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DISCUSSION
ROBERT C. TUCKER
period beforethe outbreakof the World W/0;ar. The conditionsfor a new war
were ripening,"and a new war cannotbut impingeupon us." Because the new
war could becomean inevitability withina few years,"tlhequestioncannotbut
arise beforeUs of being readyfor anything.. . . The questionof our armly,of
live one forus, considering
itspower,of its readiness,necessarilvbecomesa very-
the complications in the cotuntries arounld uS."4
Internationaleventsso developedin 1926 and 1927 as to uniiderscore Stalin's
warningabout the war dalnger.In those years Soviet Russia's one diplomlatic
partneraimiong "bourgeois"governmenlts of Eturopewas Weimar Gernmany. With
theRapallo accordof 1922 thesetwo otutcasts of theVersaillessystemllhad formed
foundedon slharedadlversityand interlockingrevisionistgoals,
a relationslhip
particularlywitlhrespectto Poland as reconstituted by the victoriousEntente
powersafterthe World War. Economicrelationswere inmportant to tlhem,too,
as was the clandestinemilitarycooperatioln betweenthe Reichswelhr, whichwas
given the tuseof Russian territoryfor trainilngputrposes, and the Red Army,
whiclhbenefitedfrom German militaryexpertise.In April 1926 tlle Rapallo
agreementwas reaffirmed and extendedfor five years in the Soviet-German
Treaty of Berlin,underwlhiclh the two governments proniisedneutralityin any
conflictcaused by unprovokedattackutponeithercountryby some otherstate.
But the Germangovernnment's waveringstance in the tense sittuation that later
developedbetweenRussia and Britaincatusednervousniess in Mfoscowand fears
that arrangemlents mightbe in the makingunder whiclhGermanywould give
foreigntroopsthe rightof transitacross lherterritory for hostilitiesin Eastern
Europe.5
The scene looked ominous fromlMoscow at this time. Soviet monetary
assistancefor Britislhworkersin theirGeneral Strikeof 1926 was followedby
and London,and the Britishgovern-
raids on Soviet officesin Peking,Slhanglhai,
ment uised docunments taken in the raids as a basis for breakingdiplomatic
relationswiththe USSR in May 1927. The assassiniation of the Soviet allmbas-
sadorto Poland, Voikov,two weekslaterwas interpreted in Moscow as evidence
of a conspiratorialanti-Sovietnmovement ratherthan as the isolated act of a
young White Russian anti-Colmmunist that it appears to have been. Shortly
thereafterthe internationial lhorizonfurtherdarkenedwith the debacle of the
ChineseCommunistPartyat the hands of the natiolnalist Chiang Kai-shek,who
had enjoyed Soviet support.On top of all this,France brokeoffeconomicnego-
tiationswiththe USSR and forcedthe recallof the Soviet ambassador,Christian
Rakovskii. The intensifiedSoviet press discussionof the war danger caused
genuinefearsamongthe Sovietpublic,and the episodelhasgone down in history
as the"Sovietwar scareof 1926-27."
Giventhe mentalset describedabove,it is not sturprising thatSoviet leaders
wereafraidthatthe Westernpowerswere hatchingplans foran anti-Sovietwar.
Historical scholarshiplhasveered to the view that the leaders' fears,however
unjustified,were real and that theycontributedto the determination to build
Soviet militarydefensesin a hurrythrouglh the heavy-industry-oriented Five-
aftertheSecondWorldWar.
4. Stalin,7:11-14.This speechwas firstpublished
5. Harvey Leonard Dyck, WeiwiiarGerxmany and Soviet Ruissia, 1996-1933: A Study in
Instability(New York, 1966), pp. 13, 68-72.
Diplom7Xatic
The Emergenceof Stalin'sForeignPolicy 567
6. Ibid., pp. 89, 96-98. In "The Soviet War Scare of 1926-27," RuissiantReview, 34,
no. 1 (January 1975), Jol-inP. Sontag argues that the war scare was genuine, yet also
"grosslyand crudelymanipulatedby Soviet politiciansin 1927."
