N EWS R E LEAS E

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

Public Information Office, Cocoa Beach, Fla.
TELEPHONES: WORTH 2-4155-WORTH 3-1110

FOR RELEASE: IMMEDIATE

February 20, 1962
Release No. 62-41

TRANSCRIPT OF MA-6 PRESS CONFERENCE

February 20, 196-

PARTICIPANTS:
Dr. Hugh L. Dryden, Deputy Administrator, NASA Headquarters
Mr. D. Brainerd Holmes, Director, Office of Manned Space Flight,
NASA Headquarters
Mr. Robert R. Gilruth, Director of Project Mercury, NASA Manned
Spacecraft Center
Mr. Walter C. Williams, Mercury Operations Director, NASA
Manned Spacecraft Center
Dr. Stanley White, Chief, Life Systems Division, NASA Manned
Spacecraft Center
MaJ. Gen. 0. J. Ritland, Commander, Space Systems Division, AFSC
Maj. Gen. Leighton I. Davis, Commander, AMR, & DOD Representative,
Project Mercury
Rear Admiral John L. Chew, Commander, Mercury Recovery Forces
Astronaut Alan B. Shepard
NARRATOR: Paul P. Haney, Project Mercury Information Manager
 We would like to proceed now. Starting at the far end of
the table is Dr. Stanley C. White, Chief of the Life Systems
Division, Manned Spacecraft Center, NASA; Major General 0. J.
Ritland, Commander of the Space Systems Division, United States
Air Force, Los Angeles; Mr. Walter C. Williams, Mercury Opera-
tions Director, Manned Spacecraft Center; Mr. Robert Gilruth,
Director of Project Mercury. To Mr. Gilruth's left is Dr. Hugh
Dryden, Deputy Administrator of NASA. To his left is Mr. D.
Brainerd Holmes; to his left Maj. Gen. Leighton I. Davis, Dept.
of Defense Representative to Project Mercury, and Cmdr. of the
Atlantic Missile Range, and to his left is Rear Adm. John L.
Chew, Cmdr. of the Mercury Recovery Forces. At this end of the
table is Astronaut Alan B. Shepard. Dr. Dryden will open the
remarks.

DRYDEN: This is a very historic day to which we have been

looking forward for a little more than three years, when the
mission performed so excellently today was only an idea in the
minds of a few people, like Bob Gilruth, and some of his
associates. We have come a long way in the three years. All I
want to say is that this is just the beginning -- just the first
step. Today, of course, is particularly John Glenn's day, but
it is the beginning of an enterprise -- the exploration of space
that will go for a long time -- and not too many years from
now we will look back at the Mercury capsule as we do on the
Wright airplane. You will think that this mission, which you
have seen today, was a very primitive kind of space mission.
Now, the man who has the responsibility at NASA at the top
level to plan these missions for the future is Brainerd
Holmes, who is sitting to my left.
HOLMES: Thank you, Hugh. I was tremendously impressed with
the effectiveness with which this program has been planned
and in which the engineering was affected and carried out
today. I think it is an excellent, major step in initiating
our man-in-space program. A great deal of information was
i received in today's flight. Much of the information could
not have been received if it were not for a man being on
board. I think we have confirmed many of the plans and much
of the engineering data in this very practical way by flying
a man in this three orbit mission. We will have more missions,
more extensive and complicated missions. I think in closing,

