Maximizing the Impact of the Diaspora in the Future

Economic Reconstruction and Development of Zimbabwe

Jason Wendle

MPA/ID SYPA

March 24, 2008

SYPA Advisor: Calestous Juma

Section Advisor: Filipe Campante

Submitted on March 24, 2008 in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Public Administration in
International Development, Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government

With sincerest thanks for the assistance of my advisors, Professors Juma and Campante, and the members of the Zimbabwean
diaspora who shared their time, insights and dream for the prosperous future of Zimbabwe.
Contents

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3

2. THE DEVELOPMENT PROBLEM 4

2.1 An Econo-political Crisis 4

2.2 Mass Emigration of Size Unknown (but Large) 5

2.3 Development Challenge 7

2.4 A Development Opportunity? (Hope from the Literature) 8

2.4.1 Repatriation Theories 9

2.4.2 Remittances 10

2.4.3 Beyond Remittances and Repatriation: Knowledge Networks 11

2.4.4 Examples 13

3. CONCEPTUALIZING ZIMBABWE’S CHALLENGE 14

3.1 Three Forces 14

3.2 Tools of Analysis 16

Primary Qualitative Data Sources & Research Questions 16

4. INDIVIDUAL DECISIONS 18

4.1 Modeling Migration and the Diaspora 18

4.1.1 A Model of Equilibrium Diaspora Size 19

4.1.2 The (Highly Probable) Decision to Return 22

4.2 What will Individuals Contribute? 25

4.2.1 Non-returnee Participation 25

4.2.2 Capital and Skills Accumulation Abroad 27

5. NETWORKS AND ORGANIZATIONS 29

5.1 The Spontaneous Organization of the Zimbabwe Diaspora 30

5.2 Visualizing and Assessing the Network 33

6. POLICY TO MAXIMIZE DIASPORA IMPACT 35

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6.1 Establish a Formal Partnership with the Diaspora 36

6.3.1 Map the Diaspora Network 37

6.3.2 Two Way Communication 38

6.2 Protect the Legal and Political Status of the Diaspora 39

6.2.1 Pass a Dual Citizenship (Retention-of-Nationality) Amendment 39

6.2.2 Enable Current Zimbabwean Citizens in the Diaspora to Vote 42

6.3 “Nudge” Repatriation 43

6.3.1 Rebuild Municipalities and Manage Urbanization 44

6.3.2 Use Targeted incentives to fill critical skills shortages. 44

APPENDICES 46

Appendix 1: Estimates of Zimbabwe Diaspora Size 46

Appendix 2: Additional Notes on Interview Methodology 47

Appendix 3: Mathematical Basis and Assumptions for the Diaspora Size Model 49

Appendix 4: Cross-Country Research on Dual Citizenship Laws 52

Appendix 5: The Global Zimbabwe Forum and Diaspora Development Chamber 53

INDEX OF FIGURES 54

BIBLIOGRAPHY 55
Data, Websites, and Documents 60

NOTES 61

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1. Executive Summary

Zimbabwe has experienced a tragic economic and political decline accompanied by massive out-

migration and human capital loss. Among others things, Zimbabwe is a special case of rapid brain

drain. While there is no consensus, recent theory has attempted to explain channels by which brain

drain can become brain gain and, globally, a new emphasis on diaspora and development has

emerged. But what does this mean for Zimbabwe? In particular, how can the regime arriving in the

wake of Robert Mugabe, whether days, months, or years into the future, maximize the impact of the

Zimbabwe diaspora for reconstruction and even long term growth?

I address this issue from the perspective of three forces that will shape the diaspora’s impact:

individuals, networks and finally policy. I use economic models, some empirical examples,

aggregated survey data, and data collected from personal interviews and document reviews, to

suggest how policy can productively interact with individuals and networks in the diaspora. I find

that the Zimbabwe diaspora is remarkably attached to its homeland, which leads me to predict a

large partial return migration in the event of a credible, though not necessarily radical, change in the

economic and political direction of the country. Furthermore I find evidence of a highly responsive

and coordinated network of diaspora organizations explicitly preparing for the reconstruction and

development of Zimbabwe. In light of this I suggest that the future government establish an

effective partnership with the diaspora by developing an institutional mechanism for communication

with diaspora networks, by working towards citizenship and voting rights for the diaspora, by

improving municipalities and by limited use of targeted incentives for critical skills shortages.

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2. The Development Problem

2.1 An Econo-political Crisi s

Over the past five to ten years, Zimbabwe has witnessed an ongoing economic collapse and political

crisis accompanied by wide scale emigration. On February 1, 2008, the Zimbabwe Reserve Bank

estimated a year-on-year inflation rate of over 24,000%, while independent estimates place the figure

at 164,000% by measuring prices increases from Jan 2007 to Jan 2008.1 The last available

unemployment figures were around 80%2 and hyperinflation has led to mass food and fuel

shortages.3 Observers have connected the economic crisis with the policy of the current regime.

African governance expert Prof. Robert Rotberg, for one, doesn’t mince words:

President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe is today's African poster child for damaging, venal
leadership. By 2005, if not well before, he had driven Zimbabwe's once-high levels of good
governance into the ground. Educational and health services were in a shambles, rule of law
had largely vanished, crime rates had escalated, corruption was rife, economic growth was
strikingly negative…infant and maternal mortality rates were extraordinarily high and life
expectations correspondingly low, political freedoms were universally denied…Today,
Zimbabweans are even more impoverished than ever before.4

Despite clear abuses, such as the internationally decried Operation Murambatsvina housing

1 CNN. 2008. “Zimbabwe inflation tops 24,000 percent, officially,” Feb 1 2008, Online:
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/02/01/zimbabwe.inflation.ap/index.html
2 CIA Factbook. 2008. (2005 estimate), Online: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/zi.html
As is typical for the case of Zimbabwe, the 2007 EIU and WDI datasets have no unemployment figures.
3 IRIN. 2007. “ZIMBABWE: Food shortages bite as teachers strike for more pay,” Reuters Alertnet: October 3, 2007, Online:
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/IRIN/0e3e7a0420624eb3c6c7e6fc4fc9276c.htm.
4 Rotberg, Robert. 2007. “A Nation in Decay,” Mail & Guardian online:
http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=305801&area=/supzim0407_home/supzim0407_content/

4
demolitions affecting at least 700,000 people,5 governments have not known exactly how to

characterize, or to intervene in the crisis. This is illustrated by the unclear policy toward asylum

seekers in the UK where, as a telling example, authorities gave one opposition activist asylum, but

deported his activist brother.6

2.2 Mass Emigration of Size Unknown (but Large)

In response to these political and economic pressures, and despite difficulties finding safe haven,

Zimbabweans have fled the country in what has become a mass exodus into South Africa, the UK

and other African and Western countries. Estimates of how many Zimbabweans have left the

country – and conversely of the population still in the country – vary widely and there is no clear

consensus. Measuring the size of the diaspora is extremely difficult because it is scattered

throughout the world by definition and because so many emigrants from Zimbabwe are

undocumented and have strong incentives not to be counted. One estimate believes the population

could be as low as 8 million rather than the 13 million reported (also depicted in Appendix 1).7 A

more common estimate is that there are 3 million in South Africa alone, with another million in the

UK, Botswana, and other nations.8

5 BBC News. 2005. “Zimbabwe slum demolitions resume,” Jul 26, 2005: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4715635.stm
6 London Independent (Emily Dugan). 2007. “Zimbabwe refugees are returned home despite asylum policy,” The London Independent, Oct 26, 2007:
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4158/is_20071026/ai_n21078403.
7 SW Radio Africa. 2007. “Factsheet: The Zimbabwe Crisis,” Online: http://www.swradioafrica.com/pages/factsheet081007.htm
8 UK Telegraph (Sophie Arie). 2008. “Half of Zimbabwe will need food aid,” Sep 27, 2007:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/09/27/wzim127.xml
Sokwanele. 2007. “Zimbabwe Refugees Suffer in Botswana and South Africa,” Online:
http://www.sokwanele.com/articles/sokwanele/zimrefugeessufferinsouthafricaandzimbabwe_20July2007.html

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The most recent (2007) attempt to rigorously estimate the number of Zimbabweans in South Africa

comes from a survey of 4654 Zimbabwean migrants in the Gauteng province conducted by Daniel

Makina at the University of South Africa.9 The survey uses the number of Zimbabweans counted in

South Africa’s 2001 census, and the distribution of arrival years among respondents to extrapolate

the increase in the size of the Zimbabwe diaspora. His estimate of 1 million, though a large number,

is less than media reports. Obvious caveats are that the census figures might have undercounted

undocumented immigrants – 50,000 uncounted in 2001 would mean an underestimate of 400,000 at

present – or that the arrival-year makeup of Makina’s sample does not resemble that of the country

as a whole. What is especially startling is an apparent exponential rate of increased immigration.

Graph 1: Number of Zimbabweans in SA Exponentially Increasing?

* = Actual Census Figures | Source: Makina 2007

9 Makina, Daniel. 2007. “Survey of Profile of Migrant Zimbabweans in South Africa: a Pilot Study,” Estimates on p. 3, Preliminary article available via
IDASA: http://www.idasa.org.za/gbOutputFiles.asp?WriteContent=Y&RID=1994

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2.3 Develo pment Challenge

What makes this mass exodus particularly crippling for Zimbabwe is the hemorrhaging of skilled

persons and, more recently, its able-bodied laborers. The most literate country on the continent as

of 2002 (see Graph 2), “Zimbabwe is losing the value of its investment in education because such

large numbers of highly trained Zimbabweans are leaving the country,” say the authors of an earlier

study on brain drain in Zimbabwe.10

Graph 2: Zimbabwe’s literacy has been outstanding in Africa, and for its income
level.

