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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
NATIONAL DRUG INTELLIGENCE CENTER
National
Drug Threat
Assessment
2010
Questions and comments may be directed to
National Drug Threat Assessment Unit, National Threat Analysis Branch
National Drug Intelligence Center
319 Washington Street 5th Floor, Johnstown, PA 15901-1622 • (814) 532-4601
NDIC publications are available on the following web sites:
INTERNET www.usdoj.gov/ndic ADNET http://ndicosa.adnet.sgov.gov RISS ndic.riss.net
LEO https://www.leo.gov/http://leowcs.leopriv.gov/lesig/ndic/index.htm
030310
Cover Photo © PhotoDisc
Product No. 2010-Q0317-001 February 2010
National
Drug Threat
Assessment
2010
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
Product No. 2010-Q0317-001 National Drug Intelligence Center
Table of Contents
Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Impact of Drugs on Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Demand for Illicit Drugs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Consequences of Illicit Drug Use. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Impact on Health and Health Care Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Impact on Crime and Criminal Justice Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Impact on Productivity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Impact on the Environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Drug Trafficking Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Drug Trafficking by Criminal Gangs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
U.S. Southwest Border Smuggling and Violence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Drug Movement Into and Within the United States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Overland Smuggling Into the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Maritime Smuggling Directly Into the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Air Smuggling Into the United States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
The Flow of Drugs Within the United States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Drug Availability in the United States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Cocaine Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Heroin Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Methamphetamine Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Marijuana Availability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
MDMA Availability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Controlled Prescription Drugs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Illicit Finance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Vulnerabilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Outlook. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Appendix A: Maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Appendix B: Tables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Appendix C: Scope and Methodology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Sources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
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National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
May 25, 2010: The National Drug Threat Assessment 2010 was updated to reflect information
regarding alien smuggling provided to the National Drug Intelligence Center after initial publica-
tion. Changes were made in the U.S. Southwest Border Smuggling and Violence section in the
last paragraph on page 14 and the last two paragraphs on page 17.
iv
U.S. Department of Justice
National Drug Intelligence Center
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
Product No. 2010-Q317-001
Mexican DTOs continue to represent the prepared for transport to the U.S.–Mexico
single greatest drug trafficking threat to the border and then smuggled into Mexico.
United States. Mexican DTOs, already the ●● According to the Bureau of Alcohol,
predominant wholesale suppliers of illicit drugs Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF),
in the United States, are gaining even greater Mexican DTO members or associates
strength in eastern drug markets where Colom- acquire thousands of weapons each year in
bian DTO strength is diminishing. The extent Arizona, California, and Texas and smug-
of Mexican DTO influence over domestic drug gle them across the border to Mexico.
trafficking was evidenced in several ways in
2009. For example: The threat posed by the diversion and abuse
of CPDs, primarily pain relievers, is increas-
●● Mexican DTOs were the only DTOs oper- ing, evidenced by the sharp rise in the percent-
ating in every region of the country. age (4.6% in 2007 to 9.8% in 2009) of state
●● Mexican DTOs increased their cooperation and local law enforcement agencies reporting
with U.S.-based street and prison gangs to CPDs as the greatest drug threat in their area.
distribute drugs. In many areas, these gangs ●● Increased abuse of CPDs has led to elevat-
were using their alliances with Mexican ed numbers of deaths related to prescription
DTOs to facilitate an expansion of their opioids, which increased 98 percent from
midlevel and retail drug distribution opera- 2002 to 2006.
tions into more rural and suburban areas.
●● Unscrupulous physicians who operate
●● In 2009, midlevel and retail drug distribu- purported pain clinics in Florida—which
tion in the United States was dominated by until recently did not have a Prescription
more than 900,000 criminally active gang Drug Monitoring Program (PDMP)—are a
members representing approximately 20,000 significant source of supply for prescription
street gangs in more than 2,500 cities. opioids distributed in numerous states.
●● Mexican DTOs increased the flow of sev- National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC)
eral drugs (heroin, methamphetamine, and analysts estimate that the overall threat posed
marijuana) into the United States, primarily by illicit drugs will not diminish in the near
because they increased production of those term. Although NDIC believes that sustained
drugs in Mexico. shortages of cocaine will persist in some U.S.
●● Drugs smuggled into the United States by markets in 2010, the availability of heroin,
Mexican DTOs usually are transported in methamphetamine, and marijuana will in-
private or commercial vehicles; however, crease, largely the result of increased produc-
Mexican DTOs also use cross-border tun- tion of the drugs in Mexico. The growing
nels, subterranean passageways, and low- strength and organization of criminal gangs,
flying small or ultralight aircraft to move including their alliances with large Mexican
drugs from Mexico into the United States. DTOs, will make disrupting illicit drug avail-
●● Mexican DTOs smuggled bulk cash drug ability and distribution increasingly difficult
proceeds totaling tens of billions of dollars for law enforcement agencies. The increased
from the United States through the South- enforcement against illegal pain clinics and
west Border and into Mexico. Much of the the growing number of PDMPs will disrupt
bulk cash (millions each week) was consoli- the supply of CPDs to prescription opioid
dated by the DTOs in several key areas, in- users in some areas, with the result that some
cluding Atlanta, Chicago, Los Angeles, New users will seek opioids from other sources and
York City, and North Carolina, where it was some will switch to heroin.
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Product No. 2010-Q0317-001 National Drug Intelligence Center
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National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
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Product No. 2010-Q0317-001 National Drug Intelligence Center
A 2007 DAWN survey of 63 metropolitan also to fires, explosions, and physical health
areas found an average of 12.1 deaths per hazards such as toxic chemicals. In 2009, 980
100,000 persons related to drug use.5 Rates children were reported to the El Paso Intel-
of drug-related deaths range from 1.1 per ligence Center (EPIC) as present at or affected
100,000 in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, to 26.1 by methamphetamine laboratories, including
per 100,000 in the New Orleans area. DAWN 8 who were injured and 2 who were killed at
also records the number of drug-related suicide the laboratories. These statistics do not include
deaths. In 2007, the number of drug-related children killed by random gunfire associated
suicides per 100,000 persons ranged from less with drug activity or who were physically or
than one in several jurisdictions (including sexually abused by a “caretaker” involved in
Chicago, Dallas-Fort Worth, and Minneapolis) drug trafficking or under the influence of drugs.
to 6.2 per 100,000 in Fargo, North Dakota. To
put these statistics in perspective, the Centers Impact on Crime and
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
reports other nonnatural death rates as follows:
Criminal Justice Systems
Motor vehicle accidents, 15.1 per 100,000; The consequences of illicit drug use im-
nontransport accidents (e.g., falls, accidental pact the entire criminal justice system, taxing
drownings), 24.4 per 100,000; suicide, 11.1 per resources at each stage of the arrest, adjudi-
100,000; and homicides, 6.2 per 100,000. cation, incarceration, and post-release su-
pervision process. Although drug courts and
The consequences of drug use usually are diversion programs in many jurisdictions have
not limited to the user and often extend to helped to alleviate this burden (see text box on
the user’s family and the greater community. page 6), substance abuse within the criminal
According to SAMHSA, combined data from justice population remains widespread.
2002 to 2007 indicate that during the prior
year, an estimated 2.1 million American chil- The most recent annual data from the Fed-
dren (3%) lived with at least one parent who eral Bureau of Investigation (FBI) show that
was dependent on or abused illicit drugs, and 12.2 percent of more than 14 million arrests in
1 in 10 children under 18 lived with a sub- 2008 were for drug violations, the most com-
stance-addicted or substance-abusing parent.6 mon arrest crime category. The proportion of
Moreover, the U.S. Department of Health and total drug arrests has increased over the past
Human Services estimated in 1999 that sub- 20 years: in 1987, only 7.4 percent of all ar-
stance abuse was a factor in two-thirds of all rests were for drug violations. Approximately
foster care placements. 4 percent of all homicides in 2008 were drug-
related, a percentage that has not changed
Many states have enacted drug-endangered significantly over the same 20-year period.
children laws to protect children from the con-
sequences of drug production, trafficking, and The characteristics of populations under
abuse. Typically associated with methamphet- correctional supervision reflect these arrest
amine production, drug-endangered children patterns. According to the Bureau of Justice
are exposed not only to abuse and neglect but Statistics (BJS), 20 percent of state prisoners
and 53 percent of federal prisoners are incar-
5. DAWN defines drug-related deaths as deaths that are
cerated because of a drug offense. Moreover,
natural or accidental with drug involvement, deaths in-
volving homicide by drug, and deaths with drug involve- 27 percent of individuals on probation and 37
ment when the manner of death denoted by the medical percent of individuals on parole at the end of
examiner is “could not be determined.” 2007 had committed a drug offense.
6. Data include alcohol dependence or alcohol abuse.
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National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
Drug Courts
To alleviate the burden that drug use and abuse have caused to the nation’s criminal justice
system, most jurisdictions have developed drug courts or other diversion programs aimed at
breaking the drug addiction and crime cycle. In these nonadversarial, coordinated approach-
es to processing drug cases, participants receive a full continuum of treatment services, are
subject to frequent urinalyses, and experience strict judicial monitoring in lieu of traditional
incarceration. Once the offender successfully completes treatment, charges may be dropped.
Since the first drug court became operational in Miami in 1989, the number of drug courts has
grown each year, and such courts now exist in all 50 states as well as the District of Columbia,
Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and Indian Country. As of July 2009, there were 2,038
active drug court programs and 226 in the planning stages. Research has shown that drug
courts are associated with reduced recidivism by participants and result in cost savings. For
instance, a 2006 study of nine California drug courts showed that drug court graduates had
recidivism rates of 17 percent, while a comparison group who did not participate in drug court
had recidivism rates of 41 percent. A study of the drug court in Portland, Oregon, found that the
program reduced crime by 30 percent over 5 years and saved the county more than $79 million
over 10 years. With success stories abundant, drug courts have gained approval at the local,
state, and federal levels.
