WMU Alumni Journal, 2005

Ship Manoeuvrability: Closing the Safety Loop

By
Michael Ekow Manuel

Abstract
This article focuses on ship manoeuvrability. It defines common terminology
and stresses the need for all parties involved in ship movements to appreciate the
principles/considerations required to safely manoeuvre ships – with emphasis on
big ships – in restricted waterways. IMO’s work in this context is discussed
together with some limitations of this work. Mention is made of the
responsibilities of those whose jobs relate to the art of conning ships and the
place of suitable MET curricula for the desired training objectives. Conclusions
drawn include the need for all relevant parties to work together and close the
safety loop with regard to ship control and manoeuvrability.

Directional stability
Directional stability is the relative tendency for a ship to stay on track or to turn from its
track without an outside impulse such as wind or rudder action (Pourzanjani, 2005). It
relates to movement (yawing) about the vertical axis. A ship that tends to stay on track is
referred to as a directionally stable ship while one that tends to digress from its track is
directionally unstable. In general a directionally unstable ship is easier to turn, but more
difficult to check once a turn has been initiated. Ships with high block coefficients (Cb) 1 -
full form ships like Very/Ultra Large Crude Carriers (V/ULCCs) and Bulk Carriers – tend to
be unstable.

If optimum control of a ship’s movement is to be gained to avoid accidents and the possible
resulting incidents of loss of life, property and pollution to the environment, the controllers
of any ship (especially big ones) must appreciate the various factors that influence the
manoeuvrability of a ship and her response (or lack of such response) to the actions of her
controllers.

Controllability is defined as the ability of a ship and its controllers (human,

electrical/electronic, mechanical) to control its movements. Manoeuvrability is the ability of
a ship to change its course/speed or to get off a track. It consists of response to piloting and
inherent hull capability (Pourzanjani, 2005).

Factors to be considered in ship handling

External Factors:
These are factors that are not under the direct control of a ship’s controllers. They may be
used to advantage when present but cannot be removed or changed once the ship is in that
particular situation. They include:

Wind - The degree to which wind affects the ship depends on such things as the ship’s
windage, hull form and position of pivot point.
Current - Currents are the horizontal movements of water due to global differences in
water density resulting from temperature (temperature gradient) and salinity differences.
Other phenomena such as sustained surface winds (wind friction) and sea bottom

1
Cb = Volume of displacement / (L X B X Draught)

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topography may generate pronounced currents. They have the same effect on all hull
forms and move a vessel bodily.
Tidal streams - These are also horizontal movements of water but are caused uniquely by
tide raising forces (i.e. the vertical changes in water level from tidal forces result in
horizontal movements of water between areas of different tidal levels). Their effect on
ships is the same as from currents.
Waves - Wave effect on a ship is related to the size of the ship and the wavelength,
height and period.
Swell - Swell has the same effect on ships as waves do. Their characteristics are similar
and the relevant parameters are length, height and period in relation with ship size
Interaction - Interaction is the result of hydrodynamic effects (such as the Bernoulli
Effect), which are set up between a ship’s hull and the hull of other ships or the ground
(banks or sea bottom). The hulls of ships are either attracted or repelled from other
objects as a result of these forces. It is pronounced when the distances between the
objects are reduced and is related to the speed of vessel(s) or water. The most well
known results of these phenomena are in the areas of ship-to-ship interaction, canal or
bank effect (suction effect and cushion effect) and squat.

The above factors are predominantly what make the art and science of ship manoeuvring
uncertain. The presence and effect of these forces are not always easy to determine or
predict. Neither is it easy – even where prediction and determination are accurate - to
respond to them appropriately. It is to this end that the expertise of ship controllers must be
developed.

Other factors are available to help in this direction.

Internal / Inherent factors:

These are generally within the direct control of the ship controller. Optimum use of these
factors come with study, an understanding of the principles on which they work and the
opportunity to develop skills in their control in non-threatening and risk-free scenarios. The
factors include:

The Ship’s Main Propulsion System - Important issues to appreciate with respect to this,
is the kind of engine, response time, critical operating speeds (engine revolutions),
maximum starts/stops, propulsor type and number, thrust from propulsor (axial and
transverse) and any propulsor offset effect.
The Vessel’s Rudder - Rudder types include the balanced, semi-balanced and
unbalanced. The Schilling, Becker, Vectwin rudders as well as Kort-Nozzle propellers
and others like them are unique rudder forms with different effects. Of interest to the
controller should be the rudder type, angle, area and area ratio.
Thrusters - Bow and stern thrusters are of immense help in ship manoeuvrability.
Operators must be aware of generated thrust/power and effect of these systems as well as
maximum ship speeds for optimum thrusters effect.
Stabilisers - Stabilisers have an effect on the rolling period of a ship. They are of help in
dampening this period when excessive, to reduce among other things ship stresses, the
potential for cargo shifting and general crew and passenger discomfort. They may be
gyroscopic, tank or fin stabilisers.

