Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2
Review of Perfect Competition
3
Microeconomics: a review
4
Individual demand: consumer
behavior
z Under the local nonsatiation assumption, the optimal
consumer demanded bundle of goods (i = 1, .., n) is given by
the following problem:
v( p, m) = max u ( x)
x
s.t. px = m
where p is the vector of market prices and m the income level
of the consumer.
z v(p, m) is the maximum utility achievable at given prices and
income and is called indirect utility function. The optimal x(p,
m) is therefore the consumer’s demand function.
5
Individual demand: consumer
behavior
L = u ( x) − λ ( px − m)
z The FOC is given by:
∂u ( x)
− λpi = 0 for i = 1,...n
∂xi
And it can be re-elaborated as:
⎛ ∂u ( x*) ⎞
⎜⎜ ⎟⎟
⎝ ∂xi ⎠ = pi for i, j = 1,...n
⎛ ∂u ( x*) ⎞ p j
⎜ ⎟
⎜ ∂x j ⎟
⎝ ⎠ 6
Individual demand: consumer
behavior
7
The quasi-linear utility function
z Partial equilibrium analysis: analyse the market
functioning of a “good” that has a relatively low weight
on the global economy.
z Hence, we can introduce two simplifying assumptions:
1. the impact of a change in consumers’ income on the
expenditure of the “good” is limited (no income effect);
2. the substitution effect on the other goods is small too.
z The prices of the rest of goods can then be considered
as fixed and we can be assume them as a numeraire,
normalised to 1.
z We can then simplify our utility function in the following
way (yi is the “rest of goods”, i.e. the numeraire):
U ( x, y ) = u ( x ) + y
8
The quasi-linear utility function
z u(xi) is a continuous, increasing, twice-differentiable,
and convex function.
z The optimization problem becomes:
U ( x, y ) = u ( x ) + y
s.t. px + y = m
z FOCs: ∂L ∂u ( x)
= − λp = 0
∂x ∂x
∂L
= 1− λ = 0
∂y
10
Consumer and Producer
Surplus
Price
9 Consumer
Surplus
S
Between 0 and Q0
consumer A receives
a net gain from buying
the product--
5 consumer surplus.
Producer
Surplus
3 Between 0 and Q0
producers receive
a net gain from
selling each product--
D producer surplus.
QD QS Q0 Quantity
11
Marginal effects of a price/quantity
changes on Consumer Surplus
z Consumer surplus, as a function of price, is given by:
∞
CS = V ( p ) = ∫ q ( p )dp
p*
z Hence, it results:
dV ( p )
= −q( p)
dp
z Intutition: the demand has a negative slope, the minus
is needed to have a positve quantity
12
Marginal effects of a price/quantity
changes on Consumer Surplus
CS = S ( q ) − p ( q ) q
q*
where S(q) = ∫0
p ( q ) dq
z Hence, it results:
dS (q )
= p(q)
dq
13
Perfect competition and Welfare
14
Welfare economics
z What are the welfare properties of the perfect
competitive equalibrium?
z The representative consumer approach: suppose
that the market demand, x(p), is generated by
maximizing the utility of a single representative
consumer who has a quasi linear utility function u(x)+y,
where x is the good under examination and y
“everything else”.
z Under this utility function, we know that: u ′( x) = p
z Hence, the direct demand function x(p) is simply the
inverse of the above condition
z Note that in case of a quasi-linear utility the demand
function is independent of income!!
15
Welfare economics
z Consider now a representative firm having a cost
function c(x), with c’ > 0, c’’ > 0 and c(0) = 0.
z In a perfect competitive market, the profit maximizing
(inverse) supply function of a representative firm is
given by p = c’(x).
z Hence, the equilibrium level of output of the x-good is
simply the solution to the equation:
u ′( x) = c′( x)
z This is the level of output at which the marginal
willingness to pay for the x-good just equals its marginal
cost of production.
16
Welfare analysis
z What is the optimal amount of output that maximizes the
representative consumer’s utility?
z Let w be the consumer’s initial endowment of the y-good. The
consumer’s problem is: max u ( x ) + y
x, y
s .t . y = w − c(x)
z Intuition: the welfare maximizing problem is simply to maximize
total utility consuming x-good and y-goods. Since x units of the x-
good means giving up – in a competitive market - c(x) units of the
y-good, our social objective function becomes:
max u ( x) + w − c( x)
x, y
17
Welfare analysis
z Another way to look at the same problem.
z Let CS(x) = u(x) - px be the consumer’s surplus and PS(x)
= px – c(x) be the producer’s surplus.
z The total surplus, or welfare, is:
W = max CS ( x) + PS ( x) =
x
= [u ( x) − px ] + px − c( x) =
= u ( x) − c( x)
18
Welfare analysis: a generalization
∑ u (x ) + ∑ y
i =1
i i
i =1
i
19
Welfare analysis: a generalization
21
Consumer Equilibrium in a
Competitive Market
22
Consumer Equilibrium in a
Competitive Market
z Pareto Optimality
z An outcome is Pareto optimal if it is not possible
to make one person better off without making
one another worse off
z If this is possbile, we face a potential Pareto
improvement (PPI)
z The adoption of the PPI criterion means that we
can focus on what happens to total surplus.
z Hence an outcome that maximizes total surplus
is Pareto optimal.