Source: WDI 2005

Note: Zimbabwe data from 2002

A more recent survey – a 2005 IOM report sampling 1000 migrants split evenly between the UK

10 Chetsanga, C. J. and T. Muchemje. . “An Analysis of the Cause and Effect of the Brain Drain in Zimbabwe,” Harare: Scientific and Industrial
Research and Development Centre (SIRDC). Online: http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d/Zimbabwe_Brain_Drain.pdf

7
and South Africa11 – profiled the Zimbabwe diaspora and found that both the UK and South

African diaspora communities sampled were comprised in large part by “the educational elite from

Zimbabwe,” with 45% having at least a Diploma in higher education12 in a country where gross

tertiary enrollment stood at 4% in 2002 (WDI 2005). Makina’s 2007 survey also revealed a highly-

educated diaspora, but may be interpreted – with considerable caution due to the inherent limits of

both sampling techniquesi – as showing a changing profile of new migrants, as the proportion of

total respondents surveyed with at least post-secondary Diplomas “drops” to 32%.13

As the economic crisis has reached new depths, desperation seems to force new types of migrants to

seek asylum, including more women. 14 Youth may be joining material resources as correlates of

emigration: 85% of Makina’s survey fall into the 18-40 age group.15 The result is that Zimbabwe

seems to be losing not just its educated but the most active segment of its labor force as a whole.

The situation in Zimbabwe is on par with the civil wars, genocides, and other catastrophes that have

afflicted Africa in past decades. It is hard to imagine that the status quo can remain for much

longer, or that Zimbabwe can quickly recover without regaining some of its lost human capital.

2.4 A Development O pportunity? (Hope fro m the Liter ature)

While it may take years to undo the damage of recent years, the recent formation of a large and

11 Bloch, Alice. 2005. The Development Potential of Zimbabweans in the diaspora: A Survey of Zimbabweans Living in the UK and South Africa,
Geneva: IOM.
12 Ibid., p. 37.
13 Op. cit., Makina 2007 p. 7.
14 Ibid. p. 3-4.
15 Ibid. p. 3-4.

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disproportionately more educated Zimbabwean diaspora is not a categorical evil. In addition to its

importance to recovery efforts, the diaspora may even provide new channels for development and

growth. Net positive effects could result from the combination of higher incomes abroad and more

available land for those who remained,ii from greater international integration leading to trade and

foreign investment, and from technology and knowledge spillovers. Yet, the literature on high-

skilled emigration is not unambiguously optimistic. True, most theories of migration would lead to

the conclusion that the diaspora is a necessary asset in Zimbabwe’s economic recovery versus a case

of diaspora abandonment of the country.iii But doubts and disagreements arise over the more

important questions of how a diaspora’s impact can be maximized and whether there is even a

potential for net gains from migration (below).

2.4.1 Repatriation Theories

Taking an extreme version of the classic “brain drain” approach characterized by Bhagwati and

Rodriguez (1975), one might conclude that the only policy to maximize the diaspora’s impact is to

get as many migrants to return as possible, thus recovering lost human capital, plundered investment

in education, and wasted skills.16 In this sense, the diaspora’s “impact” could never exceed that of

never having left the country. On the other hand, Dos Santos and Postel Vinay’s (2003) theory of

migration as a source of growth might suggest the opposite: that migrants having left could help

Zimbabwe converge towards the technological and income level of the countries that hosted them,

through the transfer of knowledge and technologies upon return. Yet this channel for growth might

16 See Bhagwait, Jagdish and Carlos Rodriguez. 1975. “Welfare-Theoretical Analyses of the Brain Drain,” Journal of Development Economics 2:
North-Holland pp. 195-221.

9
necessitate nearly the same diaspora policy as in the first case: encouraging as many migrants as

possible to return home with the technology and knowledge they acquired abroad.17

While return migration will no doubt be part of maximizing the diaspora’s impact, and will occur

naturally, to a degree (see Section 4), there are potentially dramatic impacts to be made by the

proportion of the diaspora that does not return.iv In Calestous Juma’s view, “The usual response [to

brain drain] is to seek to curb the flow of skilled people to other countries. This approach misses the

point. The real policy challenge for Africa is learning to tap the expertise of those is diaspora for

national and regional development.”18

2.4.2 Remittances

Diaspora impact is often directly linked with remittances. But while remittances are currently

credited for preventing the total collapse of the Zimbabwe economy and probably many deaths by

starvation – while perhaps sustaining the very government that most remitters decry19 – I have

chosen not to address remittances in this study. My reason for this is simply that among various

channels of possible diaspora impact, remittances and related policies have received what seems like

a disproportionate share of attention, especially since there are adequate personal incentives to

encourage remittance flows. I will note that Rapoport and Docquier (2005), find that “migration

17 Dos Santos, Fabien and Manon Domingues. 2003 “Migration as a source of growth: The perspective of a developing country,” Journal of
Population Econonomics (2003) 16:161–175.
18 Juma, Calestous. 2005. “We Can Do More Than Just Whine Over Expatriates,” The Standard, Kenya, Online:
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/1489/we_can_do_more_than_just_whine_over_expatriates.html
19 Times Online (London). 2007. “Paying for the man they hate,” June 27, 2007:
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article1991194.ece

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and associated remittances tend to have an overall positive effect on origin countries' long-run

economic performance.”20

2.4.3 Beyond Remittances and Repatriation: Knowledge Networks

A more exciting proposition, from a policy perspective, is that the diaspora can facilitate knowledge,

technology, trade, and capital flows from developed countries to their home countries. The

foundation for this idea is the importance of networks and social capital in many market

transactions21 The observation is that through personal ties to their home country and professional

ties to their host country, diaspora members form “expatriate knowledge networks”22 and generate a

“diaspora externality”.23 These networks use social capital to overcome traditional market failures

such as informational asymmetry and poor contract enforcement.24 The results are unexpected

complementarities between migration and trade, and migration and FDI, and more efficient transfer

of knowledge and technology, with an impact on business that is analogous to a reduction in the risk

premium of the home country.25

A particular application of this social capital approach to diaspora impact is the realization of the

unfulfilled promise of FDI through diaspora investment and diaspora management of foreign

20 Rapoport, Hillel and Frederic Docquier. 2005. “The Economics of Migrants’ Remittances,” Stanford University Work Paper No. 236, p.6.
21 Meyer, Jean-Baptiste. 2001. “Network Approach vs. Brain Drain: Lessons from the diaspora,” International Migration Vol. 39 (5), Malden:
Blackwell. Rauch, James E. 2001. “Business and Social Networks in International Trade,” Journal of Economic Literature Vol. XXXIX, 1177-1203.
22 Op. cit., Meyer 2001, p.97.
23 Docquier, F. and H. Rapoport. 2004: Skilled migration: the perspective of developing countries, Policy Research Working paper, 3382, The World
Bank: Washington, p. 22.
24 Op. cit., Rauch 2001.
25 Op. Cit., Docquier Rapoport (DR) 2004.

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investments. Rodrik (2004) points out that the technology and learning spillovers that are used to

justify FDI subsidization have not been substantiated empirically.26 Foreign firms may have neither

the motivation nor understanding to transfer knowledge and technology to locals.

Balasubramanyam and Wei (2005) argue that the contagion theory of technology transfer requires

the type of personal contact that a member of the diaspora can better provide due to a shared

culture and language. Similarly, local knowledge means a diaspora member working for a foreign

investor can better identify, support and train local suppliers. As a result, “the social rate of return

to a unit of investment by the diaspora may be higher than that in the case of non-diaspora foreign

direct investment.”27

Critics have argued that least developed countries are not prepared to put such knowledge transfer

from the diaspora to productive use, implying that these spillovers are not worth the loss of human

capital from migration.28 One might respond that with one of the most educated populations in

Africa but zero growth in GDP/capita for 20 years from 1980 to 2000 (Appendix 1), human capital

was not producing returns for Zimbabwe, so why not let the high-skilled at least be productive in

the diaspora and hope that some knowledge makes its way back? Or, as Meyer (2001) quotes from

the Description of the Colombian Network of Scientists and Engineers Abroad:

The expatriates have settled abroad in excellent conditions…which make it unrealistic to call
them back here successfully; however, they may still be interested in their country of origin;
let’s then try to connect them with it and benefit not only from their individual embedded

26 Rodrik, Dani. 2004. “Industrial Policy for the 21st Century,” Prepared for UNIDO, September 2004 Version, p.30.
27 Balasubramanyam, V. N. and Yingqi Wei. 2005. “The diaspora and Development,” Lancaster: Lancaster University Dept of Economics, p. 1,7-9.
28 UNCTAD. 2007. “Addressing the International Emigration of Skilled Persons.” The Least Developed Countries Report. Geneva: United Nations, p.149.

12
 knowledge but also from the extensive socio-professional networks that they have built
abroad and to which they are connected in their daily activity.29

In Zimbabwe my research indicates that the highly skilled certainly are still interested in their country

of origin, and if conditions were not yet right for return, would be eager to connect in this way.

2.4.4 Examples

Classic evidence for diaspora development theories comes from the contribution of the Chinese

diaspora to its remarkable economic growth,30 at least a portion of which can be attributed to the

positive effects of its diaspora networks on trade.31 Similarly, Taiwan’s diaspora is widely credited

with aiding the development of its electronic industry.32 Inspired by stories like these, countries

ranging from Singapore to Ghana to the Dominican Republic have begun to focus on the latent

potential of diaspora economic participation, making formal efforts to connect with their diasporas

and encourage expatriates’ involvement in development.33 International organizations are following

suit. In November 2007 the World Bank Africa Region completed its first “Open House for

African Diaspora” focusing on ways the Bank could help the diaspora contribute to home country

development.34 Around the world, networks are forming and formalizing. The Colombian network

29 Op. Cit., Meyer 2001, p. 7.

30 See, for example: International Organization for Migration. 2008. “Diaspora and Development,” IOM Website:
http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pid/539
31 Rauch, James E. and Vitor Trindande. 2002. “Ethnic Chinese Networks in International Trade,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, February 2002,
84(1): p. 129.
32 Op. cit., Juma 2005.
33 Ibid. for Singapore and Dominican Republic. Evidence from Ghana: Owusu-Ankomah, Hon. Papa, MP, Minister of the Interior. 2006. “Emigration
from Ghana: A Motor or a Brake for Develpoment,” Keynote Address at 39th Session of Commission on Population and Development, New York:
April 4, 2006, Online: http://www.un.org/esa/population/cpd/cpd2006/CPD2006_Owusu_Ankomah_Statement.pdf
34 World Bank. 2007. “Open House for Mobilizing the African diaspora for Develeopment,” Online: http://go.worldbank.org/LUCCX35X80

13
quoted above is one of 41 “highly skilled expatriate” networks that emerged both in diasporas and

countries of origin, from the 1990s to 2001.35 An African example of this type of network is the

South African Network of Skills Abroad (SA). SANSA uses a web presence to connect with South

Africans throughout the world.36 Many of these examples are too recent to provide empirical

certainty about diaspora impact, but they can provide useful models and offer hope that even in

Zimbabwe’s current crisis, there are seeds of reconstruction and new growth.

