T

The aff has to withdraw forces throughout one or more of the topic countries –
they don’t because they only withdraw forces from Okinawa. Our caselist
includes COIN, non-combat forces from Iraq, PMCs from Iraq, Afghanistan, or
both, ground troops from South Korea, and any other withdrawal from the topic
countries that occurs throughout the countries. There’s a topical version of the
aff – all they have to do is withdraw from throughout Japan – solves their offense

Group the counter-interp – it’s worse for the negative because they justify any
tiny case like withdrawal from one base or certain weapons systems – there’s
literature for all of these cases but there’s no way to prepare for all of them – only
we solve limits because we ensure a predictable debate for both the affirmative
and the negative.

They say education – this is irrelevant if it’s not predictable education – that’s key
– they kill it through a limits explosion, that’s above – and our interpretation
solves because they can still withdraw the so-called “key” troops

They say fairness – but neg preparedness outweighs aff preparedness – we need
core generics like PICs and deterrence – aff innovation and infinite prep probably
mitigate abuse to some degree but the existence of affs like Futenma, aircraft
carriers affs, or any given aff on Gulliver’s wiki proves that affs can find literature
for everything

They say common sense – this is stupid – there’s no single way to read a
resolution ever, the fact that topicality exists proves this

They say lit checks but that was answered above

They say generics check – they kill generics because their interpretation justifies
affs that can spike out of things like deterrence through only removing one base

They say reasonability – but competing interpretations is best:

1. Not a race to the bottom – the Aff can just argue that our standards are bad, or
that overlimiting is bad. It’s not about the smallest limits, it’s about the best
limits.

2. Education – competing interpretations is key to accessing in depth grammatical

debate over the meaning of the resolution in context based on standards debates.

3. Most objective – only our paradigm can actually determine the winner of the
topicality debate with complete neutrality by evaluating it based on offense and
defense instead of whether the judge thinks the affirmative interpretation is
accurate.

Reasonability sucks –

1. Arbitrary – what is reasonable can vary between judges which guarantees

inaccurate decision making and judge intervention – competing interpretations
leaves the debate with the debaters.
2. Discourages good debate – under their paradigm, the affirmative can get away
with half-assing answers to neg arguments under the basic assumption that as
long as they are close, you should err aff.

3. Topicality is an all-or-nothing issue for the affirmative – in order to proceed

with debating the substantive issues of the plan, the affirmative must meet their
burden by first proving their plan is a 100% affirmation of the topic – any risk that
they aren’t topical means you should vote negative on jurisdiction.

And, potential abuse is a voting issue –

1. Abuse doesn’t have to be flagrant – if there is even a single argument that we
have lost then there is abuse in the round which by their argument is enough to
vote neg – we lose links to things like deterrence, that’s above

2. Their argument justifies 2NC T violations. If proving abuse is the prerequisite to

voting on topicality then we are justified to either waiting until the 2NC or
reading a second or morphed T violation in the block in response to abusive 2AC
arguments.

3. Abuse is a bad standard on which to evaluate T – it encourages non-specific

case arguments in order to win on T.

4. This argument is irrelevant – as long as we win competing interpretations, this

argument doesn’t apply because it’s no longer a question of what actually
happens or can happen in round but which interpretation can provide the most
fair and predictable literature base.
 Solvency
At the top I’ll point out some critical concessions by the 2AC – don’t allow for new
1AR responses because I predicate block strategy off the 2AC.

They concede our Dworkin evidence – they are just as discriminatory as they
accuse us to be – they claim that the Okinawans have an inherent right to life that
is greater than that of anyone else – if it’s true that every life is valuable we
shouldn’t prioritize any one group over another

They concede Isaac – this is a turn to their ethics claims – arguing that the
affirmative should be implemented regardless of the consequences that come
with doing so is functionally the same as saying it is okay for the consequences to
happen – they are complicit with evil

He says Green is irrelevant – not answering the card is pretty critical – he

concedes that deontological claims lead to consequentialist analysis because we
are always weighing comparative rights – he thinks that the consequences of
keeping presence in Okinawa outweighs the consequences of removing them –
this isn’t “util good”, it’s “util inevitable”
-also his case outweighs analysis at the end of this paragraph links to the Isaac
evidence as explained above

This also answers their Donaldson evidence – deontology is preceded by util, not
the other way around

They concede our Cummisky evidence – this answers their next two pieces of
evidence – if it’s true that we should evaluate every life equally then our first
obligation should be to save as many lives as we can

They say we ignore systemic violence – this is not true – we are just weighing
consequences – if they win that systemic violence outweighs then they win under
our framework

They say genocide – but we access genocide better – the only warrant as to why
genocide is bad is because it kills a lot of people. Their evidence that says we
should act regardless of consequences doesn’t assume that those consequences
result in more people being killed.
-also cross-apply the Isaac analysis – immorality can still be necessary to prevent
more unethical options

