Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Juliette Minces
Z e d Books L t d
London and New Jersey
The House of Obedience was first published in French
by Editions Mazarine, 8 rue de Nesle, Paris, France, in
1980, and in English by Zed Press, 57 Caledonian Road,
London Nl 9BU, UK and 165 First Avenue, Atlantic Highlands,
New Jersey 07716, USA, in 1982.
A c a t a l o g u e r e c o r d for t h i s b o o k is
a v a i l a b l e from t h e B r i t i s h L i b r a r y
object whose actions might detract from the honour of the family,
arouse desire in other men or cast doubt upon her husband's
virility and manhood, which must constantly be reasserted.
Finally, it is her task to maintain the tradition, transmit it to the
young and ensure that even the most recalcitrant boys and girls
respect it.
Older women transmit men's authority and are thus equally
important in maintaining customs. Few of them will accept
changes in attitudes brought about by schooling. They remain
convinced of the validity of the tradition which assigns to each
person his or her proper place within the family or the clan: their
authority over their own domain is often as despotic as the men's
and they will exercise every means of pressure at their disposal to
ensure that the established order is respected, formally at least.
Only a few exceptional individuals, having at last acquired this
power over the household, will use it to help younger women
escape the traditional bonds.
In the countryside, where the majority of the population lives,
the family system reflects an agrarian tradition which casts the
house and the fields as a single economic unit, within which
husband and wife play complementary roles. Marriage thus be-
comes an economic necessity, since women are necessary to the
accomplishment of certain tasks. It is therefore arranged as early
as possible. The young wife goes to live with her husband's family,
until he sets up his own household, and often becomes the servant
of her mother-in-law, helping her with many domestic tasks. An
extra pair of hands is always useful.
As for the children, they are soon put to work and rapidly
acquire responsibilities, especially the girls. But they never question
parental authority. The different age groups live closely together
and, providing the traditional family structure is scrupulously
respected, there rarely develops that clash between generations
which we witness so frequently in the West. The many quarrels
between mothers and daughters-in-law described in Arab literature
almost never pose a challenge to the fundamental equilibrium of
the family.
The family is the real centre of most activities, be they social,
economic, religious, educational or political. The interests of the
extended family almost always prevail over those of the individual
or even over those of the community as a whole. It is always worth
remembering that a married woman's status depends on her ability
to have children. The larger the family, the greater its prestige,
20
The House of Obedience
112
Bibliography
113
The House of Obedience
114
Introduction: A Confessional Universe
21
The House of Obedience
I have chosen to write about Arab women rather than all Muslim
women simply because the Arab world itself contains many very
different societies. To speak in terms of Muslim women would
have meant analysing societies as divergent as Indonesia and
Albania.
According to Maxime Rodinson,* a number of common criteria
allow us to define the Arabs. Firstly, there is the Arabic language
and its different dialects, which delimits a geographical area
stretching from Morocco to Mesopotamia. Even then, there are
exceptions, notably the Berber cultures in the Maghreb.
Another, more modern, criterion is Arabism, an ideology which
involves a drive towards unification and which cannot be ignored.
Its basis, apart from language, is seen to lie in a common history
and culture going back to the 7th and 8th Centuries A.D., the
period of the Arab tribes' great conquests, when they created an
enormous empire and propagated a new monotheistic religion,
Islam.
Naturally, this does not prevent North Yemen being very differ-
ent from Morocco or Egypt, or the Bedouin tribes having little in
common with the sedentary peasants of Syria. We shall occasion-
ally go into the details of these differences, but only where they
determine specific types of behaviour towards women, who are our
real subject.
The Arab countries are generally taken to include Syria, Lebanon,
22
Introduction: A Confessional Universe
Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Gulf Emirates, the two
Yemens, Egypt, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and
Mauritania. Although they are members of the Arab League,
Somalia and the Republic of Djibouti do not use Arabic as their
everyday language.
While one can invoke a linguistic and religious unity of the Arab
world, it would be hard to find any trace of political unity. The
various states mentioned generally have conflicting economic
policies, and the differences between them in terms of resources
and revenues are considerable. The limits of solidarity are quickly
reached.
The Arab and Muslim societies do, however, all have an almost
identical vision of women, a vision which is the very root of the
status of women in those countries. As we have seen, the tribal or
familial structural basis of these societies imposes upon women a
role and a position such that any modification of their status
threatens to bring down the patriarchal, familial or tribal pillars on
which those societies rest.
It may, at first, seem paradoxical that the richest countries,
notably those of the Arabian Peninsula (except Kuwait) and Libya,
are by no means the most liberal in their legislation affecting
women. Similarly, although Syria and Iraq, countries claiming a
socialist (Ba'athist) orientation, have promoted the participation of
reasonably well-to-do urban women in economic and public life,
Algeria, which presents itself as even more revolutionary, has
brought little radical change to the traditional constraints. In all
cases, attitudes towards woman and her place in society have
changed very gradually, and only because econorric and social
necessities made it essential. Where there have been no such
pressures, legislation has remained unaltered.
In most Arab countries, the last few decades have seen a modern-
ist commercial or bureaucratic bourgeoisie develop, and women
have benefitted from the relative Westernization of these strata.
Some have gained access to university education and a few can
practise lucrative professions, instead of living cloistered segre-
gated lives. But this is obviously only true of a small minority
amongst the female population. Over the centuries there has in
fact been considerable vacillation, at least among the elite. At first,
during the colonial era, there was a fascination with the West, its
values and its power. Mustapha Kemal in Turkey, soon followed
by Rcza Shah in Iran, tried to introduce reforms and promote
what in those days was universally considered to be progress,
23
The House of Obedience
namely an imitation of the West. Half a century later, after all the
struggles of decolonization, the West was perceived as a domin-
ating force to be shut out lest it destroy the character and person-
ality of the region.
This feeling made for a desire to 'return to the sources': the
quest for identity was pursued in terms of Islam which is indeed
the source of local culture, especially for the Arabs, whose
language is that of the Koran. Islamic values were reaffirmed and
presented as the only suitable ones for the societies concerned; all
other influences were more or less violently rejected as corrupting,
or, at best, totally inadequate. This fundamentalist revival put for-
ward the most rigid interpretations of religious dogma as the only
model to be followed. The idea was to make the differentiation
from the West as sharp as possible.
For women, this 'revival' implied not only a rejection of Western
ways but also withdrawal back into the traditional family universe.
But this tradition, especially in its revived form, was partly based
on a nostalgic myth; the ancient ways could not really be main-
tained intact, given the changes which had already taken place in
society and in family life itself.