7. In 1929 the Soviet foreign commissar, Georgii Chicherin, told Louis Fischer, who
spent several days with him in Wiesbaden where he was taking a cure: "I returnedhome
in June 1927 from western Europe. Everybody in Moscow was talking war. I tried to dis-
suade them. 'Nobody is planning to attack us,' I insisted. Then a colleague enlightenedme.
He said, 'Shh. We know that. But we need this against Trotsky'" (Louis Fischer, Rvssia's
Road Fromib Peace to War: Sovic,t Forcig;y Relationis1917-1941 [New York, 1969], p. 172;
on the war scare episode as a whole, see pp. 165-79).
8. Stalin, 9:322.
9. Stalin, 10:281, 285, 288. Emphases added.
10. Stalin, 12:20-21; Stephen F. Cohen, Btkharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A
Political Biography 1888-1938 (New York, 1973), pp. 391-92; and Franz Borkenau, World
Coininunismn: A History of the CornnitnistInternational (Ann Arbor, 1962), pp. 336-37.
568 Slavic Review
11. The Commnininist Internatiottal1919-1943, ed. Jane Degras, vol. 3 (London, 1971),
p. 42.
12. Stalin, 6:282. In "The Strange Case of the Comintern,"Survey, 18 (Summer 1972):
91-137, Theodore Draper has traced Soviet use of the phrase "social-fascism" to 1922 and
original authorshipof the concept to Zinoviev.
13. Stalin, 12:246, 254-56, 260-61.
14. For examples see Nicholas S. Timasheff, The Great Retreat: The Growth and
Decline of CoiMnnistiismi in Russia (New York, 1946), chapter 6; S. Harper, The Russia I
The Emergenceof Stalin'sForeignPolicy 569
Believe In (Chicago, 1945), p. 144; and Bernard Pares, A History of Ruissia (New York,
1944), p. 497. Among foreignobservers who did not fall victimil to the unreal antithesiswere
George F. Kennan, Boris I. Nicolaevsky, and Henry C. Wolfe. See Kennan's Memoirs
1925-1950 (Boston, 1967), pp. 70-73; Nicolaevsky, "Vneshniaia politika Moskvy," Novyi
shu.rnal,1942, no. 3, pp. 199-200; and Wolfe, The ImiiperialSoviets (New York, 1940),
especially chapter 12.
15. For the President, Personal anid Secret: Corresponldentce Between Franklin D.
Roosevelt and Williamn C. Buillitt, ed. Orville H. Bullitt (Boston, 1972), pp. 68-69; U.S.,
Departmiientof State, Foreigit Relations of the UnzitedStates: DiploimiaticPapers: The
Soviet Uniion 1933-1939 (Washingtoin, D.C., 1952), pp. 60-61. On the defensive character
of Soviet foreign policy in this period, see George F. Kenman,Russia and the West Under
Lenin and Stalin (New York, 1960), pp. 265-66; and Max Beloff, The Foreigny, Policy of
Soviet Russia 1929-1941, vol. 1 (London and New York, 1947), especially chapter 3.
16. Stalin, 7:93-94.
570 Slavic Review
25. Ibid.,pp.56,60-69.
The Emergenceof Stalin'sForeignPolicy 573
26. Stalin,7:357-58,363.
27. See, forexample,ConradBrandt,Stalin's Failure in Chinia1924-1927(Cambridge,
Mass., 1958); and Leon Trotsky,The ThirdInternational AfterLetin (New York, 1970),
pp. 167-230.
28. "ExcerptsfromConfidentialSpeeches,Directivesand Lettersof Mao Tse-tung,"
New York Times,March1, 1970,p. 26. See also VladimirDedijer,Tito (New York, 1953),
p. 322.
