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The Arc of
Fred Halliday
latter half of the 1970s witnessed a sustained The Persian Gulf became a particularly apt place to
and geographically diverse series of social respond to this wave of revolutions for several interrelated
The upheavals in the Third World which, taken to? reasons. First, it was geographically near to some of the
gether, constituted a lessening of Western control in the most important social upheavals of the period?Ethiopia,
developing areas. In Africa, the Ethiopian revolution of Iran and Afghanistan. Ethiopia was the site of a large
1974 was followed by a series of changes in the remaining scale and successful Cuban intervention, in support of the
embattled colonies attendant upon the revolution in Ethiopian government. Iran was the site of the most humi?
Portugal: in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau liating individual incident in the whole process of Third
(1975) and, as a consequence of the independence of World revolutions?the hostage affair. Afghanistan was
Mozambique, in Zimbabwe (1980). The Southwest Asian the site of a large scale Soviet military intervention. But
region was transformed by the revolutions in Afghanistan these events combined with a second important factor,
(1978) and Iran (1979). In Central America there was a namely the fragility of the West's remaining allies in that
triumphant revolution in Nicaragua (1979), and continuing area and particularly the vital state of Saudi Arabia. All of
unrest in El Salvador and Guatemala. The psychological the West's allies around the Gulf were monarchies, ruling
impact of these changes served to draw attention to a de? without the consent of their people and with enormous
feat which had temporarily been repressed in the US con? corruption and inequality of wealth. The events of Iran
sciousness but which had continued to exert its subliminal showed that apparently secure regimes could be rapidly
force?the loss of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia (1975). overthrown once a popular movement started to move.
Had the final defeat in Indochina been an isolated event, it This frailty was further amplified by the special impor?
might have remained repressed, unmourned and without tance of the Gulf in US global strategy. Concern about the
future policy implications; but the combination of uphea? Persian Gulf increased greatly during the 1970s as the
vals elsewhere combined to produce what seemed to be an United States became a significant importer of oil for the
ominous "winning streak" of Third World revolutions first time. The extent of this dependence should not be
to which sooner or later the United States would be forced exaggerated: only 15 percent of US oil comes from the Gulf,
to respond. as compared to 60 percent of Europe's and 90 percent of
Japan's. But the prosperity of the US economy is affected and then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was meeting
by the greater .dependence of the other industrialized econ? regularly with the Shah to coordinate joint security mea?
omies upon Gulf oil. And the American oil companies who sures in the Gulf area.
for decades have controlled the sale of Gulf crude to Europe
and Japan would be direly affected.
There has also been the growth of a more general sense A Soviet Blueprint?
in the advanced industrialized countries that they are de?
pendent on the Third World for vital mineral resources: The turning point came in 1978: the Soviet and Cuban
while there is considerable debate on how true this depend? effort to assist Ethiopia in repulsing the Somali invasion
ence really is, and how far it is a misinformed alarmism, no became public knowledge in January; then followed the
one can deny the importance of this new mood of raw communist coup in Afghanistan in April; and by Sep?
material vulnerability. The result of both trends has been a tember the revolutionary movement in Iran had gathered
psychological response far in excess of whatever real mate? full force. Before the end of the year Carter's National
rial reliance has arisen, and a consequent emphasis upon Security Adviser Brzezinski had coined the phrase "arc of
the strategic vulnerability of the United States. The Gulf crisis" to denote the range of countries "along the shores of
fits this picture ideally: it produces the most vital of all the Indian Ocean, with fragile social and political struc?
these raw materials, and it is a long way away. tures in a region of vital importance to us threatened with
As the 1970s proceeded, it is possible to detect a steadily fragmentation. The resulting political chaos could well be
growing strategic concentration on the Gulf: US anxiety filled by elements hostile to our values and sympathetic to
about the old focus of Soviet influence, Egypt, declined as our adversaries."2
Cairo's relations with Moscow worsened, while the wind? During the course of 1978 the focus of world tension
ing down of the Indochina wars led to a gradual shift in shifted uneasily between the Southwest Asian and African
Asian strategic perspective westwards that was already contexts. Cuba certainly had sent forces to Angola, but, as
noticeable in 1973.l By the mid-1970s, Iran and Saudi Congressional hearings were to show, the dispatch of
Arabia had become the principal customers for US arms, Cuban forces was to protect the government of the newly
border. The report to the 26th Congress of the CPSU from Another, countervailing, nationality factor that has
Turkmenistan reported on unspecified opposition by local implications for the Middle East is the presence within the
mullahs.b Although the number of mosques is only around USSR of a Jewish minority whose militance reflects the
two hundred (compared with eight thousand at the end of persistence of anti-semitic sentiment in wide sections of
the war) the majority of the population retains some reli? Soviet society. Through its international contacts, the
gious belief, as evidenced by observation of festivals, endo? Soviet Jewish community has made the emigration issue a
genous marriage, and a refusal to use abortion (the most domestic US concern and thus, despite the frequently hos?
common form of Soviet birth control). However, the coher? tile character of the Soviet society around them, the Jews
ence of this phenomenon should not be exaggerated. Not constitute a calculation in Soviet policy on the Middle East.
all of these minorities are Muslims, and even within the Although the decision to allow Jewish emigration has cost
Muslim community there are sharp rivalries. The very nu? the Soviet Union some legitimacy in Arab eyes, it was
merical extent of the minority groups (more than ninety) taken largely in response to the pressure from the US
makes it much more difficult for them to pose a threat to the Congress. Since 1974, a considerable flow of Jewish emi?
