ECON 313 – Economics of Transportation VCU, fall 2007 Prof. George E.

Hoffer, PhD
Research Paper on Amtrak 7-12 November Bill Lemmond

No Way to Run a Railroad Assessment: Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor and a Search

for a Total Cost-Benefit Analysis, in Comparison with Other Modes

By the middle of the 19th century, public and private operators abandoned toll-collecting for and

maintenance on turnpikes all over the U.S. Pikes were effectively turned over for local use, as the railroads

took over the role of long distance transportation. A century later, road travel got its revenge, and air travel

helped. These modes benefited from public favor and effective lobbying. Among the results have been

infrastructure built almost entirely with public capital. Against this, railroads have been left literally to

make their own way.

To understand why Amtrak’s operating deficit, and even its very existence have been such matters

of controversy, one has to dig deeply, perhaps more than I am able at this late date. I suspect one thing that

has kept the arguments going is that at least one side argued from ideology, starting with a conclusion. As

a result, I don’t think the two sides have enough open discussion with each other. Shutting out the other

side, they each have turned more inward on their own views and have become increasingly intellectually

inbred.

Because lines have been drawn in the way above, there are prominent sources – the US

Department of Transportation, the Heritage Foundation – where I’ve sought in vain for evidence saying one

way or another as to whether the subsidies for the various modes of transportation are more benefit than

cost. Searches for “spillover benefits,” the “free rider” problem, “public good,” and “market failure” (one

at a time, not all in one search) have come up empty.

This is not simply because professional communicators do not seem to know how to produce PDF

versions of paper documents in which it is possible to search the text electronically. Most sources are

simply much more able to discuss costs than benefits. I am left to weigh what I can find and develop a less

incomplete picture, by induction - noting weaknesses in arguments, noting what is not mentioned.

Criticism of Amtrak – Praising with Faint Damns?

Maybe the only thing that keeps Amtrak both threatened and alive is that even the Heritage

foundation has given up on any effect beyond preaching to its choir – a readership it may privately despise.

I’ve read the argument of their Stuart M. Butler in favor of sale of state assets. (Heritage Lecture #148,

“Why Asset Sales are Good Public Policy.”) He begins respectfully enough, presenting both sides briefly,

Page 1 of 15
ECON 313 – Economics of Transportation VCU, fall 2007 Prof. George E. Hoffer, PhD
Research Paper on Amtrak 7-12 November Bill Lemmond

but then he plays to an expected suspicion of Congress among the readership. Congress is described as

having taken measures specifically intended to stop open inquiry into the value to the public of sale of

public assets to the private sector.

Butler cites some good examples, such as securitized federal debt instruments (including the

mortgage-backed securities too many people thought eliminated risk), detached single-family public

housing (in England) and power marketing (which I know is conducted privately by Dominion Virginia

Power).

However, his framing of the issue is obvious to me, because I’ve spent over 40 years as an

outsider, and I’ve been forced to see more sides to things than many people ever see. By sticking to un-

named public assets, which more fit the description of private, marketable goods, Butler describes in

general terms a market process, probably an auction. “With rival buyers in competition, the market price

for the asset will reach the point at which the bidder (or group of investors in the case of a public offering)

with the greatest degree of confidence offers a price reflecting the best likely future return.” (p. 3, Lecture

#148) This description of the more efficient free market process is only bate and switch when applied to

true public goods, those left to the public sector because of a history of market failure.

Butler avoids any chance that readers would think of “state assets” such as the armed forces or the

fire department, assets that were historically weak, or too limited in scope and/or scale, when only supplied

by the private sector. He does mention Amtrak as an asset suitable for sale.

The history of Amtrak is that all US railroads were given the opportunity to give up their passenger service

to Amtrak. They were even required to give Amtrak priority on their tracks. All the railroads jumped at

the chance. Passenger service was only a money-maker before US governments started subsidizing a

national hard-surface road network by $1 billion per year in the 1920s (Twentieth Century Sprawl :

Highways and the Reshaping of the American Landscape, Gutfreund, Owen D., p. 27). Then passenger

rail service was subsidized by freight rail service, which itself was losing ground. By the time Amtrak was

in the wings, regulated railroads, saddled with under-used long-distance passenger service, had gone

bankrupt throughout the northeast.

