Pakistan Responds to bin Laden Operation

May 3, 2011 | 1827 GMT

Pakistan issued an official statement May 3 in response to growing questions, both

domestic and international, over the U.S. raid that killed al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.
The statement tries to balance between the two pressures, though it leans more toward
managing the opinions of the Pakistani public, denying prior knowledge of the raid and
expressing concerns about unilateral U.S. action on Pakistani soil. While the domestic
situation is under control for now, continued questions over the raid could find Islamabad
caught between its people and the international community.

Analysis

Pakistan issued an official statement May 3 to respond to questions over the May 2
unilateral U.S. military operation in Abbottabad that killed al Qaeda leader Osama bin
Laden. Domestically, Islamabad has faced the question of how U.S. forces were able to
conduct the operation without the knowledge, let alone participation, of Pakistani
authorities. At the same time, the international community has asked how the world’s most
wanted individual was able to live in a large, relatively secure compound not far from
Pakistan’s capital for, according to U.S. homeland security adviser John Brennan, more
than five years.

The release is an effort to balance between domestic and international pressures, though it
leans more heavily toward managing domestic opinion. It begins by describing the death of
bin Laden as an “important milestone” in the global fight against terrorism, then goes on to
deny that Pakistani officials, either civil or military, had prior knowledge of the raid or that
Pakistani facilities were used in the operation. It also provides some details on how the U.S.
helicopters were able to travel from Afghanistan deep into the country undetected by the
Pakistani military and confirms that Pakistani air assets were scrambled in response to the
incursion — details clearly meant to assuage domestic concerns of Pakistani complicity in
the raid.

Addressing the issue of bin Laden’s hideout and its coordinates in country, the statement
underscores the role played by the country’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate in
obtaining the information that made the raid possible, though it does not address
international concerns about how Pakistani officials became aware of bin Laden’s location.
The Pakistanis have long complained about the limited acknowledgement they receive for
their role in the fight against al Qaeda, specifically the role of the ISI, and the tens of
thousands of Pakistani lives lost in that fight. Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari reiterated
this in a May 2 guest column in the Washington Post, calling his country the “greatest
victim of terrorism.”

One of the most interesting parts of the statement was a reference to intelligence sharing
between the ISI and the CIA regarding the presence of foreigners in the area around
Abbottabad. The wording in the statement is vague, but it clearly indicates that the ISI was
not only aware of the presence of suspicious foreigners in the area as far back as 2009, but
that the nation’s leading intelligence service was sharing such information with the CIA
from then until April. The statement leaves it unclear as to whether the intelligence
pertained to the specific compound in which bin Laden was living, however. It may have
been that the ISI had an idea that there were possible high-value targets living there and
shared this information with the CIA, which then gathered separate intelligence that pointed
to the presence of the al Qaeda leader. Or it may have been that the Pakistanis were sharing
intelligence regarding the general area around Abbottabad without ever discussing this
specific compound. Indeed, a prominent former Jemaah Islamiyah operative and al Qaeda
associate named Umar Patek, who played a leading role in the 2002 Bali nightclub
bombings, was arrested in the same town Jan. 25 — carried out by the ISI from a CIA
intelligence tip.

On the nature of bin Laden’s compound, particularly the height of its perimeter walls, the
statement said high walls are quite common in the tribal areas and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa
and fit with the local conservative cultural norms. Large houses are not uncommon in that
region, but this one’s structural consideration was different than others. It was surrounded
by two layers of security walls. The perimeter walls, topped with barbed wire, ranged from
3-5.5 meters (10-18 feet) in height, while the inner walls surrounding the house were 3.4-
3.7 meters tall. In addition, there was a 2-meter-tall privacy wall on the balcony of the
house itself, while the portion of the house not covered by privacy walls had opaque
windows designed to obstruct views inside.

The statement then expresses “deep concerns and reservations” over Washington’s
execution of the operation “without prior information or authorization from Islamabad.”
Fearing that the incident could set a precedent for similar future actions, the statement says,
“unauthorized unilateral action cannot be taken as a rule” and that any such moves in the
future will undermine U.S.-Pakistani cooperation, especially given that intelligence
obtained from the bin Laden raid could lead to other high-value al Qaeda targets in the
country. In other words, the bin Laden raid was an understandable exception, but it will be
difficult for Pakistan to tolerate more of such operations.

The statement concludes, “The Government of Pakistan and its Armed Forces consider
support of the people of Pakistan to be its mainstay and actual strength. Any actions
contrary to their aspirations, therefore, run against the very basis on which the edifice of
national defense and security is based.” This is Pakistan’s warning to the United States that
additional actions could further enrage the Pakistani public — and thus erode Islamabad’s
support for Washington.

The statement’s general focus on the concerns of its domestic audience is understandable.
There is very little Pakistan can do to prevent unilateral U.S. actions on Pakistani soil, so
Islamabad must therefore focus on the potential domestic fallout. Of course, no single
statement can be expected to effectively deal with the issue, but it does underscore that
Islamabad is on the defensive at home. The situation remains in control for now, but as
international questions over bin Laden’s support base in the country, particularly his
linkages to elements within security institutions, continue, the Pakistani state is likely to
find itself in a difficult spot between its own people and the international community.

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