1

The British National Party and the New Issue Agenda: Issue preference and policy
evaluation in Far Right support. Gareth Harris: Birkbeck College (g.harris @pol-
soc.bbk.ac.uk)

The Far Right in Britain has long been typified as ‘a case of conspicuous failure’
(Kitschelt, 1994) within the literature on the rise of the extreme right in continental
Europe. The rise in legitimacy of the British National Party (BNP), its
disproportionate media profile and the party’s slow but incremental electoral gains
have rendered this characterisation redundant. The party’s current total of 54
councillors has remained broadly consistent since their breakthrough year in 2006
with the election of 43 councillors. Although these gains within the local electoral
arena need to be put into context, there are over 20,000 elected councillors, the party’s
success has begun to translate across higher levels of electoral competition.

In the Greater London Authority (GLA) elections of 2008, their mayoral candidate,
Richard Barnbrook, won a sufficient share of the London –wide member vote (5.45%)
to pass the 5% threshold and be appointed to the London Assembly1. Until recently,
the narrative of the Far Right in Britain has predominantly has been entwined with
London2 and their win in the capital, with the ensuing legitimacy and media attention
signposted the possibility of further gains in the European elections.

The unprecedented run of electoral success for a Far Right party in Britain culminated
last year in the election of the party’s chairman, Nick Griffin, and Andrew Brons to
the European Parliament respectively for the North East, and Yorkshire and Humber
constituencies. Opponents of the BNP took solace in the fact that the BNP won their
seats with a smaller share of the vote than in 2004 and performed poorly across the
South- East, London, South-West and Scotland constituencies. This underplayed the
small increase of 1.3% in the BNP overall vote share from 2004, to a 2009 total of
6.2% (943,598 votes) and the stronger showing of the party across the East and West
Midlands (respectively 8.7% and 8.6%), the North East (8.9%) and considerable
variation within constituencies; in 52 Local Authorities the BNP polled over 10%3.

The rise in electoral support for the BNP has been matched by a growth in academic
interest. The quantitative study of BNP support has been severely limited by
methodological constraints; principally the lack of survey data containing sufficient
sample sizes of BNP voters or identifiers to allow robust analysis. Until recently this
has pushed research into the BNP in two directions; in-depth qualitative analysis of

1
Across the three contests in 2008, 329,033 Londoners expressed a preference for the Far Right, an
increase of 110,018 votes from 2004. The 2nd Mayoral preference and London member votes saw
substantial growth for the BNP, 58,091 votes (6.42%) and 40,622 (5.42%) respectively.
2
The party retains a strong presence in outer East London; Barking & Dagenham (19.4%) was the top
performing local authority in the European elections followed by Havering with the sixth best result
(14.8%).
3
Despite the poor overall showing in London, the party retains a strong presence in outer East London;
Barking & Dagenham (19.4%) was the top performing local authority in the European elections
followed by Havering with the sixth best result (14.8%).

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party supporters (Rhodes, J: 2009) and activists (Goodwin, M: 2010), or the ecology
of the party vote employing aggregate data (Bowyer, B. 2008, Borisyulk, G et al:
2007, John, P et al: 2005). Ford and Goodwin’s innovative recent publication, Angry
White Men (2010) is the first to employ a representative dataset of individual Far
Right voters in Britain since Harrop’s (1980) analysis of National Front support in the
late seventies. Their use of a dataset from MORI allowed an examination of a range of
attitudinal traits and political orientations of BNP voters, the authors conclude that the
BNP has been able to build a ‘clearly defined support base’ of middle-aged, working
class, Northern, white men who are ‘profoundly dissatisfied, most negative about the
government’s performance and most dissatisfied with the major party’s leaders and
the economy.’ The use of an aggregated dataset from the Continuous Monitoring
survey (CMS) administered by the British Election Studies4 offers a similar
opportunity. Questions used by the CMS allow an examination of past voting
behaviour, and a wider range of policy evaluations of BNP supporters.

The research finds that BNP supporters are overwhelmingly male, working class with
lower levels of education. No positive relationship was found with age but
respondents aged 55 and above were significantly less likely to be BNP supporters.
Support for the party is spread between unskilled and skilled workers but significant
relationships were found with the later, and with mid rather than lower income
groups. It is suggested that the BNP’s social base is predominately composed of the
better off and more skilled sectors of the working class. BNP supporters share with
those of the UK Independence party, the most hostile attitudes towards the
Westminster parties and some socio-economic similarities. However, they are
distinguished from UKIP supporters by their negative assessment of David Cameron
and the perceived inability of the Conservatives to deliver in policy areas that matter
to them, principally the restriction of immigration. They are distinctive in their
dissatisfaction with the democratic process and display low levels of interpersonal
trust. BNP supporters can be characterised as having a unique focus on internal
security issues concerning asylum seekers, terrorism and crime beyond all other
issues. There is evidence to suggest that the preoccupation with immigration
displayed by BNP supporters is also distinctive in its emphasis on the adverse effects
of the cultural rather than economic impact of immigration.

