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By now, most people must be aware that there was a fatal train/vehicle accident in Palo
Alto on Friday, April, 15th, 2011. The driver, a lady in her mid-60s who was visiting
family in Palo Alto, somehow stopped on the tracks when a train approached. While the
exact details of the incident have not been released to the media at this writing, given the
configuration of this intersection/at-grade crossing, it’s not hard to guess that the driver,
unfamiliar with the safety issues of involving this particular intersection, failed to use
common sense, and entered the “track zone”, stopped on the tracks, and was unable to
move the car in time to avoid being hit.
The following picture, published by one of the local newspapers, shows the aftermath of
the accident:
Even though this incident will doubtless be the result of the motorist’s failure to stay out
of the “track zone” until it was safe to enter, this particular intersection is very dangerous
during “drive time”, when Alma Street is heavily loaded. Is this intersection the only
one, or are there others?
The following pictures, obtained via Google/Earth and Google/Streets, provides both
aerial and street level views of this intersection, and the “track zone” that motorists must
negotiate:
Aerial View of Caltrain/Charleston Road/Alma Street Intersection
View From West Charleston Road, looking South—Showing Obstructions.
Newly Added Safety Improvements At The
Charleston Road/Alma Street Caltrain Crossing.
Aerial View of Alma/Charleston/Caltrain Intersection—
With Proposed Additional Buffer.
The gates at Charleston/Alma are timed to start going down about 20 seconds before a
train actually reaches the intersection. This is not a lot of time, but if people follow the
rules (meaning using common sense), then they would never go onto a track and stop.
There is only about forty-two feet of "buffer" between the tracks and Alma. If someone
does end up on the tracks when the gates start going down, there are times that there is no
place for the car to go. The traffic is heavy during afternoon “drive times”. If there is a
car in this "buffer" that can't make an immediate right turn, then the car(s) behind it have
no place to go (as the left lane is also likely holding one (or more) car(s).
To make matters worse, this is effectively a "blind corner", since there is a hedge that
comes right up to the sidewalk, making it impossible to see to the right. Trains going
North->South are easy enough to spot, but not in the other direction.
Trains are moving along at full speed at this intersection. The next station down is "The
Crossings" (San Antonio) and downtown Mountain View is next. If the train isn't
scheduled to stop at San Antonio, then it will be moving along at whatever speed at
which it is traveling. In the case of a South-North train, it's next stop is California
Avenue.
Trains don't "stop on a dime", so people need to keep that in mind when thinking about
stopping on train tracks, for whatever reason.
People tend to panic at times like these, and often aren't thinking clearly when they see a
train bearing down on themselves
Possible Solutions
The following suggestions about increasing car safety at this intersection, and other
places along the Caltrain line, in general—
The guard arm activation is about 20 seconds before the train arrives. Given the very
small buffer on the Alma Street side of the tracks, it would make sense to increase the
timing of the activation by 10-20 seconds, even though this will reduce the flow of traffic
during peak traffic times. The engineering reasons for this timing of twenty seconds no
doubt exist, but how much though was given to the safety of motorist “stranded” on the
tracks when a train approaches is an open question. During “off-hours”, the timing could
be reduced to the twenty second warning period, if that seems appropriate.
The current safety project (funded by Measure A, due to be completed in June, 2011), has
focused on pedestrian/bicyclist “safety”, at the expense of motorist “safety”. The picture
below provides some sense of what the project planners have provided in terms of new
“hardware” to protect pedestrians/bicyclists.
This solution is obvious—just expensive. The Palo Alto City Council has shown little
courage in addressing this matter. So, it’s time to move the decision out of their hands—
to an agency that has more resources, and more interest in protecting motorists’ safety.
Moving the traffic light to the west side of the tracks might reduce the cars that sit
between the tracks and the light, up to three per lane. This would reduce the opportunity
for cars to sit on the tracks waiting for the light to change. Cars could still back up in the
right lane, waiting for access to Alma Street (to the south), but this opportunity would be
greatly reduced from the present situation, based on the stop lights being on Alma Street.
At the moment, the only warning of an on-coming train is the twenty seconds announced
by the initiation of the flashing red lights, and the activation of the guard arms. It is
suggest that electronic signage (annunciators) be added on the east-bound lane of West
Charleston Road that signal the approach of trains at least fifteen seconds before the
crossing guards/lights are activated.
Traffic backups when there are accidents at the Alma/Charleston intersection, even when
the train is not involved. Annuciators alerting motorists on East Charleston, and
Arastradero Road, that there is an impediment at this intersection would alert them to
choose alternate routes around this obstruction. This would reduce delays, and frustration,
at times like these—reducing the possibility of additional accidents that were the result of
people trying to make illegal u-turns to avoid the backups.
There is clearly no visibility to the south, at the Charleston/Alma Caltrain crossing, on the
west side of the tracks. The picture below demonstrates that point clearly—
View to South, On West Side of Caltrain Tracks, On West Charleston Road
With the recent advent of low-cost/high quality outdoor electronic displays, it might
prove helpful to display track conditions on the Caltrain line (at least to the south). This
display might be considered a distraction by some, but seeing the train actually
approaching would be an additional warning that is not currently available to motorists.
Currently, the stop/limit line for the red light is just a couple of feet away from the guard
arms. Moving this limit line back thirty-fifty feet would provide some additional space
for people to utilize should they end up on the tracks when a train is approaching.