2
I feel this is really a great deal of testimony to the engi-
neering effort of this particular team and to the engineering
problems of the men working in space in the United States.
And now to my left is General Leighton I. Davis.
DAVIS: The DOD support for this project was quite extensive,
of course -- 18,000 people, 15,000 of which were in the
recovery portion, about which Admiral Chew will speak. I
would like to address myself to the other units of the DOD
which helped out. In addition to the ranges -- Pacific Range,
White Sands Missile Range and the Atlantic Missile Range --
of course we had the Sea Air Rescue Forces around the country
and Europe and Africa, the Pacific Air Force deployed, as well
as the many medical officers from the three services who are
assighed to support the project. The operation went very well
from our viewpoint. I think some of the stations performed
quite terrificly, particularly the Mercury Station at Muchea,
which.came out with the maximum amount of information on each
pass. The links of communication were particularly effective.
The voice of the Astronaut from the capsule to the Indian
Ocean ship, for instance, came back by single side band, and
also from the Atlantic ship. Similarly, in the final phases
of the recovery, there was a two shore relay by airplane, then
through sub cable and then up to our Mercury Control Center,
which went very well, and speaks, more I think as tribute to
a lot of practice and a lot of simulation in exercises of
this type. I would like to pass the ball to Admiral Chew.
CHEW: I would simply like to remark that the relative simpli-
city with which the recovery was accomplished in no way showed
the tremendous amount of work that had gone into the DOD
team effort -- the planning, the extensive preparations, the
training of all tlse forces involved. Both Army, Navy, Air
Force and Marines, and the fruition of the successful recovery,
which of course entails location -- and again in this particular
case it was simple -- because the spacecraft was sighted
coming down just about five miles away from a destroyer, The
first element then, of recovery, was simple. The second element
-- retrieval -- was also simple, for in 21 minutes the capsule
with John Glen in it was on board the Noa, and I hope and
presume that the third phase of recovery, which is delivery
of the Astronaut, will be accomplished without further ado.
It has been my privilege to be associated with such a team.
I will now pass it on to someone who probably doesn't need
much introduction, Astronaut Alan Shepard.
(OVER)

3
 i

SHEPARD: Thank you, Admiral. As a general comment I will

say that a lot of people are very happy today, happy for a lot
of reasons. For those of us who were directly connected with
the flight were extremely pleased, particularly pleased, for
the way that John was able to perform, the way he was able
to observe, and the way he was able to report. That is all I
have to say at this moment.
HANEY: I think now we would like to call on Mr. Gilruth to
speak for the mission directly.
GILRUTH: Ladies and gentlemen, needless to say I am very, very
happy, very very proud of John Glenn and the entire Mercury
team who pulled this mission off today. It was a very good
flight and we got a tremendous amount of information about space
from it. I would like to say that from where I sat, which was
not in the main stream of the events of the people controlling
this flight, but I had a very good view. I assure you -- John
Glenn performed all his test pilot functions very, very well.
He was very sharp all through the flight. At no time acted
as though he were in any other kind of a vehicle than a Marine
Corps vehicle flying somewhere on some mif~sion. He felt good
and he retained his sense of humor, and it was a thoroughly
impressive job.
I would like to pay tribute in a little bit more detail to
all the various teams that were involved in this operation
here today. First the taking it in a sort of chronological
order, the teams that checked out the spacecraft and checked
it out while they were waiting so long for the weather to be
right, but you see it finally did get right. I would also like
to pay tribute to the booster people who repaired and got
ready that wonderful booster you shot away, which was just
about exactly perfect.
I would like to pay tribute to the weatherman who stuck
with it and finally got the weather right, and all the people
who are responsible for the planning. As Admiral Chew mentioned,
the recovery teams -- it is not easy to sit out there day after
day with the seas as they were. I am sure I am going to miss some of

