPE would be much more appropriate. 22 Accordingly, the proper penalty which should be imposed in the case at bench is prision mayor by virtue
of Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code which lowers the penalty in attempted felonies to two degrees. Taking into account the Indeterminate Sentence Law he
ought to be sentenced to a penalty whose minimum should be within the range of prision correccional and whose maximum should be within the range of prision
mayor.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the trial court is hereby modified in that appellant is found guilty only of ATTEMPTED RAPE, the act of
consummated rape not having been proven beyond reasonable doubt. By virtue of Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code lowering the penalty in attempted felonies
to two degrees and taking into account the Indeterminate Sentence Law and the absence of modifying circumstances, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and six (6) months of prision correccional medium as minimum to eight (8) years and two (2) months of prision mayor
medium as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
#
Footnotes
1 TSN, November 4, 1991, pp. 3-12
2 Id.; TSN, December 4, 1991, pp. 43.; TSN, February 5, 1992, pp. 67-68.
3 Id., February 5, 1992, pp. 69.
4 TSN, January 13, 1992, pp. 29-32.
25
5 Id.
6 TSN, January 22, 1992, pp. 54-56, 58.
7 Record, p. 1.
8 Record, p. 12.
9 Decision, pp. 7; Rollo, p. 10.
10 Brief for Appellant, pp. 3-7; Rollo, pp. 53-57.
11 People vs. Lomibao, 55 Phil 616 (1931); People vs. Pastores, 40 SCRA 498 (1971); People vs. Catalino Oscar, 48 Phil 527 (1925);
People vs. Amores 58 SCRA 505 (1974). People vs. Abonada, 169 SCRA 530 (1989); People vs. Navarro 221 SCRA 684 (1993).
12 People vs. Somera, 170 SCRA 428 (1989).
13 People vs. Almenario, 172 SCRA 268 (1989).
14 Supra note 1.
15 Supra note 2.
16 Salaysay, July 18, 1991; Record, pp. 3.
17 TSN, February 5, 1992, pp. 67-68.
18 Supra notes 1 and 2.
19 On examination (Living Case No. MG-91-751, July 19, 1991) Dr. Louella Nario had the following findings:
Conclusions:
1. No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of the subject at the time of the examination.
2. Hymen, intact and its orifice small (0.6 cms. in diameter) as to preclude complete penetration by an average sized, adult,
Filipino male organ in full erection without producing any genital injury.
26
20 Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code States:
Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprive of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding
paragraphs shall be present. . . . (Emphasis supplied).
21 Supra Note 7.
22 The rule is that when the offense proved is more serious than that which is charged, the accused can only be convicted of the offense
charged. However, when the offense proved happens to be a lesser one, as in the case at bench, the accused should be convicted of the
offense which has been established by the evidence in court which is included in the offense charged. Section 4 of Rule 120 of the Rules
of Court states:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof . — When there is a variance between the offense charged in the
complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes
the offense proved, the defendant shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged
included in that which is proved.
G.R. No. L-14732 January 28, 1961
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOSEFINO G. SELFAISON, NEMESIO DALISAY, DOMINGO URETA and BERNARDO BAUTISTA, defendants-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Pacifico A. Dalisay and Virgilio S. Patricio for defendants-appellants.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
27
Appellants Josefino G. Selfaison, Nemesio Dalisay, Domingo Ureta and Bernardo Bautista — in company with Arsenio Amacio, Reynaldo Bautista, Domingo
Salde and Amrafil Dalisay who were alleged to be still at large were accused in an amended information of the crime of robbery with rape in the Court of First
Instance of Capiz. After trial, Josefino G. Selfaison was found guilty and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the complainants,
Angelita Sinag and Angelina Maghibon, the amounts of P212.50 and P110, respectively, and to pay one-fourth of the cost. The other three accused namely,
Nemesio Dalisay, Domingo Ureta, and Bernardo Bautista, were found guilty of the crime of rape and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 12 years of
prision mayor to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, plus proportionate costs. From the judgment of conviction, the four named accused appealed
to the Court of Appeals, but in view of the penalty imposed, that court certified the case to this Court.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that on April 6, 1954, the complainants Angelina Maghibon, 19 years old, and Angelita Sinag, 16, of barrio Jibon and
Kumalaskas respectively, of the town of Nabas, Capiz, boarded the "S.S. General del Pilar" bound for Capiz. The young girls, who had worked for three years as
housemaids in Manila, were going home with their savings, Angelina during that period having been able to save P110.0 and Angelita, P206. At 4 o'clock in the
afternoon of the following day, the ship arrived at the port of New Washington, Capiz. At the dock, the two girls saw an old acquaintance, Josefino G. Selfaison,
and boarded the passenger bound for the town of truck he was driving, which was Nabas. The truck started its journey at about 5 o'clock and passed through
several towns picking up and letting out passengers along the way. At barrio Ondoy, municipality of lbajay, Selfaison stopped the truck, got off and went to his
house. After a short while, he returned accompanied by four men who accommodated themselves on top of the truck. These men were later identified as Domingo
Ureta, Domingo Salde, Amrafil Dalisay and Reynaldo Bautista. The two complainants wanted to be taken to their respective barrios, but Selfaison informed them
that they would have to pay an additional fare of P5 each. The girls agreed, giving him the money, and Selfaison saw them extract the money from bundles of
paper bills hidden in the garments over their breasts.
With Selfaison still at the wheel, the trip was resumed. In the vehicle then, aside from the two complainants, and Selfaison at the driver's seat, were two lady
passengers, Nemesio Dalisay (the conductor), Bernardo Bautista (the washing") and the four men on top of the truck. At about 10 o'clock in the evening, the truck
arrived at the poblacion of Nabas. It was in this town that Arsenio Amacio boarded the truck. After discharging his two other lady passengers, Selfaison turned the
truck and drove towards the direction of barrio Ondoy. When the girls noticed this, they became apprehensive and protested. Selfaison however, drove very fast
saying that he had to get something from his house.
At sitio Pulang Data of barrio Solido, a mountainous and isolated place, Selfaison suddenly stopped the truck. He and the other men then alighted and went to the
rear of the truck. After a while, they returned and forced the girls to go down. Josefino G. Selfaison, Amrafil Dalisay, Reynaldo Bautista and Domingo Ureta pulled