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Product No. 2010-Q0317-001 National Drug Intelligence Center
hospital for drug treatment becomes incapaci- often lead to fires and explosions at clandes-
tated and is removed from the labor force. tine laboratories. Additionally, the process
According to TEDS data, there were approxi- used to produce methamphetamine results in
mately 1.8 million admissions to state-licensed toxic chemicals—between 5 and 7 pounds of
treatment facilities for illicit drug dependence waste per pound of methamphetamine—that
or abuse in 2007. Productivity losses in this are typically discarded improperly in fields,
area alone are enormous. Health-related pro- streams, forests, and sewer systems, causing
ductivity losses are higher still when lost pro- extensive environmental damage.
ductivity associated with drug-related hospital
admissions (including victims of drug-related Currently, there are no conclusive estimates
crimes) is included. regarding the nationwide cost of methamphet-
amine production site remediation because
The approximately one-quarter of offenders many of the methamphetamine laboratories
in state and local correctional facilities and the and dumpsites in the United States are un-
more than half of offenders in federal facilities discovered due to their clandestine locations.
incarcerated on drug-related charges represent However, in California alone, from January
an estimated 620,000 individuals who are not through December 10, 2009, the Califor-
in the workforce. The cost of their incarcera- nia Department of Toxic Substance Control
tion therefore has two components: keeping responded to and cleaned up 232 laboratories
them behind bars and the results of their non- and dumpsites at a cost of $776,889, or ap-
productivity while they are there. proximately $3,349 per site.
Finally, there is productivity lost to drug- Outdoor cannabis cultivation, particularly
related unemployment and drug-related on public lands, is causing increasing envi-
absenteeism. According to the 2008 NSDUH, ronmental damage. Grow site operators often
19.6 percent of unemployed adults may be contaminate and alter watersheds, clear-cut
defined as current users of illicit drugs. Based native vegetation, discard garbage and non-
on population estimates from the same study, biodegradable materials at deserted sites,
this translates into approximately 1.8 million create wildfire hazards, and divert natural
unemployed individuals who were current water courses. For example, cultivators often
drug abusers. Further, approximately 8 percent dam streams and redirect the water through
of individuals employed full time and 10.2 plastic gravity-fed irrigation tubing to supply
percent of individuals employed part-time water to individual plants. The high demand
were current users of illicit drugs. Individuals for water often strains small streams and
who are employed but have chronic absentee- damages downstream vegetation that depend
ism resulting from illicit drug use also accrue on consistent water flow. In addition, law
substantial lost productivity. enforcement officials are increasingly en-
countering dumpsites of highly toxic insecti-
Impact on the Environment cides, chemical repellants, and poisons that
are produced in Mexico, purchased by Mexi-
The environmental impact of illicit drugs is can criminal groups, and transported into the
largely the result of outdoor cannabis cultiva- country for use at their cannabis grow sites.
tion and methamphetamine production. Many These toxic chemicals enter and contaminate
of the chemicals used to produce methamphet- ground water, pollute watersheds, kill fish
amine are flammable, and the improper storage, and other wildlife, and eventually enter
use, and disposal of such chemicals that are residential water supplies. Moreover, the
typical among methamphetamine producers
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National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
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Product No. 2010-Q0317-001 National Drug Intelligence Center
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National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
Drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) are complex organizations with highly defined
command-and-control structures that produce, transport, and distribute large quantities of
one or more illicit drugs.
Criminal groups operating in the United States are numerous and range from small to moder-
ately sized, loosely knit groups that distribute one or more drugs at the retail level and midlevel.
Street gangs are defined by the National Alliance of Gang Investigators’ Associations as
groups or associations of three or more persons with a common identifying sign, symbol, or
name, the members of which individually or collectively engage in criminal activity that cre-
ates an atmosphere of fear and intimidation.
Prison gangs are highly structured criminal networks that operate within the federal and state
prison system and in local communities through members who have been released from prison.
Outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMGs) are highly structured criminal organizations whose
members engage in criminal activities such as violent crimes, weapons trafficking, and drug
trafficking. OMGs maintain a strong centralized leadership that implements rules regulating
membership, conduct, and criminal activity.
Asian DTOs have expanded their influ- (POEs) along the U.S.–Canada border, as evi-
ence nationally in recent years by traffick- denced by seizure data that show a substantial
ing MDMA and high-potency marijuana— increase in the amount of MDMA seized along
drugs that do not put them in direct the Northern Border from 2004 (312,389
competition with Mexican, Colombian, or dosage units) to 20098 (2,167,238 dosage
Dominican DTOs. units). While Asian DTOs continue to produce
high-potency marijuana in Canada, they have
The rising influence of Asian DTOs that decreased their reliance on foreign production
was observed and reported by law enforce- by establishing marijuana grows in the United
ment agencies in 2008 continued to increase States, further reducing associated smuggling
in 2009. Asian DTOs trafficked wholesale risks and costs. Consequently, the amount of
quantities of drugs in 24 of the 32 HIDTAs (see marijuana seized along the U.S.–Canada bor-
Map A2 in Appendix A), compared with 22 der decreased from 10,447 kilograms in 2005
HIDTAs in 2007. Asian DTOs that had previ- to 3,423 kilograms in 2009.
ously trafficked high-purity Southeast Asian
heroin have become the predominant distribu- Asian DTOs have filled a niche by trafficking
tors of MDMA and high-potency marijuana, high-potency marijuana and MDMA—drugs
drugs typically associated with low crimi- not typically trafficked by Mexican, Colombi-
nal penalties and high profit margins. Asian an, or Dominican DTOs. This factor has con-
DTOs increasingly smuggle large quantities tributed to their success; however, their success
of MDMA through and between ports of entry 8. National Seizure System data as of December 1, 2009.
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Product No. 2010-Q0317-001 National Drug Intelligence Center
is largely due to their ability to estimate the groups in drug trafficking should expand fur-
risk and cost of engaging in any given criminal ther in the near term, although the threat posed
activity. Asian DTOs are willing to cooperate by these groups will remain much lower than
with other criminal groups to increase their that posed by Mexican, Colombian, Domini-
profit and work with Caucasian, Hispanic, and can, and Asian DTOs.
African American DTOs or criminal groups in
most major cities in an effort to expand their
drug distribution and customer base.
Cuban DTOs and criminal groups are
slowly expanding their drug trafficking activi-
ties beyond the Florida/Caribbean Region, in
part by partnering with Mexican DTOs.
The influence of Cuban DTOs and criminal
groups is expanding, albeit at a slower rate
than that of Asian DTOs. The number of
HIDTAs reporting Cuban DTO or criminal
group activity increased from three in 2007
to eight in 2009. The expanding influence of
Cuban DTOs and criminal groups is largely
the result of their ability to exploit Cuban
émigrés to establish and tend indoor marijuana
grow sites in locations throughout the Florida/
Caribbean and Southeast Regions (specifically
in Alabama, Georgia, and North Carolina).
Cuban DTO and criminal group activity also
appears to be expanding in the Southwest
Region, where law enforcement agencies
in Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas report
Cuban DTO or criminal group involvement in
cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and mari-
juana trafficking. This expanding influence of
Cuban DTOs and criminal groups can also be
attributed to their close working relationships
with Mexican DTOs. Many Cuban émigrés
are brought illegally into the United States by
smugglers who are associated with a Mexican
DTO. Moreover, communities composed of
both Cubans and Mexicans allow for the de-
velopment of personal relationships between
criminal groups. The full extent of these rela-
tionships is unknown. However, if they follow
patterns similar to the relationships established
between Mexican and Dominican DTOs, the
involvement of Cuban DTOs and criminal
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National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
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Product No. 2010-Q0317-001 National Drug Intelligence Center
Hispanic prison gangs, primarily in To ensure a consistent profit stream from the
Southwest Border states, are gaining wholesale drugs that they purchase from Mex-
strength by working directly with Mexican ican DTOs, Hispanic prison gangs distribute
DTOs to acquire wholesale quantities of drugs through street gangs that they largely, if
drugs and by controlling most street gangs not entirely, control. Through force or intimi-
in areas along the Southwest Border. dation, Hispanic prison gangs exercise signifi-
cant control over local gangs that distribute
Prison gangs are active in all 50 states and their drugs in the Southwest Border region.
are increasing their influence over drug traf- For example, Barrio Azteca prison gang mem-
ficking in areas along the Southwest Border bers operating in El Paso, Texas, collect drug
(see Table B4 in Appendix B). Prior to 2001, payments and taxes from 47 street-level gangs
the criminal influence of prison gangs was and independent drug dealers trafficking drugs
limited primarily to retail-level drug distri- in El Paso.
bution. However, since that time, Hispanic
prison gangs have become increasingly in-
volved in the transportation and wholesale
distribution of drugs.
Hispanic prison gangs such as Hermanos
de Pistoleros Latinos (HPL) and Raza Unida
operating in Southwest Border states have
increased their involvement in wholesale drug
distribution activities through cooperative
relationships with Mexican DTOs. Through
these relationships, Hispanic prison gangs are
able to gain access to wholesale quantities of
drugs. For example, in September 2009, 21
members of HPL were convicted in the South-
ern District of Texas (Houston) of conspir-
ing to distribute more than 150 kilograms of
cocaine and laundering millions of dollars in
drug proceeds. In April 2009, 15 members and
associates of the Raza Unida prison gang were
indicted for trafficking multikilogram quanti-
ties of cocaine and methamphetamine weekly
in McAllen and Houston, Texas.
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National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
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Product No. 2010-Q0317-001 National Drug Intelligence Center
Mexican DTOs use Southwest Border In 2009, between 6,500 and 8,000 individu-
gangs to enforce and secure smuggling als (according to unofficial estimates) were
operations in Mexico and, to a lesser murdered in Mexico as cartels battled for con-
extent, the United States, particularly in trol over smuggling corridors and responded
California and Texas border areas. to increased pressure from the GOM. This
high number of cartel-related murders reflects
Mexican DTOs employ gang members a steep increase over previous years. The
who collect unpaid debts by using threats, most violent conflict is concentrated in, but
extortion, and intimidation and who murder not limited to, the Juárez Plaza. The Joaquín
rival traffickers or noncompliant members in Guzmán-Loera Organization is challenging
Mexico and, to a far lesser extent, the United the Juárez Cartel for control of drug traffick-
States. Mexican DTOs also use gang members ing in the Juárez Plaza. Actions on the part of
to enforce control of drug trafficking routes the Joaquín Guzmán-Loera organization and
from Mexico into the United States. Mexican efforts by the Juárez Cartel to exercise greater
DTOs have reportedly increased their efforts control over the Juárez Plaza have resulted in
to recruit gang members along the Southwest increased violence between the two cartels.