3. Conceptualizing Zimbabwe’s Challenge

3.1 Three Forces

Addressing the economic challenge and opportunity posed by Zimbabwe’s ever growing diaspora

involves a sort of “predictive policy analysis” that is at the same time elusive and critical. It is elusive

because not only the are the outcomes of any future diaspora policy unknown, but even the context

– political, economic, and otherwise – in which this policy will be implemented is at present

undetermined. A government that actually wants to maximize the impact of its diaspora may be one

month away or five years. This analysis is critical, however, because addressing both economic

crises and mass-migrations requires making decisions under conditions where both time and data are

in short supply. As excessive deliberation can be costly, even a limited prior understanding of the

nature of the problem and likely solutions should be of value. With this in mind, I look at the case

35 Op. Cit., Meyer 2001, p.7.

36 SANSA website: http//sansa.nrf.ac.za

14
of Zimbabwe from the vantage points of 3 forces that will play a dominant role in the diaspora’s

contribution to economic reconstruction:

1. The choices and behaviors of individuals in the diaspora.

2. The activities and influence of networks of organizations in the diaspora.

3. The policy and priorities of a future Zimbabwe government.

In reality, these forces are intertwined and interdependent, I separate them for analytical clarity in

addressing a multi-layered challenge. Working from least to most formally organized, I examine the

how individual/household decisions shape the diaspora’s migration behavior and future

involvement with development. Then I look at the role played by organizational networks in the

diaspora – principally represented by a rapidly expanding and interlinking group of Zimbabwe

diaspora civil society organizations – in mobilizing individuals toward community goals. Finally, I

analyze and recommend government policy designed to maximize the economic impact of the

diaspora, given the nature of the first two forces and their interactions.

Figure 1: 3 Forces Interacting to Affect Zimbabwe’s Diaspora Impact

 Household Individuals Networks  Diaspora

Decisions Organizations

Policy

 Zimbabwe
Government

15
3.2 Tools of Analysis

To address these forces in the presence of significant data availability and reliability constraints I

employ the use of:

1. Economic models of migration (see Section 4.1).

2. Evidence from the experience of other countries (throughout).
3. Imperfect but insightful survey studies of the Zimbabwean diaspora (Makina 2007 and
Bloch 2005, introduced in Section 2).v
4. Primary Research: one-on-one interviews with representatives from diaspora organizations
supplemented with related document reviews (see Section 3.2.1 below).

Primary Qualitative Data Sources & Research Questions

While the understanding that diaspora can be a force for development, beyond just the sending of

remittances, is growing (see Section 2.4), there is little in the way of theory about how to craft an

effective diaspora policy for a country given its particular circumstances. Our use of qualitative

methods is aimed at developing hypotheses about the behavior of the Zimbabwe diaspora and

diaspora organizations and suggesting a theory of how it can best contribute to development. In

addition, a deeper understanding of the texture of this subject, by listening to interviewees describe

attitudes, motivations and cultural realities that are not easy to measure, should contribute to policy

recommendations that are more likely to be implementable and politically feasible.

The two main sources for primary research data on the organized Zimbabwean diaspora are

interviews with individual leaders of grass roots diaspora organizations and review of documents

produced by the diaspora, including in new media as weblogs. The questions with which these

16
interviews and document reviews were approached are:

1. What will influence/motivate the Zimbabwe diaspora to contribute to its future economic
development?
2. What are the most effective types of contributions to development that Zimbabwean
emigrants can make?
3. What policies, if any, could a future government employ to bring about these desirable
contributions?

I conducted nine in-depth interviews, primarily over the phone, with representatives from a variety

of diaspora organizations (see Table 1), often connected to a common network, and one close

observer of the UK Zimbabwe diaspora. Purposeful sampling was used to select cases that

represent a range of perspectives/organizations within what turned about to be an overall tightly

knit network of diaspora fora. These organizations serve and represent Zimbabweans from a

spectrum of professions or lack thereof, as well as both major ethnic groups (Shona and Ndebele).

Seven interviewees were located primarily in South Africa – as it is the location of most

Zimbabweans abroad, a case of less-studied “South-South” migration, and a hub of the diaspora

network due to a critical mass in Johannesburg – and two were in the UK. Participants named have

been replaced with numeric codes for confidentiality purposes and are cited in the text by that 3-

digit code. To supplement the interviews in studied the organizations represented, I reviewed

diaspora organization websites, conference proceedings, petitions, and project plans, as well as

personal and political weblogs and other new media that have sprung up rapidly in the recent years

facilitating communication in the diaspora.

17
4. Individual Decisions IND

The nature of diasporas, while not exclusively so, are heavily shaped by the optimizing decisions of

individuals or households. Migrants believe that leaving one’s home country will result in a better

outcome (however defined) than staying there. Maximizing the impact of the diaspora, whether

through repatriation or remote investment, requires some analysis of the migration decision itself.

Below I construct a model to facilitate analysis of this decision and discuss some predictions for

Zimbabwe based on a combination of the model and research data. Finally I turn to important

questions related to individual skills such as: Will those with key skills return or in some other way

contribute to reconstruction? Are new skills being acquired? Is there deskilling?

4.1 Modeling Migration and the Diaspora

Most classic economic models of migration – including those that include the possibility of return

migration – are centered around the utility maximizing choice of an individual or unitary household,

and heavily focused on the wage differentials between the foreign (host) country/region and the

home country/region (Borjas 1989, Harris-Todaro 1970, Hill 1985).37 One criticism of these

models is that they ignore the role of collective entities, such as communities or larger households,

in migration decisions where issues of risk diversification, for example, come into play.38 This

criticism is relevant to the case of Zimbabwe because of the extensive social networks in the

37 I cite papers with economic models in the text when drawing from their overall themes as opposed to specific points. In such cases, see
Bibliography for full citation.
38 Massey, Douglas S., Joaquin Arango; Graeme Hugo; Ali Kouaouci; Adela Pellegrino; and J. Edward Taylor. 1993. “Theories of International
Migration: A Review and Appraisal,” Population and Development Review, Vol. 19, No. 3. (Sep., 1993), pp. 436.

18
Zimbabwe diaspora and the critical role they seem to play in the lives and choices of individual

emigrants. Another issue with traditional models is that they often emphasize prices, or wage

differentials, at the expense of preferences, or “attachment” to living at home versus abroad.39 In

Zimbabwe, and one suspects elsewhere, interviews, surveys, and observations of the diaspora

consistently point to a complex and interesting host of factors that affect diaspora decisions through

the preferences side of the equation.

To address these issues, I present a model of diaspora size affected by both price and preferences,

and at least providing a channel for the role of community and network decisions.40 I draw some

inspiration from the models mentioned above as well as Hatton and Williamson’s (2002) idea of

“compensating differential”41 and Hill’s (1985) representation of a migration-duration choice.42 The

setup of the model is particularly informed by my observation and conversations with members of

the Zimbabwean diaspora, particularly those in South Africa. A more detailed mathematical

explanation of the model, including a discussion of key assumptions, is presented in Appendix 2.

4.1.1 A Model of Equilibrium Diaspora Size

I construct my stylized model of diaspora size ( n , as a percent of the populationvi) as an equilibrium

between a given earnings differential, and the value of preferences (attachment) for the
!

39 This argument is made in a different way in: Stark, Oded. 2003. “Tales of Migration without Wage Differentials: Individual, Family, and Community
Contexts,” Paper prepared for Conference on African Migration in Comparative Perspective, Johannesburg, South Africa, 4-7 June, 2003.
40 Professor Filipe Campante helped tremendously in building this model.
41 Hatton, Timothy J. and Jeffrey G. Williamson, 2002. “What fundamentals Drive World Migration,” NBER Working Paper 9159
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9159, p.7
42 Hill, John K. 1985. Immigrant decisions concerning duration of stay and migratory frequency,” Journal of Development Economics 25 (1987), p.227

19
“motherland” as Zimbabweans call it. My earnings differential function, E = w f " w h (n) slopes

downward with n , as a growing diaspora reduces the labor supply at home and with it the wage
!
disparity between countries. This effect may be weaker than usual in Zimbabwe’s current situation
!
of hyperinflation and economic collapse. The second function shows attachment [ A = n"(n,# , $ ) ]

by tracing a cumulative distribution of preferences for living at home; it is analogous to a supply

!
curve, showing the increasing compensation required for a larger proportion of the population to

migrate. For a given n , the attachment level depends on variable “push” and “pull” factors, such as

the proportion of family members left behind, that influence an average individual attachment
!
multiplier ( " ), and factors, such as political stability at home or xenophobia in the host country, that

influence a population-wide attachment multiplier ( " ).

!

The general shape of the attachment curve (see Figure 2) is determined by its complex relationship
!
with the size of the diaspora ( n ). In keeping with the literature, we show that early increases in

diaspora size reduce the slope of the attachment curve. For example, a larger n means more
!
Zimbabweans in South Africa, and their welcoming presence should put downward pressure on
!
attachment to home. However, this effect logically has diminishing marginal returns.vii In addition,
43

collective decision-making could mean that the social pressure on the first set of migrants from a

community to leave home and send remittances is much stronger than that on subsequent migrants.

In addition, my qualitative study indicates that having a very large Zimbabwean presence in South

Africa seems associated with an increased attachment for homeland through at least two channels.

43 See Op. Cit., Hatton and Williamson 2002, p.7-8.

20
First, xenophobia has increased in response to the mass migration, and the hostile atmosphere

increases longing for home. Second, the diaspora seems to have reached a critical mass that

catalyzed an explosion of networked organizations whose existence fosters attachment and whose

primary activities often direct the diaspora to plan for return. The result of all of this is a sort of

“saturation” effect that decelerates the pace of emigration after a certain size threshold has been

reached. The two opposing effects of diaspora size on attachment generate a flat section in the

middle of the attachment curve where migration in either direction is very responsive to changes in

circumstance, and a steep section at higher values of n. (See Figure 2).