Angelita Sinag to one side of the truck, while Bernardo Bautista, Nemesio Dalisay, Arsenio Amacio and Domingo Salde dragged Angelina Maghibon to the other
side.
Angelita was pushed by Selfaison to the ground. She struggled to free herself and shouted for help, but her hands were pinned down above her head by Reynaldo
Bautista. Domingo Ureta took hold of one of her legs, and as Amrafil Dalisay held the other, Josefino G. Selfaison raised her clothes, pulled down her panties and
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. When he was through, he groped for Angelita's remaining P200 and slapped her, saying that she was arrogant
("suplada"). Reynaldo Bautista, Domingo Ureta, Amrafil Dalisay and, finally, Arsenic Amacio then took turns in raping her. Exhausted and with her genitalia
bleeding, Angelita slowly stood up, put on her panties and climbed back to the truck.
Angelina Maghibon suffered the same ordeal. After she was forcibly thrown to the grounds Arsenio Amacio held both of her hands over her head, while Bernardo
Bautista and Domingo Salde held her legs. Helpless and pinned to the ground, Angelina Maghibon made desperate struggles and frantic calls for help, but her
efforts proved futile. Nemesio Dalisay pulled out her "pedal pusher" and panties and then ravished her. When he was through, he held the girl's hands, while
Arsenio Amacio took his turn. Bernardo Bautista followed Amacio. Then Josefino G. Selfaison came and also had carnal knowledge of her. When he had finished,
he felt for and took Angelina's money amounting to P105, which was wrapped in a handkerchief fastened to her brassiere.
28
After everybody had given vent to his lust, Josefino G. Selfaison asked Angelita for the key to her trunk, but the latter refused. Whereupon, Selfaison broke the
trunk open with a stone and took away six pieces of dress materials worth P9, a can of biscuits and a dozen oranges all worth P3.50. Thereafter, Selfaison drove
the girls back to the town of Nabas and threatened them with death should they say anything about the whole affair. The girls went to the house of one Emma
Dalisay and spent the night there.
In the following morning, Angelita Sinag, accompanied by her brother, reported the incident to the Chief of Police of Nabas. The latter, however, was skeptical just
then a PC lieutenant arrived to whom Angelita narrated her story. After the other complainant, Angelina Maghibon, was fetched, the officer brought them to the
municipal building for questioning. In the course of the interrogation, Josefino G. Selfaison, who was then driving his passenger truck, was called by the PC officer
and was promptly identified by the girls. When he was asked why he abused the girls, the latter even heard him say that "devil must have entered his head." On
that same day, the girls were examined by a physician. The physical examination Angelina Maghibon showed "recent laceration of the hymen" and "contusions of
the wall of labia minora." The findings on Angelita Sinag showed "slight laceration at the posterior commissure." Three days later, the girls were again examined at
the provincial hospital and the examining physician made similar findings on their genitals.
On April 21, 1954, Angelita Sinag and Angelina Maghibon filed separate complaints in the Justice of the Peace Court of Nabas for robbery with rape. Named as
defendants were Jose G. Selfaison, Raymundo Dalisay, Arsenio Amacio, Reynaldo Bautista, Domingo Martinez, Berling Bautista, Amrafil Dalisay and alias
Mengoy. After preliminary investigation, warrants of arrest were issued against the eight accused. As the returns on the said warrants stated that there were no
persons answering to the names of Jose G. Selfaison, Raymundo Dalisay and alias Mengoy, the private prosecutor filed a joint motion to correct the complaints
asking that the names of the accused Jose G. Selfaison be changed to Josefino G. Selfaison, Raymundo Dalisay to Nemesio Dalisay, Domingo Martinez to
Domingo Salde and alias to Domingo Ureta. The motion was granted by the Justice of the Peace Court of Nabas. Thereafter, Josefino G. Selfaison, Nemesio
Dalisay, Bernardo Bautista and Domingo Ureta were arrested, but the other accused remained at large.
After the records, of both cases were elevated to the Court of First Instance of Capiz, the provincial fiscal there filed the corresponding informations, but on motion
of defense counsel, the cases were consolidated under one amended information.
At the trial of the case the appellants put up the defense of alibi. Josefino G. Selfaison testified that when the truck arrived at barrio Ondoy, he ordered one
Domingo Martinez to relieve him as driver of the truck because he was feeling tired, sick and hungry and that after the truck left, he went to bed to rest. Domingo
Ureta, on the other hand, declared that he was the driver of another truck belonging to Josefino G. Selfaison and that after he returned his truck to the garage at
about 9 o'clock in the evening, he went to the house of one Ramon Solis at barrio Ondoy and spent the night there. Nemesio Dalisay, on his part, testified that he
was the conductor of the truck driven by Domingo Ureta and that he was included in the charge because he is the brother-in-law of Josefino G. Selfaison. The
other accused, Bernardo Bautista, testified that on April 7, 1954, he was in his house in barrio Ondoy the whole evening and that while he was then a helper in the
truck driven by Selfaison, his work began only from 6 o'clock in the morning and ended at 12 noon.
The trial court, however, discredited their defense of alibi, and believing the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution, rendered the judgment of conviction
which is now before us on appeal.
After going over the records of the case, we find that the guilt of the accused, as found by the trial court, has been established by the evidence beyond reasonable
doubt. The defense of alibi interposed by the appellants cannot be allowed to prevail over the testimony of the offended parties, who positively identified them as
four of their assailants. Josefino G. Selfaison was well known to the complainants because they had previously ridden in his truck when they went to New
Washington in 1951 where they boarded a ship for Manila. They were not personally acquainted with Nemesio Dalisay and Bernardo Bautista, but these two
accused as the conductor and "washing" of the truck, respectively, were constantly seen by them during the whole trip. With respect to Domingo Ureta, the two
girls were able to recollect his features and recognize him as one of the four men who boarded the truck at barrio Ondoy. The complainants' recognition of the
29
appellants as their attackers cannot be doubted, for aside from what has already been said, they had during the carnal acts ample opportunity to scrutinize the
faces of the men who did them wrong.
There is no merit in the contention that, on account of the excitement and horrors of the moment, the complainants could not have identified their attackers and
remembered the sequence in which they were raped. It is a natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to know the identity of their assailants and the
manner in which the crime was committed creates a lasting impression which cannot easily be erased in their memory.