4
the very important elements of this team, and if I do, I hope
Walt Willliams will fill in for me. Before I relinquish my spot
here, I would like to say a word of tribute for Walt Wtlliams and
his operations team. He has always been terrific in these missions,
and has never given any indication of getting rattled and makes
the right decisions, and Walt himself, I think, deserves a large
amount of credit for pulling this team together, training it, and
training with them, with himself and Chris Craft and the rest of
those wonderful people. And now I would like to ask Walt Williams
to say how it looks from where he sat.
WILLIAMS: After that, I don't know what to say. Thanks a lot,
Bob. Rather than going into any of the real details of the
flight today, I think I would like to talk about a few of the
significant things I feel we did accomplish. We not only put an
American man in space, we showed very definitely how well a man
can work in space. We had numerous problems along the way, which
I'm sure were relayed to you, that had we not had a man aboard,
the flight would not have come out nearly so well. It surely
would not have gone three rounds. There were times when the
pilot did take over, and the automatic controls which control
the capsule quite well through much of the flight. It was re-
assuring when there were instrumentation questions that the pilot
would come back and answer and help, and as Alan pointed out, he
sure did a beautiful Job today. I have watched many a test pilot
at work, and I have never seen a better Job anywhere than John
Glenn did today.
I think one point that might be confirmed was this matter of
why we left the retro pack on during reentry. This is quite
simple. We had the choice of whether to believe we had a faulty
micro switch or a faulty relay. A faulty micro switch had given
us a false indication that the heat shield had separated from the
capsule as it does at landing. I think most of youl are familiar
with the landing bag where the heat shield is dropped down from
the capsule. There was every indication that this had occurred.
Wke also new iThe retro packs and it.$s straps would hold the heat
shield in place until fired and Jettisoned. On the other hand,
as I say, this could have been Just a faulty indication because
of the micro switch. On the other hand we could have had a relay
go bad which had fired the squib which would have disengaged the
heat shield from the capsule. And reentry with the heat shield
detached would have been a catastrophe. So our choice was to
retain the retro pack, after firing, and take advantage of the
straps of the retro peck to hold the heat shield In place until
we had enough aerodynamic force on so there would be no possibility
of the heat shield dropping off.
(OVER)

5
 I don't know if this is completely clear but this is the
problem we were faced with. We felt we were much better off
cominlg in with the retro pack on, Xnowing sooner or later that
if vie did it would, the straps holding it, would melt away, but
we also knew it would not melt away till thqre was sufficient
force against the heat shield to hold it in place. I think,
I say I think, Al you may want to confirm this from your
discussions that actually we had a false indication, that
actually the heat shield did not release from the capsule
until after the main parachute deployment, as it would be
expected to. However, we did -no know this at ,the time we
got into trouble. At least, at ' time we had\this indication,
and had tu perform our reentry, a d that was the reason for that.
Now this did mean that this interrupted the cap ule sequence
and John had to take over and do some controlling during re-.
entry. And he did a good job of this.
I don't know. I guess maybe at times I get a lit le emotional
about these things. Right now I feel like the day chool let out.
RITLAND: After following through the mission today, t seems like
the launch phase happened a long time ago -- so many hings have
happened. It was certainly a perfectly beautiful shot as all of i
you will attest to who were here today at the Cape. t more
importantly, from a scientific and technical point of view, it
was still more beautiful and wonderful.
To those of us that monitored the launch phase from Ce tral
Control and watched the plot of the missile as it rose in o the
atmosphere and then out of the atmosphere, it followed a rect
and positive line on a preplot. We did have one concern, t
about 150 seconds the pen bobbled a little bit and had no b aring
on what wias happening in space. It was the pen that tracks tho
plot.

Q. How many seconds?

RITLAND: At around 15C seconds. Anyway this seemed like a ye
long time. But I feel that this shot today, from a booster
4
point of view, just didn't happen. It was planned at least threw
year; ago by the people in the Air Force, and our contractors,
* ner-al Dynamics, !ocketdyne, General Electric and Burroughs.

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Q. Was that at 150 seconds?

RITLAND: About 150 seconds.

Q. The missile didn't wobble at all? It was Just a pen on the

plot chart?

RITLAND: Not a bit. It was Just a pen on the plot. Continuing,

we planned for this type of an operation over three years ago.
We set up special procedures. We selected special components
for the missile and we established special procedures for
acceptance and quality control. We demanded Chat the same
crews would stay on this fli-ht so they would be extremely
experienced. 1 feel certain that it was this tremendous
effort by all of the people responsible for the booster
operation that attained this success today, and we certainly
are proud of every one of our people whio participated in this
area.