Equilibrium diaspora size ( n *) in the model occurs when the earnings differential is equal to the

attachment level.viii In other words, the benefits to migrating must match the value of staying home
!
for the individual in the n th percentile. Migration occurs as a gradual response to movement in

either the earnings curve, or the attachment curve. Given what has appeared to be a recent
!
exponential increase in migration from Zimbabwe, we can depict the economic collapse as a large

vertical shift of the earnings curve, over the highly elastic (flat) section of the attachment curve – due

to a moderately-sized initial diaspora population – resulting in the equilibrium seen below. At

present it is plausible, though not entirely clear, that Zimbabwe is approaching a “saturation” stage

where migration will decelerate.

21
 Figure 2: An Economic Collapse with an Existing Diaspora Results in Massive
Migration
($)
A = n"(n,#,$ )

! !

!
w f " w h1
w f " wh 0

!
!
E1

E0
n0
n
n*
!
4.1.2 The (Highly Probable) Decision to Return
! !
! !
An implication of the model is that large scale and perhaps rapid return migration can take place

with an economic improvement – a downward shift in E – or with something that alters the

attachment level, for example, increasing λ through a major improvement in the political situation,

increasing the population-wide attachment multiplier β. Indeed in Bloch’s (2005) survey, 80% of

prospective returnees listed “improved political situation” as a condition for their return, the same

fraction that listed “improved economic situation.”44 Figure 3 depicts such a political improvement

scenario, for example a stable and democratic government taking over after the March 29th elections.

We expect an increase in β, causing A to pivot upwards, thus reducing n *. In other words, we

44 Op. Cit. Bloch 2005. P.77.

22
 would see large scale return migration, tempered by a decrease in wages. ix While wages should be

inelastic to return migrants in the long term, this effect is synonymous with the country’s ability to

absorb return migrants, which for Zimbabwe may be limited in the short term (806).45 On the other

hand, the model hints that if a new political regime could stabilize inflation and thus reduce the

earnings differential, we’d see an even larger return migration.

Figure 3: A Political Improvement Sparks Return Migration

($)
A' = n"(n,#,$ ')

! !
A = n"(n,#,$ )
w f " w h1
! !
w f " wh 0

! !
!
E

n
n* n0
Two reasons why we might not expect such as massive return to Zimbabwe are migration costs and !
some kind of decay of the attachment function once one becomes a migrant, or over time. (Think

! !
!
of " , the individual attachment multiplier, as decreasing with respect to average years away from

home). Certainly migration costs could inhibit complete return, but globalization and South-South
!
45 3-digit codes represent confidential interviewee identifiers. Hereafter I simple cite in with the code in the text.

23
migration has drastically reduced the relative costs of return migration. No respondents in the

Bloch survey listed being able to afford the move as a condition for return.

It also seems that attachment level remains strong for those who have left Zimbabwe, and is

perhaps even enhanced (through " as an average of individual experiences) once abroad by family

ties to home, by ill-treatment encountered in South Africa, or by cultural disconnect and cold
!
weather in the UK (802-805,807,908). Bloch’s survey found that 67% of expatriates surveyed

wanted to return to Zimbabwe, 21% said “maybe,” and only 12% said no, generally citing economic

and political reasons.46 These responses were consistent over a variety of personal characteristics,

including age. Further analysis of the IOM data and the similar results of Makina (2007), if made

available, could break these responses down by time outside of the country. Other evidence can be

inferred from the IOM survey where 96% kept in “regular social contact with family members” in

Zimbabwe.47 Compare this to a survey in Ghana that found that only 78% of actual returnees had

maintained “regular contact with family while abroad.”48x A further indication of social connection

is that Zimbabweans in the UK are even still “tithing” to their churches in Zimbabwe (908).

Further evidence to support the model’s return prediction is offered by the expatriates themselves.

One interviewee explains: “We were shocked by what happened. We were not expecting it. We

didn't decide to move over time. We still cling to the hope that things will change very soon” (802).

Another states simply: “Most people want to go home” (808). A third connects the massive return

46 Op. Cit. Bloch 2005, p.77.

47 Op. Cit. Bloch 2005, p.10.
48 Black, Richard, Russell King, and Richmond Tiemoko. 2003. “Migration, return and small enterprise development in Ghana: a route out of
poverty?” International Workshop on Migration and Poverty in West Africa, Sussex: Sussex Centre for Migration Research, p. 18.

24
to participation in government, implicitly dismisses pull factors like earnings differentials, and

suggests that a small shift can trigger big moves (italics mine):

“If diasporans help make up the next government, I see three quarters if not 90% of
Zimbabweans from all over the world. I see them going back to Zimbabwe and
rebuilding…the push factor is the government, so the assumption really is that if that
government steps down with its structures and policies, we see an improvement in the
economy and the political discourse of the country. Of course it won’t be radical, but I think
everyone is just ready to go there to contribute one way or another” (803).

As for attachment decay, multiple interviewees cited the Jewish diaspora as a model for their

community and devotion to homeland. Another talked about making sure that he was buried in

Zimbabwe. Others claimed:

“No one wants to stay away forever” (801).

"These people will never lose their allegiance to Zimbabwe” (802).
“Right now, no one is forgetting about Zimbabwe” (805).
“I believe so much in Zimbabwe. I feel I am only here for a certain period” (804).

4.2 What will Individuals Contribute?

4.2.1 Non-returnee Participation

So far, we have primarily emphasized the decisions individuals make to repatriate. However, it is

not only return migrants who represent the potential for positive diaspora impact. As critical if not

moreso will be that individuals who stay in the diaspora chose to contribute in other ways, such as

skills transfer programs, in which 73% of Bloch’s (2005) respondents said they wanted to

25
participate.49

Graph 3: Predicted Involvement of Diaspora in Development is Large

Source: Bloch 2005

The diaspora size model that might be stretched to address this issue is we analogize the choice to

return migrate to the choice to participate/contribute to development. While such a choice would

be influenced by the costs of that contribution, a key role is played by attachment to homeland, a

function of a number of factors the government may be able to affect. The importance to

attachment level of the diaspora’s relationship to the government is seen in that, when asked what

would enable them to contribute to development or do so more effectively, 60% of Bloch’s survey

cited political changes, whereas only 50% mentioned economic opportunities.50 Of the 24% in

Bloch’s survey who were either uncertain or uninterested in development, half cited the current

49 Op. Cit., Bloch 2005. Ch. 6, pp. 75-83.

50 Ibid., pp. 75-83.

26
political situation as their reason for this lack of interest, indicating it could change.51 Encouragingly,

for those like who concur with the argument that the social return of diaspora investment is more

effective than traditional FDI, the number one cited means of preferred contribution to

development was investment in business.

4.2.2 Capital and Skills Accumulation Abroad

The impact of diaspora returnees is often linked with the human capital, or the new knowledge and

technology they bring back with them (Section 2.4.2), as well as the savings they have accumulated

for local investment.52 In order for this to benefit Zimbabwe, migrants must be accumulating

knowledge and capital abroad. This is often assumed to be true, but the refugee-like conditions

faced by at least of a part of the diaspora in South Africa might diminish these hopes. One

interviewee spoke of teachers, 100,000 of whom he estimated have left Zimbabwe, turning to

prostitution to survive. He said that many Zimbabwean professionals in the diaspora could not use

their resumes in South Africa, and could only get jobs for the uneducated (802). Others pointed to a

mixture of deskilling and learning new skills that were unavailable inside Zimbabwe, and that the

unskilled were certainly learning new trades (803, 805). In particular, there was agreement that

expatriates were getting significant new exposure to Information and Communications Technologies

(ICTs). Survey data suggests a similar mixture of trends. Bloch reports that 54% of respondents

living in the UK and 24% in South Africa obtained some sort of professional qualification, 12% of

51 Ibid. pp. 75-83.

52 Op. Cit., Black 2003, p.18.

27
the total qualifications coming at a post-graduate level. She confirms evidence of increased ICT

training as well. At the same time she finds evidence of unused skills with 38% reported not using

some skills, but believes this understates the loss suggested by degradation of actual job titles.53

However, the downward occupational mobility that worries Bloch might not be as worrisome if

there were an oversupply of “professionals” in relation to the types of work available. It may be that

“trades” are more economically productive given the industrial capacity of Zimbabwe, and that

psychological barriers (inability to count educational investments as sunk costs, attitudes about class)

prevented the proper allocation of labor into these types of activities. Representatives of diaspora

professional organizations reported that many professionals are diversifying into new trades and

learning entrepreneurial skills in South Africa (803, 805). Before migrating “they were focused on

tertiary skills: accounting and personnel management. When they go back, they start their own shops

and do computer repairs” (805). Given that Zimbabwe’s economy has been stagnating since 1980,

this type of skills turbulence might be productive. Especially promising might be the achievement

of “new levels of ICT”(806). One application suggested by a Zimbabwean IT professional in New

York is that Zimbabwe, with its proximity to South Africa and strong base of English language

skills, could support a call-center industry.54

53 Op. Cit., Bloch 2005, p. 60.

54 Ndlovu, Robert. 2007. “Open Letter to POTRAZ,” Association of Zimbabwe Journalists website, Online:
http://www.zimbabwejournalists.com/story.php?art_id=3014&cat=1

28
5. Networks and Organizations NET

The use of diaspora technological knowledge to develop new industries like the call centers

suggested above might be enhanced by some sort of coordinating mechanism. As suggested in

Section 2.4.3, the social networks that exist within a diaspora have the potential to provide such a

coordinating mechanism, overcoming market failures that could prevent productive investments

from taking place. This coordinating potential seems to be growing in the case of Zimbabwe. The

web of informal ties that connects the diaspora seems to be gathering into organizational nodes that

accelerate the movement of resources and knowledge between individuals and groups. My

contention is that the increasingly organized networks connecting the Zimbabwe diaspora fill a

unique role by combining the responsiveness of personal relationships with the coordination ability

of organizations. Thus these networks emerge as a force that has the power to shape the impact of

the diaspora.

For my analysis I look primarily at a network of Zimbabwe diaspora organizations based in South

Africa but increasingly and intentionally connecting to the global Zimbabwe diaspora. I start by

describing a recent phenomenon whereby diaspora organizations have formed, interlinked, and

adapted their missions to a forward-looking view of Zimbabwe’s development. I then diagram the

structure of this network in South Africa, explain how can facilitate responsiveness and

coordination, and discuss the potential impact and current limitations of the network.xi The

potential policy responses of a future government are included in Section 6.