Appellant Josefino G. Selfaison claims that he was included among the accused because the offended parties knew that he was the owner of three trucks and that
they would get nothing if the charge were brought only against the others. The evidence shows, however, that the complainants knew him only as a truck driver,
and not as a wealthy man. Hence, the charge that the said complainants were prompted by mercenary motives is without basis.
Citing Dr. Anzures' "Lectures on Legal Medicine" which states that an examination within 3 days after intercourse would reveal the presence of spermatozoa, the
appellants underscore the fact that the physical examinations to which the complainants were subjected to were negative as to the presence of spermatozoa. The
absence of such spermatozoa, however, does not necessarily mean that the complainants had not in fact been raped. The very authority cited states that such
absence does not necessarily mean that the girl subject of the examination has not had any sexual intercourse. It need hardly be said here that in the crime of
rape, the slightest penetration is enough. In the case of the complainants, we agree with the trial court that the recent lacerations in the hymen and the contusions
on the walls of the labia minora, of their genitals together — with the evidence adduced during the trial — sufficiently show that the copulative act had been
performed by means of force and violence. (U. S. vs. Huertas, 39 Phil 440.) In fact, it is not even necessary that there be a medical examination of the victim in
cases of rape. Whether or not the charge will prosper depends upon the evidence offered and so long as such evidence convinces the court, a conviction for rape
is proper. At any rate, it is not improbable that the complainants washed or flushed themselves not only for the sake of cleanliness but more particularly in order to
avoid possible conception. It is, indeed, difficult to believe that the complainants, who are very young and unmarried, would tell a story of defloration, allow the
examination of their private parts, and thereafter permit themselves to be the subject of a public trial, if they were not motivated by an honest desire to have the
culprits apprehended and punished.
It is argued that Josefino G. Selfaison, who is a man of means, could not have robbed the two complainants, and to impugn the credibility of the said complainants,
the defense points to the lack of corroboration and to certain inconsistencies in their testimony. Wealth, however, is not always a badge of good conduct (People
vs. Ramos, G.R. No. L-2171, March 4, 1950) and it is not the poor alone that succumb to the impulse to rob. (People vs. Amoco G.R. No. L-3782, August 31,
1951; People vs. Liagas et al., G.R. No. L-5015.17, May 31, 1957.) As to the alleged inconsistencies or contradictions, we find, after examining the record, that
they exist only in minor details and are not of sufficient magnitude so as to denote a deliberate intent to utter falsehoods. Such inconsistencies by themselves
preclude probable coaching, and far from detracting anything from the witnesses' credibility, only tend to bolster the probative value of their testimony. (People vs.
Duldulao; People vs. Del Prado, et al., G.R. Nos. 13335-36, November 29, 1960.) In this connection, the trial court, which had the opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the complainants on the witness stand, said:
. . . Barring slight contradictions which are natural in unrehearsed witnesses, there was no act of theirs that betray their candor and which would
give rise to doubt their sincerity and veracity. They were frank and straightforward in answering question, bereft of artificiality and hesitancy that is
easily detected in one who tells a concocted story . . .
On the subject of corroboration, the rule in this jurisdiction is well-settled that in crimes of rape the sole testimony of the offended parties is sufficient to sustain a
conviction. (U.S. vs. Ramos, 1 Phil. 81; People vs. Dazo 58 Phil. 421; People vs. Macaya, et al., G.R. No. L-925, February 27, 1950; People vs. Ganal, et al., G.R.
No. L-1990, March 15, 1950.)
30
The defense also argues that the second warrants for the appellants' arrest were illegally issued because the complaints were not actually amended. It will be
recalled that the prosecution sought to amend the complaints so as to correct the names of some of the accused who were misnamed therein. The motion to
correct or to amend the complaints was granted by the Justice of the Peace Court, and while no amended complaints were filed anew, we do not think this is a
reversible error, since no substantial right of the accused were prejudiced thereby. Indeed, there was never any doubt as to who were the persons meant to be
accused, and in resorting to the argument that the complaints were not actually amended, the defense is simply availing itself of a small technicality that does not
affect in any manner the rights of the appellants.
The defense finally contends that the appellants were deprived of their right to preliminary investigation. The contention deserves scant consideration, for nothing
appears affirmatively on the record that such preliminary investigation has not been had. On the other hand, it is presumed that the inferior court proceeded in
accordance with law. (People vs. Silos and Bagano, G.R. No. L-5158, March 28, 1952.) At any rate, appellants appear to have waived such right, because
immediately after their arrest, they filed bonds for their release and subsequently proceeded to trial, without previously claiming that they did not have the benefit of
a preliminary investigation. (People vs. Ricarte, 49 Off. Gaz., 974; People vs. Quinto, 60 Phil. 451; People vs. Moreno, 77 Phil. 548; Bustos vs. Lusero, 46 Off.
Gaz. [Supp.] 445.)
The crime committed by appellant Josefino G. Selfaison, is correctly found by the trial court, is robbery with rape, for which the law impose the penalty of reclusion
temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. (Art. 94 [2], Revised Penal Code.) Considering the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity, use of motor
vehicle and superior force without any mitigating circumstances to offset them, the sentence of reclusion perpetua imposed upon him, plus restitution, is in
accordance with law. As to the other appellants, there being no showing that they took part or were in conspiracy with appellant Josefino G. Selfaison in robbing
the complainants, they were, likewise, correctly convicted of rape, and again considering the aggravating circumstances above-mentioned, the indeterminate
penalty of 12 years of prision mayor to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal imposed upon them should, therefore, also be affirmed. As
recommended by the Solicitor General, however, all the appellants Should, in addition to the penalties imposed upon them, also be sentenced to indemnify, jointly
and severally, each of the complainants in the sum of P5,000. (People vs. Demetrio, et al., 47 Off. Gaz., Supp. 12, p. 23; People vs. De Asis, et al., 61 Phil. 384.) .
With the above modification, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in all other respects. With costs.
Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
G.R. Nos. 141773-76 January 22, 2003