29. Stalin,7:27.
574 Slavic Review
This and other statementsshow that Stalin fullyaccepted Lenin's view of
Brest as the classic example of divisive diplomacy.In- his 1924 codification
of Leninistdoctrine,The Fouindationsof Leninism,Stalin twice cited Lenin to
thateffect.Moreover,the Brest precedentwas a prominentthemein an Izvestiia
articleof January1929 whichimay be takenas a foreign-policy manifestoof that
openingphase of the Stalin periodproper; its high-levelauthorshipwas reflected
in the pseudonymoussignature"Outsider." What Lenin accomplishedin the
Brest period, in spite of serious internalopposition,"in no way representsa
single episode limitedto a definitehistoricalperiod,"wrote Outsider.His utiliz-
ing of interimperialist contradictionsto gain a breathingspell for the Soviet
regimewas still a valid model. The longerthe imperialistsdelayed theirattack,
the moretimeSoviet Russia would have to build up its socialisteconomy.So, the
firstand basic directiveof Leninistforeignpolicywas: "to stretcholutthe breath-
ing spell foras long as possible-the breathingspell won by the Soviet Republic
forthefirsttimwe in theBrestperiod."30
How to accomplishthis while pursuingthe longer-rangeexpansionistaim
of his imperialcommunismwas Stalin's central foreign-policy problemin the
later 1920s and in the 1930s. Given his parallel-hauntedpoliticalmind,giventhe
Lenin-identification that disposed him to "do a Lenin" at every criticaljunc-
ture,31and given the subconsciousresentment and rivalrythat made him want
to outdo his dead identity-figure in the process, Stalin was bound to envision
hiimself bringingoffa diplomaticmasterstrokelike Lenin's Brest, save that in-
stead of tradingspace for tinme, it would gain both. Lenin himselfhad invited
such a thoughtin a ratherenigmaticpassage of thatspeechof December6, 1920
in whichhe said it was Soviet diplomacy'stask to capitalizeupon the contradic-
tions between two inmperialisms by settingthem against one another. Having
cited Brest as the firstgreat example of such a diplomacy,he asserted: "One
should not draw the conclusionthat treatiesmay [only] be like Brest or Ver-
sailles. That is untrue.There can also be a thirdtreaty,advantageousto us."32
AlthoughLenin did not specifythe distinguishing featureof the advantageous
thirdkind of treaty,he manifestly had in mindthatRussia's revolutionary inter-
ests would somehowbe promotedby it. Lenin-textualist thathe was, Stalin must
have ponderedthe quoted lines carefully.Brest and Versailles had in common
as disadvantageoustreaties-to Russia and Germanyrespectively-thesacrifice
of vital territorialinterests.One could inferthat the revolutionaryintereststo
be served by the "thirdtreaty"were territorialones.33Diplomacy,in the very
The Germtan
Orientation
InterviewingStalinin Decemnber1931,the GermanbiographerEmil Ludwig
said thathe had observedin Russia a generalenthusiasmfor everythingAmeri-
can. "You exaggerate,"Stalinreplied.Althouglh
Americanefficiencyand straight-
forwardnesswere appreciated,he said, therewas no special respectfor every-
thingAmerican.If therewas any nationtowardwhich Soviet sympathieswere
strong,it was the Germans."Our feelingstowardthe Americansbear no com-
parisonwiththesesympathies !"36
47. Dyck, Weiin-arGerm1any and Soviet Russia, pp. 229 and 235. In this and the follow-
ing two paragraphs I rely heavily on the detailed documentedrecord presentedby Dyck.
48. Apropos of Stalin's "rightism" in foreign policy, Bukharin told Kamenev in July
1928 that Stalin was taking the line in the Politburo that there should be no death sentences
in the Shakhty case. Indeed, two of the three Germans placed on trial were acquitted and the
thirdwas given a suspended sentenice.
49. Dyck, Weimar Germiiany and Soviet Russia, pp. 236, 242-44. The author plausibly
surmises here that the agreement with Poland was entailed by the prior Soviet-French
agreement; and that in 1931 the Manchurian crisis along with Soviet internalpreoccupations
made nonaggression treaties with Poland and the Baltic states appear desirable to Moscow
as added assurance of calm on its westernborders.