29
5.1 The Spontaneous Organization of the Zi mbabwe Diaspora

Starting with the question of how the highly-skilled diaspora might participate in Zimbabwe’s future

development, I quickly discovered a recent – and relatively undocumented – phenomenon: that is,

the apparently spontaneous formation of an organized network of Zimbabwean diaspora groups and

the shift these organizations are making from advocacy and refugee assistance to concrete planning

for development. While there have been significant numbers of Zimbabweans in South Africa since

the early 1990s, it seems only recently have formal diaspora organizations begun to spring up with

such frequency - often initially in response to growing humanitarian needs of the Zimbabwean

diaspora in South Africa. These organizations are relational in nature. For example, the idea for the

Zimbabwe CSO Forum (see Table 1) began “at someone’s house one Sunday afternoon at a braaixii”

(807). Perhaps due to their relational nature, I observe an uncanny adaptability of these

organizations toward future opportunities to make an impact.

Table 1 lists the diaspora organizations examined in this study. It shows that these organizations are

very young, supporting a theory that a critical mass of migrants was an important catalyst for their

formation. Secondly, the table highlights (in the right-hand column) instances where an

organization’s defined mission has been augmented, adding a forward-looking orientation and a new

focus on development in Zimbabwe in addition to life in the host country. Of particular note is that

the updated missions are often directly in line with theory on how a diaspora can aid development.xiii

30
Table 1: The Founding and Evolving Mission of Zimbabwe Diaspora Organizations
Organization Date Mission/Focus

Refugee/Diaspora Organizations

Zimbabwe Refugee Association 2000s Uphold human rights and welfare of Zimbabweans by
(Johannesburg) bringing small refugee orgs together to help each other.

Zimbabwe Restoration 2000s Protect rights of refugees (originally)

Association (Durban)
+ Empower members to reconstruct/develop Zim
[formerly Zimbabwe Refugee Association]
through skill building (IT, Engineering, Construction).

Zimbabwe Political Victims 2003 Serve the full needs of Zimbabwean refugees.
Association (ZIPOVA)
+ Service and advocate for the development of the
Zimbabwe diaspora. Train people in skills development.

Zimbabwe Exiles Forum 2003 Document the atrocities visited upon Zimbabweans
inside and outside Zimbabwe.

+ Prepare to bring cases to new Zim judiciary. Assist

economic refugees with repatriation.

Professional Organizations

Doctors in the Diaspora 2005 Deal with the problems of registration issues, free labor
mobility for doctors within SADC region.

+ “We decided to use our groups who formed [for

political reasons] as a developmental tool. So when Zim
doctors leave, they contact us and we use them to help
their home regions in many ways.”

Zimbabwe Legal Professionals 2006 Convince South Africa that Zimbabwean lawyers have a
Association role to play there.

+ Help members learn models of democracy to bring

back to Zimbabwe.

Association of Zimbabwe 2005 Assist Zimbabwe Journalists Living Abroad

Journalists
+ Gain skills to build independent Zim media. “Let’s
come together and prepare for a new Zimbabwe.”

31
Cultural

Mthwakazi Forum 2005 Provide a forum (in South Africa) where Zimbabweans
interested in socio-political issues can debate them.

Related Meta-Organizations

Zimbabwe CSO Forum 2005 Promote civil society by uniting/strengthening the CSO
sector to influence development policy and advocate for
a new prosperous and democratic Zimbabwe.

Global Zimbabwe Forum 2007  Create an international platform for all

Zimbabweans based outside the country.
 Mobilize development funds for ZDDC (below)
 Develop the human capital of the diaspora for the
benefit of Zimbabwe’s development.
 Prepare the diaspora to plan and influence, without
confrontation, the future of Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe Diaspora 2008 Investment Facility to Finance New Businesses and

Development Chamber Projects in Zimbabwe

One interviewee described the formation and changes to these organizations as follows:

Because of the necessity, these networks have evolved and unified us. They are much
stronger than before the crises or even 10 years ago. We used to have social clubs. But we
have developed from social clubs to what we have now. We know each other, we know
who is doing what, and who has which skills (803).

In a sense, crisis and hardships have resulted in more social capital, and have exogenously provided a

“clear mission around which the diaspora can rally.”55 The recently formed Global Zimbabwe

Forum and Zimbabwe Diaspora Development Chamber – birthed out of the CSO Forum – are

explicit attempts to further unify the diaspora, and to develop solutions to the challenge of

Zimbabwe’s economic future (see Appendix 5 for details). Unfortunately, at present there is little to

55 Op. Cit. Juma 2005.

32
no communication between the government of Zimbabwe and the core of this diaspora network

(see Figure 4 in next section), thus limited its current potential impact.

5.2 Visualizing and Assessing the Network

Figure 4 below depicts a stylistic diagram of the structure of the diaspora organization network in

South Africa based on my interpretation of the interviews and documents I studied. My raw data

substantiates the major linkages but the diagram intends to be conceptual rather than factual.xiv

Figure 4: Diagram of the Zimbabwe Diaspora Network in South Africa

Key:
= Network Connection
= Connection to Zim
= Civil Society Org Entity HQ in:
= Firm/Project = South Africa
= Individual Served = Zimbabwe
= $ Flow = Other Countries

This social distance between each South African entity in this network is actually quite small thanks

33
to the informal personal networks (not shown) that exist between both the leaders and the members

of these organizations (803, 807). It is common to see someone serving in more than one of these

organizations at once. One result is that information travels extremely fast from one end of the

network to the other. Add that a number of the organizations provide direct services to individuals

in the diaspora, and the network becomes a responsive organism. A typical case might involve a

migrant arriving at a church seeking temporary shelter, being quickly connected with a refugee

organization that works to help her get documentation, and then linked with an organization

representing her profession (801, 803). The inter-organization communication required for daily

transactions like these means that the leaders of the organizations are continually aware of the

“situation on the ground.” My hypothesis is that this structure has enabled the organizations to

become aware of the need for things like skills development and change their missions accordingly.

Coordination in this network has so far been facilitated by the Zimbabwe CSO Forum (“SA

Forum”, the hub of the network, in Figure 4 above). One gets the sense that its organizers have

maintained the “braai-centered,” relational approach to coordinating the actions of diaspora

organizations. At the same time, they are using those relationships to gain acceptance for a singular

and centrally-organized approach to some of the larger development challenges such as creating a

comprehensive and confidential database of the diaspora, generating a fund (“Dev Fund” above) to

provide startup capital for Zimbabwean businesses to be incubated in Southern Africa (805).56

56 Interview with 805 as well as Zim CSO Forum article on Zimbabwe Diaspora Development Chamber, available here:
http://www.zimcsoforum.org/index.php?module=Pagesetter&func=viewpub&tid=2&pid=103

34
It is lamentable that the effective coordination and responsiveness of the network in South Africa is

of little help to Zimbabwe presently. As figure 4 attempts to show, only one organization

interviewed had any contact with representatives of the government due to the fact that the regime

perceives the diaspora as a political threat (805).xv In addition, the “political landscape prevents

anyone in the diaspora from helping organizations on the ground in Zimbabwe”(801) according to

one interviewee, but another felt that the diaspora was not doing enough: “we have a number of

networks in Zimbabwe that we can connect with, but we are losing touch with the reality back

home”(806). This limited contact between networks in South Africa and Zimbabwe (also depicted

above) is a reminder that even the most effective diaspora network needs a direct and open channel

to its home country if it is to have a significant impact.

6. Policy to Maximize Diaspora Impact

POL

The open channel described above is precisely where the third force, policy, is critical. A

government of Zimbabwe that recognizes individuals and networks in the diaspora as an asset for

recovery and future development can be a necessary catalyst to maximize the diaspora’s impact. In

fact, if only a single policy recommendation could be drawn from the preceding analysis, it would be

just that: actively and explicitly recognize that the diaspora is an asset. Based on the available theory and

examples, and the above analysis of the actions of individuals and networks, I form the following

philosophy, which guides the thinking behind the policy tracks delineated in the remaining sections:

35
 1. The tools available to any government – much less one inheriting an economic meltdown –
in “directing” its diaspora are limited.

2. However, it is not presumptuous to assume that the diaspora has a latent desire and ability to
contribute to development.

3. Therefore the best policies are measures that enable and encourage (not manipulate) that
contribution, including mechanisms of communication, institutions that establish the
diaspora’s role, and observable progress on core government functions.

6.1 Establish a Formal Partnershi p with th e Diaspora

The first step to encouraging expatriate contributions is explicitly recognizing their role by providing

an institutional platform for a partnership between the government and the diaspora. This platform

can provide a crucial link between the capabilities of the diaspora and the needs and priorities of the

home country, sorely needed in Zimbabwe (Section 5.2). Two-way communication can lead to “a

national work plan” for the diaspora to rally around, cited as a key factor in diaspora impact by

Calestous Juma.57 In the context of an LDC, it can also mobilize the diaspora to raise awareness and

resources from the developed world for its needs.

Governments have used a variety institutional forms to connect to their diasporas, including Serbia’s

Ministry of Diaspora, Bangladesh’s Ministry of Expatriates Welfare and Overseas Employment,

India’s High Level Committee with the Ministry of External Affairs, and Ghana’s Migration Unit in

the Ministry of the Interior.58 Embassies can provide the infrastructure for communication and

57 Email message from Professor Juma, African expert in Science, Technology and Society.
58 Serbian Ministry: http://www.mzd.sr.gov.yu/, Bangladesh: http://probashi.gov.bd/, India: http://indiandiaspora.nic.in/, Ghana: Op. Cit., Owusu-
Ankomah 2006.

36
coordination in host countries. An office in the home country, as well, could contribute to openness

and more cooperation between diaspora and locals (908). But more important than the structure of

this institution is that it remains responsive to the initiatives that come from the diaspora itself, as

such initiatives will have more momentum. Stretching a framework devised by Matthew Andrews,59

a diaspora network such as depicted in section 5.2 comes to the table with internal acceptance, and an

ability to implement initiatives that is most likely superior to that of the government. What the

diaspora does not have, and needs from the government, is the authority to carry out these initiatives,

or the words of one interviewee, “permission to carry out their plans” (803).

