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The Emergence of Stalin's Foreign Policy

Author(s): Robert C. Tucker


Source: Slavic Review, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Dec., 1977), pp. 563-589
Published by: The American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies
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DISCUSSION

ROBERT C. TUCKER

The Emergenceof Stalin'sForeign Policy

The Hostile Encirclement


To understandStalin as a politicalthinker,we must see him as a man whose
thinkingwas stronglyinfluencedby perceivedparallels between present and
past. Unlike other Bolsheviks,he found a parallel between Russia's internal
situationin relativelytranquil1925 and on the eve of the October upheaval of
1917. He thricestatedin partyforumsduring1925 thatthe presentinternational
situationresembledthe prelude of the World War's outbreakin 1914.1 And
havingcometo thinkin Russian historicalterms,lhediscerneda parallelbetween
MuscoviteRussia's situationin earliercenturiesand Soviet Russia's now. In a
partyspeech of 1928, for example,he founda cue for presentpolicy in Peter
the Great's attemptedrevolutionary leap out of Russian backwardness;and in
theoftenquotedspeechto managersin 1931 he spokeof thebeatingsthatRussia
had sufferedin historyas punishmentfor her backwardnessand declaredthat
Soviet survivalnow dependedon conqueringthatbackwardnessin ten years.2
The crux of the thirdparallel lay in the two Russias' like isolationin an
unfriendly internationalenvironment. The Bolshevikcatchphraseforthe isolated
condition was "hostile capitalistencirclement."This idea was no inventionof
Stalin. It was an outgrowthof the Revolutionhavingto fightfor life against
White forcesenjoyingthe supportof numerousintervening foreignstates,and
of the failureof otheranticapitalistrevolutionsto take place, or to remainin
power,in Europe. Stalin,however,made a twofoldcontribution. First, he had
and was able to communicate, morethan any otherBolshevikleader,a beliefin
the encirclement's deadly hostility,a sense of the Revolution'sbeing beset by
schemingenemies abroad-linked with its internalenemies-against whom it
must incessantlybe on guard. Second, he contributedhis special perceptionof
the resemblancebetweenthe hostilecapitalistencirclement and the international
isolationof MuscoviteRussia in earliercenturies.
What made this perceivedparallel so portentouswas that as a resultpast
became prologuepolitically:Stalinismas a politicsof internalrevolutionfrom
above and externalaggrandizement restedin large part on this definitionof the
situation.The isolated Muscovitestate had embarkedon an ambitiousprogram
of ingathering by war and diplomacythe territoriesthat had belongedto Rus'
beforethe Tatar conquest; and its internalstate-building policies were geared

1. I. V. Stalin,Sochineniia,13 vols. (Moscow, 1946-52), 7:12-13, 28, 280 (hereafter


citedas Stalin').
2. Ibid.,11:248-49;13:38-39.
564 Slavic Review

to thatgoal. So, now,as Stalin saw it, an internationally


isolatedSoviet Russian
statemustbolsterits powerveryrapidlyand if need be coercivelyto preparefor
any eventuality. The dangerfromwithoutnecessitateda renewedstate-building
processwithin.Muclhof whatwas distinctiveof Stalinismas a patternof policy
flowedfromthis postulate.As in Russia's distantpast, externalpolicy helped
determine internalpolicy.
The present-pastparallelcame easilyto Stalin'smindbecatise,as a Bolshevik
of Great Russian nationalistoutlook,he viewed the USSR as the socialistsuc-
cessor-stateto hiistoricRussia; it was simultaneouslySoviet and Russian. In
1934 lheexpressedhis feelingsof the Soviet Union's Russiannessin a document
that dealt with foreignpolicy. The Central Committeejournal Bol'shevikwas
planninga special issue for the twentiethanniversaryof the outbreakof the
World War, and the editor,Adoratskii,was proposingto reprintin it Friedrich
Engels's essay of 1890, "The Foreign Policy of Russian Tsarism." This essay
hladforecastthe war with great prescienceon the basis of an acute analysisof
the thenemergingdivisiolnof European powersintoopposed camps. It had also
shown an anti-Russianbias. Engels not only coupled Russia's drive for Con-
stantinoplewithGermany'sannexationof Alsace-Lorraineas forcesforwar,but
lhealso portrayedRussian foreignpolicysince CatherineII's timein a cabalistic
liglht-as a never-endingsearch for world dominationtlhrougha diplomacy
headed by a talentedbut totallyunscrupulousgang of foreign-born adventurers
whichhe calleda "newJesuitorder"and a "secretsociety."
In a confidentiallettercirculatedto his fellowPolitburomemberson July
19, 1934, Stalin opposed the essay's republicationand took to task the second
great authorityfigureof Marxisnm.Engels had erred in explainingRussia's
acquisitivepolicymoreby the presenceof the gang of foreignadventurersthan
bytheneedforoutletto seas and seaportsforenlargedforeigntradeand strategic
positionls.
He. had portrayedthe acquisitivepolicyas a monopolyof the Russian
tsars when it was just as clharacteristic
of otlherEuropean governments, Napo-
leon's included.He h-adomittedthe imperialistcontestfor colonies, German-
Britishcontradictions, and Britain'srole as a factorin the comingof the war.
He had overestitnated the importanceof Russia's urge toward Constantinople,
and exaggeratedRussia's role by suggestingthatwar could be avertedby tsar-
ism's overtlhrow. From such reasoningit would followthata war by bourgeois
GermanyagainsttsaristRussia wouldbe a war of liberation.Indeed, Engels had
said in an 1891 letterto Bebel that"if Russia startsa war, forwardagainstthe
RRussiansand their allies, whoeverthey are!" Wlhatroom did this leave for
Lenin's revolutionary defeatism,hiispolicy of transformingthe imperialistwar
intoa civilwar?3
Let Engels's articlebe publishedin his collectedwritingsor in a historical
journal, said Staliin'sletter,but not in the party's fightingorgan where its
appearance would implyhiigh-level endorsementof its politicalcontent.Thus
Stalin censoredEngels, displayingin the process his sense of being a Russian

3. I. V. Stalin, Sochineniia, ed. Robert H. McNeal, 3 vols. (Stanford, 1967), 1(14):2-


10. The letterwas firstpublishedin Bol'shlevik,no. 9 (May 1941). For the textof Engels's
article,see Karl Marx and FriedrichEngels, The Russian Menzace to Europe, ed. P. W.
Blackstockand B. F. Hoselitz(Glencoe,1952),pp.22-55.
The Emergenceof Stalin'sForeignPolicy 565

leader,his solicitudefor Russia's state interests,and his irritationat the anti-


Russian tone and thrustof the decades-oldessay. In a clharacteristically subtle
way the letteralso expressed,as we shall see, the foreignpolicythat Stalin was
pursuingon beh-alfof SovietRussia.

The War Danger


The inevitability of futurewars involvingRussia was axiomatic for the
Bolshevikleaders. This assumptionfollowedfromLenin's analysis of the con-
temporaryworld systemin hiistreatiseof 1915-16, Iwlperialism,the Highest
Stage of Capitalismi.
Advancedcapitalism,havingnow becomefinancier-controlled
monopolycapitalism,he argued, had to turn imperialistin order to stave off
proletarianrevolutionat home.The severalleadingcapitalistcountriesof Europe,
as well as the United States and Russia (wlhosecolony was Turkestan), had
partitionedmuch of the rest of the world into colonial dependenciesto which
theyexportedsurplus capital and fromwhich they derived superprofits. That
enabled themto keep theirown labor forcesemployedand in part bribed into
quiescence,via the co-optingof venal trade-unionleaderships.Because the great
hinterland lhadbeen all dividedup by the close of the nineteentlhcentury,a late-
comerin capitalistdevelopmentlike Germanycould acquire colonies only by a
forciblerepartition-hencethe imperialistWorld War and equally inevitable
futureinterilnperialist
warsforredivisionofthecolonialspoils.
In the furtherelaborationof thisline of thoughtafter1917, Leninisttheory
pictureda worldsystemmade inherenitly tunstableby severalgroupsof interlaced
"contradictions":thosebetweenclasses in the capitalistcountries;thosebetween
capitaliststatesbecause of theirconflictinginmperialist
needs; thosebetweenpar-
ticularimperialiststatesand national-independence movementsin theircolonies;
and, finally,those betweenthe imperialiststates as a group and Russia. The
BolshevikRevolutiondeprivedthe imperialistsystemof an important component
and exerteda radicalizingeffectupon the workersof the West and the colonial
peoplesof the East. This made the Soviet Republican object of deadlyhostility
among the rulingclasses of the threatenedimperialistorder. In such circum-
stances,an eventualanti-Sovietwar was unavoidable.
But the inevitablewas not necessarilyimminent.Since the immediatepost-
war chaos of 1919-20, Stalin reportedto the FourteenthParty Congress in
December 1925, there had taken place a certain "temporarystabilizationof
capitalism"along withan equallytemporaryebb in the revolutionary tide. What
at one timehad been viewedas a slhortbreathingspell had turnedinto "a whole
periodofbreathingspell." Betweentheworldimperialist camp,now underAnglo-
American leadership,and the world anti-imperialist camp, headed by Soviet
Russia, a certainbalance of powerand periodof peacefulcoexistencehad set in.
In this situation,Soviet policy aimed to expand trade relationswith capitalist
countries,to work for peace, to pursue rapprochement with countriesdefeated
in the World War, and to strengthen Soviet ties withthe colonialcountriesand
dependencies.
At a closed Central Committeeplenum in Januaryof 1925, however,he
had definedthe externalsituationin more ominoustermsas reminiscent of the
566 Slavic Review

period beforethe outbreakof the World W/0;ar. The conditionsfor a new war
were ripening,"and a new war cannotbut impingeupon us." Because the new
war could becomean inevitability withina few years,"tlhequestioncannotbut
arise beforeUs of being readyfor anything.. . . The questionof our armly,of
live one forus, considering
itspower,of its readiness,necessarilvbecomesa very-
the complications in the cotuntries arounld uS."4
Internationaleventsso developedin 1926 and 1927 as to uniiderscore Stalin's
warningabout the war dalnger.In those years Soviet Russia's one diplomlatic
partneraimiong "bourgeois"governmenlts of Eturopewas Weimar Gernmany. With
theRapallo accordof 1922 thesetwo otutcasts of theVersaillessystemllhad formed
foundedon slharedadlversityand interlockingrevisionistgoals,
a relationslhip
particularlywitlhrespectto Poland as reconstituted by the victoriousEntente
powersafterthe World War. Economicrelationswere inmportant to tlhem,too,
as was the clandestinemilitarycooperatioln betweenthe Reichswelhr, whichwas
given the tuseof Russian territoryfor trainilngputrposes, and the Red Army,
whiclhbenefitedfrom German militaryexpertise.In April 1926 tlle Rapallo
agreementwas reaffirmed and extendedfor five years in the Soviet-German
Treaty of Berlin,underwlhiclh the two governments proniisedneutralityin any
conflictcaused by unprovokedattackutponeithercountryby some otherstate.
But the Germangovernnment's waveringstance in the tense sittuation that later
developedbetweenRussia and Britaincatusednervousniess in Mfoscowand fears
that arrangemlents mightbe in the makingunder whiclhGermanywould give
foreigntroopsthe rightof transitacross lherterritory for hostilitiesin Eastern
Europe.5
The scene looked ominous fromlMoscow at this time. Soviet monetary
assistancefor Britislhworkersin theirGeneral Strikeof 1926 was followedby
and London,and the Britishgovern-
raids on Soviet officesin Peking,Slhanglhai,
ment uised docunments taken in the raids as a basis for breakingdiplomatic
relationswiththe USSR in May 1927. The assassiniation of the Soviet allmbas-
sadorto Poland, Voikov,two weekslaterwas interpreted in Moscow as evidence
of a conspiratorialanti-Sovietnmovement ratherthan as the isolated act of a
young White Russian anti-Colmmunist that it appears to have been. Shortly
thereafterthe internationial lhorizonfurtherdarkenedwith the debacle of the
ChineseCommunistPartyat the hands of the natiolnalist Chiang Kai-shek,who
had enjoyed Soviet support.On top of all this,France brokeoffeconomicnego-
tiationswiththe USSR and forcedthe recallof the Soviet ambassador,Christian
Rakovskii. The intensifiedSoviet press discussionof the war danger caused
genuinefearsamongthe Sovietpublic,and the episodelhasgone down in history
as the"Sovietwar scareof 1926-27."
Giventhe mentalset describedabove,it is not sturprising thatSoviet leaders
wereafraidthatthe Westernpowerswere hatchingplans foran anti-Sovietwar.
Historical scholarshiplhasveered to the view that the leaders' fears,however
unjustified,were real and that theycontributedto the determination to build
Soviet militarydefensesin a hurrythrouglh the heavy-industry-oriented Five-

aftertheSecondWorldWar.
4. Stalin,7:11-14.This speechwas firstpublished
5. Harvey Leonard Dyck, WeiwiiarGerxmany and Soviet Ruissia, 1996-1933: A Study in
Instability(New York, 1966), pp. 13, 68-72.
Diplom7Xatic
The Emergenceof Stalin'sForeignPolicy 567