WHITE- I would like to turn from the mechanics and say hey to some-
tning that Al shepard said. I think as I started putting my notes
together, I said it was the day and it was all John's because of
two things as far as our point of view. First of all, he flew, as
far as we can see from the data obtained, completely normal, as
normal as can be and even more normal than roost expected flights. In
addition to this we had a real bonanza by getting good data from all
the sensors that were hooked to John aid also to the environmental
system that would give us a good correlation of how the spacecraft
and its environments were workring. Thirdly, we were
able to, in the early look data and reports

(O()

/ - 7-
 1

coming in from the station, follow along with the proposed flight
pLan and the tests we had put on to th'y to get at some of the.
questions of the Titov problems and at least in the early, very .
early looks, it looked as if John had no diffioulty with these
and the reports coming from these stations and also the voice
checks coming from John. We asked him and queried him about it
and he was very complimentary to the fact that the tests didn't
phase him a bit. I must admit the accelerations were very
nominal during launch and we werequite pleased to hear John
talking right through both BECO and SECO. He was completely
in command throughout the entire thing so far as libtening~-t, him
report, and I also say that he kept his sense of humor. I thought
it was very well and it was very refreshing around the network.
HANEY: Thank you. If you have questions, please address them to
specific panelists.
Q: Dr. Dryden, obviously this has shortened the gap in our race
with the Russians and I wonder If-you can-go into that a little
more in detail as to how much it has shortened the gap and when
that gap may not exist?
DR'YDF: This is very difficult to answer because our Russian
friends have been silent for several months now and have still
not produced the steps forward in their capabilities that may lie
ahead. I think *itis in the hands of Brainerd, Bob Gilruth and
Wernher von Braun--when we obtain the Saturn vehicle, C-1 and t!
advanced Saturns to determine whether in their hands and in the
hands of what the Russians do to decide whether we, in fact, have
closed the gap. We have orbited a man three times around the earth4
in three years from the time it was an idea.
Q: I wonder if Dr. White could tell us a little bit more in detail
what the pilotea tasks were--how they were carried on--the eating,
the drinking, the exercise and the picture taking and so on.
WHITE: First of all, I would like to say the one big task that
he carried out was the one he did so well--that of control. Now
superimposed upon this, during the flight plan, there were a
series of tests which got at the eating and drinking that was
mentioned. These were phased so that they would be repeated
with elapsing segments--each orbit. It would allow him to try
both.. solid malt-type 'pills and also some of thb tube seeds--
liquids, semiliquids and paste--as a way of finding out if the
upset of the stomach would be the problem that was associated
with Titov. We also programmed, with the sarme periodicity,
the scheduling of head motions, which would normally get; t'; the
inner ear as a trigger mechanism of setting off the nausea that
Cosmonaut Titov described. During t;he first two orbits he was
able to follow this program very, very closely. During the
third orbit he had to defer some of these to stay with i e work
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that was accumulating for him to do on the automatic control
system. We felt ,his is not a real loss because he obviously
was demonstrating a performance which compensated for the small
experiments which were scheduled.
Q: I guess this should be directed to Walt Williams. I don't
mean to beat this bobbling pen to death, but did it cause any
momentary consideration of possibly having to destroy the booster?
WILLIAMS: Oh no, as Genera' Ritland pointed out, this had nothing
to do with the booster. This is purely a display board which
wiggles.
Q: I never should have mentioned it.
WILLIAMS: I can say that the plot board in Mercury Control today
showed the smoothest tracking data that I think we have seen on
any of our missions. There was very little noise in the data-;
it was very beautiful.
Q: Will the Admiral give us some more time details on recovery--
the 21 minutes to the time on board the destroyer is from what
point?