vs.
ROSENDO LAYOSO @ SENDONG, accused-appellant.
31
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On April 14, 1999, accused-appellant Rosendo Layoso @ Sendong was charged with four counts of rape under four (4) separate Informations filed before the
Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Branch 57.1 The four similarly-worded Informations, except for the dates of commission, contained the following
allegations, to wit:
Criminal Case No. SCC-30402
That on or about October 22, 1998, in the evening, in Barangay Dumpay, Municipality of Bautista, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with Marlene B. Nitoya, a minor of 14 years old, against her will and consent and to her damage
and prejudice.
The three other Informations alleged that the rape was committed on November 18, 1998 (Criminal Case No. SCC-3041);3 on Decembr 14, 1998 (Criminal Case
No. SCC-3042);4 and on February 23, 1999 (Criminal Case No. SCC-3043).5
Accused-appellant pleaded "not guilty" on arraignment. The four cases were jointly tried.
Complainant Marlene B. Nitoya6 is the daughter of Teodora and Juanito Nitoya, having been born to them on February 15, 1984.7 She was 14 years old when the
first three acts of rape were committed; while the fourth rape occurred a few days after she turned 15 years old.
On October 22, 1998 at 8:00 in the evening, Marlene went out to buy kerosene at her Aunt Flory’s store, about 15 meters from her house. While she was on her
way, accused-appellant suddenly pulled her left arm, kissed her face and threatened to kill her if she shouted. He smelled of alcohol. He dragged Marlene to the
bamboo grove at the back of the store.8 There, he forced Marlene to lie down on the ground. When she refused, he kicked her. He then removed her panties,
mounted himself on top of her and inserted his penis into her private parts. Marlene was not able to shout for help out of fear that accused-appellant might kill her.9
Marlene’s ordeal was repeated on November 18, 1998 at the same time and place.10
On December 14, 1998, Marlene was washing her face at the pump well near her grandmother’s house when accused-appellant embraced her from behind,
covered her mouth, repeatedly kissed her and threatened to kill her if she shouted. He forced her to lie flat on the basement of the pump well, lay on top of her,
raised her skirt, removed her panties11 and inserted his penis into her vagina.
The fourth rape incident happened on February 23, 1999 between 7:30 to 8:30 in the evening. Marlene was again about to buy kerosene at the store of her Aunt
Flory when, all of a sudden, accused-appellant grabbed her from behind, covered her mouth with his right hand and brought her to a secluded place fronting the
store. He forced her to lie down, removed her panties and threatened to kill her with a bamboo stick if she told anybody what he was about to do. He kissed her on
the lips and neck then inserted his penis into her vagina. After he finished having carnal knowledge of Marlene, he again threatened to kill her if she told anyone
about it.
32
Marlene went home and washed her genitals. That night, she had difficulty sleeping because she felt pain in her private parts. When her parents arrived at 10:00 in
the evening, she told her mother that she was raped by accused-appellant four times. They went to the PNP of Basista, Pangasinan to report the matter and then
to the San Carlos General Hospital where she was physically examined.12
Marlene explained that she remembered the three rapes because she marked the dates on the calendar; while the fourth rape happened close to her birthday.13
She knew accused-appellant because he lived 15 meters away from their house and just 5 meters away from the store of her Aunt Flory.
Both Juanito and Teodora Nitoya corroborated the testimony of Marlene that she reported to them that she was raped by accused-appellant.14
Victoriano Nitoya, Marlene‘s uncle, testified that sometime in the last week of February 1999, Marlene reported to him that accused-appellant threatened her with a
bamboo stick and forcibly brought her to a bamboo plantation where she was raped.15
Dr. Ma. Salome G. Romero, the attending physician who examined Marlene, testified that her internal examination of the hymen of Marlene showed that it had
complete healed lacerations at 9 o’clock position, healed multiple partial lacerations. The possible cause of this was the penetration of the male organ into the
vulva of the patient. Dr. Salome likewise found that the vaginal canal easily admitted two fingers, which is unusual for her age.16
In his defense, accused-appellant vehemently denied the four acts of rape and raised the defense of alibi. He claimed that the cases were filed against him
because Marlene’s family wanted to avenge an incident which involved him and Marlene’s cousin, Robert Nitoya.17
He claimed that from October 3, 1998 to October 31, 1998, he was selling fruits in Manila with his elder brother, Ador Layoso. He only returned to Basista,
Pangasinan on All Saints’ Day. After Halloween, he went to in Brgy. Tanolong, Bayambang, Pangasinan, to help his brother-in-law, Jun Casingal, harvest palay.
He stayed there from November 8, 1998 to November 21, 1998. It was only on November 22, 1998, that he went back to his house in Dumpay, Pangasinan.
On December 14, 1998, he again harvested palay in the rice field from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 in the afternoon. Afterwards, he stayed in his house the whole evening.
In the afternoon of February 23, 1999, he had a drinking spree with some friends, including Robert Nitoya. The drinking session lasted up to 8:30 in the evening. In
the course of the gathering, he and Roberto were involved in a fist-fight, causing him to lose one tooth. It was because of this incident that these cases were
allegedly filed against him.18
On November 9, 1999, the trial court rendered a joint decision,19 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered in the following cases, as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. SCC-3040, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as defined in and penalized
by Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, and hereby ordered to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify Marlene Nitoya the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay her exemplary damages of P25,000.00 and to pay the cost.
33
SO ORDERED.20
Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant raises the following errors:
A. THAT THE HONORABLE JUDGE ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES ON CROSS-
EXAMINATION.
B. THAT THE HONORABLE JUDGE ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE INCONSISTENCIES IN THE PROSECUTION’S TESTIMONIES.
C. THAT THE HONORABLE JUDGE ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE INCREDIBILITY OF THE COMPLAINANT’S TESTIMONIES.21
Accused-appellant claims that the trial court failed to appreciate in his favor the testimonies of all the prosecution witnesses on cross-examination. The said