They say embracing ethics key – but literally NOWHERE do they read any sort of
spillover evidence that says their morals will be embraced all over the world – no
reason other countries won’t fight

And here’s evidence to the contrary – Even if we changed the way we approached
international relations, other actors would still be realist
Guzzini 98 assistant prof. of polisci and IR at the Central European University (Stefano,
"Conclusion: the fragmentation of realism," Realism in International Relations and
International Political Economy: The Continuing Story of a Death Foretold, Published by
Routledge, ISBN 0415144027, p. 235)
 realist
Third, this last chapter has argued that although the evolution of realism has been mainly a disappointment as a general causal theory, we have to deal with it. On the one hand,

assumptions and insights are used and merged in nearly all frameworks of analysis offered in International Relations or
International Political Economy. One of the book's purposes was to show realism as a varied and variably rich theory, so heterogeneous that it would be better to refer to it only in

to dispose of realism because some of its versions have been proven empirically wrong,
plural terms. On the other hand,

does not necessarily touch its role in the shared understandings of observers and practitioners
ahistorical, or logically incoherent,

of international affairs. Realist theories have a persisting power for constructing our
understanding of the present. Their assumptions, both as theoretical constructs, and as particular lessons of the past translated from one generation of decision-
makers to another, help mobilizing certain understandings and dispositions to action. They also provide them with legitimacy. Despite realism's several deaths as a general causal theory, it can

It exists in the minds, and is hence reflected in the actions, of many practitioners.
still powerfully enframe action.

Whether or not the world realism depicts is out there, realism is. Realism is not a causal theory that explains International
Relations, but, as long as realism continues to be a powerful mind-set, we need to understand realism to make sense of International Relations. In other words, realism is a still necessary
hermeneutical bridge to the understanding of world politics. Getting rid of realism without having a deep understanding of it, not only risks unwarranted dismissal of some valuable theoretical
insights that I have tried to gather in this book; it would also be futile. Indeed, it might be the best way to tacitly and uncritically reproduce it.

And, wars will always occur as long as states exist

Mearsheimer 1 (Mearsheimer, John J., award-winning Political Scientist at the University of
Chicago, “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics” pg. 32-33)

State Behavior Great powers fear each other . They regard each other with suspicion, and they worry that war might be in the offing.
They anticipate danger. There is little room for trust among states. For sure, the level of fear varies across time and space, but it cannot be reduced to a
From the perspective of anyone great power, all other great powers are potential
trivial level.
enemies. This point is illustrated by the reaction of the United Kingdom and France to German
reunification at the end of the Cold War. Despite the fact that these three states had been
close allies for almost forty-five years, both the United Kingdom and France immediately began worrying about the potential dangers of a united
Germany. The basis of this fear is that in a world where great powers have the capability to attack each
other and might have the motive to do so, any state bent on survival must be at least
suspicious of other states and reluctant to trust them. Add to this the "911" problem-the absence of a central
authority to which a threatened state can turn for help-and states have even greater
incentive to fear each other. Moreover, there is no mechanism, other than the possible self-interest of third parties, for punishing an
aggressor. Because it is sometimes difficult to deter potential aggressors, states have ample reason not to trust other states and to be prepared for war
with them. The possible consequences of falling victim to aggression further amplify the importance of fear as a motivating force in world politics. Great
powers do not compete with each other as if international politics were merely an economic marketplace. Political competition among states is a much
more dangerous business than mere economic intercourse; the former can lead to war, and war often means mass killing on the battlefield as well as
mass murder of civilians. In extreme cases, war can even lead to the destruction of states. The horrible consequences of war sometimes cause states to
view each other not just as competitors, but as potentially deadly enemies. Political antagonism, in short, tends to be intense, because the stakes are
great. States in the international system also aim to guarantee their own sur- vival. Because other states are potential threats, and because there is no
higher authority to come to their rescue when they dial 911, states cannot depend on others for their own security. Each state tends to see itself as
vulnerable and alone, and therefore it aims to provide for its own survival. In international politics, God helps those who help themselves. This emphasis
on self-help does not preclude states from forming alliances.11 But alliances are only temporary marriages of convenience: today's alliance partner might
be tomorrow's enemy, and today's enemy might be tomorrow's alliance partner. For example, the United States fought with China and the Soviet Union
against Germany and Japan in World War II, but soon thereafter flip-flopped enemies and partners and allied with West Germany and Japan against China
States operating in a self-help world almost always act according to their
and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
own self-interest and do not subordinate their interests to the interests of other states, or to the interests of the
so-called international community. The reason is simple: it pays to be selfish in a self-help world. This is true in the short term as
well as in the long term, because if a state loses in the short run, it might not be around for the long haul.