CHEW: The 21 minutes were taken from the time the capsule landed
in the water until it was on board.
HANEY: I believe the times were 47 and 04.
CHEW: That is correct. 47 and 04.
Q: I would like to find out two things. One is to Walt Williams-
what was the difficulty what turned the fuel light red sometime
during the second orbit and was this a consideration at one point
of perhaps terminating the flight at that point? Secondly, why
did the Astronaut spend so much time trying to get out the top
on board the destroyer rather than blowing the hatch right away?
WILLIAMS: I can answer only part of that. I think I indicated we
were having difficulty with the automatic system. We were using
excessive fuel on automatic system. Again, one of the small
thrusters malfunctioned. We had this trouble before. At this
time, rather than ioiding the mission or not going on, we had a
pilot aboard. I think I pointed this out at the time of the
Enos shot, and this was the very same thing. This time we hard
a man aboard and we did not have to worry about depleting the
automatic system because he could use the manual system and had
sufficient fuel to carry out the, sion. And we lid it on this
basis.
Now as to why he did not come. out the top hatch--came out the
side instead, I will have to refer to Al. He talked to John, I
have not. Do you have any comment, Al? (OVER)
SHEPARD: Yes, and before I comment on that--to amplify the answer
to the first question a little bit--the warning light which we use
on the fuel system is actually set to come out at a fairly high
value. In this particular case, it comes on with only 35 per cent
of the fuel used or 65 per cent remaining. It is just a warning
signal to indicate that the fuel is being used out of that system.
For example, on that tank we consider 35 per cent as being the
absolute minimum. So you see we have given ourselves a great
deal of margin there. And secondly, with respect to coming out of
the capsule, the most desirable way to keep the capsule intact is
not to blow the hitch because there is some deformation of the
hatch itself du7-ing explosion. Therefore, we had decided ahead of
time that if it was at all possible that he would come out through
the top. He wac having a little difficulty in getting out fairly
soon to go ahead And blow the hatch. That is the reason the
decision was made'.
Q: This I believe is to either Mr. Williams or to Mr. Gilruth.
You recall at the time of the MA-5 Enos flight that there was
trouble with the steering mechanism in the capsule and there was
overheating in the cabin. At that time it was said that if either
of the eventualities had occurred with a man on board he could
have corrected them. Now they both did, and man did correct them.
My question is this, whether this does not indicate to you some
sort of necessity for a rather drastic revision of your steering
mechanism in this capsule?
WILLIAMS: No, I don't think so. I would say refinements, yes,
but not drastic revision. I wish I had one of them here to show
you. This small, one-pound thruster is a delicate piece of
Jewelry which is also used with a liquid, and this is a problem.
The orifices are very small that could be easily blocked.
Q: I would like to ask Brainerd Holmes if tnray's achievement
will allow i7s to accelerate Mercury and our follow-on programs
such as Gemini or Apollo?
HOLMES; I think the answer is no. We are planning very carefully
to schedule ahead more extended Mercury flights, for additional
Mercury flights like this--three orbits, to the extent of one and
then follow hard on the heels of that with Gemini and Apollo.
But we planned for success today, and we are plannirg and laying
out our organization for our entire program for maximum accelera-
tion and speed. I think it would not be candid or frazac or honest
to say this will speed it up. If we hadn't done this today it
would have 'been a setback for us.
Q: You will stick then to the three other three-orbit Mercury
flights planned for this year in preference to the two 18 orbit
f lgh ts?

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; ,'I}
HOLMES: We will have further three orbit flights, and toward the
end of the year and the first part of next year go into 18 orbit
flights. And hard on the heels of that Gemini and Apollo flights.