Year Plan.6 At the same tinme,the war dangerwas deliberatelyexaggeratedin


connectionwiththe anti-Trotskyist campaign theinin its culminating phase-to
supportchargesthatthe oppositionwas irresponsibly fonlenting intrapartydis-
tension.7
sensionat a timeof acute international
The mnenace of war was no less politicallyvital to Stalin in arguinighis
revolutionaryGeneral Line in 1928-29 against the Rightist orientationon
balanced growthand gradualismii in both industrializationand collectivization.
He did not deviatefromthe positionhe had takenin openinga Pravda articlein
July1927: "It is hardlyopen to doubtthatthe basic questionof the presentis
the questionof the threatof a new imperialistwar. It is not a matterof some
undefinedand intangible'danger' of a new war. It is a matterof a real and
genuine threatof a new war in general and of a war against the USSR in
particular."8
Althoughthe Trotskyistoppositionwas cruslhedby December 1927, Stalin
"If two years ago it
reportedto the FifteenthCongressheld that saimiemnonth:
was possible and necessaryto speak of a period of a certainbalance and of
'peacefulcoexistence'betweenthe USSR and the capitalistcountries,now we
have every ground to assert that the period of 'peacefutlcoexistence' is receding
into the past, givingway to a period of imperialistattacksand preparationof
interventionagainstthe USSR." The temporarystabilizationof capitalismllwas
becoming "mloreand niiorerotten and 'unstable," and preparations for a new war
were"goingforwardfullsteam."9
In theaftermatlh of thecongress,Stalinpersistedin emphasizingthe serious-
ness of the war danger.Bukharin,as leader (in successionto Zinoviev) of the
Comintern,prepared theses and a draft new program for the international
organization,whose Sixth Congresswas held in Moscow in tlle summerof 1928.
He announcedthe advent of a postwar "third period" followingthe 1918-23
revolutionary period and the ensuingera of relativecapitaliststabilizationnow
nearingits end. So did Stalin. Between the two therewas a slharpdifference,
however,in that Bukharindid not see the incipienttlhirdperiod as one of in-
creasing breakdownof the stabilization,whereas Stalin did.10The defeat of
Bukharinand his supportersat the July 1929 tenthplenumof the Comintern
ExecutiveCommitteewas accompaniedby a resoltution statingtllatthe capitalist
stabilizationwas "becomingmore and miiore
ulndernmined" and that the third

6. Ibid., pp. 89, 96-98. In "The Soviet War Scare of 1926-27," RuissiantReview, 34,
no. 1 (January 1975), Jol-inP. Sontag argues that the war scare was genuine, yet also
"grosslyand crudelymanipulatedby Soviet politiciansin 1927."
7. In 1929 the Soviet foreign commissar, Georgii Chicherin, told Louis Fischer, who
spent several days with him in Wiesbaden where he was taking a cure: "I returnedhome
in June 1927 from western Europe. Everybody in Moscow was talking war. I tried to dis-
suade them. 'Nobody is planning to attack us,' I insisted. Then a colleague enlightenedme.
He said, 'Shh. We know that. But we need this against Trotsky'" (Louis Fischer, Rvssia's
Road Fromib Peace to War: Sovic,t Forcig;y Relationis1917-1941 [New York, 1969], p. 172;
on the war scare episode as a whole, see pp. 165-79).
8. Stalin, 9:322.
9. Stalin, 10:281, 285, 288. Emphases added.
10. Stalin, 12:20-21; Stephen F. Cohen, Btkharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A
Political Biography 1888-1938 (New York, 1973), pp. 391-92; and Franz Borkenau, World
Coininunismn: A History of the CornnitnistInternational (Ann Arbor, 1962), pp. 336-37.
568 Slavic Review

periodwas one of "the acceleratedaccentuationof the fundamental externaland


internalcontradictions of imperialismleading inevitablyto imperialistwars, to
greatclass conflicts.. . ."1 Under Stalin's aegis the Comiinternnow executeda
leftturn wlhichwas tacticallyand rhetorically the counterpartof the internal
revolutionfromabove. Foreign Conmmuinist partieswere enjoinedto pursue the
militanttacticsof "class againstclass" as opposedto thoseof politicalcooperation
with non-Communist socialistparties.The Comlmiunists were to intensifytheir
fightagainst Social Democracy,which Stalin had describedin 1924 as "objec-
tivelythe moderatewingof fascism"and whichwas stigmatizednow as "social-
fascism."12
BetweenJuly1929 and thegatheringof the Soviet SixteenthPartyCongress
in 1930, a real capitalistcrisisbrokeout withthe Americanstockmarketcrash
of October 1929 and the ensuingGreat Depression.Stalin reportedto the Six-
teenthCongressthat "we are livingnow in an epoch of wars and revolutions."
The stabilizationof capitalismis ending,he said, and the bourgeoisiewill seek
a way out in a new imperialistwar. Still,therewere two tendenciesin bourgeois
politicstoward the USSR: the interventionist tendencyand the contraryten-
dencytowardtradeand the preservationof peacefulrelations.Soviet diplomacy
would supportthe latterand do everything possibleto maintainpeace.13
We have notedthesteadydrumbeatof Stalin'sinvocationsofthe war danger
between1925 and 1930, his sense of the presentas the preludeto a new round
of wars and revolutionsreminiscent of the 1917-23 period. Tllat these invoca-
tions served his interestin the contestsagainst the Trotskyistand Bukharinist
oppositionsis certainlytrue.But theylikewiseexpressedhis purposesin politics.
His foreignpolicy,it mustbe emphasized,was anythingbut warlikeduringthose
years and even after.Operatingas he did on the asstumption thata war was in-
evitable,it was Stalin's purpose to postponeit and nmake tise of the time thus
gained forcreatinga powerfulSoviet heavy industryand war industrywitlhall
possible speed. The expectationof war was also the underlyingpremiseof his
foreignpolicy.In the oncomingnew war Stalin saw an openingfor the further
advanceofCommunistrevolution.

The Path ofRevolutionary


Advance
On no subject was foreignopinionmore inclinedto err in the 1930s and
early 1940s than on Stalin's foreignpolicy. The apostle of socialism in one
countrywas widely(thoughinot universally)viewedas a nationalistleader who,
in factif not in theory,had jettisonedinternational
Communistrevolutionas an
operativeaim of Soviet policy.Simplisticthinking,based on the unrealantitlhesis
of "Russian nationalism"versus "world revolutioin," blocked an understanding
of Stalinismin foreignpolicy as the subtle amalgam of both that it was.14 In

11. The Commnininist Internatiottal1919-1943, ed. Jane Degras, vol. 3 (London, 1971),
p. 42.
12. Stalin, 6:282. In "The Strange Case of the Comintern,"Survey, 18 (Summer 1972):
91-137, Theodore Draper has traced Soviet use of the phrase "social-fascism" to 1922 and
original authorshipof the concept to Zinoviev.
13. Stalin, 12:246, 254-56, 260-61.
14. For examples see Nicholas S. Timasheff, The Great Retreat: The Growth and
Decline of CoiMnnistiismi in Russia (New York, 1946), chapter 6; S. Harper, The Russia I
The Emergenceof Stalin'sForeignPolicy 569

charityto thosewlhoerred,it mustbe said thatStalin,forreasonsof Realpolitik


encouragedthe misconception.
Those who saw the internationalrevolutionas a dead letter in Stalin's
foreignpolicyhad seemingwarrantnot onllvin Stalin's words on various occa-
sionsbutalso in Sovietactions-and inactions-ofthelate 1920s alndearly1930s.
As Bukharintold Kamenev duringtheirclandestineconversationof July1928,
"ExternallyStalin is followinga rightistpolicy."And hypercautioll was in fact
the keynoteof the policiespurstued abroad at thistimiie and after.Stalin's regime
showed an anxious concernfor the miaintenance of internatioinalpeace. When
William Btillittarrivedin AMoscow in December1933 as Americanamlbassador,
followingUnited States recognitionof Soviet Russia, Foreign CommissarLit-
vinovinformed himn in theirfirstofficialconversationthatthe Soviet government
wantedto join the League of Nations, an organizationlong reviledin Soviet
publicityas a tool of Anglo-Frenclh imperialism.IHe explainedtlle shiftof policy
by the desireto sectureRussia on its westernbordersat a timlewlhena Japanese
attackwas believedimminent in theFar East.15
However, those who thoughtthat Stalinism meanitthe abandonmentof
internationalComnintnist revolutionwere mistaken.A foreignpolicy must be
understoodin termsof its longer-range perspectiveas well as tlle actionsof the
moment.At the end of the 1920s and in the early 1930s Stalin and his associates
were preoccupiedwith the internalrevolutionfrom above, knew that Soviet
societywas in no conditionto fighta war, and fearedany externalcomplications
thatcould lead to war. But preparationof the countryfora futurewar was the
primarypurpose of the policies being pursued; and the war prospectwas a
revolutionary one as well.
Even in mid-1925,the heydayof whatmanyhave takento be his intellectual
as well as tacticalalliancewitlhthe party'srightwing,Stalin flatlystated: those
who see thepresentperod of calmand capitaliststabilizationas the end of world
revolution"are mistaken.""'6 Aoreover,hIisversionof the theoryof socialismin
one cotuntry-asdistinctfromBukharin's-laid lheavystresson the continuation
of the internationalCommunistrevolutioinas the necessarypreconditionfor
makingthe futurevictoryof socialistconstructionin the USSR a "final" one.
Althougha socialistsocietycotuldbe btuilt in an isolatedRussian state,he argued,
this Soviet socialismcouldinotbe made futlly seculre,gtuaranteedagainstthe dan-