6.3.1 Map the Diaspora Network

A key component any diaspora policy should involve the collection of information on the diaspora.

Ghana, for example, is attempting to build a database of its expatriates.60 I argue that while this is

good idea, a better first step is to map the diaspora network. Management literature sheds light on

the importance of network mapping for understanding their behavior.61 Using a similar process to

that of this study, i.e. interviews with referrals and supplementary documents, a Diaspora Ministry

could quickly get a sense of the landscape of the diaspora network and learn who are the key

organizational and individual partners for future development initiatives. It could even outsource the

creation of a migrant or skills database to the networks themselves as the CSO Forum is already

59 See Andrews, Matthew. 2004. “Authority, acceptance, ability and performance-based budgeting reforms,” International Journal of Public Sector
Management, Vol. 17,4, pp. 332 – 344.
60 Op. Cit., Owusu-Ankomah 2006.
61 Krackhardt, D. and J.R. Hanson. 1993. “Informal Networks: The Company Behind the Chart,” Hvd Business Review, 71 (July/August (4)): 104-111.

37
working on this task. In general, a key goal of a Diaspora Ministry should be to establish a strong

channel to the organizational hubs of diaspora networks rather than entities at the periphery.

6.3.2 Two Way Communication

The result of this strong connection to the hub of a diaspora network is effective two-way

communication. One of the primary sentiments expressed by the organized diaspora is simply for a

voice. For example, a Zimbabwe lawyers association is hoping to share models of governance

acquired abroad with their home country (807). The magnitude of the diaspora, its importance to the

day-to-day survival of many of Zimbabwe’s citizens, and its potential for future development,

necessitate that the government solicit the input of the diaspora on certain policy issues. By getting

such input from the hubs of networks, it can ensure a broader base for the communication it is

receiving, and more members of the diaspora will feel represented than if a Diaspora Ministry was

perceived to listen only to special interests.

In the other direction, the presence of an organized diaspora community in a host country can raise

levels of awareness regarding the needs of the country of origin. A few interviewees hinted at the

role of diaspora organizations in lobbying NGOs and host countries governments for project

funding for Zimbabwe. If clear lines of communication between the Zimbabwe government and

the diaspora are established, the network of diaspora organizations can prioritize its appeals to

donors according to the policy needs of the country. This might combine the better element of

“searchers” – diaspora organizations who find projects that will succeed on the ground – and

38
“planners” – the Diaspora Ministry’s ability to fit these projects into a nationwide strategy.62

6.2 Protect the L egal and Political Status of the Diaspora

The majority of expatriates I surveyed felt insecure about any financial investments they would make

in Zimbabwe. This feeling may have a number of causes, but one way to begin to alleviate these

fears and make it easier for the diaspora to contribute in many ways is to establish institutions that

protect and define their status. Two such institutions are citizenship and voting.

6.2.1 Pass a Dual Citizenship (Retention-of-Nationality) Amendment

Currently the constitution of Zimbabwe forces any emigrant who voluntarily becomes a citizen of

another country, or who remains outside of Zimbabwe for seven consecutive years, to lose their

Zimbabwe citizenship.63 While policies of this nature are consistent with the historical position of

most countries, there has been a growing trend toward allowing dual citizenship – or more

appropriately for the case of Zimbabwe, “retention-of-nationality” – particularly among sending

countries that see large potential economic benefits to maintaining stronger ties with emigrants.64

Perhaps inspired by the productive role played by the diaspora and learning-by-doing in its IT-sector

boom,65 India recently introduced a dual citizenship policy for “strategic” host countries.66 Closer to

62 Of course Easterly doesn’t see many “better” elements of planners: Easterly, William. 2006. The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the
Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good , New York: The Penguin Press, 2006.
63 US Office of Personnel Management. 2001. “Citizenship Laws of the World,” IS-1. Online: http://www.opm.gov/extra/investigate/IS-01.pdf
64 Escobar, Cristina. 2003. “Various Routes to Dual Citizenship: the Colombian Experience in the Latin American and Caribbean Context," Presented
at annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Atlanta, GA. Online: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p106620_index.html; Also
Dahlin, Eric and Anne Hironaka. 2008. “Citizenship Beyond Borders: A Cross-National Study of Dual Citizenship,” Sociological Inquiry, Feb 2008,
Vol. 78,1, pp. 54-73.
65 Kapur, Devesh. 2002. “The causes and consequences of India's IT boom”, India Review, 1:2, 101.

39
home, Ghana authorized dual citizenship in 2003,67 and Tanzania has proposed it; proponents claim

it will bring in “US$2.5 billion worth of wealth and expertise” from the diaspora.68 (Appendix 4

discusses recent cross-country analysis of dual citizenship and proposes future research).

Not surprisingly, representatives of Zimbabwean diaspora organizations also directly link dual

citizenship with diaspora economic impact. Such a policy would be a concrete step by the

government to ensure that “Zimbabweans who leave have a connection to their home” (802). In

addition to the symbolic value of maintaining their Zimbabwean identity, dual citizenship would also

have direct implications for the security of diaspora investments, which nearly every interviewee

cited as major constraint. Both of these effects could be channels for increased diaspora

contribution to development. Enabling the effectiveness of such a policy is the fact that most of the

biggest recipients of Zimbabwean emigrants allow dual citizenship for immigrants.

Table 2: Dual Citizenship for Immigrants Provided by Host Countries:

Host Country De Jure Dual Citizenship De Facto Dual Citizenship

South Africa Yes Administrative Hurdles

UK Yes Yes

USA Not Mentioned Yes

Canada Yes Yes

Botswana No No
Source: US OPM 2001

66 Op. Cit., Juma 2005.

67 Op. Cit. Owusu-Ankomah 2006, p. 5.
68 East African Business Week (EABW). 2007. “Nod Dual Citizeship,” Online:
http://www.busiweek.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3841&Itemid=31

40
Nevertheless, dual citizenship initiatives in other African nations, such as Liberia and Tanzania, have

been controversial, often touching a raw nerve of national identity. Common objections in these

countries were that it would only benefit an elite “unpatriotic” few in the diaspora, or that

administrative capacity is lacking to prevent fraud and corruption in the system.69 However,

Escobar notes that “the main controversy and major source of variation in dual citizenship policy in

sending countries has been the degree of restrictions, particularly political, based on the non-resident

status of the nationals abroad.”70 In response to this, it is important to emphasize that dual

citizenship does not necessarily imply certain political rights, such as the right to vote, hence the

“variation” in policy. These issues can be addressed by a government separately and/or in sequence.

The Liberian and Tanzanian objections regarding catering to elites and administrative capacity are

both mitigated by the fundamental difference in the facts on the ground. The massive size and

recent exodus of Zimbabwe’s diaspora mean, first, that the Zimbabwe diaspora is no small cadre of

elites but rather the fathers, mothers, brothers and sisters of those still in the country (908). This

should diffuse concerns about stirring up detrimental tension between locals and return expatriates

(909). Second, the primary means of implementing a retention-of-nationality policy would be to do

nothing. In other words, since most of the diaspora has been outside of the country less than seven

years, by credibly promising not to revoke their citizenship, the government can take a major step

toward maintaining and strengthening the diaspora’s connection with home. If needed, the

69 Kivamwo, Simon. 2006. “Opinion on Dual Citizen System Split,” Sunday Observer, Jun 6, 2006. Online:
http://www.ippmedia.com/ipp/observer/2006/06/11/68158.html
70 Escobar, Cristina. 2006. “Extraterritorial political rights and dual citizenship in Latin America,” Latin American Research Review, Vol. 42, No. 3,
p.43.

41
processing of re-acquisition applications for those who have taken on other citizenship could be

phased in as administrative capacity is restored.

6.2.2 Enable Current Zimbabwean Citizens in the Diaspora to Vote

After lobbying for temporary asylum in host countries, perhaps the primary current goal of the

diaspora network, in terms of advocacy, is the right of current citizens in the diaspora to vote.71 The

ability to participate politically in the future government of Zimbabwe was consistently cited by

interviewees as critical to diaspora economic impact, more than financial incentives for return, for

example (803, 804, 806, 807). Electoral processes are in place for external voting in Zimbabwe, but it

is restricted to those outside the country in government service. The Zimbabwe Supreme Court

recently denied an appeal of this restriction by the diaspora in the UK and also ruled that this right

only applies to migrants who have not exceeded 12-months of residency outside Zimbabwe, adding

that the economic crisis meant resources were lacking to carry it out.72

The voting rights of citizens in the diaspora have, on the surface, more international support than

dual citizenship provisions, in that 115 countries allow some sort of “external voting” and many

constitutions make provisions or offer rights to vote abroad. 73xvi However, “while the constitutions

of many countries guarantee the right to vote for all citizens, in reality voters who are outside their

home country when elections take place are often disenfranchised because of a lack of procedures

71 Email message from officer of the CSO Forum, Feb 21, 2008.
72 International IDEA and Instituto Electoral Federal. 2007. Voting from Aboard, the International IDEA Handbook, Stockholm: Int’l IDEA, p. 58.
73 Ibid., pp. 1-4

42
enabling them to exercise that right.”74 For this reason, organizations like the IOM have begun to

offer assistance to help countries institute such procedures.75 This assistance would most likely be

available for a future Zimbabwe government and would help it clear the administrative hurdles of

granting this right. On the other hand, there will always be political hurdles to the constitutional

changes needed to ensure diaspora citizen voting rights. The best time to pass this type of reform

initiative would be shortly after an election, so that immediate political realities do not cloud the

merits or design of the policy. Most of all, the impact of this gesture on a people who feel that they

have no voice should not be underestimated. For some in the diaspora, it could be the difference

between losing hope, and losing touch, with Zimbabwe and contributing a brighter future.

6.3 “Nudge” Repatriation

While there are important benefits to sustaining a certain-sized diaspora as a channel for the transfer

of knowledge, foreign exchange and investment, a full recovery in Zimbabwe will require that a large

segment of the diaspora returns. When policies to encourage return migration are mentioned, what

often comes to mind are subsidies and other financial incentives to return. Yet, these can create

unforeseen distortions, and are unlikely to be sustainable. One of the implications of the model in

Section 4 is that migration decisions are not solely based on hard-incentives like income differences.