If any entity ever offers Amtrak a good, market price for part of its operation, the question is if the

prospective buyer is only trying to capture government subsidies. If confirmation can be had that the target

Page 2 of 15
ECON 313 – Economics of Transportation VCU, fall 2007 Prof. George E. Hoffer, PhD
Research Paper on Amtrak 7-12 November Bill Lemmond

operation can really turn a profit as a separate, private operation, and if government will continue to fund

the remaining Amtrak operations which meet demand for a public good, then Amtrak should take the

money and run.

Public administration of assets and services suffers from some very real and some simply assumed

inefficiencies, yet it is the only choice in face of market failure. After denigrating public management,

Butler also argues for sale of public assets (including Amtrak and the US Postal Service by name) as a way

of broadening the base of private ownership – the number of people who own stock and the amount they

own. This is not the first time Butler starts with a universally acclaimed good idea. Wealth is even more

concentrated than income, and were it more widely held, more people would be able to weather tough times

and finance their own best financial moves. Wider wealth increases the scope of Adam Smith’s “invisible

hand.” When more people have a sense of ownership, we are less divided, in perception and objectively,

along class lines. And employees with a stake in their employer identify more with the success of the firm

and work to support it.

However, employee stock ownership programs (ESOP) can increase risks for participants, if for

whatever reasons – inadequate financial education, restrictions on sale of assets or holdings in retirement

funds – the employees’ investments lack adequate diversification. This is not an argument against sale of

public assets, but it is a reason to make sure the employees’ corporate ownership is diversified.

Butler specifically refers to Amtrak as a target for sale to its employees, with expected increases in

efficiency, on the order of the result when Britain sold its National Freight Corporation.

“Amtrak’s northeast corridor … would seem to be candidates for serous consideration

[for sale]. If Britain’s National Freight Corporation experience is any guide to the potential,

transferring the Washington-Boston corridor to Amtrak workers at an attractive price could have

dramatic effects on productivity and the financial bottom line. Instead of privatization posing a

threat to Amtrak workers, it would then become an opportunity for workers as owners to gain

directly from improvements in productivity. And instead of Amtrak being a money-losing

albatross that cannot be sold because of worker and rider opposition, it could become an efficient

alternative service without draining the Treasury.” (Butler, p. 7)

I included the entire paragraph so the reader can experience the tone and see the argument as a

Page 3 of 15
ECON 313 – Economics of Transportation VCU, fall 2007 Prof. George E. Hoffer, PhD
Research Paper on Amtrak 7-12 November Bill Lemmond

whole. Can Butler be unfamiliar with the history of Amtrak? Again, private railroads eagerly abandoned

passenger service, even where economies of density overcame diseconomies of network scale and

disadvantages in face of airline and motor competition.

Amtrak’s statutory role does not allow it to be profitable, any more than pollution controls add to

any bottom line that doesn’t include health care costs and lost productivity. Butler suggests adding

“covenants” to any sale, requiring the new owner to continue some services that operate at a loss.

Passenger rail service generally operates at a loss. If it didn’t, the private railroads would have held onto

some of it. Very limited commuter lines are generally also publicly owned, for the same reason. Selling

Amtrak to its employees could only be done at gunpoint. If any part of it had a market value that could be

captured in stock, some investor group would have lobbied Congress for a sale.

Passenger rail service is not the same as freight rail service, and a freight trucking operation is

even less comparable. Freight service has proven profitable, when allowed to compete on a level

regulatory playing field. The privatization of Britain’s National Freight was a remarkable success that has

nothing to do with Amtrak and passenger rail service.

Some History of Amtrak and its Northeast Corridor Operations

GAO Report GAO-04-94, Appendix IV: Brief History of the Northeast Corridor and Northeast High-Speed

Rail Improvement Projects

“The Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4R Act) formally established

the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project (NECIP). … [By] 1981, Amtrak was to have … dependable

… service between Boston and New York City (called the ‘north-end’ of the Northeast Corridor) in 3 hours

and 40 minutes, and between New York City and Washington, D.C., in 2 hours 40 minutes.” The Secretary

of Transportation was to learn if it were practical to reduce times to Boston-New York 3 hours and New

York-D.C. 2 hours 30 minutes. “The 4R Act authorized $1.75 billion … Congress appropriated about $1.5

billion for fiscal years 1976 to 1980.”