testimonies, especially that of private complainant Marlene Nitoya, are fraught with inconsistencies which demonstrate the improbability of the four incidents of
rape or, at least, created doubts as to their commission. He asserts that these inconsistencies relate to vital points, i.e., the time of their commission, number of
times rape was committed, the locus criminis, the time of reporting the incidents of rape and the testimony of the complainant Marlene Nitoya herself.
According to accused-appellant, Teodora testified that Marlene reported to her that the four counts of rape were all committed at 7:00 in the evening. This,
however, was belied by the testimony of Marlene, who stated that the four incidents of rape all took place at 8:00 in the evening.
The testimonies as to the number of times rape was committed were likewise incongruous. Juanito Nitoya testified that Marlene reported to him that she was raped
three times – on October 22, 1998, November 18, 1998 and February 23, 1999. This was contradicted by Marlene and Teodora who both testified that there were
four acts of rape committed on Marlene.
The testimonies as to the place of the commission of the four rapes are also dubious. Teodora Nitoya testified that the alleged rape on February 23, 1999 took
place inside their house, while the alleged rapes on October 22, 1998 and November 18, 1998 occurred in an isolated place where there were bamboos. This was
disproved by Marlene, whose testimony never showed that any of the alleged rapes took place inside their house.
34
As regards the place and time of reporting the crimes, Juanito Nitoya claimed that at 8:00 in the morning of February 23, 1999, he reported to the police the
alleged incidents of rape of October 22, 1998, November 18, 1998 and February 23, 1999. Accused-appellant contends that if it were true that Marlene was raped
at eight o’clock in the evening of February 23, 1999, then Juanito Nitoya could not have reported an incident that has not yet occurred.
In sum, the arguments of accused-appellant boil down to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
When the credibility of witnesses is in issue, the trial court’s assessment is accorded great weight because it has the unique opportunity to hear the testimony of
witnesses and observe their deportment and manner of testifying.22 Thus, on appeal, the trial court’s findings are accorded finality unless there appears in the
record some fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated and which if properly considered, would
alter the results of the case.23 We find no sufficient justification to deviate from this time-honored principle in this appeal.
We have thoroughly reviewed the records of this case, together with the evidence and we find no cogent reason to depart from the conclusion reached by the trial
court.
The alleged inconsistencies of prosecution witnesses Juanito Nitoya, Teodora Nitoya, and Victoriano Nitoya are more apparent than real. Their testimonies do not
in any way detract from the fact that Marlene was raped by accused-appellant. These alleged inconsistencies are diminimis in nature and in no way destroy their
credibility. What is important is that the prosecution witnesses were consistent in relating the significant and indispensable components of the principal occurrence
of rape.
Assuming arguendo that the testimonies of the said prosecution witnesses must be disregarded, this will not result in the acquittal of accused-appellant because
their testimonies are merely corroborative of Marlene’s narration. The commission of the four acts of rape were established by the testimony of Marlene Nitoya
herself. Rape, by its very nature, is committed with the least possibility of being seen by the public. More often than not, this crime is committed in the presence of
only the victim and her defiler.24 Thus, we have not hesitated before and will not be disinclined now to uphold the conviction of an accused on the basis of the lone
testimony of a private complainant who testifies in no uncertain terms that he was the author of the beastly acts of rape committed upon her person.
In the case at bar, Marlene was steadfast and unwavering in her testimony that she was raped on four separate occasions by accused-appellant. She could not
have been mistaken in her identification of the accused-appellant as the latter lives within her neighborhood. In the face of his positive identification by Marlene,
accused-appellant’s self-serving denial and alibi cannot prevail. Moreover, her testimony is corroborated by the findings of the medical examination which indicated
that she was in a non-virgin state, physically confirming that Marlene was indeed raped by accused-appellant.
The testimonies of victims who are young and of tender age deserve full credence and should not be so easily dismissed as a mere fabrication25 especially where
they have absolutely no motive to testify against the accused,26 as in this case.
Accused-appellant assails as incredible Marlene’s testimony that the sex act on October 22, 1998 last only two minutes while that on December 14, 1998 lasted
one and one half (1 ½) hours. These discrepancies do not negate or discredit, at the very least, the absence of intrusion of the penis of accused-appellant into the
labia of the pudendum of Marlene. Settled is the rule that in rape cases, what is material is that there is penetration of the female organ no matter how slight.27 In a
long line of decisions, we have ruled that the only essential point is to prove at least the introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum.28
Accused-appellant likewise makes issue of the fact that Marlene failed to offer adequate resistance against her alleged perpetrator in all the four occasions of rape
considering that they all occurred near an inhabited place. Under the circumstances, Marlene’s failure to shout or offer adequate resistance against accused-
35
appellant is of no moment. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and she submits herself against her
will to the rapist’s lust out of fear for her life and personal safety.29
It was held in People v. Las Piñas, Jr.,30 citing People v. Dreu,31 that the test is whether the threat or intimidation produces a reasonable fear in the mind of the
victim that if she resists or does not yield to the desires of the accused, the threat would be carried out. Where resistance would be futile, offering none at all does
not amount to consent to the sexual assault. It is not necessary that the victim should have resisted unto death or sustained physical injuries in the hands of the
rapist. It is enough if the intercourse takes place against her will or if she yields because of genuine apprehension of harm to her if she did not do so. Indeed, the
law does not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance.