613
 Counterplan
Counterplan solves all of case and is competitive – 1NC Schenwar indicates that Congress is
the only person with the power to wage war – however, a failure to utilize the power of the
purse in the context of the military guarantees executive expansionism – Schlesinger
indicates that a militaristic executive guarantees endless interventionists genocides and
wars, turning case – also it goes against the foundation of the Constitution. The terminal
impact is global nuclear war – continued US adventurism risks breaking the taboo on nuclear
weapons and escalation to global nuclear war – that’s Hirsch

And checks on executive power are key to prevent nuclear war

Ray Forrester, professor at Hastings College of the Law, August 89, “ESSAY: Presidential
Wars in the Nuclear Age: An Unresolved Problem.”, The George Washington Law Review,
lexis, umn-rks

concentration of power in any one person, or one group, is

A basic theory--if not the basic theory of our Constitution--is that
dangerous to mankind. The Constitution, therefore, contains a strong system of checks and balances, starting with the separation of
powers between the President, Congress, and the Supreme Court. The message is that no one of them is safe with unchecked
power. Yet, in what is probably the most dangerous governmental power ever possessed, we find the potential for world
destruction lodged in the discretion of one person. As a result of public indignation aroused by the Vietnam disaster, in
which tens of thousands lost their lives in military actions initiated by a succession of Presidents, Congress in 1973 adopted, despite presidential veto, the
War Powers Resolution. Congress finally asserted its checking and balancing duties in relation to the making of presidential wars. Congress declared in
section 2(a) that its purpose was to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both
the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement
in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations. The law also stated in
section 3 that [t]he President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated. . . . Other limitations not essential to this discussion are also provided. The
intent of the law is clear. Congress undertook to check the President, at least by prior consultation, in any executive action that might lead to hostilities
and war. [*1638] President Nixon, who initially vetoed the resolution, claimed that it was an unconstitutional restriction on his powers as Executive and
Commander in Chief of the military. His successors have taken a similar view. Even so, some of them have at times complied with the law by prior
consultation with representatives of Congress, but obedience to the law has been uncertain and a subject of continuing controversy between Congress
and the President. Ordinarily, the issue of the constitutionality of a law would be decided by the Supreme Court. But, despite a series of cases in which
such a decision has been sought , the Supreme Court has refused to settle the controversy . The usual ground for such a
refusal is that a "political question" is involved. The rule is well established that the federal judiciary will decide only "justiciable" controversies. "Political questions" are not "justiciable."
However, the standards established by the Supreme Court in 1962 in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, to determine the distinction between "justiciable controversies" and "political
questions" are far from clear. One writer observed that the term "political question" [a]pplies to all those matters of which the court, at a given time, will be of the opinion that it is
impolitic or inexpedient to take jurisdiction. Sometimes this idea of inexpediency will result from the fear of the vastness of the consequences that a decision on the merits might entail.
Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HARV. L. REV. 338, 344 (1924)(footnote omitted). It is difficult to defend the Court's refusal to assume the responsibility of decisionmaking on this
most critical issue. The Court has been fearless in deciding other issues of "vast consequences" in many historic disputes, some involving executive war power. It is to be hoped that the
Justices will finally do their duty here. But in the meantime the spectre of single-minded power persists, fraught with all of the frailties of human nature that each human possesses,
including the President. World history is filled with tragic examples. Even if the Court assumed its responsibility to tell us whether the Constitution gives Congress the necessary power to
check the President, the War Powers Resolution itself is unclear. Does the Resolution require the President to consult with Congress before launching a nuclear attack? It has been
asserted that "introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities" refers only to military personnel and does not include the launching of nuclear missiles alone. In support of this
interpretation, it has been argued that Congress was concerned about the human losses in Vietnam and in other presidential wars, rather than about the weaponry. Congress, of course,
can amend the Resolution to state explicitly that "the introduction of Armed Forces" includes missiles as well as personnel. However, the President could continue to act without prior
consultation by renewing the claim first made by President [*1639] Nixon that the Resolution is an unconstitutional invasion of the executive power. Therefore, the real solution, in the
absence of a Supreme Court decision, would appear to be a constitutional amendment. All must obey a clear rule in the Constitution. The adoption of an amendment is very difficult.
Wisely, Article V requires that an amendment may be proposed only by the vote of two-thirds of both houses of Congress or by the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the
states, and the proposal must be ratified by the legislatures or conventions of three-fourths of the states. Despite the difficulty, the Constitution has been amended twenty-six times.
Amendment can be done when a problem is so important that it arouses the attention and concern of a preponderant majority of the American people. But the people must be made
aware of the problem. It is hardly necessary to belabor the relative importance of the control of nuclear warfare. A constitutional amendment may be, indeed, the appropriate method.
But the most difficult issue remains. What should the amendment provide? How can the problem be solved specifically? The Constitution in section 8 of Article I stipulates that "[t]he
Congress shall have power . . . To declare War. . . ." The idea seems to be that only these many representatives of the people, reflecting the public will, should possess the power to
commit the lives and the fortunes of the nation to warfare. This approach makes much more sense in a democratic republic than entrusting the decision to one person, even though he
may be designated the "Commander in Chief" of the military forces. His power is to command the war after the people, through their representatives, have made the basic choice to
submit themselves and their children to war. There is a recurring relevation of a paranoia of power throughout human history that has impelled one leader after another to draw their
people into wars which, in hindsight, were foolish, unnecessary, and, in some instances, downright insane. Whatever may be the psychological influences that drive the single
decisionmaker to these irrational commitments of the lives and fortunes of others, the fact remains that the behavior is a predictable one in any government that does not provide an
effective check and balance against uncontrolled power in the hands of one human. We, naturally, like to think that our leaders are above such irrational behavior. Eventually, however,
human nature, with all its weakness, asserts itself whatever the setting. At least that is the evidence that experience and history give us, even in our own relatively benign society,