Furthermore, the evidence cited therein suggests that a change in “attachment to home” could

trigger a large repatriation. Below I suggest that addressing municipal public services is a mundane

74 Ibid., p. 1
75 Ibid., p. IV

43
way to increase this attachment and modulate urbanization. Finally, I admit that a targeted and

temporary incentive program may be needed to help address areas of critical skills shortage.

6.3.1 Rebuild Municipalities and Manage Urbanization

Many in the diaspora have remained connected with their home regions, where their families still

live. The diaspora organizations have attempted to maintain these linkages, by for example sending

doctors back to their home regions on visits to conduct training workshops (803). Nevertheless

increased urbanization should be anticipated as returnees look for jobs, and start businesses, in the

absence of regional inertia. This may be a mixed blessing. Urbanization could increase technology

and knowledge spillovers. On the other hand, a rapid return and urbanization will strain an already

dysfunctional system of public services. Municipalities have “totally broken down” leading some to

believe that “Zimbabwe is in no position to actually sustain a massive return in the next 5 years”

(806). Others cited public services as a key to getting the diaspora return home. Therefore,

investing in and restoring basic public services in local regions will both increase preference for

home by improving quality of life, and potentially make the pace of urbanization more manageable.

6.3.2 Use Targeted incentives to fill critical skills shortages.

Despite the apparent eagerness of many in the diaspora to return, there are massive skills shortages,

some of which pose urgent problems and will need to be remedied more quickly than the natural

rate of return, such as nurses, doctors, and teachers.76 In these cases, the government should

76 These needs reflect the opinion of interviewees. But an article in the UK Telegraph provides an example:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/11/18/wzim118.xml.

44
consider some sort of short-term incentive scheme – such as subsidized housing loans – that does

not commit it to large recurring costs. If a new government of Zimbabwe re-establishes relations

with the international community, there should be an ample supply of donors, such as the IOM,

willing to fund reconstruction initiatives. Short-term incentives for the repatriation of key skills is

the right kind of project for donor funding because it does not create dependencies in the budget,77

and organizations like the IOM have more capacity than the government to manage this type of

initiative.

In addition to working with intergovernmental organizations on this issue, the government should

take advantage of the significant investment that organizations have already made and continue to

make, in both determining regional needs and tracking the skills that exist in the diaspora. As one

said: “If the future government wants to tap into the diaspora groups, they can just use us as a

resource: ask us, ‘of the diaspora membership, how many are interested in this and this.’” (803).

And with that, and the evidence of a motivated, capable, and entrepreneurial diaspora eager to help

Zimbabwe become a jewel in Africa, we may shorten the policy recommendation to two words…

Just ask.

77 My thinking on this has been influenced by Prof. Stephen Peterson

45
Appendices

Appendix 1: Esti mates of Zi mbabwe Diaspo ra Size

Figure A1: Speculated Population Decline, Against Economic Collapse.78xvii

Zimbabwe GDP per capita

1980 1990 2000 2010

year

Constant GDP/capita in 1996 USD Population in Millions

Source: EIU Mar 2007
* Population trend using media estimates

The above “dramatizes” a population trend based on a sample media report.71 Six years ago, a 2002

study from within Zimbabwe “was able to establish that there are 479,348 Zimbabweans in the

diaspora although the study team is aware that there is a large number of diasporans that it could not

contact.”79 If the 2002 study was with a ballpark or two of the actual number, the commonly cited 4

million figure suggests multiplicative growth in just five years.

78 Depicts the data from SW Radio Africa. 2008. “Factsheet: The Zimbabwe Crisis”: http://www.swradioafrica.com/pages/factsheet081007.htm
79 Chetsanga, C. J. and T. Muchemje. . “An Analysis of the Cause and Effect of the Brain Drain in Zimbabwe,” Harare: Scientific and Industrial
Research and Development Centre. Online: http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d/Zimbabwe_Brain_Drain.pdf, p. 4.

46
Appendix 2: Additional Notes on Interview Methodology

A1.1 Sampling

Bias in the sample could obviously be introduced to due to selective response to my interview

requests, and the use of networks to identify survey respondents. However, the responses are

generally consistent with attitudes expressed in surveys. I also attempted to verify that responses

were not politically motivated, and found no evidence of a “party line” in responses. Nearly every

respondent emphasized that their organization was non-partisan, though some had been victims of

political repression in the past. And of course there is strong mutual distrust between the

government and the diaspora in general. Most importantly, the purpose of my interviews was not to

produce a representative picture of the diaspora, but to describe a phenomenon.

A1.2 Sample Interview Template

Hello, how are you doing?

Thanks again so much for your help with this.
Were you able to view the information sheet I emailed you this morning?

Personal

Years Outside of Zimbabwe:

Profession:

Family:

Business:

Future:

47
Organization:

Mission:

Membership (numbers, locations):

Primary Activities:

Future:

What types of networks exist between the members of ___ and the country of Zimbabwe? Flows of
resources? Investment? Remittances? Do members go back to visit?

How do your org’s activities help these networks?

What factors affect the involvement of your membership in Zimbabwe in the future?

What are the most effective types of contributions to development your members can make? What
factors influence whether/how they can make this contribution?

What policies, if any, could a future government employ to bring about these desirable contributions?

What is ____ current relationship to the govt?

What are other orgs doing?

Are Zims more attached to their country than others? Why?

What should a new govt do?

Thanks for your time.

Will you be available to answer any follow up questions over email?

Do you know of other organizations or people that I should speak with on these matters? (in the UK? not
part of ZDF?)

48
 Appendix 3: M athematical B asis and Assumptions for the Diaspora Size Model

My model for diaspora size starts with a cumulative distribution function that defines the probability

of a national living abroad given an earnings differential (E), which implicitly assigns a monetary

value to the value of living at home. This is definitionally equal to n, the proportion of the total

population of a given nationality that is in the diaspora (or “diaspora size”).

n " Pr[abroad] = F[E] (1)

I assume for simplicity that F is a uniformly distributed, a CDF that shows intrinsic attachment
!
levels in the population (which are unobservable). To incorporate factor-dependent attachment

levels I parameterize F as Fλ (F[0,λ] uniformly distributed with mean λ/2). I define:

F(x) = x/λ (2)

And x in this case is the earnings differential and λ represents the strength of attachment to home.

As is obvious, a larger λ means a smaller n, ceteris paribus. This equilibrium will provide for our

earnings and attachment functions, which get their character from the earnings differential and λ.

Note that the model does not incorporate the possibility of either a negative earnings differential or

a net “dis-attachment.”

Earnings Differential (E): I assume for simplicity that each potential migrant faces the same

earnings differential. This is most likely not the case in reality, and we could have explored how

migrants of different skill levels face different incentives to leave, resulting in a disproportionate loss

49
 of the highly-skilled. But this has been well-covered in the literature and is not the purpose of this

model. If desired, the model could be easily adapted by dividing the population into skill categories

and producing various values of ni where i is a skill category. I define the earnings differential as the

difference in log earnings abroad wf versus at home wh. If desired, w could be conceived as a

function of the probability of employment and the wage rate (as in Harris-Todaro 1970), and/or it

could represent the net present value of all future financial gains at home or abroad. These

modifications are not critical to the main conclusions from the model. No costs of migration are

factored into the earnings differential. These could easily be added as friction that prevents a

perfectly efficient equilibrium in favor of the status quo. But given the extremes of the Zimbabwe

case, the financial costs of the move itself are relatively small, especially to South Africa. Finally, I

define wh to be a positive function of n, reflecting increased wages at home (in the near term at least)

resulting from a lower labor supply. This assumes that the reduced labor supply effect will more

than offset the negative pressure on wages related to the loss of human capital, a not unreasonable

assumption in Zimbabwe’s case given the scale of the migration and its seeming inability to translate

human capital into growth before the crisis. Thus the earnings differential is:

$ "w '
E = w f " w h (n) & = #Wh ,n < 0) (3)
% " log n (

While w f could be a decreasing function of n with sufficiently large out-migration to a country

!
!
such as South Africa, this would simply reinforce that the E(n) function is downward sloping.
! !

The Attachment Parameter (λ ): The attachment parameter is:

!

50
 "( n,# , $ ) (4)

where " represents the average value for the population of a multiplier function αi of personal
!
factors such as number of family members living abroad, or education level, and β is a function of
!
national factors such as political stability at home or xenophobia of the host country. Note that

"# /"$ > 0, "# /"% > 0 . Substituting (4) and (3) into (2) and (1), we get:

w f " w h (n)
! n = F(E) = (5)
#( n,$ , % )

This defines an equilibrium condition as:

!

( )
n" n,# , $ = w f % w h (n) (6)

The right side of this equation is simply E, the earnings differential function. The left side is referred
!
( )
to as A = n" n,# , $ , the attachment function. It represents the distribution of preferences for the

motherland by showing the compensation required to get the fraction n of the population to
!
migrate. Or it can be thought of as the cumulative distribution of n from 0 to λ plotted on the

vertical axis, where λ equals the compensation level at which n = 1 and everyone leaves the country.

The higher λ, the fewer people leave for a given value of E. A has a cubic shape, and this due to the

assumption that "' ( n ) < 0 , but "'' ( n ) > 0 . The logical intuition for this is discussed in the text. The

intersection of E and A as plotted in the text yields the equilibrium diaspora size and derivatives:
! !
*
w f " w h (n ) &n * &n * &n * &n * &n *
n* = > 0, < 0, < 0, < 0, <0
# ( n * ,$, % ) wf wh # $ %

!
51
Appendix 4: Cross-Country Research on Dual Citizenshi p Laws

A newly emerging body of research analyzes the recent trend of dual citizenship laws, often

attributed to the forces of globalization. Dahlin and Hironaka (2008) perform what to their

knowledge is the first large statistical analysis of state recognition of dual citizenship.80 They

construct a simple cross-country logistic regression model to address the determinants of allowing

dual citizenship. They find that the probability of having such laws increases if a country is an ex-

colony, or is more connected to the world as measured by its representation in intergovernmental

organizations, but is not statistically associated with a country’s level of immigration. Their

conclusion is that immigrant lobbying is not a primary determinant of these laws, but what may be

more interesting is the indirect suggestion that the data do not demonstrate that such laws influence

migration behavior. It seems intuitive that migration decisions would not be heavily influenced by

the possibility of dual citizenship (when compared, for example, with wage differentials or the

possibility of any citizenship in the host country). But knowing this could ease fears that dual

citizenship would encourage more people to emigrate.

