PUBLIC INTEREST

LITIGATION

SUBJECT: SOCIOLOGY

SUBMITTED TO: Dr. SANGEET

SUBMITTED BY: PIYUSH KUMAR
IstYEAR-2nd SEMESTER
ROLL NO.344

CHANAKYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY,

PATNA-800001

25
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page(s)
1. Acknowledgement-------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. List of Abbreviations----------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Research Methodology--------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Introduction--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. Milestone of Public Interest Litigation------------------------------------------------
6. Public Interest Litigation as-------------------------------------------------------------
• A boon
• A abuse
7. Necessary Steps to be taken--------------------------------------------------------------
8. Social Change and Public interest litigation------------------------------------------
9. Concept of Public interest litigation----------------------------------------------------
10. Aspect of Public interest litigation-----------------------------------------------------
11. Features of Public interest litigation--------------------------------------------------
12. Public interest litigation as instrument of social change-------------------------
13. Conclusion---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. Bibliography------------------------------------------------- -----------------------------

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

25
It is my privilege to record my deep sense to perform gratitude to those who helped me in completion of

this project.

In making of this project many people helped me immensely directly or indirectly. First of all I

would like to thank Mr.Sangeet who had given me an idea and encouragement to making this project. I

would like also to thank my friends for being cordial in order to make conducive environment of the CNLU

Hostel.

Piyush Kumar

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

25
1. AIR-All India Reporter
2. Art. – Article
3. Ch-Chapter
4. Ed. - Edition
5. Ex-Example
6. Govt.-Government
7. I.D-Industrial Dispute
8. MANU-Manupatra
9. Ors-Others
10. O.-Order
11. SC- Supreme Court
12. SCC-Supreme Court Cases
13. Sec.-Section
14. PIL – Public Interest litigation
15. USA-United States of America
16. PGA - People's Guerrilla Army
17. UNDP-United Nations Development Program
18. AICCCR-All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries
19. MCC-Maoist Communist Centre
20. SDP- State Domestic Product
21. AOBSZC- Andhra-Orissa Border Special Zonal Committee
22. JBOBSZC- Jharkhand-Bihar-Orissa Special Zonal Committee
23. DSZC- Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee
24. SAP- State Auxiliary Police
25. MI- Moisture index

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

25
Research Methodology is a systematized investigation to gain new knowledge about the
phenomena or problems. Legal phenomena require their own research methodology. The research
methodology applied here is doctrine method of research. The systematic investigation of
problems and of matters concerned with the topic “Public Interest Litigation” has been done. The
books in the library and materials available on the internet have been used to study the social and
behavioural phenomena of the topic and its verification. The main object of this legal research is to
gain familiarity with legal phenomena and to test and verify old facts to disguise the weakness or
merits of old legal aspects to analyze the facts into new theoretical frameworks.

INTRODUCTION
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Over the last three decades or so, the device of Public Interest Litigation (PIL) has come to
be recognized as a characteristic feature of the higher judiciary in India. Even though Indian courts
cannot take credit for initiating the concept of ‘public law litigation’, they have in due course

25
emerged as the site where this device has been repeatedly used to protect the interests of
disadvantaged groups as well as address matters of collective concern. The phrase ‘public law
litigation’ was first prominently used by American academic Abram Chayes to describe the
practice of lawyers or public spirited individuals who seek to precipitate social change through
court-ordered decrees that reform legal rules, enforce existing laws and articulate public norms.1
However, the evolution of Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in India, or Social Action Litigation – as
Prof. Upendra Baxi chooses to describe it, has accommodated several other distinctive features.
In this session, I will first summarise the core features of the Public Interest Litigation
(PIL) process and demonstrate how it marks a departure from the common-law understanding of
the judicial process. After that I will present an overview of the circumstances that led to the
introduction of this device which is clearly correlated to the ‘activist’ turn of the higher judiciary in
India. The next component will be devoted to a survey of some prominent decisions given in
Public Interest Litigation (PIL) cases and to conclude I will reflect on some of the strategies
adopted to streamline the institution of cases under this category.
Beginning with the first few instances in the late-1970’s, the category of Public Interest Litigation
(PIL) has come to be associated with its own ‘people-friendly’ procedure. The foremost change
came in the form of the dilution of the requirement of ‘locus standi’ for initiating proceedings.
Since the intent was to ensure redressal to those who were otherwise too poor to move the courts
or were unaware of their legal entitlements, the Court allowed actions to be brought on their behalf
by social activists and lawyers.2 In numerous instances, the Court took suo moto cognizance of
matters involving the abuse of prisoners, bonded labourers and inmates of mental institutions,
through letters addressed to sitting judges. This practice of initiating proceedings on the basis of
letters has now been streamlined and has come to be described as ‘epistolary jurisdiction’.
In Public Interest Litigation (PIL), the nature of proceedings itself does not exactly fit into
the accepted common-law framework of adversarial litigation. The courtroom dynamics are
substantially different from ordinary civil or criminal appeals. While an adversarial environment
may prevail in cases where actions are brought to highlight administrative apathy or the
government’s condonation of abusive practices, in most public interest-related litigation, the
1
See: Abram Chaves, ‘The role of the judge in Public Law litigation’, 89 Harvard Law Review
1281 (May 1976)
2
Refer: Susan D. Susman, ‘Distant voices in the Courts of India: Transformation of standing in
Public Interest Litigation’, 13 Wisconsin International Law Journal 57 (Fall 1994)