23
Consumer Equilibrium in a
Competitive Market
24
Equity and Efficiency
z Although there are many efficient
allocations, some may be more fair than
others
z The difficult question is, what is the most
equitable allocation?
z We can show that there is no reason to
believe that efficient allocation from
competitive markets will give an equitable
allocation
25
Equity and Perfect Competition
z Must a society that wants to be more
equitable necessarily operate in an
inefficient world?
26
Equity and Perfect Competition
27
Market Failures
28
Why Markets Fail
z Market Power
Those with market power choose the price
and quantity
Less output is sold than in competitive
markets
Inefficiency
Can have market power as producers or as
inputs
29
Why Markets Fail
z Externalities
Market prices do not always reflect the
activities of either producers or consumers
Consumption or production has indirect
effect on other consumption or production
not reflected in market prices
May be impossible to get insurance because
suppliers of insurance lack information
30
Why Markets Fail
z Public Goods
Nonexclusive, nonrival goods that can be
made available cheaply but which, once
available, are difficult to prevent others from
consuming
Company thinking about researching a new
technology if can’t get patent
z Once it’s made pubic, others can duplicate it
31
Why Markets Fail
z Incomplete Information
Consumers must have accurate information
about market prices or production quality for
markets to operate efficiently
Lack of information can change supply
z Buy products with no value
z Don’t buy enough of products with value
Some markets may never develop
32
Market Failures
z Economic motivations
Existence of market power (monopoly, natural
monopoly, collusive oligopoly)
Externality (positive or negative)
Market incompleteness (asymmetric information)
z Social motivations:
Redistributive concerns (urban to rural areas; rich to
poor citizens)
Merit goods (essential services should be provided to
everybody at affordable prices)
⇒ need of State policy in the form of ex ante
(regulation) or ex post (antitrust) interventions
33
Monopoly
z Monopoly
1. One seller - many buyers
2. One product (no good substitutes)
3. Barriers to entry
4. Price Maker
34
Monopolist’s Output Decision
35
Monopolist’s Output Decision
$ per
unit of
output MC
P1
P*
AC
P2
Lost
profit
D = AR
Lost
MR profit
Q1 Q* Q2 Quantity
36
Monopolist’s Output Decision
37
Equilibrium Pricing
π is maximized where MR = MC
P + P ⎡ 1 ⎤ = MC
⎢⎣ E D ⎥⎦
P − MC 1
=
P ED
38
Elasticity of Demand and Price
Markup
The more elastic is $/Q
$/Q demand, the less the
markup.
MC P* MC
P*
P*-MC
D
P*-MC
MR
D
MR
Q* Quantity Q* Quantity
Measuring Monopoly Power
z Could measure monopoly power by the extent
to which price is greater than MC for each firm
z Lerner’s Index of Monopoly Power
L = (P - MC)/P
z The larger the value of L (between 0 and 1)
the greater the monopoly power
L is expressed in terms of Ed
z L = (P - MC)/P = 1/Ed
z Ed is elasticity of demand for a firm, not the
market
40
Monopoly Power
z Pure monopoly is rare
z However, a market with several firms,
each facing a downward sloping demand
curve, will produce so that price exceeds
marginal cost
z Firms often product similar goods that
have some differences, thereby
differentiating themselves from other
firms
41
Sources of Monopoly Power
42
Sources of Monopoly Power
z The less elastic the demand curve, the
more monopoly power a firm has
z The firm’s elasticity of demand is
determined by:
1) Elasticity of market demand
2) Number of firms in market: entry
barriers and entry deterrence
3) Strategic behaviour by incumbent
4) New Technology
43
Elasticity of Market Demand
z With one firm, their demand curve is market
demand curve
Degree of monopoly power is determined completely
by elasticity of market demand (ex. OPEC)
The presence of alternative suppliers or substitute
products reduces market power (supply and demand
side substitution)
z With more firms, individual demand may differ
from market demand
Demand for a firm’s product is more elastic than the
market elasticity
44
Demand elasticity in telecoms under
a Monopoly: evidence from Italy
45
Demand elasticity in telecoms under
Monopoly: evidence from US
Bodnar et al. (1988) Taylor e Kridel (1990)
Dimension Price
(000 Elasticity Economic Position Price
Elasticity
of inhabitants)
> 500 –0,007 Poor and rural –0,071
100 – 500 –0,006 Poor and urban –0,077
30 – 100 –0,010 Poor black rural –0,089
< 30 –0,013 Rich white urban –0,026
Rurale –0,014 State Price Income
Age Elasticity Elasticity
< 26 –0,024 Arkansas –0,059 –
26 – 44 –0,009 Kansas –0,023 –
45 – 64 –0,007 Missouri –0,031 –
> 64 –0,008 Oklahoma –0,034 –
Income Texas –0,037 –
($ 000)
< 12 –0,026 Average –0,037 0,042
12 – 20 –0,012
20 – 28 –0,006
28 – 38 –0,002
> 38 –0,0005
46
Number of Firms
z The monopoly power of a firm falls as the
number of firms increases; all else equal
More important are the number of firms with
significant market share
Market is highly concentrated if only a few
firms account for most of the sales
z Firms would like to create barriers to
entry to keep new firms out of market
Patent, copyrights, licenses, economies of
scale
47
Number of Firms
z Entry barriers are of interest from two perspectives: (i)
corporate strategy and (ii) public policy.