In the case at bar, accused-appellant threatened Marlene with bodily harm prior to and after the commission of each rape. The record shows that accused-
appellant was a 24-year old man "at the peak of his masculine vigor" while Marlene, a thin, 14-year old schoolgirl who, in accused-appellant’s own words "kept
herself mostly at home."32 The contrasting physiques of the two parties further stress the futility of any physical resistance that Marlene might have wanted to put
up.33 Accordingly, Marlene’s well-founded perception that accused-appellant was capable of making good his threats to her life was enough to cow her into
submission to his sexual assaults and maintain a tight-lipped secrecy about the rape incidents. To silence and intimidate a young barrio lass like Marlene would
not have required that degree of force that would otherwise have been necessary in order to force an older and stronger woman into submission.
Based on the foregoing considerations, we hold that accused-appellant Rosendo Layoso @ Sendong is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the four counts of rape.
Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, otherwise known as the "Anti-Rape Law of 1997,"34 provide that
when the rape was committed through force and intimidation, the person guilty thereof shall be penalized with reclusion perpetua.
However, the trial court erred in awarding exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 in all four counts of rape. The joint decision of the trial court failed to
state the rationale and legal basis for its award in favor of the rape-victim. Article 2230 of the Civil Code provides that "(i)n criminal offenses, exemplary damages
as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances."35 The records of these cases show that
no aggravating circumstance attended the commission of these separate acts of rape; hence the award of exemplary damages has no factual and legal basis.36
Furthermore, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence,37 the award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 should be imposed against accused-appellant
for each count of rape, in addition to the civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00.38
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, Branch 57, in Criminal Cases Nos. SCC-
3030 to 3043, finding accused-appellant Rosendo Layoso @ Sendong guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four counts of rape, and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in each case, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he is ordered to pay the complainant, Marlene B. Nitoya,, in each case, the
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages in addition to the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. The award of exemplary damages is DELETED for lack of
factual and legal basis.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
36
A.M. No. 258 December 21, 1963
RUFINA BAUTISTA, complainant-petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. BENJAMIN O. BARRIOS, defendant-respondent.
BENGZON, C.J.:
Rufina Bautista complains that Atty. Barrios committed malpractice in that having drafted a deed of partition at her request, and as her attorney, he afterwards suit
to enforce it, refused to appear for her, and what is worse, he appeared instead as counsel for the other to the deed of partition and opposed her rights thereunder.
The evidence shows that in August 1955, Rufina Bautista engaged the services of respondent Atty. Barrios to draft an extra-judicial partition between Rufina
Bautista and her brother and sisters on one side and Federico Rovero on the other. The deed distributed the conjugal properties of Rovero and his deceased wife
Maria Bautista who was a sister of the Bautista's and who intestate in 1952. The deed was prepared by said Barrios and was accordingly signed. Thereafter, in
September of the same year, because Rovero refused to comply the terms of the deed, Rufina Bautista sued him (Civil Case No, K-689, Capiz Court of First
Instance) to deliver the properties awarded to her in the said extra-judicial partition. She asked respondent Barrios to represent her; but upon her refusal, Rufina
was compelled to, and did engaged the services of Atty. Artemio S. Arrieta. Thereafter, Atty. Barrios appeared for Federico Rovero, and opposed the demand of
Rufina Bautista.
In an attempt to clear himself, respondent Barrios declared that it was not Rufina Bautista who had solicited his services in the preparation of the deed of partition,
but that it was Federico Rovero.
As against the contrary assertions of Rufina Bautista, the defense of Atty. Barrios cannot prevail, for the reason that he himself in his answer to the complaint in
this Court, admitted that he had prepared the deed "upon the joint request of Federico Rovero, Rufina Bautista and Fransisco Bautista." Furthermore, the
circumstance that upon refusal of Rovero to comply with the terms of the deed, Rufina went to ask Barrios to enforce it — he admits Rufina went to see him — by
filing a complaint against Rovero, strongly corroborates Rufina's testimony that she had actually engaged his services to draft the partition. Indeed, when she
asked him to file the complaint, and he refused, he did not tell her that he had been engaged by Rovero to draft the partition. He merely told her she had no case,
and that she was reluctant "to take up a lost cause."
On this issue of fact, that Solicitor General finds against respondent. And we agree with said official.
Furthermore, even supposing that, as claimed by Atty. Barrios, he was employed by both Rovero and the Bautista brothers to draft the partition, it is doubtful
whether he could appear for one as against the other in a subsequent litigation. At most, if he could appear for one client, it should be for him who seeks to enforce
the partition as drafter. Yet he appeared for Rovero who sought to avoid compliance with it, asserting that it did not contain all the terms of the agreement, that it
was subject to certain modifications, etc. Moreover, in his defense of Rovero, he raised issues which obviously violated Rufina's confidence, because he alleged —
in behalf of Rovero — that the undisclosed modifications were known to Rufina at the time of execution of the partition.lawphil.net
37
The inconsistent positions taken by the respondent coupled with some flimsy arguments he had advanced1 , do not favorably impress this Court with his alleged
good faith in the matter.
Corrective measures are called for, and, in accordance with the Solicitor General's recommendation, Atty. Barrios is hereby suspended from the practice of his
profession for a period of two years from the time this becomes final. So ordered.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J., took no part.
G.R. No. L-10699 October 18, 1957
WILLIAM H. BROWN, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
JUANITA YAMBAO, defendant-appellee.
Jimenez B. Buendia for appellant.