Border. Gang members who are U.S. citizens
are a particularly valuable asset to Mexican Although much of the violence attributed
DTOs because they can normally cross the to conflicts over control of smuggling routes
U.S.–Mexico border with less law enforce- has been confined to Mexico, some has oc-
ment scrutiny and therefore are less likely to curred in the United States. Violence in the
have illicit drug loads interdicted. United States (see text box on page 16) has
been limited primarily to attacks against alien
Competition among rival Mexican drug smuggling organization (ASO) members and
cartels for control of several prominent their families—some of whom have sought
smuggling plazas has caused a significant refuge from the violence in Mexico by moving
rise in the level of violence in Mexico and a to U.S. border communities such as Phoenix.
potential rise in the United States. For example, in recent years, kidnappings in
Phoenix have numbered in the hundreds, with
260 in 2007, 299 in 2008, and 267 in 2009.
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National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
Often, the U.S. kidnapping victims have some drug smuggling. Assaults against U.S. Border
connection to alien smuggling or local drug Patrol (USBP) agents increased 46 percent
trafficking activities, although some are in- from 752 incidents in FY2006 to 1,097 inci-
nocent family members or relatives of alien dents in FY2008. Contributing most to this in-
smugglers or drug traffickers. Kidnappings crease were rocking10 assaults, which rose 77
related to alien smuggling often occur because percent from 435 incidents in FY2006 to 769
smugglers demand more money for their ser- incidents in FY2008. However, some assaults
vices. Kidnappings related to drug trafficking against USBP agents in California have been
usually occur only as a direct result of local- deadly, including the January 2008 murder
ized drug trafficking activities. For example, of a USBP officer who was struck and killed
an individual or individuals may be kidnapped by the automobile of a fleeing drug suspect
because of a lost drug load or failure to pay in Imperial County and the fatal shooting of a
a drug debt. The number of U.S. kidnapping USBP officer investigating suspicious activity
incidents is most likely underreported because in Campo in July 2009.
many victims’ families are unwilling to re-
port the crime for fear that the victim will be Weapons smuggled from the Southwest
killed, the kidnappers will retaliate against the Border region to Mexico have contributed
family, or law enforcement will discover the to the escalating violence in Mexico.
family’s drug trafficking activities or illegal Thousands of weapons are smuggled from
alien status. the United States to Mexico every year, ac-
cording to the ATF. It is unclear how many
Violence in the United States
of these weapons are smuggled into Mexico
Direct violence similar to the conflicts occur- by DTOs or how many ultimately come into
ring among major DTOs in Mexico is rare in the possession of DTOs. Nevertheless, some
the United States. Incidents of direct inter-
percentage of this weapons smuggling is
cartel or intracartel violence have not mate-
rialized in the United States in a manner that
orchestrated by DTOs. The U.S. weapons that
in any way resembles the widespread cartel these DTOs acquire originate in cities in Ari-
violence in Mexico. Nevertheless, some re- zona, California, and Texas. Mexican DTO-
ports of DTO or cartel violence occasionally linked enforcement groups and gang members
emerge, including some incidents in 2009. purchase firearms and ammunition from
More typical, however, is indirect violence Federally Licensed Firearms Dealers at gun
within DTOs or cartels. Indirect violence stores, gun shows, and pawn shops and from
takes many forms: drug customers who owe unlicensed dealers at gun shows, often using
money are kidnapped until payment is made straw purchasers11 to insulate themselves from
and cartel employees who fail to deliver the the transactions. The firearms and ammunition
contraband or the expected proceeds are are then smuggled from the United States to
disciplined through beatings, kidnappings, Mexico on behalf of Mexican DTOs.
torture, or death.
16
Product No. 2010-Q0317-001 National Drug Intelligence Center
The Southwest Border is a principal entry moving special-interest aliens into the United
point into the United States for illegal aliens. States. However, among the aliens from
special-interest countries who have been
The Southwest Border region is the principal encountered at the U.S.–Mexico border over
entry point for undocumented aliens smuggled at least the past five years, none documented
from Mexico, Central America, and South as a known or suspected terrorist has been
America by ASOs. These ASOs often pay identified as having been assisted by a DTO.
fees to Mexican DTOs for the right to operate
along specific routes in certain border areas. Of particular concern is the cross-border
transit of criminal gang members who pose
Additionally, some aliens who attempt to public safety threats to communities through-
cross the U.S.–Mexico border illicitly each out the U.S.–Mexico border region and the
year and are encountered by law enforcement country. These individuals include members of
are from special-interest countries including transnational gangs such as Barrio Azteca,
Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan. These Mara Salvatrucha (MS 13), and Sureños
special-interest aliens, numbering in the (including 18th Street, Florencia, and Los
hundreds, constitute a very small fraction of Wonders), who transit the U.S.–Mexico border
annual apprehensions at the U.S.–Mexico illicitly and smuggle drugs or weapons on
border by law enforcement. Available report- behalf of Mexican DTOs.
ing indicates that some alien smuggling
organizations (ASOs) in Mexico specialize in
17
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
IO
R
TA
vation each week by Native American DTOs that
C
O
BE
are supplied by Canada-based DTOs. Native
É
Ottawa Montréal
U
!
Q
!
^
!
American DTOs also smuggle multithousand-
tablet quantities of MDMA into the United States Akwesasne Akwesasne
and multikilogram quantities of cocaine into
Canada through the reservation. As much as 20 Toronto
VT
ME XI C O
a. NDIC-derived estimate based on law enforcement reporting and Royal Canadian Mounted Police production
estimates.
b. NDIC-derived estimate based on law enforcement reporting and production estimates for Mexico.
18
Product No. 2010-Q0317-001 National Drug Intelligence Center
19
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
20
Product No. 2010-Q0317-001 National Drug Intelligence Center
Meanwhile, production estimates for South factors—some of which are interrelated and
American heroin, historically transported into some of which are unique to the drug—that
the United States via commercial air, have affect modes and methods used to transport
steadily declined (see Figure 2 on page 24). This drugs into the United States. Nonetheless, it
increased availability of Mexican heroin, is possible that seizures of large quantities of
coupled with increased involvement of Mexi- cocaine en route to Mexico and counterdrug
can DTOs in trafficking South American efforts may have impacted the ability of
heroin, likely have resulted in significantly major DTOs to smuggle cocaine from South
greater quantities of heroin being transported America to Mexico. These factors may also
across the Southwest Border. explain the decrease in seizures along the
Southwest Border, the decline in cocaine
Methamphetamine and marijuana seizures availability in portions of the United States,
have also increased along the Southwest and the lack of similar long-term declines in
Border, partly because of increased produc- the availability of methamphetamine, heroin,
tion. As with heroin, the increase appears to be and marijuana.
specific to the drug. Methamphetamine pro-
duction in Mexico appears to be increasing
again after a sustained period of limited
Maritime Smuggling
production resulting from laws that eventually Directly Into the
banned pseudoephedrine in Mexico. Multiple United States
factors may be contributing to an increase in
marijuana smuggling, particularly decreased Significantly lesser quantities of drugs are
GOM cannabis eradication efforts, which have smuggled directly into the United States by
resulted in elevated production levels. traffickers using maritime conveyances than
by traffickers using overland routes. In 2009,
Common Overland Smuggling Methods less than 3 percent of all arrival zone drug
Mexican DTOs dominate the transportation seizures occurred on commercial and noncom-
of illicit drugs across the Southwest Border. mercial maritime conveyances. Nevertheless,
They typically use commercial trucks and pri- some DTOs continue to use maritime smug-
vate and rental vehicles to smuggle cocaine, gling methods to move illegal drugs into the
marijuana, methamphetamine, and heroin
United States (see text box on page 22), and like
through the 25 land POEs as well as through
overland smugglers, some of these maritime
vast areas of desert and mountainous terrain
between POEs. Asian traffickers, OMGs, and smugglers shifted their operations in 2008 and
Indo-Canadian drug traffickers transport sig- 2009 in response to law enforcement pressure
nificant quantities of high-potency marijuana or gaps in interdiction coverage.
and MDMA into the United States across the
Traffickers used private maritime vessels to
U.S.–Canada border. They use commercial
trucks and private and rental vehicles to smuggle drugs into the United States during
transport these drugs through more than 100 2009 through Puerto Rico, South Florida,
land POEs. They also use all-terrain vehicles South Texas, and southern California, and
(ATVs), aircraft, maritime vessels, and couri- Mexican DTOs sometimes smuggle drugs by
ers on foot to smuggle drugs through vast maritime means to avoid law enforcement
areas between POEs. scrutiny along the Southwest Border.
The primary threat from drug smuggling via
A review of the smuggling patterns for private vessels is from Caribbean-based traf-
each of the major drug types reveals myriad fickers exploiting the Puerto Rico and Florida
21
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
coastlines. Traffickers transported mostly co- in the region during 2008. Federal investiga-
caine from the Dominican Republic to Puerto tors believe that the smugglers typically depart
Rico, although they smuggled lesser amounts from Tamaulipas State in northern Mexico and
of heroin and MDMA, sometimes commin- make short hops to the Texas coastline. Mexi-
gled with cocaine loads. Caribbean traffickers can traffickers also used private vessels in 2009
also smuggled cocaine, heroin, and marijuana to smuggle marijuana from the northern Mexi-
from the Bahamas to areas of South Florida co state of Baja California to southern Califor-
between Miami and Palm Beach. Seizure nia. In fact, in 2009, more than 3.1 metric tons
totals and routes remained relatively constant of marijuana were reported to have been seized
compared with those of previous years. from private vessels arriving in southern Cali-
fornia, primarily the San Diego area.