Section 1 discusses how BNP support and the issue of opposition to immigration can
be located within the spatial, valence and expressive models of voting behaviour.
Section 2 introduces the models and the rationale guiding the selection of variables.
Section 3 examines the socio-economic profile (3.1), past voting affiliation (3.2) and
attitudes to immigration of BNP supporters (3.3). Section 4 reports the findings of the
binominal and multinomial regression models. Section 5 discusses the implications of
the analysis for interpretations of BNP support.

Section 1. Voting behaviour

As the BNP’s vote has grown, so has the need to place the Far Right vote within the
voting behaviour literature. Ford et al (2010) have taken up the challenge and
highlight the implications of three models of voting behaviour, identity (Butler &
Stokes. 1974), spatial (Downs, A. 1957) and valence models (Stokes, D. 1963 Clarke

4
The CMS survey data is accessible at http://bes.utdallas.edu/2009/cms-data.php

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et al. 2004, 2009) to the interpretation of BNP support. This section briefly outlines
how BNP support can be placed within this literature and finishes by relating BNP
support to the emergence of a new issue agenda as highlighted by Clarke et al (2009).

Within the identity model, voting behaviour is located in an individual’s socio-

economic context and social identity. In Britain this has taken its archetypal form in
the class-based voting that arguably dominated British politics up until the late
seventies (Clarke et al: 2004). The increasing fluidity and breakdown of rigid social
identities, the dissolution of organised labour that accompanied post-industrialisation,
has led to a process of class de-alignment that hastened the demise of class- based
voting. However, the connection of the BNP to the referent of the white working class
both within public and political discourse, suggests the continued relevance of a class-
based analysis of voting behaviour when applied to the Far Right. As much as the
embourgoisement thesis pre-occupied academics concerned with class in the seventies
(Goldthorpe,J et al.1971) , a thesis of the immiseration and residualisation of the
white working class has concerned academics seeking to explain Far Right support
(Ford et al. 2010, Goodwin, M. 2008, Husbands, C.1983). The literature has reached a
consensus over the attraction of the BNP to the white working class (Bowyer, B.
2008), yet uncertainty remains on whether this support is segmented (John, P. 2005)
or spread more broadly (Ford et al, 2010.). Previous research has also highlighted the
influence of low levels of education, age, gender and concentration of support within
Northern England.

BNP supporters are predominantly working class, middle-aged, Northern, male, with
low levels of educational achievement.

The classic model of spatial voting proposed by Downs (1957) implies a unilinear
dimension of political competition with clear oppositional positions, as represented on
the tax-spend scale. The individual voter places themselves in proximate ideological
space to the party that they perceive to maximise their utility. A necessary corollary is
that competition to capture the median voter leads to convergence towards the centre
of political competition. As Ford et al (2010) point out, convergence towards the
median voter displayed by both New Labour and the Conservatives allows the
potential for parties such as the BNP and UKIP to win supporters at the margins of
political competition. Consequently BNP support would be expected to be composed
of those who felt abandoned by New Labour’s attempt to woo the voters of middle
England (John et al. 2004, foreword) or equally working class Tories alienated by the
‘caring conservatism’ embraced by David Cameron.

BNP support is a consequence of Labour’s abandonment and alienation of its core

electorate.

Down’s conception of political space has been modified to account for the Far Right
vote by conceptualising political space as multi-dimensional (Iversflaten, E. 2005).
Agents make their decision to vote responsively to a party’s perceived position on a
variety of dimensions of political competition. Heath et al (1993) use of the
libertarian/ authoritarian axis of political competition has been employed to model
explanations of Far Right voting by co-opting the issue of anti-immigrant sentiment.
Opposition to immigration and by extension, BNP support represents a position issue
over which the BNP exert clear ownership in the absence of any unequivocal

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difference between the policy agendas of the Westminster parties. The issue of
immigration occupies a peculiar position within political space, analogous to the issue
of capital punishment. As is well documented (Saggar, D. 2003) within the British
electorate there is widespread agreement on the need to consider the possible negative
impact if not outright hostility to immigration. It is arguably the disjuncture between
the preferences of voters and the consensus of politicians that the BNP is able to
exploit.

BNP support is predominantly concerned with the issue of immigration beyond any
other issue.

Both the inability of the majority of voters to define their orientation and the position
of parties to clear policy preferences has led to the challenging of the Downs’ model
through the valence theory of voting (Clarke et al. 2004, Stokes, D. 1963). Valence
models question the assumption that there are clearly defined ideological positions on
issues but point to the acceptance of common goals in policy areas, economic growth
and the provision of public services for example. Politics and the decision to vote
becomes less a matter of ideological competition than managerial, an assessment of a
party’s competence to deliver a desired policy outcome.