Q: Mr. Williams, could you indicate roughly how much of the 4

hours and 50 minutes were controlled flight by Glenn and how much
was on the automatic system; and the second part of the question--
did the fact that the pilot was called upon--how much of the flight
was automatic and how much was manual? Or fly by wire? And did
the fact the pilot had to take over interfere with the planned
weather or scientific or astronomical observations?
WILLIAMS: Well, I will answer those in reverse order. I think
Dr. White covered this in that I don't feel it really did inter-
fere with the other things he had to do, and really he was up for
quite a long time. And things, once in orbit, I don't feel happen
that quickly. He can't control the machine and still carry out
his tasks. John Glenn, like Al or any of our other astronauts,
are used to flying a machine and making observations at the same
time. I cannot give you any exact number on the amount of manual
flying versus automatic, but I think--and again I have to say I
think--that the manual flying was in excess of 50 per cent.

WHITE: Actually Walt, I think you should note to them that

in this last orbit much of the checking and work he was doing
actually was contributing t( the very type of thing he would
be doing anyway--namely looking out the window, checking horizons
and this type of thing--so it complemented ea h other. He Just
had another reason for doing it.
Q: Could Admiral Chew tell us where G'Jenn precisely landed in
relation to what large body of land, for instance Bermuda or
Puerto Rico?
CHEW: About 166 miles lae east of Grand Turk. General Davis
very kindly corrected me. I think it is about 150 nautical
and 166 statute.
HANEY: Admiral Chew, you might want to add--do you have any
word on the disposition of John Glenn as to his movements?
Did you have any late word before you left the Cape?
CHEW: I have no late word other than he will be transferred
to the carrier Randolph and then flown to the island.
HANEY: Will that be this evening, or has an estimate been put
on it?
(OVER)

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CE:Ws Nor. When I left the control row there was not an
indication of precisely what time he would leave the.oarrier.
WILLXAMSs Admiral Chew, I believe I just got some had Signal
here that he was going to go aboard the Randolph in five ftnutes.
Q. We have been told around here that Vice President 7ohnton
is going down to the island to escort Glenn here and that the
President is coming up here Friday. Is there any confirmation
to that?
Man: There was an announcement at the White House at
approximately 15 minutes before this meeting began that thE
President does plan to come down here Friday morning. We will
have firmer times, sites and agenda on this probably tomorrow
morning.
Q: I have a few other questions on vital statistics. Can you
tell us the time that Col. Glenn was w~ightless? Can you tell
us the number of miles that he flow today? Also the maximum
o force?
HANEY: The number of miles he flew and max 0. Alan, do you have
any figures on that?
SHEPARMD The computers are at work. The ftogee and perigee,
Walt?.
47ILLAIS I have those--141.2 nautical miles was the aogee.
Perigce was 86.84 nautical miles. Period of orbit w.3 B8
minutes 29 seconds. The Inclination of the orbit wal 32.54
degrees. The velocity of insertion was 25,728 feet per second,
which was very close to what we planned it to be.
QILRUTH: In response to the other question about how far did
he fly, I believe the figure was 81,000 miles--give or take a
few miles. Quite a bit to put on your coar In one afternoon.
WILLIAMS: The weightlessness would be roughly three times the
orbital,
SHEPARD: About four and three quarter hours for the period of
weightlessness. And the acceleration went up to a peak of about
8 0 twioe during launch and a little over 8 0 during reentry,

- 12 -
Q: Was there any damage so far as you know from your conversation--
any damage to the capsule which caused it to land, getting out
of it?
SHEPARD: No, there was no damage to the capsule. We were re-
ceiving continual reports through the relay which General Davis
mentioned from the recovery ship here at the Cape, and so we were
getting immediate information. And they continued to indicate
that there was no external damage visible in the capsule, in-
cluding the landing system. The impact bag system was also intact.
Q: Mr. Williams, I would like to ask about the pictures that Col.
Glenn was to take in orbit. Did he take pictures in orbit?
WILLIAMS: Yes, he did.
.Q: What kind of film did he use, sir? Did he use color film,
black and white?
WILLIAMS: He used color. He used black and white.
SHEPARD: Yes, he used both color and black and white.
WILLIAMS: I recall at one time during the flight he was putting
the fourth roll of film in the camera, but I don't :remember now
just when it was.