Common Maritime Smuggling Methods
Commercial maritime vessels, especially
Various DTOs—most notably Colombian but maritime containers, remain a viable con-
also Dominican, Jamaican, Puerto Rican, veyance for smuggling drugs directly into
and Venezuelan—transport cocaine and
the United States, but seizure data and law
lesser amounts of heroin and marijuana to
enforcement reporting indicate that this
the United States using a variety of convey-
ances, including container ships, cruise smuggling method continues to account for
ships, commercial fishing vessels, recre- a relatively small portion of the nation’s il-
ation vessels, and go-fast boats. The drugs licit drug supply.
are typically concealed in hidden compart-
Traffickers use commercial maritime vessels
ments, commingled with legitimate goods,
or couriered by passenger or crew members to smuggle sizable quantities of drugs into the
on maritime vessels. Traffickers also have United States, but data suggest that other con-
increasingly used self-propelled semisub- veyance methods are preferred by smugglers.
mersibles (SPSSs)a to transport cocaine Traffickers often hide drugs among legitimate
from South America to Mexico. The use of cargo in maritime containers, a fraction of
SPSSs affords traffickers the ability to co- which are inspected. Analysis of commercial
vertly transport large quantities of drugs. maritime seizure data for 2004 through 2009
a. Self-propelled semisubmersible vessels are maritime vessels used indicates that cocaine and marijuana are most
by traffickers to transport illicit drugs. These vessels typically pro- often smuggled in commercial maritime ves-
trude only a few inches above the surface of the water, making them
very difficult to detect visually. SPSSs typically have a four-man sels from Caribbean locations, such as the
crew and are capable of carrying multiton quantities of cocaine. Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica, into
East Coast ports in Florida and New Jersey.
Mexican traffickers seeking to avoid scru- Traffickers also use commercial vessels to
tiny along the Southwest Border used private smuggle cocaine from the Dominican Re-
vessels to smuggle marijuana and cocaine public into Puerto Rico. Smaller amounts of
into the United States during 2009. Incidents heroin, typically 2 kilograms or less, are oc-
involving kilogram packages of cocaine and casionally smuggled by cruise ship passengers
marijuana washing up or being found aban- working for Caribbean trafficking organiza-
doned along the South Texas coastline in- tions into East Coast ports; however, this smug-
creased, particularly in the South Padre Island gling technique appears to have declined since
area, during the first half of the year. By the 2006. Seizure data indicate that methamphet-
end of December, more than 114 kilograms of amine is rarely smuggled into the United States
cocaine had been recovered in the region. In on commercial maritime vessels.
comparison, only 1 kilogram was recovered
22
Product No. 2010-Q0317-001 National Drug Intelligence Center
Drug shipments are typically stashed in ranches, warehouses, residences, and trailers near
primary points of entry into the United States for consolidation, distribution, and subsequent
transport to drug markets throughout the United States. To transport drugs, traffickers pri-
marily use commercial trucks and privately owned and rental vehicles equipped with hidden
compartments and natural voids in the vehicles. Additionally, bulk quantities of illicit drugs are
sometimes commingled with legitimate goods in commercial trucks. Many drug traffickers use
postal and package delivery services to transport illicit drugs within the United States and, to
a much lesser extent, use couriers and cargo shipments on aircraft, buses, and trains.
Despite the fact that sizable quantities of shipments concealed in commercial mari-
drugs are seized annually from commer- time containers by Caribbean and South
cial maritime vessels arriving in the United American traffickers are intercepted by U.S.
States, the dominance of Mexican traffick- authorities as they transit the United States
ing organizations as the primary transporters en route to markets in Europe and Asia.
of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and meth-
amphetamine to the United States results Air Smuggling Into the
in commercial maritime seizure totals that
are far less than Southwest Border seizure
United States
totals. Seizure data for 2009 show that the The amount of drugs smuggled into the
amount seized from commercial maritime United States by couriers and in cargo
vessels remains less than 1 percent (6,015 aboard commercial aircraft is significantly
kg of 828,223 kg) of the amount seized at less than the amount smuggled by other
the Southwest Border. Law enforcement means. In 2009, the total amount seized
reporting confirms that Caribbean and South from commercial aircraft for cocaine,
American traffickers are more likely than heroin, methamphetamine, marijuana, and
Mexican traffickers to take advantage of MDMA was less than for any other convey-
commercial maritime vessels as a smuggling ance. Drug seizure data show that only 24
conveyance to supply their much smaller percent of heroin seizures, 15 percent of
U.S. distribution networks. Moreover, large MDMA seizures, 6 percent of cocaine sei-
quantities of drugs seized at U.S. ports are zures, and less than 1 percent each of meth-
often destined for distribution in countries amphetamine and marijuana seizures were
other than the United States. Many drug from commercial air conveyances.
23
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
9.0
8.5
7.8
8.0
7.0
6.0
5.0 4.6
3.8
4.0
3.0
1.9
2.0
1.0
NA NA
0.0
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
24
Product No. 2010-Q0317-001 National Drug Intelligence Center
The use of commercial air to smuggle to the major drug markets within the United
heroin into the United States is rapidly States. (See Figure 3 on page 26.)
declining, while heroin smuggling over the
Southwest Border is increasing. Among the eight principal drug corridors,
Corridor A is particularly vital to DTOs.
The amount of heroin seized at commercial Corridor A is the primary route for DTOs
air POEs decreased 56.2 percent (909 kg to 398 transporting multiton quantities of cocaine,
kg) from 2004 through 2008. The decrease is heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine from
partially attributable to a shift in the smuggling the Southwest Border to eastern U.S. drug
of South American heroin by couriers on markets, many of the largest drug markets in
commercial flights to overland transportation the country. Within Corridor A, Interstate 10 as
across the Southwest Border as well as in- well as Interstates 8 and 20 are among those
creased airport interdiction activities in Colom- most used by drug couriers, as evidenced by
bian airports. Colombian DTOs are now, to a drug seizure data showing that from 2008
large extent, relying on Mexican DTOs to through October 2009, nearly 19 percent of all
smuggle heroin overland into the United States reported interstate cocaine seizures and 7
rather than conducting their own air courier percent of all reported interstate heroin sei-
smuggling operations. At the same time that zures occurred on these routes.
heroin seizures decreased at commercial air
POEs, heroin seizures at Southwest Border Corridor B is also important to DTOs, es-
POEs increased 44.0 percent (386 kg to 556 pecially those moving methamphetamine and
kg), and preliminary seizure data indicate that marijuana produced in California or Mexico to
Southwest Border heroin seizures reached a major market areas in western, central, or east-
record high in 2009 (see Table 2 on page 24). ern states. Interstates 15, 80, 70, and 40 are the
leading routes through Corridor B, and seizures
The decline in commercial air smuggling for on these interstates accounted for 46 percent of
heroin is attributable to a number of factors, all reported methamphetamine seizures and 31
including decreasing South American heroin percent of all marijuana seizures on interstates
production and a shift to smuggling routes from 2008 through October 2009.
across the Southwest Border. Most of the her-
oin seized at air POEs in previous years was Drug couriers moving drugs through the
seized from South American heroin couriers. various corridors are often destined for one of
However, South American heroin production the relatively few primary U.S. drug markets,
appears to have decreased sharply since 2003 where there are large drug user populations and
(see Figure 2 on page 24). where drugs are further distributed to smaller
markets. There are relatively little data available
The Flow of Drugs Within to objectively rank cities as leading or lesser
drug markets. Nevertheless, analysis of national
the United States seizure data that identify the destination and
There are 327 official U.S. land, maritime, origination of drug shipments shows that seven
and air POEs; however, a relatively few POEs city areas (Chicago, Denver, Detroit, Houston,
account for most of the drug flow into the Miami, New York, and Tucson) are identified
United States. In fact, 88 percent of all drug more often than any other cities as major points
seizures occurred at just 20 POEs. From these of both origination12 and destination for drug
and other POEs, drug shipments are transport- shipments (see Table 3 on page 24).
ed to dozens of national and regional distribu-
tion centers through eight principal corridors 12. Excludes cities within the Southwest Border Arrival
Zone area (within 150 miles of the U.S.–Mexico border).
25
Figure 3. Drug Transportation Corridors in the United States
" "
)
13
)
5 "
)
23
"
)
19
"
)
9 "
) )6
77 "
132
±
³
! "
)
1 "
)
97 Regional Drug Transportation Corridors
Blaine
"
)
95
"
)
1 ¦
¨
§11
"
)
3 "
)
16 "
)
10
"
)3 113
±
³
Seattle "
)
93
±
³
"
)
17 134
" "
)4 "
)
11
"
)
6 "
"
)1 175
)
±
³
5 ! "
)
35 39
¦
¨
§ Spokane
"
)
75
"
)
71 Houlton !
117 "
±
³
±
³ 155 )2
Portland 82
"
)
11
"
)
17 "
" ¦
¨
§ )1
±
³
117
±
³
173
90
¦
¨
§ 144
±
³
95
¦
¨
§
29
¦
¨
§ 105
Billings
¦
¨
§ 94
Duluth
!
Sault
Ste.Marie
! ±
³
¦
¨
§84
! "
)
69 93
D
87
89
¦§
¨
§ ¦
¨
15
¦
¨
§ ¦
¨
§
±
³
401
C 81
¨
§
! 91
Buffalo ! Minneapolis 75
¦Syracuse ¦
¨
§ "
Boston
¦
¨
§ !
¦
¨
§5 88
86
43
¦
¨
§ Port
Huron ! ¦
¨
§
¦
¨
§ 90
¦
¨
§ ! 402
± Buffalo
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
¦
¨
§25 ³³
±
Detroit " 401
Salt
35
¦
¨
§ Chicago Cleveland "
! ¦
¨
§80 ¦
¨
§ 78 New York
80
¦
¨
§ LakeCity
!
" Pittsburgh 83
Sacramento
!
E !
Des 71
!
