EXAMPLES OF EMPLOYMENT OF TANKS IN

NIGHT FIGHTING ON THE EUROPEAN LAND

MASS DURING WORLD WAR II

[Note: This manuscript was prepared on 2 June 1966 by Martin

Blumenson, a historian assigned to the Office of the Chief of Military
History (now US Army Center of Military History) for reference use by
members of the Office of the Chief of Staff, Army. It is typical of the
kinds of "staff support" projects routinely carried out by the Center.
The original is on file in the Historical Manuscripts Collection (HMC)
under file number 2-3.7 AC.Y, which should be cited in footnotes, along
with the title. It is reproduced here with only those limited
modifications required to adapt to the World Wide Web; spelling,
punctuation, and slang usage have not been altered from the original.
Where modern explanatory notes were required, they have been
inserted as italicized text in square brackets.]

EXAMPLES OF EMPLOYMENT OF TANKS IN NIGHT FIGHTING ON

THE EUROPEAN LAND MASS DURING WORLD WAR II

1. In order to assure agreement on the definition and the parameters

of the problem, certain types of action have been eliminated. They are:

a. Tanks in an artillery role.

b. Tanks in tactical marches.

c. Tanks in meeting engagements.

 d. Attack movements starting during the night but
designed to get armor to the LD or to the enemy MLR by
dawn, the actual battle to be fought during the day.

e. Daylight attacks turning into exploitation or pursuit and

pressed beyond dusk and into the hours of darkness to
complete the successful action.

2. Bona fide and documented tank attacks made during the hours of
darkness in World War II are few in number. Some examples are
presented here in brief form.

a. Full-scale attack:

(1) Operation TOTALIZE, a night attack

launched by the First Canadian Army form
positions south of Caen toward Falaise. The
attack started at 2300, 7 August 1944, when
more than 1,000 RAF planes, including heavy
bombers, dropped more than 5,000 tons of
bombs in front of the ground troops. As 720
artillery pieces shelled the enemy and lighted
the battlefield with flares, as Bofors guns fired
tracer bullets to mark the direction of the
attack, and as searchlights provided artificial
sunlight, two divisions moved out around
midnight. Preceded by

[1]

tanks with flailing mechanisms to detonate

enemy mines and by engineers who cleared
routes through German mine fields, eight
columns of armor, each with four vehicles
abreast, advanced. Infantrymen followed in
armored personnel carriers with the mission of
detrucking at appropriate places to mop up
bypassed strongpoints. Despite dense clouds of
dust mixed with ground mist, despite vehicular
collisions, despite inevitable losses in direction,
 the Canadians broke through substantial
German defenses for a distance of three miles
by dawn. Source: Martin Blumenson, Breakout
and Pursuit, pp. 479-80.

b. Surprise raid.

(1) German 3d Panzer Division. 25 October

1941. Attacking out of a bridgehead on the
Susha River to gain access to the Mzensk-Tula
road, a brigade commander decided to make a
night raid with the 18th Panzer Regiment. He
started moving with one battalion at 1800,
advanced slowly in pitch-black darkness, and,
just before reaching the road objective, ran
into enemy trucks, which turned out to belong
to a Russian tank-repair depot. In a sharp
exchange of fire, several Russian trucks were
destroyed; the others escaped in the darkness.
The German tank battalion moved to the road,
established blocking positions, and enabled the
entire XXIV Panzer Corps to advance along the
road in the morning. Source: Oskar Munzel,
Panzer-Taktik (Neckargemuend, Germany,
1959) p. 108.

(2) 83d Division and part of the attached 736th

Tank Battalion. 1 March 1945. A regimental
task force attempted to seize by stealth a
bridge over the Rhine at Oberkassel, moving
during the night, trying to deceive the
Germans on the identity of the column.

The task force reached the outskirts of

Oberkassel, but was discovered at dawn. The
alarm was given, and the Germans destroyed
the bridge as the task force was rushing
forward to seize it. Source: Charles B.
MacDonald, The Last Offensive, (unpublished
manuscript) Chapter IX, p. 22.
 (3) Task Force Baum: CCB, 4th Armored
Division. 26-27 March 1945. A tank company,
joined with an infantry company and
supporting elements, struck out from friendly
lines to go approximately 50 miles into enemy-
held territory and liberate a German camp
confining American officer prisoners of war.
Streaking through the enemy rear during the
hours of darkness, the task force was detected
shortly after daylight by the enemy. The task
force reached its objective but was destroyed
as it was trying to return to friendly lines.
Source: John Toland, The Last 100 Days, pp.
287-99.