The evolution of most of these societies meant that women
could no longer live in the relative security provided by the tradit-
ional family. Yet the 'modernization' which has done away with
the security of the extended family has not provided women with
a substitute, since few women were prepared to assume complete
and sole responsibility for their own lives. The contradictions have
thus become even more acute. The societies of the Arab world have
been shaken to the core by Western penetration and have been too
profoundly modified for a return to the old lifestyle to be possible,
except in the most unusual cases. Western-type urbanization,
which seems irreversible, has broken the structure of the extended
family, which offered the only way back to the authentic tradition-
al lifestyle.
The transformation of the Arab world's economic structures and
methods of production has not only helped dislocate the tradition-
al family, it has made it possible for women in the towns to work
out of the house. (In the countryside, women have always worked
in the fields.) This new feature may as yet only affect a limited
number of women, but it has important consequences and reduces
their dependence on the economic level at least.
Furthermore, girls have been given access to schooling in several
countries. True, the girls stay at school for far fewer years than the
24
The House of Obedience
namely an imitation of the West. Half a century later, after all the
struggles of decolonization, the West was perceived as a domin-
ating force to be shut out lest it destroy the character and person-
ality of the region.
This feeling made for a desire to 'return to the sources': the
quest for identity was pursued in terms of Islam which is indeed
the source of local culture, especially for the Arabs, whose
language is that of the Koran. Islamic values were reaffirmed and
presented as the only suitable ones for the societies concerned; all
other influences were more or less violently rejected as corrupting,
or, at best, totally inadequate. This fundamentalist revival put for-
ward the most rigid interpretations of religious dogma as the only
model to be followed. The idea was to make the differentiation
from the West as sharp as possible.
For women, this 'revival' implied not only a rejection of Western
ways but also withdrawal back into the traditional family universe.
But this tradition, especially in its revived form, was partly based
on a nostalgic myth; the ancient ways could not really be main-
tained intact, given the changes which had already taken place in
society and in family life itself.
The evolution of most of these societies meant that women
could no longer live in the relative security provided by the tradit-
ional family. Yet the 'modernization' which has done away with
the security of the extended family has not provided women with
a substitute, since few women were prepared to assume complete
and sole responsibility for their own lives. The contradictions have
thus become even more acute. The societies of the Arab world have
been shaken to the core by Western penetration and have been too
profoundly modified for a return to the old lifestyle to be possible,
except in the most unusual cases. Western-type urbanization,
which seems irreversible, has broken the structure of the extended
family, which offered the only way back to the authentic tradition-
al lifestyle.
The transformation of the Arab world's economic structures and
methods of production has not only helped dislocate the tradition-
al family, it has made it possible for women in the towns to work
out of the house. (In the countryside, women have always worked
in the fields.) This new feature may as yet only affect a limited
number of women, but it has important consequences and reduces
their dependence on the economic level at least.
Furthermore, girls have been given access to schooling in several
countries. True, the girls stay at school for far fewer years than the
24
A s u l t a n was d e e p l y d e p r e s s e d . His vizier grew
w o r r i e d a n d i n q u i r e d as to t h e r e a s o n . T am in love
with a n o t h e r h a r e m ' , replied t h e S u l t a n .
Ottoman anecdote
A m a n ' s s h a d o w d o e s m o r e for a h o m e t h a n t h e
s h a d o w of a wall.
Egyptian proverb
2 Everyday Forms of
Oppression
29
The House of Obedience
A Man's Society
30
Everyday Forms of Oppression
The education young girls receive from their mothers and aunts,
especially when the extended family still lives under one roof, is
conceived precisely to enforce respect for the tradition, a tradition
which requires that girls should be docile, submissive, discreet,
active, modest, quietly spoken and without curiosity about the
outside world: the family's honour, which rests on the correct
behaviour of the girls and women, must be safeguarded at all costs.
The girls are taught that their sole aim in life should be marriage
and childbearing. They must obey not only their fathers, but also
their brothers, even when the latter are much younger than they
are. In short, from her early childhood, everything is done to turn
a girl into the ideal wife and mother.
The birth of a boy is an occasion for great festivities, even
amongst the poor; God has blessed the family's house. A baby
boy will be si"'!ded longer, his mother and sisters will carry him
until a later age, be will be pampered, spoilt, given everything. His
31
The House of Obedience
viii
The House of Obedience
32
Everyday Forms of Oppression
33
The House of Obedience
34
Everyday Forms of Oppression
Century.
By contrast, in those social strata which remained untouched by
capitalism or which were its victims — the traditional traders of
the souks and bazaars, the artisans in both town and countryside
- - a rejection of the West grew apace. Western innovations, in any
case, found no place amongst the nomads or the traditional c o m -
munities in the countryside. Schooling was quite irrelevant to the
shepherds and modernization of agriculture remained limited,
since the peasants were too poor to invest in new methods and
tools. The 'new ideas' were deemed useless. In order to protect
their own identity, especially after their countries had been colon-
ized, the people strove to preserve their tradition and developed a
nationalist ideology which put considerable stress on the
'unrevised' values of Islam. Islam became an ideology of resistance.
Women's liberation was thus quite out of the question, and
remains so today. Men's image of themselves and of women has
changed little except amongst the Westernized or cosmopolitan
elites (Egypt, Lebanon) who are, by definition, only a small
minority. Women's liberation would require a real change in atti-
tudes, a particularly difficult process, especially as it involves a
loss of power for the men.
We have seen how the little boy is brought up, the attention that
is showered upon him and the almost unlimited rights he enjoys
simply because he is a boy. This deliberate promotion of narcissism,
by attaching such excessive value to his virility and to virility in
general, forces him to feel 'committed to machismo' in a way
which conditions all his behaviour. The way he feels, the way he
acts and sees things Ls moulded by it. If he does not conform to
the image of the virile male that society conveys and expects him
to internalize, he will immediately be mocked and depreciated. In
this sense, one can also talk of the oppression of men.
This forced commitment to machismo has several manifestations.
Firstly, on the economic level, a man who cannot provide ade-
quately for his family is looked down upon and loses his self-
respect, especially if he is already of an age when society expects
him to stop behaving like a young man (usually around 40). On the
moral level, as we know, the chastity of girls and wives is the
guarantee of family honour. If the family, or more accurately, the
men of the family, believe, correctly or not, that one of the women
has misbehaved, the father, or a brother, or even a cousin, is duty
bound to avenge the family honour, usually by killing the girl or
woman who has become suspect. A man who refuses to follow the
35
The House of Obedience
36
Everyday Forms of Oppression
37
The House of Obedience
38
Everyday Forms of Oppression
Men of the ruling classes are also obsessed but they find a partial
solution in foreign travel and in a certain evolution of women's
condition in the circles they move in. For the others, at the mom-
ent, there is no answer.
