You are on page 1of 6

c 

  

c








 c
!
  ! "#$    
  %&'   
     ( ) *


+,- 


  ! 





  !   c   
   *   
 c

 
     
  

.   
  #"$
/ 
 
!
       
 
    
!


Conclusion
Therefore, instead of focusing only on tackling the naxal violence, the government should
monitor the activities of the front organizations as well. Moreover, there is a need to strengthen
the capabilities of the local police in action and in intelligence collection. The same can be done
through specialized training and provisioning of better infra-structure to increase their overall
efficiency and effectiveness. It is high time we stopped thinking of naxalites as µsome
misguided citizens¶ and start dealing with them as outright enemies of the State. The
Nepalese Naxalites have shown the way by laying down arms and joining the mainstream
political process. Our home-grown Naxals ought to take a cue from them.
Naxalites are known to follow flexible tactics. If the situation warrants, they restrict the
movement at the level of political mobilization, highlight local issues through front
organizations and organize meetings in strongholds to garner popular sympathy.

` 
   
  `  !
Unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, equipped with cameras, data and video links are the latest weapons to be
deployed against Naxals in India. Developed by Hindustan Aeronautics, each machine will cost at least Rs 18
lakh. Will they work to contain or subdue what the prime minister has called the ³greatest threat to India¶s internal
security?´ I doubt.

The Naxal ² or Maoist ² agitations in the country today are different from, say, the AASU-sponsored violence in
Assam or the Khalistan-inspired violence in Punjab in the 1980s, or even the militancy in Jammu & Kashmir. The
violence in Assam, Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir were orchestrated, at least initially, by close-knit organisations
with a clear-cut agenda of breaking away from mainstream India on ethnic or religious grounds. Today¶s Naxal
movements have no such goals.

Reckoned conservatively, Naxal activity in India today spreads across 90 districts in 10 states: Andhra Pradesh,
Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West
Bengal. A look at this list will convince you that these movements aren¶t driven by the urge to break away from
the country based on one geographical, ethnic or linguistic drive: at least six languages are spoken by the natives
of these 10 states.

But cutting across this diversity, there are some startling similarities about the condition of people living there. To
start with, they are poor. Studies show that 85 of the country¶s 100 poorest districts are in seven of those 10
states. In the Naxal-affected districts, 32% of the population is below the officially-measured poverty line,
compared to 24% elsewhere.

Second, in these districts, state governments have a terrible record of delivering public goods and services. Only
68% of homes in Naxal-affected districts get safe drinking water, in other places, the number is 74%.

Many of these problems have to do with one simple fact: the people living in these areas are tribals who, on
paper, receive special rights and privileges but are actually subject to brutal discrimination in India¶s caste-
conscious society. Even in West Bengal¶s so-called socialist utopia, in dry areas where a single source of water,
like a well or a pond, has to be shared by many households, the tribal is the last person in queue to get her
bucketful.

Babus in state and district administrations are mostly drawn from the local elite, and their sympathies lie entirely
with µtheir¶ people. So, they pour whatever resources they have in better-off, urban, upper-caste areas. The tribal
areas remain backward. What else explains the fact that only 43% of women in tribal, Naxal-affected areas get
skilled medical attention during pregnancy, when 51% of women elsewhere get the same care?

If you place a map of India listing its mineral resources over another map marking areas of Naxal influence, the
two would overlap almost perfectly. The poorest areas of the country are rich in coal, iron ore and bauxite seams
but the µcurse of minerals¶ has gripped the area.

Coal mining was nationalised in the 1970s and, almost immediately, most activities surrounding the actual mining
were hived off to efficient private operators: the mining mafia. Around Dhanbad and Asansol in the east, the coal
mafia controlled everything: trucking, transportation, the movement of railway wagons and labour contracts. With
money came political power. We¶ve seen something similar in Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh, where the Bellary
brothers, who control large mining leases, have acquired enough clout to bring the BJP government of Karnataka
to its knees.

None of that is good news for the people who live there. The power of local mining overlords makes it easy for
them to muscle into tribal land, fell forests and sell off timber as well as the minerals under the ground. This robs
locals of land and forest resources. Over time, anger builds up.

It¶s easy to jump to the conclusion that the Naxal areas are hotbeds of crime and violence. Research by
economist Vani K Borooah, of the University of Ulster, throws cold water on that assumption. After comparing
rates of violent crimes, crimes against women and against public order across all Indian districts with Naxal-
affected ones, he finds that Naxal-affected areas are in many ways less crime-prone than other parts.

He also finds, unsurprisingly, that urban areas are more crime-prone than rural ones ² where Naxals largely
operate ² that poverty has little role in influencing the number of violent crimes, but riots and arson were more
likely in poorer areas. Conflicts over drinking water led to higher crime rates, as did discrimination against
scheduled tribes.

Though Borooah finds it hard to explain why criminal activity is lower in Naxal areas than in others, he has a
provocative suggestion: ³Judging from the experience of Northern Ireland, it is plausible that Naxalites ² like the
Loyalist and Republican paramilitary forces in Northern Ireland ² also enforce law and order in their areas of
influence.´

The Naxal issue is complex, widespread and rooted in local factors. The government can¶t end Naxalism by
sending the military into villages and jungles. And it won¶t help to club Naxals as terrorists and book suspects
under harsh laws.

Last year, a report on Naxalism, published by the Planning Commission, made this accurate observation:
³Mobilising the support of the people is also absolutely essential to weaken the support base of the Naxals. The
political parties are not playing their role in this regard. The representatives of major political parties have virtually
abdicated their responsibility.´

Perhaps the only exception to this was Mamata Banerjee¶s Trinamool Congress, which backed a police boycott
movement called PCAPA in the western, tribal belt of Bengal. But as soon as the state cracked down on the
PCAPA, Trinamool support for it withered.