(4) Task Force Hollingsworth: CCB, 2d Armored

Division. 11 April 1945. A column of tanks
struck out from Magdeburg after darkness to
capture a bridge across the Elbe at
Schoenebeck. The tanks came within a few feet
of the bridge but were unable to take it in the
face of determined German fire. By the time a
new attack with infantry could be mounted, the
Germans had demolished the structure.
Source: Charles B. MacDonald, The Last
Offensive, (unpublished manuscript) Chapter
XVII, pp. 22-23; Cornelius Ryan, The Last
Battle, pp. 305-10.

c. Counterattack:

(1) German 5th Parachute Regiment. 29

November 1944. Two companies of the 26th
Infantry attacked at noon and took the village
of Merode by darkness. The Germans
counterattacked during the night, using

at least one tank, probably more. They retook

the village before the Americans, beset with
confusion, could get supporting tanks into the
 village to bolster the infantry. Charles B.
MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, pp.
490-91.

d. Breakout from encirclement.

(1) Parts of the 2d SS Panzer Division, the 17th

SS Engineer Battalion, the 6th Parachute
Regiment, and the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier
Division were trapped near the village of
Roncey in the Cotentin of Normandy late in July
1944. They tried to break through a series of
roadblocks established by the 2d Armored
Division to ring the encircled Germans. Shortly
before dawn, 29 July, about thirty enemy tanks
and other vehicles, led by an 88-mm. Self-
propelled gun, approached a cross-roads
defended by a company of American armored
infantry and a company of tanks. German
infantrymen crawled along the ditches beside
the road and half a dozen German tanks and
armored vehicles assaulted frontally to force
open an escape route. The self-propelled gun
in the lead overran the American defensive line
and was about to make a breakthrough wen
rifle shots killed the driver and gunner. As the
gun carriage blocked the road, Germans and
Americans battled for the crossroads until
daybreak, when the Germans withdrew,
leaving 17 dead and 150 wounded. American
losses were less than 50 casualties, one tank,
and one halftrack.

About the same time, several miles away,

about 15 German tanks and several hundred
troops overran an outpost manned by an
infantry company. The company commander
was killed at once, and the troops fell back half
a mile into the positions of an armored field
artillery battalion,

4
which fired for thirty minutes and held off
further German attack until nearby armored
infantrymen arrived and re-established the
outpost. They found 7 destroyed Mark IV tanks
and counted 125 German dead. Some Germans
had escaped.

German groups struck the armored defensive

line again during the following night of 29 July.
One of the largest was a group of about 1,000
troops and nearly 100 armored vehicles, which
struck at the cross-roads of St. Denis le Gast in
two columns. A shot by a Mark V, which poked
its gun through a hedgerow, destroyed the
command halftrack of the American tank
battalion, and the tank continued to fire and
set vehicles at the command post ablaze. The
Americans became disorganized and fell back,
relinquishing the crossroads. As the Germans
poured through the opening, the Americans
rallied and returned to fight an intense close-
range battle. By morning, American troops
again held firm hold on St. Denis le Gast;
against losses of 100 men and 12 vehicles,
they had killed 130 enemy, wounded 124,
captured 500, and destroyed at least 25
vehicles, of which 7 were tanks.

At Cambry, shortly after midnight of 29 July,

about 2,500 Germans made an organized
break. The point of the attack overran a tank
roadblock and threatened to crush the
defenses held by a company each of tanks and
infantry. American tankfire at very short range
destroyed the momentum of the German
attack, which fell apart as panic-stricken troops
tried to flee. At the end of a six-hour
engagement, 450 Germans were killed, 1,000
were prisoners, and about 100 vehicles of all
types were destroyed; the American losses
were about 50 killed and 60 wounded. Source:
Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, pp.
277-81.