25
judges take on a far more active role in terms of posing questions to the parties as well as exploring
solutions. Especially in actions seeking directions for ensuring governmental accountability or
environmental protection, the orientation of the proceedings is usually more akin to collective
problem-solving rather than an acrimonious contest between the counsels. Since these matters are
filed straightaway at the level of the Supreme Court or the High Court, the parties do not have a
meaningful opportunity to present evidence on record before the start of the court proceeding. To
overcome this problem, our Courts have developed the practice of appointing ‘fact-finding
commissions’ on a case-by-case basis which are deputed to inquire into the subject-matter of the
case and report back to the Court. These commissions usually consist of experts in the concerned.
In matters involving complex legal considerations, the Courts also seek the services of senior
counsels by appointing them as amicus curiae on a case-by-case basis.3
For purposes of constitutional competence, these actions are characterized as those coming
under the writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of India under Article 32 of our Constitution and
the various High Courts, under Article 226. The traditional extent of writ jurisdiction was of course
a colonial inheritance from the British-era and the remedies that could be invoked were those of
habeas corpus, quo warranto, mandamus, prohibition and certiorari. However, the Indian Courts
have pushed the boundaries of constitutional remedies by evolving the concept of a ‘continuing
mandamus’ which involves the passing of regular directions and the monitoring of their
implementation by executive agencies. In addition to designing remedies for ensuring that their
orders are complied with, the Courts have also resorted to private law remedies such as injunctions
and ‘stay’ orders in Public Interest Litigation (PIL) matters. 4 The Supreme Court of India has been
able to shape appropriate remedies for a variety of situations on account of the wide discretionary
powers for granting constitutional remedies that have been conferred on it as per the language of
Article 32 of the Constitution. Furthermore, under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, the
Supreme Court’s rulings are considered to be the ‘law of the land’ and become binding precedents
for all courts and tribunals in the country’s legal system. Hence, the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Public Interest Litigation (PIL) matters have progressively shaped a unique jurisprudence that
gives due weightage to the interests of the underprivileged and backward sections in society. A
3
See Ashok H. Desai & S. Muralidhar, ‘Public Interest Litigation: Potential and Problems’ in B.N.
Kirpal et. al. (eds.), Supreme but not Infallible (OUP, 2000) 159-192, at p. 164-167
4
See: T.R. Andhyarujina, Judicial Activism and Constitutional Democracy in India (Bombay:
N.M. Tripathi, 1992)

25
significant consequence of this is that creative remedies designed for particular fact-situations
come to be widely reported and are referred to by Courts all over the country. In this way, the
rulings given in PIL cases create an active judicial dialogue within the whole legal system.
The advent of Public Interest Litigation (PIL) is one of the key components of the approach
of ‘judicial activism’ that is attributed to the higher judiciary in India. The Courts’ interventions
have played a pivotal role in advancing the protection of civil liberties, the rights of workers,
gender justice, accountability of public institutions, environmental conservation and the guarantee
of socio-economic entitlements such as housing, health and education among others. This has not
only strengthened the position of the judiciary vis-à-vis the other wings of government, but has
also raised its prestige among the general populace. However, this activist disposition of the Courts
also has its critics.
The principled criticism against Public Interest Litigation (PIL) is that it detracts from the
constitutional principle of ‘separation of powers’ by allowing the Courts to arbitrarily interfere
with policy-choices made by the legislature and pass orders that may be difficult for the executive
agencies to implement. In respect of practical considerations, the criticism revolves around the
behaviour of litigants as well as judges. From time to time, it has been urged that the dilution of the
requirement of ‘locus standi’ has opened up the floodgates for frivolous cases that either involve
the litigants’ private interests or are vehicles for gaining publicity rather than seeking justice for
disadvantaged groups.4 It is argued that in light of the increasing case-load before the appellate
judges, the PIL cases impose an additional ‘gate-keeping’ role and impede efficiency. From the
standpoint of the judges, it is reasoned that quite often there are no checks against decisions or
orders that amount to ‘judicial overreach’ or ‘judicial populism
While all of these criticisms have been offered by acclaimed scholars, senior practitioners
and sitting judges as well, there is a much more compelling case in defence of the use of Public
Interest Litigation (PIL). I would like to take this opportunity to present that defence. The main
rationale for ‘judicial activism’ in India lies in the highly unequal social profile of our population,
where judges must take proactive steps to protect the interests of those who do not have a voice in
the political system and do not have the means or information to move the Courts. This places the
Indian Courts in a very different social role as compared to several developed nations where
directions given by ‘unelected judges’ are often viewed as unjustified restraints on the will of the
majority. It is precisely this countermajoritarian function that needs to be robustly discharged by an

25
independent and responsible judiciary. At this point I would like to recall an observation made in
the matter of Bihar Legal Support Society v. The Chief Justice of India & Ors5
“The majority of the people of our country are subjected to this denial of ‘access to justice’
and overtaken by despair and helplessness, they continue to remain victims of an exploitative
society where economic power is concentrated in the hands of a few and it is used for perpetuation
of domination over large masses of human beings…… The strategy of public interest litigation has
been evolved by this Court with a view to bringing justice within the easy reach of the poor and
disadvantaged sections of the community.”

The ‘activist’ Turn of the Indian Judiciary

Our judicial system is a very visible part of the inheritance from the British Raj. We continue to
rely on a sizeable body of statutory law and precedents from the colonial period, with the
exception of what is repugnant to our constitutional provisions. However, the framers of our
Constitution incorporated influences from several countries and adopted the idea of ‘judicial
review’ as opposed to the British notion of ‘Parliamentary sovereignty’.6 In India, the criteria for
the Courts to review governmental action is threefold – the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III
of the Constitution, the reasonableness of administrative actions and the demarcation of legislative
competence between the Union and the States. 6

5
AIR 1987 SC 38

6
There is an express provision for ‘judicial review’ in Article 13 of the Constitution of India.
Article 13(1) says that “all laws that were in force in the territory of India immediately before the
adoption of the Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions containing the
fundamental rights, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.” Article 13(2) further says
that “the states shall not make any law that takes away or abridges any of the fundamental rights,
and any law made in contravention of the aforementioned mandate shall, to the extent of the
contravention, be void.”