the "nuclear
where the Executive is subject to the rule of law. [*1640] Vietnam and other more recent engagements show that it can happen and has happened here. But

football"--the ominous "black bag" --remains in the sole possession of the President. And, most important, his
decision to launch a nuclear missile would be, in fact if not in law, a declaration of nuclear war, one
which the nation and, indeed, humanity in general, probably would be unable to survive.

Independently, constitution is a d-rule

Daryl Levinson, Professor of law at University of Virginia, 2000 [University of Chicago Law Review, Spring,
Lexis]

Extending a majority rule analysis of optimal deterrence to constitutional torts requires some explanation, for we do
not usually think of violations of constitutional rights in terms of cost-benefit analysis and efficiency. Quite the
opposite, constitutional rights are most commonly conceived as deontological side-constraints
that trump even utility-maximizing government action. 69 Alternatively, constitutional rights
might be understood as serving rule-utilitarian purposes. If the disutility to victims of constitutional
violations often exceeds the social benefits derived from the rights-violating activity, or if rights violations create
long-term costs that outweigh short-term social benefits, then constitutional rights can be justified as tending to
maximize global utility, even though this requires local utility-decreasing steps. Both the deontological and
rule-utilitarian descriptions imply that the optimal level of constitutional violations is zero;
that is, society would be better off, by whatever measure, if constitutional rights were never
violated.

They say Congress doesn’t pass it –

a) This doesn’t matter – we fiat the passage of the counterplan
b) The evidence is in the context of Gate’s defense cuts, not Congress exercising
its power of the purse

They say Obama vetos –

a) doesn’t matter – 1NC Rosen indicates that Congress alone has the power to
end a war means that Obama’s veto doesn’t matter
b) This just says that in the past Obama hasn’t wanted to remove the bases –
recent Futenma negotiations probably disprove

They say all three branches check – but 1NC Rosen and Schenwar indicate that
only unilateral action by Congress can solve because it demonstrates that
Congress will not stand for executive expansionism – incorporating the executive
still subordinates Congress – more evidence
Louis Fisher, Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers for the Library of Congress, Spring 97, “ARTICLE: Presidential
Independence and the Power of the Purse”, U.C. Davis Journal of International Law & Policy, lexis, umn-rks

The shift of the war power from Congress to the President belies a core belief by the framers
that each branch would protect its own prerogatives. They believed that a powerful dynamic of institutional self-defense would
safeguard the system of separation of powers. n191 Instead, Congress repeatedly surrenders its powers to the President.
Congress contributes to presidential independence by conferring substantial spending
discretion by statute and by declining to challenge the growing customary spending
discretion that Presidents assume. n192 While custom changes power and relationships, at least in the area of the war power, it does not change
the Constitution. If Congress slept for decades and allowed President to singlehandedly commit the
nation to war, and one day Congress awoke from its slumbers to pass legislation telling the
President that he may not use funds for a pending military action, that is the end of it. The congressional
action, no matter how late in the day, would prevail. If we want to reestablish some of the fundamental
principles established by the framers, several steps are necessary. For reasons that have both constitutional and practical dimensions, U.S.
foreign policy must be conducted only with funds appropriated by Congress. Allowing the President to carry
out foreign policy with private or foreign contributions would create a political system the framers feared most: the union of purse and sword. The framers
deliberately separated those powers to protect individual liberties. Fusing the powers in
today's world creates dangers far greater than in 1787. At the Iran-Contra hearings, Secretary of State George Shultz repudiated the idea of
using nonappropriated funds for foreign policy: "You cannot spend funds that the Congress doesn't either authorize
you to obtain or appropriate. That is what the Constitution says, and we have to stick with it." n193 The President may not spend funds "in the name of
the United States [*139] except as appropriated by Congress." n194 Members of Congress continue to use the power of the purse to direct the President in
foreign affairs and war, but increasingly they exhibit a lack of institutional self-confidence. They do not
function like a coequal branch. A greater number of legislators believe that the Constitution, whatever its original purpose, now gives the lion's share
(if not the exclusive share) of foreign policy and the war power to the President. The result is statutory language and legislative histories that are conspicuously vague and
contradictory. It is not unusual to see legislative principles expressed in non-binding form, merely announcing the "sense" of Congress on a matter of national urgency. Non-
if
binding resolutions are not totally without effect. They at least can be cited as evidence that Congress has not completely acquiesced to presidential actions. n195 But
members of Congress want to participate in questions of war and peace on a coequal basis and with maximum
effectiveness, they must do so through explicit statutory commands , not sense-of-Congress resolutions. The framers did not
create Congress -- the first branch of government -- to debate and release general, non-binding declarations. Nor is it consistent with the Constitution for executive officials to
merely "consult" legislators before they act. The purpose of Congress is to authorize national policy, especially in military affairs. Some legislators in recent years have claimed
that Congress can limit funds for past actions but never for future actions. There is no constitutional support for that theory. The decision to use military
force against other nations is reserved to Congress, and through that prerogative and the power of the
purse, members may confine a President's actions prospectively as well as retrospectively.