(2) The German breakout from the Argentan-

Falaise pocket was so large in scope, so
 disjointed in sequence, and so poor in
documentation that only a fragmentary record
survives. The overall operation consisted of two
parts, first, a withdrawal, which started on the
night of 16 August 1944 after the failure of the
Mortain counterattack, and second, a breakout,
which started on the night of 19 August 1944
after Allied troops closed the pocket. During
the first phase, the withdrawals made during
the hours of darkness on three successive
nights were accomplished for the most part
without intense combat. During the second
phase, the breakout operations conducted
during the hours of darkness on two successive
nights were the result for the most part of
individual, fragmented efforts. Commanders
tried to employ their armor, when tanks were
available to them, at the point of each column,
in the rear guard, and to a certain extent as
covering forces on the flanks. Success in
escaping the closing Allied ring depended on
individual initiative of small unit commanders,
on unit morale and will to fight, and on pure
chance—the good fortune, for example, of
finding an intact bridge or shallow ford. An
account of the second phase of the breakout,
which is more relevant to the problem, may be
found in Martin Blumenson, Breakout and
Pursuit, pp. 542 ff.

3. There was much night fighting by tanks of both sides during the
battle of the Bulge, not all of it documented. The following examples,
taken from Hugh M. Cole, The Ardennes: The Battle of the Bulge (page
numbers are cited after each example) have been divided into
successful and unsuccessful actions from the point of view of the
attacking armor. An

6
example fitting neither category is added. A summary statement is
appended on the night-fighting experience of the 4th Armored Division
during its drive to Bastogne.

a. Successful actions.

(1) During the exceptionally dark night of 16

December 1944, a regimental armored task
force from the 1st SS Panzer Division overran
and engulfed two platoons of American infantry
at Bucholz. Moving into Honsfeld while
American troops were pulling out, the leading
German tanks simply joined the American
traffic and, led by a man signaling with a
flashlight, rolled down the village streets.
American troops scrambled out of town as
Germans poured in from all sides. Pp. 90-91.

(2) Mark IV and Panther tanks of the 3d Panzer

Regiment reached a roadblock protecting
Bastogne and defended by an understrength
tank battalion of CCR, 9th Armored Division
after darkness on 17 December 1944.
Sweeping the area with machine gun fire to
clear any infantry who might be protecting the
American tanks, the panzers overran and
destroyed two tank platoons, set other vehicles
ablaze with tracer bullets, and knocked out the
roadblock. Pp. 295-296.

(3) An hour before midnight, 20 December, the

1st Battalion, 119th Infantry (30th Division)_
and a tank company holding a sanatorium
building on a hill on the edge of Stoumont
came under attack. German tanks inched
forward to positions from which they fired
directly into the sanatorium. American tanks
brought up were unable to negotiate the steep
banks of the hill, and one was set afire by a
German bazooka, two others were knocked out
by German tank fire. These burning tanks and
some outbuildings set afire lighted the
approaches to the main building
 7

and prevented further American tank

maneuver. German tanks then ran in close
enough to fire through the windows of the
sanatorium. After furious close-in fighting, the
Germans took possession of the large building
and drove the Americans off the hill. Pp. 349-
51.

(4) The 18th Volks Grenadier Division attacking

along the Schoenberg road toward St. Vith
mounted what turned out to be the final
assault at 2000, 21 December, against a 106th
Division roadblock incorporating three
Sherman tanks into the defenses. A German
infantry regiment, supported by one or two
platoons of Tiger tanks, quickly knocked out
the Shermans and broke through the line of
foxholes held by exhausted men who had
battled for several days against overwhelming
odds. Pp. 404-05.

(5) The 1st Battalion, 319th Infantry (80th

Division) waited until after dark on 23
December—when ten tanks formerly attached
to the 28th Division arrived—to attack Kehman.
The task force destroyed three German tanks
and freed the village. Pp. 518-19.

(6) The 2d Battalion, 104th Infantry (26th

Division) and a few tanks attacked at 0045, 25
December to take Eschdorf. When German fire
turned back the infantry, three tanks churned
to the fore through the snow until checked by a
small creek, extended by an antitank ditch. A
second effort launched at 0400 succeeded only
in getting as far as the first effort. But because
the tanks in the center pinned down the
German defenders, the American companies
on the flanks broke through and moved into
the town. Pp. 542-43.
 (7) At 2100, 24 December, the 2d SS Panzer
Division attacked toward Manhay, where
elements of the 3d, 7th, and 9th Armored

Divisions were located, some withdrawing from

defensive positions previously held in the
general area. On that beautifully clear and
moonlit night, the glistening and hard-packed
snow gave goo surface for tank movement. A
captured Sherman tank led the German tank
column and deceived the American defenders
at a roadblock in front of Manhay. Four
American Shermans fell to enemy bazookas
and two were crippled. A thousand yards or so
beyond, where another roadblock was
defended by an understrength rifle company
and ten medium tanks dug into hull defilade,
the German column, still led by the captured
Sherman, got close to the defenders, let loose
flares that blinded the dug-in Shermans and
knocked them out. Around 2230, the Germans
were entering Manhay, where they knocked
out five more American tanks. Pp. 587-89.

b. Unsuccessful actions.