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Sails - Sails have been used probably since the earliest days of transport on water. In
more contemporary times they have been fitted to big power driven ships to take
advantage of the wind in reducing fuel consumption – a relatively high cost “centre” in
ship operation.

Case Studies
It is acknowledged that accidents are the result of a chain of causal factors. The following
accounts concentrate on the role played in these accidents by the effects of hydrodynamics
and the human element in this context.

In 1996, the Sea Empress went aground in the entrance to Milford Haven in the UK. The
hydrodynamic effects of speed and proximity to the ground that creates the phenomenon of
squat were contributory factors in the grounding. Just prior to the initial grounding, the ship
was drawing 15.9 m. She approached the Milford Haven channel at 10.5 knots. The
estimated speed on grounding was 10 knots. With the transition from deep water to
shallower water there would have been some squat. Specialist thinking on this concludes
that at that point the Sea Empress’s draught due to squat would have been increased by 0.75
m to about 16.6 m. With a charted depth of 13.7 m and a height of tide of 2.2 m the water
depth available was about 16 m (UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch [MAIB], 1997, p.
26). A combination of events including the set of the current, pilot training, master-pilot
interaction and master appreciation of the progression of events had led to a situation where
the ship was not positioned in suitably deep water and this led to a costly accident.

Regarding the grounding of the Regal Princess in 2001, the Australian Transport Safety
Bureau [ATSB], 2002, noted that:

Regal Princess has an overall length of 245 m and a length of about 214 m at the
waterline. Below the waterline the ship, from the fore end of the bulbous bow to the
after end of the rudder, is about 216.5 m in length. Regal Princess has a beam-to-
draught ratio of 3.98 and has a typical modern cruise liner profile with a large
windage area of about 7000 m2. This would create approximately 38 tonnes force in
a 20 knot beam wind. This force and the beam-to-draught ratio make the ship
susceptible to large leeway in any significant wind. The dimensions of the channel
are therefore critical factors in the ship handling characteristics of a ship
manoeuvring within the channel. The water displaced by the ship’s forward motion
must flow under and along the sides of the vessel. If the channel is narrow and the
depth of water either side of the channel relatively shallow, the problem of
displacing the water caused by the ship’s passage creates a blocking effect. In such
constricted conditions an increase in velocity of the water flow is created, which
results in a decrease in pressure (the Bernoulli Effect). This pressure decrease causes
vessel responses such as squat and bank effect. Cairns channel is 90 m wide, with a
declared depth of 8.5m. The charted depth of water outside, either side of the
channel is 2.1 m. Even with 2 m of tide the dynamics set up by the water resistance
and the acceleration of water past the hull within the channel confines would have
affected the ship’s manoeuvring characteristics (p. 12).

The Under Keel Clearance (UKC) of 22 per cent was well within typical guidelines
for UKC. The conclusion must be that there was adequate water under the keel.
However, the beam-to-draught ratio and blockage factor, coupled with the

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limitations that the single rudder imposed on the ship’s ability to steer, were all
factors in the grounding (p. 14).

The following is an excerpt from the MAIB investigation report into the grounding of the
Stolt Tern on the 1st of December 2004.

The grounding occurred when the ship was entering Holyhead with a harbour pilot
embarked. As the ship approached the harbour’s breakwater, speed was reduced, and
helm was applied to adjust the ship’s course by 10° to starboard. The bow thruster
was applied to starboard at the same time. As the ship passed the intended heading,
efforts to check the swing included the application of maximum port rudder and the
use of the bow thruster to port, but these had no perceivable effect. The master was
unable to regain control of the movement of the ship, which grounded in shoal water
to the south of the breakwater.