Valence models would appear to have a problem in explaining the BNP vote as the
perception of a party’s ability to effectively deliver the desired policy outcome is
determined by heuristic devices such as past performance or qualities of the party
leader, neither of which are yardsticks by which the BNP are judged positively.
However, within the framework of valence voting, Clarke et al (2009) highlight the
emergence of a new cluster of policy issues as a critical factor in explaining the
outcome of the 2005 general election. The events of 9/11, the Iraq war and the
London terrorist bombing in 2005 provided the external shocks to hoist a new issue
agenda focused on internal and external security onto the electorate. Evaluations of a
party’s ability to deliver on policy preferences internally surrounding the nexus of
asylum seekers, crime and terrorism and externally on the Iraq war became influential
factors in explaining individual voting decisions. Crucially the new issue agenda was
seen to challenge the issue salience of the traditional concerns with the economy and
public services.

The centrality of this nexus of policy issues to BNP supporters is apparent given the
latter’s overwhelming preoccupation with immigration and traditional authoritarian
law and order concerns. However since 2005, the external shocks held to be
responsible for the change in the salience of issue prioritisation have now been
eclipsed by the financial crisis which has brought economic worries and the spectre of
severe cuts in public expenditure back to the fore-front of voters concerns.
Consequently the new issue agenda could be considered to be paramount with BNP
supporters whilst its salience was diminished for the supporters of other parties.

BNP supporters would be distinguished from the voters of other parties by a concern
with the evaluation of policies concerning internal security over the economy and
public services.

Finally, the interpretation of BNP support can be broadened beyond the literature
concerned with voting behaviour, to the decision not to vote and systemic

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disenchantment with the political process. This interpretation spans both valence and
position models of voting behaviour. On one hand, the decision to vote for an outsider
party such as the BNP might represent the lack of an ideological alternative between
the parties as stated with the issue of immigration. On the other, a vote for the BNP
might represent a lack of belief or credibility in the political will to effect change on
the issues that matter to their supporters. Subsequently a final model is developed to
capture levels of dissatisfaction with both the political process and quality of life.

BNP supporters are distinguished by low levels of interpersonal trust, dissatisfied

both in life and with the democratic process, less likely to participate in formal and
informal modes of political participation, pay less attention to politics and feel less
able to influence the political process.

Section 2. Methodology and models

1. Dependent variable

The research utilises a dataset from the monthly Continuous Monitoring Surveys run
by the BES. 17 months of CMS surveys are aggregated, dating from June 2008 until
November 2009. The merged dataset gives a weighted sample size of 434 respondents
who answered BNP to the question, which party did the respondent intend to vote for
in the next general election out of a sample size of 19,1865. First, the specified models
are regressed against BNP vote intention. These initial results are then compared to
those of other parties in a multinomial model to establish a distinctive profile of BNP
supporters; particular attention is paid to a comparison with the BNP’s closest
ideological competitor, the UK Independence party.

2. Model specification

Model 1. Socio-economic context

BNP Vote= α + Low level of education + Type of employment +Age Band + Region
+ Low income + Mid-income + Social Housing Tenant + Gender + e

Where low level of education is a dummy, coded 0-1 indicating whether an individual
had left school at 16; Type of employment approximates a measure for social class,
using higher managerial as a reference; Age band is a measure for a age using 20-25
as the reference. Region is a predictor for the region the respondent lives in, using E.
Anglia as the reference. Low income, Mid-income are dichotomous, coded 0-1,
respectively capturing whether an individual earned less than 20,000 per annum or
between 20,000 and 40,000; Social Housing tenant is a dummy coded 0-1, capturing
whether the respondent resided in social housing/ housing association.

5
Following convention (Bowyer, B. 2009, Whitely, P. 1979), the sample size was clipped to only
include ethnic groups, white British, white other, other ethnic group. This resulted in a loss of two
cases who identified as black African and Indian.

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Model 2. Policy clusters

BNP Vote = α + Economic evaluation + Service evaluation + Security evaluation +

Everyday security satisfaction + Everyday service satisfaction + e

Where economic evaluation, service evaluation, security satisfaction are factor scores
derived from 16 measures of cognitive and affective policy evaluations; service and
economic scores run negatively whilst satisfaction with internal security runs
positively6; Everyday security and service satisfaction are index scores composed of
the additive measures of a respondents levels of satisfaction with direct experience of
two clusters of policy, services and security7.