Q: Will we be able to get these pictures?

WILLIAMS: Sure.
Q: And number two, please. Major Titov reported illness while
aloft starting almost immediately as I recall. The fact that
Col. Glenn reported no such illness indicates what to you? That
is it a matter of individuality? Or we train our men better, or
what?
WILLIAMS: Well, I could answer that almost any way I see fit.
I don't know very much about the Titov flight, except this report
of nausea, which, as I recall, occurred after six hours -- not
immediately. If you recall, Gagarin reported no difficulty.
John Glenn at no time today indicated that his condition was any-
thing but excellent. In fact, I recall one comment that he said,
"Now that I am getting use to it, it is quite comfortable." "I
feel at home" -- was more or less his comment.
WHITE: I would like to second your comment about the fact we
do not know -- they have not released the data as to when Titov
became ill. And we can only chip away at this thing. We say
that John Glenn did not become ill or have any ill effects during
this flight. I think it would be speculative to go beyond that
today. (OVER)
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WILLIAMS: I think another speculation on this, in spite of the
stories that Titov was sick, it is also reported that he carried
out his flight quite well, and did the things he had to do. So
the degree of illness, of nausea, we Just don't know.

Q: I would like to address this to Mr. Williams, Just to clear

up this controlled flight in orbit. You indicated, Mr. Williams,
it was at least an orbit and a half. Earlier reports from Johnny
Powers indicated it might have run a little over two orbits.
Would either of these establish an international record for the
United States?
WILLIAMS: I don't know if there is a record for that sort of thing.
FAI, of course, will get all information from this flight, and we
will, naturally, lay claim to whatever record that was set.
DRYDEN: There are three efficient observers here from the FAX,
including the President, Mr. L. A. France.
Q: Dr. White, could you elaborate on the effects of weightlessness
on Col Glenn -- his response, his reaction or comments to weight-
lessness?
WHITE: I can summarize it very well. He said that there were no
adverse effects, and as far as the data that we have seen and had
a chance to look at, we agree.
HANEY: Do you recall, Dr. White, his comment when the retros
fired?
WHITE: He said he thought at that time, I think it was most im-
pressive, was changing the status, he said he felt like he was
going back to Hawaii for a moment there.
0,: I would like to ask Mr. Gilruth, about the actual reentry in
which the retro pack was attached to the shield. Did this in-
crease the problem O1 getting back into the atmosphere? Of
controlling the spacecraft?
GILRUTH: No, I think it would have very little effect. Actually
the retro pack would not stay on during the entire reentry because
the metal straps that retain it are thin metal and probably would
burn away by the time the spacecraft -- or long before it reached
the maximum heating condition, so we would expect it to have a
very little or small effect on the reentry heating.
Q: This is for Mr. Williams. Do you have any idea what those
luminous particles which Glenn noticed?
WILLIAMS: No, I do not.

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Q: When do you expect John Glenn back here, and when will we have
a press conference with him? When will we know if the President
is coming?

HANEY: When can we expect, I believe, John back directly, Walt,

Friday morning, at this point, would you estimate?
GILMUTH: Well, I think it is a little premature to say exactly
*when. I certainly don't know myself.
HANEY: If you will check with the News Center tomorrow we will
probably have more definitive information at that time.
Qt Do you have a maximum heat load during reentry?

GILRUTH: Do you mean BTUs per square foot per second max? I have
forgotten them.
Q: Temperature?
GILRUTH: Temperature of what?

Q: Of the heat shield? How hot did it get?

GILRUTH: Wells the melting glass, I think, is supposed to be

somewhere between three and four thousand, not glass, but ablative
surface. But the air, as you know, is very, very much hotter
than that.
Q: I would like to ask Mr. Gilruth to explain whether or not it
is true that Col. Glenn suffered a period of blackout upon landing.
Is that true or untrue?
GILRUTH: It is untrue, to my best knowledge.