z Incumbents want to protect not only their market shares
but also their profits
z A key objective of corporate strategy is profitable entry
deterrence.
z Profitable entry deterrence occurs when incumbent firms
are able to earn monopoly profits without attracting entry
z Profitable entry deterrence depends on the interaction
between structural entry barriers and incumbent’s
behaviour
z Public policy should aim at eliminating entry barriers and
detect entry deterrence
48
Government Restrictions on Entry
49
Structural Barriers to Entry
z Structural characteristics that protect market
power without attracting entry, such as:
Economies of scale
Sunk expenditures of the entrant
Absolute cost advantage: incumbent may face lower
costs or a better access to existing facilities (i.e. the
use of the network in the telecoms industry)
Sunk expenditures by consumers and product
differentiation:
z If a consumer faces a large cost for switching to a
new product, he could decide not to switch ⇒
switching costs and creation of brand loyalty.
z Finally, consumer might not view the offerings of
other firms as substitute.
50
Strategic behavior by Incumbents
51
New Technology
z Technological change can generate new
products and services, and the
introduction of these products reduces
the market power of producers of
established products.
z Nintendo in ’80 was a monopolist, but the
monopoly ended after the entry by Sega
… and later on by Sony (Playstation) and
Microsoft (X Box)
52
The Social Costs of Monopoly
Power
z Monopoly power results in higher prices
and lower quantities
z However, does monopoly power make
consumers and producers in the
aggregate better or worse off?
z From a social point of view, the effects of
the monopolistic inefficiency can be
appreciated if we look at the Marshall’s
surplus
53
Monopoly Dead Weight Loss
54
Monopoly Dead Weight Loss
z The DWL area measures the surplus that could
have been created with a competitive market,
but goes loss due to level of the price which is
fixed by the monopolist
55
The determinants of Deadweight
loss
DWL = 1/2dPdQ
1 ⎛ dP ⎞⎛ P ⎞⎛ Q ⎞⎛ P ⎞
DWL = dPdQ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎜ ⎟⎟⎜ ⎟
2 ⎝ dP ⎠⎝ P ⎠⎝ Q ⎠⎝ P ⎠
56
The determinants of Deadweight
loss
1
DWL = Ed P Q L
m m 2
2
z Harnerger’s loss: the inefficiency of a monopoly is
greater the larger the elasticity of demand, the larger
the Lerner Index and the larger the industry
(measured by industry revenues) … however L is
inversely related to Ed
57
The determinants of Deadweight
loss
1 1 ⎛ P m
−c⎞ π
DWL = Ed P Q L = P Q ⎜⎜
m m 2 m m
m
⎟⎟ =
2 2 ⎝ P ⎠ 2
58
The Multi-plant Firm
z For some firms, production takes place
in more than one plant, each with
different costs
z Firm must determine how to distribute
production between both plants
1. Production should be split so that the MC in
the plants is the same
2. Output is chosen where MR=MC. Profit is
therefore maximized when MR=MC at each
plant.
59
The Multi-plant Firm
60
The Multi-plant Firm
62
Production with Two Plants
$/Q MC1 MC2
MCT
P*
MR* D = AR
MR
Q1 Q2 QT Quantity
63
Durable Goods Monopoly
z A durable good is a good which provides
a stream of sustained consumption
services: it can be used more than once.
z Two complicating factors:
Monopoly creates it own competition! The
existence of a second-hand market limits
monopoly market power
The price consumers are willing to pay today
depends on the expectations about the price
of the good tomorrow
64
Durable Goods Monopoly
z Assume that the good last forever and so
that it does not depreciate over time.