There has really been no sustained effort to change these ways
of thinking, except perhaps in 'l\inisia (even if the results there
arc not always evident) and in revolutionary Yemen. The central
point that is never raised is how to change the status of women.
Marriage in its present form remains the cornerstone of the whole
system. A radical transformation of the roles attributed to women
would imply a revolution at every level including the political,
especially in the countries where the maintenance of the status
quo in this domain is one of the guarantees of stability for the
ruling regimes.
;i9
The House of Obedience
40
1 Introduction: A
Confessional Universe
13
Everyday Forms of Oppression
41
Everyday Forms of Oppression
41
The House of Obedience
42
Everyday Forms of Oppression
43
The House of Obedience
44
Everyday Forms of Oppression
Immigrant Women
One might think that the social pressures would diminish once
outside the country. Yet the position of most immigrant Arab
women in Europe is much the same as in the Arab countries,
45
The House of Obedience
46
Everyday Forms of Oppression
47
The House of Obedience
considerable hold over both men and women, despite the oppor-
tunities for birth control which exist in Europe. Requests for
family planning advice are only made once three or four children
have been born (not to mention any miscarriages), and even then
only by the women, never by the men. A husband will rarely allow
his wife to use contraception unless her health is suffering or the
family is in dire financial straits.
Finally, 'mixed' marriages, which are generally disapproved of,
are often kept secret from his parents by the young man involved.
As far as girls are concerned, the civil law of most Arab countries,
following in this the religious law, forbids them to marry a non-
Muslim. If they do not comply, they can find themselves in
serious trouble, especially as the children — who actually belong
to the husband — will not be considered part of the 'tribe'.
It is customary for a young man who has emigrated by himself
to come home once he has saved enough for the bride-price; his
family will then marry him to a girl he may never have seen. He will
stay with her for a few months and then go back alone, to avoid
forcing her to share the living conditions he has to put up with in
Europe. In the meantime, he will entrust her to his family and
arrange to rejoin her during the holidays. Only if his parents have
emigrated with him will he take his bride back to Europe: a woman
is thought unlikely to be equipped to confront the unknown — in
this case a foreign country — without the support of a family
framework. Faced with the range of problems posed by the arrival
of his wife and children, the husband often hesitates to bring them
to Europe, preferring to leave them under his parents' watchful
eyes. Loneliness, isolation and a desire to be with his children,
whom he would otherwise only see during brief holidays, may
nonetheless convince him that he needs them with him, even
though he knows that the inevitable changes which Arab women,
especially the younger ones, go through in Europe could threaten
his very status as father and husband. Children who have been to
a European school and who have absorbed and learnt to value the
Western lifestyle may no longer recognize their father's absolute
authority as self-evident. As for his wife, she will discover with
some astonishment the powerlessness of her husband in Western
society, and may come to look upon him in a less flattering light.
The old frameworks break down, but there are no new ones to
replace them. In fact, an attachment to the code of the Muslim
world persists, since the Western lifestyle is judged too lax and
therefore cannot be adopted. The families feel torn between two
48
Everyday Forms of Oppression
The Veil
The veil is one of the key symbols of women's position in the
Muslim world. Yet it Is worth remembering that many societies,
from antiquity to the present day, have veiled their women. The
practice has persisted mainly in the Islamic areas, except among
the Kurds whose women go unveiled. The eternal black scarf
worn by Sardinian, Corsican, Sicilian and other women of the
Christian Mediterranean is a vestige of what was once a very
widespread accoutrement. In fact, Arab women have not always
been veiled. The aristocracy insisted upon it, but as long as the
village or tribe managed to preserve its old endogamous structure,
the veil was not essential for ordinary women. Furthermore, the
strict separation between the sexes meant that women had no need
to hide their faces. They only wore a veil when they had to leave
49
The House of Obedience
14
The House of Obedience
50
Everyday Forms of Oppression
Circumcision o f W o m e n *
51
The House of Obedience
m y h a n d a n d m y a r m s a n d m y thighs, s o t h a t I b e c a m e
u n a b l e t o resist o r even t o m o v e . I also r e m e m b e r t h e icy
t o u c h o f t h e b a t h r o o m tiles u n d e r m y n a k e d b o d y , a n d un-
k n o w n voices a n d h u m m i n g s o u n d s i n t e r r u p t e d n o w a n d
again b y a rasping m e t a l l i c s o u n d w h i c h r e m i n d e d m e o f t h e
b u t c h e r w h e n h e u s e d t o s h a r p e n h i s knife b e f o r e slaughtering
a s h e e p for t h e Eid.
M y b l o o d was f r o z e n i n m y veins. I t l o o k e d t o m e a s t h o u g h
s o m e thieves h a d b r o k e n i n t o m y r o o m a n d k i d n a p p e d m e
from my bed. They were getting ready to cut my t h r o a t
w h i c h w a s a l w a y s w h a t h a p p e n e d with d i s o b e d i e n t girls like
myself i n t h e stories t h a t m y old rural g r a n d m o t h e r w a s s o
f o n d o f telling m e .
I strained m y ears t r y i n g t o c a t c h t h e r a s p o f t h e m e t a l l i c
sound. The m o m e n t it ceased, it was as though my heart
s t o p p e d b e a t i n g w i t h it. I w a s u n a b l e t o see, a n d s o m e h o w m y
b r e a t h i n g s e e m e d also t o have s t o p p e d . Y e t I imagined t h e
t h i n g t h a t was m a k i n g t h e rasping s o u n d c o m i n g closer and
closer t o m e : S o m e h o w i t was n o t a p p r o a c h i n g m y n e c k a s I
had expected b u t another part of my body. Somewhere below
m y belly, a s t h o u g h seeking s o m e t h i n g b u r i e d b e t w e e n m y
thighs. A t t h a t very m o m e n t I realized t h a t m y t h i g h s h a d
been pulled wide a p a r t , a n d t h a t each o f m y lower l i m b s was
being h e l d as far a w a y from t h e o t h e r as possible, g r i p p e d by
steel fingers t h a t never r e l i n q u i s h e d their p r e s s u r e . I felt t h a t
t h e rasping knife o r blade was h e a d i n g s t r a i g h t d o w n t o w a r d s
my throat. Then suddenly t h e sharp metallic edge seemed to
d r o p b e t w e e n m y thighs a n d t h e r e c u t off a piece o f flesh
from my body.