Slavs at the top.6 The growth of distinct national entities- gration has come from the Soviet Union?around 260,000
Uzbek, Kazakh, etc.?since 1917 has also eroded the exit visas were granted between 1974 and 1980.
grounds for a single pan-Islamic sentiment.
For many of these minorities the cultural rights, how?
ever limited, and standard of living are higher on the
Soviet than on the Middle Eastern side of the border. The Trade and Aid
death rate in Soviet Turkmenia in the mid-1970s was 7.2
per thousand, the number of doctors 2.7 per thousand, and The scale of the Soviet commitment to the Middle East, in
the number of hospital beds 10.2 per thousand. In Afghan? economic and military terms, has outstripped that to any
istan the average figures were 23.8 per thousand, 0.2 per other part of the non-communist world. The economic
thousand, and 7.5 per thousand. 7 in Soviet commitment has resulted from geographical
Literacy proximity
Tadjikistan, where the population speaks a dialect of and the availability of energy supplies, and has focused on
Persian, has gone from two percent to 99 percent under Iran, Afghanistan and Iraq. The military commitment has
Jerry Hough of the Brookings Institution has written: "In Libya, meanwhile, had come a long way since the early
the broad historical perspective, the Soviet economy has years of Qaddafi's regime, when the Tripoli press declared
performed rather well, especially given its relative lack of in red banner headlines that Russia was an "imperialist"
foreign investment and the large proportion of its resources countrv. Western sources spoke of up to $12 billion in Soviet
devoted to military purposes ... Its rate of economic arms sales to Libya, and hundreds of Soviet military techni?
growth, even in the 'slowdown' of the 1970s, has been sub? cians were reported in Libya, including some helping with
stantial, well above that of the United States. In the thirty- advanced missiles.14 Both these liaisons seemed to confirm
five years since the end of World War II, the consumer has an alarmist view of Soviet strategic intentions: Syria was
enjoyed a steadily rising standard of living."12 increasingly in control of Lebanon, and remained the only
All in all, the economic condition of the Soviet Union is front-line Arab state implacably hostile to Israel. Libya's
not so desparate as to force it to engage in rash gambles in pro-Soviet orientation undermined the southern flank of
the countries lying to its south. With its oil and gas, this NATO, and constituted a challenge to Sadat's Egypt.
region has been and will remain of importance to the Soviet Moreover, Libyan involvement in activities which it is
economy, but this importance will more likely be mediated impossible not to categorize as "terrorist" gave rightwing
via normal commercial dealings rather than through the US critics their opportunity to argue that Moscow was
advance of the Red Army.13 involved in orchestrating international terrorist activities
through its "surrogates."
Taken together, these two alliances were no substitute
Soviet Setbacks for the one the Soviets had lost with Egypt. In both cases,
moreover, the Soviet commitment was in part designed to
At the start of the 1980s, Soviet influence in the Middle check the tendency of both regimes towards reckless ven?
East appears to be at a lower point than at any time since tures: a Syrian miscalculation vis-a-vis Israel, or a Libyan
1955. Egypt has broken all ties with the USSR and has one vis-a-vis Egypt could easily lead to disaster. Indeed, we
repudiated its $7 billion debt to Moscow. Sadat has repeat? cannot but suspect that one of the prime functions of the
edly gone out of his way to insult the Soviets. Iraq has been the Soviet technicians in Libya is to prevent the Libyans
executing communists and is openly suppplying Somalia from using the missiles they posses?just as Soviet person?
and Eritrea with help against Soviet-supported Ethiopia. nel in Egypt in the late 1960s had a similar role.
For the Arab and Iranian lefts, Soviet policy in the Middle
East has not been active enough: Moscow has desisted A Disastrous Record
from support of revolutionary movements in the region in
order to consolidate relations with nationalist govern? The difficulties that the West has encountered in regard to
ments and to appease the imperialist countries. This cri? the Arab world have not correlated with a commensurate
tique began with the decision by Lenin and his associates to rise in Soviet influence. Soviet expectations that national?
work with the nationalist governments of Turkey and Iran ist and thereby anti-imperialist regimes would become re-
An Alternative Critique
* It has alsoprovidedtheSovietswithfrontlinesfurthersouththantheywouldother?
wisehavehad.Theadvantageofthisshouldnotbeoverstated, however.Sovietcapacity
toinfluenceIranorseizetheGulfis predominantly affectedbytheUSSR'sproximityto
Iranitself,andhas beenonly marginallyenhancedby the Afghanintervention,as a
glanceat the mapwillshow.
City_St._Zip