Believe In (Chicago, 1945), p. 144; and Bernard Pares, A History of Ruissia (New York,
1944), p. 497. Among foreignobservers who did not fall victimil to the unreal antithesiswere
George F. Kennan, Boris I. Nicolaevsky, and Henry C. Wolfe. See Kennan's Memoirs
1925-1950 (Boston, 1967), pp. 70-73; Nicolaevsky, "Vneshniaia politika Moskvy," Novyi
shu.rnal,1942, no. 3, pp. 199-200; and Wolfe, The ImiiperialSoviets (New York, 1940),
especially chapter 12.
15. For the President, Personal anid Secret: Corresponldentce Between Franklin D.
Roosevelt and Williamn C. Buillitt, ed. Orville H. Bullitt (Boston, 1972), pp. 68-69; U.S.,
Departmiientof State, Foreigit Relations of the UnzitedStates: DiploimiaticPapers: The
Soviet Uniion 1933-1939 (Washingtoin, D.C., 1952), pp. 60-61. On the defensive character
of Soviet foreign policy in this period, see George F. Kenman,Russia and the West Under
Lenin and Stalin (New York, 1960), pp. 265-66; and Max Beloff, The Foreigny, Policy of
Soviet Russia 1929-1941, vol. 1 (London and New York, 1947), especially chapter 3.
16. Stalin, 7:93-94.
570 Slavic Review

ger of successfulforeigni militaryintervention and overthrow,until the Com-


munistrevolutionspreadfartlher. Nor did Stalin dropthisline of reasoningonce
he had finishedoffthe Trotskyistopposition.In 1938, he took advantageof a
privateletterfroman obscureKonisornolfunctionary named Ivanov to restate
itfully,unequivocally, and in public.
Ivanov lhadbeen firedfromhis job as a propagandiston the charge-than
wlhiclhnone could be more deadllyin that year of terror-thathe was guiltyof
politicalheresyin hiisfailureto affirm thatsocialismhad won "finalvictory"in
the USSR and thatthe countrywas tlherefore fullyguaranteedagainstinterven-
tion fromwithoutand the restorationof capitalisnm. In his lengtlhy reply,Stalin
gave Ivanov firmsupport.He declaredthat "since we do not live on an island
but in a 'systemof states,'a considerablentumber of whiclhare hostileto the
land of socialism,creatinga dangerof intervention and restoration,we say openly
and lhonestly that the victoryof socialismin our counitry is not yet final."To
makeit finalwouldonlybe possible"througlh combiningthe seriousefforts of the
interinationalproletariatwith the still mnore serious effortsof our whole Soviet
people."17Thouglhguardedlyformutlated in thesewords,the idea tllatthe finality
of socialism'svictoryin the USSR dependled on thefurther spreadof Communist
revolution abroadcouldlnothavebeennmade moreunmistakable.
But if Stalinkeptfaithwiththe Bolshevikcoimmitment to the furtlher
prog-
ress of the internationalCommuniist revolution,he was innovativein his manner
of envisagingthe progressand the Soviet role in securingit. His visionof future
Communistrevolutionswas Russocentric.Because his revolutionislmi was blended
withhis Great Russian nationalisn,the furtherprogressof Communistrevolu-
tion was associated in hiisminlid with the futureextensionof the international
power and clominionof Soviet Russia and its territorialaggrandizement. Stalin
slhowedI his Russocentrismwhen he wrote in 1921 that Soviet Russia, so far a
"socialistisland" in the capitalistencirclenment,would be betteroffif it had "as
iteighbors one large industriallyclevelopedor several Soviet states."18Four years
later,in his reportto the FourteenthParty Congress!he mentionedthe loss of
westernUkrainianand Belorussialnterritories to Poland as a factformalizedby
the Versaillestreatyand now again by the Locarno conferenceof 1925.19These
words foreshadowedthe futureincorporation of easternPoland into the Soviet
Union, forwhich Stalin would be honoredin the Soviet press as the "gatherer
ofRus "-a titleoncebestowecd uponthe Muscovitetsars.
At the end of 1924, Stalin had writtenthatthe pathsof developmentof the
world revolutionwere "not so simple" as seemed earlier. Once it had been
thouglht that the revolutionwould develop throughthe ripeningof elementsof
socialismlin the moreadvancedcountriesat the same time,but thatidea was in
need of substantialmodification. The imorelikelyprospectwas that the world
revolutionwould developthrouglh the revolutionary "fallingaway" (otpadenie)
of morecountriesfromthe systemof imperialiststates,followingthe path of the
"firstfallen-awaycountry."20 In 1926 Stalin indicatedwherehe thoughtthe new

17. Pravda, February 14, 1938.


18. "The Party Before and After Taking Power," in Stalin, 5:109. Emphasis added.
19. Stalin, 7:273.
20. "The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists," in Stalin,
6:396-97, 398-99.
The Emergenceof Stalin'sForeignPolicy 571

fallen-away lands wouldbe located.No matterwhatsuccessesm-light be scoredin


theconstruction of Sovietsocialism,he said, thecotuntrywould notbe guaranteed
againstdangerfromwithoutso long as it remainedisolatedin the capitalisten-
circlement."So in order to win conclusively,we must ensure that the present
capitalistencirclement is replacedby a socialistencirclement,thatthe proletariat
is victoriousat least in several countries."Y21A "socialist encirclement"would
necessarilyconsistofcountriesgirdlingtheUSSR.
Given his Russocentricorientation,it was natural-even inevitable-that
Stalin wotuldenvisagethe international Communistrevolutionas radiatingout-
ward fromthe Soviet REussianheartlandin its futurecourse; thathe would fore-
see the emergenceof a bipolarworld.It was establishedBolslsevikdoctrinethat
the OctoberRevolutionhad split the worldinto two hostile"camps." As Stalin
put it to the Foourteenth Congressin 1925, therewere alreadytwo "centersof
gravity."One was "Anglo-America,"the centerof gravityforbourgeoisgovern-
ments;the otlherwas Soviet Russia, the centerof gravityforthe workersof the
West and therevolutionaries oftheEast.22Althoughnot long afterwardhe spoke
of contradictionsand even possible war betweenBritainand America,the pre-
vision of a bipolar world did not change. In his well-known1927 interview
with a group of visitingAmericansympathizers, he foresawthe formationof
"two centers"on a world scale in the furtlher course of the internationalrevolu-
tion.23
The notion that the internationalCommunistrevolutionwould grow by
accretionfromthe Soviet centerwas implicitin the very argunmentation about
socialism in one countryreviewed above. Further socialist revolutionswere
neededto gitaranteethesecutrity of the first.They would give Russia's revolution
a deep defensiveglacis as well as controlover territoryand resourcesthatwould
therebybe detachedfromthe capitalistworld; and then no conceivableanti-
Sovietmilitary interventioncouldsucceed.
Such was Stalin's design for a foreignpolicy that mighitbe describedas
imperialcommunism. Innovativein its envisagement of the path of revolutionary
advance,it also involveda momenltous innovationin regardto themeansof effect-
ingtheanticipated futureadvance.

The Uses ofDiplomacy


Once in power,the Bolshevikrevolutionaries quicklydiscoveredhow valu-
able cliplonmacycould be as a defensiveweapon to ensure the Soviet Republic's
survivalby keepingits enemiesdivided.As Lenin puitit, "So long as we have
not won the whole world, so long as we remain economicallyand militarily
weaker than what is leftof the capitalistworld,we must stickto tlle rule: be
able to exploitthe contradictionsand oppositionsbetweentlle imperialists.If we
had not followedthis rule, we would long ago have been hanged on separate
aspen treesto the capitalists'generaljoy. Oturbasic experiencein this respect
camefromconcludingtheBresttreaty."24
21. "On the Social Democratic Deviation in Our Party," in Stalin, 8:263.
22. Stalin, 7:281-82.
23. Prazvda,September15, 1927.
24. Speech of December 6, 1920 to Moscow party activists, in V. I. Lenin, Pobnoe
sobranie sochinenii,5th ed., 55 vols. (Moscow, 1958-65), 42:56 (hereafter cited as Lenin).
572 Slavic Review

The Brest-Litovsktreatywas the territorially costly separate peace that


the fledglingSoviet governmenthad concludedwith Germanyin March 1918
at Lenin's insistenceand againstthe oppositionof numerouspartycomradeswho
favoredrevolutionary war againstthe advanlcingGermanarmies or a policy of
no-war-no-peace. It was the firstand for Lenin the classic case of an agreement
witha capitalistgovernnment forthesake of Sovietstirvival.
Were thereat presentdeep intercapitalist divisionswhichSoviet diplomacy
could similarlyutilize? Lenin affirmeld that therewere-above all three: Japa-
nese-American rivalryin the Pacific;thebroadercontradictions betweenAmerica
and the rest of the capitalistworld,Etiropein particular;and the deep discord
betweentheEntentepowersand defeatedGermany.25
In relationswithcountriesof the East (a termby whiclhearlybolshevism
designatedroughlywhat we mean today by the "Third World"), Leninist
foreignpolicy assigned to diplomacyan indirectlyrevolutionaryrole. It fol-
lowed fromIntperialism,the Highest Stage of Capitalismthat the departureof
any colonial dependencyfroman imperialistcountry'ssphere of controland
economicexploitationmust necessarilyaggravateboth the competitivestruggle
betweendifferent imperialisnmsover whateverareas remainedavailable for ex-
ploitationand the class contradictionsinsidethe imperialistcountrythathad lost
the given colony as a marketfor capital exportsand a source of superprofits
whichwould be used in part to keep working-classdiscontentfromboilingover
into revolt.Hence Soviet diplomacycould indirectlypromotethe revolutionary
cause by givingaid and supportto movementsfornationalliberationand inde-
pendencein the East or to establishedgovernmentswhich were concernedto
make theircountriesmore independentof the West. Such was the sense of the
dictumattributedto Lenin (whetherhe ever said it or not) that the road to
Paris runsthroughPeking.
No matterthatthe leaders of the nationalistmovements, such as Kemal in
Turkey,were anti-Communist in some instances; that they suppressedtheir
nativeCommunists;thattheirprogramswentno fartherthanindependenceand
nationaldevelopmentunder bourgeoisbanners.Rapprochementwith themand
the governments formedby them,or even withestablishedEastern governments
disposedto throwoffWesterntutelage,was a defensiveSoviet interestin that
it fosteredthe rise of friendlystates on Russia's periphery.Thus, the Foreign
Commissariat(Narkomindel) under Chicherinpursued with Lenin's most ac-
tive support a fundamentally anti-Britishdiplomacyof friendshipwith non-
Communist Turkey,Afghanistan, and Persia.
Later in the 1920s, the chieftheaterof tlhepoliticsof Soviet alliance with
revolutionary nationalismwas China. Here Moscow wentbeyondordinarydiplo-
macyto link itselfwithDr. Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang,a nationalistpartythat
was based in Canton and aspiredto establishits rule over the whole of China.
The ChineseCommunistswere directedthroughthe Cominternto join and work
withintheKuomintang.
Ever consciousof present-pastparallels,Stalin told the Chinese Commis-
sion of the CominternExecutive Committeein November1926 that the coming
nationalrevolutionary regimein China would be reminiscent of the "democratic