The Emergenceof Stalin'sForeignPolicy 581
part of those in authority,and, not least, the tactics pursued by the German
Comimunists on ordersfrolmi M\oscow-from Stalin. By the stumnlmerof 1933, the
Nazi dictatorshipwas firmly established.50
With theirmass-workerand trade-unionconstittiencies-acombinedtotal
of close to 40 percentof the Reichstagseats in Novemnber 1932 (representing
about seven millionSocial Democraticvotes anidnearlysix millionCommunist
ones)-the two partiesof the GermanlLeft were togetlher a potentiallypowerful
forceforpreservationof the constittutional order.Whetlhertheycould have pre-
ventedthe Nazi victoryby resolutelyworkingin tandcem and with otheranti-
Fascist elementstowardthis end is an unanswerablequestion.What is certain
is thatthe absenceof stuclh cooperation,indeedthe strifebetweenthe two parties
duringthatcriticaltime,facilitatedthe downfallof the constitutional order.Nor
were Commnunist mindsblinidto the catastroplhic clharacterof the course being
taken. As early as September 1930 Trotsky raised Ihis powerfulvoice from
Prinkipoexile to tirgetlle GermanCommunistParty (the KPD) to work with
the SPD in a unitedfrontagainstfascisnm. He accuratelyforewarnedtlhatHitler
in power would be a "super-Wrangel,"that a Nazi victory would imeanthe
crushingof the Gernman workingclass and an inevitablewar againstthe USSR,
that the antiworkerrepressionsof tlheItalian Fascists would appear pale and
almost humaneby coniparisonwith what the Nazis would do, and that there
wotildbe no dislodgingthe Nazis once they took statepower.Instinctively many
GermanCommllunists tooka similarview.51
Stalin hiaddifferent ideas about the course to be followed.He forcedupon
theKPD a policythatabettedtheNazi victory.It coupled"National Bolshevism"
in an updatedversionwithuncompronmising belligerenceagainst Social Democ-
racy ("social-fascism"). A CominternExecutive Committeedirectiveto the
German Communistsin February 1930 demanded "merciless exposure" of
Social Denmocracy, of its leftwinlgin particular,as thebasic forceforestablishing
and forwar againsttheUSSR. The "National Bolshevism"
a Fascist dictatorshli)
tacticsconsistednow in competingwith the Nazis for the rnantleof German
nationalism.Under Cominterndirectionthe German Communistleader Heinz
Neumann,in the sumnmer of 1930, drafteda new KPD "Program of National
and Social Liberation"which promisedto annul the Versailles treatyand the
Young Plan and whichdenouncedthe SPD as thetreasonablepartyof Versailles.
Competitionwith the Nazis wentalong witha certainamountof collaboration.
In the summerof 1931, the Communists,on ordersfromMoscow, joined in a
Nazi- and rightist-organized plebesciteagainst the SPD state governmentin
Prtussia.At a Nazi meetingchairedby Goebbels,for example,Heinz Neumann
coupledhiiscall foran assault on Westerncapitalismwith,reportedly, thewords:
50. Karl Dietrich Bracher, The Germlan Dictatorshlip: The Origins, Structure, and
Effects of National Socialismn,trans. Jean Steiniberg(New York, 1970), chapter 4.
51. Leon Trotsky, The StrutggleAgainst Fascismiiin Germanty(New York, 1971), pp.
125-29, 139. In "The German Comnmuniists' United-Front and Popular-Front Ventures,"
Thle Comniuterw: Historical Highlighits,ed. Milorad M. Drachkovitch ancl Branko Lazitch
(New York, 1966), p. 115, Babette L. Gross writes from experielncethat for memlbersof
the German CommunistParty at that time, "tlheNazi bully squads were the mnailladversary;.
theyhad to be counterattacked,theirblows warded off."
582 Slavic Review
"Young Socialists! Brave fightersfor the nation: the Commnunists do not want
to engagein fraternalstrifewitlhtheNationalSocialists."52
The leaningtowarda unitedanti-Fascistfrontwitlhthe SPD was not en-
tirelyconfinledto the Commnunist rankand file; therewere signsof it amongthe
partyleaders too. Ernst Tlhaelimainni rebelledat firstagainst the instrtuction to
participatein the anti-SPD Prussian plehescite.Then le, Hermnann Remmele,
and Heinz Neumnann "were called to AMoscow to learn at firstlhandthat this
instrtuctionhad been issued to the ConiniunistInternationalby Stalin person-
ally."53AnotherformerGerman Comnlunist,wlhoworked in the Colnintern
officesin Moscow in 1932 and sturvived a lengtlhy later incarcerationin Soviet
concentration canmps,recallsthat"as earlyas 1932 thereexistedin the leaderslhip
of the KPD as well as in the Comiiiternmlachlilne a miiarked readinessto set up a
'unitedfront'witlhthe Social Demlocratswlhichwouldhiavepreventedtllevictory
of National Socialism.Bu-ttlheirtimiidproposalswere not adopted.The influence
of Stalin-wlhoheldfastto hiisline,wlhilealnycriticismi of it was instantlybranided
as 'antipartyheresy,'if not as 'provocationby agentsof international capitalism'
-was decisive."54
The SPD leaderslilp,concernled over its ties witlhthe Catlholicand Center
parties,also lheldback fromiicollaborationwitlhthe Commntiiists. By the autummn
of 1932,however,the deptlhof the crisisnmade the urgencyof collaborationclear.