The investigation identified several contributory factors, including:

• The ship’s turn to starboard could not be checked because of her
manoeuvring characteristics when speed was reduced quickly, the
differential effects of the tidal stream in the vicinity of the breakwater, and
the initial use of the bow thruster and helm.
• Inadequate communication and teamwork between the bridge personnel
meant the pilot was unaware that Stolt Tern’s speed had been reduced to
below the level he had requested, or that the bow thruster had been used.
• In an attempt to prevent the collision with the breakwater, the master took
evasive action which ignored the advice given by the pilot to put the ship’s
action astern.
• Additionally, this action was taken when Stolt Tern was too close to the
breakwater for it to be successful.
• The precaution of allowing greater passing distance from the breakwater
was not considered during the port’s risk assessment. This was because the
approach to the port was perceived to be relatively straightforward, there
had been no history of accidents or incidents to raise concerns and the port
management had a high regard for the ability and experience of the pilot.
(MAIB, 2005, p. 1)

This report was published on the 8th of September 2005 and shows how contemporary these
issues still are.

The narratives show the importance of ship controllability and the necessity for it to be
appreciated by all. The events - and the effects of hydrodynamic forces that affect ship
controllability - are consistently repeated in many such scenarios in countless ports round the
world. Thankfully they do not always result in accidents but the potential remains and given
a small window of opportunity can and do create incidents which are dangerous, costly and
embarrassing to many parties. With hindsight, the errors are clear and it is easy to criticise
(in the specific case of the Sea Empress, there certainly has not been a lack of criticism) but
the operators caught in events as described above do not enjoy the benefits of such hindsight
as they try to control their ships. To limit their own vulnerability, they must ensure their
appreciation of the dynamics involved and the necessary skills that have to be honed to avoid
such accidents.

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IMO’s Work: Selected Quality Measures for Manoeuvring Characteristics at the

Design Stage
• MSC Circular 389 – Interim guidelines for estimating manoeuvring performance in
ship design (1985)
This circular by the Ship Design and Equipment Sub-Committee (DE) was aimed at
encouraging the specific consideration of the importance of ship manoeuvrability at the
design stage of new ship building.

• Resolution A.601 (15) – Provision and display of manoeuvring information on board

ships (1987)
The resolution requires that specific manoeuvring information, including dimensions of the
ship and the manoeuvring characteristics, is on board and available to navigators in a
uniform international format. The information is to be presented in the form of a pilot card,
a wheelhouse poster and a manoeuvring booklet. The resolution is based on previous work
in Resolution A.209 from 1971 (recommendation on information to be included in the
manoeuvring booklets).

• Resolution A.751 (18) – Interim standards for ship manoeuvrability (1993)

This resolution sets out standards and defines terms to be used in trials to ensure that ship
manoeuvring performance is improved. MSC Circular 644 (1994) – Explanatory notes to
the interim standards for ship manoeuvrability - was set up to be consulted when reference
was made to Resolution A.751 (18). The circular has been superseded by MSC Circular
1053.

• MSC resolution 137 (76) – Standards for ship manoeuvrability (2002).

This MSC resolution has an annex which sets out standards no longer viewed as “interim”.
The annex has requirements similar to those of resolution A.751 (18).

• MSC Circular 1053 – Explanatory notes to the standards for ship manoeuvrability
(2002).
It gives detailed explanatory notes for the standards set out in MSC resolution 137 (76). The
circular supersedes MSC Circular 644.

IMO Standards for Manoeuvrability

A number of measures are used to qualify/indicate the manoeuvring characteristics of ships
at the design stage. The definitions of these measures as given below are as indicated in
MSC Circular 1053. The guidelines for the application of the standards states categorically
that trials should be conducted preferably in deep, unconfined but sheltered waters and that
the water depth should exceed four times the mean draught of the ship 2 (IMO, 2002, p. 6).

• Inherent Course Stability - A ship is dynamically stable on a straight course if it,

after a small disturbance, soon will settle on a new straight course without any
corrective rudder. The resultant deviation from the original heading will depend on the
degree of inherent course stability and on the magnitude and duration of the
disturbance.

2
This constitutes one of the major limitations of these standards as discussed later in the article. The standards
are of limited value where they should matter most – in restricted waters.

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• Course Keeping Ability - The course-keeping quality is a measure of the ability of

the steered ship to maintain a straight path in a predetermined course direction without
excessive oscillations of rudder or heading.

• Initial Turning/Course Changing Ability under Moderate Helm - The initial

turning ability is defined by the change-of-heading response to a moderate helm, in
terms of heading deviation per unit distance sailed or in terms of the distance covered
before realizing a certain heading deviation.