25. Ibid.,pp.56,60-69.
The Emergenceof Stalin'sForeignPolicy 573

dictatorshipof proletariatand peasantry"whichLenin had envisagedforRussia


duringthe Revolutionof 1905, save that it would be anti-imperialist primarily.
Hie also maintainledthat unlike traditionalrevolutions,includingRussia's in
1905,wlhichusuallystartedwitlhan unarmedpeople's rising,China was showing
a new patternof revolutionary militarism:"In China it is not an unarmedpeople
thatfacesthe troopsof an old government but an arnmed people in the personof
its revolutionaryarmy. In China an armed revolutioinis fightingagainst an
armedcounterrevolution."26 The notionof an "armedrevolution"was an integral
elementof emergentStalinismin foreignpolicy. However, the defeatsuffered
by Soviet policy when Chiang Kai-shek turnedagainst Moscow's tutelageand
slatughteredChinese Communistsen masse in 1927 nmust lhaveconvincedStalin,
to judge by his actionsin laterlife,thatthe onlyreliableforceforarmedrevolu-
tionwas his own Red Army.
The terriblesetbackof Chinesecommunism at the handsof ChiangKai-shek
has gone down in scholarlyhistoryas "Stalin's failurein China."27Undeniably
it was a failure,yet two pointsbear emphasisin a genieralappraisal. First,the
politicsof Soviet alliance with a Chinese nationalistmovementwere Leninist.
Second, it is not clear how tragicthe ClhineseComilmunlist defeatwas fromthe
special standpointof Stalin's Russo-imperialcommunism.Given China's size,
population,geopoliticalposition,and imperialtraditions,Stalin kniewthat a
CommunistChina would inevitablydevelop into a second hegemoniccenterof
worldcommunism, and the prospectcould not have pleased him. Such an inter-
pretationof his thinkingis consistentwith his subsequentbehavior.In 1945,
accordingto Mao Tse-tung,"Stalin triedto preventthe Cllinese revolutionby
sayingthatthereshouldnot be any civil war anidthatwe mustcollaboratewith
Chiang Kai-shek.At thattimewe did not carrythis into effect, and the revolu-
tionwas victorious.Afterthe victory,theyagain suspectedthatChina would be
likeYugoslaviaand I wouldbecomea Tito."28
Of all the teachingsof Lenin, none impressedStalin more deeplythan the
view thatintercapitalist discordswere an invaluableasset whichit was the duty
of Soviet diplomacyto exploitto the fullestpossible extent.Conflictsand con-
tradictionsbetweencapitalistcountrieswereunquestionably "the greatestsupport
of our regimeand our revolution,"Stalin affirmed, for example,in a speech to
a Moscow partyconferencein January1925, and then continued:"This may
seem strangebut it is a fact,comrades.If the two main coalitionsof capitalist
countriesduringthe imperialistwar in 1917 had not been engaged in mortal
combatagainsteach other,iftheyhad not been at one another'sthroat,not been
preoccupiedand lackingin time to entera contestwith the Soviet regime,the
Soviet regimewould hardlyhave survivedthen. Struggle,conflicts,and wars
betweenour enemiesare,I repeat,our greatestally."29

26. Stalin,7:357-58,363.
27. See, forexample,ConradBrandt,Stalin's Failure in Chinia1924-1927(Cambridge,
Mass., 1958); and Leon Trotsky,The ThirdInternational AfterLetin (New York, 1970),
pp. 167-230.
28. "ExcerptsfromConfidentialSpeeches,Directivesand Lettersof Mao Tse-tung,"
New York Times,March1, 1970,p. 26. See also VladimirDedijer,Tito (New York, 1953),
p. 322.
29. Stalin,7:27.
574 Slavic Review
This and other statementsshow that Stalin fullyaccepted Lenin's view of
Brest as the classic example of divisive diplomacy.In- his 1924 codification
of Leninistdoctrine,The Fouindationsof Leninism,Stalin twice cited Lenin to
thateffect.Moreover,the Brest precedentwas a prominentthemein an Izvestiia
articleof January1929 whichimay be takenas a foreign-policy manifestoof that
openingphase of the Stalin periodproper; its high-levelauthorshipwas reflected
in the pseudonymoussignature"Outsider." What Lenin accomplishedin the
Brest period, in spite of serious internalopposition,"in no way representsa
single episode limitedto a definitehistoricalperiod,"wrote Outsider.His utiliz-
ing of interimperialist contradictionsto gain a breathingspell for the Soviet
regimewas still a valid model. The longerthe imperialistsdelayed theirattack,
the moretimeSoviet Russia would have to build up its socialisteconomy.So, the
firstand basic directiveof Leninistforeignpolicywas: "to stretcholutthe breath-
ing spell foras long as possible-the breathingspell won by the Soviet Republic
forthefirsttimwe in theBrestperiod."30
How to accomplishthis while pursuingthe longer-rangeexpansionistaim
of his imperialcommunismwas Stalin's central foreign-policy problemin the
later 1920s and in the 1930s. Given his parallel-hauntedpoliticalmind,giventhe
Lenin-identification that disposed him to "do a Lenin" at every criticaljunc-
ture,31and given the subconsciousresentment and rivalrythat made him want
to outdo his dead identity-figure in the process, Stalin was bound to envision
hiimself bringingoffa diplomaticmasterstrokelike Lenin's Brest, save that in-
stead of tradingspace for tinme, it would gain both. Lenin himselfhad invited
such a thoughtin a ratherenigmaticpassage of thatspeechof December6, 1920
in whichhe said it was Soviet diplomacy'stask to capitalizeupon the contradic-
tions between two inmperialisms by settingthem against one another. Having
cited Brest as the firstgreat example of such a diplomacy,he asserted: "One
should not draw the conclusionthat treatiesmay [only] be like Brest or Ver-
sailles. That is untrue.There can also be a thirdtreaty,advantageousto us."32
AlthoughLenin did not specifythe distinguishing featureof the advantageous
thirdkind of treaty,he manifestly had in mindthatRussia's revolutionary inter-
ests would somehowbe promotedby it. Lenin-textualist thathe was, Stalin must
have ponderedthe quoted lines carefully.Brest and Versailles had in common
as disadvantageoustreaties-to Russia and Germanyrespectively-thesacrifice
of vital territorialinterests.One could inferthat the revolutionaryintereststo
be served by the "thirdtreaty"were territorialones.33Diplomacy,in the very

30. Izvestiia,January22, 1929. For an English translation,see Xenia J. Eudin and


Robert M. Slusser, Soviet Foreign Policy 1928-1934: Documents and Materials, vol. 1
(UniversityPark and London,1966), pp. 158-66.
31. On Leninas Stalin'sidentity-figure,
whomhe aspiredto matchor outdoin history-
making exploits, see Robert C. Tucker, Stalin As Revolutionary 1879-1929: A Study in
HistoryandPersonality(New York,1973),chapters4, 12,and 13.
32. Lenin,42:56. Althoughnot in the text,the word "only"belongsto the sentence's
sensein thecontextof whatfollows.
33. I am not suggestingthat this was what Lenin had in mind. In general,Stalin's
imperial-Communist orientation
on contiguousterritoriesas fieldsfor revolutionary
advance
was a departurefromLeninistthinkingabout the futurecourse of Communistrevolution.
Stalin'sbolshevismwas fusedwithRussiannationalism;Lenin's was not. I am indebtedto
ProfessorMosheLewinforsuggesting thatthispointbe stressed.
The Emergenceof Stalin'sForeignPolicy 575

act of keepingRussia's enemiesdividedin orderto prolongthe breathingspell,


would therebyacquire a revolutionarily offensiverole, servingthe (in Stalin's
mind) fusedinterests of Sovietand internationalcommunism.
A futurewar situationwouldbe theappropriatesettingforthe revolutionary
advance.The outlinesof sulcha scenariowere clear in Stalin's mindas early as
1995. In addressingthe closed Central Committeeplenumon January19, he
said thata new war wotildbecomeinevitablewitliina fewyears.It was impera-
tive,therefore,to be readyforanything,to preparethe armyand air forceand
raise themto the requtisite But this,said Stalin,did not mean thatRussia
lheight.
should initiatelhostilities.
"Our bannerremains,as before,the bannerof peace.
But if war begins,we shall not be able to sit witlhfoldedhands-we shall have
to make a move,but the move will come last. And we shall act so as to throw
the decisive weightonto the scales, the weightthat could be preponderant."34
War would thus be the pathwayto the Comnmunist revolution'sterritorialad-
vance,whichwould finallygive the re-volution of socialistconstructionin Russia
the securityof tenurethat was attainablein lnootherway. Diplomacyhad its
critically
important partto playin his context.
At thattimetherewas a flawin thewar-and-revolution scenario:no existing
antagonismwas deep enouglhto generatea big new interimperialist war. Stalin
frankly admittedas muchin his publicspeechof January27, 1925 to the Moscow
partyconference. Having statedthatconflicts and wars betweenRussia's enemies
were her "greatestally," he went on: "But since the pluses of capital in this
sphereare, so far,greaterthan its minuses,and militarycollisionsbetweenthe
capitalistsare not to be expectedany clay,clearlynmatters don't yet stand the
way we would like wvith our thirdally."35These words did not implythat Stalin
was impatiently awaitingtheoutbreakof war. Since some yearswould be needed
to preparethe countryfor all contingencies, prolongationof the existinginter-
nationalpeace was essential.Eventually,lhowever, the predictedinterimperialist
war wouldcome.The missionof Stalin'sdiplomacywas to expeditethisdevelop-
mentand to ward offthe dangerthatthe new war would startas an onslaught
againstthe SovietUnion.

The Germtan
Orientation
InterviewingStalinin Decemnber1931,the GermanbiographerEmil Ludwig
said thathe had observedin Russia a generalenthusiasmfor everythingAmeri-
can. "You exaggerate,"Stalinreplied.Althouglh
Americanefficiencyand straight-
forwardnesswere appreciated,he said, therewas no special respectfor every-
thingAmerican.If therewas any nationtowardwhich Soviet sympathieswere
strong,it was the Germans."Our feelingstowardthe Americansbear no com-
parisonwiththesesympathies !"36

34. Stalin, 7:12-14.


35. Ibid., p. 38. Stalin had listed the Western proletariat and the oppressed colonial
peoples as the firstand second allies. But elsewhere in the speech he implicitlyput the inter-
imperialistcontradictionsin or near firstplace by calling them "our greatest (velichaishii)
ally."
36. Stalin, 13:114-15.
576 Slavic Review

Afterinquiringthe reasonforthe ardentpro-Germansympathies(to which


Stalinarclhly replied,ifonlybecause Germanygave theworldMarx aridEngels),
Ludwig said that recentSoviet-Polislhtalks about a nonaggressiontreatyhad
aroused alarm among Germanpoliticians.Should Poland's presentbordersre-
ceive officialSoviet recognition,it would be deeplydisappointing to the German
people,whichhad takentheUSSR's oppositionto theVersaillessystemseriously.
In his carefullywordedresponse,Stalilnstressedthata Soviet-Polishnonaggres-
sion agreementwould mean nothingmorethanan undertaking by the two states
not to attackone another.It would be neithera recognitionof the Versailles
systemnor a guaranteeof Poland's borders. "We have never been Poland's
guarantorsand neverwill be, just as Poland has not and will lnotbe a guarantor
of ours. Our friendlyrelationswith Germanyremainjust what theyhave been
so far. Such is my firmconviction.So, the alarm of whichyou speak is utterly
unfounded."37
Stalin's German orientationwas not rooted in anythingpersonal. It be-
longedto his Bolshevikpoliticalcultureand the legacy of Lenin. Not only had
Germanybeen one of Lenin's domiciles in emigration,its pre-1914 Social
Democracya chrysalisof his Marxistthoughtand its wartime"state capitalism"
a patternthathe admiredsufficiently to offerto early Soviet Russia as an object
of emulation,but the Brest treaty,that primal act of diplomacyto which the
BolshevikRevolutionowed its survival,was an accord betweelnMoscow and
Berlin.
In December of 1920, Lenin visualized an alliance with Germanyas an
attractiveoption for Moscow's divisive diplomacy."Germany is one of the
strongestadvanced capitalistcountries,it cannot put up with the Versailles
treaty,and Germany,herselfimperialist,must seek an ally against world im-
perialism,"he said in his speech of December6. "Here is a situationwe must
utilize."Recentdevelopments in Germanymade thisseem propitious.
The prominentBolshevikfigureand experton Germanaffairs,Karl Radek,
had gone to Germanyin December 1918 to attenda Congressof Workers'and
Soldiers' Councilsand was arrestednot long afterthe abortiveSpartacistrising
of the followingmontlh.Among the Germanswho visitedhim in a Berlill jail
was GeneralLudendorff's aide, Colonel Bauer,who suggestedan alliancebetween
the German military,the German Communists,and Soviet Russia. Another
visitorwas a General Reibnitzwho, as Radek later recalled,thoughtthat the
German officers"mightstrikea bargain with the Communistparty and with
Soviet Russia; theyunderstandthat we cannot be conqueredand that we are
Germany'sallies in thestrugglewiththeElntente."38
On the otherside,two leadingHamburgCommunists, HeinrichLaufenberg
and Fritz Wolffheim, began to preachwhat came to be called "National Bolslhe-
vism,"a programof revolutionary collaboration-orcollusioln-betweenGerman
Communistsand nationalistsagainst the Germangovernment(then lheadedby
the Social DemocratFriedrichEbert) and the Versaillestreaty.Radek publicly