Given the recent changes many developing countries have made to their dual citizenship laws, in the

hopes of reaping an economic benefit, more cross-country analyses may be warranted. Of particular

use might be a fixed-effect model measuring the impact of transitioning from prohibition to

allowance of dual citizenship on some economic outcome that reflects the hoped for benefit, such as

80 Dahlin, Eric and Anne Hironaka. 2008. “Citizenship Beyond Borders: A Cross-National Study of Dual Citizenship,” Sociological Inquiry, Feb 2008,
Vol. 78,1, pp. 54-73.

52
remittance levels, or diaspora investment. A similar model could attempt to confirm that emigration

rates do not significantly respond to dual citizenship laws.

Appendix 5: Th e Global Zi mbabwe Forum and Diaspora Development Chamber

The Global Zimbabwe forum is the most recent, most coordinated and most ambitious initiative of

the organized Zimbabwe diaspora that I have discovered. In many ways, it is the child of the

Zimbabwe Civil Society Organization Forum, especially in its top leadership. In December 2007,

the CSO Forum initiated the first Zimbabwe Global Diaspora Conference for the diaspora, bringing

150 delegates from around the world to discuss, among other things, the Global Zimbabwe Forum.

The agenda was described follows:81

 The setting up of a global forum and leadership for all Zimbabwean institutions and
organizations that are based in the diaspora…with national and continental chapters all over
the diaspora

 The adoption of a visionary policy document that will help to define the role of the diaspora
in the political and socio-economic development of Zimbabwe from both a long term and
short term perspective.

 A critical and thorough analysis of both the opportunities and challenges that are affecting
Zimbabweans now living in the diaspora.

81 This is an excerpt from the 2007 Conference Announcement, provide me by an interviewee.

53
Index of Figures

Graph 1: Number of Zimbabweans in SA Exponentially Increasing?.........................................6

Graph 2: Zimbabwe’s literacy has been outstanding in Africa, and for its income level...........7

Figure 1: 3 Forces Interacting to Affect Zimbabwe’s Diaspora Impact ................................... 15

Figure 2: An Economic Collapse with an Existing Diaspora Results in Massive Migration.. 22

Figure 3: A Political Improvement Sparks Return Migration..................................................... 23

Graph 3: Predicted Involvement of Diaspora in Development is Large.................................. 26

Table 1: The Founding and Evolving Mission of Zimbabwe Diaspora Organizations.......... 31

Figure 4: Diagram of the Zimbabwe Diaspora Network in South Africa ................................ 33

Table 2: Dual Citizenship for Immigrants Provided by Host Countries: ................................. 40

Figure A1: Speculated Population Decline, Against Economic Collapse................................. 46

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Rotberg, Robert. 2007. “A Nation in Decay,” Mail & Guardian Online:

http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=305801&area=/supzim0407_home/supzi
m0407_content/

SANSA. 2008. South African Network of Skills Abroad, Website: http//sansa.nrf.ac.za

Scientific and Industrial Research and Development Center (SIRDC). 2002. “An Analysis of the
Cause and Effect of the Brain Drain in Zimbabwe,” Harare: SIRDC.

Sokwanele. 2007. “Zimbabwe Refugees Suffer in Botswana and South Africa,” Online:
http://www.sokwanele.com/articles/sokwanele/zimrefugeessufferinsouthafricaandzimbabw
e_20July2007.html

Stark, Oded and David E. Bloom. 1985. "The new economics of labor migration." American Economic
Review 75: 173-178.

Stark, Oded. 2003. “Tales of Migration without Wage Differentials: Individual, Family, and
Community Contexts,” Paper prepared for Conference on African Migration in
Comparative Perspective, Johannesburg, South Africa, 4-7 June, 2003.

Stark, Oded. 2004. “Rethinking the Brain Drain,” World Development Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 15–22.

SW Radio Africa. 2008. “Factsheet: The Zimbabwe Crisis”:

http://www.swradioafrica.com/pages/factsheet081007.htm

UNCTAD. 2007. “Addressing the International Emigration of Skilled Persons.” The Least Developed
Countries Report. Geneva: United Nations, Ch. 4.

UNECA. 2004. “Human Resources and Labor Mobility,” Assessing Regional Integration in Africa,
ECA Policy Research Report Chap. 9.

UK Telegraph (Sophie Arie). 2008. “Half of Zimbabwe will need food aid,” Sep 27, 2007:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/09/27/wzim127.xml

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UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). 2008. “Country Profile: Zimbabwe.” Online:
http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=P
age&cid=1007029394365&a=KCountryProfile&aid=1019745115464

US Department of State. 2008. “Dual Nationality.” Online:

http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1753.html

US Office of Personnel Management (USOPM). 2001. “Citizenship Laws of the World,” IS-1.
Online: http://www.opm.gov/extra/investigate/IS-01.pdf

Wahlbeck, Osten. 2002. “The concept of diaspora as an analytical tool in the study of refugee
communities,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies Vol. 28, No. 2: 221-238.

World Bank. 2007. “Open House for Mobilizing the African diaspora for Develeopment,” Online:
http://go.worldbank.org/LUCCX35X80

Data, Websites, and Documents

Data Sources

CIA Factbook 2008: Zimbabwe Stats Online: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-

factbook/geos/zi.html

EIU 2007: Economist Intelligence Unit data from March 2007.

WDI 2005, 2007: World Bank World Development Indicators.

Selected Websites/Blogs:

Cry Beloved Zimbabwe (blog): http://crybelovedzimbabwe.blogspot.com

Diaspora Organization Leader’s blog: http://danielmolokele.blogspot.com/

Global Diaspora Forum Description: http://danielmolokele.blogspot.com/2007/12/what-is-global-

zimbabwe-forum.html

Southern African Migration Project: http://www.queensu.ca/samp/

Zimbabwe diaspora (CSO) Forum: http://www.zimcsoforum.org

ZIPOVA description: http://danielmolokele.blogspot.com/2007/11/meet-zimbabwe-political-

victims.html

Internal Documents from the CSO/Global Forum:

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Zimbabwe CSO Forum to Petition SADC Countries for Temporary Protected Status

Zimbabwe Diaspora Development Chamber Progress Report

Zimbabwe Diaspora Forum Announcement of Global Conference (PDF of expired web page)

Zimbabwe Global Diaspora Conference – Conference Binding Proposal

Notes

i In the absence of a sampling frame of Zimbabweans in the UK and South Africa, the Bloch 2005 survey used networks
to distribute its survey, and respondents were self-selected. However she reports that the range of organizations and
media used for distribution was as broad as possible. Due to the same limitation, Makina’s 2007 survey also used non-
probabilistic methods, in this case face-to-face methods in three suburbs of Johannesburg known as resident areas for
Zimbabwean immigrants. He explains that great care was made to include the undocumented population, which can
often remain hidden. [Op. cit. Bloch 2005 and Makina 2007]
ii This effect is not included in most of the migration models, discussed in Section 4, which usually look at only at the
welfare of those who remain at home and which, when limited to elites, don’t often contemplate a scale of migration
such that resource availability trumps the loss of human capital and associated productivity.
iii A possible exception would be Grubel and Scott’s (1966) denial of individually-produced externalities and assertion
that skilled migrants capture nearly all the benefit of their own human capital and that they produce more freely moving
knowledge abroad. This might lead to an indifference towards the diaspora.
iv I omit a prominent theory of brain gain, that of Stark (2004) and Mountford (1997), also summarized in (UNCTAD
2007), which suggests that skilled migration might encourage more individual investment in education by those at home
who themselves hope to emigrate. If the government can restrict emigration to some maximum proportion of these
individuals, the policy would be welfare improving. However it seems too politically implausible to include in the text.
v Unfortunately, the primary data from either of these surveys was not available for analysis. There are a number of
questions that could be illuminated by correlations or regression analysis, some of which I mention in the text. Prof.
Makina is currently preparing a longer report from his data and it is my hope that future work will continue with both of
these valuable datasets.
vi While the text uses this model to address the national population as a whole, the model could just as easily address the
size of the diaspora and the migration decision within a sub-populations such as the highly-skilled, who might face
different incentives that the rest of the population.

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vii When the diaspora is small, each new migrant counts for a larger proportional increase in Zimbabweans (and reduces
the disutility of migrating more) than when the diaspora is large.
viii Note that this concept offers an equilibrium explanation for persisting wage differentials in areas where labor mobility
is unrestricted (such as between U.S. states and territories).
ix Note that the construction of the model implies that those who left most recently are the first to return, as their
compensation requirements to live abroad are higher. This seems logical unless we in some sort of optimum migration
duration such as in Hill (1985).
x Perhaps trivially, P < 0.0001 in test of these two proportions.
xi At this stage an evaluation of the effectiveness of these organizations would be premature.
xii Afrikaans for “barbeque”.
xiii Unless otherwise noted, paraphrased statements and quotes in the table are obtained from interviews with
organization leaders. Identity codes are not listed here, for confidentiality purposes.
xiv Major linkages include every connection to “SA Forum” (representing the Zimbabwe CSO Forum, whose
membership may be found here:
http://www.zimcsoforum.org/index.php?module=Pagesetter&tid=2&filter=menu_order^sub^89), as well as between
any two entities based in different countries. In addition, I do not attempt to represent the relational networks between
individuals, nor include every type of organization, nor represent every relationship between the organizations shown.
xv In fact the representatives of the diaspora organizations I interviewed were both fiercely non-partisan, in that they did
not support a particular candidate and were looking for non-political solutions for the future, and at the same time nearly
unanimous in agreement that the current regime is an obstacle to both economic growth and the diaspora’s participation
in the country. An ZimOnline article by the chairman of the Zim CSO Forum (not an interviewee) characterizes this
paradox: http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=2573
xvi While numerous Latin American countries have extended political rights such as voting even to dual citizens (Escobar
2007), the prospect of allowing Zimbabweans who hypothetically obtain dual citizenship to vote is too politically
contentious to be part of a discussion of near to medium-term priorities.
xvii Note that if we were to use the recorded GDP figures with the estimated population decline, and assuming
measurement of GDP has not been compromised by the hyperinflation, we would see that the GDP/capita does not
collapse nearly as dramatically.

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