Professional Documents
Culture Documents
It is quite possible that historians of the 2050s, looking back into our now
closing century, will pick out, as one deep tectonic movement stretching
across more than two centuries, the disintegration of the great polyethnic,
polyglot, and often polyreligious monarchical empires built up so painfully
in mediaeval and early modern times.2 In most cases the disintegration was
accompanied by great violence, and was often followed by decades of civil
and interstate wars. In the 1770s the first nation-state was born in North
America out of armed resistance to imperial Britain, but it was inwardly so
divided that it subsequently endured the bloodiest civil war of the nineteenth
century. Out of the prolonged collapse of the Spanish Empire between 1810
and 1830 came the brutal despotisms, rebellions and civil strife that have
plagued Latin America until our own time. As a result of the Great War of
1914---1918 the Hohenzollern, Habsburg, Romanov and Ottoman empires
blew up, leaving in their wake a congeries of small, weak, and generally
unstable nation-states in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Near East.
3
The fall of the Ch’ing Empire in 1911 opened two generations of civil
wars in China. Partition in British India, massive interethnic violence
in Sri Lanka, the Thirty Years War in Vietnam, the continuing civil
strife in Northern Ireland, the bloody collapse of the Ethiopian
Empire, the horrors in Uganda and Zaire-----all in differing ways can
be seen as outcomes of the same long process.
This phase, however, did not last very long. Reeling under the fero-
cious onslaught of Hitler’s armies, Stalin and his associates discovered
that encouraging nationalism was crucial to the war effort. In a
famous speech delivered on 7 November 1941, the CPSU’S general sec-
retary urged his listeners thus: ‘Let the manly images of our great
ancestors Aleksandr Nevsky, Dmitri Donskoi, Kuzma Minin, Dmitri
Pozharsky, Aleksandr Suvorov and Mikhail Kutusov inspire you in
this war.’1 Prosperous Europe has today forgotten how much it owes
both to Stalin and to Russian nationalism for the destruction of the
Nazi empire. But in the war’s aftermath, it proved implausible to add
the communized states of Eastern Europe to the USSR, and thus began
a pluralization of Communist states bearing national names. After
Eastern Europe came Yugoslavia, North Korea, China, Cuba, and Viet-
nam, Laos and Cambodia. In 1979 the first, and, it may well be, the last,
wars between Communist states broke out, as Vietnam invaded Cam-
bodia and China invaded Vietnam. A historical logic was already
visible, if then generally unnoticed. Nationalism could be halted, but
not permanently restrained or superseded. So that, during the 1980s,
Stalin’s empire was just as surely imploding as Churchill’s had done.
2
This text is a revised and expanded version of a talk recorded by the Australian
Broadcasting
1
Corporation in Ithaca, NY on 5 December 1991.
Aleksandr Nevsky defeated the Swedish army on the banks of the Neva in 1240;
Dmitri Donskoi routed the Mongols on the banks of the Don in 1380; Kuzma Minin
and Dmitri Pozharsky expelled the Poles from Moscow in 1612, leading to the founding
of the Romanov dynasty; Aleksandr Suvorov was Catherine the Great’s outstanding
general; Mikhail Kutusov-----thanks to Tolstoy’s energetic promotion-----was widely
regarded as Napoleon’s successful antagonist in 1812. In another speech of that year,
Stalin spoke more broadly of the Germans as ‘a people devoid of conscience and
honour, a people with the morals of beasts, [who] have the impudence to call for the
destruction of the Great Russian Nation, the Nation of Plekhanov, of Lenin, of Belin-
sky, Chernychevsky, Pushkin, Tolstoy, Glinka, Tchaikovsky, Gorky and Chekhov, of
Pavlov and Chechinov . . . and of Kutusov.’
4
Portugal collapsed, creating by the end of the 1970s a United Nations
with four times the membership that had made up the pioneering
League of Nations half a century earlier.