¦
¨
§ " Philadelphia
San Omaha ! Moines
39
¨
§
¦ ¨
§
¦ 57 ¨
§ ¦
¨
§
69
68
Francisco "
¦
¨
§76
¦ §
¦
¨ 75 §
¦
¨ " Baltimore
74 77
! Denver
¦
¨
§ ¦
¨
§ ¦
¨
§ 66 " Washington
70 72
¦
¨
§ B
Kansas
¦
¨
§ ! Cincinnati 79
¦
¨
§
City !
70
¦
¨
§ St.Louis ! 64
¦
¨
§
26
64
G
Las
Vegas
¦
¨
§ ¦
¨
§81
! ¦
¨
§ 65
75
44 24
¦
¨
§ ¦
¨
§ 95
Barstow
!
¦
¨
§ ¦
¨
§
Knoxville !
40
¦
¨
§
Los " ¦
¨
§ 26
Oklahoma
! 65
Angeles San 10
¦
¨
§ ¦
¨
§ 17 Albuquerque
40
City
! Little
¦
¨
§ 77
¦
¨
§ H
Diego Phoenix ¦
¨
§ Rock
¦
¨
§85
" !
" ¦
¨
§ 27 F ! Atlanta
¦
¨
§8
55
¦
¨
§
30
¦
¨
§ A
Las 16
10
¦
¨
§ Cruces
!
Dallas ¦
¨
§
¦
¨
§19 "
" ¦
¨
§ 20
" ElPaso
)2 65
¦
¨
§49 ¦
¨
§59 ¦
¨
§ Jacksonville
45
¦
¨
§ "
Corridors 10 35
A E "
)
45
¦
¨
§ ¦
¨
§ ¦
¨
§10
75
¦
¨
§
Houston !
NewOrleans
B F " 4
C G
"
)
15 " San ¦
¨
§
Antonio ! 95
D H
Tampa ¦
¨
§
37
¦
¨
§
Major Cities !
Laredo
Miami
" 1,000,000 + !
"
)
49 "
)
85
" 500,000 - 999,999 "
)
15
"
)
40 "
)
40
! less than 500,000
"
)
40 "
)
57
Source: Federal, state, and local law enforcement data and reporting.
Product No. 2010-Q0317-001 National Drug Intelligence Center
30,000
19,324
20,000
10,000
0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009*
Source: National Drug Intelligence Center analysis of Federal-Wide Drug Seizure System data.
*Data as of June 2009.
Note: Federal-wide Drug Seizure System totals have been adjusted to exclude seizures that did not occur within the United States or its
territorial waters.
27
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
$198.47
$200 80.0
$183.63
69.8
Price Per Pure Gram
Purity in Percent
$174.38
61.2
59.3
$150 57.1 57.6 57.4 60.0
48.1 48.6
46.4 46.2
$130.34 44.8
$126.06
$122.81
$119.08
$115.26
$100 40.0
$99.24
$94.65 $94.96 $94.73
$90.18
$50 From January 2007 through September 2009, the price per pure gram of Cocaine increased 75.4%, 20.0
from $99.24 to $174.03, while the purity decreased 31.5%, from 67% to 46%.
$0 0.0
Jan- Apr- Jul- Oct- Jan- Apr- Jul- Oct- Jan- Apr- Jul- Oct- Jan- Apr- Jul-
Mar06 Jun06 Sep06 Dec06 Mar07 Jun07 Sep07 Dec07 Mar08 Jun08 Sep08 Dec08 Mar09 Jun09 Sep09
PPG_mean $94.65 $94.96 $94.73 $90.18 $99.24 $119.08 $130.34 $115.26 $122.81 $126.06 $183.63 $198.47 $174.38 $173.19 $174.03
Purity_mean 68.6 68.9 68.1 69.8 67.4 59.3 57.1 61.2 57.6 57.4 46.4 44.8 48.1 48.6 46.2
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Source: Quest Diagnostics Incorporated. *(U) Percent differences may not equal the average calculated from the quarterl
*Data as of December 9, 2009. * Jan-June 2009
Source: QUEST Diagnostics Incorporated extracted December 9, 2009
28
Product No. 2010-Q0317-001 National Drug Intelligence Center
Workplace drug tests also indicated a re- U.S. drug markets where cocaine availability
duction in cocaine availability; the percentage is closely monitored, officials in 22 drug mar-
of positive tests for cocaine among samples kets (primarily markets east of the Mississippi
submitted to Quest Diagnostics declined sub- River and along the Southwest Border) report
stantially between the end of 2006 and midyear that during the first half of 2009, availability
2009 (see Figure 6 on page 28). In addition, all was below 2006 levels; the cocaine short-
14 cities monitored by DAWN reported that the ages have been attributed to several factors
proportion of drug-related emergency depart- (see text box). Officials in only 4 of the 51
ment admissions attributed to cocaine has markets—Boise, Idaho; Omaha, Nebraska;
declined since 2006. Portland, Oregon; and Salt Lake City, Utah—
reported that cocaine availability levels were
Anecdotal reporting from law enforcement higher than in 2006.
officials throughout the country supports the
trend reflected in the national data. Of the 51
29
2006 515.0
2007 485.0
2008 295.0
200.0
100.0
0.0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Source: U.S. Government estimate.
Law enforcement reporting indicates that hero- Increased availability in some markets can be
in remains widely available and that availability partly attributed to increased heroin production
is increasing in some areas, as evidenced by high in Mexico. From 2004 through 2008, heroin
wholesale purity, low prices, increased levels of production estimates for Mexico increased 342
abuse, and elevated numbers of heroin-related percent, from 8.6 metric tons pure to 38 metric
overdoses and overdose deaths. For instance, tons pure (see Figure 8 on page 31).
according to DEA Heroin Signature Program Increased heroin availability has led to in-
(HSP) data, the wholesale purity of Mexican creased heroin abuse and, consequently, an
heroin was 40 percent in 2008, the highest aver- increase in heroin-related overdoses and overdose
age purity for Mexican heroin analyzed under deaths. Law enforcement reporting from the
the HSP since 2005 (47%). Additionally, Mexi- Great Lakes, Mid-Atlantic, New England, New
can heroin represented 39 percent (by weight) of York/New Jersey, Southeast, and West Central
all heroin analyzed through the HSP, the highest OCDETF Regions suggests that heroin abuse is
percentage since 1987 (42%). The wholesale increasing, particularly among younger abusers.
purity of South American heroin stabilized at Moreover, in mid-2009, law enforcement and
57 percent in 2008 after significantly decreasing public health agencies in 29 drug markets span-
from 2000 to 2006. However, South American ning 17 states began reporting elevated levels of
heroin representation under the HSP decreased heroin-related overdoses, which in many areas
markedly to 58 percent (by weight) in 2008 from began to increase in 2008 (see Figure 9 on page
a high of 88 percent in 2003. The decreased rep- 31). The degree to which heroin overdoses in-
resentation of South American heroin under the creased in these drug markets—which ranged in
HSP resulted from a significant increase of Mex- size from Burlington, Vermont, to Dallas, Tex-
ican heroin samples seized and analyzed under as—varied widely, but for each area the increase
the program, 300 kilograms in 2008 compared was significant relative to what local officials
with 136 kilograms in 2007, rather than an over-
30
2005 8.0
2006 13.0
2007 18.0
Product No.
20082010-Q0317-001
38.0 National Drug Intelligence Center
30.0
25.0
20.0 18.0
15.0 13.0
8.6 8.0
10.0
5.0
0.0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
gin
scog
Andro
!
(
!
( n
nde ork ord
Chitte (Y
( Straffingham
!
!
( Rock
!
( ssex
!
!
( E
Midd lesex
Dane Milwauk ee
!
( !
( folk
( Racine
! ( Suf
!
!
(
( Lak e u
!
Dauph
in Nassa
y
Lak e ( ( La Porte
(!
!! Alleghen !
(
Porter !
(
Franklin !
(
ton
Washing
!
(
burg
( Meck len
!
( Bernalillo
!
( Pima
!
Tarrant !
(!( Dallas
31
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
normally observe. Although a variety of the United States are based primarily in Afghani-
factors have been associated with the increase, stan, Pakistan, West Africa, and India. Similarly,
including some prescription opioid users even though Southeast Asian (SEA) opium and
switching to heroin (see text box), the only heroin production estimates marginally increased
commonality appears to be an overall increase from 2007 to 2008, only limited quantities of
in heroin availability. the drug are available in the United States. Most
SEA heroin is consumed regionally in Southeast
The capacity of Mexican DTOs to occupy a Asia and the East Asia–Pacific region.
more significant share of the heroin market in
cities historically dominated by South Ameri-
can heroin may be evolving. In addition to
Methamphetamine
Mexican DTOs trafficking and distributing Availability
greater quantities of South American heroin, From mid-2008 through 2009, methamphet-
investigative reporting and heroin signature amine availability increased in the United States.
analysis indicate the possibility of white heroin Drug availability indicator data show that meth-
being produced in Mexico using Colombian amphetamine prices, which peaked in 2007, de-
processing techniques, as well as the distribu- clined significantly during 2008 and 2009, while
tion of “mixed” heroin containing both South methamphetamine purity increased (see Figure
American and Mexican heroin. However, 10 on page 33). Methamphetamine seizures also
additional information is needed to confirm the increased in 2008 after dropping in 2007, and
existence of and to understand the potential 2009 data indicate that seizures continue to rise
threat posed by these two heroin forms. (see Figure 11 on page 33).
Despite record estimates of opium and heroin Analysis of available data indicates that
production in Afghanistan, the United States methamphetamine availability in the United
remains a secondary market for Southwest Asian States is directly related to methamphetamine
(SWA) heroin. SWA heroin is smuggled into production trends in Mexico, which is the
the United States in relatively small quantities, primary source of methamphetamine consumed
primarily by couriers on transatlantic flights and in the United States. That is, as methamphet-
through the international mail system. Organiza- amine production declined in Mexico in 2007
tions responsible for trafficking SWA heroin into and early 2008 as a result of precursor chemical
32
Product No. 2010-Q0317-001 National Drug Intelligence Center
$264.94
$250
$242.97
80.0
$225.70
$219.89
$210.50
Price Per Pure Gram
Purity in Percent
$200 63.3
$185.52 61.6
$173.92 57.0 56.6 60.0
52.2 $179.03
$168.61
$150 45.8 53.6
$100
From January 2007 through September 2009, the price per pure gram of Methamphetamine 20.0
$50 decreased 13.5%, from $147.12 to $127.28, while the purity increased 22.1%, from 57% to 69%.