Example: land
65
Durable good in perfect competition
66
Durable good in monopoly
z The monopolist sets the marginal revenues
equal to the marginal cost (= 0) and determine
the first year consumption and price (Q1 and P1)
z In the second period, the monopolist faces a
residual demand given by Qc – Q1 where
consumers have a willingness to pay larger than
marginal costs but lower than P1.
z In order to sell additional units of the good and
use its stock, the monopolists cannot do better
than reducing the price … up to the competitive
price!
67
Durable good in monopoly
68
Durable goods: the Coase
conjecture
69
Durable goods and strategic actions
z Strategic consumers:
Incentives to delay purchasing if they anticipate that the
monopolist will lower prices in the future
z Cost of waiting depends on the discount rate, i.e. on the
actual cost of consumption tomorrow: the larger it is, the
greater the preference of consumers for a dollar today as
opposed to a dollar tomorrow.
z Assume that the adjusting period is very small and the
discount rate equal to 0 (the discount factor is equal to 1):
a durable goods monopolist has no monopoly power if
the time between price adjustment is vanishingly small ⇒
the Coase Conjecture
70
Durable goods and strategic actions
71
Durable goods and Pacman
economics
72
Durable goods: Coase vs. Pacman
73
Natural Monopoly and
Government Intervention
74
The Social Costs of Monopoly
z Social cost of monopoly is likely to exceed the
deadweight loss
z No allocative efficiency, no incentive to minimize cost ⇒
X-inefficiency
z Hicks’s statement: “The best of all monopoly profit is a
quite life!!”
z Rent Seeking
Firms may spend to gain monopoly power
z Lobbying
z Advertising
z Building excess capacity
z Dynamic efficiency? Shumpeter vs. Arrow approach on
the effect of the market structure on investment
75
The Social Costs of Monopoly
76
Regulation vs. Competition policy
Pm MC
P1
P2 = PC
AC
P3
P4 AR
AnyIfprice
left alone,
below Pa4 monopolist
results
Ifthe
price
For
Ifinprice is
outputlowered
levels
is lowered
firm
produces incurring
Q to to
PCPoutput
above
a loss. 3 output
QP1 , .
m and charges m
decreases andmaximum
the original
increases to its aaverage
shortage
and
Q exists.
C and
marginal
there revenue
is no curves
deadweight apply.
loss. Qm Q1 Q3 Qc Q’3 Quantity
78
The Social Costs of Monopoly
Power
z Natural Monopoly
A firm that can produce the entire output of
an industry at a cost lower than what it would
be if there were several firms
Usually arises when there are large
economies of scale
We can show that splitting the market into
two firms results in higher AC for each firm
than when only one firm was producing
79
Regulating the Price of a Natural
Monopoly
$/Q
If the price
Unregulated, were regulate to be Pc,
the monopolist
the firmQwould
would produce m and
lose money
and go P
charge out
m.
of business. Can’t
cover average costs
AC
Pr
MC
PC
AR
MR
Qm Qr QC Quantity
80
Some definitions on Natural Monopoly
81
Some definitions on Natural Monopoly
82
Questions that need to be addressed:
83
Example: Telecommunications
Mobile telephony
Long distance
Natural telephony
monopoly
International
telephony
84
Example: Electricity market
National Transmission
(high voltage)
85
Example: Gas industry
National transmission
Reserve in stock
Natural
monopolies
Local transmission
Retail market
86
Conduct regulation: price control
PAC
AC
PCm Cm
D
QAC Q Cm
87
Conduct regulation: price control
88
Conduct regulation: price control
89
Conduct regulation: price control
z Firm’s profit are zero, but there is always a
deadweigh loss (squared area in figure)
pAC
AC
MC
D
q
qAC
90
Conduct regulation: price control
z Multiproduct setting: practical methods, fully
distributed costs (FDC)
z Suppose to have a cost function:
92
Conduct regulation: price control/6
z It is easy to show that all the three methods
above described leads to define a “equal
mark up rule”.
z In fact:
z Is this efficient?
93
Conduct regulation: price control
z The answer is NO!
DR
DE
p’
p’
A C B D
MC MC
q q
94
Conduct regulation: price control
DE
pR
B’
D’
pE B
A’ C’
MC MC
q q
96
Conduct regulation: price control
z In general, we have:
98
Cross subsidization
99
Cross subsidization
100
Cross subsidization
101
Cross subsidization
p1q1 ≤ C(q1,0)
p2q2 ≤ C(0,q2)
102