37. Ibid., pp. 115-17.


38. For the Bauer visit, see Warren Lerner, Karl Radek: The Last Internationalist
(Stanford, 1970), p. 86; for Reibnitz's visit, see E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revoluttion
1917-1923, vol. 3 (New York, 1953), p. 314, which quotes a memoir later published by
Radek in the Soviet journal Kr-asnaianav'.
The Emergenceof Stalin'sForeignPolicy 577

opposed this,and Lenin in early 1921 repudiated"the preposterousabsurdities


of 'National Bolshevism'(Laufenbergand others),whichhas gone to the length
of advocatinga bloc withthe Germanbourgeoisieforwar againstthe Entente."39
But the idea that the Commuinists should make commoncause with German
nationalism did notdie.
The German Communistleader Thialheimerfound that the anti-Entente
German bourgeoisiewas playing an "objectively"revolutionaryrole, as had
Bismarck,that "revolutionaryfromabove," after 1848. Radek picked up this
themeand in an articleforthetwenty-fifth anniversary ofthe Russian Communist
Party's foundingcomparedBismarckwith Lenin. In May 1923 he drafteda
manifestoforthe Germanpartywhichdrew a distinctionbetweentwo kinds of
Fascists: the ones "directlysold to capital" aindthose"mislednationalisticpetty
bourgeois"who failedto see thatthe way to overcomeGermany'snationaldis-
grace was to join withthe proletariat.At a session of the CominternExecutive
Committeethefollowingmonth,he wentfurtller and foundthe phirase"National
Bolslhevism" acceptable,saying"the strongempihasison the nationin Germany
is a revolutionaryact, like the emphasison the nationin the colonies."40
Later in the session, Radek gave a speech which caused a sensation in
Germany.Called "Wanderer into the Void," afterthe title of a nationalistic
novel then in vogue in Germany,it eulogized a young Fascist named Leo
Schlageterwho had servedin theFreikorps(a paramilitary forerunner of Hitler's
StormTroopers) and as a Nazi partyorganizer.In May Schlageterhad been
executedby the Frenchoccupationauthoritiesfor tryingto sabotagea railroad
in the Ruhr, and the Gernman nationalistresistancewas makinga h-eroout of
him.Joiningthe campaign,Radek called himn a "martyrof Germannationalism"
and appealed to the multitudeof still livingSchlageters,"the great nmajority of
the nationalistminded masses," to become not wanderersinto the void, but
"wanderersinto a betterfutureforthe whole of mankind"withthe Communist
movement.41
The Schlageterline drew favorablereactionfromtwo prominentGerman
right-wingnationalists,Count Ernst Reventlowand Moeller van den Bruck,
who foundcommongroundbetweennationalistsand Communists-alongwith
the problemthatcooperationbetweenthelmi to createa new trulyGermanorder
in place of the Weimar systemwould hardlybe possible unless the Germanas
well as Russian Communistsprovedthemiiselves acceptableallies by eradicating
Jewishinfluence.42The phenomenonof National Bolshevismacquireda twofold

39. Left-WintgCommxl^unism: AntInfantile Disorder, in The Lenin Anthology,ed. Robert


C. Tucker (New York, 1975), p. 594.
40. E. H. Carr, The Interregtuwn1923-1924 (New York, 1954), pp. 159-60, 177.
41. World News and Viezws (International Press Correspondence)i June 28, 1923,
pp. 460-61.
42. Abraham Ascher and Guenter Lewy, "National Bolshevism in Weimar Germany:
Alliance of Political Extremes Against Democracy," Social Research, Winter 1956, pp.
464-66. For a time during the tense summerof 1923 Communistsand Nazis shared platforms
at protest mass nmeetings, although one Nazi speaker remarked that the Communists could
never be national so long as theywere led by "Radek-Sobelsohn and whatever the other Jews
are called" (Carr, The Interregnumt, pp. 182-83). In mid-August the Nazis banned such
common meetings. Nazi anti-Semitisnm was an embarrassmentfor the Communists at that
time, Carr observes here, although a Communist proclamation was reported by the Berlin-
578 Slavic Review
con-notationj:on the one hand, the Com--muilist tactic of associatingthemselves
with Germannationalismfor theirown revolutionary purposes; on tlle other,
the attractionthat extremenationalistslike Reventlowand van den Bruck felt
forbolslhevism as a virilemovemiielnt opposedto the Weimar system,the Elntente,
and Versailles.
Such a pathbreakingmove as Radek's Schlageterspeech could not lhave
been takenwithouthiigher politicalsanctioln.Radek hiimself latersaid thatit had
been endorsedby Ziniovievin hiiscapacityas Cornilternchief.Since thiswas tlle
timeof Stalini'striumvirate withZinovievand Kamenev in the Politburo,he too
mtust have approvedit. Stalincouldtunderstandthepowerof nationalisn1 because
he himselffelt it. As a BolslhevikRussian nationalist,he would have readily
appreciatedthe uses of National Bolshevisnm as a tacticfor the German Conm-
munists.In later years, very likely throuiglh psychologicalprojection,he was
always suspectingforeignConmmlunist leaders of hiiddelnnationalBolslhevistten-
dencies aln(dseekingto combat tlhem.He would never have wanted Natiolnal
Bolslhevism to come to power in Germany,or anywlhere else outsideof Russia,
btitwas quickerthanmostotlherRussialnBolshevikleadersto see tllatit was to
the politicaladvantageof commlitulnism, especiallyin Germany,to make commlilon
cause witlhnationalislmi. Considering,mloreover, the readiness Stalilnllad long
since shownto make sly use of anti-Semlitisnm in intrapartypoliticalstruggles,
lhewas theleastlikelyofall Bolslhevik leadersto be outragedby tlleanti-Semitism
of Germannationalists.All in all, it is not surprisingtlhatthe Schlageterline,
thouglh it quicklypassed into hiistory, was a portentof tlhings to come in Stalin's
politicsand in Germany.
Afterthe crisis of 1923 subsided,Moscow pursuedits Germanpolicypri-
marilythrotuglh state-to-state relations.Lenin's previsionof a Soviet-German
alliance had borne frtuit in the Rapallo treatyof 1922, whichprovidedfor full
resumptionof diploi-natic relations,mutualcancellationof economicclaims,and
most-favored nationtreatment. This coup of Lenin's divisivediplomacyopened
the way for the anti-Versaillespartnerslhip betweenthe Soviet and German
governments duringthe 1920s. The relationship, tlhouglhclose, was also an un-
easy one because of conflicting pressureson bothpartners.On the Germanside
therewas a divisionamolnginfluential circlesand in the Foreign Ministrybe-
tweenmenof Easterniorientation(the Ostlers), who saw tlleRussian connection
as vital for Germany'srevisionistgoals, alndthose of Westerlnorientation(the
Westlers),wlhofeltthatGermany'sinterests,the territorial one included,could
best be servedby cooperationwiththe West. The Germianambassadorin MIos-
cow, CountBrockdorff-Rantzau, and the miian who succeededhim in thatpost in
1929, Herbert von Dirksen,were prominentOstlers,as were the Reiclhswehr
leaders who valued the clandestineuiseof Soviet soil for militarytrainingand
testingin collaborationwith the Red Army. The Germlaln Social Demlocratic
Party (SPD), on the otherhand,was stronglyweddedto the Westernorienta-
tion.43

based Menshevik Sotsialistichleskiivestniikto have said: "Jezcwish


capitalists grow fat oIn the
exploitationof the Gervnanpeople."
43. Dyck, WeiniiarGermianya)ld Soviet R2ussia,pp. 103 and 141. The instabilityof the
partnershipis the key theme of this illuminatingstudy. It is also shown in G. Hilger and
The Emergenceof Stalin'sForeignPolicy 579

The lattercircunmstance helps to explain Stalin's extremeantipathyforthe


SPD. He told a GermanCommunistjournalist,Wilheln1Herzog, in February
1925 that a proletarianrevolutionwas out of the questionin Germanyso long
as theSPD had notbeen exposed,crtushed, minor-
and reducedto an insignificant
ity among the workers.Recalling that Lenin in the pre-Octoberperiod had
insistedon the Mensheviks'eliminationas a primeconditionof victory,Stalin
said thatnow no firmGermanrevolutionary victorywas possibleeven in the best
of externalconditionsas long as therewere,withinthe workingclass, two com-
petingpartiesof equal strength.44 Stalin's antipathyextended,quite logically,to
GermanConmmunists of moderatepersuasionwho favoreda commonfrontwith
amenableleft-wingSocial Democratsagainstthe Fascist clanger.One such per-
son was the prominentGermanpartyleader Heinrich Brandler,who had op-
posed the Schlageterline in the 1923 crisis arid soughta unitedfrontwith the
SPD leftwing,lookingto possible Communistparticipationin a coalitiongov-
ernment.45 Later in the monthof his interviewwith Herzog, Stalin numbered
Brandler,along withhis associateThalheimer,amongthe "old" leaderswho,like
the Lunacharskiisand Pokrovskiisin Russia, were passing out of the picture
now; and stressedthe need to eradicate"Brandlerism"fromthe GermanCom-
munistParty.46Brandler'sexpulsionfrompartymembershipcame in 1929, by
whichtimeit was officialComnintern policyto damn Social Democracyas "social
fascism."
The Germanalignmentwas a starby whichStalin steeredSoviet diplomacy
in the later 1920s and early 1930s. The anti-Ententememoriesof the Russian
civil war were an enduringinfluenceoni his politicalthinking:the two great
adversarypoles of attractionin the contemporary world were the Soviet East
and the capitalist'West led by "Anglo-America."The Inow abundantlydocu-
mentedinnerhistoryof Moscow-Berlinrelationsin the later 1920s reveals the
pictureof a Germangovernment adheringgenerallyto the Russian connection
in the midstof a tuig-of-war of pressuresfromWest and East; and of a Stalin
regimenervouisly fearfullest its Germanconnectionbe lost due to a combination
of the Westlers'influenceinternallyand a determinedeffortby the Versailles
powers to lure Berlin into theiranti-Sovietcamp with economic,political,and
territorialconcessionsthat theywere in a positiolnto give. From the talks on
renewalof Rapallo that led to the 1926 Treaty of Berlin,to the talks of early
1931 onlthe latter'sextensioln,the now available GermanForeign Ministrycor-
respondenceshows the Soviet side regularlypressingthe Germansto reaffirm
theiradherenceto the Rapallo line and periodicallytakinginitiativesto cement