Model 3. Immigration and issue importance model

BNP Vote = α + Security Issue importance + Service Issue importance + Opposition

to EU + Migration issue importance + Government performance/asylum seekers +
Conservative performance/asylum seekers + Asylum seekers/reduction +
Contact/asylum seekers + Read anti-immigrant paper + e

Where Security and Service importance are factor scores derived from 5 questions in
which respondents were asked to rate the importance of an issue on a scale of 0-108;
Opposition to the EU is a dummy, coded from 0-1 composed of two questions
capturing opposition to joining the Euro and European Union membership;
Government and Conservative performance asylum seekers is a predictor with a 0-5
scale running from very well to very badly in answer to the question, how well do you
think the government/conservatives handle asylum seekers? Asylum
seekers/reduction is a dummy, coded 0-1, where 1 = reduction, in answer to the
question whether respondents favour a reduction in the number of asylum seekers;
Contact with asylum seekers is a dummy, coded 0-1, where 1=yes, in answer to the
question whether respondent had contact with asylum seekers. Anti-immigrant paper
is a dummy coded 0-1, where 1= yes, in answer to the question whether respondents
read an anti-immigrant paper, an anti-immigrant paper is considered to be the Sun,
Daily Mail and the Daily express.

Model 4. Party partisanship and past affiliation

BNP Vote = α + Labour vote 2005 + Conservative vote 2005 + Feelings towards
Labour party + Feelings towards Brown + Feelings towards Conservatives +
Feelings towards Cameron + e

Where Labour/Conservative vote 2005 is a dummy, coded 0-1, in answer to the

question had the respondent voted for either party in the 2005 general election.

6
The 16 predictors load on 3 factors with an eigen scores of above 1, collectively they explain 54.69%
of the total variance, full tables available on request.
7
Reliability tests were applied to both scales yielding a Cronbach’s α of .684.
8
Two factors were extracted using varimix rotation with eigen values of above 1, the two factors
collectively explained 73.95% of the total variance.

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Feelings towards Labour/Conservatives are a predictor where respondents are asked

to rate their feelings towards either party on a scale of 0-10, ranging from strongly
dislike to strongly like. Feelings towards Gordon Brown/ David Cameron are
dummies, coded 0-1, where 1 is the sum of negative feelings towards either party
leader.

Model 5. Political and social dissatisfaction

BNP Vote = α + Life satisfaction + Democracy satisfaction + Interpersonal trust +

Political efficacy +Attention to Politics + Likelihood of formal political action +
Likelihood of informal political action + e

Where life/democracy satisfaction is a response to the questions how satisfied were

respondents in either respect, with scale of 0-4, ranging from very satisfied to very
dissatisfied; Interpersonal trust is a predictor scaled 0-10 where respondents are asked
how much can people be trusted, ranging from cannot to can be trusted. Attention to
politics and political efficacy are predictors scaled 0-10, where respondents are asked
respectively whether they paid attention to politics and could influence politics,
ranging from no influence to a great deal, and no attention to a great deal; Likelihood
of informal and formal political action are factor scores9.

Section 3. Demography, past affiliation and attitudes to immigration

In the following section the socio-economic composition, past voting affiliation and
attitudes towards immigration of BNP supporters are examined with reference to both
the base population and UKIP supporters.

1. Socio-economic composition

Table 1. Insert here.

First with reference to the overall sample population, BNP supporters are most clearly
imbalanced by gender, 66.4% of BNP supporters were male compared to 49.2% in the
general population. BNP supporters tend to be older and are over represented in the
44-55 and less so in the 55-64 age band; however, they are under represented in the
over 65 group. The geographical distribution is as expected with over-representation
in the Yorkshire and Humber, North West and East Midlands. This supports the
assertion that the BNP vote is predominantly Northern with the caveat that the East
and to a lesser extent, the West Midlands are potential strongholds of support.
Occupational structure runs as expected, with heavier representation in the skilled and
unskilled manual classes, 35% against 17.1% in the base population, and more
generally with those in paid employment. BNP supporters are characterised by higher
rates of social housing residency, almost double the sample average. This appears to
support the assertion that inter-group conflict over social housing allocation is a
possible driver in BNP support10.

9
Two factors are extracted form five questions (q38-42) with eigen values of above 1, with an
explained variance of 69.64%.
10
Conflict over housing has been cited as a significant driver of BNP support in areas such as Barking

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BNP supporters had the largest proportion of respondents with low levels of
educational achievement, 65.8%, who had left school by 16 compared to an average
of 38.6% across all other parties. Levels of newspaper readership were marginally
above average, and although Far Right supporters showed a high level of respondents
who read an anti-immigrant paper, this was not the highest. Internet use amongst BNP
supporters was polarised with both the highest proportion of respondents who used
the internet very little and those who used it a great deal. This reflects the importance
of the internet as a tool for the BNP to circumvent a largely hostile mainstream media.

The categories in which the BNP are over-represented mark a distinct profile from
that of the Westminster parties. The party whose demographic profile most overlaps is
the UK Independence party. UKIP supporters tend to be over –represented in many of
the same categories as the BNP, but to a lesser degree, suggesting that both parties are
appealing to a similar demographic particularly with regards to occupational structure
and level of education. However the main distinction in the profile of the supporters
of the two parties, appears to be in age and regional strength, UKIP supporters are
disproportionately represented in the over 65 and retiree groups, both against the BNP
and supporters of other parties. Notably they also share the highest percentage
frequency of supporters who read an anti-immigrant paper. The following section
discusses whether the demographic similarities between the two parties extend to their
past political affiliation.