52
Everyday Forms of Oppression
T h e d e s c r i p t i o n a b o v e i s b y a n E g y p t i a n w o m a n d o c t o r a n d writer,
recalling h e r o w n c i r c u m c i s i o n . In h e r case, t h e r e were no festivi-
ties t o a t t e n u a t e t h e s h o c k o f t h e o p e r a t i o n . T h i s p a r t i c u l a r l y
barbaric c u s t o m is pre-Islamic in origin, a l t h o u g h it is p r a c t i s e d in
m a n y Muslim c o u n t r i e s o f t h e Near E a s t a n d especially Black
Africa u n d e r t h e n a m e of Islam. • •
T h e r e are t h r e e different t y p e s of circumcision or clitorideet-
o m y . T h e m o s t benign form i s ' S u n n i t e ' c i r c u m c i s i o n , w h i c h d o e s
n o t necessarily sexually cripple t h e w o m a n providing she m a n a g e s
t o o v e r c o m e t h e psychological t r a u m a ; i t consists i n t h e r e m o v a l
of t h e clitoral h o o d , a n d is t h u s akin to t h e circumcision of b o y s .
I n t h e t o w n s , this i s t h e m o s t c u r r e n t m e t h o d a m o n g s t t h e m o r e
e n l i g h t e n e d o f t h e social s t r a t a w h o h a v e n o t y e t a b a n d o n e d t h e
practice altogether.
Excision p r o p e r is a different m a t t e r , involving t h e a m p u t a t i o n
of t h e clitoral glans, or even of t h e e n t i r e clitoris. T h i s f o r m is
practised m a i n l y i n E g y p t . I n o t h e r areas, t h e y also c u t off t h e
adjacent parts o f t h e m i n o r i n n e r lips (labia m i n o r a ) , o r even t h e
lips themselves.
The third type of clitoridectomy, infibulation, is practised
n o t a b l y i n t h e S u d a n , T r o p i c a l Africa, Eritrea a n d S o m a l i a . I t i s
k n o w n a s t h e ' P h a r a o n i c ' circumcision and involves t h e a m p u t a -
tion of t h e clitoris, t h e m i n o r i n n e r lips a n d m o s t of t h e major
o u t e r lips. T h e t w o p a r t s o f t h e vulva are t h e n s t i t c h e d t o g e t h e r .
O n l y a small vaginal o p e n i n g is left to allow u r i n e a n d m e n s t r u a l
b l o o d to be e v a c u a t e d . While t h e scar tissue is f o r m i n g , t h i s small
orifice is k e p t o p e n w i t h a s h a r d of w o o d , a n d on t h e girl's w e d d i n g
night, it is w i d e n e d with a r a z o r or a scalpel. E a c h t i m e t h e w o m a n
53
The House of Obedience
is about to give birth, the stitches are removed, and then she is
sewn up again.
Leaving aside the pain and fear which must, in themselves,
cause a permanent trauma, infibulation has very serious physio-
logical repercussions. Apart from permanent frigidity, it often
leads to urinary or gynaecological infections, abortions or sterility,
painful menstrual periods, cysts, abscesses in the vulva and even
cancers. The narrowing of the vaginal orifice alone can cause
sterility, not to mention obstetric complications.
The reasons given to justify this practice centre on respect for
the custom and the prevention of sexual immorality, since excision
is supposed to quell girls' sexual desires. In certain countries,
notably parts of Ethiopia, there is also a widespread fear that an
unmutilated girl will not be able to find a husband.
Finally, in rural areas throughout the Arab world, excision is
considered as an obligation which every little girl must submit to.
54
3 The Legal Status of
Women: Reforms and
Social Inertia
57
The House of Obedience
58
The House of Obedience
58
The Legal Status of Women
59
The Legal Status of Women
59
Introduction: A Confessional Universe
When Islam came to the fore in Arabia during the 7th Century, and
before it spread from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf, it was not
only a new religion but also a movement of social reform with
particular relevance to the status of women. In pre-Islamic Arabia,
for instance, women were treated as chattels, to be bought and
sold or inherited. Polygamy was unlimited and the husband could
break off the union as he chose. Infanticide of baby girls was quite
common.
Islam gave women a legal status, with rights and duties. They
were allowed to keep their father's name after marriage and
acquired a legal personality. The bride-price* was henceforth to be
the sole property of the bride; marriage thus became a contract
between husband and wife, rather than a transaction in which the
women's guardian sold her to her future husband.
The man's right to divorce a woman on the spot as he chose was
restricted by the imposition of a three-month waiting period,
15
The House of Obedience
Marriage
* The Hanafi School is one of the four schools of Sunni Islam. It is especially
strong in Egypt. Sunnis form the majority of Muslims. Shia Islam is pre-
dominant in Iran and Iraq.
60
The Legal Status of Women
61
The House of Obedience
Polygamy
62
The Ijegal Status of Women
63
The House of Obedience
Divorce
* Muslim orthodoxy.
64
The Legal Status of Women
65
The House of Obedience
66
The Legal Status of Women
67
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Custody of Children
68
The Legal Status of Women
Inheritance
69
The House of Obedience
16
The House of Obedience
70
The Legal Status of Women
descendant, but traditional Sunni law added the rider that the
descendant must be male. Tunisian law also insists that a surviving
spouse must share the inheritance with all other legitimate heirs.
In Iraq, the 1963 law is based on the Shia law, even though it
applies to both the Sunni and Shia communities of that country.
Any child, male or female, thus takes precedence over any collater-
als and other distant relatives. In the Sudan, Egypt and Iraq, a
husband or father can leave a larger portion of his assets to his wife
or daughter if he so chooses.
71
The House of Obedience
72
The Legal Status of Women
women, the lowest level of schooling for girls and, generally speak-
ing, the smallest number of women in paid employment. In 1970,
85% of women were illiterate, as against 60% of men (UNESCO,
1972). The gap between the numbers of literate men and women
is thus still large, and indeed grew by 5% between 1960 and 1970
as more schools, attended mainly by boys, were opened.
Studies of the literacy rate by age group illustrates just how
stubborn are the traditions which restrict women's access to
education; illiteracy is almost as common amongst young women
as amongst older women. For instance, in Libya in 1970, 84% of
young girls between 10 and 14 were illiterate, as against 95% of
women aged 60 years and over. Ttfe same applies to many Arab
countries where there have been no serious efforts to alter the
situation. However, in recent years, the number of schools has
increased considerably in several countries, even if the educational
system remains unsatisfactory and the number of teachers inade-
quate, once again especially in the countryside. In a word, the
struggle against illiteracy is not as advanced as in other Third
World countries outside Black Africa.