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 However, the scope of this power of ‘judicial review’ was keenly contested throughout the
1950’ and 1960’s, primarily over the question of the ‘right to property’. During that phase,
governments at both the Union level and most states enacted legislations providing for land
acquisition in order to advance the policy of agrarian land reforms. However, many of the large
landowners who were required to give up their holdings challenged these laws before the Courts
on grounds such as inadequate compensation among others. While the Nehru-led government
passed several Constitutional amendments with the objective of immunizing these land-reforms
measures against ‘judicial review’, the Courts frequently ruled in favour of the property-owners.
By the late 1960’s, this tussle between the Courts and the Congress Party controlled Parliament
turned into one between the idea of ‘judicial review’ on one hand and unqualified ‘parliamentary
sovereignty’ on the other hand.7 The Supreme Court itself was called upon to rule on the scope of
the Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution, and it evolved the ‘Basic Structure’ doctrine in
the much-cited decision in Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala.8 By a narrow majority of 7-6
it was ruled that Parliament’s power of amendment was not absolute and it could not amend the
‘Basic structure’ of the Constitution, which in the opinion of the judges consisted of elements such
as democracy, rule of law, secularism, separation of powers and judicial review.9 The said
decision did not curry favour with the Indira Gandhi-led government of the day and three of the
judges who ruled for the majority were superseded in the matter of appointment to the position of
Chief Justice of India in 1973. Nevertheless, the decision had given a clear signal in defense of
judicial independence.
Around the same time, there was an increasing realization on part of the sitting judges in
the Supreme Court that the judiciary was commonly perceived as an elitist body which would
dispense justice only to those who could afford it. Its pro-landowner decisions had also been
portrayed as an impediment to the land reforms programme by the incumbent executive agencies.
Recognising the need to engage with the egalitarian Constitutional philosophy, some judges took
the lead in raising concerns about improving access to justice for the underprivileged. In a report
on legal aid published in 1971, Justice P.N. Bhagwati had observed:

7
For a brief commentary on the evolution of the doctrine of ‘judicial review’ in India, See: S.P.
Sathe, ‘Judicial Activism: The Indian experience’, 6 Washington University Journal of Law and
Policy 29 (2001)
8
(1973) 4 SCC 225

25
 “Even while retaining the adversary system, some changes may be effected whereby the
judge is given a greater participatory role in the trial so as to place the poor, as far as possible,
on a footing of equality with the rich in administration of justice.”
The Committee on Judicare consisting of Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer and Justice Bhagwati
referred to Social Action Litigation as a supplemental tool to grassroots legal services
programmes, in their report published in 1977. Soon after, these two judges took the lead in
promoting the same by taking suo moto cognisance of matters on the basis of letters addressed to
them. However, before describing the use of PIL in some significant instances, it is important to
understand the other limb of the Indian judiciary’s ‘activist’ turn – i.e. a change in the
understanding of constitutional rights.
The most representative right that can be examined to illustrate this change is Article 21 of
the Constitution of India. Article 21 reads as follows: “No person shall be deprived of his life or
personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.” The understanding of Article
21 in the early years of the Supreme Court was that ‘personal liberty’ could be curtailed as long as
there was a legal prescription for the same. In A.K. Gopalan’s case,11 the Supreme Court had
ruled that preventive detention by the state was permissible as long as it was provided for under a
governmental measure (e.g. legislation or an ordinance) and the Court could not inquire into the
fairness of such a measure. It was held that the words ‘procedure established by law’ were
different from the substantive ‘due process’ guarantee provided under the Fourteenth amendment
of the US Constitution. The framers of the Indian Constitution had consciously chosen the
expression ‘procedure established by law’ which requires a much lower threshold for placing
restraints on individual liberty. Noted scholar Granville Austin has speculated that this pro-
government orientation may have been prompted by the widespread communal violence that had
taken place around the time of partition. Furthermore, it is a well known fact that Shri B.N. Rau,
one of the principal draftsmen of our constitutional text had been advised about the complications
of incorporating a substantive ‘due process’ clause by none other than Justice Felix Frankfurter.
This position prevailed for several years until it was changed in Maneka Gandhi’s case. In that
case, it was held that restraints on ‘personal liberty’ protected under Article 21 should also be
tested against the guarantees of non-arbitrariness, reasonableness and fairness that were implicit in
the language of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Indian Constitution. Article 14 mandates the
guarantee of ‘equal protection before the law’, while Article 19 enumerates the basic freedoms
available to citizens such as free speech, peaceful assembly, association, movement and pursuit of

25
livelihood. The Court developed a theory of ‘inter-relationship of rights’ to hold that governmental
action which curtailed either of these rights should meet the designated threshold for restraints on
all of them. In this manner, the Courts incorporated the guarantee of ‘substantive due process’ into
the language of Article 21. Many commentators have opined that this change in the interpretation
of Article 21 was prompted by the experience of the ‘internal emergency’ imposed between June
1975 and March 1977 – a period that was marked by the use of arbitrary and unjust detention laws
against the political opposition as well as thousands of ordinary citizens.
The decision in Maneka Gandhi’s case9 proved to be a precursor to a series of decisions, wherein
the conceptions of ‘life’ and ‘personal liberty’ came to be interpreted liberally. Primarily through
the vehicle of Public Interest Litigation, the Supreme Court has continued to expand the ambit of
Article 21 which now includes some guarantees for socio-economic entitlements which had not
been expressly enumerated as part of the fundamental rights in the Constitution. In the words of
Justice Bhagwati:
“we think that the right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes
along with it, namely the bare necessities of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and
shelter over the head and facilities for reading, writing and expressing oneself in diverse
forms.” 10
Moreover, through innovative changes to the process for instituting proceedings, ascertaining facts
and granting discretionary remedies, the Indian Courts have stepped beyond their traditional
domain to render justice to women, children, bonded laborers and other oppressed sections of
society. Notably, the Supreme Court has affirmed that both the Fundamental Rights enumerated in
Part III of the Constitution and the Directive Principles enumerated in Part IV, must be interpreted
harmoniously. It was observed in the Kesavananda Bharati decision, that the directive principles
and the fundamental rights supplement each other and aim at the same goal of bringing about a
social revolution and the establishment of a welfare State. Furthermore, in Unni Krishnan, J.P. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh,, Justice Jeevan Reddy had declared:

9
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597

10
Cited from: Ashok Desai & S. Muralidhar, ‘Public Interest Litigation: Potential and Problems’ in
B.N. Kirpal et. al. (eds.), Supreme but not infallible (OUP, 2000) 159-192, at p. 161