They say Baudrillard – but Baudrillard is just talking about deterrence breaking
down – make him prove a causal internal link between rejecting interventionist
wars and deterrence breaking down

They say Rescher –

The risk they assign to our disad is flawed – Catastrophic impacts are likely, but
are assessed as less likely because they are disjunctive probabilities – Prefer this
evidence because it indicts the methods their authors use to decide whether our
impacts are low-probability

Yudkowsky 8 (Eliezer, Full-time Research Fellow at the Singularity Institute for Artificial
Intelligence and Cofounder, January 22, 2008, “Circular Altruism”)

Overly detailed reassurances can also create false perceptions of safety: "X is not an existential
risk and you don't need to worry about it, because A, B, C, D, and E"; where the failure of any one
of propositions A, B, C, D, or E potentially extinguishes the human species. "We don't need to worry
about nanotechnologic war, because a UN commission will initially develop the technology and prevent its proliferation
until such time as an active shield is developed, capable of defending against all accidental and malicious outbreaks that contemporary nanotechnology is capable of producing, and this condition
will persist indefinitely." Vivid, specific scenarios can inflate our probability estimates of security, as well as misdirecting defensive investments into needlessly
people tend to overestimate conjunctive probabilities and
narrow or implausibly detailed risk scenarios. More generally,
underestimate disjunctive probabilities. (Tversky and Kahneman 1974.) That is, people tend to overestimate the probability that, e.g., seven events of
90% probability will all occur. Conversely, people tend to underestimate the probability that at least one of seven events of 10% probability will occur. Someone judging whether to, e.g.,
incorporate a new startup, must evaluate the probability that many individual events will all go right (there will be sufficient funding, competent employees, customers will want the product)
while also considering the likelihood that at least one critical failure will occur (the bank refuses a loan, the biggest project fails, the lead scientist dies). This may help explain why only
44% of entrepreneurial ventures3 survive after 4 years. (Knaup 2005.) Dawes (1988) observes: 'In their summations lawyers avoid arguing from disjunctions ("either this or that or
the other could have occurred, all of which would lead to the same conclusion") in favor of conjunctions. Rationally, of course, disjunctions are much more probable than are conjunctions.' The
scenario of humanity going extinct in the next century is a disjunctive event. It could happen as a result of any of the existential risks discussed in this
book - or some other cause which none of us fore saw. Yet for a futurist, disjunctions make for an awkward and unpoetic-sounding prophecy.