Even in those countries which have introduced reforms, con-
siderable disparities in schooling persist between boys and girls,
although the situation has improved somewhat over the years. It
is in any case difficult to assess the true level of women's schooling
and education in the various Arab countries. The available
statistics are not precise and are also relatively out of date. Part
of the inaccuracy conies from the fact that some countries,
Mauritania and Saudi Arabia, for example, are reticent about
indicating how many girls and women there are in each family.
Generally speaking, the statistics simply point to overall trends.
(This is true for most underdeveloped countries.)
One thing we do know: in most Arab countries, the level of
schooling for girls is, on the whole, low. It varies considerably
from country to country and also from area to area within a par-
ticular country. The most traditionalist countries have 'resolved'
the problem thanks to television, which enables little girls to
pursue their studies without leaving the family home. Of course,
television is not yet available to every family.
The result is that, in some countries, fewer than 10% of little
girls go to school. In a country like Tunisia, which has actively
promoted girls' education, 50% attend primary school at least.
By contrast, in North Yemen, the 1973 figure was 3% (8% for
boys). The percentage diminishes considerably when it comes to
73
The House of Obedience
74
The Legal Status of Women
urban women working outside the home. There Is a fear that they
will come into contact with men, and that, by going out, they will
acquire too ureal a frcedutn. Men have little faith in their wives,
because oi' the very nature of Arab marriages. And there is also the
fear that the men themselves will lose face if they arc seen to be
incapable of providing for their families on their own. Paradoxi-
cally, it is still amongst the poorest classes of society that the
fewest women are in paid employment, although this is gradually
ceasing to be the case.
In the more educated social strata, economic pressures, often
connected with the adoption of new patterns of consumption, have
led young men to accept more readily the idea of.their wives going
out to work; a second salary is often a very valuable addition to
family income. In any case, it would be inaccurate to claim that
women in the Arab world were not part of the economically active
population. The statistics are often misleading, in that they rarely
take into account women who practise a craft at home and whose
husbands sell the product and keep the proceeds. Similarly,
women agricultural workers are often left out of the statistics,
even though in some sectors they play a crucial role. The fact
remains, however, that the level of women's employment in agri-
culture is lower amongst Muslim Arabs than amongst Christian
Arabs or amongst the women of other rural societies (in Latin
America, for example). As we have repeatedly pointed out, the
ideal of most Muslim societies remains the incarceration of women.
Although it has never been as strong in the countryside as in the
towns, this ideal has gradually become a dominant model and it is
only because of the prevailing economic conditions that it is not
enforced to the letter.
The low level of women's participation in the workforce is seen
as a brake on economic development in many countries, notably
Iraq, Libya and Egypt. These countries believe that the main causes
of the phenomenon are superstitions, social prejudice and the
attitudes of the women themselves towards work and social depen-
dency (United Nations Commission on the Status of Women,
1970).
Nonetheless, the economic importance of women's labour should
not be underestimated. They often work more than the men, since
on fop of working in the fields or the factory they have to look
after the house and children, li; the countryside, women partici-
pate in all agricultural activities, they look after the livestock and
are the main craft producers: they spin wool, make carpets and
75
The House, of Obedience
tents, weave cloth, sew clothes, make baskets, etc. All these activi-
ties are taken completely for granted and are rarely recognized as
work.
In the non-agricultural, non-traditional sectors, women with
some education have turned to activities which are akin to the
traditional specifically 'feminine' tasks (teaching, midwifery,
nursing, etc.). Many women are employed in the textile sector,
which provides segregated workshops; others find jobs as house-
maids, usherettes, etc. Amongst these workers there is a much
higher percentage of divorcees than of widows or spinsters (three
times higher in Egypt, four times higher in Syria, for example).
Probably divorced women who have not remarried quickly and are
thus seen as not living up to the expectations of their family and
of society at large are less subject to the restrictions imposed upon
young girls and widows, who return to their family.
Finally, except in the most highly qualified professions, women's
wages are invariably lower than men's, even when there is a specific
law to the contrary, as in Tunisia, Iraq and Egypt.
76
4 Two Examples of Women
In Arab Societies
79
The House of Obedience
80
The Maghreb: Algeria
81
Introduction: A Confessional Universe
* Patrilineally descended.
17
The House of Obedience
82
The Maghreb: Algeria
leadership abroad.
Throughout this period, women were just as active as men and
just as committed to armed struggle. But this in no way changed
their status, and the fact that they were participating in one way or
another in the war did nothing to free them from the patriarchal
yoke. Like the men — and perhaps even more so, except in the
case of young women students — they were not fighting for social
change as well as national liberation. On the contrary, the whole
idea of recovering national independence was to restore the old
lifestyle which colonization had disrupted and which was reme-
mbered with great nostalgia. Identity could only be established
through Islam. Although they were oppressed by the men, this
oppression seemed easier to bear than that imposed by coloniz-
ation. The structures of Muslim society were not open to question,
since colonialism had sought to destroy them. In fact, the women
were hardly aware of the double alienation they suffered. Women's
participation in political life had always been very limited. As in
other countries, it was only the few who came from liberal fam-
ilies who had over been able to pursue their studies in Algeria or in
France. For this privileged minority, access to French society had
opened up new ways of thinking, and when independence came,
they made considerable advances. But the majority of women
knew only the tradition. The life they led and the education they
had received offered them no possibility of imagining that they
could, like the men, undertake autonomous political activity
within an organization. That was seen as the men's affair.
33
The House of Obedience
8-4
The Maghreb: Algeria
85
The House of Obedience
changes that building a new society would have involved; too many
of them were illiterate, few were used to paid employment and
almost none had been trained to act autonomously in personal and
social matters. Even in the towns, most women were incapable of
imagining a way of life different from the one they had learnt from
their mothers. At most, they may have wished for a relaxation of
the restrictions imposed upon them.
Independence was finally won in July 1962, and the women were
sent back to their homes. Some of them, usually the younger ones,
had thought that their participation in the struggle entitled them
to certain rights. They were soon disillusioned. Yet the first
President of the Algerian Republic, Ben Bella paid homage to them
before his overthrow, and even encouraged women to take a slightly
more active role in public life; amongst other things, he was
obviously concerned to reinforce his popularity. The new state had
granted women the right, to vote. And in 1963 a law was passed
fixing the minimum age for marriage at 18 for boys and 16 for
girls, but the personal consent of the bride was still not required.
Forced marriage, child marriage and polygamy were outlawed, but
despite these reforms, women's status and role barely changed.