25
 “The provisions of Parts III and IV are supplementary and complementary to each other and
not exclusionary of each other and that the fundamental rights are but a means to achieve the
goal indicated in Part IV”.
This approach of harmonizing the fundamental rights and directive principles has been successful
to a considerable extent. For example, the Supreme Court has pointed to the objectives of socio-
economic entitlements in order to interpret the right to ‘life and personal liberty’. For instance, in
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, a journalist had filed a petition on behalf of
hundreds of pavement-dwellers who were being displaced due to construction activity by the
respondent corporation. The Court recognised the ‘right to livelihood and housing’ of the
pavement-dwellers as an extension of the protection of life and personal liberty, and issued an
injunction to halt their eviction. Similarly, in Parmanand Katara v. Union of India, the Court
articulated a ‘right to health’ when it ruled that no medical authority could refuse to provide
immediate medical attention in emergency cases. In numerous instances where the Court’s
intervention has been sought in environment-related matters, it has also referred to a ‘right to a
clean environment’ emanating from Article 21. The Courts have also pointed to Directive
principles in interpreting the constitutional prohibitions against forced labour and child labour

Milestones of Public Interest Litigation in India

One of the earliest cases of public interest litigation was that reported as Hussainara Khatoon (I) v.
State of Bihar. This case was concerned with a series of articles published in a prominent
newspaper - the Indian Express which exposed the plight of undertrial prisoners in the state of
Bihar. A writ petition was filed by an advocate drawing the Court’s attention to the deplorable
plight of these prisoners. Many of them had been in jail for longer periods than the maximum
permissible sentences for the offences they had been charged with. The Supreme Court accepted
the locus standi of the advocate to maintain the writ petition. Thereafter, a series of cases followed
in which the Court gave directions through which the ‘right to speedy trial’ was deemed to be an
integral and an essential part of the protection of life and personal liberty.
Soon thereafter, two noted professors of law filed writ petitions in the Supreme Court highlighting
various abuses of the law, which, they asserted, were a violation of Article 21 of the
Constitution.20 These included inhuman conditions prevailing in protective homes, long pendency
of trials in court, trafficking of women, importation of children for homosexual purposes, and the

25
non-payment of wages to bonded labourers among others. the Supreme Court accepted their locus
standi to represent the suffering masses and passed guidelines and orders that greatly ameliorated
the conditions of these people.
In another matter, a journalist, Ms. Sheela Barse11, took up the plight of women prisoners
who were confined in the police jails in the city of Bombay. She asserted that they were victims of
custodial violence. The Court took cognizance of the matter and directions were issued to the
Director of College of Social Work, Bombay. He was ordered to visit the Bombay Central Jail and
conduct interviews of various women prisoners in order to ascertain whether they had been
subjected to torture or ill-treatment. He was asked to submit a report to the Court in this regard.
Based on his findings, the Court issued directions such as the detention of female prisoners only in
designated female lock-ups guarded by female constables and that accused females could be
interrogated only in the presence of a female police official.
Public interest litigation acquired a new dimension – namely that of ‘epistolary
jurisdiction’ with the decision in the case of Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration,12 It was initiated
by a letter that was written by a prisoner lodged in jail to a Judge of the Supreme Court. The
prisoner complained of a brutal assault committed by a Head Warder on another prisoner. The
Court treated that letter as a writ petition, and, while issuing various directions, opined that:
“…technicalities and legal niceties are no impediment to the court entertaining even an informal
communication as a proceeding for habeas corpus if the basic facts are found”.

In Municipal Council, Ratlam v. Vardichand,13 the Court recognized the locus standi of a
group of citizens who sought directions against the local Municipal Council for removal of open
drains that caused stench as well as diseases. The Court, recognizing the right of the group of
citizens, asserted that if the:

"…centre of gravity of justice is to shift as indeed the Preamble to the Constitution mandates, from
the traditional individualism of locus standi to the community orientation of public interest
litigation, the court must consider the issues as there is need to focus on the ordinary men."

11
Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra, (1983) 2 SCC 96
12
(1978) 4 SCC 494
13
(1980) 4 SCC 162

25
 In Parmanand Katara v. Union of India,14 the Supreme Court accepted an application by an
advocate that highlighted a news item titled "Law Helps the Injured to Die" published in a national
daily, The Hindustan Times. The petitioner brought to light the difficulties faced by persons
injured in road and other accidents in availing urgent and life-saving medical treatment, since
many hospitals and doctors refused to treat them unless certain procedural formalities were
completed in these medico-legal cases. The Supreme Court directed medical establishments to
provide instant medical aid to such injured people, notwithstanding the formalities to be followed
under the procedural criminal law.

In many other instances, the Supreme Court has risen to the changing needs of society and
taken proactive steps to address these needs. It was therefore the extensive liberalization of the rule
of locus standi which gave birth to a flexible public interest litigation system. A powerful thrust to
public interest litigation was given by a 7-judge bench in the case of S.P. Gupta v. Union of
India.15The judgment recognized the locus standi of bar associations to file writs by way of public
interest litigation. In this particular case, it was accepted that they had a legitimate interest in
questioning the executive’s policy of arbitrarily transferring High Court judges, which threatened
the independence of the judiciary. Explaining the liberalization of the concept of locus standi, the
court opined:

“It must now be regarded as well-settled law where a person who has suffered a legal
wrong or a legal injury or whose legal right or legally protected interest is violated, is unable to
approach the court on account of some disability or it is not practicable for him to move the court
for some other sufficient reasons, such as his socially or economically disadvantaged position,
some other person can invoke the assistance of the court for the purpose of providing judicial
redress to the person wronged or injured, so that the legal wrong or injury caused to such person
does not go unredressed and justice is done to him The unique model of public interest litigation
that has evolved in India not only looks at issues like consumer protection, gender justice,
prevention of environmental pollution and ecological destruction, it is also directed towards
finding social and political space for the disadvantaged and other vulnerable groups in society. The
Courts have given decisions in cases pertaining to different kinds of entitlements and protections
such as the availability of food, access to clean air, safe working conditions, political