$0 0.0
Jan- Apr- Jul- Oct- Jan- Apr- Jul- Oct- Jan- Apr- Jul- Oct- Jan- Apr- Jul-
Mar06 Jun06 Sep06 Dec06 Mar07 Jun07 Sep07 Dec07 Mar08 Jun08 Sep08 Dec08 Mar09 Jun09 Sep09
PPG_mean $207.67 $242.97 $173.92 $130.16 $147.12 $210.50 $264.94 $278.97 $219.89 $225.70 $185.52 $168.61 $179.03 $128.91 $127.28
Purity_mean
2005
37.4 37.7 2006
49.0 57.0 2007 2008 2009*
56.6 42.9 38.8 40.7 45.8 52.2 53.6 61.6 63.3 68.7 69.1
Methamph
Intelligence Division - Indications6,246
and Warning Section 7,613 4,974 6,318 6,568
12/09/2009
7,000 6,568
6,246 6,318
6,000
4,974
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009*
Source: National Seizure System.
*Data as of December 1, 2009.
33
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
2,918
3,000 2,798
2,500
2,201
2,000 1,860
1,500
1,000
500
0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009*
restrictions (see text box), methamphetamine chemical derivatives such as n-acetyl ephedrine
availability declined in the United States. By late and methylamine that are not regulated in
2008, however, Mexican DTOs had adapted Mexico, but can be used to produce metham-
their operating procedures in several ways phetamine precursor chemicals and ultimately
including the smuggling of restricted chemicals methamphetamine. Limited access to ephedrine
via new routes, importing nonrestricted chemical and pseudoephedrine has also prompted meth-
derivatives instead of precursor chemicals, and amphetamine producers in Mexico to increas-
using alternative production methods. For ingly use nonephedrine-based methamphetamine
example, Mexican DTOs smuggle ephedrine and production methods. According to DEA report-
pseudoephedrine from source areas in China and ing, Mexican DTOs conduct large-scale non-
India using indirect smuggling routes that ephedrine-based production operations in Mexi-
include transit through Central Africa, Europe, co, particularly using the phenyl-2-propanone
and South America. In addition, packages (P2P) method. In fact, the GOM has reported
containing ephedrine and pseudoephedrine are several seizures of phenylacetic acid, a chemical
commonly mislabeled as other items during used to produce the methamphetamine precursor
transit to avoid law enforcement inspection at air chemical P2P. Circumventing the chemical
and seaports in Mexico. Methamphetamine control laws in Mexico has enabled an upsurge in
producers in Mexico also have begun importing methamphetamine production in Mexico and
34
2006 3977
2007 3096
2008 3931
2009 4571
Product No. 2010-Q0317-001 National Drug Intelligence Center
5,000 4,571
3,977 3,931
4,000
3,096
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Source: National Seizure System.
increased the flow of methamphetamine into the especially in the Southeast Region; however,
United States as evidenced by methamphetamine methamphetamine superlabs14 in California
seizures at or between POEs along the U.S.– also increased in scale and number during the
Mexico border (see Figure 12 on page 34). same period. The increase in domestic meth-
amphetamine production in 2008 and 2009
When methamphetamine production in Mex- was fueled primarily by individuals and crimi-
ico was disrupted in 2007 and 2008, produc- nal groups that organized pseudoephedrine
tion in the United States increased as users and smurfing15 operations to acquire large amounts
distributors compensated for the reduced foreign of the chemical.
supply. However, even as production in Mexico
increased in 2009, production in the United 14. Superlabs are laboratories capable of producing 10 or more
States showed no decline. In fact, U.S. metham- pounds of methamphetamine in a single production cycle.
phetamine laboratory seizures in 2009 exceeded 15. Smurfing is a method used by some methamphetamine
and precursor chemical traffickers to acquire large quan-
seizures in 2008 (see Figure 13). tities of pseudoephedrine. Individuals purchase pseu-
doephedrine in quantities at or below legal thresholds
The increase in domestic production was from multiple retail locations. Traffickers often enlist the
realized primarily in small-scale methamphet- assistance of several associates in smurfing operations to
amine laboratories throughout the country, increase the speed with which chemicals are acquired.
35
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
36
2004 10400.0
2005 10100.0
2006 15500.0
2007 15800.0
Product No. 2010-Q0317-001
2008 21500.0 National Drug Intelligence Center
25,000
21,500
20,000
15,500 15,800
13,500
15,000
10,400 10,100
10,000
2005 1034102
2006
5,000 1146687
2007 1472536
2008 0 1253054
2009* 1489673
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Significant quantities of cannabis are culti- 1,013,088 plants in 2004 to 4,043,231 plants
vated on public lands, particularly by Mexi- in 2008. Public lands are often used for can-
can DTOs and criminal groups, as evidenced nabis cultivation because DTOs benefit from
by high and increasing eradication figures. the remote locations that seemingly limit the
Over the past 5 years, more than 11 mil- chance of detection and allow them to main-
lion marijuana plants (see Table 5 on page tain such activities without ownership of any
38) have been eradicated from federal public land that can be seized by law enforcement
lands—the majority were eradicated from or traced back to a participating member.
public lands in western states. In addition, The increased prevalence of these grow sites
the number of plants eradicated from these on publicly accessible lands has resulted in
lands increased more than 300 percent from numerous armed confrontations with hikers,
37
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
hunters, and passersby unwittingly entering outdoor eradication. However, some groups—
active cultivation sites. particularly Asian groups—have established
large-scale operations in, or shifted operations
More growers are establishing indoor to, the United States to avoid seizure of the
grow sites to produce better marijuana and shipments at the Canadian border and to attain
avoid outdoor detection and eradication. better access to drug markets. In addition to
Indoor cannabis cultivation that allows for in- the increased sense of security that indoor sites
creased security and potentially higher-quality provide, cultivators benefit from year-round
marijuana has become more popular—particu- production and controlled environmental condi-
larly with Caucasian independents and criminal tions such as lighting and nutrients. Controlling
groups—with the proliferation of coordinated these factors allows for increased growth and
outdoor eradication efforts nationwide (see maturation times, as well as potentially higher-
Table 4 and Table 5). Law enforcement at- quality marijuana that can command a much
tributes the increased interest in cultivating higher price.
indoors partially to the heightened levels of
38
Product No. 2010-Q0317-001 National Drug Intelligence Center
Asian traffickers are operating an increasing number of indoor grow sites. Some U.S.-based
and Canada-based Asian groups (primarily ethnic Vietnamese and Chinese) engage in large-
scale indoor cultivation, operating multithousand plant sites, predominantly in the Pacific
Northwest and throughout much of California. Within the past decade, these tight-knit and of-
ten family-oriented groups have expanded their network throughout the country to numerous
states, including Texas and several New England states, to avoid law enforcement detection
and to gain better access to drug markets.
Cuban traffickers are the primary operators of indoor marijuana grow sites in the Southeast
Region. Cuban-operated indoor sites are of a smaller scale than Asian-operated grows. Can-
nabis cultivation sites operated by Cuban traffickers are most prevalent in southern Florida,
but such activity has expanded northward into northern Florida, Georgia, and North Carolina
to move operations closer to potential drug markets. Cuban immigrants are often exploited by
DTOs and criminal groups to cultivate high-potency cannabis at these indoor sites, and the
problem appears to be growing. Law enforcement reporting and eradication data indicate an
increase in the seizure of indoor cannabis grow operations that cultivate high-potency mari-
juana, and the number of indoor grow sites seized in Florida rose each year between 2004
(246 sites) and 2008 (1,022 sites). (See Table 6.)
Table 6. Number of Indoor Grow Sites and Plants Eradicated in Florida, 2004–2008
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Grow Sites 246 384 480 944 1,022
Plants 21,879 45,217 36,172 74,698 78,489
Source: Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression Program.
39
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
15,000
13,004
10,000
5,000
0
2005 2006 2007 2008
Source: National Forensic Laboratory Information System Annual Reports.
40
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009*
MDMA 3,424,844 2,507,577 1,715,153 4,399,014 2,167,238
MDMA seizures along the Southwest Bor- American and Hispanic users. Asian DTOs
der and through commercial air have also have begun distributing MDMA to African
increased, albeit on a much smaller scale. American and Hispanic street gangs, which
Seizures at or near the Southwest Border show distribute the drug along with other illicit
an increase from 114,286 dosage units in 2006 drugs in markets throughout the United States,
to 387,143 dosage units in 2009. Furthermore, most notably in the Southeast, Southwest, and
commercial air seizures spiked in 2008, with Great Lakes Regions. Moreover, MDMA is no
a 91.4 percent increase from 2007 to 2008 longer exclusively viewed as a “rave” or club
(433,571 dosage units to 829,857 dosage units); drug, which also aids distributors in selling it
MDMA commercial air seizure totals for 2009 to nontraditional abusers.
decreased, resulting in levels comparable to
2007 levels.
Ready availability of MDMA has enabled
distributors to expand their customer base to
include new user groups, most notably African
41
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
42
2001 3994.0
2002 5547.0
2003 6524.0
2004 7547.0
Product No. 2010-Q0317-001 National Drug Intelligence Center
2005 8541.0
2006 11001.0
Figure 18. Number of Reported Unintentional Poisoning Deaths With
Mention of Opioid Analgesics, 2001–2006
12,000
11,001
10,000
8,541
7,547
8,000
6,524
5,547
6,000
3,994
4,000
2,000
2005 3.9
2006 0 3.9
2007 4.6
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
2008 8.1
2009
Source: 9.8 Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics.