System-wide
Adding annunciators along the full length of the Central Expressway/Alma Street
roadway that could be used to alert motorists to obstructions would be helpful for
reducing backups for both accidents, and Caltrain accidents.
Add Collision Avoidance Radar To Engines
Having “car-on-tracks” detectors that would alert trains approaching an at-grade crossing
would seem to be an obvious safety improvement that should be explored by every
government agency having a Caltrain presence in its jurisdiction.
Administration
Provide An Accurate Cost Analysis Of Providing Safety Features For Full 77-Mile
Caltrain System.
There does not seem to be a clear, publicly-accessible “safety model” for the Caltrain
system. Member governments in the JPA (Joint Powers Agency) should insist that
Caltrain Administration provide a full accounting of the current “safety model”, and a
cost estimate of costs to increase the safety of the stations, and crossings.
Member agencies of the JPA should insist that the Caltrain Administration post timely,
and accurate, accident information on its WEB-site.
Currently, accident data, such as accident locations, fatalities, injuries, etc. are not
provided on Caltrain’s WEB-site, and must be requested via a Public Information
Request—to which Caltrain response times are “spotty”. Moreover, with the San Matero
County Sheriff’s Office being the lead agency for accident investigation, their
commitment to service to non-San Mateo County residents is open to question.
This accident/incident data should also include all of the payouts that Caltrain/member
agencies have made to settle claims from people injured on Caltrain property, or on
public property trying to cross Caltrain property.
Capital expenditure records for Caltrain are not particularly good. This has been pointed
out in Santa Clara County Grand Jury reviews of VTA, and a report on VTA by the
Office of the State Auditor in 2008. (VTA funds much of Caltrains capital expenditure.)
While records might exist that can be researched to determine what projects had been
funded for “safety”, comments from VTA representatives suggest that this would be
“difficult” to track using the current accounting methods of these agencies.
Given the multi-agency “ownership” of the Caltrain entity, it is very clear that some
issues, such as “safety” are not “well-owned”, and may, in fact, be “orphans”—with no
clear advocate at the current time. One might think that City Councils in the towns where
the Caltrain line passes might be highly vocal advocates for better safety at Caltrain
stations and crossings. Sadly, this does not seem to be the case. Having outside safety
consultants would add another “set of eyes” to this matter of safety, that seems to have
little support at the moment.
During the last two decades, the Palo Alto City Council, and its Planning Department
seem to have become infatuated with “alternative transportation”. This infatuation has
resulted in various efforts to downsize streets, such as El Camino Real, the
Charleston/Arastradero Corridor, Middlefield Road, and Embarcadero Road. However,
there has been little interest exhibited on the part of the traffic planners (citing “City
Council policy” as reasons) to include underpasses on the Caltrain line to increase safety
for pedestrians and motorists. This is a Palo Alto problem, but elected officials in all JPA
Municipalities, and Counties, are encouraged to review their “policy” about vehicular
transportation safety to insure that a similar fixation on “alternative transportation” has
not caused a similar lack of interest in street design issues that would lead to increased
motorists’ safety.
Currently, Palo Alto has a “Bicyclist Advisory Commission, but no similar advisory
commissions to deal with traffic issues. Palo Alto does have a Planning and
Transportation Commission, but this group does not provide the same venue that an
Advisory Commission on traffic issue might. JPA member agencies are encouraged to
consider the possibility of creating such commissions for the public to provide more input
about the streets, roads and traffic in the towns where they live, and work.
Caltrain’s Administration, while not totally opaque, is not totally transparent, either.
Because of the nature of the multi-agency operation/funding of this entity, there seems to
be no clear “ownership” of system-wide safety. Questions about accidents here in Palo
Alto are referred to the San Mateo County Sheriff’s office, which does not have a clear
mandate to provide service to people in Santa Clara county, as say, the Palo Alto Police
Department does for its citizens. Moreover, other safety-related matters, like the beating
of a Caltrain rider in Redwood City recently, seem to disappear from view, as soon as the
local papers tire of running articles about those injured. To make matters worse, we are
now seeing both the local papers, and the public safety agencies refusing to identify those
killed, or injured, on Caltrain property—trying, it would seem, to sanitize the Caltrain
safety record.
For the most part, residents, motorists, and Caltrain riders have little information about
the overall safety of this system. All that we generally know is that there are between
twenty and thirty people killed yearly by Caltrain, but we have little/no knowledge of
how many people were injured, or robbed, while using the Caltrain system, or crossing
Caltrain property.
So—we are left with the very nagging question: just how safe is Caltrain, and what would
it cost to make it safer?
Conclusion:
Caltrain’s costs are ever-increasing. The cost of capital expenditures is not well
documented, so that actual costs of operating this system for 18,000-19,000 unique
people daily is much higher than the operational budget posted on the Caltrain WEB-site
would have us believe. The costs in terms of human life, and the financial aftermath of
the deaths, is never documented in the local papers, or on the Caltrain WEB-site.
If all of the suggestions proposed in this short paper would expanded system-wide, it
would not doubt add $1B-$2B in capital costs, and additional operational costs. While
there would no doubt be a reduction in the loss of human life, we are left with the
question where this $1B-$2B would come from, and who would champion these
expenditures?
While some of the ideas proposed herein are not all that expensive, it becomes clearer by
the day that shutting down Caltrain would, in the long run, be a lot less expensive, than
operating it in the future—particularly with the need for safety enhancements on Caltrain
property, and the city/county roads crossing this property.
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