An SPD leader,FriedrichStaimpfer, obtainedan interviewwitlhthe Soviet envoy
in Berlin,Lev Klhinclhuk, hiimselfa formerRussian AMenshevik. "Wouldl it be
possibleto expectthecooperationof Comnltnuiismii in thestruggleagainstNatiolnal
Socialism?" Stampferasked Klhinclhtuk. Several interviewsfollowedbetween
Starnpferand a Soviet embassyattaclhe,Vinogradov,wlhofinially broke offthe
exchangesby sayilng:"Moscow is conviniced that the road to Soviet Gernmany
leads tlhrotuglh
Hitler."55
Stalin's decisive personal role in the KPD policies that abettedthe Nazi
revolutionis beyonddotubt.Insofaras the possibilityexistedof hleadingofftllis
event by encouraginga tunitedfrontof the GernmalLeft and otlheranti-Nazi
forces,he was chieflyresponsibleforits failureto materialize.His decisionmlay
therefore lhavebeen a criticalone in its conse(luences.To some it lhasseemedan
act of montinuental froml
stemm1iling
politicalineptittude failtureto graspthe revoltu-
tionarynatureof NationlalSocialismll or a beliefthat its victory-as was said in
Communltiist circles at that time-would be slhort-livecl and pave German conm-
mulnism'sway to power.Suclhinter-pretations are ulncolnvincing.The tlhencutrrent
versionabout a slhort-lived Nazi victorybears earmiiarksof a conveniienit
rational-
52. Ascher and Lewy, "National Bolshevism in Weimar Germany," pp. 472, 478-79.
For the February 1930 Cominiterndirective,see Kom'munistichesleii Internatsio;al' v dokut-
inentakh1919-1932,part 2 (Moscow, 1933), p. 946.
53. Gross, "The German Commnuniists' UJnited-Frontand Popular-Front Ventures,"
p. 117. The authior,herself the sister of Margarete Buber-Neumainni(Heinz Neumann's
wife), also reports here (p. 116) that onl a visit to Moscow in April 1931 Neumanniheard
Stalin criticize the KPD for having cooperated with the SPD in Tlluringia in bringingabout
a vote of no-confidencein the Nazi ministerof the interior,Wilhelm Frick.
54. Ex-Insider, "Moscow-Berlin 1933," Surveyv, no. 44-45 (October 1962), p. 162.
55. Stampfer subsequentlysettled in the United States where he revealed this informa-
tion in aniinterview.See David J. Dallin, Russia and PostwuarEutrope,trans. F. K. Lawrence
(New IHaven, 1943), pp. 61-62 n.
The Emergenceof Stalin'sForeignPolicy 583
istic,revanchist,illiberal,antidemocratic,antipacifist,
and anti-Versailles.They
wereplainlya bellicoseforce.Th-eiraccessionto powermightthenbe a harbinger
of great tension,if not a new war, betweenGermanyand the West. We have
directtestimony In a conversationwithHeinz
thatthiswas what Stalintlhotuglht.
Neumannat the end of 1931, lhesaid: "Don't you believe,Neutmain., that if the
Nationalistsseize powerin Gerimlanythey will be so completely preocctupiedwith
theWest thatwe willbe able to buildtipsocialismin peace?"57
Stalin'sline of thoughtand action-or inaction-at thiscriticaljuncturewas
consistentwith his war-and-revolution scelnario.By accepting,if not actively
the Nazi takeover,he was guidingeventsin the directionhe had long
facilitating,
wantedthemto take-toward a war betweenopposed imperialismsin Europe.