Centers for Disease
Figure 19. Percentage of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies Reporting
CPDs as Their Greatest Drug Threat, 2005–2009
12.0
9.8
10.0
8.1
8.0
6.0
4.6
3.9 3.9
4.0
2.0
0.0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
A higher percentage of law enforcement enforcement officers base their assessment of the
agencies in all nine OCDETF regions respond- threat on several factors, two of which are
ing to the NDTS 2009 reported diverted pharma- diversion- and abuse-related crime rates and
ceuticals as their greatest drug threat in 2009 gang involvement in drug distribution. For both
than they did in 2008 (see Figure 19). Law of these factors, a higher percentage of agencies
43
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
25 25 2008 2009
25
22
20
20
16 17
15
13
10 9 10
10
6 6 7
6
5 4
3
2 1
0
reported an increase in 2009 (see Table 7). The Nonmedical personnel, primarily investors, are
percentage of agencies reporting that pharma- operating numerous purported pain clinics23 in
ceutical diversion and abuse contribute to other Broward and Palm Beach Counties, Florida. A
crime in their areas trended upward in seven of Florida grand jury found that from 2007 through
the nine OCDETF regions in 2009 (see Figure 2009, the number of pain clinics in those coun-
20). The percentage of agencies reporting street ties grew from 4 to 115, and in one 6-month
gang involvement in pharmaceutical distribution span, these pain clinic doctors dispensed more
also trended upward in six of the nine OCDETF than 9 million tablets of oxycodone. The grand
regions in 2009 (see Figure 21 on page 45). jury also found that the Broward and Palm Beach
Unscrupulous pain clinic physicians in 23. DEA investigations indicate that dubious pain clinics
Florida dispense or prescribe large quantities have unique characteristics, some of which include the
ability to quickly relocate, vague or misleading owner-
of prescription opioids to dealers and abusers ship records, form nearly exclusive association with
and are a source of supply for opioids distrib- specific pharmacies, use specific physicians, cash-based
uted in numerous states that have PDMPs. payment methods, and rapid examinations.
44
Pacific 45 58 45% 58%
Southeast 52 54 52% 54%
Southwest 53 58 53% 58%
West Central 41 43 41% 43%
Product No. 2010-Q0317-001 National Drug Intelligence Center
Figure 21. Percentage of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies Reporting
Street Gang Involvement in Pharmaceutical Distribution, by OCDETF Region, 2008–2009
70
2008 2009 58
58
60
55 55 54 53
52
50
44 46 45 45 43
41 40 41
40
35 35
28
30
20
10
County clinics attract drug seekers from Ken- limited what regulators could do with regard
tucky, Ohio, Tennessee, and West Virginia. to closing clinics or disciplining investors. For
example, the Department of Health regulated
Unscrupulous physicians—some with healthcare professionals but not facilities; the
criminal records—employed at Florida clinics Agency for Health Care Administration
supply the constant demand for prescription provided oversight on clinics that accept
opioids among distributors and abusers in insurance, but illegal clinics usually accept
Florida as well as among individuals from only cash. Enacted in July 2009, Florida’s new
states in the Great Lakes, Mid-Atlantic, New law establishing a PDMP requires that pain
England, and Southeast OCDETF Regions, management clinics register with the Depart-
where operational PDMPs have made acquir- ment of Health. Moreover, under the law, the
ing CPDs more difficult. These physicians state medical and osteopathic medicine boards
dispense or prescribe large quantities of must set standards of practice for all physi-
prescription opioids to customers who have no cians and osteopaths who prescribe controlled
legitimate need for the drugs; the physicians substances from those clinics.
usually charge an up-front fee for this service
and accept only cash payments. Florida law
45
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
The manager of two Florida pain management clinics and three prescribing physicians were
sentenced in April 2009 for their roles in a prescription drug conspiracy. The manager was
sentenced to 240 months in prison; one physician was sentenced to 30 months in prison, and
the other two were sentenced to 72 months in prison. The manager of the clinic and the three
physicians had purported to provide pain management treatment for chronic pain patients;
however, they engaged in a conspiracy to unlawfully dispense hundreds of thousands of
controlled pain medications, including OxyContin, Dilaudid, Roxicodone, oxycodone, Lortab,
methadone, and others in exchange for cash fees for office visits. The manager was also
convicted of possessing, carrying, and using a firearm in the furtherance of the conspiracy.
Federal law enforcement authorities in November 2009 dismantled a Florida trafficking ring
that had sent more than 190,000 oxycodone tablets from South Florida pain clinics to abus-
ers in Kentucky, North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia. At least 20 people
were indicted on distribution charges; the ring had allegedly operated for 3 years and used at
least four or five clinic doctors per day to obtain the drugs. Members of the ring shipped thou-
sands of pills per day by vehicle or overnight delivery services and allegedly made at least $5
million over the 3 years.
Kentucky State Police detectives and troopers along with FBI agents, armed with 518 felony
arrest warrants, conducted a drug roundup in October 2009 that stemmed from Operation
Flamingo Road. This investigation targeted Kentucky drug traffickers in at least 33 counties who
had traveled to South Florida to obtain CPDs from pain clinic doctors and returned to Kentucky
to distribute the drugs. Penalties for felony charges of trafficking in controlled substances range
from 18 months to 20 years in prison.
46
Product No. 2010-Q0317-001 National Drug Intelligence Center
47
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
48
Product No. 2010-Q0317-001 National Drug Intelligence Center
a direct relationship with the ultimate receiv- This money laundering vulnerability has been
ing bank (a situation that occurs frequently, eliminated by the new SWIFT Message Format,
especially in international transfers), banks called MT 202 COV, which took effect Novem-
may use either cover payments26 or serial ber 21, 2009. The new format retains both origi-
payments27 to send the money through one or nator and beneficiary information on all transfers
more intermediate banks.28 made through intermediary banks, allowing
intermediary banks to better investigate or block
In cases where cover payments are used, two suspicious transactions.
separate SWIFT message instructions are sent.
The first set of instructions, called MT 103, The recent acquisition of a banking license
contains all of the originating customer and by a virtual world company (online role-
ultimate beneficiary information, but is seen playing game) offers drug money launder-
only by the originating bank and the benefi- ers the ability to access the global financial
ciary bank. A second message, the MT 202, is system anonymously; however, large-scale
sent to the intermediary banks. Previously, the use of virtual world banks to launder drug
SWIFT MT 202 messages that accompanied money is unlikely, since launderers remain
cover payments between intermediary banks encumbered by placement of drug proceeds.
did not retain originator and beneficiary ac-
count information. In March 2009, a virtual world company
(see text box on page 50) received a license
This lack of information allowed money from the Swedish Financial Authority to con-
launderers to disguise their identity by send- duct banking activities. This license enables
ing wire transfers through intermediary banks. the game’s virtual economy to interact with
When a SWIFT 202 was used, only the origi- and carry out the functions of real-world
nating and beneficiary bank, which could be banks, such as offering interest-bearing sav-
foreign-based banks, could see the originator ings, Automated Clearing House (ACH)
and beneficiary information. The intermediary transactions, and lending.29 The ability to
banks, which would typically be U.S. banks, anonymously access the international finan-
would not know this information. cial system through this virtual world’s bank
creates a money laundering threat, particularly
because rigorous know-your-customer pro-
cedures will be difficult to enforce. In virtual
environments, role-playing games are built
around the premise of players pretending to be
other people. Establishing the actual identity
of players will be very challenging for finan-
26. The cover payment method divides the message into cial institutions and law enforcement.
two parts. Detailed funds-transfer instructions are sent
directly to the beneficiary’s bank via a SWIFT MT 103,
while a second message, the SWIFT 202, is sent through
all intermediary banks.
29. In the past, other virtual worlds have included “virtual
27. Using serial payments, one financial institution trans- banks,” but these functioned only as an element of the game
mits the funds-transfer instructions via a SWIFT MT and were not part of the real-world financial system. Prior
103 message to the intermediary bank. Each institution to the issuance of this banking license, players of this virtual
involved in this process receives the same level of detail world could exchange real money for the virtual currency
about the transaction at each step. used in the game. Players could also earn money in the game
28. Intermediary banks, also called correspondent banks, by buying and selling objects or completing tasks such as
allow banks to do business with each other if they do not hunting and mining. Earned virtual currency could be cashed
have a direct relationship. out of the game at a fixed exchange rate to the U.S. dollar.
49
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
50
Product No. 2010-Q0317-001 National Drug Intelligence Center
51
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
At the federal level, several bills (HR 1191 and companion SB 1336, and HR 1359 and companion SB
1292) were introduced in the House of Representatives in 2009 to amend the CSA. HR 1191 provides
for disposal of CPDs through state take-back programs, while HR 1359 permits the consumer to deliver
drugs for disposal. HR 1191 also recommended amending the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to prohibit
product labeling that proposed flushing of unused prescription drugs. Both bills were referred to the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce and the House Committee on the Judiciary in 2009. DOJ
has endorsed HR 1359 and SB 1292, since they afford the most flexibility.
At the state level, legislators in Florida, Maine, Minnesota, Oregon, and Washington introduced bills in
2009 that would require drug manufacturers to operate and pay for systems that facilitate the collection,
transportation, and disposal of leftover prescription drugs. In California, a senate bill was being consid-
ered in 2009 that would require the state’s Board of Pharmacy to work with other state agencies, local
governments, drug manufacturers, and pharmacies to develop sustainable programs to manage the
disposal of prescription drugs.
a. The CSA defines an “ultimate user” as a person who obtains a drug legally and possesses it for his or her own use, for a family
member’s use, or for use in an animal in the household.