14
(1989) 4 SCC 286
15
(1981) Supp. SCC 87

25
representation, affirmative action, anti-discrimination measures and the regulation of prison
conditions among others. For instance, in People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of
India,16 a petition was brought against governmental agencies which questioned the employment of
underage labourers and the payment of wages below the prescribed statutory minimum wage-
levels to those involved in the construction of facilities for the then upcoming Asian Games in
New Delhi. The Court took serious exception to these practices and ruled that they violated
constitutional guarantees. The employment of children in construction-related jobs clearly fell foul
of the constitutional prohibition on child labour and the non-payment of minimum wages was
equated with the extraction of forced labour. Similarly, in Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of
India,17 the Supreme Court’s attention was drawn to the widespread incidence of the age-old
practice of bonded labour which persists despite the constitutional prohibition. Among other
interventions, one can refer to the Shriram Food & Fertilizer case18 where the Court issued
directions to employers to check the production of hazardous chemicals and gases that endangered
the life and health of workmen. It is also through the vehicle of PIL, that the Indian Courts have
come to adopt the strategy of awarding monetary compensation for constitutional wrongs such as
unlawful detention, custodial torture and extra-judicial killings by state agencies In the realm of
environmental protection, many of the leading decisions have been given in actions brought by
renowned environmentalist M.C. Mehta. He has been a tireless campaigner in this area and his
petitions have resulted in orders placing strict liability for the leak of Oleum gas from a factory in
New Delhi,30 directions to check pollution in and around the Ganges river,31 the relocation of
hazardous industries from the municipal limits of Delhi,32 directions to state agencies to check
pollution in the vicinity of the Taj Mahal33 and several afforestation measures. A prominent
decision was made in a petition that raised the problem of extensive vehicular air pollution in
Delhi. The Court was faced with considerable statistical evidence of increasing levels of hazardous
emissions on account of the use of diesel as a fuel by commercial vehicles. The Supreme Court
decided to make a decisive intervention in this matter and ordered government-run buses to shift to
the use of Compressed Natural Gas (CNG), an environment-friendly fuel.34 This was followed
some time later by another order that required privately-run ‘autorickshaws’ (three-wheeler
vehicles which meet local transportation needs) to shift to the use of CNG. At the time, this
16
AIR 1982 SC 1473
17
(1984) 3 SCC 161
18
(1986) 2 SCC 176

25
decision was criticized as an unwarranted intrusion into the functions of the pollution control
authorities, but it has now come to be widely acknowledged that it is only because of this judicial
intervention that air pollution in Delhi has been checked to a substantial extent. Another crucial
intervention was made in Council for Environment Legal Action v. Union of India,19 wherein a
registered NGO had sought directions from the Supreme Court in order to tackle ecological
degradation in coastal areas. In recent years, the Supreme Court has taken on the mantle of
monitoring forest conservation measures all over India, and a special ‘Green bench’ has been
constituted to give directions to the concerned governmental agencies. At present, I am part of this
Green bench and can vouch for the need to maintain judicial supervision in order to protect our
forests against rampant encroachments and administrative apathy.
An important step in the area of gender justice was the decision in Vishaka v. State of
Rajasthan.36 The petition in that case originated from the gang-rape of a grassroots social worker.
In that opinion, the Court invoked the text of the Convention for the Elimination of all forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and framed guidelines for establishing redressal
mechanisms to tackle sexual harassment of women at workplaces. Though the decision has come
under considerable criticism for encroaching into the domain of the legislature, the fact remains
that till date the legislature has not enacted any law on the point. It must be remembered that
meaningful social change, like any sustained transformation, demands a long-term engagement.
Even though a particular petition may fail to secure relief in a wholesome manner or be slow in its
implementation, litigation is nevertheless an important step towards systemic reforms.
A recent example of this approach was the decision in People’s Union for Civil Liberties v.
Union of India,20 where the Court sought to ensure compliance with the policy of supplying mid-
day meals in government-run primary schools. The mid-day meal scheme had been launched with
much fanfare a few years ago with the multiple objectives of encouraging the enrolment of
children from low-income backgrounds in schools and also ensuring that they received adequate
nutrition. However, there had been widespread reports of problems in the implementation of this
scheme such as the pilferage of foodgrains. As a response to the same, the Supreme Court issued
orders to the concerned governmental authorities in all States and Union Territories, while giving
elaborate directions about the proper publicity and implementation of the said scheme. Public

19
(1996) 5 SCC 281
20
(2007) 1 SCC 728

25
Interest Litigation popularly known as PIL can be broadly defined as litigation in the interest of
that nebulous entity: the public in general. Prior to 1980s, only the aggrieved party could
personally knock the doors of justice and seek remedy for his grievance and any other person who
was not personally affected could not knock the doors of justice as a proxy for the victim or the
aggrieved party. As a result, there was hardly any link between the rights guaranteed by the
Constitution of India and the laws made by the legislature on the one hand and the vast majority of
illiterate citizens on the other.

However, this entire scenario gradually changed when the post emergency Supreme Court tackled
the problem of access to justice by people through radical changes and alterations made in the
requirements of locus standi and of party aggrieved. The splendid efforts of Justice P N Bhagwati
and Justice V R Krishna Iyer were instrumental of this juristic revolution of eighties to convert the
apex court of India into a Supreme Court for all Indians. As a result any citizen of India or any
consumer groups or social action groups can approach the apex court of the country seeking legal
remedies in all cases where the interests of general public or a section of public are at stake.
Further, public interest cases could be filed without investment of heavy court fees as required in
private civil litigation.

Till 1960s and seventies, the concept of litigation in India was still in its rudimentary form and was
seen as a private pursuit for the vindication of private vested interests. Litigation in those days
consisted mainly of some action initiated and continued by certain individuals, usually, addressing
their own grievances/problems. Thus, the initiation and continuance of litigation was the
prerogative of the injured person or the aggrieved party. Even this was greatly limited by the
resources available with those individuals. There was very little organized efforts or attempts to
take up wider issues that affected classes of consumers or the general public at large.

However, all these scenario changed during Eighties with the Supreme Court of India led the
concept of public interest litigation (PIL).

The development of Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in the country has, however, very recently
uncovered its own pitfalls and drawbacks. The genuine causes and cases of public interest have in
fact receded to the background and irresponsible PIL activists all over the country have started to

25
play a major but not a constructive role in the arena of litigation. They try to utilize this
extraordinary remedy, available at a cheaper cost, as a substitute for ordinary ones.

