ABSTRACT: CRAIG H.

ALLEN, THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME

ORGANIZATION IN IMPLEMENTING THE 1982 LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION:
IS THE IMO’S SUCCESS HASTENING THE DEMISE OF FLAG STATE PRIMACY?

The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea is often described as a framework
convention that was meant to be supplemented by more detailed international agreements. Many
of those agreements were already in place in 1982; others have emerged in the intervening years.
Several important articles in the LOS Convention advert to the role of “competent international
organizations” (e.g., Articles 22, 197-202, 207, 266). Additionally, the convention repeatedly
refers to “generally accepted international rules and standards.” It is widely understood that in
vessel safety and security and marine pollution prevention matters, the International Maritime
Organization serves as the CIO (this is not to deny the important role of the ILO, IAEA or IOC in
their particular fields of competency).
The IMO is also the principal source of the “generally accepted international rules and
standards” for vessels. It has sponsored more than 40 international conventions, protocols and
other treaties, and hundreds of international codes and recommendations. IMO Conventions
which set accepted international standards include the Safety of Life as Sea Convention (SOLAS
74/78), the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution by Ships (MARPOL 73/78),
the Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchstanding of Seafarers (STCW
78/95), the Convention on International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea
(COLREGS) and the Convention on Load Lines. By requiring compliance with generally
accepted international standards, the LOS Convention (together with the various port state
control regimes) effectively "universalizes" the principal IMO conventions, requiring all flag
States to adopt and enforce them whether a party to the underlying convention or not.
The modern role of the IMO in developing the rules and standards is designed both to
harmonize the regime for vessels engaged in international trade and transport and to guard against
a “race to the bottom” that might result if flag States were free to set their own standards. At the
same time, however, it can be argued that the IMO’s growing prominence in developing rules and
standards has further diminished the role of the flag State. It might further be argued that because
the LOS Convention relies so heavily on flag States to effectively exercise jurisdiction and
control over their vessels, any developments which encourage or permit flag States to
“outsource” their prescriptive or enforcement responsibilities carry the potential to undermine one
of the key underpinnings of the LOS regime. When the transfer of prescriptive responsibility is
coupled with the growing role of classification societies and port State control inspections in
enforcement, the emerging picture is one of a flag State role that is more notional than real.