A. G. Meyer, The Incoinpatible Allies: A Memoir-History of Ger-man-SovietRelations


1918-1941 (New York, 1953). On the Rapallo accord as a result mainly of Soviet initiative,
aimed at "the splittingoff of the Germans from the others," see Kennan, Russia and the
West, pp. 204 and 207. For a full historical account of Rapallo's diplomatic background,
see Renata Bournazel, Rapallo: Naissance d'ut Mythe (Paris, 1974).
44. Stalin, 7:36.
45. Ruth Fischer, Stalin and Germanasl
Coninmunismi:A Study in the Origins of the State
Party (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), pp. 287 and 313. Brandler, notes the author, wrote in the
Germanpartyorgan Rote Fahne: "Beat the Fascists whereveryou meet them."
46. "Letter to Comrade Me--rt" (actually, to the German left Communist Arkadi
Maslow), in Stalin, 5:43 and 45.
580 Slavic Review

political,military,and economicties with Berliin.Thtis the 1931 talks found


Litvinovoffering the Germansa choice betweenstraightrenewalor a stronger
treatywhereas the Germans favored simple renewal; and the Narkomindel
wanteda five-yearextensionas againstthe originalWilhelmstrasseproposal of
onlysix months.47
It is trtlethat Germandealingswitlhthe Rtussianswere bedeviledby many
frustrations and thatforabout a year in 1929-30-during the clhancellorsllip of
HermannMuller,the firstSocial Democratto lholdthatpost since 1923-severe
tensionsbrouglht by developmentson the Soviet side plunged the partnership
into a crisis.The earlier Soviet arrestof fiveGermanengineersand the subse-
qtuenttrialof tlhreeof tliemin the Slhakhty case was one of tlle developments.48
The militantCommiiunist denmonstrationin Berlinfor May Day in 1929-an ex-
pressionof tlheComintern'snew linie-was another.A tlhirdwas the descenton
Moscow, duringcollectivization, of thousandsof Mennonitesof Germllan extrac-
tionwho were fleeingtheirvillagesin quest of a new homein Canada and whose
plightgreatlyaroused Germ-lani a series of Soviet
public opinion. Signiificantly,
initiativesfor betterrelationscaused the diplomaticcrisis to subside in early
1930.
As WeirnarGermanyenteredthe timeof its death agony,Moscow signed
a nonaggressionagreementwithFrance (August 1931) witha view to defusing
French anti-Sovietism;and in January1932 it concludeda similaragreement
with Poland. In doing so, the Narkomindelrejected the Poles' longstanding
demandfor a clause specificallyrecognizingthe German-Polishborder. But it
agreedto a generalfornmula definingaggressionas any actionviolatingthe terri-
torialintegrity or politicalindependence of eitherside.49To theworriedGermans
this looked like an "indirectguarantee"of the easternborderstheyaspired one
dayto revise.
Stalin's forthright statenmentto Ludwig in Decenmber 1931 that the USSR
would neverbe.Poland's guarantorwas obviouslyintendedto reassurethellm that
whateverphraseologywas used in the impendingtreatywith Poland, theyhad
no cause foralarm. He wantedto emphasizethat Moscow's Germanorientation
was stillin force.

Stalin and theNazi Revoluttion


The WeimarRepublicwentdownunderthe assault of the GreatDepression
and the Nazi movement, helpedalong by variouspoliticalfactors:the feebleness
of the centerforces,the absenceof alertand vigorouspoliticalleadershipon the

47. Dyck, Weiin-arGerm1any and Soviet Russia, pp. 229 and 235. In this and the follow-
ing two paragraphs I rely heavily on the detailed documentedrecord presentedby Dyck.
48. Apropos of Stalin's "rightism" in foreign policy, Bukharin told Kamenev in July
1928 that Stalin was taking the line in the Politburo that there should be no death sentences
in the Shakhty case. Indeed, two of the three Germans placed on trial were acquitted and the
thirdwas given a suspended sentenice.
49. Dyck, Weimar Germiiany and Soviet Russia, pp. 236, 242-44. The author plausibly
surmises here that the agreement with Poland was entailed by the prior Soviet-French
agreement; and that in 1931 the Manchurian crisis along with Soviet internalpreoccupations
made nonaggression treaties with Poland and the Baltic states appear desirable to Moscow
as added assurance of calm on its westernborders.
The Emergenceof Stalin'sForeignPolicy 581

part of those in authority,and, not least, the tactics pursued by the German
Comimunists on ordersfrolmi M\oscow-from Stalin. By the stumnlmerof 1933, the
Nazi dictatorshipwas firmly established.50
With theirmass-workerand trade-unionconstittiencies-acombinedtotal
of close to 40 percentof the Reichstagseats in Novemnber 1932 (representing
about seven millionSocial Democraticvotes anidnearlysix millionCommunist
ones)-the two partiesof the GermanlLeft were togetlher a potentiallypowerful
forceforpreservationof the constittutional order.Whetlhertheycould have pre-
ventedthe Nazi victoryby resolutelyworkingin tandcem and with otheranti-
Fascist elementstowardthis end is an unanswerablequestion.What is certain
is thatthe absenceof stuclh cooperation,indeedthe strifebetweenthe two parties
duringthatcriticaltime,facilitatedthe downfallof the constitutional order.Nor
were Commnunist mindsblinidto the catastroplhic clharacterof the course being
taken. As early as September 1930 Trotsky raised Ihis powerfulvoice from
Prinkipoexile to tirgetlle GermanCommunistParty (the KPD) to work with
the SPD in a unitedfrontagainstfascisnm. He accuratelyforewarnedtlhatHitler
in power would be a "super-Wrangel,"that a Nazi victory would imeanthe
crushingof the Gernman workingclass and an inevitablewar againstthe USSR,
that the antiworkerrepressionsof tlheItalian Fascists would appear pale and
almost humaneby coniparisonwith what the Nazis would do, and that there
wotildbe no dislodgingthe Nazis once they took statepower.Instinctively many
GermanCommllunists tooka similarview.51
Stalin hiaddifferent ideas about the course to be followed.He forcedupon
theKPD a policythatabettedtheNazi victory.It coupled"National Bolshevism"
in an updatedversionwithuncompronmising belligerenceagainst Social Democ-
racy ("social-fascism"). A CominternExecutive Committeedirectiveto the
German Communistsin February 1930 demanded "merciless exposure" of
Social Denmocracy, of its leftwinlgin particular,as thebasic forceforestablishing
and forwar againsttheUSSR. The "National Bolshevism"
a Fascist dictatorshli)
tacticsconsistednow in competingwith the Nazis for the rnantleof German
nationalism.Under Cominterndirectionthe German Communistleader Heinz
Neumann,in the sumnmer of 1930, drafteda new KPD "Program of National
and Social Liberation"which promisedto annul the Versailles treatyand the
Young Plan and whichdenouncedthe SPD as thetreasonablepartyof Versailles.
Competitionwith the Nazis wentalong witha certainamountof collaboration.
In the summerof 1931, the Communists,on ordersfromMoscow, joined in a
Nazi- and rightist-organized plebesciteagainst the SPD state governmentin
Prtussia.At a Nazi meetingchairedby Goebbels,for example,Heinz Neumann
coupledhiiscall foran assault on Westerncapitalismwith,reportedly, thewords:

50. Karl Dietrich Bracher, The Germlan Dictatorshlip: The Origins, Structure, and
Effects of National Socialismn,trans. Jean Steiniberg(New York, 1970), chapter 4.
51. Leon Trotsky, The StrutggleAgainst Fascismiiin Germanty(New York, 1971), pp.
125-29, 139. In "The German Comnmuniists' United-Front and Popular-Front Ventures,"
Thle Comniuterw: Historical Highlighits,ed. Milorad M. Drachkovitch ancl Branko Lazitch
(New York, 1966), p. 115, Babette L. Gross writes from experielncethat for memlbersof
the German CommunistParty at that time, "tlheNazi bully squads were the mnailladversary;.
theyhad to be counterattacked,theirblows warded off."
582 Slavic Review

"Young Socialists! Brave fightersfor the nation: the Commnunists do not want
to engagein fraternalstrifewitlhtheNationalSocialists."52
The leaningtowarda unitedanti-Fascistfrontwitlhthe SPD was not en-
tirelyconfinledto the Commnunist rankand file; therewere signsof it amongthe
partyleaders too. Ernst Tlhaelimainni rebelledat firstagainst the instrtuction to
participatein the anti-SPD Prussian plehescite.Then le, Hermnann Remmele,
and Heinz Neumnann "were called to AMoscow to learn at firstlhandthat this
instrtuctionhad been issued to the ConiniunistInternationalby Stalin person-
ally."53AnotherformerGerman Comnlunist,wlhoworked in the Colnintern
officesin Moscow in 1932 and sturvived a lengtlhy later incarcerationin Soviet
concentration canmps,recallsthat"as earlyas 1932 thereexistedin the leaderslhip
of the KPD as well as in the Comiiiternmlachlilne a miiarked readinessto set up a
'unitedfront'witlhthe Social Demlocratswlhichwouldhiavepreventedtllevictory
of National Socialism.Bu-ttlheirtimiidproposalswere not adopted.The influence
of Stalin-wlhoheldfastto hiisline,wlhilealnycriticismi of it was instantlybranided
as 'antipartyheresy,'if not as 'provocationby agentsof international capitalism'
-was decisive."54
The SPD leaderslilp,concernled over its ties witlhthe Catlholicand Center
parties,also lheldback fromiicollaborationwitlhthe Commntiiists. By the autummn
of 1932,however,the deptlhof the crisisnmade the urgencyof collaborationclear.
An SPD leader,FriedrichStaimpfer, obtainedan interviewwitlhthe Soviet envoy
in Berlin,Lev Klhinclhuk, hiimselfa formerRussian AMenshevik. "Wouldl it be
possibleto expectthecooperationof Comnltnuiismii in thestruggleagainstNatiolnal
Socialism?" Stampferasked Klhinclhtuk. Several interviewsfollowedbetween
Starnpferand a Soviet embassyattaclhe,Vinogradov,wlhofinially broke offthe
exchangesby sayilng:"Moscow is conviniced that the road to Soviet Gernmany
leads tlhrotuglh
Hitler."55
Stalin's decisive personal role in the KPD policies that abettedthe Nazi
revolutionis beyonddotubt.Insofaras the possibilityexistedof hleadingofftllis
event by encouraginga tunitedfrontof the GernmalLeft and otlheranti-Nazi
forces,he was chieflyresponsibleforits failureto materialize.His decisionmlay
therefore lhavebeen a criticalone in its conse(luences.To some it lhasseemedan
act of montinuental froml
stemm1iling
politicalineptittude failtureto graspthe revoltu-
tionarynatureof NationlalSocialismll or a beliefthat its victory-as was said in
Communltiist circles at that time-would be slhort-livecl and pave German conm-
mulnism'sway to power.Suclhinter-pretations are ulncolnvincing.The tlhencutrrent
versionabout a slhort-lived Nazi victorybears earmiiarksof a conveniienit
rational-