Dangerous Fancies
The second prejudice, which is related to, and grows partly out of the
first, has to do with the relationship between capitalism, markets, and
state size. Unreflecting commentators-----on the Left and on the Right
-----frequently assume that ‘small’ countries, with limited resources in
raw materials and labour, are somehow not ‘real’ countries or are
‘barely’ viable in the face of the industrial giants and the exigencies of
the world capitalist economy. This kind of thinking goes back to early
modern mercantilism, and was given additional force in the late eight-
eenth century by the American nationalist Alexander Hamilton, and
in the mid nineteenth century by the German nationalist Friedrich
2
To be sure, the Han form the vast majority of China’s population, and this demo-
graphic weight should militate against successful separatisms. But one should not
forget the history of political fissiparousness among the Han themselves. In the last 150
years China has been much longer divided than unified.
5
List, who argued for ‘big’ nation-states on the grounds that only these
had sufficiently large internal markets to permit ‘economic sover-
eignty’ and a seriously competitive place in an industrializing world.
But revisionist students of political economy have for some time been
arguing that in a highly interconnected world economy it is quite
often small, ethnically and religiously homogeneous countries that do
best. In Europe they point to The Netherlands and Finland, Norway
and Austria by comparison with Italy, France and the United King-
dom. In Asia they refer us to South Korea and Thailand, Singapore
and Japan, by comparison with India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka or Paki-
stan. The argument is quite simple at bottom. It is that in such small,
homogeneous countries the sense of national solidarity is especially
strong, making it easier for political and economic leaders to ask
for sacrifices without expensive coercion, to develop smoother indus-
trial relations, and effectively to seek specialized niches in the inter-
national division of labour. Conversely, domestically troubled giants
like the United States or India face enormous political difficulties in
bending and renovating the national economy in the contemporary
environment.
All four fancies are not merely profoundly conservative. To the extent
that powerful leaders in big countries actually believe them, they are
dangerous, for they have the cumulative effect of encouraging such
people to imagine that they stand for progress and peace, while their
adversaries stand for ‘narrow’ nationalism, sectionalism, and often
‘terrorism’. In turn, this view encourages them to unleash the prepon-
derant military power at their disposal to make their wishes prevail. A
simple example is Indonesia’s bloody ‘integration’ of the old Portu-
guese colony of East Timor, which between 1975 and 1980 took the
lives of one third of the local population. Today, in the face of ever
bolder resistance to this ‘integration’, the regime in Jakarta prepares
6
for more repression against ‘disintegrationists’, ‘separatists’ and ‘anti-
Indonesian elements’. Everyone sensible knows that all significant
violence would cease the minute Jakarta agreed to quit East Timor
and leave its wretched and heroic people alone.
Modern Imaginings
What, then, accounts for the driving power of nationalism and its
much less respectable younger relation ‘ethnicity’? And how are the
two related? Two common types of explanation quite clearly can not
stand serious investigation. One is that they are the natural creatures
of economic discontent and relative deprivation. It is true that many
nationalist and ethnic movements build on, or exploit, such discon-
tents. Yet these same discontents have also fired a wide variety of
other, often competing, social movements-----socialist, communist,
religious, millenarian, and so forth. Nonetheless, many of these com-
petitors, for a variety of reasons, seem today to have lost their ideolog-
ical power for the time being. Hence nationalism and ethnicity are
very likely to move in to take their place. We are seeing a good deal of
this ‘moving-in’ in today’s Eastern Europe, where once-staunch Stalin-
ists are turning themselves into strident nationalists. The other expla-
nation, typically propounded by the political leaders of nationalist
and ethnic movements, is that they represent deep historical memories
and traditional communities. In fact, however, such movements are
distinctly modern imaginings, and none go back further than the last
quarter of the eighteenth century. The truth is that it is precisely their
modernity which gives nationalism and ethnicity such contemporary
power.