The impact to extinction is infinite potential lives – Even a miniscule risk

outweighs everything else

Bostrum 3 (Nick, Professor of philosophy at Oxford, Winner of the Eugene R. Gannon Award
for the Continued Pursuit of Human Advancement, “Astronomical Waste: The Opportunity
Cost of Delayed Technological Development”
http://www.nickbostrom.com/astronomical/waste.html)
The effect on total value, then, seems greater for actions that accelerate technological development than for practically any other possible action.
colonization of the
Advancing technology (or its enabling factors, such as economic productivity) even by such a tiny amount that it leads to
local supercluster just one second earlier than would otherwise have happened amounts to bringing about
more than 10^31 human lives (or 10^14 human lives if we use the most conservative lower bound) that would not otherwise have
existed. Few other philanthropic causes could hope to mach that level of utilitarian payoff. Utilitarians are not the only ones who should strongly oppose
astronomical waste. There are many views about what has value that would concur with the assessment that the current rate of wastage constitutes an
enormous loss of potential value. For example, we can take a thicker conception of human welfare than commonly supposed by utilitarians (whether of a
hedonistic, experientialist, or desire-satisfactionist bent), such as a conception that locates value also in human flourishing, meaningful relationships,
noble character, individual expression, aesthetic appreciation, and so forth. So long as the evaluation function is aggregative (does not count one person’s
welfare for less just because there are many other persons in existence who also enjoy happy lives) and is not relativized to a particular point in time (no
time-discounting), the conclusion will hold. These conditions can be relaxed further. Even if the welfare function is not perfectly aggregative (perhaps
because one component of the good is diversity, the marginal rate of production of which might decline with increasing population size), it can still yield a
similar bottom line provided only that at least some significant component of the good is sufficiently aggregative. Similarly, some degree of time-
discounting future goods could be accommodated without changing the conclusion.[7] III. THE CHIEF GOAL FOR UTILITARIANS SHOULD BE TO REDUCE
it may seem as if a utilitarian ought to focus her efforts on
EXISTENTIAL RISK In light of the above discussion,
accelerating technological development. The payoff from even a very slight success in this endeavor is so enormous that it
dwarfs that of almost any other activity. We appear to have a utilitarian argument for the greatest possible urgency of technological development.
However, the true lesson is a different one. If what we are concerned with is (something like)
maximizing the expected number of worthwhile lives that we will create, then in addition to the opportunity cost of
delayed colonization, we have to take into account the risk of failure to colonize at all. We might fall
victim to an existential risk, one where an adverse outcome would either annihilate Earth-originating intelligent life or permanently and
drastically curtail its potential.[8] Because the lifespan of galaxies is measured in billions of years,
whereas the time-scale of any delays that we could realistically affect would rather be measured in years or
decades, the consideration of risk trumps the consideration of opportunity cost. For example, a
single percentage point of reduction of existential risks would be worth (from a utilitarian expected utility
point-of-view) a delay of over 10 million years. Therefore, if our actions have even the slightest effect on the probability of eventual
colonization, this will outweigh their effect on when colonization takes place. For standard utilitarians, priority number one, two, three and
four should consequently be to reduce existential risk. The utilitarian imperative “Maximize expected aggregate utility!” can be
simplified to the maxim “Minimize existential risk!”.

Writing off low-probability impacts makes disasters inevitable – Evaluate

magnitude times probability

Posner 5 (Richard, The Probability of Catastrophe. Richard A. Posner. Wall Street Journal. (Eastern
edition). New York, N.Y.: Jan 4, 2005. pg. A.12. Proquest)

The fact that a catastrophe is very unlikely to occur is not a rational justification for ignoring
the risk of its occurrence. Suppose that a tsunami as destructive as the one in the Indian Ocean occurs on
average once a century and kills 150,000 people. That is an average of 1,500 deaths per year. Without having to
attempt a sophisticated estimate of the value of life to the people exposed to the risk, one can say with some confidence that if an annual
death toll of 1,500 could be substantially reduced at moderate cost, the investment would be worthwhile. A combination of educating the
residents of low-lying coastal areas about the warning signs of a tsunami (tremors and a sudden recession in the ocean), establishing a warning system
involving emergency broadcasts, telephoned warnings, and air-raid-type sirens, and improving emergency response systems, would have saved many of
the people killed by the Indian Ocean tsunami, probably at a total cost below any reasonable estimate of the average losses that can be expected from
tsunamis. Relocating people away from coasts would be even more efficacious, but except in the most vulnerable areas or in areas in which residential or
commercial uses have only marginal value, the costs would probably exceed the benefits. For annual costs of protection must be matched with annual,
not total, expected costs of tsunamis. Why weren't any cost-justified precautionary measures taken in anticipation of a tsunami on the scale that
occurred? Tsunamis are a common consequence of earthquakes, which themselves are common; and tsunamis can have other causes besides
earthquakes -- a major asteroid strike in an ocean would create a tsunami that would dwarf the Indian Ocean one. There are a number of reasons for such
neglect. First, although a once-in-a-century event is as likely to occur at the beginning of the century as at any other time, it is much less likely to occur in
the first decade of the century than later. Politicians with limited terms of office and thus foreshortened political horizons are likely to discount low-risk
disaster possibilities, since the risk of damage to their careers from failing to take precautionary measures is truncated. Second, to the extent that
effective precautions require governmental action, the fact that government is a centralized system of control makes it difficult for officials to respond to
the full spectrum of possible risks against which cost-justified measures might be taken. The officials, given the variety of matters to which they must
attend, are likely to have a high threshold of attention below which risks are simply ignored. Third, where risks are regional or global rather than local,
many national governments, especially in the poorer and smaller countries, may drag their heels in the hope of taking a free ride on the larger and richer
countries. Knowing this, the latter countries may be reluctant to take precautionary measures and by doing so reward and thus encourage free riding.
Fourth, countries are poor often because of weak, inefficient, or corrupt government, characteristics that may disable poor nations from taking cost-
people have difficulty thinking in terms of probabilities, especially very low
justified precautions. Fifth,
probabilities, which they tend therefore to write off. This weakens political support for incurring
the costs of taking precautionary measures against low-probability disasters. The operation of some of these
factors is illustrated by the refusal of the Pacific nations, which do have a tsunami warning system, to extend their system to the Indian Ocean prior to the
recent catastrophe. Tsunamis are more common in the Pacific, and most of the Pacific nations do not abut on the Indian Ocean. An even more dramatic
example concerns the asteroid menace, which is analytically similar to the menace of tsunamis. NASA, with an annual budget of more than $10 billion,
spends only $4 million a year on mapping dangerously close large asteroids, and at that rate may not complete the task for another decade, even though
such mapping is the key to an asteroid defense because it may give us years of warning. Deflecting an asteroid from its orbit when it is still millions of
miles from the earth is a feasible undertaking. In both cases, slight risks of terrible disasters are largely ignored essentially for political reasons. In part
because tsunamis are one of the risks of an asteroid collision, the Indian Ocean disaster has stimulated new interest in asteroid defense. This is welcome.
The
The fact that a disaster of a particular type has not occurred recently or even within human memory (or even ever) is a bad reason to ignore it.
risk may be slight, but if the consequences, should it materialize, are great enough, the expected cost
of disaster may be sufficient to warrant defensive measures.