GAO concurs that more time and money should have been spent planning, and that Amtrak

needed to present a comprehensive plan on which to base a cost-benefit analysis and any funding. They

also say that year-to-year funding, uncertain, historically fluctuating and often inadequate by a factor of ten,

discouraged thorough planning and project-length efficiency. “In January 1979, DOT … stated not only

Page 4 of 15
ECON 313 – Economics of Transportation VCU, fall 2007 Prof. George E. Hoffer, PhD
Research Paper on Amtrak 7-12 November Bill Lemmond

that the project had been inadequately planned, but also that another $750 million would be needed to

complete the project (for a total of $2.5 billion). Completion would be delayed until at least 1983. In May

1980, the Passenger Railroad Rebuilding Act of 1980 authorized” the above request, but “required FRA

[the Federal Railroad Administration] to transfer responsibility for the project to Amtrak by … 1985.”

I find it remarkable that once FRA oversight (as opposed to merely writing checks) was first seen

as desirable, then punished for bringing bad news, and at the time of this GAO report is once again seen as

valuable, as opposed to meddling micro-management.

By 1982, cost increases had eliminated items from the project budget, chiefly the electrification of

rail lines between Boston and New Haven [This was not completed until the 1990s.]. This put the trip time

goals out of reach. Electrical work went through so many changes that about $100 million beyond planned

expenses was needed, mostly for flag men on streets to maintain road and rail traffic safety. Even after the

electrification from Boston to New York was completed, at the time of the GAO report, the contractor was

the target of a criminal investigation and in litigation brought by Amtrak.

In 1985, the FRA treated the NECIP as completed, as far as their responsibilities. They were no

longer to audit progress and “additional funding for remaining major work elements was not envisioned.”

[NECIP did achieve the original trip time goals, but focused mostly on the “south-end” lines] “because of

significant deterioration … from years of deferred maintenance and neglect [sic; I don’t think the neglect

was deferred. J]. In November 1986, DOT reported that when Congress authorized and funded NECIP in

1976, the Northeast Corridor had literally begun to disintegrate at both its … ends.” (Text version, p. 52)

“Between 1985 and 1990, funding for NECIP … averaged about $21 million per year, compared

with about $250 million … 1967 through 1984.” The GAO hints at some public good effect. “As a result

of efforts by various organizations in the mid- and late 1980s, including the Coalition of Northeast

Governors, interest again rose in high-speed passenger rail service between New York City and Boston,

because of its potential to mitigate increasing highway and air congestion, as well as air pollution levels.”

(GAO, p 53) The 1992 Amtrak Authorization and Development Act authorized $470 million for FY 1193

and 1994 (only $429 appropriated). Amtrak opened the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project

(NHSRIP), and in 1994, FRA issued the master plan, with three milestones: “(1) initiate electrified train

service between Boston and New York City [finally connect Boston and New Haven], (2) initiate 3-hour

Page 5 of 15
ECON 313 – Economics of Transportation VCU, fall 2007 Prof. George E. Hoffer, PhD
Research Paper on Amtrak 7-12 November Bill Lemmond

train service between these cities, and (3) complete the infrastructure improvements designed to enhance

track capacity and extend the useful life of existing assets.” (GAO, 53)

Problems have caused delays and so far, the 3-hour goal for New York- Boston has not been

reached. Uncertain year-to-year funding by Congress is said to have discouraged project-length planning

and ironically led to more cost overruns. This has made coordination with other stakeholders (governments

along the route, commuter lines) less than necessary, especially regarding parts of the route which are not

owned by Amtrak. Reworking curves for higher speeds have been delayed. While GAO doesn’t say this, I

suspect this is made difficult by the density of development along the route and the difficulty in changing

right-of-way.