52. Ascher and Lewy, "National Bolshevism in Weimar Germany," pp. 472, 478-79.
For the February 1930 Cominiterndirective,see Kom'munistichesleii Internatsio;al' v dokut-
inentakh1919-1932,part 2 (Moscow, 1933), p. 946.
53. Gross, "The German Commnuniists' UJnited-Frontand Popular-Front Ventures,"
p. 117. The authior,herself the sister of Margarete Buber-Neumainni(Heinz Neumann's
wife), also reports here (p. 116) that onl a visit to Moscow in April 1931 Neumanniheard
Stalin criticize the KPD for having cooperated with the SPD in Tlluringia in bringingabout
a vote of no-confidencein the Nazi ministerof the interior,Wilhelm Frick.
54. Ex-Insider, "Moscow-Berlin 1933," Surveyv, no. 44-45 (October 1962), p. 162.
55. Stampfer subsequentlysettled in the United States where he revealed this informa-
tion in aniinterview.See David J. Dallin, Russia and PostwuarEutrope,trans. F. K. Lawrence
(New IHaven, 1943), pp. 61-62 n.
The Emergenceof Stalin'sForeignPolicy 583

izationput out by Stalin's headquarters.However inadequatehis understanding


of Hitler and the Nazi movementnmayhave been in 1930-33, Stalin knew
enoughabout Italian fascism'sstayingpowers,not to mentionRussian bolshe-
vism's,to beware of assumingthat the Nazis could not create a stable single-
partysystemand extirpateresistancewitlhruthlessterror,as theydid. We must
take intoaccountthat Stalin,despitehiisdoctrinairecast of mind,was an astute
politician,reasonablywell informed, and givento actingwitha carefullythought
out rationale.Althouglhcomiiplex, -therationalein this instanceis not hard to
reconstruct.
First,elementalcautiondictatedthatthe GermanCommunistsbe restrained
fromany attemnpt at a seizureof power,no matterhow revolutionary the German
situation.In the comparablecircumstances of 1923, Stalin had arguedin a letter
to Zinovievthat the GermanCommunistsshoouldbe restrainedon the grounds
thattheirpositionwas not so favorableas the Bolsheviks'in 1917 in Russia and
that"if power in Germanywere,so to speak,to fall to the streetand the Com-
munistspicked it up, it would end in failureand collapse."56He had ample
reason to take the sanmeview in 1932. Even if a coup should initiallysucceed,
the GermanCommunistscould not possiblylholdout on theirown againstcom-
bined internaland externalcounterrevolution-ary forces.The USSR for its part
was in no positionto cometo theiraid or to riskany international complications
thatmightresultin earlywar. SeparatedfromGermanyby hostilePoland, pre-
occupiedwithits piatiletka., strickenby famine,it would be condemnedto stand
by helplesslyand ignominiously whileGermancolmnmuniismn was beingoverthrown
and destroyed.
For differenit reasons Stalin could not look withfavoron a KPD bloc with
the SPD and otheramenableelementsto preveint the fall of the Weimar system.
Even sucha policyentailedsome smallriskof international anlti-Soviet complica-
tionswhichhladto be avoidedat all costs.And stupposing thepolicysucceededand
the Nazis were stoppeclfromtakingpower,what then?As a partnerin an anti-
Nazi coalitionof the GermainLeft,the KPD would be in no positionto make a
revolutionof its own. As Stalin had said in his interviewwith Herzog, tlle
existenceof two more or less evenlybalanced working-classparties excluded
thepossibility of a Communistrevolution.Still miiore compelling, in all likelihood,
was the considerationthatSPD politicianswere inveterateThestlers,indeedthe
chiefGermanforcefora Westernorientationi in foreignpolicy.As probablythe
domiinantpartner in the anti-Nazi coalition,their foreign-policy orientation
wotuldbe influenitial. No prospectcould have been less pleasingto Stalinl.
The onlyseriousremainingpossibilitywas thepaththatStalintook.Accept-
ing and even ilndirectly abettingthe Nazi takeoverwas a course that offered
promisealo)ngwithidangersto the USSR (but in what directionwere tlhereno
dangers?) and the certaintythat Gernman conmmunism would be severelyre-
pressedand have to go underground.Despite theirshrillideologicalantibolshe-
vism and anti-Slav racism (along with anti-Semitism, which would not grieve
Stalin), the Nazis were not Westlers.Their movlement was stridently national-

56. Quoted by Carr, The Interregn.umi,


p. 187. See also Trotsky, The Struggle Against
Fascismi in Germany, pp. 111-12. Although Stalin did not later include the letter in his
collected works, he acknowledged its authenticityin a Central Committee plenum of 1927
(see Stalin, 10:61-62).
584 Slavic Review

istic,revanchist,illiberal,antidemocratic,antipacifist,
and anti-Versailles.They
wereplainlya bellicoseforce.Th-eiraccessionto powermightthenbe a harbinger
of great tension,if not a new war, betweenGermanyand the West. We have
directtestimony In a conversationwithHeinz
thatthiswas what Stalintlhotuglht.
Neumannat the end of 1931, lhesaid: "Don't you believe,Neutmain., that if the
Nationalistsseize powerin Gerimlanythey will be so completely preocctupiedwith
theWest thatwe willbe able to buildtipsocialismin peace?"57
Stalin'sline of thoughtand action-or inaction-at thiscriticaljuncturewas
consistentwith his war-and-revolution scelnario.By accepting,if not actively
the Nazi takeover,he was guidingeventsin the directionhe had long
facilitating,
wantedthemto take-toward a war betweenopposed imperialismsin Europe.
This was not,as he knew,an earlyprospect,forit would be a matterof years,at
best,beforethe Nazis could rearmGermanyfor war. But an early outbreakof
war was not sometlhing for which Russia was preparedeitlher.What thieNazi
victoryportendedwas the end of passivityin Germanforeignpolicy.A liberal
democraticWeirnarGermanyperpetuallypoised betweenOstpolitikand West-
politik,waveringbetweentheRussian connectionand theWesternalignmient into
whichshe was regtilarly being drawnby anti-Sovietpoliticiansand capitalistsin
America,Britain,France, and Germanyherself,wotuldnevergo to war against
the West for Germaninterests.A Nazi Germanymight.There was of course
the alternatepossibilitythata Nazi Gerimany would marchagainst Russia. But
Stalin reckonedthat he could containthis threatby the devices of diplomacy.
Time and eventswould slhowtlhattp to a pointtlhecalctulationiwas a shrewdone.
As the Nazi revoltution drew near, Mloscowsignaled its readinessfor it,
indeed its cautious hopeftulnessregardingit. In july 1932 the counselorof the
Germanembassyin Moscow, Hilger, lhada talk witlhDoletskii,the lheadof the
Soviet news agencyTASS. Along witlhSoviet worries,Doletskiicommtinicated
to Hilger "hiisconvictiontlhathealthypoliticalcomimonsense would win otutin
a National Socialistgovernment;even the Nazis would be sensibleand continue
a policytowardRussia that,in hiisopinion,was consonantwitlhthe long-range
interestsof Germany.""His conviction"was unquestionably theviewthatDolets-
kii had been commissionedto conveyinformally.58
A formerGernman Communistwrites that a saying was currentin anti-
Fascist German circles at that time, "WitlhoutStalin, no Hitler," and that
Zinaovievsaid to hiimin early 1933: "Apart froml tlheGermanSocial Democrats,
Stalin bears the main responsibilityto historyfor Hlitler'svictory."59There is
no measuring degrees of responsibility in stulci comnplex mliatters. Wlhat the histo-
rian can do is to establishthe factof it and tryto explainithe reasonsforit.

57. Margarete Buber-Neumnann,Von Potsdau11i iiacli Moslueai: Stationen cities Irrweges


(Stuttgart, 1957), p. 284. The autlhoradds here: "I haven't forgottenStalin's question to
Neumann because it was the first thing Heinz shared with me when lhe arrived at the
FriedrichstrasseStation in Berlin."
58. Hilger anadMeyer, ThleInlconiipatiblc
Allies, p. 253.
59. Erich Wollenberg, The Red Army1:A Study' of thleGrowth of Soviet Imiperialism
(London, 1940), p. 278. Wollenberg was one of the editors of Rote Fahne in 1932.
The Emergenceof Stalin'sForeignPolicy 585

First Overtutres
Using terrorto solidifytheirpower,the Nazis seized upon the pretextof
the Reichstagfireto houndthe membersof the KPD into exile, into concentra-
tioncamps,or underground. Initially,theirrelationiswithMoscow were clouded
by a series of ugly incidentsin wlhiclh Nazi touglhsinvaded the premisesof
Soviet commercialand other officesin Berlin and in some instancesmolested
theiremployees.The new Germanauthoritieshastened,however,to assure the
Sovietgovernment thattheiranti-Communist internalpolicieshad nothingto do
withtheirforeignpolicy.
On March23, 1933 Hitlerdeclaredthe Reich readyto cultivatefriendly and
mutuallyprofitablerelationswiththe USSR. "It is above all the government of
theNationalRevolutionwho feeltlhemselves in a positionto adoptsuch a positive
policywithregardto Soviet Russia," lhesaid further."The fightagainst Com-
nmunism in Germanyis our internalaffairin whichwe will neverpermitinter-
ferencefromoutside.Our politicalrelationswitlhotlherPowers to whomwe are
bound by common interestswill not be affectedtlhereby."'60 In early May,
Hitler's governnment took the symbolicstep of ratifying the protocol-signed in
1931 but leftunratified by the Bruiningand von Papen governnments-on an ex-
tensionof the 1926 Treaty of Berlin. More important, he receivedKhinclhuka
few days beforethis and discussed some mattersthat bore on the "common
interests"to which he had referredin the Marclh23 speeclh.Observingthat
Germanyand Russia were linkedby "nmutual interests"of long-termcharacter,
Hitlersaid thatthesewere botheconlomlic and politicalbecausethe two countries
had the same difficulties and the samleenemlies."The Soviets,forexampnle, must
be concernedabout their eastern frontie-, wlhile Germany must be concerned
about lherwesternfrontier.Germanyfaces a lhar-d economicsittuation, but that
of the Sovietsis noteasy. In botlhinstances,as inl many othiers,oile mustremem-
ber all the timethatthe two countriescan complementone anotlherand render
nmutual services."6tStalin unlquestionably read this witlhinterest.Hitler was
transparently hintingat the possibilityof a Russo-Gernman deal to carve up
Poland.
Moscow's publicposturewas wary.Its clhief conmmentator on Germanaffairs
now was Radek. Aftergoing into Siberianexile witlhotherleading Trotskyists
in January1928, he lhad recantedIhis oppositionismin mid-1929,returnedto
MIoscow,and reenteredpoliticallife as a writeron foreigni affairsand beliind-
the-scenesforeign-policy adv7iserto Stalin. In articlesprintedin Bol'shevikand
Pravda in M\ay-June 1933, Radek construedHitler's conciliatorygesturesas a
means of gainingtime and as a concessionto Germanindustrialists concerned
to keep Sovietorders(luringtheeconomiccrisis.He also said thatAlfredRosen-
berg,whomn lhecalled "the inspirerof Germ-ian fascism'sforeignpolicy,"had paid
an tunofficial visit to London to sound out Britishdie-bardson a possible deal
againstthe USSR. Germanfascismwas combiningits reassurancesto Moscow
witlhefforts to buildan anti-Sovietcoalition.