This was not,as he knew,an earlyprospect,forit would be a matterof years,at
best,beforethe Nazis could rearmGermanyfor war. But an early outbreakof
war was not sometlhing for which Russia was preparedeitlher.What thieNazi
victoryportendedwas the end of passivityin Germanforeignpolicy.A liberal
democraticWeirnarGermanyperpetuallypoised betweenOstpolitikand West-
politik,waveringbetweentheRussian connectionand theWesternalignmient into
whichshe was regtilarly being drawnby anti-Sovietpoliticiansand capitalistsin
America,Britain,France, and Germanyherself,wotuldnevergo to war against
the West for Germaninterests.A Nazi Germanymight.There was of course
the alternatepossibilitythata Nazi Gerimany would marchagainst Russia. But
Stalin reckonedthat he could containthis threatby the devices of diplomacy.
Time and eventswould slhowtlhattp to a pointtlhecalctulationiwas a shrewdone.
As the Nazi revoltution drew near, Mloscowsignaled its readinessfor it,
indeed its cautious hopeftulnessregardingit. In july 1932 the counselorof the
Germanembassyin Moscow, Hilger, lhada talk witlhDoletskii,the lheadof the
Soviet news agencyTASS. Along witlhSoviet worries,Doletskiicommtinicated
to Hilger "hiisconvictiontlhathealthypoliticalcomimonsense would win otutin
a National Socialistgovernment;even the Nazis would be sensibleand continue
a policytowardRussia that,in hiisopinion,was consonantwitlhthe long-range
interestsof Germany.""His conviction"was unquestionably theviewthatDolets-
kii had been commissionedto conveyinformally.58
A formerGernman Communistwrites that a saying was currentin anti-
Fascist German circles at that time, "WitlhoutStalin, no Hitler," and that
Zinaovievsaid to hiimin early 1933: "Apart froml tlheGermanSocial Democrats,
Stalin bears the main responsibilityto historyfor Hlitler'svictory."59There is
no measuring degrees of responsibility in stulci comnplex mliatters. Wlhat the histo-
rian can do is to establishthe factof it and tryto explainithe reasonsforit.
First Overtutres
Using terrorto solidifytheirpower,the Nazis seized upon the pretextof
the Reichstagfireto houndthe membersof the KPD into exile, into concentra-
tioncamps,or underground. Initially,theirrelationiswithMoscow were clouded
by a series of ugly incidentsin wlhiclh Nazi touglhsinvaded the premisesof
Soviet commercialand other officesin Berlin and in some instancesmolested
theiremployees.The new Germanauthoritieshastened,however,to assure the
Sovietgovernment thattheiranti-Communist internalpolicieshad nothingto do
withtheirforeignpolicy.
On March23, 1933 Hitlerdeclaredthe Reich readyto cultivatefriendly and
mutuallyprofitablerelationswiththe USSR. "It is above all the government of
theNationalRevolutionwho feeltlhemselves in a positionto adoptsuch a positive
policywithregardto Soviet Russia," lhesaid further."The fightagainst Com-
nmunism in Germanyis our internalaffairin whichwe will neverpermitinter-
ferencefromoutside.Our politicalrelationswitlhotlherPowers to whomwe are
bound by common interestswill not be affectedtlhereby."'60 In early May,
Hitler's governnment took the symbolicstep of ratifying the protocol-signed in
1931 but leftunratified by the Bruiningand von Papen governnments-on an ex-
tensionof the 1926 Treaty of Berlin. More important, he receivedKhinclhuka
few days beforethis and discussed some mattersthat bore on the "common
interests"to which he had referredin the Marclh23 speeclh.Observingthat
Germanyand Russia were linkedby "nmutual interests"of long-termcharacter,
Hitlersaid thatthesewere botheconlomlic and politicalbecausethe two countries
had the same difficulties and the samleenemlies."The Soviets,forexampnle, must
be concernedabout their eastern frontie-, wlhile Germany must be concerned
about lherwesternfrontier.Germanyfaces a lhar-d economicsittuation, but that
of the Sovietsis noteasy. In botlhinstances,as inl many othiers,oile mustremem-
ber all the timethatthe two countriescan complementone anotlherand render
nmutual services."6tStalin unlquestionably read this witlhinterest.Hitler was
transparently hintingat the possibilityof a Russo-Gernman deal to carve up
Poland.