7
capitalism brought into being mass publics who began to imagine,
through the media, a new type of community: the nation. In the twen-
tieth century, with the development of radio and television, these
impulses have been enormously reinforced, and stretch still further, in
that their messages are accessible to people who do not have to be very
literate in the dominant vernacular-----messages, furthermore, which
have a colloquial, auditory and visual immediacy that print can
scarcely match.
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themselves masters of the indigenous populations. (Following inde-
pendence from the metropoles, they encouraged huge new immigra-
tions from non-British and non-Spanish Europe to consolidate this
domination and to promote accumulation in a labour-scarce envir-
onment). Afterwards, only in Australia, New Zealand, Canada and
South Africa could their example be followed. In all later market
migrations, people moved away from the periphery towards more
inward centres, they had no choice but to be subordinated, and they
were never regarded even as ‘debased Europeans’.
There is still another way in which the market is making a special con-
tribution to the new world disorder, and it intersects frequently with
the upheavals sketched out above. In the early days of industrialism,
the munitions industries in the advanced Western states operated
largely outside the market. They typically had but a single customer,
the state, produced commodities to customer specifications, charged
administered prices, and were, because of imperial rivalries, usually
surrounded with a wall of secrecy. But by the 1880s, some of these
munitions giants, for example Armstrong in Britain and Krupp in
Germany, had broken out of the state’s monopsonistic grip, and were
building an infant world arms market. Characteristically, these con-
glomerates’ free-market customers were weak, peripheral and agrarian
states which were incapable of constructing the high-tech metallur-
gical and chemical plants necessary for making modern weapons of
their own on a mass scale. Thus British and American arms flowed to
the recently independent states of South America, German weapons
primarily to Eastern Europe and the Ottoman Empire. For two basic
reasons, this process picked up increasing speed after World War I.
The first was the collapse of the Romanov, Habsburg, Ottoman,
Hohenzollern and Ch’ing empires, and the proliferation in the debris
of a host of new, weak, agrarian nation-states, also completely incap-
able of self-armament. The second was the new speed with which
weapons systems were becoming obsolete as the pace of invention
accelerated: in one generation, aeroplanes, submarines, aircraft car-
riers, tanks and poison gas were all born. The great munitions indus-
tries were now in the business of supplying their core customers with
the most advanced and expensive war machinery possible, but also
selling off obsolescent, cheaper lines of goods on the world market.
The logic behind these developments only deepened its thrust after
World War II, as technological innovation picked up further speed,
and as the number of weak, agrarian states proliferated. But two new
conditions substantially aggravated the situation. On the one hand, as
a result of the oil crisis of 1973, the world saw for the first time
immensely rich weak, agrarian states, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and
Iraq, which had the purchasing power to acquire ‘firstclass’ arms
from the industrial cores. On the other hand, the onset of the Cold
War pitted two superpowers in a global struggle fought largely
through proxies in the periphery, precisely because the two powers
were terrified by the prospect of a nuclear war between themselves. As
a matter of state policy, military-assistance programmes on a vast
scale developed, largely outside the international market, in that their
beneficiaries’ bills were often paid for by the superpowers themselves.
Hence the massive arms races of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s in the
Near East, South, Southeast, and East Asia, Latin America, and even
Africa. The character of superpower competition in the periphery
also encouraged both sides to sell or grant quite sophisticated
weapons to customer-clients who were not the leaderships of nation-
states: guerrillas, rebels, terrorists and counter-terrorists, above all in
zones where the rival superpower was hegemonic. We recall Amer-
ican operations against Soviet-influenced Afghanistan, Angola and
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Cuba, and Soviet operations against American-influenced South
Africa and various parts of Latin America. In a substantial number of
such cases, superpower military support was provided to subgroups
which, to a greater or lesser degree, defined themselves in nationalist,
ethnic or racial terms. (The temptations were particularly great in
Asia and Africa. There, nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century
imperialisms had forcibly ‘integrated’, within iron colonial cages, a
huge variety of older polities, ethnolinguistic groups and religious
communities.3 The independent successor-states born after World
War II were thus peculiarly vulnerable to external manipulation of
ethnic sentiments.)