Indeed women have never campaigned for any modification of
their status since.
On the contrary, in the struggle for power between the President
and the General Secretary of the Party which soon ensued, the
latter used appeals to Islam to reinforce his support. For instance,
in 1963, the head of the FLN decreed that whether or not some-
body observed Ramadan was an appropriate criterion for determ-
ining how Algerian they were. Religious observance and nationalism
went hand in hand, and many Algerians who had rather abandoned
strict religious adherence felt obliged to respect Free Algeria's first
Ramadan, simply in order to prove the purity of their commitment
to the country's independence. Since then, things have become
more institutionalized and the social pressures have grown so
strong that even non-believers feel compelled to conform to the
edicts of religion.
From the beginning, the FLN and subsequently the Algerian
state never sought to implement a policy geared to emancipating
women. They argued that the people would reject such a move,
especially in the rural areas. Indeed it is fair to say that the eman-
cipation of women has remained a taboo subject in Algeria.
Although the initial independent regime had contented itself
with proclamations, the coup d'etat which brought Houari
86
The Maghreb: Algeria
87
The Maghreb: Algeria
87
The House of Obedience
88
The House of Obedience
88
The Maghreb: Algeria
8S
The House of Obedience
responsibility towards all female relatives and the fact that family
honour depends on the sexual purity of women has consolidated
the structure of control exercised by the men over their female kin.
The men of a family are institutionally supported in the exercise
of this function by the religious and legal system, which means
they can impose upon a woman whatever sanctions they see fit
whenever they feel that family honour has not been respected.
However, honour alone is not enough to justify such control. For
family sanctions to be truly efficacious, it is essential that the
family group should unfailingly accept the responsibility to provide
economic support for women kinfolk, and that women's economic
dependency be perpetuated thereby.
A woman in Islam is thus characterized by her status as a minor
and the fact that her role is restricted exclusively to the family, as
mother and teacher — in other words as guardian of the traditions;
only in the more privileged classes does she have the status of
producer.
In the towns, customs have evolved a little, but elsewhere,
amongst the poor, the peasantry and the nomads, traditional
family relations and attitudes remain very much in force. Even in
the towns, which are growing rapidly due to the rural exodus and
where urban living conditions make it difficult for all but the
richest to maintain extended families, it would be unthinkable for
even distant relatives to be housed and fed other than within the
family. Hospitality is a duty and must be free of charge, at least
during the first few days. In other words, even when urban con-
ditions have forced the family to become a nuclear unit (father,
mother and direct descendants), people still think in terms of the
extended family, with all the rights and duties that implies.
Amongst the rural poor, the desire for many sons continues to
have a real basis in the fact that children's labour in the fields is
necessary, especially for fruit picking and at harvest time. Further-
more a large number of sons is still seen as a source of pride and a
guarantee for the future, since boys are required to support their
elderly parents and their unmarried, divorced or widowed sisters.
In the countryside, neither schooling for girls nor birth control
as a means of securing a better overall standard of living are seen
as necessities, since there is little in people's own experience to
show that these 'novelties' do improve the living conditions of the
family as a whole. As a result, attitudes change only very slowly
and most aspects of the tradition remain unquestioned. Religion
and what is seen as desirable are still inextricably bound up with
18
The House of Obedience
90
The Maghreb: Algeria
31
The House of Obedience
92
The Maghreb: Algeria
93
The House of Obedience
94
The Near East: Egypt
95
The House of Obedience
tendency and that by 1956 women had been granted full political
rights. That same year, free education was instituted for both boys
and girls. Due to the shortages of teachers and buildings, mixed
education became the rule in state schools: later, co-education,
which had originally been prompted by lack of facilities, became
Ministry of Education policy, in an attempt to change and
'modernize' the attitudes of both men and women.
It is undeniable that, in the towns at least, the atmosphere is
infinitely more relaxed than in the rest of the Arab world. Men
and women move about side by side without any apparent prob-
lems, even at work, and one gets the impression that the evolution
of the tradition has been smooth and unbroken, even amongst the
proletarianized strata of society. However, despite the reforming
legislation, women used to complain that the long-promised im-
provement of women's status had not been properly implemented.
Their demands were finally met in June 1979, despite the strong
opposition of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is particularly
powerful in Egypt.
The new reform further restricts men's rights to repudiate their
wives. From now on, a man is required to inform his wife that she
has been repudiated, which was not the case before. Similarly, a
man must inform his spouse if he takes a second wife. The econo-
mic constraints imposed by the new law are also likely to dis-
courage men who are thinking of repudiating their wives or taking
a second bride. If a man repudiates his wife, he will be obliged to
pay her maintenance and indemnity; for instance a wife with
children can expect to retain occupancy of the family home.
Furthermore, the State Bank will provide financial support to the
repudiated spouse by paying her advances on the maintenance
payments which will later be deducted from the ex-husband's
salary.
Custody of the children, which used to be granted to the mother
only until the age of 10 for little girls and 7 for little boys, has
been extended. Girls now stay with their mother until marriage,
and boys until they are 15 years old, providing the repudiated wife
is deemed blameless. However, the legislators did not insist that
divorces be decreed by a tribunal. They accepted the 1931 law
which required that the proceedings be registered by a departmen-
tal official; this was a major advance at the time but seems sadly
out of date nowadays.
When it comes to reforms of the marriage laws, to women's
right to divorce, to questions of repudiation, family law and
96
The Near East: Egypt
contraception, Egypt certainly does not lag behind the other Arab
countries. The legislation has long striven to keep abreast of social
changes. True, polygamy is still allowed, unlike in Algeria: 3% of
all marriages are polygamous. The justification offered is that
polygamy is a lesser evil than divorce; the children continue to
have a home and even the women are thought to prefer sharing a
husband to not having a husband at all.
The reality of everyday life is, of course, somewhat different.
The laws are often ignored, and are far in advance of people's
attitudes. Yet one is always struck by the tremendous diversity of
lifestyles in Egypt, where the most traditional and the most
'modern' types of behaviour exist simultaneously. Many women of
the ruling classes, educated multilingual women, work and have
responsibilities equivalent to the men's, without it being seen as a
problem at all. Working-class women, even if they still represent
only a small proportion of the total female population (only about
3% of women are wage-earners, and the number has been falling
in recent years) have been granted equal rights with men, before
the law at least. Unlike in many other Arab countries, the work-
shops of the big factories are not segregated. Unfortunately, the
lack of creches and nurseries means that the women frequently
have to stop work in order to look after young children. When
they eventually go back to work, they often find they have lost
ground. 'We work like donkeys, and then our careers get disrupted
for lack of proper social services,' said one young woman. The
collapse of the extended family, which used to provide the
necessary social support, has created needs amongst the working
population which an underdeveloped country cannot easily
satisfy.