Assistant City Fiscal Rafel A. Jose for appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to obtain legal separation from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He alleged
under oath that while interned by the Japanese invaders, from 1942 to 1945, at the University of Sto. Tomas internment camp, his wife engaged in adulterous
relations with one Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby girl that Brown learned of his wifes misconduct only in 1945, upon his release from internment; that
thereafter the spouse lived separately and later executed a document (Annex A ) liquidating their conjugal partnership and assigning certain properties to the
erring wife as her share. The complaint prayed for confirmation of the liquidation agreement; for custody of the children issued of the marriage; that the defendant
be declared disqualified to succeed the plaintiff; and for their remedy as might be just and equitable.
Upon petition of the plaintiff, the court subsequently declared the wife in default, for failure to answer in due time, despite service of summons; and directed the
City Fiscal or his representatives to—
investigate, in accordance with Article 101 of the Civil Code, whether or not a collusion exists between the parties and to report to this Court the
result of his investigation within fifteen (15) days from receipt of copy of this order. The City Fiscal or his representative is also directed to intervene
in the case in behalf of the State. (Rec. App. p. 9).
38
As ordered, Assistant City Fiscal Rafael Jose appeared at the trial, and cross-examined plaintiff Brown. His questions (strenuously objected to by Brown's counsel)
elicited the fact that after liberation, Brown had lived maritally with another woman and had begotten children by her. Thereafter, the court rendered judgment
denying the legal separation asked, on the ground that, while the wife's adultery was established, Brown had incurred in a misconduct of similar nature that barred
his right of action under Article 100 of the new Civil Code, providing:
ART. 100. The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation or of consent to the
adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties
to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition.
that there had been consent and connivance, and because Brown's action had prescribed under Article 102 of the same Code:
ART. 102 An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of
the cause and within five years from and after date when such cause occurred.
since the evidence showed that the learned of his wife's infidelity in 1945 but only filed action in 1945.
Brown appeared to this Court, assigning the following errors:
The court erred in permitting the Assistant Fiscal Rafel Jose of Manila to act as counsel for the defendant, who defaulted.
The court erred in declaring that there was condonation of or consent to the adultery.
The court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's complaint.
Appellant Brown argues that in cross-examining him with regard to his marital relation with Lilia Deito, who was not his wife, the Assistant Fiscal acted as consel
for the defaulting wife, "when the power of the prosecuting officer is limited to finding out whether or not there is collusion, and if there is no collusion, which is the
fact in the case at bar, to intervene for the state which is not the fact in the instant case, the truth of the matter being that he intervened for Juanita Yambao, the
defendant-appellee, who is private citizen and who is far from being the state.".
The argument is untenable. Collusion in matrimonial cases being "the act of married persons in procuring a divorce by mutual consent, whether by preconcerted
commission by one of a matrimonial offense, or by failure, in pursuance of agreement to defend divorce proceedings" (Cyclopedia Law Dictionary; Nelson, Divorce
and Separation, Section 500), it was legitimate for the Fiscal to bring to light any circumstances that could give rise to the inference that the wife's default was
calculated, or agreed upon, to enable appellant to obtain the decree of legal separation that he sought without regard to the legal merits of his case. One such
circumstance is obviously the fact of Brown's cohabitation with a woman other than his wife, since it bars him from claiming legal separation by express provision
of Article 100 of the new Civil Code. Wherefore, such evidence of such misconduct, were proper subject of inquiry as they may justifiably be considered
circumstantial evidence of collusion between the spouses.
The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of
annulment of marriages, under Article 88), is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract; that it is a social institution in which the state is vitally
interested, so that its continuation or interruption cannot be made depend upon the parties themselves (Civil Code, Article 52; Adong vs, Cheong Gee, 43 Phil, 43;
39
Ramirez vs. Gmur 42 Phil. 855; Goitia vs. Campos, 35 Phil. 252). It is consonant with this policy that the injury by the Fiscal should be allowed to focus upon any
relevant matter that may indicate whether the proceedings for separation or annulment are fully justified or not.
The court below also found, and correctly held that the appellant's action was already barred, because Brown did not petition for legal separation proceedings until
ten years after he learned of his wife's adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945. Under Article 102 of the new Civil Code, action for legal
separation can not be filed except within one (1) year from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when
such cause occurred. Appellant's brief does not even contest the correctness of such findings and conclusion.
It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense. Nevertheless, the courts can take cognizance thereof, because actions seeking a decree of
legal separation, or annulment of marriage, involve public interest and it is the policy of our law that no such decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear
upon the record.
Hence, there being at least two well established statutory grounds for denying the remedy sought (commission of similar offense by petitioner and prescription of
the action), it becomes unnecesary to delve further into the case and ascertain if Brown's inaction for ten years also evidences condonation or connivance on his
part. Even if it did not, his situation would not be improved. It is thus needless to discuss the second assignment of error.
The third assignment of error being a mere consequence of the others must necessarily fail with them.
The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.
------------------------END--------------------------
40