“High-speed rail service was initiated in January 2000 [only achieving 3 hours, 20 minutes, New

York-Boston, thanks to delayed infrastructure improvements], even though the electrification work was not

substantially completed until July [almost 3 years late].” (GAO, 54) Through March 2003 spending on the

NHSRIP [which I now note is a rather unfortunate acronym] was “about $2.6 billion by Amtrak and an

additional $625 million by commuter rail agencies and state governments.” (GAO, 54)

Should Amtrak Be Saved? (27 March 2002, in Knowledge@Wharton)

Wharton says Amtrak was ‘created in 1970 by the Rail Passenger Service Act as a for-profit

entity.” (Wharton, 1) Did anyone really believe this was possible? As mentioned, as soon as private

railroads were allowed, they threw all their passenger service to Amtrak as the hottest of potatoes. “Since

its inception, … [Amtrak] has never made money, due in part, say some, to its contradictory missions: It

has been expected t wean itself off federal aid while continuing to provide a national service that includes

costly long-distance routes. (Wharton, 1) Amtrak Reform Council (ARC) senior financial analyst Michael

Mates says “18 [of Amtrak’s] trains represent just about 18% of total ridership and … 70% of the cost [of

Amtrak service].” (Wharton, 4)

“In 1996 Amtrak’s revenues were $1.6 billion but expenses stood at $2.3 billion … By fiscal

2001, un-audited [Caution!] figures show that Amtrak’s loss increased to more than $1 billion.” In

February 2002, the ARC suggested separating infrastructure and operations. This would put Amtrak

operations on a more equal footing with air and road travel, where infrastructure is provided with public

capital. Please note below two charts from DOT, Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Neither chart seems

Page 6 of 15
ECON 313 – Economics of Transportation VCU, fall 2007 Prof. George E. Hoffer, PhD
Research Paper on Amtrak 7-12 November Bill Lemmond

to reflect capital spending on infrastructure.

W. Bruce Allen, professor of business and public policy, regional science, and transportation at

Wharton, said of Amtrak in the beginning “If a freight company signed on, it could abandon all passenger

services Amtrak wouldn’t operate. Sure, it had to provide track priorities, but it seemed to be a fairly good

exchange.” Sticking Amtrak with operations all others fled, while expecting Amtrak to make a profit can’t

have been simply naïve on such a grand scale. It had to be dishonest “it was dealing with political

constituencies who would not let it manage the system the way a business manager could. Unions

restricted the amount of time a person could work. Then there were equipment problems, and freight

companies didn’t always maintain tracks to passenger standards. Sometimes they just paid the penalty for

not giving the passenger trains priority, and let the freight trains go first if it made economic sense.” (Allen

in Wharton, 2)

Some of the best the proud Wharton School of Business offered leaves too much out. I wonder if

they were willing to sacrifice the quality of their article simply to make another college at U. Penn look

bad. Vukan R. Vuchic, “a professor of transportation systems engineering at the University of

Pennsylvania’s School of Engineering and Applied Science believes that privatizing the rail system and

breaking it up isn’t a good idea. ‘There are two questions to ask,’ he says. ‘The first is: Does our country

need railroads? And the second is: Should it be Amtrak, or another organization?’” (Wharton, 3)

There’s nothing wrong with the questions, and the author(s) of the Wharton article include enough

evidence that the answers aren’t obvious enough to the voters or perhaps even our representatives.

Vuchic’s quoted answers don’t really answer.

“’The answer to question one is a vehement yes. There’s no way to imagine a country like the

U.S. without railroads. [Sadly, it’s all too obvious many have found a way to such imagining. Railroads

need more than “Argument weak here – thump pulpit loudly.” “Distances over 500 miles” is not

something that jumps out at the layperson, and that’s only for freight.] To answer the second question – if

we agree that we need railroads – it’s only rational to have the involvement of government.’” [Thanks to

capital subsidies for other transportation modes, demand and cost comparisons are distorted beyond the

ability of most people to see them clearly.] The Wharton article does add “The fact that demand for

Amtrak services has gone up over the years seems to support Vuchic’s point. In 1971, a year after Amtrak

Page 7 of 15
ECON 313 – Economics of Transportation VCU, fall 2007 Prof. George E. Hoffer, PhD
Research Paper on Amtrak 7-12 November Bill Lemmond

began operations, it transported 1.2 million people a month. By 1999, that figure had risen 45% to 1.8

million. Annual numbers tell a similar story. Amtrak ridership went from 13.7 million in 1972 to 23.5

million in 2001.

“Vuchic argues that if the U.S. accepts gasoline and ticket taxes, why should it not do something

for rail? ‘We subsidize certain industries because we think they are essential services and that they will

have a multiplier effect on the economy. [Subsidies should be limited to industries which fit the foregoing

description but also would produce considerably less than is needed for unsubsidized productivity to

increase beyond the subsidy total.] If we agree on that, there is no need to hide subsidies on other transport

modes. We subsidize other modes, such as airlines and highways, but we don’t call them subsidies.’”