97
The House of Obedience
those who do not work in the fields are kept at home. 'Crimes of
honour' are common. Women remain economically dependent,
unless they have property of their own, in which case they can
manage it themselves and receive all the revenues. Their fate is very
much that of their mothers before them. Marriages are still
frequently contracted between cousins, according to paternal
decisions. As one village teacher told me: 'Here, emotions are
stifled, and the choice of marriage partners is very limited, even for
the parents, because the communities are so small. The worst thing
is when an adolescent is married off to an old man. But the women
are all convinced that they must abide by the customs. It seems
perfectly natural to them.' Progress in the countryside clearly still
has a long way to go.
The various regimes, of both left and right, which have succeeded
one another in Egypt over the last 20 years, have all sought to
modernize structures and attitudes by passing laws or decrees,
including some which have allowed women greater autonomy vis-
a-vis the family and men in general. The real problem has been one
of information, of making sure that the laws were known and
enforced.
This modernization, from which the notables and their wives
have benefited most, was clearly the product of the West's impact
on the Egyptian ruling classes, who saw it as a new means of
enriching themselves and, eventually, of developing the country.
The early feminist movement, for example, addressed itself to the
women of the most privileged classes and reached only a cultured
public who had already been seduced by the Western ideology. The
enlightened strata believed that only this ideology could 'liberate'
the individual, free the country from destitution and remove the
traditional constraints. 'Enlightenment' came from the West, and
nationalism did not yet necessarily involve the strict application of
Islam. The presence of Copts (Egyptian Christians) and the foreign
colonies (Greek and Jewish, amongst others) facilitated the intro-
duction of ideas from the West. It is no coincidence that a modern
party such as the Wafd emerged in Egypt, which was faster to
adapt to the new circumstances than any other Near Eastern
society (except Turkey).
This 'cosmopolitan' intelligentsia, for whom Islam was not the
definitive code, although they did not reject it, were open to all
sorts of influences, since they were confident that whatever
happened they would remain primarily Egyptian. Such an attitude
may well have existed in other social strata as well, even those
98
The Near East: Egypt
99
Introduction: A Confessional Universe
the tradition.
The Arab world is further characterized by clan or family ties
which are strictly regulated by Islamic law. This is true at every
level of society except amongst the intellectuals and Westernized
cadres. Endogamous marriages, which do not involve a dispersal
of family property or diminish the family's power, are seen as pref-
erable to exogamous marriages. Unions are often formed between
cousins who are more or less closely related. The family group, in
the broad sense, is the keystone of society. In order to ensure the
purity of the line, the fiancee must be a virgin, so girls are fre-
quently married off very young. They are educated almost entirely
with a view to their future roles as wives and mothers, and are
closely watched from puberty onwards. A girl's virginity is a family
possession of considerable importance, even today. Young women
of the bourgeoisie who have led a relatively free life during their
years at university usually have their hymen replaced before
marriage by accommodating surgeons whose fortunes are quickly
made.
In certain cases, for instance in the Gulf Emirates, a little girl
will become engaged very young and be sent to live with her future
husband's family at an early age, long before the marriage can be
consummated. Her education is thus completed by her mother-in-
law, who brings her up to meet the requirements of the future
husband and his household.
The enormous importance placed on women's fertility is a fund=
amental source of insecurity for those who are considered infertile
or who give birth only to girls; either of these misfortunes is suffic-
ient motive for repudiation, divorce or the introduction of a new
wife into the household. It goes without saying that the infertility
of a union is always blamed on the woman.
Once she is old and has had sons, however, a woman can exert
considerable influence within her family. Usually it will be she who,
at the request of the father, will choose a wife for her sons. It is to
her that her sons will come to share their troubles, for throughout
their childhood and adolescence, she will have been their closest
companion; relations with the father are often more difficult, and
extremely codified. An elderly woman may remain a minor vis-a-
vis her husband but she usually enjoys great authority over the
household and its inhabitants, which is very much her own dom-
ain. Men have their own world outside, in the coffee houses,
markets and in public life. At last she is universally respected; no
longer a sexual being, she ceases to be that crushed and dominated
19
The House of Obedience
100
The Near East: Egypt
Yet nearly all the women 1 met in Egypt had been cut, whether
they were students at university, teachers, trade union officials,
cleaning ladies, workers or peasants. Many reject, it for their
daughters, but this attitude has not reached down into the popular
strata. There, the girls still have to undergo the operation, since
the religion - or the tradition, people are not too sure which —
requires it. Usually this means sterring clear of the hospitals,
calling in the midwife and using only a local anaesthetic. If a girl
is to become a woman, it is something she just has to go through.
In 1979, I asked women from poor backgrounds why they wanted
to impose such an ordeal on their daughters, given that they them-
selves had complained about the terrible pain. 'That is not the
point. It is the custom. God wills i t ' One woman, an administrator
who had refused to have her own daughter cut, nonetheless sought
to avoid the question by concentrating on the festivities which
surround the ceremony and which are supposed to make it less
atrocious. Nobody seemed to realize that the practice itself had
been illegal for 20 years. Indeed it is surprising how few women
denounce what is going on. Female circumcision in Egypt is less
of a mutilation than in some other parts of Africa (amputation of
the labia, infibulation) but I still find it quite astonishing that
people tolerate what is being perpetrated upon little girls and do
nothing to prevent it. The inaction of the Left is particularly
baffling. The Cairo intellectuals that I met no longer have their
daughters cut, but it seems that nothing is being done to explain
to more traditional families just how noxious a practice it is. And
yet there are perfectly adequate centres from which such an edu-
cation campaign could be based: the village family planning clinics
for example.
101
The House of Obedience
102
The Near East: Egypt
103
The House of Obedience
104
5 The Future of Arab
Women: Some Basic
Ambiguities
Whilst it is true that both in the Near East and in the Maghreb
many countries have modernized their legislation, the everyday
life of most women has barely been improved. The modernization
has mainly affected those few women in the towns who have had
access to genuine education and information, in other words those
who belong to the so-called privileged classes. These women know
the rights they have recently acquired and have been able to exer-
cise them. But they still constitute only a tiny minority, a sort of
display window that hides the misery of the rest, with whom they
have little contact. The privileged few can lead a satisfying
personal life and engage in the complete range of professional act-
ivities, but most women are still subject to the full weight of the
tradition. Their lack of knowledge about the outside world, and
the difficulty they have in imagining a different status and
different social relations mean that they hardly ever struggle to
improve their lot. They still accept the heavy burden imposed
upon them by the tradition. By the generally established norms of
human rights, they are the most oppressed women in the Third
World.