Any probability times an infinite magnitude justifies consideration

Wiener 5 (Jonathan, Professor of Law, Environmental Policy and Public Policy at Duke
University, University Fellow of Resources for the Future, “Book Review: Catastrophe: Risk
and Response; Collase: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed”, Journal of Public Analysis
and Management, Autumn, Vol. 24, Issue 4, pp. 885-9)
Moreover, there are at least two major questions about the remedies for risks of catastrophe and collapse. The first is how to prioritize among the wide
array of potential end-of-the-world scenarios. The number and diversity of such doomsday forecasts in the literature is bracing, as evidenced by Posner’s
own extensive survey, Martin Rees’s Our Final Hour (2003), John Leslie’s The End of the World (1996), and Corey Powell’s article “20 Ways the World
Could End” in Discover magazine (October 2000), as well as prior retrospective studies cited by Diamond such as Joseph Tainter’s The Collapse of
The lower the probability of catastrophe that one is willing to consider, the
Complex Societies (1988).
greater the number of conceivable catastrophes. Indeed, as the probability asymptotically approaches
zero, the number of imaginable scenarios approaches infinity. And if the end of all life on Earth
is valued at infinity, rather than at $600 trillion, then the expected value of the catastrophic risk is an
infinitesimal probability multiplied by an infinite impact. These conundrums make priority-setting nearly impossible.
Attempting to sort out which are “real” or “plausible” risks (remember the Y2K computer disaster?) can recapitulate the error that Posner seeks to avoid,
of neglecting low-probability risks. At the same time, Posner worries that crying wolf—false positives—lull the public into inattention. Diamond argues that
we must tolerate some false alarms in order to have warning systems sensitive enough to
issue true alarms; zero false alarms would imply the failure to issue some true alarms. His calculus of optimal alarm accuracy is very similar to
Posner’s BCA. Ex ante, the real question is not whether the risk is “real” or “true,” but whether the
expected value of the low (but non-zero) probability multiplied by the catastrophic impact
(with a premium for risk aversion) justifies some cost of prevention.

519
 Kritik
The affirmative insists on drilling the images of pain associated with our soldiers
in Okinawa into our heads, ensuring that we will remember it for as long as we
live and forever be scared by it. However, this insistence on remembering and
guilt turns the case – as long as we focus on pain and paying off our infinite debt
to those who have suffered we can never actually solve oppression – we are
paralyzed by our guilt, unable to take any meaningful action. Saurette indicates
that our insistence on creating an ideal world where this pain does not exist
makes us hate the world we live in and refuse to change it for the better – this
leads to a world where death becomes desirable. The alternative is to forget
about the suffering associated with the bases in Okinawa. Our Zupancic evidence
says that this refusal to acknowledge suffering is a way to resist the paralyzing
function of suffering; to allow everybody to decide their own will to power. Use
the ballot to move past the harms that they discuss and find new ways to act –
this solves the case because it opens up ways to actually act politically.