• Yaw Checking Ability - The yaw checking ability of the ship is a measure of the
response to counter-rudder applied in a certain state of turning, such as the heading
overshoot reached before the yawing tendency has been cancelled by the counter-
rudder in a standard zigzag manoeuvre.

• Turning Ability under Full Helm - Turning ability is the measure of the ability to
turn the ship using hard-over rudder.

• Stopping Ability - Stopping ability is measured by the "track reach" and "time to dead
in water" realized in a stop engine-full astern manoeuvre performed after a steady
approach at full test speed. Lateral deviations are also of interest.

Various ways are used to determine these parameters for individual ships. They have
collectively been termed definitive manoeuvres.

Definitive Manœuvres
• Direct Spiral Manoeuvre
This manoeuvre (sometimes called Dieudonné spiral manoeuvre) indicates the inherent
directional stability of the ship. It is done in the following steps:

• Maintain steady speed and course for one minute. The speed (engine) setting is
maintained unchanged throughout the manoeuvre after this point.
• Turn rudder quickly to starboard to about 150. The rudder angle is maintained until a
steady yaw rate is achieved. This is held for one to two minutes.
• Decrease the rudder angle to 100, and hold this until a new steady yaw rate is again
achieved and then maintained for about one minute.
• The process is repeated for 50 and 00 rudder angle.
• After the rudder amidship manoeuvre, the process is repeated in increments of 50 on
the port side (up to 150) and then back to 00 rudder angle.

The results are shown in a diagram such as is shown in figure 1 (with a reverse spiral).

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Figure 1: Yaw rate/ rudder angle relationship

Source: IMO MSC Circular 1053 (p.17)

Directional stability is indicated by a response which practically returns the ship to a straight
course quickly. Instability is indicated by continued yawing even under appreciable counter
rudder.

• Zigzag Manoeuvre
The test is started with a zero rudder angle. A steady speed and course is then achieved for
one minute. Speed/power settings are left unaltered after this stage.
The rudder is then quickly deflected to a predetermined angle e.g. starboard 100, and held
there until the vessel turns a pre-selected number of degrees e.g. 100 off the original
heading/base course. At this point, the rudder is again quickly deflected to the opposite (port)
angle - 100 – and again held until the vessel turns to the corresponding angle off the initial
heading (base course) on the opposite side.
The process is repeated a number of times.

The results indicate inherent effectiveness/quickness of the rudder to initiate and check
changes of course and shows overshoot tendencies in course alteration. They may be shown
in a diagram such as in figure 2.

Figure 2: Zig-zag 100/100 test

Source: IMO MSC Circular 1053 (p.19)

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• Slowing and Stopping Tests.

These may be tests done to indicate the distances and offsets (from original track)
experienced by ships stopping under full astern power (see figure 3) or slowing down at
different speed settings. The tests indicate such parameters as track reach, head reach and
lateral deviation from the original track.

Figure 3: Stopping Test (crash stop)

Source: IMO MSC Circular 1053 (p.20)

• Turning Circles
These definitive manoeuvres are indicative of the distances travelled by the ship with
different rudder angles and in different conditions. They give a measure of such parameters
as advance, transfer, tactical diameter, drift angle and swept path as shown in figure 4.

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Figure 4: Turning circle

Source: IMO MSC Circular 1053 (p.18)

All these manoeuvres require time and often a great deal of sea room and are best done at the
design stage. The IMO wheelhouse poster requires the posting of information regarding the
ships turning/stopping in shallow water, in different laden conditions and at different speeds
which should have been derived from design level trials. What companies and ship crew
have to do is periodically verify this data with some “sea trials” of their own. However, due
to commercial pressures most masters are unwilling to entertain such “frivolous” activity en
route to a port often on very tight schedules. Sometimes the trade patterns of a ship do not
allow for passage through areas with enough sea room. The writer is “fortunate” to have
worked with companies that appreciated the necessity of the navigating officers knowing
their ship and allowed (even scheduled) time for this. In the absence of this, mathematical
modelling, as indicated in MSC 1053, is probably the best way to estimate how different
conditions affect the data in the manoeuvring booklet. The potential cost of ignorance in this
area is so high as to merit a full commitment to this irrespective of the time delays and
relatively small commercial costs.

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Beyond the design stage, what must be appreciated is that the results of all the definitive
manoeuvres are dependent on ship type, hull form, speed, centre of gravity, pivot point,
windage, power plant and many other parameters unique to every ship. The results could
also vary significantly under different environmental as well as laden conditions. It is
important when using information from manoeuvring booklets to remember the above.