SHEPARDs Perhaps I could help clarify that. There was some

confusion with respect to blackout. John reported blackout, indeed,
but it had to do with blackout of communications as a result of
ionization during the reentry. As you may know, communications
are lost during part of the reentry, and this was the blackout to
which he referred. He suffered no blackout himself. As a matter
of fact, performed very well during the reentry.
Q: Could Dr. White give us any kind of idea what kind of changes
took place in Col. Glenn's respiration rate and his heartbeat
during the weightlessness, if any changes?
(OVER)
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WHITE: Well, as you would expect, the rate went up by a factor
of about a half -- actually a little less than a half, during
the launch. By the time he had been weightless for approxi-
mately twenty minutes, he had returned to almost pre-launch
values. Now, depending on the workload, and the activity, and
exercising and things of this type he was doing, the pulse
stayed about pre-launch and nominal values. Blood pressure also
stayed very close to -- as some of the data we looked at --
stayed very close to the normal, on the pad data. We check
under exercise, where we gave him a chance to do a certain given
amount of exercise we had checked against here on the ground,
and looked at this again, and we saw no marked change in the
reports we have gotten to date, that the exercise tolerance,
or the changes that would be physiological expected with pro-
longed weightlessness did not occur, as far as we can see on
the preliminary data.

Q: I believe we were told at one point that the temperature

of the cabin was 105 degrees, or 108, something like that.
That seems pretty hot to me. Why did it get that warm? And
was his suit -- did he feel that warmth or was he insulated
from it?

WILIZAMS: He was insulated from it, in that he has his

own cooling system within the suit.

WHITE: First of all, you were right in that he did get

to this height, and what you saw was cyclic, day-night cycle
that occurred in the cabin of anywhere about five to ten
degrees, it looks like. In other words, when the night
side would come, I.t would start cooling down, and when the
light side would come, the heating on the outside would
add to the hVeat on the irnide, and it would start going up.
He was insulated, and as far as his suit temperature was
concerned, he was throttling this, and actually kept if fairly
well turned downs in other words, to stop or to reduce the
amount of the evaporative water going through his suit
circuit. So he was maintaining himself confortably

- 16 -
and he reported this consistently around the flight, all the
way through the flight, until after reentry, and the only
time he said it was kind of hot in there, so he was well in-
sulated, even though the temperature of the cabin was running
maybe 20 to 30 degrees higher than his suit.

Q: From the information you have on hand, how would you

Judge, percentagewise, the success of the mission?
WILLIAMS: Well, I would say that when John Glenn stepped out
on the deck of the destroyer, the mission was lQO per cent
a success.

Q: Will Deke Slayton be the next astronaut and can you give
us some idea of the picture?

GILRUTH: Well, I think our next team -- Deke Slayton is a

fine pilot with Walter Schirra as the backup and Gus Grissom as
third mao or anchor man, such as Al Shepard was on this flight
to John Glenn and Scott Carpenter. We will select additional
crews in the same manner as we have in the past, for future
flights. We have not done it at this time.

Q: I would like to know if the pilot did use the little flash-
flights on the tips of his gloves, since he has asked for them?

WILLIAMS: I don't think he mentioned them. But I imagine he

did. He was planning to.

SHEPARD: Yes, he did, very effectively.

Q: Due to the difficulty of Col Glenn getting out of the top of

the capsule, is there going to be any change in the exit next
time? It was to be programmed for him to get out while he was
still at sea. He had trouble even with outside help. What was
the cause of this and what will you do next time?
GILRUTH: Don't you think we ought to have a chance to talk to
John and look at the capsule and maybe get a little sleep before
we have to answer all these questions?
HANEY: On that happy note, I think we will thank you for your
many excellent questions. These gentlemen have been up, many of
them, all night long and some of them have to catch planes at
7:00 to get back north. Thank you very much.
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