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Problem Areas in LEGAL ETHICS

G.R. No. L-46132 May 28, 1991

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Rogelio A. Vinluan for defendant-appellant.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 3, Rollo)

SO ORDERED. (pp. 39-40, Rollo)

Not satisfied with the decision, the accused appealed.

The antecedent facts as summarized in the People's brief are as follows:

Breast—epherical, popilla brownish pink

Pubic hair—moderate in amount

Labia majora and minora—pinkish in color

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

SIXTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

SEVENTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

EIGHTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

G.R. No. L-48727 September 30, 1982

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

CONTRARY TO LAW, with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence.

San Fernando, La Union, May 8,1973.

(SGD.) IRENE DULAY Offended Party

(SGD.) GAUDENCIO DULAY

The facts are narrated in the People's brief as follows:

1. Presence of erythema of the vestibular portion of external genitalia;

2. Healing lacerations of the hymen at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock;

3. Easily admit one finger with pain;

4. Unclotted blood at the vaginal cavity;

7. Florence test-reagent not available.

(Exhibit "A", Records, p. 3).

LA UNION PROVINCIAL HOSPITAL

San Fernando, La Union

CLINICAL CASE RECORD

Fiscal Physician: Physician:

Dept. Obs.: Govt.

Dental: Off. Prvt.

Name of Patient: Irene Dulay

Maiden name: ____________________

Residence: San Fernando, La Union

In case of accident or death notify Natividad Leones, (employer)

Charge Hosp. Acct. to: _______________________________________

Admitted: 6:00 P.M. 4-22-1973 Assgd PR: I Bed by Dr. Estioco

Transf: P.M.____19____ to Dept: PR Ward #: ______ Bed # ______

Complaints: Vaginal bleeding

Healing lacerated wide at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock hymen.

Results: Rec.: Disposition:, Disch:

Unimprov: Abcond: 3:45

History written by: APPROVED:

(SGD.) ESTIOCO (unintelligible)

(Resident Physician) Dept. Head

Healing time of laceration of the hymen:

Superficial laceration of the hymen may heal in two or three days.

A — Yes. (tsn, pp. 27-28, May 15,1974)

5. Q — Why are you in this office?

6. Q — Who are those persons who offended you, if you know?

7. Q — When did that incident happened?

8. Q — What did these Joseph and Elizabeth do against you?

G.R. No. 104947 June 30, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Transf: P.M.19 to Dept: PR Ward #: Bed # ____