(1) About 1930, 16 December, three German

tanks and a platoon or so of infantry simply
rolled through the line of the 1st Battalion, 9th
Infantry (2d Division) and proceeded toward
Rocherath. Half an hour later, when more
German tanks came along the same road, they
struck mines and were stopped. American fires
then turned them back. After an hour of
reorganization, the Germans attacked again.
Five or six German tanks rolled to within a few
hundred yards of the foxhole line. Joined by
infantry, the German tanks broke through. But
the Americans refused to panic and checked
the attack by midnight. Pp. 109-10.
(2) The 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry (2d
Division) had set up defensive positions at
Krinkelt which were struck at 2130, 16
December by German tanks and infantry. The
defenders let the tanks roll past, then

took on the infantry. Three German tanks with

infantry clinging to their decks got into the
streets of the village, but by midnight the
enemy tanks were knocked out and the
infantry killed or captured. Pp. 110-11.

(3) During the night of 18 December, the 12th

SS Panzer Division dispatched a battalion of
infantry, plus a few tanks, from Bullingen
toward Burgenbach. The tanks had a hard time
on the road, which was a river of mud. About
0225, 19 December, about 20 truckloads of
German infantry dismounted, deployed behind
a dozen tanks, and moved against the 2d
Battalion, 26th Infantry (1st Division). American
artillery opened up. Some German tanks mired
down before they could reach the American
line. Others were discouraged by bazooka and
antitank fires. Three tanks were on the point of
breaking through the defenses when they were
knocked out by American 155-mm. howitzer
fires. Pp. 129-30.

(4) Defending Neville during the night of 19

December, the 1st Battalion, 506th Parachute
Infantry (101st Airborne Division) met an
assault launched by the 2d Panzer Division.
Throughout the night panzers prowled about
the edge of the village, while eight Shermans
inside the village engaged in a "blindfold duel"
to keep the German tanks from entering. Pp.
453-54.
 (5) At 1845, 23 December, a regiment of
Panzer Lehr, employing at least two tank
companies, began a co-ordinated attack
against Marvile, held by the 2d Battalion, 327th
Glider Infantry (101st Airborne Division) and a
tank battalion of CCB, 10th Armored Division.
The German tankers overran defenses on the
edge of Marvie but were unable to enter the
village. They launched a second attack at
midnight, but were stopped

10

again by American tank and tank destroyer

fires against the panzers silhouetted by the
glare of burning buildings. The battle ended
just before dawn with both opponents holding
part of Marvie. Pp. 471-72.

(6) A tank battalion of CCA, 4th Armored

Division was driving to reach Bastogne on 22
December. Approaching Warnach as night was
falling, a tank company at the head of the
column entered the village and ran into
German fire. While tank destroyers shelled the
houses, a light tank platoon and a rifle platoon
advanced into the village to clear it. These
elements were ambushed, and one tank and
most of the foot troops, got out. Antitank fires
were effective. Not until after daylight did the
Americans take the village. Pp. 529-30.

c. Tanks defending a village.

The 1st SS Panzer Division sent a column

composed of infantry and assault guns toward
Recht. About 0200, the advance guard hit the
village defended by a tank battalion operating
under the headquarters of CCR, 7th Armored
Division. Unwilling to risk his tanks without
infantry protection in a night fight through
narrow streets and uncertain of the German
 strength, the American commander ordered a
withdrawal after a sharp 450-minute
engagement. P. 280.

d. The following summary statement is appended to

indicate the impracticability of continuous armored action:
"Attack around the Clock, enjoined by General Patton, had
not been notably successful so far as the tank arm was
concerned. From commander down, the 4th Armored
[Division] was opposed to further use of the weakened tank
battalions in hours of darkness." P. 531.

11

4. The following is a paraphrased excerpt of a German observation of

the use of tanks in night operations on the Russian front.