Fewer women are educated in the Arab world than elsewhere,
even though schooling for girls has made some progress in most
Arab countries. Admittedly, the absolute number of women with
some education is increasing, and the gap which separates them
from men is not as great as it once was, though it is far from
closed.
The percentage of women wage-earners is probably the lowest
in the world, and the birth-rate is the highest. In most Arab
countries, very little has been done to transform the Family Code
and people's attitudes; and where it is legal, polygamy plays a key
vole in increasing the birth rate. Except in Tunisia, and more
107
The House of Obedience
recently Syria and Iraq, the laws concerning the family are amongst
the most inequitable in the world. Most of the Arab countries are
still confessional states, where the legislation is based on Koranic
law reinterpreted, to varying extents, to suit local political needs.
This law, which custom has rendered even harsher, is grossly un-
favourable to women, in that it grants them no status outside the
framework of the patriarchal family.
In other words, reforms are always instituted within an Islamic
framework and even when women are to some extent recognized
as men's equals in terms of civil rights, inequality remains the
order of the day in practically every other domain. There have
been a few adjustments but no real revolutions. Even the most ex-
tensively reformist legislation has done nothing to change either
women's personal status or the Family Code. Where the state has
paid particular attention to women's conditions, it was usually
because demographic problems were becoming pressing and
urgently required a solution (as in Egypt). Once again, the real
issue was an economic problem, not a desire to liberate women
from the constraints and subordination imposed upon them.
In all these countries, there is a widely held belief that what
change is necessary will come about through schooling for girls and
the inescapable effects of industrialization. Few states actually
have any political will to promote women from their present status.
Indeed the idea is that women's status will only improve as the
nuclear family becomes more widespread — once again, the family
is the key — and as economic pressures force more and more
women to go out to find work. Hopefully, the dishonour which
today still attaches to a woman working in the outside world will
diminish as the practice becomes more general. Some progress in
this direction has already been made, especially under the
Ba'athist regimes of Syria and Iraq, and in Egypt, mainly in the
towns, of course. Naturally this is only possible if jobs are available
in the first place. Unemployment, aggravated by a high birth-rate,
is one of the major curses of all the predominantly rural under-
developed countries.
Furthermore the process which supposedly enables women to
liberate themselves through paid labour is very slow and, as in the
West, is often hard for the women concerned, for whom work
constitutes an extra burden rather than a liberation. They only
shoulder this burden because economic circumstances leave them
no other option, and it is all the harder to bear given that there are
few social service provisions such as creches and nurseries. As for
108
The Future of Arab Women
the men, they have not given up their patriarchal attitudes, even if
they are now forced to allow their women to go out to work.
Women thus end up having to serve as producers on top of their
normal roles as wives and mothers, and there are no structures
established to help them in this threefold task apart from the
traditional support provided by grandmothers. In fact, if one
excludes the elite, very few women have really benefited from the
'advantages' of modernism such as paid labour. Modernism has
simply disrupted the secure traditional family structure without
providing any real compensation other than a meagre salary and
extra tasks for those who work.
Finally, one has to recognize the obstacles to any progress that
are put up by both men and women, even in countries where
feminist demands are long established, such as Egypt. The demands
stem essentially from the elites who have benefited from recent
changes, and the obstacles are the invariable reaction of the trad-
itional strata of Arab society, especially the peasantry. What seems
new, and to an outside observer, relatively surprising, is that women
belonging to these elites, educated women who are fully able to
lead an independent life, are deliberately turning back to the
tradition, as in Egypt. This revivalism does not, of course, go so
far as to demand incarceration: these women move about freely,
alone or in groups, attend university and are intensely active. But
their desire for a 'return to the sources' leads them to refuse any
modernization — even that already achieved in their social group
— on the grounds that it is synonymous with Westernization, loss
of identity and moral depravity. The 'return to the sources'
represents an affirmation of Islamic values against Western values
which are deemed unsuitable for the societies concerned. It is an
essentially political stance which aims to prove that Islam is once
again a possible alternative to the West. The goal is to recuperate
Islamic values and endow them afresh with that prestige which they
lost under the pressure of past political and economic dependency.
109
The House of Obedience
by the great powers to the oil countries, notably those of the Arab
world, has enabled that world to recover its identity and its pride,
both of which are closely linked to Islam. The economic bargaining
power of these countries is now so extensive as to have induced
even the United States to modify its previously unconditional
support for the Arab countries' main enemy, Israel. Islam and the
Islamic countries can no longer safely be ignored, especially as they
are increasingly exercising an influence in areas which were once
the private hunting grounds of the West, such as Black Africa.
This is the essential background to any understanding of why the
people still refuse Westernization, and of why certain charismatic
leaders find such a ready audience (Khomeini in Iran, Ghaddafi in
Libya, etc.) when they appeal to the masses in the name of
nationalism and traditional values. In many countries this
tendency is reinforced by the attitudes of compromised and corrupt
ruling classes whom the people see as symbols of collaboration
with the West and who are held responsible for the impoverishment
and degeneration of Third World countries generally. The ground
lost by feminist movements is one measure of this hostility.
Socialism cannot be relied upon to hasten the necessary changes
either, even if it does modify the status of women. Wherever the
individual is seen primarily as a producer, an equally alienating
Puritanism is likely to develop. All the regimes claim that they have
more urgent and important matters to attend to than women's
liberation as we understand it, i.e. a liberation which extends also
to a personal, sexual and familial level. Priority is invariably given
to development, with the assumption that other problems can only
be tackled once economic scarcity has been overcome. This is the
usual argument used by all the existing regimes, whether of the
right or of the left, to explain their slowness in changing the
conditions experienced by women. In any case, the women are
themselves often not yet ready to accept these changes. Behind the
apparently Westernized world of the towns, there is the solidly
resistant core of the countryside, the shanty-towns and the petty
bourgeoisie. The latter are the most frustrated, since they are
aware of the need for change but cannot initiate it. The small
islands of emancipated, educated women who work in fulfilling
occupations and have a certain influence in urban society offer no
model for the broad masses. They are part of different world, a
shadow of the West.
Indeed, following recent events in Iran and other Islamic coun-
tries, it would seem that the whole issue calls for re-examination.
110
The Future of Arab Women
Ill
The House of Obedience
112
Bibliography
113
The House of Obedience
114