3
The eminent historian of Africa, Roland Oliver, describes the ‘partition’ of the con-
tinent in the last quarter of the nineteenth century as ‘a ruthless act of political amalga-
mation, whereby something on the order of ten thousand units was reduced to a mere
forty.’
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politics. In the weak peripheral states, militaries largely armed and
trained from the outside were even more likely to turn inwards, as the
nineteenth-century experience of Latin America shows. The world
today is full of national armies that have never fought an external
enemy, but continue to torment their own fellow-citizens.
Among the many reasons for this introversion have been, especially in
the ex-colonial periphery, the processes of decolonization itself, as
well as the temptations posed by the general absence of countervailing
domestic powers in poor, weak, and still heavily agrarian nations. In
the first place, when the imperial powers began creating local mili-
taries in the colonies, they trained them for purposes of domestic
control. The Burma Rifles, for example, were destined to be deployed
only in British Burma and against domestic Burmese resistance to
British rule. In the second place, for obvious political reasons, they
recruited on a heavily ethnicized basis, characteristically favouring
backward and/or Christian minorities: ‘Martial Races’ in India,
Ambonese in the Dutch Indies, Karens in Burma, Berbers in Algeria,
Ibos in Nigeria, and so forth. The transfer of sovereignty therefore
often created a fundamental and dangerous antagonism between an
ethnic minority in control of the most powerful domestic organiz-
ation, and majorities or pluralities that claimed state power on the
basis of popular elections and representative government. Even where
coups did not rapidly ensue, militaries were too important for the
new national governments not to attempt to seize control of recruit-
ment into the officer corps. Under the best of conditions-----that is,
where some genuine conception of national representation in the mili-
tary was adhered to-----majoritarianism usually threatened the hitherto
powerful minorities inside the military with the long-term erosion of
their ascendancy, and, perhaps, their ability to help their fellow
ethnics in time of trouble. In other cases, such as in Latin America,
recruitment to the officer corps was heavily biased on class and
ethnic-racial lines, generally excluding ‘Indians’, and favouring
creoles and mestizos from the middle and upper classes. Small wonder
then that militaries have been extensively used in the periphery to
maintain power structures which, despite nationalist rhetoric, have
been profoundly ethnicized. Still less wonder that discontent and
rebellion against such status quos should have also disposed them-
selves along ethnic, quasi-ethnic, or racial lines.
Hence, despite the end of the Cold War, dangerous convergences that
were already born in the last century show every sign of continuing to
develop: market-led proliferation of weapons-systems, mythologiz-
ation of militaries as sine qua non symbols and guarantors of national
sovereignty, and ethnicization of officer corps.
12
camp for the past twenty-five years, despite British use of the most
sophisticated urban counter-insurgency methods against the IRA, and
despite British leaders as aggressive as Margaret Thatcher. The IRA
survives not only because of its local nationalist appeal and its ruth-
less methods, but because it has gained political and financial support
in the United States and inside England, weapons on the international
arms market, and training and intelligence from Libya and in the
Near East. Belgrade is less than 1,000 kilometres from Berlin, capital
of the most powerful state in Europe and hub of the European Com-
munity. But Berlin, the Community and the United States seem
largely impotent in the face of the civil war destroying Old Yugo-
slavia. Belgrade is the headquarters of a putatively ‘national’ army
which was and is disproportionately Serbian and is now being used
for Serbian rather than Yugoslavian ends. Croat politicians, on the
other hand, have been highly active on the world arms market, and
draw substantial resources from emigrant Croat communities in
various countries around the world.
4
‘Him’ because this type of politics seems to attract males more than females.
13