PIL- A Boon:

1. In Public Interest Litigation (PIL) vigilant citizens of the country can find an inexpensive legal
remedy because there is only a nominal fixed court fee involved in this.
2. Further, through the so-called PIL, the litigants can focus attention on and achieve results
pertaining to larger public issues, especially in the fields of human rights, consumer welfare and
environment.

Abuse of PIL:

However, the apex court itself has been compelled to lay down certain guidelines to govern the
management and disposal of PILs.
Of late, many of the PIL activists in the country have found the PIL as a handy tool of harassment
since frivolous cases could be filed without investment of heavy court fees as required in private
civil litigation and deals could then be negotiated with the victims of stay orders obtained in the so-
called PILs.
Just as a weapon meant for defense can be used equally effectively for offence, the lowering of the
locus standi requirement has permitted privately motivated interests to pose as public interests. The
abuse of PIL has become more rampant than its use and genuine causes either receded to the
background or began to be viewed with the suspicion generated by spurious causes mooted by
privately motivated interests in the disguise of the so-called public interests.

Necessary Steps to be taken

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There may be cases where the PIL may affect the right of persons not before the court, and
therefore in shaping the relief the court must invariably take into account its impact on those
interests and the court must exercise greatest caution and adopt procedure ensuring sufficient
notice to all interests likely to be affected.

At present, the court can treat a letter as a writ petition and take action upon it. But, it is not every
letter, which may be treated as a writ petition by the court. The court would be justified in
treating the letter as a writ petition only in the following cases:

(i) It is only where the letter is addressed by an aggrieved person or (ii)

A public spirited individual or

(iii) A social action group for the enforcement of the constitutional or the legal
rights of a person in custody or of a class or group of persons who by reason of poverty,
disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position find it difficult to
approach the court for redress.

Even though it is very much essential to curb the misuse and abuse of PIL, any move by the
government to regulate the PIL results in widespread protests from those who are not aware of its
abuse and equate any form of regulation with erosion of their fundamental rights. Under these
circumstances the Supreme Court Of India is required to step in by incorporating safe guards
provided by the civil procedure code in matters of stay orders /injunctions in the arena of PIL.

Public Interest Litigants, all over the country, have not taken very kindly to such court decisions.
They do fear that this will sound the death-knell of the people friendly concept of PIL. However,
bona fide litigants of India have nothing to fear. Only those PIL activists who prefer to file
frivolous complaints will have to pay compensation to the opposite parties. It is actually a
welcome move because no one in the country can deny that even PIL activists should be
responsible and accountable. It is also notable here that even the Consumers Protection Act, 1986
has been amended to provide compensation to opposite parties in cases of frivolous complaints
made by consumers. In any way, PIL now does require a complete rethink and restructuring. It is
however, obvious that overuse and abuse of PIL can only make it stale and ineffective. Since it is

25
an extraordinary remedy available at a cheaper cost to all citizens of the country, it ought not to be
used by all litigants as a substitute for ordinary ones or as a means to file frivolous complaints.

Social Change and Public Interest Litigation in India

Social change is the necessity of any society. In India it is done through Public Interest Litigation.
In this article an attempt was made to assess the impact of PIL over Indian Society. The
jurisprudence of PIL is necessary to understand the nature of PIL in India.

Such is the disillusionment with the state formal legal system that it is no longer demanded by law
to do justice, if justice perchance is done, we congratulate ourselves for being fortunate. In these
circumstances one of the best things that have happened in the country in recent years is the
process of social reform through Public Interest Litigation or Social Action Litigation.

Late 1970s marked discernible shift from legal centralism. Legal pluralism was very apparent now.
It was realized that social conduct was regulated by the interaction of normative orders, notion of
popular justice, community justice, and distributive justice were sought to be institutionalised,
though outside the sphere of the formal legal system and in opposition to it.

Public Interest Litigation as exists today

PIL today offers such a paradigm which locates the content of informal justice without the formal
legal system. Non Anglo-Saxon jurisdiction directs courts to transcend the traditional judicial
function of adjudication and provide remedies for social wrongs. PIL had already molded the state
in to the instrument of socio-economic change. Social justice is the byproduct of this transcends
from the formal legal system.

Evolution of Public Interest Litigation

The Indian PIL is the improved version of PIL of U.S.A. According to “Ford Foundation” of
U.S.A., “Public interest law is the name that has recently been given to efforts that provide legal
representation to previously unrepresented groups and interests. Such efforts have been undertaken
in the recognition that ordinary marketplace for legal services fails to provide such services to
significant segments of the population and to significant interests. Such groups and interests
include the proper environmentalists, consumers, racial and ethnic minorities and others”. The
emergency period (1975-1977) witnessed colonial nature of the Indian legal system. During
emergency state repression and governmental lawlessness was widespread. Thousands of innocent

25
people including political opponents were sent to jails and there was complete deprivation of civil
and political rights. The post emergency period provided an occasion for the judges of the
Supreme Court to openly disregard the impediments of Anglo-Saxon procedure in providing
access to justice to the poor. Notably two justices of the Supreme Court, Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer
and P. N. Bhagwati recognised the possibility of providing access to justice to the poor and the
exploited people by relaxing the rules of standing. In the post-emergency period when the political
situations had changed, investigative journalism also began to expose gory scenes of governmental
lawlessness, repression, custodial violence, drawing attention of lawyers, judges, and social
activists. PIL emerged as a result of an informal nexus of pro-active judges, media persons and
social activists. This trend shows starke difference between the traditional justice delivery system
and the modern informal justice system where the judiciary is performing administrative judicial
role. PIL is necessary rejection of laissez faire notions of traditional jurisprudence.

The first reported case of PIL in 1979 focused on the inhuman conditions of prisons and under trial
prisoners. In Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1360, the PIL was filed by an
advocate on the basis of the news item published in the Indian Express, highlighting the plight of
thousands of undertrial prisoners languishing in various jails in Bihar. These proceeding led to the
release of more than 40, 000 undertrial prisoners. Right to speedy justice emerged as a basic
fundamental right which had been denied to these prisoners. The same set pattern was adopted in
subsequent cases.