60. Hitler's Speeches, ed. N. H. Baynes, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1942), 2:1019, quoted by
Beloff,The For-eigni.
Policy of Soviet Russia, p. 25.
61. Report of April 28, 1933 from Khinchuk, in Doknwmenty vneslnei politiki SSSR,
chiefed. A. A. Gromyko,vol. 16 (Moscow, 1970), p. 271.
586 Slavic Review

Stalin did not intendto stalndidlyby in the face of the machinatiolns Radek
was describing.H-Ieknewthatno attackcould possiblybe immiinent at thatearly
stage and he was aware of holdingstrongcards of his own in the diplomatic
gameforhiglhstakesnow beginning.Hitlerhad alreadyindicatedin his talk with
Khinchukthatone commnon interest,hencepotenitialbasis of cooperation,between
his Germanyand Stalin's Russia was their respectiverevisionistclaimiis uipon
different portionsof Poland. If Hitlerwas disposedto pursuehis revisionistaims
in the West by meansof war, Stalin was in a positionto gtuaraintee hlinmagainst
that Germanspecterinheritedfrom1914-18-a two-front war. There was also
reasonto believethatHitler'spoliciesmighlt be influencedby thoseveryReichs-
wehr;nationalist,and capitalistcircleswhiclhhad been proponentsof the Eastern
orientation all along. One of them,Generalvon Seeckt,had arguedin a recently
publishedpamphletthat it was tiselessfor Germanyto try and drive a wedge
betweenBritainand France and that slheneeded Rtissia's frienldslhip for attain-
mentof her revisionistaims. Radek approvinglyquoted the pamphletat length
in one of his articles,clearlyimplyingthatthe generalwas talkingsense.62
Finally,therewas in National Socialismll, itselfa revolutionary moverment,
a currentof admniration for revolutionaryRussia. The rightistNational Bolshe-
vism of whiclhwe have spoken had its representatives among the Nazis. These
Rechtsbolschezuisten saw Stalin as a true mlanof power (Gewaltmnensch) and an
exponentof Russian nationalismin oppositionto the internationalist coimmnuLinism
of thoselike Trotsky,whomtheydespisedas rootlesscosmopolitanJews. Even
AlfredRosenberg'sorgan WeltUkanpf spoke (in 1929) of Stalin's anti-Semnitisi
and said Rtissia could not be called a Jewishstate since Trotskyhad been de-
posed andlnon-Jewslike Stalin,Kalinin,and Rykovwere on the rise.63Not until
Hitler's "nightof the long knives,"Juine30, 1934, was the leftistanticapitalist
strainpurgedfromthe Nazi movement.Btutthatwas still in the futture.
Sedately,withno slhowof anxietyor alarm,Moscow signaledits interestin
doingbusinesswith Berlin. Having reciprocatedHitler's action in ratifyinig the
protocolon extension of the 1926 treaty,tl-ieSoviet governmentptiblishedanl
Izvestiia editorialon AMay 5, 1933 whichreaffirmed the Rapallo tradlition,
pointed
out thatpast unfriendly Germanpoliciestowardthe USSR had only weakened
Germany,proclaimedthe Soviet desire for peace and good economicrelations
withthat country,and concluidedthat the now extendedtreaty"will have the
significancegiven it by concreteactiolnsof the parties that concludedit." In
speeclhesof Decemnber1933, both Foreign CommissarLitvinov and Premier
Molotov macleit explicitthat Gernmaniy's externalpolicy,not its internalonie,
was whatconcernedtheUSSR.64
More meaningfulthan these cautiouslyrestraine(d public statementswere
messages communicated by Soviet officialsin private.Tinmeand again, Hilger
recalls,Molotov,Litvinov,and DeptityForeignComlmllissar Krestinskiiwentout

62. Karl Radek, Podgotozvkabor'bi -a novyi per-edelnzirea(Moscow, 1934), pp. 92-94.


This book is a collection of Radek's articles publishedlin 1933.
63. My account of National Bolshevism amoingthe Nazis is based on Walter Laqucur,
Russia antdGermany: A Cetnturyof Conflict (Londoon,1965), pp. 154-58; and Ascher and
Lewy, "National Bolshevism in Weimar Germaniy,"pp. 469, 474-78.
64. M. M. Litvinov, Vneshniaia politika SSSR (Moscow, 1935), p. 70.
The Emergenceof Stalin'sForeignPolicy 587

of theirway to assure Germanrepresentatives that the USSR had no wish to


reorientits foreignpolicy. Moscow cordiallyreceiveda group of high-ranking
Germanofficers who came in May 1933 forimieetings withthe Red Armygeneral
staff,altlhoughthe Germanmlilitary stationson Soviet soil were closed down im-
mediatelyon the guests' departure.65 In October 1933, however,Tukhachevskii,
the Sovietchiefof staff, toldthe Germancharged'affaires, von Twardowski,that
good will towardthe Reichswehrlhadnot diminislhed among his fellowofficers
and thatthe Germlian army'said in building up the Red Armtywould neverbe
forgotteni.War Conmmissar Voroshilov,early in 1934, recalledthe two armies'
collaborationwith nostalgiaand urged the new Germanambassador (a strong
Ostler,RudolfNadolny) to influencelhisgovernment to followa less anti-Soviet
policy."Justa few reassturing words fromHitler,hlesaid, would be enoughto
show the Kremlinthat Mlein i Kamnpf was niolongerhis basic policystatement."66
More outspoken,doubtlessbecause his lack of high officialpositionmade
hiima more convenientcouduit,was Radek. Accordingto Hilger, Radek re-
peatedlysaid in privateconversationthat notlhing wotuldblock Russia's path to
friendship withGermany.Butt-his argumentran-the tough,cautious,and sus-
picious Stalin,who lhadread Mein Ka'tipfin Russian translation, was uncertain
as to Berlin'sattitude.In August 1934,on the occasionof a visitto Moscow by
a Nazi professor,Oberlahnder, who was believed to be a proponentof Soviet-
Germanfriendslhip, and in the presenceof the Germanembassy'spress attache,
Baum, as well as Bukharin,Radek expressedadmirationforthe Nazis' organ-
izingtalent,the powerof theirmovement, and its youth'sentlhusiasm. As Baum
reportedthe conversationto hiiscolleague Hilger, both Radek and Bukharin
voiceda hiighopinionof the Germianpeople along withthe beliefthatthe Nazi
regimewould tultimlately succumbto internalcrisis,and Radek said: "There are
magnificent lads in the SA and SS. You'll see, the day will come when they'll
be throwinghand grenadesforus."67The Schlageterline was not forgotten.
Stalin chose the solemlnforumiof a partycongressto make his own pro-
nouncementat long last. Two passages of his nmainreportto the Sevenlteenth
Congress,deliveredon January26, 1934, are noteworthy. First, he said that a
new imperialist war was comingand that"it will certainlytinleashrevolutionand
place the very existenceof capitalismin questionin a numberof countriesas
happened during the firstimperialistwar." And fturtlher: "Let not M'Iessrs.
bour-geois blameus if,on the da-yafterstuclh a war,certaingovernments near and
(learto thenm now rtulinigsafely'by the grace of God,' turnup m-issing." Stalin's
beliefin a new internationalwar as the crucibleof Communistrevoltution is

65. Hilger and Meyer, The Incoinpatible Allies, pp. 256-57. Hilger says lhere that the
Russians motivated this action by saying they had a reliable report that Vice-Chancellor
von Papen had givenithe French ambassador in Berlin detailed informationon Soviet-Geirman
military relations. According to Wollenberg (TThe Red Army, p. 237), two top Soviet
generals, Tuklhachevskiiand Gamarnik, proposed right after Hitler's accession that Red
Army-Reichswehrrelations be br-okenoff but were turned down because "Stalin did not
agree with them."
66. Hilger and Meyer, The Incom-patibleAllies, pp. 270-71. Oii the Tukhachevskii
statementsee also Laqueur, Russia and Gerian,c, p. 164, where a documnientary source is
given (DoetMinents on GermianForeign Policy, series C, vol. 2, November 1, 1933, p. 81).
67. Hilger and Meyer, The Inicomipatible
Allies, pp. 267-68. This conversationtook place
at Baum's dacha outside Moscow.
588 Slavic Review

clear. The countriesin questionwere not named. But the logical candidates,as
we haveseen,werecountriesin closeproximity to theUSSR.
The other revealingpassage dealt directlywith Soviet-Germanrelations.
It was not true, Stalilnsaid, wlhatcertainGermanpoliticianswere saying,that
because of the rise of GermanfascismitlheUSSR was now orientingitselfon
France and Poland and had become a supporterof Versailles. Despite all the
Sovietlack of raptureforthe Germ-lan Fascist regimle,fascismhad nothingto do
withit,as shownby thefactthatfascismin Italy did notpreventthe USSR from
havingthe best of relationswitlhthatcountry.The difficulty (in Soviet-German
relations) arose fromthe clhangein Germanpolicy,fromthe fact that in the
contestbetweendifferent foreign-policy tendenciesgoing on in Germanya new
line reminiscent of the kaiser's anti-Russianone and representedby people like
Rosenbergwas prevailingover the old line embodied in the Soviet-German
treaties.As for the USSR's "supposed reorientation," its sole orientationhad
been and remainedon the USSR alone. "Aindif the USSR's interestsdemand
rapprochement withtheseor those countriesnot concernedto violate peace, we
embarkuponthiscoursewithouthesitation."68
Subtlyyetunambiguously, Stalin was tellingHitler thatwheneverhis gov-
ernmentshouldbe disposedto leave Russia in peace and revivethe "old line" of
Russo-Gernman collaboration,Russia would be ready,in her own interests,to
reciprocate.Hitler had referredto commoninterestsbetweenthe two states.
Stalinwas signalinghis awarenessofthem.
In the letterof July1934 to his Politburocolleagues,recommending against
republication of Engels's essay of 1890 in Bol'shevik'sspecial issue on the twen-
tiethanniversaryof the startof the First World War, Stalin conveyed,just as
subtly,thenatureof hiisdesign.On behalfof revolutionEngels was readyto take
sideswithGermanyagainsttsaristRussia in the impendingEuropeanwar. When
war brokeout in 1914, Lenin refusedto supporteitherside and took the stance
of revolutionary defeatism,seekingto turn the war betweenrival imperialisms
into a series of revolutionary civil wars in the belligerentcountries,Russia in-
cluded.In makingspecificreferenceto that,Stalin was suggestingthat Moscow
shouldmaneuveritselfintoa positionof revolutionary (in the sense thatit would
open a way for armed revolutionat a propitioustime) noninvolvement in the
second imperialistwar now impending.Here again he was takinga leaf from
Lenin'sbook,butverymuchin his ownway.

In the presentstate of knowledgewe cannotsay when the specificsof the


deal concludedwithHitlerin 1939 becameclearin Stalin'smind.But it is evident
fromthe foregoingthat even prior to the Nazi conquestof power, his politics
werepointedin thatdirection.
August 1939 representedthe fruitionof Stalin's whole complexconception
ofthemeansof Sovietsurvivalin a hostileworldand emergenceintoa command-
ing internationalposition.It embracedthe presumptionof the inevitability of a
greatnew war: the idea that,throughdivisivediplomacyin the Lenin tradition,
Russia could both help to precipitatethe conflictand preserveneutralityduring

68. Stalin,13:294,297,302-3.
The Emergenceof Stalin'sForeignPolicy 589

its earlierstages,allowingthe combatantsto exlhaustthemselveswhile she grew


strongerand stronger;and the notionthatat some point Russia would be able
to takeoverterritories to wlhichshe had historicalclaimand contiguouscountries
wlhoseensuingSoviet-guidedrevolutionswould advance the world-revolutionary
cause whilecreatingthe "socialistencirclement" thatwould give Russia's revolu-
tion the still missingguaranteedsecurity.The ultimateoutcomewas Stalin's
versionof the "thirdtreaty"that Lenin lhad foretold,the one that would be
nleithera Brestnor a Versaillesbut "advantageousto us." All the ingredientsof
the conceptionwere, as we have seen, presentin his tlinkingbeforeeventsin
Germanygave himan opportunity to act uponit.
Betweenthe idea and the executionfell manyobstacles.For a long while
Hitlerprovedunreceptive to Moscow's overturesand showedominousanimosity.
Stalin's tacticsshiftedaccordingly,but his aimndid not. The tortuouspath by
whichhe proceededto his goal can be tracedthroughthe historyof Soviet diplo-
macyin theremainderofthe 1930s.

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