(Wharton, 3)

If the U.S. separates infrastructure from Amtrak’s operating costs, and funds it through public

funds, we need to avoid mistakes made in Britain. ARC analyst Mates says The British had contracts that

made track fees largely fixed. So operators thought to themselves, ‘What we have to do to be profitable is

to run more trains.’ But there was no time or money to fix the tracks. In the 1970s and 1980s, the physical

infrastructure was neglected. The private entities could not get enough money to support infrastructure

improvements. But the operators are making money. Ridership has shot up to levels not seen since the

Second World War.” (Wharton, 3)

Mates and the ARC continue. “you don’t have to privatize everything. Sleeper and meal services

are probably good candidates for privatizing. I would spin off the Northeast Corridor infrastructure into a

new entity. Amtrak or any other operator could run over it. Congress could decide whether all costs

should get passed to users or whether there should be some subsidies.” (Wharton, 3) Subsidies need to be

justified by spillover benefits to taxpayers beyond riders of Amtrak.

For long-haul trains, especially the 18 routes which cost the most, Mates suggests turning them

into high-end integrated vacation experiences, similar to how ocean liners have shifted from transportation

to cruises. “Take overnight and full-service dining cars, franchise them out, and make it a luxury

experience – a package deal.” The article “Century Gone” pointed out that in the face of growing

competition from the automobile and buses, luxury express trains gained in ridership and commanded

premium prices from travelers who valued comfort.

Page 8 of 15
ECON 313 – Economics of Transportation VCU, fall 2007 Prof. George E. Hoffer, PhD
Research Paper on Amtrak 7-12 November Bill Lemmond

The U.S. is the only developed country to lower the speed of its passenger trains. Amtrak is still

on a long, slow way back. Acela train-sets were not in place at the writing of the Wharton article. There

are hopes for annual additions of $300 million in revenue, with $180 million for Amtrak’s bottom line and

2 million passengers who would otherwise have traveled some other way than by train. In 2001, Amtrak

attracted 240,000 new passengers.

Allen warns of more infrastructure demands. “Freight railroads in the U.S. don’t really have

excess capacity. If you want high speed trains, who’s going to build the tracks? ARC says let’s get the

states and regions involved.” The private sector can supply contractors, but it’s passenger rail, so

investment will remain shy.

“Mates cautions ‘European cities have more compact land areas, and different population density.

The area they’re serving is very different. You can’t really compare the two. If a train’s going faster than

110 miles an hour, you have to eliminate grade crossings, and there are lots of these in the Midwest. If

you’re stopping all the time, you can’t accelerate and decelerate the way you need to.’” (Wharton, 4)

Page 9 of 15
ECON 313 – Economics of Transportation VCU, fall 2007 Prof. George E. Hoffer, PhD
Research Paper on Amtrak 7-12 November Bill Lemmond

The following figures are from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, on the web site of the US

Department of Transportation.

“Figure 1. Net Federal Subsidies to Passenger Transportation by Mode: FY 1990 – 2003”

I wish I knew how they concluded that subsidies for highway travel were not only negative, but

massively so. If this were true, how is it we have one bridge collapsed, and I’ve been hearing for years that

thousands of Depression Era bridges are at the end of their service life?

DOT’s BTS also has Excel spreadsheets, which I am including on a CD, should you have more

use for them than I did. They are a wealth of information on variable costs. Most recent figures for total

passengers carried in a year by rail (about 25 million) and air (over 650 million) show that passenger rail is

relatively minor.

It’s this level of apparent unreality that was most discouraging. Difficulty in finding comparisons

of benefits across modes was fruitless. Here, the comparison of costs is bizarre. Below are two charts from

Twentieth Century Sprawl : Highways and the Reshaping of the American Landscape by Owen D.

Gutfreund. (It’s a book I think you’d enjoy and may want to reference, if only for the League of American

Wheelmen (19th century bicyclists) whose Good Roads campaign was joined by the railroads in the belief

Page 10 of 15
ECON 313 – Economics of Transportation VCU, fall 2007 Prof. George E. Hoffer, PhD
Research Paper on Amtrak 7-12 November Bill Lemmond

that the chief effect of good roads would be to increase the geographic reach of their stations. Included on

the accompanying CD is a file, called HighwaySubsidies.doc, which is composed of excerpts from the

book.)