In 1981 the case of Anil Yadav v. State of Bihar, AIR 1982 SC 1008, exposed the brutalities of the
Police. News paper report revealed that about 33 suspected criminals were blinded by the police in
Bihar by putting the acid into their eyes. Through interim orders S. C. directed the State
government to bring the blinded men to Delhi for medical treatment. It also ordered speedy
prosecution of the guilty policemen. The court also read right to free legal aid as a fundamental
right of every accused. Anil Yadav signalled the growth of social activism and investigative
litigation.
In (Citizen for Democracy v. State of Assam, (1995) 3SCC 743), the S. C. declared that the
handcuffs and other fetters shall not be forced upon a prisoner while lodged in jail or while in
transport or transit from one jail to another or to the court or back.

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 CONCEPT OF PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION

According to the jurisprudence of Article 32 of the Constitution of India, “The right to move the
Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this part
is guaranteed”. Ordinarily, only the aggrieved party has the right to seek redress under Article 32.
In 1981 Justice P. N. Bhagwati in .S. P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1981 (Supp) SCC 87, articulated
the concept of PIL as follows, “Where a legal wrong or a legal injury is caused to a person or to a
determinate class of persons by reason of violation of any constitutional or legal right or any
burden is imposed in contravention of any constitutional or legal provision or without authority of
law or any such legal wrong or legal injury or illegal burden is threatened and such person or
determinate class of persons by reasons of poverty, helplessness or disability or socially or
economically disadvantaged position unable to approach the court for relief, any member of public
can maintain an application for an appropriate direction, order or writ in the High Court under
Article 226 and in case any breach of fundamental rights of such persons or determinate class of
persons, in this court under Article 32 seeking judicial redress for the legal wrong or legal injury
caused to such person or determinate class of persons.”

The rule of locus standi have been relaxed and a person acting bonafide and having sufficient
interest in the proceeding of Public Interest Litigation will alone have a locus standi and can
approach the court to wipe out violation of fundamental rights and genuine infraction of statutory
provisions, but not for personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique
consideration (Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W. B., (2004) 3 SCC 349).

Supreme Court in Indian Banks’ Association, Bombay and ors v. M/s Devkala Consultancy
Service and Ors., J. T. 2004 (4) SC 587, held that “In an appropriate case, where the petitioner
might have moved a court in her private interest and for redressal of the personal grievance, the
court in furtherance of Public Interest may treat it a necessity to enquire into the state of affairs of
the subject of litigation in the interest of justice. Thus a private interest case can also be treated as
public interest case”.

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In Guruvayur Devaswom Managing Commit. And Anr. Vs. C.K. Rajan and Ors, J.T. 2003 (7) S.C.
312, S.C. held, “The Courts exercising their power of judicial review found to its dismay that the
poorest of the poor, depraved, the illiterate, the urban and rural unorganized labour sector, women,
children, handicapped by 'ignorance, indigence and illiteracy' and other down trodden have either
no access to justice or had been denied justice. A new branch of proceedings known as 'Social
Interest Litigation' or 'Public Interest Litigation' was evolved with a view to render complete
justice to the aforementioned classes of persona. It expanded its wings in course of time. The
Courts in pro bono publico granted relief to the inmates of the prisons, provided legal aid, directed
speedy trial, maintenance of human dignity and covered several other areas. Representative
actions, pro bono publico and test litigations were entertained in keeping with the current accent on
justice to the common man and a necessary disincentive to those who wish to by pass the, real
issues on the merits by suspect reliance on peripheral procedural shortcomings… Pro bono publico
constituted a significant state in the present day judicial system. They, however, provided the
dockets with much greater responsibility for rendering the concept of justice available to the
disadvantaged sections of the society. Public interest litigation has come to stay and its necessity
cannot be overemphasized. The courts evolved a jurisprudence of compassion. Procedural
propriety was to move over giving place to substantive concerns of the deprivation of rights. The
rule of locus standi was diluted. The Court in place of disinterested and dispassionate adjudicator
became active participant in the dispensation of justice”.

25
 Aspects of Public interest Litigation
(a) Remedial in Nature
Remedial nature of PIL departs from traditional locus standi rules. It indirectly incorporated the
principles enshrined in the part IV of the Constitution of India into part III of the Constitution. By
riding the aspirations of part IV into part III of the Constitution had changeth the procedural nature
of the Indian law into dynamic welfare one. Bandhu Mukti Morcha v. Union of India,
Unnikrishnan v. State of A.P., etc were the obvious examples of this change in nature of judiciary.

(b) Representative Standing

Representative standing can be seen as a creative expansion of the well-accepted standing
exception which allows a third party to file a habeas corpus petition on the ground that the injured
party cannot approach the court himself. And in this regard the Indian concept of PIL is much
broader in relation to the American. PIL is a modified form of class action.

(c) Citizen standing

The doctrine of citizen standing thus marks a significant expansion of the court’s rule, from
protector of individual rights to guardian of the rule of law wherever threatened by official
lawlessness.

(d) Non-adversarial Litigation

In the words of S. C. in People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, AIR 1982 S.C.
1473, “We wish to point out with all the emphasis at our command that public interest litigation…
is a totally different kind of litigation from the ordinary traditional litigation which is essentially of
an adversary character where there is a dispute between two litigating parties, one making claim or
seeking relief against the other and that other opposing such claim or resisting such relief”. Non-
adversarial litigation has two aspects.

1. Collaborative litigation; and

2. Investigative Litigation

Collaborative Litigation: In collaborative litigation the effort is from all the sides. The claimant,
the court and the Government or the public official, all are in collaboration here to see that basic
human rights become meaningful for the large masses of the people. PIL helps executive to

25
discharge its constitutional obligations. Court assumes three different functions other than that
from traditional determination and issuance of a decree.
(i). Ombudsman- The court receives citizen complaints and brings the most important ones to the
attention of responsible government officials.
(ii) Forum – The court provides a forum or place to discuss the public issues at length and
providing emergency relief through interim orders.
(iii) Mediator – The court comes up with possible compromises.

Investigative Litigation: It is investigative litigation because it works on the reports of the

Registrar, District Magistrate, comments of experts, newspapers etc.