Moscow's publicposturewas wary.Its clhief conmmentator on Germanaffairs
now was Radek. Aftergoing into Siberianexile witlhotherleading Trotskyists
in January1928, he lhad recantedIhis oppositionismin mid-1929,returnedto
MIoscow,and reenteredpoliticallife as a writeron foreigni affairsand beliind-
the-scenesforeign-policy adv7iserto Stalin. In articlesprintedin Bol'shevikand
Pravda in M\ay-June 1933, Radek construedHitler's conciliatorygesturesas a
means of gainingtime and as a concessionto Germanindustrialists concerned
to keep Sovietorders(luringtheeconomiccrisis.He also said thatAlfredRosen-
berg,whomn lhecalled "the inspirerof Germ-ian fascism'sforeignpolicy,"had paid
an tunofficial visit to London to sound out Britishdie-bardson a possible deal
againstthe USSR. Germanfascismwas combiningits reassurancesto Moscow
witlhefforts to buildan anti-Sovietcoalition.
60. Hitler's Speeches, ed. N. H. Baynes, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1942), 2:1019, quoted by
Beloff,The For-eigni.
Policy of Soviet Russia, p. 25.
61. Report of April 28, 1933 from Khinchuk, in Doknwmenty vneslnei politiki SSSR,
chiefed. A. A. Gromyko,vol. 16 (Moscow, 1970), p. 271.
586 Slavic Review
Stalin did not intendto stalndidlyby in the face of the machinatiolns Radek
was describing.H-Ieknewthatno attackcould possiblybe immiinent at thatearly
stage and he was aware of holdingstrongcards of his own in the diplomatic
gameforhiglhstakesnow beginning.Hitlerhad alreadyindicatedin his talk with
Khinchukthatone commnon interest,hencepotenitialbasis of cooperation,between
his Germanyand Stalin's Russia was their respectiverevisionistclaimiis uipon
different portionsof Poland. If Hitlerwas disposedto pursuehis revisionistaims
in the West by meansof war, Stalin was in a positionto gtuaraintee hlinmagainst
that Germanspecterinheritedfrom1914-18-a two-front war. There was also
reasonto believethatHitler'spoliciesmighlt be influencedby thoseveryReichs-
wehr;nationalist,and capitalistcircleswhiclhhad been proponentsof the Eastern
orientation all along. One of them,Generalvon Seeckt,had arguedin a recently
publishedpamphletthat it was tiselessfor Germanyto try and drive a wedge
betweenBritainand France and that slheneeded Rtissia's frienldslhip for attain-
mentof her revisionistaims. Radek approvinglyquoted the pamphletat length
in one of his articles,clearlyimplyingthatthe generalwas talkingsense.62
Finally,therewas in National Socialismll, itselfa revolutionary moverment,
a currentof admniration for revolutionaryRussia. The rightistNational Bolshe-
vism of whiclhwe have spoken had its representatives among the Nazis. These
Rechtsbolschezuisten saw Stalin as a true mlanof power (Gewaltmnensch) and an
exponentof Russian nationalismin oppositionto the internationalist coimmnuLinism
of thoselike Trotsky,whomtheydespisedas rootlesscosmopolitanJews. Even
AlfredRosenberg'sorgan WeltUkanpf spoke (in 1929) of Stalin's anti-Semnitisi
and said Rtissia could not be called a Jewishstate since Trotskyhad been de-
posed andlnon-Jewslike Stalin,Kalinin,and Rykovwere on the rise.63Not until
Hitler's "nightof the long knives,"Juine30, 1934, was the leftistanticapitalist
strainpurgedfromthe Nazi movement.Btutthatwas still in the futture.