It must also be borne in mind that the IMO design standards and requirements have been
criticised for being inadequate in addressing the range of manoeuvring situations that are
critical to ship operations (Quadvlieg & van Coevorden, 2003; Knierim, 1994). Some
criticisms are that the standards:

• Focus only on conventional vessels – displacement ships with traditional propulsion

and steering systems.
• Do not sufficiently address critical shallow/restricted water manoeuvring.
• Do not take into account the impact of the environment – wind, waves and the
presence of other vessels.

The standards relate to “voluntary criteria for ships, operating at sea-speed in deep water”
and “are therefore of little value in assessing ship handling performance at low speeds in
restricted waters” (Gray et al, 2001, p.16).

These criticisms are certainly justified. While it is probably inconceivable that any set of
regulations or recommendations can cover all the possible scenarios on board ship, the
standards as they stand do not sufficiently address these critical issues.

All of this places a big responsibility, not only on ship designers, but also on training
establishments to go beyond the generalities as stated in many IMO instruments. There are
many ships out at sea which are designed to comply with the IMO recommendations/criteria
in a fit-for-purpose fashion, but whose reactions in restricted waterways may not be as
indicated in the manoeuvring booklet etc. While appreciating the definitive manoeuvres as
described, ship officers and controllers must remember to leave significant safety margins
when navigating in restricted waters.

Unique Characteristics of Ships: The Esso Osaka trials

The manoeuvring trials of the 278,000 tonne Esso Osaka in shallow water have becoming a
reference point in developing two very critical principles. The ship’s response and
manoeuvrability in different conditions were determined by Exxon and reports submitted to
the US Maritime Administration, US Coast Guard and American Institute of Merchant
Shipping (Knierim, 1994). The trials show that:

1. Shallow water effects are complex and unpredictable and sufficiently large margins
must be allowed for control to be maintained.
2. It is important to avoid too much generalisation and to seek to know the
characteristics of the particular ship being handled at the specific time and in those
conditions.

This again emphasises the need for an in-depth appreciation of these principles and makes
communication between ship handlers – such as pilot/master interaction – essential.

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Use of Aids/Tools
Tools which help in the controlling of ships are currently available. They include Rate of
Turn Indicators (ROTI) 3 , instruments which indicate cross track error and various other
navigational methods and instruments. State-of-the-art tools include predictors which help
to give an indication as to the position of the ship a few minutes ahead of present position – a
kind of “prophetic position indicator”. These new tools – collectively known as Ship
Predictor Systems (SPS) are at different stages of development in various jurisdictions. A
helpful analysis of Canadian efforts in this direction is given by Transport Canada 4 . SSPA
in Sweden has a Hydrodynamic Predictor (HdP) system which is claimed to give high
accuracy in forecast position indication (30-600 seconds forecast). SSPA indicates that these
systems are already in use on catamarans in Europe (personal communication with
Thorstensson, October 19, 2004) 5 . The system is also incorporated in various other
frameworks e.g. the simulation programme PORTSIM which is especially useful for training.

Whatever tools are used, it is imperative that the operator be well educated/trained in their
use, including an understanding of their limitations and an avoidance of over reliance on a
particular tool – as with all navigational tools.

Training of Ship Handlers

One of the conclusions of the Sea Empress investigation was that “the pilot’s error was due
in part to inadequate training ... and that when the effect of set was noticed, the master failed
to appreciate that the action then ordered by the pilot would not be adequate” (MAIB, 1997,
pp. 94-95). The training of human ship controllers is essential. Currently, in the opinion of
this writer, not enough emphasis is placed on the understanding and development of skills
associated with directional stability and stopping ability of ships especially in restricted
waters. Informal interactions with various individuals certificated as Master Mariners
indicate a curriculum structure in some countries/institutions that does not give the desired
emphasis to this at the senior navigation officer level. The STCW – without being very
specific – certainly requires that this education be present. Table A-II/2 (IMO, 2001, p. 48)
of the code is very clear that there must be evaluated competence in manoeuvring for pilot
embarkation/disembarkation and in rivers, estuaries and other restricted waters, having
regard to weather/wind, tide/current, head reach, stopping distances, turning circles, constant
rates of turn, squat, interaction etc. While the definitive manoeuvres and the complexities of
restricted water manoeuvring may not be as exhaustively addressed in IMO instruments as
some may desire, it is imperative that institutions appreciate the principles/spirit of these
IMO instruments, incorporate these principles into their curricula and devise training
methodologies for those other subject areas where the legislation is limited.