2. Past voting and party affiliation.

Table 2. Insert here.

The vote in the 2005 general election of BNP/UKIP supporters is explored to

establish if there is a relationship towards past political affiliation with the
Westminster parties, as illustrated in table 2. Overall 82.2% (336) BNP and 88.4%
(549) vote intenders voted in the 2005 general election. For the former, 32% voted for
Labour in the 2005 general election over 15.4% for the Conservatives. For
respondents intending to vote for UKIP, there is a more even balance, 24.8% voted
for Labour and 22.2% for the Conservatives in 2005. The BNP vote appears to be
more likely to be drawn from ex- Labour voters. However it must be noted that
support both for UKIP and the BNP primarily draws from Labour with an excess of
16.6% for the BNP against 2.6% for UKIP of ex-Labour over ex-Conservative voters.

To examine this question in more detail, two sub-groups are defined within the
supporters of both parties. Using the variable for party identification, it is possible to
decompose supporters of both parties into two sub-groups; core supporters who
identify with the party and intend to vote for them, and protest voters; those who
identify with other parties but intend to vote for either UKIP or the BNP. For the
BNP, 51.4% both identified with the party and intended to vote for it, whilst 48.6% of
BNP voter intenders identified with other parties. For UKIP, 55.6 % both identified
with the party and intended to vote for it, whilst 45.4% intended to vote for the party
but identified with other parties. Table 3 examines the breakdown of these two sub-
groups past voting behaviour.

and Dagenham (John et al, 2006).

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Table 3. Insert here.

The majority of BNP core supporters came from the ranks of those who voted for
Labour in 2005 with an excess of 18.2% over Conservative voters. For UKIP core
supporters, this pattern is reversed but less polarised with an excess of 6.4% of
Conservative over Labour supporters. Core support for both parties is roughly
equivalent in the proportion of Liberal Democrat voters. For BNP protest voters there
is a significant increase in the proportion of Labour voters of 11.5% and a smaller
increase in the number of Conservative voters. However for UKIP protest voters there
is a smaller increase in the number of Conservative voters and a much larger increase
in the number of Labour voters, twice as many. It is suggested that the core support
for the BNP is predominantly composed of ex-Labour voters, whilst the core of UKIP
support is drawn predominantly from the Conservatives. However both parties appear
to attract a majority of protest voters from Labour.

3. Immigration

Survey evidence has highlighted the salience of immigration as an issue to the general
public and this was supported by the CMS data despite the context of the current
financial crisis. 10.2% of the general population considered immigration to be the
most important issue facing the UK, second only to the general economy at 38.5%. Of
those who thought immigration was the most important issue, 23% (443) thought that
the best party to deal with that issue was the BNP, only marginally second to the
Conservatives at 24%. Only the Conservatives and the BNP appear to exert clear
ownership of this issue. Unsurprisingly parties of the right were also the most hostile
to asylum seekers; 99.5% of BNP voters, 97.9% of UKIP and 92.8% of Conservative
voters wished to see a reduction in the number of asylum seekers11. A concern with
immigration as an issue and negative feelings towards asylum seekers are clearly not
exclusive to BNP voters but spread evenly across the parties of the right.

To examine the possible sources of this concern with immigration, a subset of

questions are examined which tapped into feelings towards immigrants. These
questions unfortunately captured too small a sample size of BNP voters (102) to run
in logistic regression analysis. However, inspection of the responses of BNP
supporters does highlight some important differences to those of supporters of other
parties. Table 4 represents the sum of negative perceptions of immigrants minus the
positive by intention to vote for either of the parties of the right and the base
population.

Table 4. Insert here.

Within the base population, it is the assertion that immigrants strengthen the economy
that attracts the most negative responses, second to the response to whether

11
Voters of all parties including those of the left had a majority of voters who expressed a preference
for a reduction in the number of asylum seekers. The Green party had the lowest percentage at 59.7%.
Non and undecided voters all expressed strong preferences for a reduction in the number of asylum
seekers, 88.3 and 82.0% respectively.

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immigrants enrich the culture of a country, followed by the effect on taxes and
increase in security concerns12. Surprisingly, given the connection with immigration
and crime within the media, the response to whether immigrants commit crime is
relatively small. The only responses that attract a favourable balance are to the
assertion that migrants do jobs that others do not wish to do, and are unfairly
victimised.

As expected this balance is negatively skewed for the BNP supporters. The highest
number of negative associations is in response to the question, whether immigrants
enrich culture (88.4), increase terrorism (87.5) and strengthen the economy (87.4) and
following a drop, the threat to the English language (79.4). This sensitivity to cultural
concerns is exclusive to BNP voters; UKIP and Conservative vote intenders both
share the concern with terrorism, pre-eminent for UKIP and the economy, ranked
highest for the Conservatives but the concern over culture and the threat to the
English language is significantly lower. Although concern with immigration is high
within the general population this is a reflection of economic imperatives; for BNP
supporters the source of this concern is the cultural threat posed by immigration.