52
Product No. 2010-Q0317-001 National Drug Intelligence Center
bulk cash quickly through stash houses. How- heroin and marijuana production in Mexico
ever, a dedicated investigative team capable of and greatly reduced efforts to eradicate drug
developing and exploiting organizational crops in that country. The production esti-
intelligence in each of the leading bulk cash mates are supported by Southwest Border drug
consolidation cities could result in significant seizure data showing sharp increases in heroin
bulk cash seizures in those cities. Moreover, and marijuana seizures in 2009. Southwest
enhanced interdiction efforts and rigorous Border seizure data also indicate that metham-
outbound inspections of vehicles leaving the phetamine production has increased sharply in
United States would very likely result in a Mexico as well because of traffickers’ ability
sharp increase in bulk cash seizures. to circumvent precursor chemical restrictions
and employ alternative production methods
Outlook despite strong GOM restrictions on ephedrine
and pseudoephedrine imports. Only cocaine
The growing strength and organization of production estimates show decreasing produc-
criminal gangs, including their growing alli- tion in Colombia, and that trend is reflected
ances with large Mexican DTOs, has changed in availability data, including cocaine seizure
the nature of midlevel and retail drug distri- data, which show relatively low availability of
bution in many local drug markets, even in the drug.
suburban and rural areas. As a result, disrupt- The increased enforcement against illegal
ing illicit drug availability and distribution pain clinics and the growing number of
will become increasingly difficult for state and PDMPs will increasingly disrupt the supply of
local law enforcement agencies. In many of CPDs to prescription opioid users who typi-
these markets, local independent dealers can cally acquire these drugs through doctor-
no longer compete with national-level gangs shopping and from unscrupulous physicians.
that can undersell local drug distributors. Many users will seek CPDs from other sourc-
Previously, state and local law enforcement es, including pharmacy robberies. The number
agencies could disrupt drug availability in of pharmacy armed robberies has increased
their areas, at least temporarily, by investigat- over the past 5 years, and in many states,
ing and dismantling local distribution groups. laws are not sufficient to deter such crimes.
But well-organized criminal gangs are able to Other prescription opioid users will increas-
maintain a stronger, more stable drug supply ingly switch to heroin because, according to
to local markets and to quickly replace distrib- reporting from law enforcement and treatment
utors when individual gang members or entire providers, in many instances heroin is less
distribution cells are arrested. Significantly expensive than diverted prescription opioids.
disrupting drug distribution in smaller drug
markets will increasingly require large-scale
multijurisdictional investigations, most likely
necessitating federal law enforcement support.
Without a significant increase in drug inter-
diction, seizures, arrests, and investigations
that apply sustained pressure on major DTOs,
availability of most drugs will increase in
2010, primarily because drug production in
Mexico is increasing. The most recent drug
production estimates show sharp increases in
53
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
54
Product No. 2010-Q0317-001 National Drug Intelligence Center
Appendix A: Maps
Map A1. Nine OCDETF Regions
55
Map A2. Drug Distribution by Select DTOs, by HIDTA Region*
"
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Milwaukee
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National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
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Product No. 2010-Q0317-001
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VI
58
Number of
Gang Members
10,001 or More
3,501-10,000
2,501-3,500
501-2,500
1-500
0
No Reporting
Source: Federal, state, and local law
enforcement reporting January 1, 2006,
through April 8, 2008.
Map A5. 2009 Greatest Drug Threat by Region, as Reported by State and Local Agencies
Pacific
% % % % %
.6 .2 0.8 6.2 3.9
West Central 29 39 1 1
Product No. 2010-Q0317-001
New
Great Lakes England
% % % % %
.6 .8 0.0 3.0 8.0
40 27 2
Mid-Atlantic
New York /
New Jersey
5% 3% 5% 7% 2% % % % % %
% % % % % .8 .8 .0 .7 .7
5. 1. 79. 5. 7. .3 4.8 0.3 7.9 7.3 38 16 15 15 12
19 6
% % % 5% 3%
.0 .9 .0 . .
40 30 2 14 12
59
g s
ru
D
Southwest n
tio
Southeast nei rip
esc
am P r
h et
n e m
p na lled
a o
ai oin ha iju tr
oc er et ar on
% % % % % C H M M C
% % % % % .2 1.1 2.8 5.3 9.6
.8 .6 .0 .0 3.2 60 2
23 2 57 12
Pacific
Florida / Caribbean
Source: National Drug
% % 2% 4% 9% Intelligence Center's
.1 .4 . 9. 7. National Drug Threat
62 0 10 1 Survey 2009.
National Drug Intelligence Center
Map A6. 2009 Greatest Drug Threat, as Reported by State and Local Agencies
36.9%
27.6%
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
12.9% 12.1%
9.8%
60
Cocaine Heroin Methamphetamine Marijuana Controlled Prescription
Drugs
Appendix B: Tables
Table B1. Trends in Percentage of Past Year Drug Use, 2004–2008
Drug 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Cocaine (any form)
Individuals (12 and older) 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.3 2.1
Adolescents (12-17) 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.2
Adults (18-25) 6.6 6.9 6.9 6.4 5.5
Adults (26 and older) 1.7 1.5 1.8 1.7 1.6
Crack
Individuals (12 and older) 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4
Adolescents (12-17) 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.1
Adults (18-25) 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.6
Adults (26 and older) 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.4
Heroin
Individuals (12 and older) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2
Adolescents (12-17) 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Adults (18-25) 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4
Adults (26 and older) 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1
Marijuana
Individuals (12 and older) 10.6 10.4 10.3 10.1 10.3
Adolescents (12-17) 14.5 13.3 13.2 12.5 13.0
Adults (18-25) 27.8 28.0 28.0 27.5 27.6
Adults (26 and older) 7.0 6.9 6.8 6.8 7.0
Methamphetamine
Individuals (12 and older) 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.3
Adolescents (12-17) 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.4
Adults (18-25) 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.2 0.8
Adults (26 and older) 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.3
Prescription Narcotics
Individuals (12 and older) 4.7 4.9 5.1 5.0 4.8
Adolescents (12-17) 7.4 6.9 7.2 6.7 6.5
Adults (18-25) 11.9 12.4 12.4 12.1 12.0
Adults (26 and older) 3.0 3.3 3.6 3.6 3.3
LSD
Individuals (12 and older) 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
Adolescents (12-17) 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.7
Adults (18-25) 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.5
Adults (26 and older) 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
61
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
(Table continued from previous page.)
62
Product No. 2010-Q0317-001 National Drug Intelligence Center
Table B3. Drugs Distribution in the United States, by DTOs and OCDETF Region
OCDETF/DTO Mexican Asian Colombian Dominican Cuban
Florida/ Cocaine
Cocaine Cocaine
Caribbean Heroin Marijuana Cocaine
Heroin Heroin
Marijuana MDMA Heroin
Marijuana Marijuana
Methamphetamine
Cocaine Cocaine
Heroin Heroin Cocaine Cocaine
Great Lakes —
Marijuana Marijuana Heroin Heroin
Methamphetamine MDMA
Cocaine
Cocaine
Heroin Marijuana Cocaine
Mid-Atlantic Heroin —
Marijuana MDMA Heroin
Marijuana
Methamphetamine
Cocaine
Marijuana Cocaine Cocaine
Heroin
New England MDMA Heroin Heroin —
Marijuana
Methamphetamine Marijuana Marijuana
Methamphetamine
Cocaine
Cocaine
Heroin Heroin Cocaine
New York/ Heroin
Marijuana Marijuana Heroin —
New Jersey Marijuana
MDMA MDMA Marijuana
MDMA
Methamphetamine
Cocaine
Marijuana
Heroin
Pacific MDMA — — —
Marijuana
Methamphetamine
Methamphetamine
Cocaine
Heroin Marijuana Cocaine
Southeast — Marijuana
Marijuana MDMA Marijuana
Methamphetamine
Cocaine Cocaine Cocaine
Cocaine
Heroin Marijuana Heroin
Southwest Cocaine Marijuana
Marijuana MDMA Marijuana
Methamphetamine
Methamphetamine Methamphetamine Methamphetamine
Cocaine
Heroin Marijuana
West Central — — —
Marijuana MDMA
Methamphetamine
Source: Federal, state, and local law enforcement reporting.
63
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
64
Product No. 2010-Q0317-001 National Drug Intelligence Center
(Table continued from previous page.)
65
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
66
Product No. 2010-Q0317-001 National Drug Intelligence Center
(Table continued from previous page.)
67
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
68
Product No. 2010-Q0317-001 National Drug Intelligence Center
69
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
70
Product No. 2010-Q0317-001 National Drug Intelligence Center
Sources
Numerous state and local law enforcement agencies throughout the United States provided
valuable input to this report through their participation in the NDTS and interviews with NDIC
FIOs. These agencies are too numerous to thank individually.
71
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
72
Product No. 2010-Q0317-001 National Drug Intelligence Center
Chicago Division
Cocaine Program
Dallas Division
Denver Division
Detroit Division
Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression Program
Domestic Monitor Program
El Paso Division
El Paso Intelligence Center
National Seizure System
Federal-Wide Drug Seizure System
Heroin Domestic Monitor Program
Heroin Signature Program
Houston Division
Los Angeles Division
Miami Division
National Forensic Laboratory Information System
Newark Division
New Orleans Division
New York Division
Office of Diversion Control
Philadelphia Division
Phoenix Division
San Diego Division
San Francisco Division
Seattle Division
Special Operations Division
St. Louis Division
System to Retrieve Information From Drug Evidence
Washington, D.C., Division
Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys
U.S. Attorneys Offices
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Albany Field Office
Albuquerque Field Office
Anchorage Field Office
Atlanta Field Office
Baltimore Field Office
Birmingham Field Office
Boston Field Office
Buffalo Field Office
Charlotte Field Office
Chicago Field Office
Cincinnati Field Office
Cleveland Field Office
73
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
74
Product No. 2010-Q0317-001 National Drug Intelligence Center
75
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010
76
Cover Photo © PhotoDisc
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
NATIONAL DRUG INTELLIGENCE CENTER
National
Drug Threat
Assessment
2010
Questions and comments may be directed to
National Drug Threat Assessment Unit, National Threat Analysis Branch
National Drug Intelligence Center
319 Washington Street 5th Floor, Johnstown, PA 15901-1622 • (814) 532-4601
NDIC publications are available on the following web sites:
INTERNET www.usdoj.gov/ndic ADNET http://ndicosa.adnet.sgov.gov RISS ndic.riss.net
LEO https://www.leo.gov/http://leowcs.leopriv.gov/lesig/ndic/index.htm
062210