To get Naxals into the political mainstream, the political mainstream has to make the first move. And to do that,
the government has to take the first step to reconciliation. Otherwise, which politician would like to be seen
hobnobbing with people branded as Naxals and terrorists? 
`   

ë     
    
   
 
 
              
                  
             
               
                 
          
         !" 
          
     
   
     
#                  
      
       
         
     

          


$          
     
           
    % 

     
          
&    
      

          
     
  '             
   
   
    
(             &   
   
 )  
'     
        *   +   
)  '               
     $      
     
  
     
       
 
   '          
#  
     $      ,     

       ,       


      
   
             
 
             - 
             &  
   
   $             
                   
              
         
   
   $ 
     
       
     
             
       
                   
     
       
                  
          
   
     $    $
     
           $   
.       
  #
     -       
         $            
    

     $     
    +    
          
                  
 -   
$(/$  * r
             
 0 
(           1    
        ,              
              
                
             
ë     / 2/ 3       
          
     -       
     
     
ë                 
            
     
    
     
      
    -           
                -   

   
  45 
     
          
41     
           
  
          (   
      
  
(                 /  
   1+          (    
      *1
        
+      $  
     
 
        $         
                 
     
                    
  
       
         
   
  (                
 1+(          
   
            (   
      #            
               
     
 
 -               

         /      $ 

  +5/         


/6(&                    
               / 
/61  78   /   *
   $ /             
/    6(&          

 
           
/  
             6
    + 9:;<<
      
 
! "
 
6  #      
    
 
 &     * 
  
    
 $
  '          
    ë     /      
              +    
         /    /  
     ë        + 
1       
       
       /      
                   
    
         
      
 
 ë       
   
  -       

›     › ›  


     

$                      
            
  /  '             =   
     >         $ 

$9""?6 
                     $9""@ 
      
               
 
     
            

6 
       +=  6#   ë * 
   <@:A         $2+  3      
-         $ 2+  ,  3  <@:@ /       +      
2+3
   ( $2+3+  9""?  $2+ 3 +  
   
  
               
    @"B    $       
     6         6  
        
 
      

 $2+ 3   +    


  ' 
     
 
         / &   9"   $99C   
      
 $   
  -   $      
     
        DD 6 *    
ë * >     *           6  
/ 1        =       '  
    
ë            
=       


  $$     
  6      
      
  6       
                  6
      $
2+ 3   
    $              
  
                    /     = 
         ,      
 /     
    

       ==    
       #       
          
  $ =                      
    (
/  +ë  $E  *  8       
 6      

(                                  
       6     
            
                          
   
               ë  
                       6              
        6  +                    (      
 
           $ 
     
(                  
                           
     
    

6                      
(6  (8F         E #      
G  
  

6          


                  

       
                  
=
                  
   
    H         
          

    

/         



              
5 +   & $    
5 +  
   

 6       
  
     
    
 
   
                     
       
  
      $  =   
 
           
        

                                  (

>                       6       

                       
       
                    

   #    6  

D        1 &  !"""" 


          
     +   
             $ 
     $2+  3'   =       
               
,
                   6                  
  ' 
         6           
                

/    ( 


          
           /       -  
    
       6                   
  

/) '     #       6  $     
     
    *            6  
        $                                
 =     
          

$2+ 3              
    
                         
                      / 
   
$    
  
          +       
   $  
  6         
 

I  7

      6                      6    
 
           &    6        #   
  *                   6            
         &    *    &  
         
                           
 
 
     
   6
$         8- 
>   2 ( 8  3 ,        J           

                           $
        
  
 1   6       ë     

      2=  3    


  $  
    
 6       $ &            
   
      


! "
 

Chhatishgarh came into being to fulfill the aspiration of the tribals. Today, tribal remain more marginalized than
any other community. The land is being occupied by not only the private companies and forest-department but
also by the outsiders who are flourishing at the cost of the locals. The government may look more into the Naxal
problem by bringing more funds for the home ministry but in the absence of a proactive reform particularly on
land and forest management, government would be betraying to its own self. By throwing tribal away from their
own area and denying them dignity, the government cannot expect anything. The corrupt and contemptuous
officials have to go. Cases if like of Kartik and Abhishek Anand are not isolated. This is a trend in Chhatishgarh.
One does not what is the domicile policy of Chhatishgarh. Has the government ever taken people into confidence
on the issues such as land, water and forests?

If the government wants to tackle the Naxal threat it has to introspect on its own position. It cannot deny tribals
and Dalit their legitimate right over their resources. If the state apparatus continue to become more brahmanical
by giving huge, palatial land to the corrupt Babas while the marginalized languish of hunger and malnutrition,
nothing will move. You cannot win a war against violence by pretending to look it with administrative viewpoint.
Let the Dalit and tribals have more fare representation in police, administration and policymaking. The day
government does its work sincerely the problem will automatically disappear. If things were so great let them
ponder why the tribal remain landless in its own land and why people have to buy water in Chhattisgarh. It is
equally important to find out as why Chhattisgarh which used to supply electricity to other state, today, is reeling
under sever electricity cut. One is sure; tribals and Dalits are not the reason of this mess of Chhattisgarh. The
mess in Chhattisgarh is created by the corrupt upper caste beaurocracy with active blessings of political
leadership and it need to come clean. It cannot win a war against Naxals by scuttling the criticism or voices of
dissent by putting innocent people into jails in the names of fighting naxal violence. It will have to show results by
winning people's heart and giving a positive programme in the villages.

You might also like