Section 4. Analysis

Table 5 represents the results of the regression models using both BNP vote intention
as a dichotomous dependent variable against other party choice (binomial model) and
intention to vote for Labour, the Conservatives, Liberals or UKIP using BNP vote
intention as a referent (multinomial model).

Table 5. Insert here.

Within the demographic model, the two dominant socio-economic effects in

explanations of BNP support, gender and low levels of educational achievement
displayed the expected effects. BNP supporters were more likely to be male and have
left school at 16 or before, and this was robust across all alternative party choices. For
social class, the only significant positive relationship (using higher managerial as a
referent) was with respondents who identified as skilled manual workers who were
70% more likely to support the BNP. This was influential in the decision to vote for
the BNP over the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives but not against Labour or
UKIP. There are two notable surprises; the failure of the mid-range age group, 30-55,
and the unskilled workers to achieve statistical significance.

The assertion that the BNP vote might be segmented within the broad category of the
working class is supported by the positive direction of the coefficient for mid-income,
ranging from 20,000-40,000 and the lack of significant relationships for social
housing tenants and never worked. However those resident in social housing were
more likely to support the BNP over the Conservatives. Surprisingly, belonging to the
lower income group was found to be insignificant and the relationship with the middle
income group was also influential when it came to supporting the BNP over Labour or
the Conservatives, a pattern which is repeated for the unemployed. Finally the

12
This association of concern over immigration and its economic impact is reinforced by MORI
surveys http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/publications/publication.aspx?oItemId=1349

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negative relationship with both the older age groups found in the binominal model
were reinforced, respondents in the 55-64 and 65 plus groups were predicted to be
more likely to vote for the Liberal democrats and UKIP. Regionally, respondents in
the North West were less likely to support the Conservatives, as were those in the East
Midlands and Yorkshire and Humber of supporting UKIP rather than the BNP. This
pattern was reversed for respondents in the South East who were predicted to be
36.8% more likely to vote for UKIP.

Negative evaluations of the economy, public services and internal security,

satisfaction of everyday services and security all achieved significance when they
were initially entered into the model. However the only predictor that maintained a
relationship after the addition of predictors relating to immigration was the negative
evaluation of internal security. This disproportionate concern with internal security
issues appears to distinguish BNP supporters from those of other parties, negative
evaluations of security related policies set them apart from Labour and the Liberal
Democrats, whilst a higher priority attached to security issues distinguish them from
Conservative or UKIP supporters. Although a negative evaluation of public service
policy does seem to affect the intention to vote BNP against Labour or the Liberal
Democrats, BNP voters do not seem to attach greater importance to issues concerning
the provision of public services than voters of other parties. This brings into doubt the
assertion that competition with minority ethnic populations for public services is the
primary causal driver of BNP support.

Respondents who rated immigration as the most important issue and wished to reduce
the number of asylum seekers were more likely to support the BNP over alternative
party choices. Similarly, opposition to the EU increased the likelihood of supporting
UKIP, but also reduced the odds of supporting Labour or the Liberals. Both parties
appear to exert clear ownership of the issues with which they are predominantly
identified; with opposition to the EU favouring UKIP, and opposition to, and the
prioritisation of immigration favouring the BNP. A respondent’s negative assessment
of how well the Conservatives would handle the issue of asylum seekers made BNP
support more likely than all other party choices, as did a negative perception of
Labour’s ability (excepting UKIP). This supports the assumption that UKIP
supporters may be distinguished from BNP voters by a belief in the potential of the
Conservatives to deal effectively with the issue of asylum seekers and immigration
related issues.

That BNP support seems to be most strongly influenced by the feelings on the issue of
immigration is not surprising but two points should be noted. First, opposition to
immigration trumps that of opposition to Europe13. Secondly, that this hostility does
not necessarily stem from direct experience of asylum seekers as suggested by the
negative coefficient for the dummy, contact with asylum seekers, a respondent who
had contact with asylum seekers was less likely to support the BNP14. Thirdly, that
not only does this hostility stem from a perception of the government’s ability to deal
competently with the issue of immigration, but also the lack of credibility in the

13
This conflicts with the official view of the party as being predominantly concerned with opposition
to European integration and its consequences of which unconstrained immigration is one.
14
This variable was not included in the multinomial model.

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Conservatives to do so either. Finally, the failure of readership of an anti-immigrant

paper to achieve significance must be highlighted, in fact readership of the Daily
Mail, the Sun or Express raises the odds of supporting UKIP over the BNP.