Simulators have been of extreme help in developing these skills in navigators. It must be
noted however that the kind of simulators needed to develop such skills in a risk free
environment are not mandatory under STCW and are certainly not available at a global level.
STCW mandates the use of simulators for radar and ARPA training only. Other tools for
such training – training ships or large physical models – are also not available to many
institutions because of financial constraints.

3
A statutory requirement for ships ≥ 100,000 GT as per SOLAS Chapter V, Regulation 12.
4
See web page http://www.tc.gc.ca/tdc/summary/13300/13368e.htm.
5
WMU – MET class of 2005 field trip to SSPA.

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The IMO’s work with various instruments/standards requires that the manoeuvring
capabilities of a ship are made a major consideration at the design stage of the ship. This
involves naval architects and ship builders. In other instruments – such as STCW –
operators are then required to possess the skills and knowledge to successfully control these
ships. Although STCW does not sufficiently address the training requirements of pilots,
these individuals are also critical to the success of ship manoeuvring in confined waters. In
Resolution 10 of the STCW 95 conference, it is acknowledged that “time constraints
prevented full consideration to be given to the possibility of including provisions on the
training and certification of such personnel (pilots) in the amendments” (IMO, 2001, p. 62).
The conference proceeded to invite the IMO to consider developing provisions covering the
training and certification of maritime pilots, vessel traffic service personnel etc. Resolution
A.960 (23) - Recommendations on training and certification and on operational procedures
for maritime pilots other than deep-sea pilots, adopted on the 5th of December 2003 – is one
such provision. All of these resource personnel - designers, naval architects, ship owners
and builders, ship officers, maritime pilots, training institutions, harbour authorities and
regulators - must have suitable education/training and work together to achieve the safety
required in this context. In the words of Knierim (1994, p. 139) “we can join hands across
this vast sea of information, have dialogue for the advancement of marine safety, and, as
they say, close the loop!”

Conclusions
While the design and limitations of a channel or port entrance are outside the control of
ships’ officers, they nevertheless have to appreciate clearly the effects that such
designs/limitations have on their ships and be prepared to take appropriate action. These
actions must include a study of the dynamics of ship manoeuvrability in an operational
context (and not only an academic one), proceeding with the necessary caution and speed or
a refusal to use the particular channel or entrance if the conditions merit such a decision.

Masters must still remember that it is not for nothing that they are legally acclaimed to be
MASTERS of the ships over which they have command. Ultimately one should know one’s
ship and know it well. All the theories will not replace knowledge of own ship when it
comes to manoeuvring. It is worth noting that in the event of an accident in some
jurisdictions, the master is not liable to be excused, even where his/her culpability is
unproven.

References
Australian Transport Safety Bureau [ATSB]. (2002). Marine safety investigation: Independent
investigation into the grounding of the British flag passenger ship Regal Princess (Marine safety
investigation report; 166). Canberra, Australia: Author.

Gray, W. G., Waters, J., Blume, A., & Landsburg, A. C. (2002). Channel design and vessel
manoeuvrability: Next steps. Paper presented to the New York Metropolitan Section of the Society of
Naval Architects and Marine Engineers (SNAME), 9 January, 2002, New York, U.S.A.

International Maritime Organization [IMO]. (2001). International Convention on Standards of

Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978 as amended in 1995 and 1997. London:
Author.

—. (2002). Explanatory notes to the standards for ship manoeuvrability (MSC/Circular 1053).
London: Author.

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Knierim, T. G. (1994). Maneuvering information for the pilot/navigator: Its source value and
limitations. Marine Technology, 31(2), 123-144.

Pourzanjani, M. (2005). Directional stability. Unpublished lecture notes, World Maritime University,
Malmö, Sweden.

Quadvlieg, F. H. H. A., & van Coevorden, P. (2003). Maneuvering criteria: More than IMO A751
alone. Paper presented to the International Conference on Marine Simulation and Ship Manoeuvring:
Marsim 2003, 25-28 August 2003, Kanazawa, Japan.

UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch [MAIB]. (1997). Report of the Chief Inspector of Marine
Accidents into the grounding and subsequent salvage of the tanker Sea Empress at Milford Haven.
London : Stationery Office

—. (2005). Report on the investigation of the grounding of Stolt Tern. Online:

<http://www.maib.dft.gov.uk/cms_resources/StoltTern.pdf> (Accessed: September 2005)

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