Kritik outweighs and turns case:

a) Paralysis and endless suffering – Zupančič indicates that as long as we keep
images of suffering in our minds we cannot ever do anything about it – only by
forgetting can we find ways to actually solve oppression rather than letting it
continue
b) Value to life – As we hold the past in our memories we never can let go and
actually find happiness – this leads to worthless lives without value – death
becomes desirable in this framework because we can never obtain our perfect
world – that’s Nietzsche

They say perm –

1. Doesn’t solve – they still try to maintain a focus on memory – any net benefit
to the perm is a new link because they still maintain images of pain as a
justification – that’s Zupancic – we need to free ourselves from these images of
pain

2. Impossible – the alt is entirely to reject their representations – means either

the perm is useless or they sever out of their reps – severance is a voter for
fairness and education – it destroys counterplan and kritik ground by making all
of our arguments non competitive, as perm do the counterplan would always
solve – these arguments are key to neg ground, sometimes the status quo isn’t
defensible, the Aff would just read 8 minutes of racism bad and always win

3. Perm doesn’t necessarily allow for their impacts – Zupancic indicates that a
willingness to divorce pain from suffering is key to create new political action that
moves away from the paralysis they cause, allowing us to solve their impacts –
means there’s no risk of a net benefit

4. A true affirmation of being involves affirming the world as is in every way

shape and form means the perm does not capture solvency.
White, 90 – Mark Hopkins Professor of Philosophy at Williams College – 1990(Alan, “Within Nietzsche’s
Labyrinth”, http://www.williams.edu/philosophy/faculty/awhite/WNL%20web/WNL%20contents.htm)

Zarathustra affirms being. Immediately before describing his restoration to divinity of "Lord Chance," he
announces:
I have become one who blesses and one who affirms: this is why I wrestled long and was a
wrestler, so that once my hand would be freed for blessing. And this is my blessing: to stand over every thing
whatsoever as its own sky or heaven, as its rounded roof, its azure bell and eternal security: and blessed is he who
thus blesses! For all things are baptized in the well of eternity and beyond good and evil. (III:4; 209.3-10)
Nietzsche, too, affirms being. His "experimental philosophy" presses on to "the
reverse" of "a will to the No," on to "a Dionysian affirmation of the world as it is,
without subtraction, exception, or selection" (16[32] / WP:1041). His amor fati requires
"that one want nothing otherwise, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity.
Not merely to bear what is necessary, still less to conceal it [...] but rather to love
it" (EHII:10).
Nietzsche's affirmation is, certainly, an acceptance. But an agreement? A
categorical agreement? No, Zarathustra would insist, three times no!
Zarathustra may "say yes as the open sky says yes," but he also says "no as the
storm says no"; he says no, we have seen, to despotism, to dogmatism, and to
mediocrity. And he knows that there is much shit in the world.
-61

They say perm challenges biopolitics –

a) Irrelevant – the impact to the K isn’t biopolitics, it’s a violent hatred of the
world we live in
b) New link – they’re still trying to alleviate the suffering of the Okinawan people
– this merely recreates the world we live in as unclean and imperfect, making us
hate it and wish for a new one

They say we require compassion –

a) this is literally the link to our K – we are criticizing their attempt to move
towards a love for the Other because it simply reinforces the debt that we
supposedly owe – we will always feel guilty and indebted to the Okinawans
b) this turns the aff – if showing compassion for the Other reinforces power
relations then they link hardest of all by showing compassion for the Okinawans

They say we can’t eliminate the state –

a) irrelevant – our kritik is not about the workings of violent state power or
getting rid of them – we are talking about an individual choice to try to avoid
ressentiment
b) Question of alternative solvency miss the point – the ballot is a way to reclaim
your life from the joylessness of the affirmatives framework
White, 90 – Mark Hopkins Professor of Philosophy at Williams College – 1990(Alan, “Within Nietzsche’s
Labyrinth”, http://www.williams.edu/philosophy/faculty/awhite/WNL%20web/WNL%20contents.htm)

The most provocative teachings I find in Nietzsche are not political, but rather ethical;
Nietzsche does not attempt to tell us how to save the world, but rather how to save
ourselves – how to save ourselves from living lives that we will come to view with regret
rather than with pride. And he teaches that we can do that without becoming
supermen who blithely crush their supposed inferiors beneath their feet.

They say perm alt then plan –

1. First cross-apply all the answers to the perm from above
2. Nonsensical – the alternative is to forget about the specific instance of the
plan – you can’t forget about something that hasn’t happened, then do it
3. Time frame Perms are illegitimate and a voting issue for fairness and
competitive equity.
A. Ground – they can always claim to do something before or after the plan
making it impossible to garner any form of competition. This destroys any form of
reciprocity and education.
B. Intrinsic – adds sequence to the plan to the 1ac which justifies unpredictable
offense mooting the 1NC
C. Severance – they sever out of the immediacy of their aff destroying our ability
to garner offense to their framework making it conditional impacted above.
D. The damage has been done – perms take seconds to read and we have to
answer every one of them or we lose.

They say case is a disad –

1. They misunderstand the alternative – we are not “forgetting about the

Okinawans,” we are actively separating the pain they associate with our military
presence from suffering – we reject the notion of suffering as a bad thing – our
Zupancic evidence indicates that this is the only way to actually solve the impacts
they’re talking about

2. Cross-apply White from above – the role of the ballot should be choosing
between competing ontologies, not political solutions – if we win that the
ontological stance of the 1AC creates a hatred of the world we live in you vote
negative to reject it – the political effects of the alternative don’t matter

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