Regarding partisanship, a vote for the Conservatives/Labour in the 2005 general

election were both negative predictors of BNP support, respondents who voted for the
Conservatives in 2005 were less likely to vote for the BNP than those who had voted
for Labour. In the initial model increased sympathy towards the Conservatives/
Labour was only negatively related to the former, however in the multinomial model,
respondents who had more positive feelings towards the Conservatives were more
likely to choose the BNP over Labour; this could be a result of an appeal to the
working class Tory vote. However a dislike of David Cameron made respondents
much more likely to support the BNP over UKIP, the Conservatives and the Liberals,
the inverse was true for those who had a more positive view of the Conservative party
performance. Failure of the evaluation of Labour’s performance to achieve
significance and the negative relationship with Conservative support in the initial
model suggests that BNP support is not simply informed by a negative assessment of
Labour and the government but also a lack of a credible alternative in the
Conservatives, and that this might specifically be a product of Cameron’s leadership.
The dislike of Cameron for the BNP and a positive view of the Conservatives for
UKIP distinguish their supporters.

Finally regarding the predictors capturing political disenchantment and

dissatisfaction, BNP supporters do appear to be more dissatisfied with the democratic
process. The coefficients for this predictor reduced the odds of supporting an
alternative party choice except for UKIP. Perhaps as a consequence, the likelihood of
participating in informal forms of politics also reduced the odds of voting
Conservative/Labour. However this is not an easy caricature of political
disenchantment, increased attention to politics, as in the binominal model, exerts a
positive influence on BNP support reducing the odds of supporting all three
Westminster parties. BNP supporters are distinguished by dissatisfaction with the
democratic process but this does not necessarily extend to life satisfaction or political
efficacy, both of which fail to achieve significance. Additionally none of these
predictors make a significant difference when compared to the odds of supporting
UKIP, only higher levels of social capital as marked by interpersonal trust positively
influence the odds of supporting UKIP.

Section 5. Conclusion

The socio-demographic profile of BNP voters supports the existing literature; BNP
supporters are likely to be male, poorly educated, working class and Northern.
However, this statement needs to be qualified. There is some evidence to suggest that
the generalisation of the BNP vote as working class needs to be refined, the decision
to vote BNP is strongly related to skilled manual workers and those who fall within
the mid- income brackets. The BNP does not seem to be appearing to the more
marginalised sectors of society in terms of income or social housing, although
unemployment does positively influence the decision to vote for the BNP over
Labour/Conservatives.

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UKIP and the BNP appear to be pitching at the same demographic with the latter
appealing to an older and more South Eastern section of the electorate. Both parties
are attracting disaffected Labour voters, though this is a stronger effect for the BNP in
the form of protest voters. However, a past affiliation for Labour seems to distinguish
BNP core supporters to those of UKIP. This is reinforced by the heightened hostility
to the Conservative party and notably its leader David Cameron.

The nexus of security concerns around asylum seekers, crime and terrorism also
appear to be distinctive for BNP supporters compared to those of other parties,
eclipsing economic worries. Unsurprisingly, BNP supporters consistently express the
most worry over asylum and immigration related issues, once all other predictors are
held at their mean. The concern over immigration is widely held within the general
population but BNP supporters are distinctive in their heightened hostility and
negative perception of immigrants. Surprisingly given the current focus on inter-
ethnic competition as the motor of Far Right support, BNP supporters do not appear
to prioritise issues around the provision of public services more than other party
supporters.

However a further factor in the decision to vote BNP appears not only to be a negative
perception of the governments’ handling of this issue but an equally damning
assessment of the Conservative’s potential performance. For BNP voters, immigration
is a valence issue, on which none of the major parties can be seen as credible. Not
only does this set them apart from the supporters of all parties, but may also feed into
a more general sense of political dissatisfaction. However the caricature of BNP
supporters as the most politically disenchanted simply does not hold true, BNP
supporters display high levels of dissatisfaction with the democratic process, but are
more likely to participate in informal forms of political participation and pay more
attention to politics. Not only do certain segments of society perceive immigration as
a threat to perhaps their way of life or status, but a critical factor in Far Right support,
as Harrop suggests in his analysis of the National Front is, ‘the sense that the political
structure is incapable of responding to the perceived threat’.

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Table 1: Demographic profile of BNP supporters compared to those of other

parties.

Base BNP UKIP

Male 49.2 66.4 60.0

Female 50.8 33.6 40.0
Age Band
20-25 5.9 5.3 2.1
26-35 14.6 9.2 4.8
36-44 15.0 17.1 10.4
45-54 17.3 24.6 17.2
55-64 29.7 31.2 38.3
65+ 16.8 12.1 27.1
Region
E.Midlands 7.3 11.4 6.1
London 10 7.0 6.3
North 4.7 4.8 2.9
North West 11.8 15.2 13.0
S. East 17.4 14.3 19.9
S. West 10.3 7.5 16.1
W.Midlands 8.0 9.9 10.4
Yorkshire 9.0 15.0 8.3
Type of work
Prof, high tech 23.9 11.6 14.6
Manager 18.6 15.5 18.1
Skilled 7.6 18.6 13.2
Semi-skilled 9.5 16.2 12.2
Retired 25.1 21.0 37.7
Income
10-20,000 17.5 18.6 22.9
20-24 999 9.7 11.4 8.5
25-29 999 8.7 9.7 11.4
30-39 999 12.8 13.3 10.4
40,000 + 24.1 15.4 13.6
Tenure
Ownership 77.0 66.9 75.4
Social Housing 10.3 20.0 14.1
Age completed education
16 37.6 65.8 56.5
21 or over 32.9 13.8 14.0
Media use
Newspaper/every day 37.0 37.9 36.4
Newspaper/not at all 25.7 26.6 19.9
Anti-immigrant paper 48.8 63.6 74.9
Internet Usage Not much 4.9 8.0 6.9
A Great deal 58.0 60.9 53.8