Combat at Night. "Battles which extend into darkness or sudden

encounters during the night generally lead quickly to a static firefight
or to an immediate breaking off of the engagement." "The scope of a
night attack must generally be restricted and the objective limited."
These quotations from the German manual on troop leadership were
regarded in peacetime training as accepted doctrine. The campaign in
the East produced a decisive change. The increased number and
effectiveness of modern weapons forced a shift to purely night
operations of ever increasing scope. The growing importance of air
power also contributed to the practice of assembling, deploying, and
readying forces in darkness. Not only the scope and importance of
night operations, but the manner of their execution changed
significantly. Before the war and at the outset, night operations were
normally carried out in stealth. During the course of the war, in
addition to surreptitious attacks by limited numbers of infantry,
powerful attacks were made with concentrated forces employing
superior mobility and heavy firepower. In these, tanks and/or armored
personnel carriers played a decisive role, particularly when enemy
firepower was limited. Tanks in combination with 1) halftracks, 2)
closely following infantry, or 3) self-propelled assault guns carrying
infantry, and firing as they moved almost always had success if they
attained surprise. The approach of tanks at night gave the defender a
feeling of helplessness.
Combat in darkness or fog requires an especially high state of training,
hardened and determined troops, special equipment, including devices
for night vision, whether infra-red or radar, and maximum mental,

12

physical, and moral exertion. Night operations, particularly large

attacks, must be thoroughly prepared. More time than normal is
necessary not only for reconnaissance on foot during the day but also
for executing the operation on the battlefield. A failure in a night
operation generally has a greater moral effect on the executing troops
than a similar failure in the daytime.

In summary, night operations give certain advantages: reduce the

effectiveness of enemy ground weapons and air power; heighten the
moral factors on the side of the attacker' conceal movements behind
the front and on the battlefield; as well as certain disadvantages:
provoke greater difficulty in command, ground orientation,
reconnaissance, security, and maintenance of contact among friendly
forces; reduce weapons support; reduce co-ordination with artillery.

The German practice of depending on the initiative of the small-unit

leaders suffers in night operations because of the difficulty of co-
ordinating the combat arms. Further, breaking enemy resistance by
means of concentrated fires at certain times and places is often
impossible at night.

Finally, in night combat, the stronger will and the better nerves are
decisive. These are generally the decisive factors in day operations.

Night Attack and Night Pursuit. The Russians constantly improved and
refined their night attack methods during the war. In 1941-42, local
successes were insufficiently exploited. In 1942-43, large-scale attacks
were pressed well after dark, though toward relatively shallow
objectives, often simply to take the forward line of the German
positions.

13

Usually, these attacks failed despite heavy expenditures of men and

materiel, because of poorly organized artillery support and the inability
of Russian small-unit leaders to deal with German counterattacks
launched even by relatively small forces. From the end of 1943, the
Russians normally executed night attacks toward deep objectives and
used numerous tanks; they were frequently successful. Particularly
good examples are: the big Russian tank breakthrough on the night of
the second day of battle in the Baranov bridgehead in January, 1945;
and the night attack on Berlin against a fluid German front in April,
1945. In the Baranov bridgehead, Russian infantry followed a heavy
artillery preparation and, with tank support, broke big gaps which were
exploited during the hours of darkness by tanks heading for deep
objectives.

The main characteristics of Russian night attacks were: deception as to

place of attack and method of execution; heavy concentration at the
point of breakthrough; and mass infiltration. In pursuit the Russians
often used night attacks or night marches. Particularly impressive in
this respect was the advance of Russian tank forces at the end of
January 1945 out of the Posen area via Landsberg an dem Warthe
toward Stettin, which was carried out in a single night through the
large and difficult forested area of the Landsberger Heide (heath)
despite a heavy snowstorm. Source: Eike Middleldorf, Taktik im
Russlandfeldzug (Darmstadt, Germany, 1956), pp. 196 ff.

5. A research report entitled "Armor in Night Attack," prepared at The

Armored School, Fort Knox, in 1949-1950:

a. recognized the very few references dealing with the

employment of armor in night attacks;
 14

b. stated that night operations give the benefit of secrecy

and surprise to the attacker;

c. reminded of the psychological advantage accruing tot he

attacker because of his knowledge of when, where, and
how the attack is to be conducted;

d. repeated the necessity for thorough planning and

detailed reconnaissance;

e. warned of the extreme difficulty of maintaining control;

f. concluded that "Any unit with proper training and

equipment is capable of conducting night operations as a
routine form of combat."

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