I do find it odd that the same author says overall funding for highways was
over $1.5 billion per year in the 1920s. I wonder why he doesn’t also chart state and
local funds.

Page 11 of 15
ECON 313 – Economics of Transportation VCU, fall 2007 Prof. George E. Hoffer, PhD
Research Paper on Amtrak 7-12 November Bill Lemmond

Page 12 of 15
ECON 313 – Economics of Transportation VCU, fall 2007 Prof. George E. Hoffer, PhD
Research Paper on Amtrak 7-12 November Bill Lemmond

“Figure 2: Net Federal Subsidies per Thousand Passenger-Miles by Mode: FY 1990 – 2002”

I suspect the only subsidies included are for day-to-day operations, and that public capital for infrastructure
is left out, for air and highway modes, certainly. I searched in vain for complete, side-by-side comparisons
of fixed cost subsidies.
In the 1920s, all levels of US governments were subsidizing construction of paved roads an

average $1 billion per year, in dollars of the time. Adjusted for inflation, this dwarfs appropriations for

infrastructure on Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor, which barely rose above $250 million (in 1980s and 1990s

dollars) some years. The more I read, the more I think, the more I appreciate JayEtta Hecker (also quoted

extensively in GAO report GAO-04-94), Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues. If the rest decided to

relegate advocating public investment in railroad infrastructure as “women’s work,” then the rest really are,

as I suspect, nothing more than a bunch of rhymes-with-hicks. Can you tell I want to pop someone for

doing such a job at taxpayer expense – and palming it off as educational? Thank you for not being like

that.

Page 13 of 15
ECON 313 – Economics of Transportation VCU, fall 2007 Prof. George E. Hoffer, PhD
Research Paper on Amtrak 7-12 November Bill Lemmond

Appendix A, All-Purpose, Perpetual Script for Annual Congressional Debate on Amtrak

(a “Mad Lib” work in progress)

Usual Suspects: Privatization Hawks

“Amtrak is a waste of government [Name a government resource (such as “cheese”).]! Amtrak should be

made to sell its [Name something on which trains run (such as “track” or “not-on-time”).] as well as the

[Name an article of clothing.] off their [Name a body part which can be politely mentioned around mild-

mannered women and small children.] to [Name some entity with amazing amounts of money (such as

“Microsoft”).]. No one [Name a positive attribute adjective (such as “important,” “cool” or “sober”).] rides

Amtrak anymore. … What? [Name a majorly scary action movie star (such as “Chuck Norris” or

“Ahhnold”)] still rides Amtrak? Oh [Name an expletive, if not in delicate mixed company.]! I’m so

[Name a really bad end, preferably worse than death, involving graphic, vengeful violence (such as

“spindled, folded AND mutilated”).]!

Usual Suspects: Public Sector Hawks

“Amtrak is a fine use of government [Name some government resource different from the one above (such

as “red tape”).]. Passenger rail has been a vital part of the lives of American [Name a group of

marginalized Americans (such as “Deadheads,” “homeless,” or “college students”).] since [Name a period

in US history (such as “the Reformation”).]. We should unite in supporting Amtrak in its role as the [Name

a superlative adjective (such as “oldest,” “loudest,” “poorest,” or “saddest”).] mode of transportation for

[Name a synonym for traveling (such as “commuting” or “fleeing”).] between America’s [Name a

synonym for “cities”.]. And we’re going to tell [action movie star named above] on you.

Page 14 of 15
ECON 313 – Economics of Transportation VCU, fall 2007 Prof. George E. Hoffer, PhD
Research Paper on Amtrak 7-12 November Bill Lemmond

Works Cited

Butler, Stuart M. “Why Asset Sales Are Good Public Policy – heritage lecture #148”

http://www.heritage.org/Research/GovernmentReform/HL148.cfm

Government Accounting Office. Report GAO-04-94, Appendix IV: Brief History of the Northeast

Corridor and Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Projects

Gutfreund, Owen D. Twentieth Century Sprawl : Highways and the Reshaping of the American Landscape

(electronic copy, by way of FCU Library free subscription electronic book service, the name of which

slips my mind.)

Wharton School of Business. Knowledge@Wharton. “Should Amtrak Be Saved?” 27 March 2002.

http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=538#

Page 15 of 15