N= 19816

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Table 2. BNP/UKIP vote intention by 2005 vote.

Conservative Labour Liberal Minor Non/Don’t N/a Total

Party Know

BNP 15.4 32.0 5.1 28.1 1.5 17.8 100

UKIP 22.2 24.8 6.4 34.0 1.0 11.6 100

a) All figures significant at 0.001 level.

N= 19186

Source CMS. June 2008-November 2009. British election studies.

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Table 3. 2005 percentage vote breakdown for core supporters and protest voters

BNP UKIP
Core Protest Core Protest

Conservatives 15.9 22.5 24.5 26.5

Labour 34.1 45.6 18.1 40.8
Liberal Party 4.7 8.1 4.0 11.4
Minor Party 45.3 23.8 53.4 21.2
Total % 100 100 100 100
n 170 160 298 245

a) All figures significant at 0.001 level.

N = 15833

Source CMS. June 2008-November 2009. British election studies.

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Table 6. The sum of negative perceptions of immigrants minus positive by party.

Base BNP UKIP CON.

Enrich culture. 20.9 88.4 58.0 40.0

Strengthen economy. 29.4 87.2 67.4 49.5
Do jobs that others don’t… +21.9 54.6 13.2 +17.5
NHS, too many immigrants 12.8 64.8 46.2 25.1
Blame immigrants too much… +7.4 72.5 39.3 11.4
Raise taxes. 16.1 71.5 61.4 32.6
Take jobs 9.5 67.6 49.1 20.5
Threaten English language 12.4 79.4 55.9 31.9
Commit crime. 2.1 65.3 39.7 27.9
Terrorism, increase. 14.2 87.5 77.4 45.1
Result of glob. 25.0 44.2 26.4 4.8
N 4818 102 106 1757

Source CMS. June 2008-November 2009. British election studies.

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Table 5. Multinomial model with BNP vote as reference category

BNP Labour Conservati Liberal UKIP

ve Party

Constant -10.661*** 8.825*** 7.726*** 11.223*** 1.481***

Unemployed -.735* -.633***
Skilled .532** -.613*** -.450*
Gender .359** -.327* -.475** -.476***
Social housing -.651
Low education .819** -.882*** -.863*** -.979*** -.922***
Mid-income .395*** -.474** -.341*
North West -.727
East Midlands -1.011***
Yorkshire .644* -.965***
South East 1.445***
Age 55-64 -.751** 1.292*** 1.562***
Age 65+ -.999** 1.040*** 1.233***
Anti/immigrant. paper .596***

Economic factor -.275***

Security Factor -.208** .252* .301**
Service factor -.239* -.197***
Security issue -.444*** -.288** -.279*
Service issue

Opposition EU -.384* -.497** 1.452***

Migration issue 1.191*** -1.357*** -1.209*** -1.415*** -.713***
Reduce asylum seekers 2.622*** -2.44*** -2.169** -2.721**
Govt/asylum seekers .713*** -.772*** -.665*** -653***
Con/asylum seekers .465*** -.340*** -.646*** -.404*** -.225**
Contact asylum seekers -.527**

Con/like -.095* -.220*** .759***

Labour/like .682*** .083*
Labour vote 2005 -.374** 1.704*** .791*** -.773***
Conservative vote -.975*** 1.497*** -1.370***
Brown negative .519** -1.400***
Cameron negative .638*** -1.145*** -.512** -.585***
Con. performance -.095** .784*** .645** .517**
Govt. performance .714* .671**

Attention to politics .111*** -.205*** -.135*** -.176***

Political influence
Interpersonal trust -.089** .082* .086* .077**
Democracy satisfied .310** -.632*** -.310** -.444***
Life satisfied .217*
Formal politics -.271***

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Informal politics .255** -.268*** -.201***

McFadden R2 .348 .511

a) Age band 55-64, 65+ uses Age 20-25 as the reference category. Region uses E.Anglia
as the reference category. Skilled manual worker uses higher managerial as the
reference category.
b) p * < 0.05, p** < 0.01, p*** < 0.001
c) All coefficents displayed are betas.
d) BNP vote is the referent
e) Variables that failed to achieve significance across all parties are excluded.

Source CMS. June 2008-November 2009. British election studies.

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