(e) Crucial Aspects

The flexibility introduced in the adherence to procedural laws. In Rural Litigation and Entitlement
Kendra v. State of U.P.,(1985) 2 SCC 431, court rejected the defense of Res Judicta. Court refused
to withdraw the PIL and ordered compensation too. In R.C. Narain v. State of Bihar, court
legislated the rules for the welfare of the persons living in the mental asylum. To curtail custodial
violence, Supreme Court in Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra, issued certain guidelines.
Supreme Court has broadened the meaning of Right to live with human dignity available under the
Article 21 of the Constitution of India to a greatest extent possible.

(f) Relaxation of strict rule of Locus Standi

The strict rule of locus standi has been relaxed by way of (a) Representative standing, and (b)
Citizen standing. In D.C.Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, AIR 1987 SC 579, S.C. held that a petitioner, a
professor of political science who had done substantial research and deeply interested in ensuring
proper implementation of the constitutional provisions, challenged the practice followed by the
state of Bihar in repromulgating a number of ordinances without getting the approval of the
legislature. The court held that the petitioner as a member of public has ‘sufficient interest’ to
maintain a petition under Article 32.

The rule of locus standi have been relaxed and a person acting bonafide and having sufficient
interest in the proceeding of Public Interest Litigation will alone have a locus standi and can
approach the court to wipe out violation of fundamental rights and genuine infraction of statutory
provisions, but not for personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique

25
consideration…court has to strike balance between two conflicting interests: (i) nobody should be
allowed to indulge in wild and reckless allegations besmirching the character of others; and (ii)
avoidance of public mischief and to avoid mischievous petitions seeking to assail, for oblique
motives, justifiable executive and the legislature (Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W. B., (2004) 3
SCC 349).

It is depressing to note that on account of trumpery proceedings initiated before the courts,
innumerable days are wasted, which time otherwise could have been spent for the disposal of cases
of genuine litigants. Though the Supreme Court spares no efforts in fostering and developing the
laudable concept of PIL and extending its ling arm of sympathy to the poor, ignorant, the
oppressed and the needy whose fundamental rights are infringed and violated and whose
grievances go unnoticed, unrepresented and unheard (Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W. B.,
(2004) 3 SCC 349).

(g) Epistolary Jurisdiction

The judicial activism gets its highest bonus when its orders wipe some tears from some eyes. This
jurisdiction is somehow different from collective action. Number of PIL cells was open all over
India for providing the footing or at least platform to the needy class of the society.

Features of Public interest litigation

Through the mechanism of PIL, the courts seek to protect human rights in the following ways:
1) By creating a new regime of human rights by expanding the meaning of fundamental right to
equality, life and personal liberty. In this process, the right to speedy trial, free legal aid, dignity,

25
means and livelihood, education, housing, medical care, clean environment, right against torture,
sexual harassment, solitary confinement, bondage and servitude, exploitation and so on emerge as
human rights. These new reconceptualised rights provide legal resources to activate the courts for
their enforcement through PIL

.
2) By democratization of access to justice. This is done by relaxing the traditional rule of locus
standi. Any public spirited citizen or social action group can approach the court on behalf of the
oppressed classes. Courts attention can be drawn even by writing a letter or sending a telegram.
This has been called epistolary jurisdiction.

3) By fashioning new kinds of relief’s under the court’s writ jurisdiction. For example, the court
can award interim compensation to the victims of governmental lawlessness. This stands in sharp
contrast to the Anglo-Saxon model of adjudication where interim relief is limited to preserving the
status quo pending final decision. The grant of compensation in PIL matters does not preclude the
aggrieved person from bringing a civil suit for damages. In PIL cases the court can fashion any
relief to the victims.

4) By judicial monitoring of State institutions such as jails, women’s protective homes, juvenile
homes, mental asylums, and the like. Through judicial invigilation, the court seeks gradual
improvement in their management and administration. This has been characterized as creeping
jurisdiction in which the court takes over the administration of these institutions for protecting
human rights.

5) By devising new techniques of fact-finding. In most of the cases the court has appointed its
own socio-legal commissions of inquiry or has deputed its own official for investigation.
Sometimes it has taken the help of National Human Rights Commission or Central Bureau of
Investigation (CBI) or experts to inquire into human rights violations. This may be called
investigative litigation.

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PIL as an Instrument of Social Change
PIL is working as an important instrument of social change. It is working for the welfare of every
section of society. It’s the sword of every one used only for taking the justice. The innovation of
this legitimate instrument proved beneficial for the developing country like India. PIL has been
used as a strategy to combat the atrocities prevailing in society. It’s an institutional initiative
towards the welfare of the needy class of the society. In Bandhu Mukti Morcha v. Union of India,
S.C. ordered for the release of bonded labourers. In Murli S. Dogra v. Union of India, court banned
smoking in public places. In a landmark judgement of Delhi Domestic Working Women’s Forum
v. Union of India, (1995) 1 SCC 14, Supreme Court issued guidelines for rehabilitation and
compensation for the rape on working women. In Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan Supreme court has
laid down exhaustive guidelines for preventing sexual harassment of working women in place of
their work.

Conclusion
It would be appropriate to conclude by quoting Cunningham, “Indian PIL might rather be a
Phoenix: a whole new creative arising out of the ashes of the old order.”
PIL represents the first attempt by a developing common law country to break away from legal
imperialism perpetuated for centuries. It contests the assumption that the most western the law, the

25
better it must work for economic and social development such law produced in developing states,
including India, was the development of under develop men.
The shift from legal centralism to legal pluralism was prompted by the disillusionment with formal
legal system. In India, however instead of seeking to evolve justice- dispensing mechanism ousted
the formal legal system itself through PIL. The change as we have seen, are both substantial and
structural. It has radically altered the traditional judicial role so as to enable the court to bring
justice within the reach of the common man.
Further, it is humbly submitted that PIL is still is in experimental stage. Many deficiencies in
handling the kind of litigation are likely to come on the front. But these deficiencies can be
removed by innovating better techniques. In essence, the PIL develops a new jurisprudence of the
accountability of the state for constitutional and legal violations adversely affecting the interests of
the weaker elements in the community. We may end with the hope once expressed by Justice
Krishna Iyer, “The judicial activism gets its highest bonus when its orders wipe some tears from
some eyes”.

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25
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