Sedately,withno slhowof anxietyor alarm,Moscow signaledits interestin
doingbusinesswith Berlin. Having reciprocatedHitler's action in ratifyinig the
protocolon extension of the 1926 treaty,tl-ieSoviet governmentptiblishedanl
Izvestiia editorialon AMay 5, 1933 whichreaffirmed the Rapallo tradlition,
pointed
out thatpast unfriendly Germanpoliciestowardthe USSR had only weakened
Germany,proclaimedthe Soviet desire for peace and good economicrelations
withthat country,and concluidedthat the now extendedtreaty"will have the
significancegiven it by concreteactiolnsof the parties that concludedit." In
speeclhesof Decemnber1933, both Foreign CommissarLitvinov and Premier
Molotov macleit explicitthat Gernmaniy's externalpolicy,not its internalonie,
was whatconcernedtheUSSR.64
More meaningfulthan these cautiouslyrestraine(d public statementswere
messages communicated by Soviet officialsin private.Tinmeand again, Hilger
recalls,Molotov,Litvinov,and DeptityForeignComlmllissar Krestinskiiwentout
65. Hilger and Meyer, The Incoinpatible Allies, pp. 256-57. Hilger says lhere that the
Russians motivated this action by saying they had a reliable report that Vice-Chancellor
von Papen had givenithe French ambassador in Berlin detailed informationon Soviet-Geirman
military relations. According to Wollenberg (TThe Red Army, p. 237), two top Soviet
generals, Tuklhachevskiiand Gamarnik, proposed right after Hitler's accession that Red
Army-Reichswehrrelations be br-okenoff but were turned down because "Stalin did not
agree with them."
66. Hilger and Meyer, The Incom-patibleAllies, pp. 270-71. Oii the Tukhachevskii
statementsee also Laqueur, Russia and Gerian,c, p. 164, where a documnientary source is
given (DoetMinents on GermianForeign Policy, series C, vol. 2, November 1, 1933, p. 81).
67. Hilger and Meyer, The Inicomipatible
Allies, pp. 267-68. This conversationtook place
at Baum's dacha outside Moscow.
588 Slavic Review
clear. The countriesin questionwere not named. But the logical candidates,as
we haveseen,werecountriesin closeproximity to theUSSR.
The other revealingpassage dealt directlywith Soviet-Germanrelations.
It was not true, Stalilnsaid, wlhatcertainGermanpoliticianswere saying,that
because of the rise of GermanfascismitlheUSSR was now orientingitselfon
France and Poland and had become a supporterof Versailles. Despite all the
Sovietlack of raptureforthe Germ-lan Fascist regimle,fascismhad nothingto do
withit,as shownby thefactthatfascismin Italy did notpreventthe USSR from
havingthe best of relationswitlhthatcountry.The difficulty (in Soviet-German
relations) arose fromthe clhangein Germanpolicy,fromthe fact that in the
contestbetweendifferent foreign-policy tendenciesgoing on in Germanya new
line reminiscent of the kaiser's anti-Russianone and representedby people like
Rosenbergwas prevailingover the old line embodied in the Soviet-German
treaties.As for the USSR's "supposed reorientation," its sole orientationhad
been and remainedon the USSR alone. "Aindif the USSR's interestsdemand
rapprochement withtheseor those countriesnot concernedto violate peace, we
embarkuponthiscoursewithouthesitation."68
Subtlyyetunambiguously, Stalin was tellingHitler thatwheneverhis gov-
ernmentshouldbe disposedto leave Russia in peace and revivethe "old line" of
Russo-Gernman collaboration,Russia would be ready,in her own interests,to
reciprocate.Hitler had referredto commoninterestsbetweenthe two states.
Stalinwas signalinghis awarenessofthem.
In the letterof July1934 to his Politburocolleagues,recommending against
republication of Engels's essay of 1890 in Bol'shevik'sspecial issue on the twen-
tiethanniversaryof the startof the First World War, Stalin conveyed,just as
subtly,thenatureof hiisdesign.On behalfof revolutionEngels was readyto take
sideswithGermanyagainsttsaristRussia in the impendingEuropeanwar. When
war brokeout in 1914, Lenin refusedto supporteitherside and took the stance
of revolutionary defeatism,seekingto turn the war betweenrival imperialisms
into a series of revolutionary civil wars in the belligerentcountries,Russia in-
cluded.In makingspecificreferenceto that,Stalin was suggestingthat Moscow
shouldmaneuveritselfintoa positionof revolutionary (in the sense thatit would
open a way for armed revolutionat a propitioustime) noninvolvement in the
second imperialistwar now impending.Here again he was takinga leaf from
Lenin'sbook,butverymuchin his ownway.
68. Stalin,13:294,297,302-3.
The Emergenceof Stalin'sForeignPolicy 589